[House Prints 110-B]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
110th Congress Committee
2nd Session COMMITTEE PRINT Print 110-B
_______________________________________________________________________
COMPILATION
of
HOMELAND SECURITY
PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES (HSPD)
(Updated through December 31, 2007)
__________
Prepared for the use of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
of the
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
JANUARY 2008
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
39-618 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2008
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts Lamar Smith, Texas
Norman D. Dicks, Washington Christopher Shays, Connecticut
Jane Harman, California Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Tom Davis, Virginia
Nita M. Lowey, New York Daniel E. Lungren, California
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Mike Rogers, Alabama
Columbia Bobby Jindal, Louisiana
Zoe Lofgren, California Dave G. Reichert, Washington
Donna M. Christensen, Virgin Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Islands Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Bob Etheridge, North Carolina Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Henry Cuellar, Texas David Davis, Tennessee
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Al Green, Texas
Ed Perlmutter, Colorado
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
(II)
C O N T E N T S
Homeland Security Presidential Directives
1. Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security
Council.................................................... 1
2. Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies......... 5
3. Homeland Security Advisory System........................ 9
4. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.. 15
5. Management of Domestic Incidents......................... 23
6. IIntegration and Use of Screening Information to Protect
Against Terrorism.......................................... 31
7. Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization,
and Protection............................................. 33
8. National Preparedness.................................... 43
9. Defense of United States Agriculture and Food............ 51
10. Biodefense for the 21st Century.......................... 57
11. Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures..... 67
12. IPolicy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal
Employees and Contractors.................................. 71
13. Maritime Security Policy................................. 73
14. Domestic Nuclear Detection............................... 81
15. (Classified - Not Available)........................... 85
16. National Strategy for Aviation Security.................. 87
17. (Classified - Not Available)........................... 115
18. Medical Countermeasures Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction................................................ 117
19. Combating Terrorism Use of Explosives in the United
States..................................................... 127
20. National Continuity Policy............................... 133
21. Public Health and Medical Preparedness................... 141
(III)
Homeland Security Presidential Directive--1
Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council
----------
A. Homeland Security Council
Securing Americans from terrorist threats or
attacks is a critical national security function. It
requires extensive coordination across a broad spectrum
of Federal, State, and local agencies to reduce the
potential for terrorist attacks and to mitigate damage
should such an attack occur. The Homeland Security
Council (HSC) shall ensure coordination of all homeland
security-related activities among executive departments
and agencies and promote the effective development and
implementation of all homeland security policies.
B. The Homeland Security Council Principals Committee
The HSC Principals Committee (HSC/PC) shall be the
senior interagency forum under the HSC for homeland
security issues. The HSC/PC is composed of the
following members: the Secretary of the Treasury; the
Secretary of Defense; the Attorney General; the
Secretary of Health and Human Services; the Secretary
of Transportation; the Director of the Office
Management and Budget; the Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security (who serves as Chairman); the
Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff; the
Director of CentralIntelligence; the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Director of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency; and the Assistant
to the President and Chief of Staff to the Vice
President. The Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs shall be invited to attend all
meetings of the HSC/PC. The following people shall be
invited to HSC/PC meetings when issues pertaining to
their responsibilities and expertise are discussed: the
Secretary of State; the Secretary of the Interior; the
Secretary of Agriculture; the Secretary of Commerce;
the Secretary of Labor; the Secretary of Energy; the
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency; and the Deputy
National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism. The
Counsel to the President shall be consulted regarding
the agenda of HSC/PC meetings and shall attend any
meeting when, in consultation with the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security, the Counsel deems it
appropriate. The Deputy Director of the Office of
Homeland Security shall serve as Executive Secretary of
the HSC/PC. Other heads of departments and agencies and
senior officials shall be invited, when appropriate.
The HSC/PC shall meet at the call of the Assistant
to the President for Homeland Security, in consultation
with the regular attendees of the HSC/PC. The Assistant
to the President for Homeland Security shall determine
the agenda, in consultation with the regular attendees,
and shall ensure that all necessary papers are
prepared. When global terrorism with domestic
implications is on the agenda of the HSC/PC, the
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs shall perform these tasks in concert.
C. Homeland Security Council Deputies Committee
The HSC Deputies Committee (HSC/DC) shall serve as
the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for
consideration of policy issues affecting homeland
security. The HSC/DC can task and review the work of
the HSC interagency groups discussed below. The HSC/DC
shall help ensure that issues brought before the HSC/PC
or the HSC have been properly analyzed and prepared for
action. The HSC/DC shall have the following as its
regular members: the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury;
the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Deputy Attorney
General; the Deputy Secretary of Health and Human
Services; the Deputy Secretary of Transportation; the
Deputy Director of the Office of Homeland Security (who
serves as Chairman); the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence; the Deputy Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation; the Deputy Director of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency; the Deputy Director of the
Office of Management and Budget; and the Assistant to
the President and Chief of Staff to the Vice President.
The Assistant to the President and Deputy National
Security Advisor shall be invited to attend all
meetings of the HSC/DC. The following people shall be
invited to attend when issues pertaining to their
responsibilities and expertise are to be discussed: the
Deputy Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of the
Interior; the Deputy Secretary of Agriculture; the
Deputy Secretary of Commerce; the Deputy Secretary of
Labor; the Deputy Secretary of Energy; the Deputy
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; the Deputy Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency; the Deputy
National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism; and
the Special Advisor to the President for Cyber-space
Security. The Executive Secretary of the Office of
Homeland Security shall serve as Executive Secretary of
the HSC/DC. Other senior officials shall be invited,
when appropriate.
The HSC/DC shall meet at the call of its Chairman.
Any regular member of the HSC/DC may request a meeting
of the HSC/DC for prompt crisis management. For all
meetings, the Chairman shall determine the agenda, in
consultation with the regular members, and shall ensure
that necessary papers are prepared.
D. Homeland Security Council Policy Coordination Committees
HSC Policy Coordination Committees (HSC/PCCs) shall
coordinate the development and implementation of
homeland security policies by multiple departments and
agencies throughout the Federal government, and shall
coordinate those policies with State and local
government. The HSC/PCCs shall be the main day-to-day
fora for interagency coordination of homeland security
policy. They shall provide policy analysis for
consideration by the more senior committees of the HSC
system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by
the President. Each HSC/PCC shall include
representatives from the executive departments,
offices, and agencies represented in the HSC/DC.
Eleven HSC/PCCs are hereby established for the
following functional areas, each to be chaired by the
designated Senior Director from the Office of Homeland
Security:
1. Detection, Surveillance, and
Intelligence (by the Senior Director,
Intelligence and Detection);
2. Plans, Training, Exercises, and
Evaluation (by the Senior Director, Policy
andPlans);
3. Law Enforcement and Investigation (by
the Senior Director, Intelligence and
Detection);
4. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Consequence Management (by the Senior Director,
Response and Recovery);
5. Key Asset, Border, Territorial
Waters, and Airspace Security (by the Senior
Director, Protection and Prevention);
6. Domestic Transportation Security (by
the Senior Director, Protection and
Prevention);
7. Research and Development (by the
Senior Director, Research and Development);
8. Medical and Public Health
Preparedness (by the Senior Director,
Protection and Prevention);
9. Domestic Threat Response and Incident
Management (by the Senior Director, Response
and Recovery);
10. Economic Consequences (by the Senior
Director, Response and Recovery); and
11. Public Affairs (by the Senior
Director, Communications).
Each HSC/PCC shall also have an Executive
Secretary to be designated by the Assistant to
the President for Homeland Security (from the
staff of the HSC). The Executive Secretary of
each HSC/PCC shall assist his or her Chair in
scheduling the meetings of the HSC/PCC,
determining the agenda, recording the actions
taken and tasks assigned, and ensuring timely
responses to the central policy-making
committees of the HSC system. The Chairman of
each HSC/PCC, in consultation with its
Executive Secretary, may invite representatives
of other executive departments and agencies to
attend meetings of the HSC/PCC, when
appropriate.
The Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security, at the direction of the President and
in consultation with the Vice President, the
Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, the
Secretary of Transportation, and the Director
of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, may
establish additional HSC/PCCs, as appropriate.
The Chairman of each HSC/PCC, with the
agreement of its Executive Secretary, may
establish subordinate working groups to assist
the PCC in the performance of its duties.
The Vice President may attend any and all
meetings of any entity established by or under
this directive.
This directive shall be construed in a
manner consistent with Executive Order 13228.
GEORGE W. BUSH
Homeland Security Presidential Directive--2
Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies
(As amended by HSPD--5)
----------
A. National Policy
The United States has a long and valued tradition
of welcoming immigrants and visitors. But the attacks
of September 11, 2001, showed that some come to the
United States to commit terrorist acts, to raise funds
for illegal terrorist activities, or to provide other
support for terrorist operations, here and abroad. It
is the policy of the United States to work aggressively
to prevent aliens who engage in or support terrorist
activity from entering the United States and to detain,
prosecute, or deport any such aliens who are within the
United States.
1. Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force
By November 1, 2001, the Attorney General shall
create the Foreign Terrorist TrackingTask Force (Task
Force), with assistance from the Secretary of State,
the Director of Central Intelligence and other officers
of the government, as appropriate. The Task Force shall
ensure that, to the maximum extent permitted by law,
Federal agencies coordinate programs to accomplish the
following: 1) deny entry into the United States of
aliens associated with, suspected of being engaged in,
or supporting terrorist activity; and 2) locate,
detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens already
present in the United States. The Attorney General
shall appoint a senior official as the full-time
Director of the Task Force. The Director shall report
to the Deputy Attorney General, serve as a Senior
Advisor to the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security, and maintain direct liaison with the
[Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS)] the Department of Homeland Security on
issues related to immigration and the foreign terrorist
presence in the United States. The Director shall also
consult with the Assistant Secretary of State for
Consular Affairs on issues related to visa matters.
The Task Force shall be staffed by expert personnel
from the Department of State, the INS, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, the
Customs Service, the Intelligence Community, military
support components, and other Federal agencies as
appropriate to accomplish the Task Force's mission.
The Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, and the Director of Central Intelligence
shall ensure, to the maximum extent permitted by law,
that the Task Force has access to all available
information necessary to perform its mission, and they
shall request information from State and local
governments, where appropriate.
With the concurrence of the Attorney General, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of
Central Intelligence, foreign liaison officers from
cooperating countries shall be invited to serve as
liaisons to the Task Force, where appropriate, to
expedite investigation and data sharing.
Other Federal entities, such as the Migrant
Smuggling and Trafficking in Persons Coordination
Center and the Foreign Leads Development Activity,
shall provide the Task Force with any relevant
information they possess concerning aliens suspected of
engaging in or supporting terrorist activity.
2. Enhanced INS and Customs Enforcement Capability
The Attorney General and the [Secretary of the
Treasury] Secretary of Homeland Security, assisted by
the Director of Central Intelligence, shall immediately
develop and implement multi-year plans to enhance the
investigative and intelligence analysis capabilities of
the [INS and the Customs Service] Department of
Homeland Security. The goal of this enhancement is to
increase significantly efforts to identify, locate,
detain, prosecute or deport aliens associated with,
suspected of being engaged in, or supporting terrorist
activity within the United States.
The new multi-year plans should significantly
increase the number of [Customs and INS] Department of
Homeland Security special agents assigned to Joint
Terrorism Task Forces, as deemed appropriate by the
Attorney General and the [Secretary of the Treasury]
Secretary of Homeland Security. These officers shall
constitute new positions over and above the existing
on-duty special agent forces of the [two agencies]
Department of Homeland Security.
3. Abuse of International Student Status
The United States benefits greatly from
international students who study in our country. The
United States Government shall continue to foster and
support international students. The Government shall
implement measures to end the abuse of student visas
and prohibit certain international students from
receiving education and training in sensitive areas,
including areas of study with direct application to the
development and use of weapons of mass destruction.
The Government shall also prohibit the education
and training of foreign nationals who would use such
training to harm the United States or its Allies.
The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, and the Attorney General, working in
conjunction with the Secretary of Education, the
Director of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
Energy, and any other departments or entities they deem
necessary, shall develop a program to accomplish this
goal. The program shall identify sensitive courses of
study, and shall include measures whereby the
Department of State, the Department of Homeland
Security, the Department of Justice, and United States
academic institutions, working together, can identify
problematic applicants for student visas and deny their
applications. The program shall provide for tracking
the status of a foreign student who receives a visa (to
include the proposed major course of study, the status
of the individual as a full-time student, the classes
in which the student enrolls, and the source of the
funds supporting the student's education). The program
shall develop guidelines that may include control
mechanisms, such as limited duration student
immigration status, and may implement strict criteria
for renewing such student immigration status.
The program shall include guidelines for exempting
students from countries or groups of countries from
this set of requirements.
In developing this new program of control, the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Education
shall consult with the academic community and other
interested parties. This new program shall be presented
through the Homeland Security Council to the President
within 60 days.
The [INS] Department of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Department of Education, shall
conduct periodic reviews of all institutions certified
to receive nonimmigrant students and exchange visitor
program students. These reviews shall include checks
for compliance with record keeping and reporting
requirements. Failure of institutions to comply may
result in the termination of the institution's approval
to receive such students.
4. North American Complementary Immigration Policies
The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Secretary of [the Treasury] Homeland Security and the
Attorney General, shall promptly initiate negotiations
with Canada and Mexico to assure maximum possible
compatibility of immigration, customs, and visa
policies. The goal of the negotiations shall be to
provide all involved countries the highest possible
level of assurance that only individuals seeking entry
for legitimate purposes enter any of the countries,
while at the same time minimizing border restrictions
that hinder legitimate trans-border commerce.
As part of this effort, the Secretaries of State
and [the Treasury] Homeland Security and the Attorney
General shall seek to substantially increase sharing of
immigration and customs information. They shall also
seek to establish a shared immigration and customs
control data-base with both countries. The Secretary of
State, the Secretary of [the Treasury] Homeland
Security, and the Attorney General shall explore
existing mechanisms to accomplish this goal and, to the
maximum extent possible, develop new methods to achieve
optimal effectiveness and relative transparency. To the
extent statutory provisions prevent such information
sharing, the Attorney General and the Secretaries of
State and [the Treasury]Homeland Security shall submit
to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
proposed remedial legislation.
5. Use of Advanced Technologies for Data Sharing and
Enforcement Efforts
The Director of the OSTP, in conjunction with the
Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
and the Director of Central Intelligence, shall make
recommendations about the use of advanced technology to
help enforce United States immigration laws, to
implement United States immigration programs, to
facilitate the rapid identification of aliens who are
suspected of engaging in or supporting terrorist
activity, to deny them access to the United States, and
to recommend ways in which existing government
databases can be best utilized to maximize the ability
of the government to detect, identify, locate, and
apprehend potential terrorists in the United States.
Databases from all appropriate Federal agencies, state
and local governments, and commercial databases should
be included in this review. The utility of advanced
data mining software should also be addressed. To the
extent that there may be legal barriers to such data
sharing, the Director of the OSTP shall submit to the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget
proposed legislative remedies. The study also should
make recommendations, propose timelines, and project
budgetary requirements.
The Director of the OSTP shall make these
recommendations to the President through the Homeland
Security Council within 60 days.
6. Budgetary Support
The Office of Management and Budget shall work
closely with the Attorney General, the Secretaries of
State and of the Treasury, the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security, and all other
appropriate agencies to review the budgetary support
and identify changes in legislation necessary for the
implementation of this directive and recommend
appropriate support for a multi-year program to provide
the United States a robust capability to prevent aliens
who engage in or support terrorist activity from
entering or remaining in the United States or the
smuggling of implements of terrorism into the United
States. The Director of the Office of Management and
Budget shall make an interim report through the
Homeland Security Council to the President on the
recommended program within 30 days, and shall make a
final report through the Homeland Security Council to
the President on the recommended program within 60
days.
GEORGE W. BUSH
Homeland Security Presidential Directive--3
Homeland Security Advisory System
(As amended by HSPD--5)
----------
Purpose
The Nation requires a Homeland Security Advisory
System to provide a comprehensive and effective means
to disseminate information regarding the risk of
terrorist acts to Federal, State, and local authorities
and to the American people. Such a system would provide
warnings in the form of a set of graduated ``Threat
Conditions'' that would increase as the risk of the
threat increases. At each Threat Condition, Federal
departments and agencies would implement a
corresponding set of ``Protective Measures'' to further
reduce vulnerability or increase response capability
during a period of heightened alert.
This system is intended to create a common
vocabulary, context, and structure for an ongoing
national discussion about the nature of the threats
that confront the homeland and the appropriate measures
that should be taken in response. It seeks to inform
and facilitate decisions appropriate to different
levels of government and to private citizens at home
and at work.
Homeland Security Advisory System
The Homeland Security Advisory System shall be
binding on the executive branch and suggested, although
voluntary, to other levels of government and the
private sector. There are five Threat Conditions, each
identified by a description and corresponding color.
From lowest to highest, the levels and colors are:
Low =Green;
Guarded = Blue;
Elevated = Yellow;
High = Orange;
Severe = Red.
The higher the Threat Condition, the greater the
risk of a terrorist attack. Risk includes both the
probability of an attack occurring and its potential
gravity. Threat Conditions shall be assigned by the
[Attorney General] Secretary of Homeland Security in
consultation with the Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security. [Except in exigent circumstances,
the Attorney General shall seek the views of the
appropriate Homeland Security Principals or their
subordinates, and other parties as appropriate, on the
Threat Condition to be assigned.] Except in exigent
circumstances, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall
seek the views of the Attorney General, and any other
federal agency heads the Secretary deems appropriate,
including other members of the Homeland Security
Council, on the Threat Condition to be assigned. Threat
Conditions may be assigned for the entire Nation, or
they may be set for a particular geographic area or
industrial sector. Assigned Threat Conditions shall be
reviewed at regular intervals to determine whether
adjustments are warranted.
For facilities, personnel, and operations inside
the territorial United States, all Federal departments,
agencies, and offices other than military facilities
shall conform their existing threat advisory systems to
this system and henceforth administer their systems
consistent with the determination of the Attorney
General with regard to the Threat Condition in effect.
The assignment of a Threat Condition shall prompt
the implementation of an appropriate set of Protective
Measures. Protective Measures are the specific steps an
organization shall take to reduce its vulnerability or
increase its ability to respond during a period of
heightened alert. The authority to craft and implement
Protective Measures rests with the Federal departments
and agencies. It is recognized that departments and
agencies may have several preplanned sets of responses
to a particular Threat Condition to facilitate a rapid,
appropriate, and tailored response. Department and
agency heads are responsible for developing their own
Protective Measures and other antiterrorism or self-
protection and continuity plans, and resourcing,
rehearsing, documenting, and maintaining these plans.
Likewise, they retain the authority to respond, as
necessary, to risks, threats, incidents, or events at
facilities within the specific jurisdiction of their
department or agency, and, as authorized by law, to
direct agencies and industries to implement their own
Protective Measures. They shall continue to be
responsible for taking all appropriate proactive steps
to reduce the vulnerability of their personnel and
facilities to terrorist attack. Federal department and
agency heads shall submit an annual written report to
the President, through the Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security, describing the steps they have
taken to develop and implement appropriate Protective
Measures for each Threat Condition. Governors, mayors,
and the leaders of other organizations are encouraged
to conduct a similar review of their organizations'
Protective Measures.
The decision whether to publicly announce Threat
Conditions shall be made on a case-by-case basis by the
Attorney General in consultation with the Assistant to
the President for Homeland Security. Every effort shall
be made to share as much information regarding the
threat as possible, consistent with the safety of the
Nation. The [Attorney General] Secretary of Homeland
Security shall ensure, consistent with the safety of
the Nation, that State and local government officials
and law enforcement authorities are provided the most
relevant and timely information. The [Attorney General]
Secretary of Homeland Security shall be responsible for
identifying any other information developed in the
threat assessment process that would be useful to State
and local officials and others and conveying it to them
as permitted consistent with the constraints of
classification. The [Attorney General] Secretary of
Homeland Security shall establish a process and a
system for conveying relevant information to Federal,
State, and local government officials, law enforcement
authorities, and the private sector expeditiously.
At the request of the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Department of Justice shall permit and
facilitate the use of delivery systems administered or
managed by the Department of Justice for the purposes
of delivering threat information pursuant to the
Homeland Security Advisory System.
The Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary
of Homeland Security and the Attorney General shall
ensure that a continuous and timely flow of integrated
threat assessments and reports is provided to the
President, the Vice President, Assistant to the
President and Chief of Staff, the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security, and the Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs. Whenever
possible and practicable, these integrated threat
assessments and reports shall be reviewed and commented
upon by the wider interagency community.
A decision on which Threat Condition to assign
shall integrate a variety of considerations. This
integration will rely on qualitative assessment, not
quantitative calculation. Higher Threat Conditions
indicate greater risk of a terrorist act, with risk
including both probability and gravity. Despite best
efforts, there can be no guarantee that, at any given
Threat Condition, a terrorist attack will not occur. An
initial and important factor is the quality of the
threat information itself. The evaluation of this
threat information shall include, but not be limited
to, the following factors:
1. To what degree is the threat information
credible?
2. To what degree is the threat information
corroborated?
3. To what degree is the threat specific
and/ or imminent?
4. How grave are the potential consequences
of the threat?
Threat Conditions and Associated Protective Measures
The world has changed since September 11, 2001. We
remain a Nation at risk to terrorist attacks and will
remain at risk for the foreseeable future. At all
Threat Conditions, we must remain vigilant, prepared,
and ready to deter terrorist attacks. The following
Threat Conditions each represent an increasing risk of
terrorist attacks. Beneath each Threat Condition are
some suggested Protective Measures, recognizing that
the heads of Federal departments and agencies are
responsible for developing and implementing appropriate
agency-specific Protective Measures:
1. Low Condition (Green). This condition is
declared when there is a low risk of terrorist
attacks. Federal departments and agencies
should consider the following general measures
in addition to the agency-specific Protective
Measures they develop and implement:
a) Refining and exercising as
appropriate preplanned Protective
Measures;
b) Ensuring personnel receive proper
training on the Homeland Security
Advisory System and specific preplanned
department or agency Protective
Measures; and
c) Institutionalizing a process to
assure that all facilities and
regulated sectors are regularly
assessed for vulnerabilities to
terrorist attacks, and all reasonable
measures are taken to mitigate these
vulnerabilities.
2. Guarded Condition (Blue). This condition is
declared when there is a general risk of
terrorist attacks. In addition to the
Protective Measures taken in the previous
Threat Condition, Federal departments and
agencies should consider the following general
measures in addition to the agency-specific
Protective Measures that they will develop and
implement:
a) Checking communications with
designated emergency response or
command locations;
b) Reviewing and updating emergency
response procedures; and
c) Providing the public with any
information that would strengthen its
ability to act appropriately.
3. Elevated Condition (Yellow). An Elevated
Condition is declared when there is a
significant risk of terrorist attacks. In
addition to the Protective Measures taken in
the previous Threat Conditions, Federal
departments and agencies should consider the
following general measures in addition to the
Protective Measures that they will develop and
implement:
a) Increasing surveillance of critical
locations;
b) Coordinating emergency plans as
appropriate with nearby jurisdictions;
c) Assessing whether the precise
characteristics of the threat require
the further refinement of preplanned
Protective Measures; and
d) Implementing, as appropriate,
contingency and emergency response
plans.
4. High Condition (Orange). A High Condition is
declared when there is a high risk of terrorist
attacks. In addition to the Protective Measures
taken in the previous Threat Conditions,
Federal departments and agencies should
consider the following general measures in
addition to the agency-specific Protective
Measures that they will develop and implement:
a) Coordinating necessary security
efforts with Federal, State, and local
law enforcement agencies or any
National Guard or other appropriate
armed forces organizations;
b) Taking additional precautions at
public events and possibly considering
alternative venues or even
cancellation;
c) Preparing to execute contingency
procedures, such as moving to an
alternate site or dispersing their
workforce; and
d) Restricting threatened facility
access to essential personnel only.
5. Severe Condition (Red). A Severe Condition
reflects a severe risk of terrorist attacks.
Under most circumstances, the Protective
Measures for a Severe Condition are not
intended to be sustained for substantial
periods of time. In addition to the Protective
Measures in the previous Threat Conditions,
Federal departments and agencies also should
consider the following general measures in
addition to the agency-specific Protective
Measures that they will develop and implement:
a) Increasing or redirecting personnel
to address critical emergency needs;
b) Assigning emergency response
personnel and pre-positioning and
mobilizing specially trained teams or
resources;
c) Monitoring, redirecting, or
constraining transportation systems;
and
d) Closing public and government
facilities.
[Comment and Review Periods]
[The Attorney General, in consultation and
coordination with the Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security, shall, for 45 days from the date of
this directive, seek the views of government officials
at all levels and of public interest groups and the
private sector on the proposed Homeland Security
Advisory System.
One hundred thirty-five days from the date of this
directive the Attorney General, after consultation and
coordination with the Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security, and having considered the views
received during the comment period, shall recommend to
the President in writing proposed refinements to the
Homeland Security Advisory System.]
GEORGE W. BUSH
Homeland Security Presidential Directive--4
(National Security Presidential Directive--17)
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
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``The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of
radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared
that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence
indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United
States will not allow these efforts to succeed. ... History
will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed
to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to
peace and security is the path of action.''
PRESIDENT BUSH
Introduction
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) - nuclear,
biological, and chemical - in the possession of hostile
states and terrorists represent one of the greatest
security challenges facing the United States. We must
pursue a comprehensive strategy to counter this threat
in all of its dimensions.
An effective strategy for countering WMD, including
their use and further proliferation, is an integral
component of the National Security Strategy of the
United States of America. As with the war on terrorism,
our strategy for homeland security, and our new concept
of deterrence, the U.S. approach to combat WMD
represents a fundamental change from the past. To
succeed, we must take full advantage of today's
opportunities, including the application of new
technologies, increased emphasis on intelligence
collection and analysis, the strengthening of alliance
relationships, and the establishment of new
partnerships with former adversaries.
Weapons of mass destruction could enable
adversaries to inflict massive harm on the United
States, our military forces at home and abroad, and our
friends and allies. Some states, including several that
have supported and continue to support terrorism,
already possess WMD and are seeking even greater
capabilities, as tools of coercion and intimidation.
For them, these are not weapons of last resort, but
militarily useful weapons of choice intended to
overcome our nation's advantages in conventional forces
and to deter us from responding to aggression against
our friends and allies in regions of vital interest. In
addition, terrorist groups are seeking to acquire WMD
with the stated purpose of killing large numbers of our
people and those of friends and allies - without
compunction and without warning.
We will not permit the world's most dangerous
regimes and terrorists to threaten us with the world's
most destructive weapons. We must accord the highest
priority to the protection of the United States, our
forces, and our friends and allies from the existing
and growing WMD threat.
Pillars of Our National Strategy
Our National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction has three principal pillars:
Counterproliferation to Combat WMD Use
The possession and increased likelihood of use of
WMD by hostile states and terrorists are realities of
the contemporary security environment. It is therefore
critical that the U.S. military and appropriate
civilian agencies be prepared to deter and defend
against the full range of possible WMD employment
scenarios. We will ensure that all needed capabilities
to combat WMD are fully integrated into the emerging
defense transformation plan and into our homeland
security posture. Counterproliferation will also be
fully integrated into the basic doctrine, training, and
equipping of all forces, in order to ensure that they
can sustain operations to decisively defeat WMD-armed
adversaries.
Strengthened Nonproliferation to Combat WMD Proliferation
The United States, our friends and allies, and the
broader international community must undertake every
effort to prevent states and terrorists from acquiring
WMD and missiles. We must enhance traditional measures
- diplomacy, arms control, multilateral agreements,
threat reduction assistance, and export controls - that
seek to dissuade or impede proliferant states and
terrorist networks, as well as to slow and make more
costly their access to sensitive technologies,
material, and expertise. We must ensure compliance with
relevant international agreements, including the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC). The United States will continue to
work with other states to improve their capability to
prevent unauthorized transfers of WMD and missile
technology, expertise, and material. We will identify
and pursue new methods of prevention, such as national
criminalization of proliferation activities and
expanded safety and security measures.
2Consequence Management to Respond to WMD Use
Finally, the United States must be prepared to
respond to the use of WMD against our citizens, our
military forces, and those of friends and allies. We
will develop and maintain the capability to reduce to
the extent possible the potentially horrific
consequences of WMD attacks at home and abroad. The
three pillars of the U.S. national strategy to combat
WMD are seamless elements of a comprehensive approach.
Serving to integrate the pillars are four cross-cutting
enabling functions that need to be pursued on a
priority basis: intelligence collection and analysis on
WMD, delivery systems, and related technologies;
research and development to improve our ability to
respond to evolving threats; bilateral and multilateral
cooperation; and targeted strategies against hostile
states and terrorists.
Counterproliferation
We know from experience that we cannot always be
successful in preventing and containing the
proliferation of WMD to hostile states and terrorists.
Therefore, U.S. military and appropriate civilian
agencies must possess the full range of operational
capabilities to counter the threat and use of WMD by
states and terrorists against the United States, our
military forces, and friends and allies.
Interdiction
Effective interdiction is a critical part of the
U.S. strategy to combat WMD and their delivery means.
We must enhance the capabilities of our military,
intelligence, technical, and law enforcement
communities to prevent the movement of WMD materials,
technology, and expertise to hostile states and
terrorist organizations.
Deterrence
Today's threats are far more diverse and less
predictable than those of the past. States hostile to
the United States and to our friends and allies have
demonstrated their willingness to take high risks to
achieve their goals, and are aggressively pursuing WMD
and their means of delivery as critical tools in this
effort. As a consequence, we require new methods of
deterrence. A strong declaratory policy and effective
military forces are essential elements of our
contemporary deterrent posture, along with the full
range of political tools to persuade potential
adversaries not to seek or use WMD. The United States
will continue to make clear that it reserves the right
to respond with overwhelming force - including through
resort to all of our options - to the use of WMD
against the United States, our forces abroad, and
friends and allies.
In addition to our conventional and nuclear
response and defense capabilities, our overall
deterrent posture against WMD threats is reinforced by
effective intelligence, surveillance, interdiction, and
domestic law enforcement capabilities. Such combined
capabilities enhance deterrence both by devaluing an
adversary's WMD and missiles, and by posing the
prospect of an overwhelming response to any use of such
weapons.
Defense and Mitigation
Because deterrence may not succeed, and because of
the potentially devastating consequences of WMD use
against our forces and civilian population, U.S.
military forces and appropriate civilian agencies must
have the capability to defend against WMD-armed
adversaries, including in appropriate cases through
preemptive measures. This requires capabilities to
detect and destroy an adversary's WMD assets before
these weapons are used. In addition, robust active and
passive defenses and mitigation measures must be in
place to enable U.S. military forces and appropriate
civilian agencies to accomplish their missions, and to
assist friends and allies when WMD are used.
Active defenses disrupt, disable, or destroy WMD en
route to their targets. Active defenses include
vigorous air defense and effective missile defenses
against today's threats. Passive defenses must be
tailored to the unique characteristics of the various
forms of WMD. The United States must also have the
ability rapidly and effectively to mitigate the effects
of a WMD attack against our deployed forces.
Our approach to defend against biological threats
has long been based on our approach to chemical
threats, despite the fundamental differences between
these weapons. The United States is developing a new
approach to provide us and our friends and allies with
an effective defense against biological weapons.
Finally, U.S. military forces and domestic law
enforcement agencies as appropriate must stand ready to
respond against the source of any WMD attack. The
primary objective of a response is to disrupt an
imminent attack or an attack in progress, and eliminate
the threat of future attacks. As with deterrence and
prevention, an effective response requires rapid
attribution and robust strike capability. We must
accelerate efforts to field new capabilities to defeat
WMD-related assets. The United States needs to be
prepared to conduct post-conflict operations to destroy
or dismantle any residual WMD capabilities of the
hostile state or terrorist network. An effective U.S.
response not only will eliminate the source of a WMD
attack but will also have a powerful deterrent effect
upon other adversaries that possess or seek WMD or
missiles.
Nonproliferation
Active Nonproliferation Diplomacy
The United States will actively employ diplomatic
approaches in bilateral and multilateral settings in
pursuit of our nonproliferation goals. We must dissuade
supplier states from cooperating with proliferant
states and induce proliferant states to end their WMD
and missile programs. We will hold countries
responsible for complying with their commitments. In
addition, we will continue to build coalitions to
support our efforts, as well as to seek their increased
support for nonproliferation and threat reduction
cooperation programs. However, should our wide-ranging
nonproliferation efforts fail, we must have available
the full range of operational capabilities necessary to
defend against the possible employment of WMD.
Multilateral Regimes
Existing nonproliferation and arms control regimes
play an important role in our overall strategy. The
United States will support those regimes that are
currently in force, and work to improve the
effectiveness of, and compliance with, those regimes.
Consistent with other policy priorities, we will also
promote new agreements and arrangements that serve our
nonproliferation goals. Overall, we seek to cultivate
an international environment that is more conducive to
nonproliferation. Our efforts will include:
1A Nuclear
1A Strengthening of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty and International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including through
ratification of an IAEA Additional Protocol by
all NPT states parties, assurances that all
states put in place full-scope IAEA safeguards
agreements, and appropriate increases in
funding for the Agency;
1A Negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-Off
Treaty that advances U.S. security interests;
and
1A Strengthening the Nuclear Suppliers Group
and Zangger Committee.
1A Chemical and Biological
1A Effective functioning of the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;
1A Identification and promotion of
constructive and realistic measures to
strengthen the BWC and thereby to help meet the
biological weapons threat; and
1A Strengthening of the Australia Group.
1A Missile
1A Strengthening the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR), including through
support for universal adherence to the
International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic
Missile Proliferation.
Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Cooperation
The United States pursues a wide range of programs,
including the Nunn-Lugar program, designed to address
the proliferation threat stemming from the large
quantities of Soviet-legacy WMD and missile-related
expertise and materials. Maintaining an extensive and
efficient set of nonproliferation and threat reduction
assistance programs to Russia and other former Soviet
states is a high priority. We will also continue to
encourage friends and allies to increase their
contributions to these programs, particularly through
the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of
Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. In addition,
we will work with other states to improve the security
of their WMD-related materials.
Controls on Nuclear Materials
In addition to programs with former Soviet states
to reduce fissile material and improve the security of
that which remains, the United States will continue to
discourage the worldwide accumulation of separated
plutonium and to minimize the use of highly-enriched
uranium. As outlined in the National Energy Policy, the
United States will work in collaboration with
international partners to develop recycle and fuel
treatment technologies that are cleaner, more
efficient, less waste-intensive, and more
proliferation-resistant.
U.S. Export Controls
We must ensure that the implementation of U.S.
export controls furthers our nonproliferation and other
national security goals, while recognizing the
realities that American businesses face in the
increasingly globalized marketplace. We will work to
update and strengthen export controls using existing
authorities. We also seek new legislation to improve
the ability of our export control system to give full
weight to both nonproliferation objectives and
commercial interests. Our overall goal is to focus our
resources on truly sensitive exports to hostile states
or those that engage in onward proliferation, while
removing unnecessary barriers in the global
marketplace.
Nonproliferation Sanctions
Sanctions can be a valuable component of our
overall strategy against WMD proliferation. At times,
however, sanctions have proven inflexible and
ineffective. We will develop a comprehensive sanctions
policy to better integrate sanctions into our overall
strategy and work with Congress to consolidate and
modify existing sanctions legislation.
WMD Consequence Management
Defending the American homeland is the most basic
responsibility of our government. As part of our
defense, the United States must be fully prepared to
respond to the consequences of WMD use on our soil,
whether by hostile states or by terrorists. We must
also be prepared to respond to the effects of WMD use
against our forces deployed abroad, and to assist
friends and allies.
The National Strategy for Homeland Security
discusses U.S. Government programs to deal with the
consequences of the use of a chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear weapon in the United States. A
number of these programs offer training, planning, and
assistance to state and local governments. To maximize
their effectiveness, these efforts need to be
integrated and comprehensive. Our first responders must
have the full range of protective, medical, and
remediation tools to identify, assess, and respond
rapidly to a WMD event on our territory.
The White House Office of Homeland Security will
coordinate all federal efforts to prepare for and
mitigate the consequences of terrorist attacks within
the United States, including those involving WMD. The
Office of Homeland Security will also work closely with
state and local governments to ensure their planning,
training, and equipment requirements are addressed.
These issues, including the roles of the Department of
Homeland Security, are addressed in detail in the
National Strategy for Homeland Security.
The National Security Council's Office of Combating
Terrorism coordinates and helps improve U.S. efforts to
respond to and manage the recovery from terrorist
attacks outside the United States. In cooperation with
the Office of Combating Terrorism, the Department of
State coordinates interagency efforts to work with our
friends and allies to develop their own emergency
preparedness and consequence management capabilities.
Integrating the Pillars
Several critical enabling functions serve to
integrate the three pillars -counterproliferation,
nonproliferation, and consequence management - of the
U.S. National Strategy to Combat WMD.
Improved Intelligence Collection and Analysis
A more accurate and complete understanding of the
full range of WMD threats is, and will remain, among
the highest U.S. intelligence priorities, to enable us
to prevent proliferation, and to deter or defend
against those who would use those capabilities against
us. Improving our ability to obtain timely and accurate
knowledge of adversaries' offensive and defensive
capabilities, plans, and intentions is key to
developing effective counter-and nonproliferation
policies and capabilities. Particular emphasis must be
accorded to improving: intelligence regarding WMD-
related facilities and activities; interaction among
U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, and military
agencies; and intelligence cooperation with friends and
allies.
Research and Development
The United States has a critical need for cutting-
edge technology that can quickly and effectively
detect, analyze, facilitate interdiction of, defend
against, defeat, and mitigate the consequences of WMD.
Numerous U.S. Government departments and agencies are
currently engaged in the essential research and
development to support our overall strategy against WMD
proliferation. The new Counterproliferation Technology
Coordination Committee, consisting of senior
representatives from all concerned agencies, will act
to improve interagency coordination of U.S. Government
counterproliferation research and development efforts.
The Committee will assist in identifying priorities,
gaps, and overlaps in existing programs and in
examining options for future investment strategies.
Strengthened International Cooperation
WMD represent a threat not just to the United
States, but also to our friends and allies and the
broader international community. For this reason, it is
vital that we work closely with like-minded countries
on all elements of our comprehensive proliferation
strategy.
Targeted Strategies Against Proliferants
All elements of the overall U.S. strategy to combat
WMD must be brought to bear in targeted strategies
against supplier and recipient states of WMD
proliferation concern, as well as against terrorist
groups which seek to acquire WMD.
A few states are dedicated proliferators, whose
leaders are determined to develop, maintain, and
improve their WMD and delivery capabilities, which
directly threaten the United States, U.S. forces
overseas, and/ or our friends and allies. Because each
of these regimes is different, we will pursue country-
specific strategies that best enable us and our friends
and allies to prevent, deter, and defend against WMD
and missile threats from each of them. These strategies
must also take into account the growing cooperation
among proliferant states - so-called secondary
proliferation - which challenges us to think in new
ways about specific country strategies.
One of the most difficult challenges we face is to
prevent, deter, and defend against the acquisition and
use of WMD by terrorist groups. The current and
potential future linkages between terrorist groups and
state sponsors of terrorism are particularly dangerous
and require priority attention. The full range of
counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence
management measures must be brought to bear against the
WMD terrorist threat, just as they are against states
of greatest proliferation concern.
End Note
Our National Strategy to Combat WMD requires much
of all of us the Executive Branch, the Congress, state
and local governments, the American people, and our
friends and allies. The requirements to prevent, deter,
defend against, and respond to today's WMD threats are
complex and challenging. But they are not daunting. We
can and will succeed in the tasks laid out in this
strategy; we have no other choice.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5
Management of Domestic Incidents
(1) To enhance the ability of the United States to
manage domestic incidents by establishing a single,
comprehensive national incident management system.
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Definitions
(2) In this directive:
(a) the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of Homeland Security.
(b) the term ``Federal departments and
agencies'' means those executive departments
enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101, together with the
Department of Homeland Security; independent
establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C. 104(1);
government corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C.
103(1); and the United States Postal Service.
(c) the terms ``State,'' ``local,'' and the
``United States'' when it is used in a
geographical sense, have the same meanings as
used in the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
Public Law 107-296.
Policy
(3) To prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover
from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies, the United States Government shall
establish a single, comprehensive approach to domestic
incident management. The objective of the United States
Government is to ensure that all levels of government
across the Nation have the capability to work
efficiently and effectively together, using a national
approach to domestic incident management. In these
efforts, with regard to domestic incidents, the United
States Government treats crisis management and
consequence management as a single, integrated
function, rather than as two separate functions.
(4) The Secretary of Homeland Security is the
principal Federal official for domestic incident
management. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of
2002, the Secretary is responsible for coordinating
Federal operations within the United States to prepare
for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks,
major disasters, and other emergencies. The Secretary
shall coordinate the Federal Government's resources
utilized in response to or recovery from terrorist
attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies if and
when any one of the following four conditions applies:
(1) a Federal department or agency acting under its own
authority has requested the assistance of the
Secretary; (2) the resources of State and local
authorities are overwhelmed and Federal assistance has
been requested by the appropriate State and local
authorities; (3) more than one Federal department or
agency has become substantially involved in responding
to the incident; or (4) the Secretary has been directed
to assume responsibility for managing the domestic
incident by the President.
(5) Nothing in this directive alters, or impedes the
ability to carry out, the authorities of Federal
departments and agencies to perform their
responsibilities under law. All Federal departments and
agencies shall cooperate with the Secretary in the
Secretary's domestic incident management role.
(6) The Federal Government recognizes the roles and
responsibilities of State and local authorities in
domestic incident management. Initial responsibility
for managing domestic incidents generally falls on
State and local authorities. The Federal Government
will assist State and local authorities when their
resources are overwhelmed, or when Federal interests
are involved. The Secretary will coordinate with State
and local governments to ensure adequate planning,
equipment, training, and exercise activities. The
Secretary will also provide assistance to State and
local governments to develop all-hazards plans and
capabilities, including those of greatest importance to
the security of the United States, and will ensure that
State, local, and Federal plans are compatible.
(7) The Federal Government recognizes the role that
the private and nongovernmental sectors play in
preventing, preparing for, responding to, and
recovering from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and
other emergencies. The Secretary will coordinate with
the private and nongovernmental sectors to ensure
adequate planning, equipment, training, and exercise
activities and to promote partnerships to address
incident management capabilities.
(8) The Attorney General has lead responsibility for
criminal investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist
threats by individuals or groups inside the United
States, or directed at United States citizens or
institutions abroad, where such acts are within the
Federal criminal jurisdiction of the United States, as
well as for related intelligence collection activities
within the United States, subject to the National
Security Act of 1947 and other applicable law,
Executive Order 12333, and Attorney General-approved
procedures pursuant to that Executive Order. Generally
acting through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Attorney General, in cooperation with other Federal
departments and agencies engaged in activities to
protect our national security, shall also coordinate
the activities of the other members of the law
enforcement community to detect, prevent, preempt, and
disrupt terrorist attacks against the United States.
Following a terrorist threat or an actual incident that
falls within the criminal jurisdiction of the United
States, the full capabilities of the United States
shall be dedicated, consistent with United States law
and with activities of other Federal departments and
agencies to protect our national security, to assisting
the Attorney General to identify the perpetrators and
bring them to justice. The Attorney General and the
Secretary shall establish appropriate relationships and
mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between
their two departments.
(9) Nothing in this directive impairs or otherwise
affects the authority of the Secretary of Defense over
the Department of Defense, including the chain of
command for military forces from the President as
Commander in Chief, to the Secretary of Defense, to the
commander of military forces, or military command and
control procedures. The Secretary of Defense shall
provide military support to civil authorities for
domestic incidents as directed by the President or when
consistent with military readiness and appropriate
under the circumstances and the law. The Secretary of
Defense shall retain command of military forces
providing civil support. The Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary shall establish appropriate relationships
and mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between
their two departments.
(10) The Secretary of State has the responsibility,
consistent with other United States Government
activities to protect our national security, to
coordinate international activities related to the
prevention, preparation, response, and recovery from a
domestic incident, and for the protection of United
States citizens and United States interests overseas.
The Secretary of State and the Secretary shall
establish appropriate relationships and mechanisms for
cooperation and coordination between their two
departments.
(11) The Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs shall be responsible for
interagency policy coordination on domestic and
international incident management, respectively, as
directed by the President. The Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and the Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs shall work
together to ensure that the United States domestic and
international incident management efforts are
seamlessly united.
(12) The Secretary shall ensure that, as appropriate,
information related to domestic incidents is gathered
and provided to the public, the private sector, State
and local authorities, Federal departments and
agencies, and, generally through the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security, to the President. The
Secretary shall provide standardized, quantitative
reports to the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security on the readiness and preparedness of the
Nation -- at all levels of government -- to prevent,
prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic
incidents.
(13) Nothing in this directive shall be construed to
grant to any Assistant to the President any authority
to issue orders to Federal departments and agencies,
their officers, or their employees.
Tasking
(14) The heads of all Federal departments and agencies
are directed to provide their full and prompt
cooperation, resources, and support, as appropriate and
consistent with their own responsibilities for
protecting our national security, to the Secretary, the
Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and the
Secretary of State in the exercise of the individual
leadership responsibilities and missions assigned in
paragraphs (4), (8), (9), and (10), respectively,
above.
(15) The Secretary shall develop, submit for review to
the Homeland Security Council, and administer a
National Incident Management System (NIMS). This system
will provide a consistent nationwide approach for
Federal, State, and local governments to work
effectively and efficiently together to prepare for,
respond to, and recover from domestic incidents,
regardless of cause, size, or complexity. To provide
for interoperability and compatibility among Federal,
State, and local capabilities, the NIMS will include a
core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and
technologies covering the incident command system;
multi-agency coordination systems; unified command;
training; identification and management of resources
(including systems for classifying types of resources);
qualifications and certification; and the collection,
tracking, and reporting of incident information and
incident resources.
(16) The Secretary shall develop, submit for review to
the Homeland Security Council, and administer a
National Response Plan (NRP). The Secretary shall
consult with appropriate Assistants to the President
(including the Assistant to the President for Economic
Policy) and the Director of the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, and other such Federal officials as
may be appropriate, in developing and implementing the
NRP. This plan shall integrate Federal Government
domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and
recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards
plan. The NRP shall be unclassified. If certain
operational aspects require classification, they shall
be included in classified annexes to the NRP.
(a) The NRP, using the NIMS, shall, with
regard to response to domestic incidents,
provide the structure and mechanisms for
national level policy and operational direction
for Federal support to State and local incident
managers and for exercising direct Federal
authorities and responsibilities, as
appropriate.
(b) The NRP will include protocols for
operating under different threats or threat
levels; incorporation of existing Federal
emergency and incident management plans (with
appropriate modifications and revisions) as
either integrated components of the NRP or as
supporting operational plans; and additional
operational plans or annexes, as appropriate,
including public affairs and intergovernmental
communications.
(c) The NRP will include a consistent approach
to reporting incidents, providing assessments,
and making recommendations to the President,
the Secretary, and the Homeland Security
Council.
(d) The NRP will include rigorous requirements
for continuous improvements from testing,
exercising, experience with incidents, and new
information and technologies.
(17) The Secretary shall:
(a) By April 1, 2003,
(1) develop and publish an initial
version of the NRP, in consultation
with other Federal departments and
agencies; and
(2) provide the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security with a
plan for full development and
implementation of the NRP.
(b) By June 1, 2003,
(1) in consultation with Federal
departments and agencies and with State
and local governments, develop a
national system of standards,
guidelines, and protocols to implement
the NIMS; and
(2) establish a mechanism for ensuring
ongoing management and maintenance of
the NIMS, including regular
consultation with other Federal
departments and agencies and with State
and local governments.
(c) By September 1, 2003, in consultation with
Federal departments and agencies and the
Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security, review existing authorities and
regulations and prepare recommendations for the
President on revisions necessary to implement
fully the NRP.
(18) The heads of Federal departments and agencies
shall adopt the NIMS within their departments and
agencies and shall provide support and assistance to
the Secretary in the development and maintenance of the
NIMS. All Federal departments and agencies will use the
NIMS in their domestic incident management and
emergency prevention, preparedness, response, recovery,
and mitigation activities, as well as those actions
taken in support of State or local entities. The heads
of Federal departments and agencies shall participate
in the NRP, shall assist and support the Secretary in
the development and maintenance of the NRP, and shall
participate in and use domestic incident reporting
systems and protocols established by the Secretary.
(19) The head of each Federal department and agency
shall:
(a) By June 1, 2003, make initial revisions to
existing plans in accordance with the initial
version of the NRP.
(b) By August 1, 2003, submit a plan to adopt
and implement the NIMS to the Secretary and the
Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security. The Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security shall advise the President on
whether such plans effectively implement the
NIMS.
(20) Beginning in Fiscal Year 2005, Federal
departments and agencies shall make adoption of the
NIMS a requirement, to the extent permitted by law, for
providing Federal preparedness assistance through
grants, contracts, or other activities. The Secretary
shall develop standards and guidelines for determining
whether a State or local entity has adopted the NIMS.
Technical and Conforming Amendments to National Security
Presidential Directive-1 (NSPD-1)
(21) NSPD-1 (``Organization of the National Security
Council System'') is amended by replacing the fifth
sentence of the third paragraph on the first page with
the following: ``The Attorney General, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget shall be invited to attend
meetings pertaining to their responsibilities.''.
Technical and Conforming Amendments to National Security
Presidential Directive-8 (NSPD-8)
(22) NSPD-8 (``National Director and Deputy National
Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism'') is amended
by striking ``and the Office of Homeland Security,'' on
page 4, and inserting ``the Department of Homeland
Security, and the Homeland Security Council'' in lieu
thereof.
Technical and Conforming Amendments to Homeland Security
Presidential Directive-2 (HSPD-2)
(23) HSPD-2 (``Combating Terrorism Through Immigration
Policies'') is amended as follows:
(a) striking ``the Commissioner of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)''
in the second sentence of the second paragraph
in section 1, and inserting ``the Secretary of
Homeland Security'' in lieu thereof ;
(b) striking ``the INS,'' in the third
paragraph in section 1, and inserting ``the
Department of Homeland Security'' in lieu
thereof;
(c) inserting ``, the Secretary of Homeland
Security,'' after ``The Attorney General'' in
the fourth paragraph in section 1;
(d) inserting ``, the Secretary of Homeland
Security,'' after ``the Attorney General'' in
the fifth paragraph in section 1;
(e) striking ``the INS and the Customs
Service'' in the first sentence of the first
paragraph of section 2, and inserting ``the
Department of Homeland Security'' in lieu
thereof;
(f) striking ``Customs and INS'' in the first
sentence of the second paragraph of section 2,
and inserting ``the Department of Homeland
Security'' in lieu thereof;
(g) striking ``the two agencies'' in the
second sentence of the second paragraph of
section 2, and inserting ``the Department of
Homeland Security'' in lieu thereof;
(h) striking ``the Secretary of the Treasury''
wherever it appears in section 2, and inserting
``the Secretary of Homeland Security'' in lieu
thereof;
(i) inserting ``, the Secretary of Homeland
Security,'' after ``The Secretary of State''
wherever the latter appears in section 3;
(j) inserting ``, the Department of Homeland
Security,'' after ``the Department of State,''
in the second sentence in the third paragraph
in section 3;
(k) inserting ``the Secretary of Homeland
Security,'' after ``the Secretary of State,''
in the first sentence of the fifth paragraph of
section 3;
(l) striking ``INS'' in the first sentence of
the sixth paragraph of section 3, and inserting
``Department of Homeland Security'' in lieu
thereof;
(m) striking ``the Treasury'' wherever it
appears in section 4 and inserting ``Homeland
Security'' in lieu thereof;
(n) inserting ``, the Secretary of Homeland
Security,'' after ``the Attorney General'' in
the first sentence in section 5; and
(o) inserting ``, Homeland Security'' after
``State'' in the first sentence of section 6.
Technical and Conforming Amendments to Homeland Security
Presidential Directive-3 (HSPD-3)
(24) The Homeland Security Act of 2002 assigned the
responsibility for administering the Homeland Security
Advisory System to the Secretary of Homeland Security.
Accordingly, HSPD-3 of March 11, 2002 (``Homeland
Security Advisory System'') is amended as follows:
(a) replacing the third sentence of the second
paragraph entitled ``Homeland Security Advisory
System'' with ``Except in exigent
circumstances, the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall seek the views of the Attorney
General, and any other federal agency heads the
Secretary deems appropriate, including other
members of the Homeland Security Council, on
the Threat Condition to be assigned.''
(b) inserting ``At the request of the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Department
of Justice shall permit and facilitate the use
of delivery systems administered or managed by
the Department of Justice for the purposes of
delivering threat information pursuant to the
Homeland Security Advisory System.'' as a new
paragraph after the fifth paragraph of the
section entitled ``Homeland Security Advisory
System.''
(c) inserting ``, the Secretary of Homeland
Security'' after ``The Director of Central
Intelligence'' in the first sentence of the
seventh paragraph of the section entitled
``Homeland Security Advisory System''.
(d) striking ``Attorney General'' wherever it
appears (except in the sentences referred to in
subsections (a) and (c) above), and inserting
``the Secretary of Homeland Security'' in lieu
thereof; and
(e) striking the section entitled ``Comment
and Review Periods.''
GEORGE W. BUSH
Homeland Security Presidential Directive--6
----------
To protect against terrorism it is the policy of
the United States to (1) develop, integrate, and
maintain thorough, accurate, and current information
about individuals known or appropriately suspected to
be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in
preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism
(Terrorist Information); and (2) use that information
as appropriate and to the full extent permitted by law
to support (a) Federal, State, local, territorial,
tribal, foreign-government, and private-sector
screening processes, and (b) diplomatic, military,
intelligence, law enforcement, immigration, visa, and
protective processes.
This directive shall be implemented in a manner
consistent with the provisions of the Constitution and
applicable laws, including those protecting the rights
of all Americans.
To further strengthen the ability of the United
States Government to protect the people, property, and
territory of the United States against acts of
terrorism, and to the full extent permitted by law and
consistent with the policy set forth above:
(1) The Attorney General shall establish
an organization to consolidate the Government's
approach to terrorism screening and provide for
the appropriate and lawful use of Terrorist
Information in screening processes.
(2) The heads of executive departments and
agencies shall, to the extent permitted by law,
provide to the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center (TTIC) on an ongoing basis all
appropriate Terrorist Information in their
possession, custody, or control. The Attorney
General, in coordination with the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and
the Director of Central Intelligence shall
implement appropriate procedures and safeguards
with respect to all such information about
United States persons. The TTIC will provide
the organization referenced in paragraph (1)
with access to all appropriate information or
intelligence in the TTIC's custody, possession,
or control that the organization requires to
perform its functions.
(3) The heads of executive departments and
agencies shall conduct screening using such
information at all appropriate opportunities,
and shall report to the Attorney General not
later than 90 days from the date of this
directive, as to the opportunities at which
such screening shall and shall not be
conducted.
(4) The Secretary of Homeland Security
shall develop guidelines to govern the use of
such information to support State, local,
territorial, and tribal screening processes,
and private sector screening processes that
have a substantial bearing on homeland
security.
(5) The Secretary of State shall develop a
proposal for my approval for enhancing
cooperation with certain foreign governments,
beginning with those countries for which the
United States has waived visa requirements, to
establish appropriate access to terrorism
screening information of the participating
governments.
This directive does not alter existing authorities
or responsibilities of department and agency heads to
carry out operational activities or provide or receive
information. This directive is intended only to improve
the internal management of the executive branch and is
not intended to, and does not, create any right or
benefit enforceable at law or in equity by any party
against the United States, its departments, agencies,
entities, officers, employees or agents, or any other
person.
The Attorney General, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
and the Director of Central Intelligence, shall report
to me through the Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security not later than October 31, 2003, on
progress made to implement this directive and shall
thereafter report to me on such progress or any
recommended changes from time to time as appropriate.
GEORGE W. BUSH
Homeland Security Presidential Directive--7
Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and
Protection
----------
Purpose
(1) This directive establishes a national policy
for Federal departments and agencies to identify and
prioritize United States critical infrastructure and
key resources and to protect them from terrorist
attacks.
Background
(2) Terrorists seek to destroy, incapacitate, or
exploit critical infrastructure and key resources
across the United States to threaten national security,
cause mass casualties, weaken our economy, and damage
public morale and confidence.
(3) America's open and technologically complex
society includes a wide array of critical
infrastructure and key resources that are potential
terrorist targets. The majority of these are owned and
operated by the private sector and State or local
governments. These critical infrastructures and key
resources are both physical and cyber-based and span
all sectors of the economy.
(4) Critical infrastructure and key resources
provide the essential services that underpin American
society. The Nation possesses numerous key resources,
whose exploitation or destruction by terrorists could
cause catastrophic health effects or mass casualties
comparable to those from the use of a weapon of mass
destruction, or could profoundly affect our national
prestige and morale. In addition, there is critical
infrastructure so vital that its incapacitation,
exploitation, or destruction, through terrorist attack,
could have a debilitating effect on security and
economic well-being.
(5) While it is not possible to protect or
eliminate the vulnerability of all critical
infrastructure and key resources throughout the
country, strategic improvements in security can make it
more difficult for attacks to succeed and can lessen
the impact of attacks that may occur. In addition to
strategic security enhancements, tactical security
improvements can be rapidly implemented to deter,
mitigate, or neutralize potential attacks.
Definitions
(6) In this directive:
(a) The term ``critical infrastructure''
has the meaning given to that term in section
1016(e) of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (42
U.S.C. 5195c(e)).
(b) The term ``key resources'' has the
meaning given that term in section 2(9) of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
101(9)).
(c) The term ``the Department'' means the
Department of Homeland Security.
(d) The term ``Federal departments and
agencies'' means those executive departments
enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101, and the Department
of Homeland Security; independent
establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C. 104(1);
Government corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C.
103(1); and the United States Postal Service.
(e) The terms `State,'' and ``local
government,'' when used in a geographical
sense, have the same meanings given to those
terms in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101).
(f) The term ``the Secretary'' means the
Secretary of Homeland Security.
(g) The term ``Sector-Specific Agency''
means a Federal department or agency
responsible for infrastructure protection
activities in a designated critical
infrastructure sector or key resources
category. Sector-Specific Agencies will conduct
their activities under this directive in
accordance with guidance provided by the
Secretary.
(h) The terms ``protect'' and ``secure''
mean reducing the vulnerability of critical
infrastructure or key resources in order to
deter, mitigate, or neutralize terrorist
attacks.
Policy
(7) It is the policy of the United States to
enhance the protection of our Nation's critical
infrastructure and key resources against terrorist acts
that could:
(a) cause catastrophic health effects or
mass casualties comparable to those from the
use of a weapon of mass destruction;
(b) impair Federal departments and
agencies' abilities to perform essential
missions, or to ensure the public's health and
safety;
(c) undermine State and local government
capacities to maintain order and to deliver
minimum essential public services;
(d) damage the private sector's capability
to ensure the orderly functioning of the
economy and delivery of essential services;
(e) have a negative effect on the economy
through the cascading disruption of other
critical infrastructure and key resources; or
(f) undermine the public's morale and
confidence in our national economic and
political institutions.
(8) Federal departments and agencies will
identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of
critical infrastructure and key resources in order to
prevent, deter, and mitigate the effects of deliberate
efforts to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit them.
Federal departments and agencies will work with State
and local governments and the private sector to
accomplish this objective.
(9) Federal departments and agencies will ensure
that homeland security programs do not diminish the
overall economic security of the United States.
(10) Federal departments and agencies will
appropriately protect information associated with
carrying out this directive, including handling
voluntarily provided information and information that
would facilitate terrorist targeting of critical
infrastructure and key resources consistent with the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 and other applicable
legal authorities.
(11) Federal departments and agencies shall
implement this directive in a manner consistent with
applicable provisions of law, including those
protecting the rights of United States persons.
Roles and Responsibilities of the Secretary
(12) In carrying out the functions assigned in the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary shall be
responsible for coordinating the overall national
effort to enhance the protection of the critical
infrastructure and key resources of the United States.
The Secretary shall serve as the principal Federal
official to lead, integrate, and coordinate
implementation of efforts among Federal departments and
agencies, State and local governments, and the private
sector to protect critical infrastructure and key
resources.
(13) Consistent with this directive, the Secretary
will identify, prioritize, and coordinate the
protection of critical infrastructure and key resources
with an emphasis on critical infrastructure and key
resources that could be exploited to cause catastrophic
health effects or mass casualties comparable to those
from the use of a weapon of mass destruction.
(14) The Secretary will establish uniform
policies, approaches, guidelines, and methodologies for
integrating Federal infrastructure protection and risk
management activities within and across sectors along
with metrics and criteria for related programs and
activities.
(15) The Secretary shall coordinate protection
activities for each of the following critical
infrastructure sectors: information technology;
telecommunications; chemical; transportation systems,
including mass transit, aviation, maritime, ground/
surface, and rail and pipeline systems; emergency
services; and postal and shipping. The Department shall
coordinate with appropriate departments and agencies to
ensure the protection of other key resources including
dams, government facilities, and commercial facilities.
In addition, in its role as overall cross-sector
coordinator, the Department shall also evaluate the
need for and coordinate the coverage of additional
critical infrastructure and key resources categories
over time, as appropriate.
(16) The Secretary will continue to maintain an
organization to serve as a focal point for the security
of cyberspace. The organization will facilitate
interactions and collaborations between and among
Federal departments and agencies, State and local
governments, the private sector, academia and
international organizations. To the extent permitted by
law, Federal departments and agencies with cyber
expertise, including but not limited to the Departments
of Justice, Commerce, the Treasury, Defense, Energy,
and State, and the Central Intelligence Agency, will
collaborate with and support the organization in
accomplishing its mission. The organization's mission
includes analysis, warning, information sharing,
vulnerability reduction, mitigation, and aiding
national recovery efforts for critical infrastructure
information systems. The organization will support the
Department of Justice and other law enforcement
agencies in their continuing missions to investigate
and prosecute threats to and attacks against
cyberspace, to the extent permitted by law.
(17) The Secretary will work closely with other
Federal departments and agencies, State and local
governments, and the private sector in accomplishing
the objectives of this directive.
Roles and Responsibilities of Sector-Specific Federal Agencies
(18) Recognizing that each infrastructure sector
possesses its own unique characteristics and operating
models, there are designated Sector-Specific Agencies,
including:
(a) Department of Agriculture -
agriculture, food (meat, poultry, egg
products);
(b) Health and Human Services - public
health, healthcare, and food (other than meat,
poultry, egg products);
(c) Environmental Protection Agency -
drinking water and water treatment systems;
(d) Department of Energy - energy,
including the production refining, storage, and
distribution of oil and gas, and electric power
except for commercial nuclear power facilities;
(e) Department of the Treasury - banking
and finance;
(f) Department of the Interior - national
monuments and icons; and
(g) Department of Defense - defense
industrial base.
(19) In accordance with guidance provided by the
Secretary, Sector-Specific Agencies shall: (a)
collaborate with all relevant Federal departments and
agencies, State and local governments, and the private
sector, including with key persons and entities in
their infrastructure sector; (b) conduct or facilitate
vulnerability assessments of the sector; and (c)
encourage risk management strategies to protect against
and mitigate the effects of attacks against critical
infrastructure and key resources.
(20) Nothing in this directive alters, or impedes
the ability to carry out, the authorities of the
Federal departments and agencies to perform their
responsibilities under law and consistent with
applicable legal authorities and presidential guidance.
(21) Federal departments and agencies shall
cooperate with the Department in implementing this
directive, consistent with the Homeland Security Act of
2002 and other applicable legal authorities.
Roles and Responsibilities of Other Departments, Agencies, and
Offices
(22) In addition to the responsibilities given the
Department and Sector-Specific Agencies, there are
special functions of various Federal departments and
agencies and components of the Executive Office of the
President related to critical infrastructure and key
resources protection.
(a) The Department of State, in
conjunction with the Department, and the
Departments of Justice, Commerce, Defense, the
Treasury and other appropriate agencies, will
work with foreign countries and international
organizations to strengthen the protection of
United States critical infrastructure and key
resources.
(b) The Department of Justice, including
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, will
reduce domestic terrorist threats, and
investigate and prosecute actual or attempted
terrorist attacks on, sabotage of, or
disruptions of critical infrastructure and key
resources. The Attorney General and the
Secretary shall use applicable statutory
authority and attendant mechanisms for
cooperation and coordination, including but not
limited to those established by presidential
directive.
(c) The Department of Commerce, in
coordination with the Department, will work
with private sector, research, academic, and
government organizations to improve technology
for cyber systems and promote other critical
infrastructure efforts, including using its
authority under the Defense Production Act to
assure the timely availability of industrial
products, materials, and services to meet
homeland security requirements.
(d) A Critical Infrastructure Protection
Policy Coordinating Committee will advise the
Homeland Security Council on interagency policy
related to physical and cyber infrastructure
protection. This PCC will be chaired by a
Federal officer or employee designated by the
Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security.
(e) The Office of Science and Technology
Policy, in coordination with the Department,
will coordinate interagency research and
development to enhance the protection of
critical infrastructure and key resources.
(f) The Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) shall oversee the implementation of
government-wide policies, principles,
standards, and guidelines for Federal
government computer security programs. The
Director of OMB will ensure the operation of a
central Federal information security incident
center consistent with the requirements of the
Federal Information Security Management Act of
2002.
(g) Consistent with the E-Government Act
of 2002, the Chief Information Officers Council
shall be the principal interagency forum for
improving agency practices related to the
design, acquisition, development,
modernization, use, operation, sharing, and
performance of information resources of Federal
departments and agencies.
(h) The Department of Transportation and
the Department will collaborate on all matters
relating to transportation security and
transportation infrastructure protection. The
Department of Transportation is responsible for
operating the national air space system. The
Department of Transportation and the Department
will collaborate in regulating the
transportation of hazardous materials by all
modes (including pipelines).
(i) All Federal departments and agencies
shall work with the sectors relevant to their
responsibilities to reduce the consequences of
catastrophic failures not caused by terrorism.
(23) The heads of all Federal departments and
agencies will coordinate and cooperate with the
Secretary as appropriate and consistent with their own
responsibilities for protecting critical infrastructure
and key resources.
(24) All Federal department and agency heads are
responsible for the identification, prioritization,
assessment, remediation, and protection of their
respective internal critical infrastructure and key
resources. Consistent with the Federal Information
Security Management Act of 2002, agencies will identify
and provide information security protections
commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm
resulting from the unauthorized access, use,
disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of
information.
Coordination with the Private Sector
(25) In accordance with applicable laws or
regulations, the Department and the Sector-Specific
Agencies will collaborate with appropriate private
sector entities and continue to encourage the
development of information sharing and analysis
mechanisms. Additionally, the Department and Sector-
Specific Agencies shall collaborate with the private
sector and continue to support sector-coordinating
mechanisms:
(a) to identify, prioritize, and
coordinate the protection of critical
infrastructure and key resources; and
(b) to facilitate sharing of information
about physical and cyber threats,
vulnerabilities, incidents, potential
protective measures, and best practices.
National Special Security Events
(26) The Secretary, after consultation with the
Homeland Security Council, shall be responsible for
designating events as ``National Special Security
Events'' (NSSEs). This directive supersedes language in
previous presidential directives regarding the
designation of NSSEs that is inconsistent herewith.
Implementation
(27) Consistent with the Homeland Security Act of
2002, the Secretary shall produce a comprehensive,
integrated National Plan for Critical Infrastructure
and Key Resources Protection to outline national goals,
objectives, milestones, and key initiatives within 1
year from the issuance of this directive. The Plan
shall include, in addition to other Homeland Security-
related elements as the Secretary deems appropriate,
the following elements:
(a) a strategy to identify, prioritize,
and coordinate the protection of critical
infrastructure and key resources, including how
the Department intends to work with Federal
departments and agencies, State and local
governments, the private sector, and foreign
countries and international organizations;
(b) a summary of activities to be
undertaken in order to: define and prioritize,
reduce the vulnerability of, and coordinate the
protection of critical infrastructure and key
resources;
(c) a summary of initiatives for sharing
critical infrastructure and key resources
information and for providing critical
infrastructure and key resources threat warning
data to State and local governments and the
private sector; and
(d) coordination and integration, as
appropriate, with other Federal emergency
management and preparedness activities
including the National Response Plan and
applicable national preparedness goals.
(28) The Secretary, consistent with the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 and other applicable legal
authorities and presidential guidance, shall establish
appropriate systems, mechanisms, and procedures to
share homeland security information relevant to threats
and vulnerabilities in national critical infrastructure
and key resources with other Federal departments and
agencies, State and local governments, and the private
sector in a timely manner.
(29) The Secretary will continue to work with the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and, as appropriate, the
Department of Energy in order to ensure the necessary
protection of:
(a) commercial nuclear reactors for
generating electric power and non-power nuclear
reactors used for research, testing, and
training;
(b) nuclear materials in medical,
industrial, and academic settings and
facilities that fabricate nuclear fuel; and
(c) the transportation, storage, and
disposal of nuclear materials and waste.
(30) In coordination with the Director of the
Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Secretary
shall prepare on an annual basis a Federal Research and
Development Plan in support of this directive.
(31) The Secretary will collaborate with other
appropriate Federal departments and agencies to develop
a program, consistent with applicable law, to
geospatially map, image, analyze, and sort critical
infrastructure and key resources by utilizing
commercial satellite and airborne systems, and existing
capabilities within other agencies. National technical
means should be considered as an option of last resort.
The Secretary, with advice from the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Secretaries of Defense and the
Interior, and the heads of other appropriate Federal
departments and agencies, shall develop mechanisms for
accomplishing this initiative. The Attorney General
shall provide legal advice as necessary.
(32) The Secretary will utilize existing, and
develop new, capabilities as needed to model
comprehensively the potential implications of terrorist
exploitation of vulnerabilities in critical
infrastructure and key resources, placing specific
focus on densely populated areas. Agencies with
relevant modeling capabilities shall cooperate with the
Secretary to develop appropriate mechanisms for
accomplishing this initiative.
(33) The Secretary will develop a national
indications and warnings architecture for
infrastructure protection and capabilities that will
facilitate:
(a) an understanding of baseline
infrastructure operations;
(b) the identification of indicators and
precursors to an attack; and
(c) a surge capacity for detecting and
analyzing patterns of potential attacks. In
developing a national indications and warnings
architecture, the Department will work with
Federal, State, local, and non-governmental
entities to develop an integrated view of
physical and cyber infrastructure and key
resources.
(34) By July 2004, the heads of all Federal
departments and agencies shall develop and submit to
the Director of the OMB for approval plans for
protecting the physical and cyber critical
infrastructure and key resources that they own or
operate. These plans shall address identification,
prioritization, protection, and contingency planning,
including the recovery and reconstitution of essential
capabilities.
(35) On an annual basis, the Sector-Specific
Agencies shall report to the Secretary on their efforts
to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection
of critical infrastructure and key resources in their
respective sectors. The report shall be submitted
within 1 year from the issuance of this directive and
on an annual basis thereafter.
(36) The Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs will lead a national security
and emergency preparedness communications policy
review, with the heads of the appropriate Federal
departments and agencies, related to convergence and
next generation architecture. Within 6 months after the
issuance of this directive, the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and the Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs shall
submit for my consideration any recommended changes to
such policy.
(37) This directive supersedes Presidential
Decision Directive/NSC-63 of May 22, 1998 (``Critical
Infrastructure Protection''), and any Presidential
directives issued prior to this directive to the extent
of any inconsistency. Moreover, the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and the Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs shall
jointly submit for my consideration a Presidential
directive to make changes in Presidential directives
issued prior to this date that conform such directives
to this directive.
(38) This directive is intended only to improve
the internal management of the executive branch of the
Federal Government, and it is not intended to, and does
not, create any right or benefit, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against
the United States, its departments, agencies, or other
entities, its officers or employees, or any other
person.
GEORGE W. BUSH
Homeland Security Presidential Directive--8
National Preparedness
----------
Purpose
(1) This directive establishes policies to
strengthen the preparedness of the United States to
prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic
terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-
hazards preparedness goal, establishing mechanisms for
improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to
State and local governments, and outlining actions to
strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, State,
and local entities. Definitions
(2) For the purposes of this directive:
(a) The term ``all-hazards preparedness''
refers to preparedness for domestic terrorist
attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies.
(b) The term ``Federal departments and
agencies'' means those executive departments
enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101, and the Department
of Homeland Security; independent
establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C. 104(1);
Government corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C.
103(1); and the United States Postal Service.
(c) The term ``Federal preparedness
assistance'' means Federal department and
agency grants, cooperative agreements, loans,
loan guarantees, training, and/ or technical
assistance provided to State and local
governments and the private sector to prevent,
prepare for, respond to, and recover from
terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies. Unless noted otherwise, the term
``assistance'' will refer to Federal assistance
programs.
(d) The term ``first responder'' refers to
those individuals who in the early stages of an
incident are responsible for the protection and
preservation of life, property, evidence, and
the environment, including emergency response
providers as defined in section 2 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101),
as well as emergency management, public health,
clinical care, public works, and other skilled
support personnel (such as equipment operators)
that provide immediate support services during
prevention, response, and recovery operations.
(e) The terms ``major disaster'' and
``emergency'' have the meanings given in
section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C.
5122).
(f) The term ``major events'' refers to
domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters,
and other emergencies.
(g) The term ``national homeland security
preparedness-related exercises'' refers to
homeland security-related exercises that train
and test national decision makers and utilize
resources of multiple Federal departments and
agencies. Such exercises may involve State and
local first responders when appropriate. Such
exercises do not include those exercises
conducted solely within a single Federal
department or agency.
(h) The term ``preparedness'' refers to
the existence of plans, procedures, policies,
training, and equipment necessary at the
Federal, State, and local level to maximize the
ability to prevent, respond to, and recover
from major events. The term ``readiness'' is
used interchangeably with preparedness.
(i) The term ``prevention'' refers to
activities undertaken by the first responder
community during the early stages of an
incident to reduce the likelihood or
consequences of threatened or actual terrorist
attacks. More general and broader efforts to
deter, disrupt, or thwart terrorism are not
addressed in this directive.
(j) The term ``Secretary'' means the
Secretary of Homeland Security.
(k) The terms ``State,'' and ``local
government,'' when used in a geographical
sense, have the same meanings given to those
terms in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101).
Relationship to HSPD-5
(3) This directive is a companion to HSPD-5, which
identifies steps for improved coordination in response
to incidents. This directive describes the way Federal
departments and agencies will prepare for such a
response, including prevention activities during the
early stages of a terrorism incident.
Development of a National Preparedness Goal
(4) The Secretary is the principal Federal
official for coordinating the implementation of all-
hazards preparedness in the United States. In
cooperation with other Federal departments and
agencies, the Secretary coordinates the preparedness of
Federal response assets, and the support for, and
assessment of, the preparedness of State and local
first responders.
(5) To help ensure the preparedness of the Nation
to prevent, respond to, and recover from threatened and
actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and
other emergencies, the Secretary, in coordination with
the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and
agencies and in consultation with State and local
governments, shall develop a national domestic all-
hazards preparedness goal. Federal departments and
agencies will work to achieve this goal by:
(a) providing for effective, efficient,
and timely delivery of Federal preparedness
assistance to State and local governments; and
(b) supporting efforts to ensure first
responders are prepared to respond to major
events, especially prevention of and response
to threatened terrorist attacks.
(6) The national preparedness goal will establish
measurable readiness priorities and targets that
appropriately balance the potential threat and
magnitude of terrorist attacks, major disasters, and
other emergencies with the resources required to
prevent, respond to, and recover from them. It will
also include readiness metrics and elements that
support the national preparedness goal including
standards for preparedness assessments and strategies,
and a system for assessing the Nation's overall
preparedness to respond to major events, especially
those involving acts of terrorism.
(7) The Secretary will submit the national
preparedness goal to me through the Homeland Security
Council (HSC) for review and approval prior to, or
concurrently with, the Department of Homeland
Security's Fiscal Year 2006 budget submission to the
Office of Management and Budget.
Federal Preparedness Assistance
(8) The Secretary, in coordination with the
Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (HHS), and the heads of other Federal
departments and agencies that provide assistance for
first responder preparedness, will establish a single
point of access to Federal preparedness assistance
program information within 60 days of the issuance of
this directive. The Secretary will submit to me through
the HSC recommendations of specific Federal department
and agency programs to be part of the coordinated
approach. All Federal departments and agencies will
cooperate with this effort. Agencies will continue to
issue financial assistance awards consistent with
applicable laws and regulations and will ensure that
program announcements, solicitations, application
instructions, and other guidance documents are
consistent with other Federal preparedness programs to
the extent possible. Full implementation of a closely
coordinated interagency grant process will be completed
by September 30, 2005.
(9) To the extent permitted by law, the primary
mechanism for delivery of Federal preparedness
assistance will be awards to the States. Awards will be
delivered in a form that allows the recipients to apply
the assistance to the highest priority preparedness
requirements at the appropriate level of government. To
the extent permitted by law, Federal preparedness
assistance will be predicated on adoption of Statewide
comprehensive all-hazards preparedness strategies. The
strategies should be consistent with the national
preparedness goal, should assess the most effective
ways to enhance preparedness, should address areas
facing higher risk, especially to terrorism, and should
also address local government concerns and Citizen
Corps efforts. The Secretary, in coordination with the
heads of other appropriate Federal departments and
agencies, will review and approve strategies submitted
by the States. To the extent permitted by law, adoption
of approved Statewide strategies will be a requirement
for receiving Federal preparedness assistance at all
levels of government by September 30, 2005.
(10) In making allocations of Federal preparedness
assistance to the States, the Secretary, the Attorney
General, the Secretary of HHS, the Secretary of
Transportation, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary
of Veterans Affairs, the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency, and the heads of other
Federal departments and agencies that provide
assistance for first responder preparedness will base
those allocations on assessments of population
concentrations, critical infrastructures, and other
significant risk factors, particularly terrorism
threats, to the extent permitted by law.
(11) Federal preparedness assistance will support
State and local entities' efforts including planning,
training, exercises, interoperability, and equipment
acquisition for major events as well as capacity
building for prevention activities such as information
gathering, detection, deterrence, and collaboration
related to terrorist attacks. Such assistance is not
primarily intended to support existing capacity to
address normal local first responder operations, but to
build capacity to address major events, especially
terrorism.
(12) The Attorney General, the Secretary of HHS,
the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of
Energy, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency,
and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies
that provide assistance for first responder
preparedness shall coordinate with the Secretary to
ensure that such assistance supports and is consistent
with the national preparedness goal.
(13) Federal departments and agencies will develop
appropriate mechanisms to ensure rapid obligation and
disbursement of funds from their programs to the
States, from States to the local community level, and
from local entities to the end users to derive maximum
benefit from the assistance provided. Federal
departments and agencies will report annually to the
Secretary on the obligation, expenditure status, and
the use of funds associated with Federal preparedness
assistance programs.
Equipment
(14) The Secretary, in coordination with State and
local officials, first responder organizations, the
private sector and other Federal civilian departments
and agencies, shall establish and implement streamlined
procedures for the ongoing development and adoption of
appropriate first responder equipment standards that
support nationwide interoperability and other
capabilities consistent with the national preparedness
goal, including the safety and health of first
responders.
(15) To the extent permitted by law, equipment
purchased through Federal preparedness assistance for
first responders shall conform to equipment standards
in place at time of purchase. Other Federal departments
and agencies that support the purchase of first
responder equipment will coordinate their programs with
the Department of Homeland Security and conform to the
same standards.
(16) The Secretary, in coordination with other
appropriate Federal departments and agencies and in
consultation with State and local governments, will
develop plans to identify and address national first
responder equipment research and development needs
based upon assessments of current and future threats.
Other Federal departments and agencies that support
preparedness research and development activities shall
coordinate their efforts with the Department of
Homeland Security and ensure they support the national
preparedness goal.
Training and Exercises
(17) The Secretary, in coordination with the
Secretary of HHS, the Attorney General, and other
appropriate Federal departments and agencies and in
consultation with State and local governments, shall
establish and maintain a comprehensive training program
to meet the national preparedness goal. The program
will identify standards and maximize the effectiveness
of existing Federal programs and financial assistance
and include training for the Nation's first responders,
officials, and others with major event preparedness,
prevention, response, and recovery roles. Federal
departments and agencies shall include private
organizations in the accreditation and delivery of
preparedness training as appropriate and to the extent
permitted by law.
(18) The Secretary, in coordination with other
appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall
establish a national program and a multi-year planning
system to conduct homeland security preparedness-
related exercises that reinforces identified training
standards, provides for evaluation of readiness, and
supports the national preparedness goal. The
establishment and maintenance of the program will be
conducted in maximum collaboration with State and local
governments and appropriate private sector entities.
All Federal departments and agencies that conduct
national homeland security preparedness-related
exercises shall participate in a collaborative,
interagency process to designate such exercises on a
consensus basis and create a master exercise calendar.
The Secretary will ensure that exercises included in
the calendar support the national preparedness goal. At
the time of designation, Federal departments and
agencies will identify their level of participation in
national homeland security preparedness- related
exercises. The Secretary will develop a multi-year
national homeland security preparedness-related
exercise plan and submit the plan to me through the HSC
for review and approval.
(19) The Secretary shall develop and maintain a
system to collect, analyze, and disseminate lessons
learned, best practices, and information from
exercises, training events, research, and other
sources, including actual incidents, and establish
procedures to improve national preparedness to prevent,
respond to, and recover from major events. The
Secretary, in coordination with other Federal
departments and agencies and State and local
governments, will identify relevant classes of
homeland-security related information and appropriate
means of transmission for the information to be
included in the system. Federal departments and
agencies are directed, and State and local governments
are requested, to provide this information to the
Secretary to the extent permitted by law.
Federal Department and Agency Preparedness
(20) The head of each Federal department or agency
shall undertake actions to support the national
preparedness goal, including adoption of quantifiable
performance measurements in the areas of training,
planning, equipment, and exercises for Federal incident
management and asset preparedness, to the extent
permitted by law. Specialized Federal assets such as
teams, stockpiles, and caches shall be maintained at
levels consistent with the national preparedness goal
and be available for response activities as set forth
in the National Response Plan, other appropriate
operational documents, and applicable authorities or
guidance. Relevant Federal regulatory requirements
should be consistent with the national preparedness
goal. Nothing in this directive shall limit the
authority of the Secretary of Defense with regard to
the command and control, training, planning, equipment,
exercises, or employment of Department of Defense
forces, or the allocation of Department of Defense
resources.
(21) The Secretary, in coordination with other
appropriate Federal civilian departments and agencies,
shall develop and maintain a Federal response
capability inventory that includes the performance
parameters of the capability, the timeframe within
which the capability can be brought to bear on an
incident, and the readiness of such capability to
respond to domestic incidents. The Department of
Defense will provide to the Secretary information
describing the organizations and functions within the
Department of Defense that may be utilized to provide
support to civil authorities during a domestic crisis.
Citizen Participation
(22) The Secretary shall work with other
appropriate Federal departments and agencies as well as
State and local governments and the private sector to
encourage active citizen participation and involvement
in preparedness efforts. The Secretary shall
periodically review and identify the best community
practices for integrating private citizen capabilities
into local preparedness efforts.
Public Communication
(23) The Secretary, in consultation with other
Federal departments and agencies, State and local
governments, and non-governmental organizations, shall
develop a comprehensive plan to provide accurate and
timely preparedness information to public citizens,
first responders, units of government, the private
sector, and other interested parties and mechanisms for
coordination at all levels of government.
Assessment and Evaluation
(24) The Secretary shall provide to me through the
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security an
annual status report of the Nation's level of
preparedness, including State capabilities, the
readiness of Federal civil response assets, the
utilization of mutual aid, and an assessment of how the
Federal first responder preparedness assistance
programs support the national preparedness goal. The
first report will be provided within 1 year of
establishment of the national preparedness goal.
(25) Nothing in this directive alters, or impedes
the ability to carry out, the authorities of the
Federal departments and agencies to perform their
responsibilities under law and consistent with
applicable legal authorities and presidential guidance.
(26) Actions pertaining to the funding and
administration of financial assistance and all other
activities, efforts, and policies in this directive
shall be executed in accordance with law. To the extent
permitted by law, these policies will be established
and carried out in consultation with State and local
governments.
(27) This directive is intended only to improve
the internal management of the executive branch of the
Federal Government, and it is not intended to, and does
not, create any right or benefit, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against
the United States, its departments, agencies, or other
entities, its officers or employees, or any other
person.
GEORGE W. BUSH
Homeland Security Presidential--9
Defense of United States Agriculture and Food
----------
Purpose
(1) This directive establishes a national policy
to defend the agriculture and food system against
terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies.
Background
(2) The United States agriculture and food systems
are vulnerable to disease, pest, or poisonous agents
that occur naturally, are unintentionally introduced,
or are intentionally delivered by acts of terrorism.
Americas agriculture and food system is an extensive,
open, interconnected, diverse, and complex structure
providing potential targets for terrorist attacks. We
should provide the best protection possible against a
successful attack on the United States agriculture and
food system, which could have catastrophic health and
economic effects.
Definitions
(3) In this directive:
(a) The term critical infrastructure has
the meaning given to that term in section
1016(e) of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (42
U.S.C. 5195c(e)).
(b) The term key resources has the meaning
given that term in section 2(9) of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101(9)).
(c) The term Federal departments and
agencies means those executive departments
enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101, and the Department
of Homeland Security; independent
establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C. 104(1);
Government corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C.
103(1); and the United States Postal Service.
(d) The terms State, and local government,
when used in a geographical sense, have the
same meanings given to those terms in section 2
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
101).
(e) The term Sector-Specific Agency means
a Federal department or agency responsible for
infrastructure protection activities in a
designated critical infrastructure sector or
key resources category.
Policy
(4) It is the policy of the United States to
protect the agriculture and food system from terrorist
attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by:
(a) identifying and prioritizing sector-
critical infrastructure and key resources for
establishing protection requirements;
(b) developing awareness and early warning
capabilities to recognize threats;
(c) mitigating vulnerabilities at critical
production and processing nodes;
(d) enhancing screening procedures for
domestic and imported products; and
(e) enhancing response and recovery
procedures.
(5) In implementing this directive, Federal
departments and agencies will ensure that homeland
security programs do not diminish the overall economic
security of the United States
Roles and Responsibilities
(6) As established in Homeland Security
Presidential Directive-7 (HSPD-7), the Secretary of
Homeland Security is responsible for coordinating the
overall national effort to enhance the protection of
the critical infrastructure and key resources of the
United States. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall
serve as the principal Federal official to lead,
integrate, and coordinate implementation of efforts
among Federal departments and agencies, State and local
governments, and the private sector to protect critical
infrastructure and key resources. This directive shall
be implemented in a manner consistent with HSPD-7.
(7) The Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and
Human Services, and the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency will perform their
responsibilities as Sector-Specific Agencies as
delineated in HSPD-7.
Awareness and Warning
(8) The Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture,
Health and Human Services, the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency, and the heads of other
appropriate Federal departments and agencies shall
build upon and expand current monitoring and
surveillance programs to:
(a) develop robust, comprehensive, and
fully coordinated surveillance and monitoring
systems, including international information,
for animal disease, plant disease, wildlife
disease, food, public health, and water quality
that provides early detection and awareness of
disease, pest, or poisonous agents;
(b) develop systems that, as appropriate,
track specific animals and plants, as well as
specific commodities and food; and
(c) develop nationwide laboratory networks
for food, veterinary, plant health, and water
quality that integrate existing Federal and
State laboratory resources, are interconnected,
and utilize standardized diagnostic protocols
and procedures.
(9) The Attorney General, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, and the Director of Central
Intelligence, in coordination with the
Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human
Services, and the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency, shall develop
and enhance intelligence operations and
analysis capabilities focusing on the
agriculture, food, and water sectors. These
intelligence capabilities will include
collection and analysis of information
concerning threats, delivery systems, and
methods that could be directed against these
sectors.
(10) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall
coordinate with the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health
and Human Services, and the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency, and the heads of other
appropriate Federal departments and agencies to create
a new biological threat awareness capacity that will
enhance detection and characterization of an attack.
This new capacity will build upon the improved and
upgraded surveillance systems described in paragraph 8
and integrate and analyze domestic and international
surveillance and monitoring data collected from human
health, animal health, plant health, food, and water
quality systems. The Secretary of Homeland Security
will submit a report to me through the Homeland
Security Council within 90 days of the date of this
directive on specific options for establishing this
capability, including recommendations for its
organizational location and structure.
Vulnerability Assessments
(11) The Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and
Human Services, and Homeland Security shall expand and
continue vulnerability assessments of the agriculture
and food sectors. These vulnerability assessments
should identify requirements of the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan developed by the
Secretary of Homeland Security, as appropriate, and
shall be updated every 2 years.
Mitigation Strategies
(12) The Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Attorney General, working with the Secretaries of
Agriculture, Health and Human Services, the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency,
the Director of Central Intelligence, and the heads of
other appropriate Federal departments and agencies
shall prioritize, develop, and implement, as
appropriate, mitigation strategies to protect
vulnerable critical nodes of production or processing
from the introduction of diseases, pests, or poisonous
agents.
(13) The Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and
Human Services, and Homeland Security shall build on
existing efforts to expand development of common
screening and inspection procedures for agriculture and
food items entering the United States and to maximize
effective domestic inspection activities for food items
within the United States.
Response Planning and Recovery
(14) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in
coordination with the Secretaries of Agriculture,
Health and Human Services, the Attorney General, and
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, will ensure that the combined Federal, State,
and local response capabilities are adequate to respond
quickly and effectively to a terrorist attack, major
disease outbreak, or other disaster affecting the
national agriculture or food infrastructure. These
activities will be integrated with other national
homeland security preparedness activities developed
under HSPD-8 on National Preparedness.
(15) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in
coordination with the Secretaries of Agriculture,
Health and Human Services, the Attorney General, and
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, shall develop a coordinated agriculture and
food-specific standardized response plan that will be
integrated into the National Response Plan. This plan
will ensure a coordinated response to an agriculture or
food incident and will delineate the appropriate roles
of Federal, State, local, and private sector partners,
and will address risk communication for the general
public.
(16) The Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and
Human Services, in coordination with the Secretary of
Homeland Security and the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency, shall enhance recovery
systems that are able to stabilize agriculture
production, the food supply, and the economy, rapidly
remove and effectively dispose of contaminated
agriculture and food products or infected plants and
animals, and decontaminate premises.
(17) The Secretary of Agriculture shall study and
make recommendations to the Homeland Security Council,
within 120 days of the date of this directive, for the
use of existing, and the creation of new, financial
risk management tools encouraging self-protection for
agriculture and food enterprises vulnerable to losses
due to terrorism.
(18) The Secretary of Agriculture, in coordination
with the Secretary of Homeland Security, and in
consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human
Services and the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency, shall work with State and local
governments and the private sector to develop:
(a) A National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS)
containing sufficient amounts of animal
vaccine, antiviral, or therapeutic products to
appropriately respond to the most damaging
animal diseases affecting human health and the
economy and that will be capable of deployment
within 24 hours of an outbreak. The NVS shall
leverage where appropriate the mechanisms and
infrastructure that have been developed for the
management, storage, and distribution of the
Strategic National Stockpile.
(b) A National Plant Disease Recovery
System (NPDRS) capable of responding to a high-
consequence plant disease with pest control
measures and the use of resistant seed
varieties within a single growing season to
sustain a reasonable level of production for
economically important crops. The NPDRS will
utilize the genetic resources contained in the
U.S. National Plant Germplasm System, as well
as the scientific capabilities of the Federal-
State-industry agricultural research and
extension system. The NPDRS shall include
emergency planning for the use of resistant
seed varieties and pesticide control measures
to prevent, slow, or stop the spread of a high-
consequence plant disease, such as wheat smut
or soybean rust.
Outreach and Professional Development
(19) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in
coordination with the Secretaries of Agriculture,
Health and Human Services, and the heads of other
appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall
work with appropriate private sector entities to
establish an effective information sharing and analysis
mechanism for agriculture and food.
(20) The Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and
Human Services, in consultation with the Secretaries of
Homeland Security and Education, shall support the
development of and promote higher education programs
for the protection of animal, plant, and public health.
To the extent permitted by law and subject to
availability of funds, the program will provide
capacity building grants to colleges and schools of
veterinary medicine, public health, and agriculture
that design higher education training programs for
veterinarians in exotic animal diseases, epidemiology,
and public health as well as new programs in plant
diagnosis and treatment.
(21) The Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and
Human Services, in consultation with the Secretaries of
Homeland Security and Education, shall support the
development of and promote a higher education program
to address protection of the food supply. To the extent
permitted by law and subject to the availability of
funds, the program will provide capacity-building
grants to universities for interdisciplinary degree
programs that combine training in food sciences,
agriculture sciences, medicine, veterinary medicine,
epidemiology, microbiology, chemistry, engineering, and
mathematics (statistical modeling) to prepare food
defense professionals.
(22) The Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and
Human Services, and Homeland Security shall establish
opportunities for professional development and
specialized training in agriculture and food
protection, such as internships, fellowships, and other
post-graduate opportunities that provide for homeland
security professional workforce needs.
Research and Development
(23) The Secretaries of Homeland Security,
Agriculture, and Health and Human Services, the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency,
and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments
and agencies, in consultation with the Director of the
Office of Science and Technology Policy, will
accelerate and expand development of current and new
countermeasures against the intentional introduction or
natural occurrence of catastrophic animal, plant, and
zoonotic diseases. The Secretary of Homeland Security
will coordinate these activities. This effort will
include countermeasure research and development of new
methods for detection, prevention technologies, agent
characterization, and dose response relationships for
high-consequence agents in the food and the water
supply.
(24) The Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland
Security will develop a plan to provide safe, secure,
and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment
laboratories that research and develop diagnostic
capabilities for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases.
(25) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Secretaries of Agriculture and
Health and Human Services, shall establish university-
based centers of excellence in agriculture and food
security.
Budget
(26) For all future budgets, the Secretaries of
Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Homeland
Security shall submit to the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, concurrent with their budget
submissions, an integrated budget plan for defense of
the United States food system.
Implementation
(27) Nothing in this directive alters, or impedes
the ability to carry out, the authorities of the
Federal departments and agencies to perform their
responsibilities under law and consistent with
applicable legal authorities and Presidential guidance.
(28) This directive is intended only to improve
the internal management of the executive branch of the
Federal Government, and it is not intended to, and does
not, create any right or benefit, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against
the United States, its departments, agencies, or other
entities, its officers or employees, or any other
person.
GEORGE W. BUSH
Homeland Security Presidential Directive--10
Biodefense for the 21st Century
----------
``Bioterrorism is a real threat to our country. It's a threat
to every nation that loves freedom. Terrorist groups seek
biological weapons; we know some rogue states already have
them....It's important that we confront these real threats to
our country and prepare for future emergencies.''
President George W. Bush
June 12, 2002
``Armed with a single vial of a biological agent small groups
of fanatics, or failing states, could gain the power to
threaten great nations, threaten the world peace. America, and
the entire civilized world, will face this threat for decades
to come. We must confront the danger with open eyes, and
unbending purpose.''
President Bush
February 11, 2004
Biological weapons in the possession of hostile states or
terrorists pose unique and grave threats to the safety and
security of the United States and our allies. Biological
weapons attacks could cause catastrophic harm. They could
inflict widespread injury and result in massive casualties and
economic disruption. Bioterror attacks could mimic naturally-
occurring disease, potentially delaying recognition of an
attack and creating uncertainty about whether one has even
occurred. An attacker may thus believe that he could escape
identification and capture or retaliation.
Biological weapons attacks could be mounted either inside
or outside the United States and, because some biological
weapons agents are contagious, the effects of an initial attack
could spread widely. Disease outbreaks, whether natural or
deliberate, respect no geographic or political borders.
Preventing and controlling future biological weapons
threats will be even more challenging. Advances in
biotechnology and life sciences - including the spread of
expertise to create modified or novel organisms - present the
prospect of new toxins, live agents, and bioregulators that
would require new detection methods, preventive measures, and
treatments. These trends increase the risk for surprise.
Anticipating such threats through intelligence efforts is made
more difficult by the dual-use nature of biological
technologies and infrastructure, and the likelihood that
adversaries will use denial and deception to conceal their
illicit activities. The stakes could not be higher for our
Nation. Attacks with biological weapons could:
1A Cause catastrophic numbers of acute casualties,
long-term disease and disability, psychological trauma,
and mass panic;
1A Disrupt critical sectors of our economy and the
day-to-day lives of Americans; and
1A Create cascading international effects by
disrupting and damaging international trade
relationships, potentially globalizing the impacts of
an attack on United States soil.
Fortunately, the United States possesses formidable
capabilities to mount credible biodefenses. We have mobilized
our unrivaled biomedical research infrastructure and expanded
our international research relationships. In addition, we have
an established medical and public health infrastructure that is
being revitalized and expanded. These capabilities provide a
critical foundation on which to build improved and
comprehensive biodefenses.
The United States has pursued aggressively a broad range of
programs and capabilities to confront the biological weapons
threat. These actions, taken together, represent an
extraordinary level of effort by any measure. Among our
significant accomplishments, we have:
1A Expanded international efforts to keep
dangerous biological materials out of the hands
of terrorists;
1A Launched the Proliferation Security Initiative to
stem the trafficking in weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), including biological weapons;
1A Established the BioWatch program, a network of
environmental sensors to detect biological weapons
attacks against major cities in the United States;
1A Initiated new programs to secure and defend our
agriculture and food systems against biological
contamination;
1A Increased funding for bioterrorism research within
the Department of Health and Human Services by thirty-
fold;
1A Expanded the Strategic National Stockpile of
medicines for treating victims of bioterror attacks,
ensuring that the stockpile's ``push packages'' can be
anywhere in the United States within 12 hours;
1A Stockpiled enough smallpox vaccine for every
American, and vaccinated over 450,000 members of the
armed services;
1A Launched and funded Project BioShield to speed the
development and acquisition of new medical
countermeasures against biological weapons;
1A Provided Federal funds to improve the capacities
of state and local health systems to detect, diagnose,
prevent, and respond to biological weapons attacks; and
1A Worked with the international community to
strengthen global, regional and national programs to
prevent, detect, and respond to biological weapons
attacks.
Building on these accomplishments, we conducted a
comprehensive evaluation of our biological defense capabilities
to identify future priorities and actions to support them. The
results of that study provide a blueprint for our future
biodefense program, Biodefense for the 21st Century, that fully
integrates the sustained efforts of the national and homeland
security, medical, public health, intelligence, diplomatic, and
law enforcement communities.
Specific direction to departments and agencies to carry out
this biodefense program is contained in a classified version of
this directive.
Biodefense for the 21st Century
The United States will continue to use all means necessary
to prevent, protect against, and mitigate biological weapons
attacks perpetrated against our homeland and our global
interests. Defending against biological weapons attacks
requires us to further sharpen our policy, coordination, and
planning to integrate the biodefense capabilities that reside
at the Federal, state, local, and private sector levels. We
must further strengthen the strong international dimension to
our efforts, which seeks close international cooperation and
coordination with friends and allies to maximize our
capabilities for mutual defense against biological weapons
threats.
While the public health philosophy of the 20th Century
emphasizing prevention is ideal for addressing natural disease
outbreaks, it is not sufficient to confront 21st Century
threats where adversaries may use biological weapons agents as
part of a long-term campaign of aggression and terror. Health
care providers and public health officers are among our first
lines of defense. Therefore, we are building on the progress of
the past three years to further improve the preparedness of our
public health and medical systems to address current and future
BW threats and to respond with greater speed and flexibility to
multiple or repetitive attacks.
Private, local, and state capabilities are being augmented
by and coordinated with Federal assets, to provide layered
defenses against biological weapons attacks. These improvements
will complement and enhance our defense against emerging or
reemerging natural infectious diseases.
The traditional approach toward protecting agriculture,
food, and water - focusing on the natural or unintentional
introduction of a disease - also is being greatly strengthened
by focused efforts to address current and anticipated future
biological weapons threats that may be deliberate, multiple,
and repetitive.
Finally, we are continuing to adapt United States military
forces to meet the biological weapons challenge. We have long
recognized that adversaries may seek biological weapons to
overcome our conventional strength and to deter us from
responding to aggression. A demonstrated military capability to
defend against biological weapons and other WMD strengthens our
forward military presence in regions vital to United States
security, promotes deterrence, and provides reassurance to
critical friends and allies. The Department of Defense will
continue to ensure that United States military forces can
operate effectively in the face of biological weapons attacks,
and that our troops and our critical domestic and overseas
installations are effectively protected against such threats.
Pillars of Our Biodefense Program
The essential pillars of our national biodefense program
are: Threat Awareness, Prevention and Protection, Surveillance
and Detection, and Response and Recovery.
Successful implementation of our program requires
optimizing critical cross-cutting functions such as:
information management and communications; research development
and acquisition; creation and maintenance of needed biodefense
infrastructure, including the human capital to support it;
public preparedness; and strengthened bilateral, multilateral,
and international cooperation.
National biodefense preparedness and response requires the
involvement of a wide range of Federal departments and
agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal
Federal official for domestic incident management and is
responsible for coordinating domestic Federal operations to
prepare for, respond to, and recover from biological weapons
attacks. The Secretary of Homeland Security coordinates, as
appropriate, with the heads of other Federal departments and
agencies, to effectively accomplish this mission.
The Secretary of State is the principal Federal officer
responsible for international terrorist incidents that take
place outside the U.S. territory, including United States
support for foreign consequence management and coordinates, as
appropriate, with heads of other Federal departments and
agencies, to effectively accomplish this mission. When
requested by the Secretary of State, and approved by the
Secretary of Defense, the Department of Defense will support
United States foreign consequence management operations, as
appropriate.
The following sections describe our aims and objectives for
further progress under each of the pillars of our national
biodefense program, as well as highlight key roles played by
Federal departments and agencies.
Threat Awareness Biological Warfare Related Intelligence
Timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence enables all
aspects of our national biodefense program. Despite the
inherent challenges of identifying and characterizing
biological weapons programs and anticipating biological
attacks, we are improving the Intelligence Community's ability
to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence. We are
increasing the resources dedicated to these missions and
adopting more aggressive approaches for accomplishing them.
Among our many initiatives, we are continuing to develop more
forward-looking analyses, to include Red Teaming efforts, to
understand new scientific trends that may be exploited by our
adversaries to develop biological weapons and to help position
intelligence collectors ahead of the problem.
Assessments
Another critical element of our biodefense policy is the
development of periodic assessments of the evolving biological
weapons threat. First, the United States requires a continuous,
formal process for conducting routine capabilities assessments
to guide prioritization of our on-going investments in
biodefense-related research, development, planning, and
preparedness. These assessments will be tailored to meet the
requirements in each of these areas. Second, the United States
requires a periodic senior-level policy net assessment that
evaluates progress in implementing this policy, identifies
continuing gaps or vulnerabilities in our biodefense posture,
and makes recommendations for re-balancing and refining
investments among the pillars of our overall biodefense policy.
The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with other
appropriate Federal departments and agencies, will be
responsible for conducting these assessments.
Anticipation of Future Threats
The proliferation of biological materials, technologies,
and expertise increases the potential for adversaries to design
a pathogen to evade our existing medical and non-medical
countermeasures. To address this challenge, we are taking
advantage of these same technologies to ensure that we can
anticipate and prepare for the emergence of this threat. We are
building the flexibility and speed to characterize such agents,
assess existing defenses, and rapidly develop safe and
effective countermeasures. In addition, we must guard against
the spread of potentially infectious agents from beyond our
borders. We are strengthening the ability of our medical,
public health, agricultural, defense, law enforcement,
diplomatic, environmental, and transportation infrastructures
to recognize and confront such threats and to contain their
impact. The Department of Health and Human Services, in
coordination with other appropriate Federal departments and
agencies, is working to ensure an integrated and focused
national effort to anticipate and respond to emerging
biological weapons threats.
Prevention and Protection
Proactive Prevention
Preventing biological weapons attacks is by far the most
cost-effective approach to biodefense. Prevention requires the
continuation and expansion of current multilateral initiatives
to limit the access of agents, technology, and know-how to
countries, groups, or individuals seeking to develop, produce,
and use these agents.
To address this challenge, we are further enhancing
diplomacy, arms control, law enforcement, multilateral export
controls, and threat reduction assistance that impede
adversaries seeking biological weapons capabilities. Federal
departments and agencies with existing authorities will
continue to expand threat reduction assistance programs aimed
at preventing the proliferation of biological weapons
expertise. We will continue to build international coalitions
to support these efforts, encouraging increased political and
financial support for nonproliferation and threat reduction
programs. We will also continue to expand efforts to control
access and use of pathogens to strengthen security and
prevention.
The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction, released in December 2002, places special emphasis
on the need for proactive steps to confront WMD threats.
Consistent with this approach, we have improved and will
further improve our ability to detect and destroy an
adversary's biological weapons assets before they can be used.
We are also further expanding existing capabilities to
interdict enabling technologies and materials, including
through the Proliferation Security Initiative. Additionally, we
are working to improve supporting intelligence capabilities to
provide timely and accurate information to support proactive
prevention.
Responsibilities for proactive prevention are wide-ranging,
with the Department of State, Department of Defense, Department
of Justice, and the Intelligence Community playing critical
roles in our overall government-wide effort.
Critical Infrastructure Protection
Protecting our critical infrastructure from the effects of
biological weapons attacks is a priority. A biological weapons
attack might deny us access to essential facilities and
response capabilities. Therefore, we are working to improve the
survivability and ensure the continuity and restoration of
operations of critical infrastructure sectors following
biological weapons attacks. Assessing the vulnerability of this
infrastructure, particularly the medical, public health, food,
water, energy, agricultural, and transportation sectors, is the
focus of current efforts. The Department of Homeland Security,
in coordination with other appropriate Federal departments and
agencies, leads these efforts, which include developing and
deploying biodetection technologies and decontamination
methodologies.
Surveillance and Detection
Attack Warning
Early warning, detection, or recognition of biological
weapons attacks to permit a timely response to mitigate their
consequences is an essential component of biodefense. Through
the President's recently proposed biosurveillance initiative,
the United States is working to develop an integrated and
comprehensive attack warning system to rapidly recognize and
characterize the dispersal of biological agents in human and
animal populations, food, water, agriculture, and the
environment. Creating a national bioawareness system will
permit the recognition of a biological attack at the earliest
possible moment and permit initiation of a robust response to
prevent unnecessary loss of life, economic losses, and social
disruption. Such a system will be built upon and reinforce
existing Federal, state, local, and international surveillance
systems. The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination
with other appropriate Federal departments and agencies,
integrates these efforts.
Attribution
Deterrence is the historical cornerstone of our defense,
and attribution - the identification of the perpetrator as well
as method of attack .- forms the foundation upon which
deterrence rests. Biological weapons, however, lend themselves
to covert or clandestine attacks that could permit the
perpetrator to remain anonymous. We are enhancing our
deterrence posture by improving attribution capabilities. We
are improving our capability to perform technical forensic
analysis and to assimilate all-source information to enable
attribution assessments. We have created and designated the
National Bioforensic Analysis Center of the National Biodefense
Analysis and Countermeasure Center, under the Department of
Homeland Security, as the lead Federal facility to conduct and
facilitate the technical forensic analysis and interpretation
of materials recovered following a biological attack in support
of the appropriate lead Federal agency.
Response and Recovery
Once a biological weapons attack is detected, the speed and
coordination of the Federal, state, local, private sector, and
international response will be critical in mitigating the
lethal, medical, psychological, and economic consequences of
such attacks. Responses to biological weapons attacks depend on
pre-attack planning and preparedness, capabilities to treat
casualties, risk communications, physical control measures,
medical countermeasures, and decontamination capabilities.
Response Planning
A biological response annex is being drafted as part of our
National Response Plan (NRP). We are catalyzing the development
of state and local plans that are consistent with the NRP and
ensure a seamless coordinated effort. Capabilities required for
response and mitigation against biological attacks will be
based on interagency-agreed scenarios that are derived from
plausible threat assessments. These plans will be regularly
tested as part of Federal, state, local, and international
exercises. The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination
with other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, is
developing comprehensive plans that provide for seamless,
coordinated Federal, state, local, and international responses
to a biological attack.
Mass Casualty Care
Following a biological weapons attack, all necessary means
must be rapidly brought to bear to prevent loss of life,
illness, psychological trauma, and to contain the spread of
potentially contagious diseases. Provision of timely preventive
treatments such as antibiotics or vaccines saves lives,
protects scarce medical capabilities, preserves social order,
and is cost effective.
The Administration is working closely with state and local
public health officials to strengthen plans to swiftly
distribute needed medical countermeasures. Moreover, we are
working to expand and, where needed, create new Federal, state,
and local medical and public health capabilities for all-hazard
mass casualty care.
The Department of Health and Human Services, in
coordination with other appropriate Federal departments and
agencies, is the principal Federal agency responsible for
coordinating all Federal-level assets activated to support and
augment the state and local medical and public health response
to mass casualty events. For those mass casualty incidents that
require parallel deployment of Federal assets in other
functional areas such as transportation or law enforcement, the
Department of Homeland Security will coordinate the overall
Federal response in accordance with its statutory authorities
for domestic incident management. Under certain circumstances,
the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of
Defense, given their specialized expertise and experience, may
be called upon to play important supporting roles in mass
casualty care.
Risk Communication
A critical adjunct capability to mass casualty care is
effective risk communication. Timely communications with the
general public and the medical and public health communities
can significantly influence the success of response efforts,
including health- and life-sustaining interventions. Efforts
will be made to develop communication strategies, plans,
products, and channels to reach all segments of our society,
including those with physical or language limitations. These
efforts will ensure timely domestic and international
dissemination of information that educates and reassures the
general public and relevant professional sectors before,
during, and after an attack or other public health emergency.
The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with
other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, is
developing comprehensive coordinated risk communication
strategies to facilitate emergency preparedness for biological
weapons attacks. This includes travel and citizen advisories,
international coordination and communication, and response and
recovery communications in the event of a large-scale
biological attack.
Medical Countermeasure Development
Development and deployment of safe, effective medical
countermeasures against biological weapons agents of concern
remains an urgent priority. The National Institutes of Health
(NIH), under the direction of the Department of Health and
Human Services, is working with the Department of Homeland
Security, the Department of Defense, and other agencies to
shape and execute an aggressive research program to develop
better medical countermeasures. NIH.s work increasingly will
reflect the potential for novel or genetically engineered
biological weapons agents and possible scenarios that require
providing broad-spectrum coverage against a range of possible
biological threats to prevent illness even after exposure.
Additionally, we have begun construction of new labs. We are
striving to assure the nation has the infrastructure required
to test and evaluate existing, proposed, or promising
countermeasures, assess their safety and effectiveness,
expedite their development, and ensure rapid licensure.
The Department of Health and Human Services, in
coordination with other appropriate Federal departments and
agencies, will continue to ensure the development and
availability of sufficient quantities of safe and efficacious
medical countermeasures to mitigate illness and death in the
event of a biological weapons attack.
Decontamination
Recovering from a biological weapons attack may require
significant decontamination and remediation activities. We are
working to improve Federal capabilities to support states and
localities in their efforts to rapidly assess, decontaminate,
and return to pre-attack activities, and are developing
standards and protocols for the most effective approaches for
these activities.
The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency,
in coordination with the Attorney General and the Secretaries
of Defense, Agriculture, Labor, Health and Human Services, and
Homeland Security, is developing specific standards, protocols,
and capabilities to address the risks of contamination
following a biological weapons attack and developing
strategies, guidelines, and plans for decontamination of
persons, equipment, and facilities.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive--11
Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures
----------
(1) In order more effectively to detect and
interdict individuals known or reasonably suspected to
be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in
preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism
(``suspected terrorists'') and terrorist activities, it
is the policy of the United States to:
(a) enhance terrorist-related screening
(as defined below) through comprehensive,
coordinated procedures that detect, identify,
track, and interdict people, cargo,
conveyances, and other entities and objects
that pose a threat to homeland security, and to
do so in a manner that safeguards legal rights,
including freedoms, civil liberties, and
information privacy guaranteed by Federal law,
and builds upon existing risk assessment
capabilities while facilitating the efficient
movement of people, cargo, conveyances, and
other potentially affected activities in
commerce; and
(b) implement a coordinated and
comprehensive approach to terrorist-related
screening - in immigration, law enforcement,
intelligence, counterintelligence, and
protection of the border, transportation
systems, and critical infrastructure - that
supports homeland security, at home and abroad.
(2) This directive builds upon HSPD-6,
``Integration and Use of Screening Information to
Protect Against Terrorism.'' The Terrorist Screening
Center (TSC), which was established and is administered
by the Attorney General pursuant to HSPD-6, enables
Government officials to check individuals against a
consolidated Terrorist Screening Center Database. Other
screening activities underway within the Terrorist
Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and the Department of
Homeland Security further strengthen the ability of the
United States Government to protect the people,
property, and territory of the United States against
acts of terrorism.
(3) In this directive, the term ``terrorist-
related screening'' means the collection, analysis,
dissemination, and use of information related to
people, cargo, conveyances, and other entities and
objects that pose a threat to homeland security.
Terrorist-related screening also includes risk
assessment, inspection, and credentialing.
(4) Not later than 75 days after the date of this
directive, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretaries
of State, Defense, Transportation, Energy, Health and
Human Services, Commerce, and Agriculture, the
Directors of Central Intelligence and the Office of
Management and Budget, and the heads of other
appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall
submit to me, through the Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security, a report setting forth plans and
progress in the implementation of this directive,
including as further described in sections 5 and 6 of
this directive.
(5) The report shall outline a strategy to enhance
the effectiveness of terrorist-related screening
activities, in accordance with the policy set forth in
section 1 of this directive, by developing
comprehensive, coordinated, systematic terrorist-
related screening procedures and capabilities that also
take into account the need to:
(a) maintain no less than current levels
of security created by existing screening and
protective measures;
(b) encourage innovations that exceed
established standards;
(c) ensure sufficient flexibility to
respond rapidly to changing threats and
priorities;
(d) permit flexibility to incorporate
advancements into screening applications and
technology rapidly;
(e) incorporate security features,
including unpredictability, that resist
circumvention to the greatest extent possible;
(f) build upon existing systems and best
practices and, where appropriate, integrate,
consolidate, or eliminate duplicative systems
used for terrorist-related screening;
(g) facilitate legitimate trade and
travel, both domestically and internationally;
(h) limit delays caused by screening
procedures that adversely impact foreign
relations, or economic, commercial, or
scientific interests of the United States; and
(i) enhance information flow between
various screening programs.
(6) The report shall also include the following:
(a) the purposes for which individuals
will undergo terrorist-related screening;
(b) a description of the screening
opportunities to which terrorist-related
screening will be applied;
(c) the information individuals must
present, including, as appropriate, the type of
biometric identifier or other form of
identification or identifying information to be
presented, at particular screening
opportunities;
(d) mechanisms to protect data, including
during transfer of information;
(e) mechanisms to address data
inaccuracies, including names inaccurately
contained in the terrorist screening data
consolidated pursuant to HSPD-6;
(f) the procedures and frequency for
screening people, cargo, and conveyances;
(g) protocols to support consistent risk
assessment and inspection procedures;
(h) the skills and training required for
the screeners at screening opportunities;
(i) the hierarchy of consequences that
should occur if a risk indicator is generated
as a result of a screening opportunity;
(j) mechanisms for sharing information
among screeners and all relevant Government
agencies, including results of screening and
new information acquired regarding suspected
terrorists between screening opportunities;
(k) recommended research and development
on technologies designed to enhance screening
effectiveness and further protect privacy
interests; and
(l) a plan for incorporating known
traveler programs into the screening
procedures, where appropriate.
(7) Not later than 90 days after the date of this
directive, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
coordination with the heads of the Federal departments
and agencies listed in section 4 of this directive,
shall also provide to me, through the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, a prioritized
investment and implementation plan for a systematic
approach to terrorist-related screening that optimizes
detection and interdiction of suspected terrorists and
terrorist activities. The plan shall describe the
scope, governance, principles, outcomes, milestones,
training objectives, metrics, costs, and schedule of
activities to implement the policy set forth in section
1 of this directive. The Secretary of Homeland Security
shall further provide a report on the status of the
implementation of the plan to me through the Assistant
to the President for Homeland Security 6 months after
the date of this directive and shall thereafter report
to me on such progress or any recommended changes from
time to time as appropriate.
(8) In order to ensure comprehensive and
coordinated terrorist-related screening procedures, the
implementation of this directive shall be consistent
with Government-wide efforts to improve information
sharing. Additionally, the reports and plan required
under sections 4 and 7 of this directive shall inform
development of Government-wide information sharing
improvements.
(9) This directive does not alter existing
authorities or responsibilities of department and
agency heads including to carry out operational
activities or provide or receive information. This
directive is intended only to improve the internal
management of the executive branch of the Federal
Government, and it is not intended to, and does not,
create any right or benefit enforceable at law or in
equity by any party against the United States, its
departments, agencies, entities, officers, employees,
or agents, or any other person.
GEORGE W. BUSH
Homeland Security Presidential Directive--12
Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal
Employees and Contractors
----------
(1) Wide variations in the quality and security of
forms of identification used to gain access to secure
Federal and other facilities where there is potential
for terrorist attacks need to be eliminated. Therefore,
it is the policy of the United States to enhance
security, increase Government efficiency, reduce
identity fraud, and protect personal privacy by
establishing a mandatory, Government-wide standard for
secure and reliable forms of identification issued by
the Federal Government to its employees and contractors
(including contractor employees).
(2) To implement the policy set forth in paragraph
(1), the Secretary of Commerce shall promulgate in
accordance with applicable law a Federal standard for
secure and reliable forms of identification (the
``Standard'') not later than 6 months after the date of
this directive in consultation with the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Director
of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. The
Secretary of Commerce shall periodically review the
Standard and update the Standard as appropriate in
consultation with the affected agencies.
(3) ``Secure and reliable forms of
identification'' for purposes of this directive means
identification that
(a) is issued based on sound criteria for
verifying an individual employee's identity;
(b) is strongly resistant to identity
fraud, tampering, counterfeiting, and terrorist
exploitation;
(c) can be rapidly authenticated
electronically; and
(d) is issued only by providers whose
reliability has been established by an official
accreditation process. The Standard will
include graduated criteria, from least secure
to most secure, to ensure flexibility in
selecting the appropriate level of security for
each application. The Standard shall not apply
to identification associated with national
security systems as defined by 44 U.S.C.
3542(b)(2).
(4) Not later than 4 months following promulgation
of the Standard, the heads of executive departments and
agencies shall have a program in place to ensure that
identification issued by their departments and agencies
to Federal employees and contractors meets the
Standard. As promptly as possible, but in no case later
than 8 months after the date of promulgation of the
Standard, the heads of executive departments and
agencies shall, to the maximum extent practicable,
require the use of identification by Federal employees
and contractors that meets the Standard in gaining
physical access to Federally controlled facilities and
logical access to Federally controlled information
systems. Departments and agencies shall implement this
directive in a manner consistent with ongoing
Government-wide activities, policies and guidance
issued by OMB, which shall ensure compliance.
(5) Not later than 6 months following promulgation
of the Standard, the heads of executive departments and
agencies shall identify to the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and the Director of OMB
those Federally controlled facilities, Federally
controlled information systems, and other Federal
applications that are important for security and for
which use of the Standard in circumstances not covered
by this directive should be considered. Not later than
7 months following the promulgation of the Standard,
the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security
and the Director of OMB shall make recommendations to
the President concerning possible use of the Standard
for such additional Federal applications.
(6) This directive shall be implemented in a
manner consistent with the Constitution and applicable
laws, including the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) and
other statutes protecting the rights of Americans.
(7) Nothing in this directive alters, or impedes
the ability to carry out, the authorities of the
Federal departments and agencies to perform their
responsibilities under law and consistent with
applicable legal authorities and presidential guidance.
This directive is intended only to improve the internal
management of the executive branch of the Federal
Government, and it is not intended to, and does not,
create any right or benefit enforceable at law or in
equity by any party against the United States, its
departments, agencies, entities, officers, employees or
agents, or any other person.
(8) The Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security shall report to me not later than 7 months
after the promulgation of the Standard on progress made
to implement this directive, and shall thereafter
report to me on such progress or any recommended
changes from time to time as appropriate.
GEORGE W. BUSH
Homeland Security Presidential Directive--13
(National Security Presidential Directive--41)
Maritime Security Policy
----------
Memorandum for
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of the Interior
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Transportation
The Secretary of Energy
The Secretary of Homeland Security
Chief of Staff to the President
Director, Office of Management and Budget
The United States Trade Representative
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Counsel to the President
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security
Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality
Director of Central Intelligence
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant of the Coast Guard
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Director, National Counterterrorism Center
This directive establishes U.S. policy, guidelines, and
implementation actions to enhance U.S. national security and
homeland security by protecting U.S. maritime interests. It
directs the coordination of United States Government maritime
security programs and initiatives to achieve a comprehensive
and cohesive national effort involving appropriate Federal,
State, local, and private sector entities. This directive also
establishes a Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee
to coordinate interagency maritime security policy efforts. As
specified herein, the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security, in cooperation with appropriate Federal
departments and agencies, will jointly coordinate the
implementation of the policy set forth in Section II of this
directive.
I. BACKGROUND
For the purposes of this directive, ``Maritime
Domain'' means all areas and things of, on, under,
relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean,
or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-
related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and
vessels and other conveyances. Due to its complex
nature and immense size, the Maritime Domain is
particularly susceptible to exploitation and disruption
by individuals, organizations, and States. The Maritime
Domain facilitates a unique freedom of movement and
flow of goods while allowing people, cargo, and
conveyances to transit with anonymity not generally
available by movement over land or by air. Individuals
and organizations hostile to the United States have
demonstrated a continuing desire to exploit such
vulnerabilities. The United States must deploy the full
range of its operational assets and capabilities to
prevent the Maritime Domain from being used by
terrorists, criminals, and hostile States to commit
acts of terrorism and criminal or other unlawful or
hostile acts against the United States, its people,
economy, property, territory, allies, and friends,
while recognizing that maritime security policies are
most effective when the strategic importance of
international trade, economic cooperation, and the free
flow of commerce are considered appropriately.
II. POLICY
The security of the Maritime Domain is a global
issue. The United States, in cooperation with our
allies and friends around the world and our State,
local, and private sector partners, will work to ensure
that lawful private and public activities in the
Maritime Domain are protected against attack and
criminal and otherwise unlawful or hostile
exploitation. These efforts are critical to global
economic stability and growth and are vital to the
interests of the United States.
It is the policy of the United States to take all
necessary and appropriate actions, consistent with U.S.
law, treaties and other international agreements to
which the United States is a party, and customary
international law as determined for the United States
by the President, to enhance the security of and
protect U.S. interests in the Maritime Domain,
including the following:
1A Preventing terrorist attacks or criminal
acts or hostile acts in, or the unlawful
exploitation of, the Maritime Domain, and
reducing the vulnerability of the Maritime
Domain to such acts and exploitation;
1A Enhancing U.S. national security and
homeland security by protecting U.S. population
centers, critical infrastructure, borders,
harbors, ports, and coastal approaches in the
Maritime Domain;
1A Expediting recovery and response from
attacks within the Maritime Domain;
1A Maximizing awareness of security issues in
the Maritime Domain in order to support U.S.
forces and improve United States Government
actions in response to identified threats;
1A Enhancing international relationships and
promoting the integration of U.S. allies and
international and private sector partners into
an improved global maritime security framework
to advance common security interests in the
Maritime Domain; and
1A Ensuring seamless, coordinated
implementation of authorities and
responsibilities relating to the security of
the Maritime Domain by and among Federal
departments and agencies. These actions must be
undertaken in a manner that facilitates global
commerce and preserves the freedom of the seas
for legitimate military and commercial
navigation and other legitimate activities as
well as civil liberties and the rights
guaranteed under the Constitution.
III. POLICY COORDINATION
The Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee
(MSPCC) is hereby established, consistent with NSPD-1
and HSPD-1. The MSPCC, in consultation with the
relevant regional and functional policy coordinating
committees of the Federal Government, and without
exercising operational oversight, shall act as the
primary forum for interagency coordination of the
implementation of this directive. As part of that
effort, the MSPCC shall review existing interagency
practices, coordination, and execution of U.S. policies
and strategies relating to maritime security, and shall
recommend specific improvements to all of them as
warranted. The MSPCC shall provide analysis of new U.S.
policies, strategies, and initiatives relating to
maritime security for consideration by the Deputies and
Principals Committees of the NSC and the HSC, and
subsequently by the NSC and the HSC, and shall ensure
ongoing coordination and implementation of such
policies, strategies, and initiatives.
The reviews, plans, and recommendations required by
this directive (as set forth in Sections IV and V
below) shall be completed by the departments and
agencies designated herein in coordination with the
MSPCC, and shall then be prepared for consideration by
and submitted to the Deputies and Principals Committees
of the NSC and the HSC, and subsequently to the NSC and
the HSC.
The MSPCC shall be co-chaired by an NSC staff
representative selected by the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs and an HSC
representative selected by the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security, and shall include the
following officers or their designated representatives:
1A The Vice President
1A The Secretary of State
1A The Secretary of the Treasury
1A The Secretary of Defense
1A The Attorney General
1A The Secretary of the Interior
1A The Secretary of Commerce
1A The Secretary of Transportation
1A The Secretary of Energy
1A The Secretary of Homeland Security
1A Director, Office of Management and Budget
1A The United States Trade Representative
1A Chairman of the Council on Environmental
Quality
1A Director of Central Intelligence
1A Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
1A Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
1A Director, National Counterterrorism Center
The co-chairs of the MSPCC may invite
representatives of other departments and agencies to
attend MSPCC meetings as they deem appropriate.
IV. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
National Strategy for Maritime Security.
A coordinated and integrated government-wide effort
to enhance the security of the Maritime Domain requires
an over-arching strategy. The Secretaries of Defense
and Homeland Security shall jointly lead a
collaborative interagency effort to draft a recommended
National Strategy for Maritime Security, which shall be
submitted for my consideration within 180 days after
the effective date of this directive. Such a strategy
must present an over-arching plan to implement this
directive and address all of the components of the
Maritime Domain, including domestic, international,
public, and private components. It shall further
incorporate a global, cross-discipline approach to the
Maritime Domain centered on a layered, defense-in-depth
framework that may be adjusted based on the threat
level. The strategy shall build on current efforts and
those initiated by this directive, as well as
complement existing strategies, tools, and resources.
All relevant Federal departments and agencies shall
cooperate with the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland
Security in this effort and provide all appropriate
assistance.
V. POLICY ACTIONS
In concert with the development of a National
Strategy for Maritime Security, the following actions
shall be taken: Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).
Maritime Domain Awareness is the effective
understanding of anything associated with the global
Maritime Domain that could impact the security, safety,
economy, or environment of the United States. It is
critical that the United States develop an enhanced
capability to identify threats to the Maritime Domain
as early and as distant from our shores as possible by
integrating intelligence, surveillance, observation,
and navigation systems into a common operating picture
accessible throughout the United States Government.
The Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security
have established a Maritime Domain Awareness Senior
Steering Group (MDASSG). The MDASSG is co-chaired by
representatives of the Secretaries of Defense and
Homeland Security and includes representatives from
departments and agencies that will participate in the
MSPCC.
The MDASSG shall coordinate national efforts to
achieve maximum Maritime Domain Awareness. No later
than 180 days after the effective date of this
directive, the MDASSG will develop and submit to me,
through the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland
Security, a national plan to improve Maritime Domain
Awareness, which shall include near-term and long-term
objectives, required program and resource implications,
and any recommendations for organizational or policy
changes.
Global Maritime Intelligence Integration.
A robust and coordinated intelligence effort serves
as the foundation for effective security efforts in the
Maritime Domain. In support of this effort, I direct
the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, with
the support of the Director of Central Intelligence,
and in coordination with the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to use existing
intelligence capabilities to integrate all available
intelligence on a global basis regarding the location,
identity, and operational capabilities and intentions
of potential threats to U.S. interests in the Maritime
Domain. The Secretaries of Defense and Homeland
Security, with the support of the Director of Central
Intelligence, and in coordination with the Director of
the NCTC, the Director of the FBI, and other
appropriate departments and agencies, shall submit to
me for approval, through the Assistants to the
President for National Security Affairs and Homeland
Security, a plan for global maritime intelligence
integration within 180 days after the effective date of
this directive. The plan shall include appropriate
interagency participation to ensure effective
government-wide sharing of information and data
critical to intelligence production.
Domestic Outreach.
A successful strategy to implement this directive
must include coordination with State and local
authorities and consultation with appropriate private
sector persons and entities. The Secretary of Homeland
Security, in coordination with the Attorney General and
the Secretaries of the Treasury, Interior, Commerce,
and Transportation, shall lead the development of a
comprehensive engagement plan that ensures that the
interests of State and local governments and the
private sector are considered in the Federal
Government's implementation of this directive. The plan
shall be completed within 180 days after the effective
date of this directive and shall take effect upon
approval by the Secretary of Homeland Security.
Coordination of International Efforts and International
Outreach.
Ensuring the security of the Maritime Domain must
be a global effort, in which United States Government
efforts are developed and furthered with the support of
other governments and international organizations
resulting in lasting international cooperation. The
Secretary of State shall lead the coordination of
United States Government initiatives in the
implementation of this directive with regard to
activities with foreign governments and international
organizations. All Federal departments and agencies
shall coordinate with the Department of State on
policies, programs, and initiatives relating to the
implementation of this directive that could affect the
conduct of foreign policy. In addition, the Secretary
of State, in coordination with the Secretaries of
Defense, Commerce, Transportation, and Homeland
Security, and the U.S. Trade Representative, and in
consultation with appropriate private sector persons
and entities, shall develop, within 180 days after the
effective date of this directive, a comprehensive plan
to solicit international support for an improved global
maritime security framework. Such plan shall take
effect upon approval by the Secretary of State.
Maritime Threat Response.
The Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security,
in consultation with the Attorney General and the
Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Commerce, and
Transportation, shall develop a comprehensive National
Maritime Security Response Plan to ensure seamless
United States Government response to maritime threats
against the United States. This plan, when approved by
me, shall supplement the National Response Plan
required by HSPD-5 and complement the critical
infrastructure protection plans required by HSPD-7 and
the domestic all-hazards preparedness goals and
structures required by HSPD-8. The plan, at a minimum,
shall reflect lead agency roles and responsibilities,
including recommendations regarding changes to existing
policy, including those reflected in PDD-39 and PDD-62,
in the following areas:
1) maritime security response and
counterterrorism operations;
2) maritime interception operations;
3) prevention and detection of, and
response to, the mining of U.S. ports;
4) detection, interdiction and disposition
of targeted cargo, people, and vessels; and
5) attacks on vessels with U.S. citizens
aboard or that affect U.S. interests anywhere
in the world.
The plan also shall:
1) include recommended protocols that
establish clear coordination relationships
governing protection and defense of the United
States against threats to its interests in the
Maritime Domain; and
2) provide recommendations concerning the
designation of an interagency planning and
command-and-control entity to ensure unity of
command for national execution of maritime
security policy. An interim plan shall be
submitted no later than 180 days after the
effective date of this directive, through the
Assistants to the President for National
Security Affairs and Homeland Security, and
shall be finalized after completion of the
National Strategy for Maritime Security.
Maritime Infrastructure Recovery.
Rapid recovery from an attack or similar disruption
in the Maritime Domain is critical to the economic
well-being of our Nation. A credible capability for
rapid recovery will not only minimize an incident's
economic impact but also serve as a deterrent. The
Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with
other appropriate officials, including the Secretaries
of Defense, State, the Treasury, the Interior,
Commerce, and Transportation, and in consultation with
key industry stakeholders, shall be responsible for the
development of recommended minimum Federal standards,
where appropriate, for maritime recovery operations,
and shall develop comprehensive national maritime
infrastructure recovery standards and a plan,
complementary to the national preparedness goals and
standards required by HSPD-8. Such standards and plan
shall be completed no later than 180 days after the
effective date of this directive, shall focus on the
restoration of physical assets and transportation
systems, and shall take effect when approved by the
Secretary of Homeland Security. The standards and plan
also shall describe a maritime infrastructure recovery
exercise program consistent with the National Exercise
Program administered by the Department of Homeland
Security. The program shall address coordination with
State, local, and private sector partners, and
cooperation with foreign governments and international
entities as appropriate.
Maritime Transportation System Security.
The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination
with the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce, and
Transportation, and the U.S. Trade Representative, and
in consultation with appropriate industry
representatives, shall develop recommendations for
improvements to the national and international
regulatory framework with respect to licensing,
carriage, communications, safety equipment, and other
critical systems for all private vessels, including
commercial vessels, operating in the Maritime
Domain.The recommendations shall be submitted to me,
through the Assistants to the President for National
Security Affairs and Homeland Security, no later than
180 days after the effective date of this directive.
Maritime Commerce Security.
To implement this directive effectively and to
enhance economic growth, the United States must promote
global supply chain security practices to reduce the
risk of terrorists or criminals acting against the
United States from within the Maritime Domain. The
Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with
the Secretaries of Defense, State, the Treasury,
Commerce, Transportation, and Energy and the U.S. Trade
Representative shall lead a collaborative interagency
effort, in consultation with appropriate industry
representatives, to develop a comprehensive
international maritime supply chain security plan no
later than 180 days after the effective date of this
directive. The plan shall define supply-chain security
requirements, include recommendations to further secure
commercial operations from point of origin to point of
destination, build on available resources, and provide
a recommended framework of roles, responsibilities, and
implementation actions. The plan shall define
measurable national ``end state'' supply chain security
goals and develop contingency plans to continue the
flow of commerce in the event of an incident
necessitating total or partial closure of U.S. borders
to maritime commerce. The plan shall take effect upon
approval by the Secretary of Homeland Security.
VI. GENERAL.
This directive does not alter existing authorities
or responsibilities of the department and agency heads,
including their authorities, to carry out operational
activities or to provide or receive information. This
directive is intended only to improve the internal
management of the Executive Branch and is not intended
to, and does not; create any right or benefit
enforceable at law or in equity by any party against
the United States, its departments, agencies, entities,
officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
Nothing in this directive impairs or otherwise
affects the authority of the Secretary of Defense over
the Department of Defense, including the chain of
command for military forces from the President and
Commander-in-Chief, to the Secretary of Defense, to the
commander of military forces, or military command and
control procedures.
The Assistants to the President for National
Security Affairs and Homeland Security and the Chairman
of the Council on Environmental Quality shall
coordinate as appropriate the work of the MSPCC under
this directive and the work of the Committee on Ocean
Policy under the Executive Order of December 17, 2004.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive--14
(National Security Presidential Directive--43)
Domestic Nuclear Detection
----------
(1) To protect against the unauthorized
importation, possession, storage, transportation,
development, or use of a nuclear explosive device,
fissile material, or radiological material in the
United States, and to protect against attack using such
devices or materials against the people, territory, or
interests of the United States, it is the policy of the
United States to:
(a) Continue to develop, deploy, and
enhance national nuclear and radiological
detection capabilities in an effort to better
detect, report on, disrupt, and prevent
attempts to import, possess, store, transport,
develop, or use such devices and materials;
(b) Continue to enhance the effective
integration of nuclear and radiological
detection capabilities across Federal, State,
local, and tribal governments and the private
sector for a managed, coordinated response; and
(c) Continue to advance the science of
nuclear and radiological detection through an
aggressive, expedited, evolutionary, and
transformational program of research and
development in such detection technologies.
(2) To implement the policy set forth in paragraph
(1), the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
coordination with the Secretaries of State, Defense,
and Energy, and the Attorney General, shall establish a
national level Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)
within the Department of Homeland Security. The DNDO
shall include personnel from the departments of
Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE),
State (DOS), Justice (DOJ), and other Federal
departments and agencies as appropriate. The Secretary
of Homeland Security shall have authority, direction,
and control over the DNDO as provided in section 102
(a)(2) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The DNDO
shall:
(a) Serve as the primary entity in the
United States Government to further develop,
acquire, and support the deployment of an
enhanced domestic system to detect and report
on attempts to import, possess, store,
transport, develop, or use an unauthorized
nuclear explosive device, fissile material, or
radiological material in the United States, and
improve that system over time;
(b) Enhance and coordinate the nuclear
detection efforts of Federal, State, local, and
tribal governments and the private sector to
ensure a managed, coordinated response;
(c) Establish, with the approval of the
Secretary of Homeland Security and in
coordination with the Attorney General and the
Secretaries of Defense and Energy, additional
protocols and procedures for use within the
United States to ensure that the detection of
unauthorized nuclear explosive devices, fissile
material, or radiological material is promptly
reported to the Attorney General, the
Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, and
Energy, and other appropriate officials or
their respective designees for appropriate
action by law enforcement, military, emergency
response, or other authorities;
(d) Develop, with the approval of the
Secretary of Homeland Security and in
coordination with the Attorney General and the
Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy, an
enhanced global nuclear detection architecture
with the following implementation:
(i) the DNDO will be responsible
for the implementation of the domestic
portion of the global architecture;
(ii) the Secretary of Defense will
retain responsibility for
implementation of DOD requirements
within and outside the United States;
and
(iii) the Secretaries of State,
Defense, and Energy will maintain their
respective responsibilities for policy
guidance and implementation of the
portion of the global architecture
outside the United States, which will
be implemented consistent with
applicable law and relevant
international arrangements;
(e) Conduct, support, coordinate, and
encourage an aggressive, expedited,
evolutionary, and transformational program of
research and development efforts to support the
policy set forth in paragraph (1);
(f) Support and enhance the effective
sharing and use of appropriate information
generated by the intelligence community, law
enforcement agencies, counterterrorism
community, other government agencies, and
foreign governments, as well as provide
appropriate information to these entities; and
(g) Further enhance and maintain
continuous awareness by analyzing information
from all DNDO mission--related detection
systems.
(3) To ensure the success of DNDO efforts in
support of the policy, the Secretaries of State,
Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security, and the
Attorney General shall:
(i) determine and provide
appropriate nuclear, scientific, and
other expertise to the DNDO;
(ii) participate within the DNDO
in jointly developing and coordinating
detection and response guidance,
protocols, and training for Federal.
State, local, and tribal officials;
(iii) participate within the DNDO
in jointly developing and coordinating
the global nuclear detection
architecture; and
(iv) where appropriate,
participate in the conduct of research
and development for nuclear detection.
(4) The Secretary of Energy shall lead the
development of nonproliferation research and
development and, where appropriate, make available
dual-use counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism
nuclear detection research and development to DNDO and
other entities and officials to support the development
of the domestic nuclear and radiological detection
system. The Secretary of Energy will make maximum
appropriate use of DNDO research, development, test and
evaluation programs, and procedures for deploying
equipment, taking due account of foreign sensitivities.
The Secretary of Energy shall also report information
related to detection events to the DNDO. Nothing in
this Directive shall be construed to limit or otherwise
affect any of the authorities or responsibilities of
the Secretary of Energy under any statute, regulation,
or executive order.
(5) The Secretary of Defense shall consult with
the Secretary of Homeland Security on all aspects of
the DNDO to ensure efficiencies, interoperability, and
sharing of innovative concepts and operational
procedures designed to protect the United States.
Nothing in this Directive shall be construed to impair
or otherwise affect the authority of the Secretary of
Defense over the Department of Defense, including the
chain of command for military forces from the President
as Commander in Chief, to the Secretary of Defense, to
the commanders of the combatant commands, or military
command and control procedures.
(6) The Attorney General shall coordinate with the
Secretary of Homeland Security on all aspects of DNDO's
global nuclear detection architecture, particularly as
they relate to the development of response guidance
protocols and training for Federal, State, local, and
tribal law enforcement and information sharing
activities. Nothing in this Directive shall be
construed to impair or otherwise affect the authority
of the Attorney General as stated in Homeland Security
Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, ``Management of Domestic
Incidents,'' of February 28, 2003.
(7) The Secretary of State shall coordinate with
the Secretary of Homeland Security on all aspects of
DNDO's global nuclear detection architecture,
particularly as they relate to overseas detection and
reporting activities and to the formulation and
implementation of U.S. foreign policy.
(8) The Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
shall coordinate with the Secretary of Homeland
Security on all aspects of DNDO's global nuclear
detection architecture. The DNI also shall ensure the
timely dissemination to the DNDO of all radiological,
nuclear, and related threats to the United States and
other intelligence information relevant to the support,
development, and maintenance of the global nuclear
detection architecture and related efforts. Functions
assigned by this Directive to the DNI shall be
performed by the Director of Central Intelligence until
the first DNI is appointed by the President.
(9) This Directive shall be implemented in a
manner consistent with applicable law, including the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Homeland Security Act of
2002, and the National Security Act of 1947 (all as
amended), and presidential guidance, and subject to the
availability of appropriations. Nothing in this
Directive alters, or impedes the ability to carry out,
existing authorities or responsibilities of department
and agency heads to perform their responsibilities
under law and consistent with applicable legal
authorities and presidential guidance. With regard to
nuclear search activities, nothing in this Directive
alters in any way existing directives,
responsibilities, and roles. This Directive is intended
only to improve the internal management of the
executive branch of the Federal Government, and it is
not intended to, and does not, create any right or
benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law
or in equity, against the United States, its
departments, agencies, entities, officers, employees,
or any other person.
(10) Within 120 days after the date of this
Directive, and thereafter not less than annually, the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall report to me
through the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs on the implementation of this
Directive, including an assessment of the effectiveness
of DNDO and any recommendations for additional
enhancements or efforts. The initial implementation
report shall include:
(a) the plans for integrated program and
budget planning between the appropriate
agencies needed to properly execute the DNDO
responsibilities and
(b) a joint staffing plan for the DNDO.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive--15
[on the war on terrorism]
----------
HSPD--17 is a Classified document and not available for
release.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive--16
National Strategy for Aviation Security
----------
Prologue
The security and economic prosperity of the United
States depend significantly upon the secure operation
of its aviation system and use of the world's airspace
by the Nation, its international partners, and
legitimate commercial interests. Terrorists, criminals,
and hostile nation-states have long viewed aviation as
a target for attack and exploitation. The tragic events
of September 11, 2001 and the Heathrow plot of August
2006 are telling reminders of the threats facing
aviation and the intent and capabilities of adversaries
that mean to do harm to the United States and its
people.
In June 2006, building upon the Administration's
successful efforts since 9/11, the President directed
the development of a comprehensive National Strategy
for Aviation Security (hereafter referred to as ``the
Strategy'') to protect the Nation and its interests
from threats in the Air Domain.\1\ The Secretary of
Homeland Security, in accordance with National Security
Presidential Directive-47/Homeland Security
Presidential Directive-16 (NSPD-47/HSPD-16), will
coordinate the operational implementation of the
Strategy, including the integration and synchronization
of related Federal programs and initiatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Air Domain is defined as the global airspace, including
domestic, international, and foreign airspace, as well as all manned
and unmanned aircraft operating, and people and cargo present in that
airspace, and all aviation-related infrastructures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aviation security is best achieved by integrating
public and private aviation security global activities
into a coordinated effort to detect, deter, prevent,
and defeat threats to the Air Domain, reduce
vulnerabilities, and minimize the consequences of, and
expedite the recovery from, attacks that might occur.
The Strategy aligns Federal government aviation
security programs and initiatives into a comprehensive
and cohesive national effort involving appropriate
Federal, State, local, and tribal governments and the
private sector to provide active layered aviation
security for, and support defense in-depth of, the
United States.
Through a collaborative interagency effort and with
input from aviation stakeholders, seven supporting
plans will be developed to address the specific threats
and challenges identified in NSPD-47/HSPD-16. Although
the plans will address different aspects of aviation
security, they will be mutually linked and reinforce
each other. The supporting plans are:
1A Aviation Transportation System Security
Plan;
1A Aviation Operational Threat Response Plan;
1A Aviation Transportation System Recovery
Plan;
1A Air Domain Surveillance and Intelligence
Integration Plan;
1A International Aviation Threat Reduction
Plan;
1A Domestic Outreach Plan; and
1A International Outreach Plan.
Development of these plans will be guided by the
need to revalidate and further enhance current aviation
security principles. These plans will be updated on a
periodic basis in response to changes in perceived
risks to aviation security, the world environment,
technology, air transport demands, the global aviation
system, and national and homeland security policies.
Together, the Strategy and seven supporting plans
present a comprehensive national effort to prevent
hostile or illegal acts within the Air Domain, promote
global economic stability, and protect legitimate
aviation activities.
Introduction
``America historically has relied heavily on two vast oceans
and two friendly neighbors for border security, and on the
private sector for most forms of domestic transportation
security. The increasing mobility and destructive potential of
modern terrorism has required the United States to rethink and
renovate fundamentally its systems for border and
transportation security. Indeed, we must now begin to conceive
of border security and transportation security as fully
integrated requirements because our domestic transportation
systems are inextricably intertwined with the global transport
infrastructure. Virtually every community in America is
connected to the global transportation network by the seaports,
airports, highways, pipelines, railroads, and waterways that
move people and goods into, within, and out of the Nation. We
must therefore promote the efficient and reliable flow of
people, goods, and services across borders, while preventing
terrorists from using transportation conveyances or systems to
deliver implements of destruction.''
National Strategy for Homeland Security
The United States has a vital national interest in
protecting its people, infrastructure, and other interests from
threats in the Air Domain. The differences between ground-based
and airborne aviation security measures implemented in
different jurisdictions throughout the world, the volume of
domestic and international air traffic, the speed with which
events unfold, and the complexity of aviation assets make the
Air Domain uniquely susceptible to attack or exploitation by
terrorist groups, hostile nation-states, and criminals.
Adversaries have demonstrated the ability and a continuing
desire to exploit vulnerabilities and to adapt to changes in
aviation security measures by conducting multiple,
simultaneous, catastrophic attacks against the United States
and its global interests. Exploitation of the Air Domain by
terrorists and hostile nation-states using unconventional
attack methods is not a recent phenomenon. In the 1970s,
overseas militant groups hijacked commercial passenger aircraft
as a means of garnering international media attention to
further their causes. The rise of Islamic religious extremism
and state-sponsored terrorism spawned further attacks against
civil aviation, including: the hijacking of Trans World
Airlines Flight 847 in 1985; the hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73
in 1986 in Karachi, Pakistan; the destruction of Pan Am Flight
103 over Scotland in 1988; and the downing of a French UTA
aircraft over Niger in 1989. The attacks of September 11, 2001,
brought the reality of these methods to the United States; the
Heathrow plot of August 2006 reminds us of the continuing
danger.
Over the past five years, the security of the aviation
sector has been significantly strengthened through the efforts
of the Federal government working with State, local, and tribal
governments, the international community, and the private
sector. Together these partners continue to implement a broad
range of aviation security measures through innovative
initiatives and by leveraging pre-existing capabilities to
provide the Nation with an active, layered aviation security,
and defense in-depth. Such measures include: a federalized
Transportation Security Officer workforce that screens
passengers and baggage traveling on passenger aircraft;
hardened cockpit doors to prevent unauthorized access to the
flight deck; Federal Air Marshals who fly anonymously on
commercial passenger aircraft to provide a law enforcement
presence; enhanced explosives and threat detection technology
deployed in hundreds of airports; airspace and air traffic
management security measures; and a cadre of canine explosives
detection teams screening baggage, cargo, and increasingly,
carry-on items.
Other important security activities include: thousands of
pilots who voluntarily participate in the Federal Flight Deck
Officer program, which permits trained pilots to carry
firearms; flight crew members, including flight attendants who
have voluntarily taken the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) Advanced Flight Crew Self-Defense
course; other Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement
officers who travel armed as part of their normal duties;
establishment of a program to collect and analyze suspicious
events; efforts to streamline operational coordination on
incidents both in the air and on the ground; daily vetting of
thousands of crew members and passengers on flights to and from
the United States; and improvement of surveillance and
intelligence sharing. In addition, the Nation's air defense
mission has been transformed by expanding surveillance and air
interdiction efforts inward to counter terrorist air threats,
as well as by continuing traditional air defense activities
against the threats from hostile nation-states.
In today's global and interconnected economy, the safe
movement of people and cargo across the open skies is a crucial
factor in promoting free trade and advancing prosperity and
freedom. Defeating the array of threats to the Air Domain
requires a common understanding of, and a coordinated effort
for, action on a global scale. Nations have a common interest
to protect global air travel. Since all nations benefit from
this collective security, the United States must encourage all
nations to share the responsibility for maintaining aviation
security by countering the threats in this domain.
The Aviation Transportation System\2\ comprises a broad
spectrum of private and public sector elements, including:
aircraft and airport operators; over 19,800 private and public
use airports; the aviation sector; and a dynamic system of
facilities, equipment, services, and airspace. The Aviation
Transportation System continues to grow rapidly, as more and
more passengers regularly choose to fly. On a daily basis,
thousands of carrier flights arrive, depart, or overfly the
continental United States, while each year millions of tons of
freight and thousands of tons of mail are transported by air in
the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\The Aviation Transportation System is defined as U.S. airspace,
all manned and unmanned aircraft operating in that airspace, all U.S.
aviation operators, airports, airfields, air navigation services, and
related infrastructure, and all aviation-related industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Nation must be capable of stopping terrorist groups,
hostile nation-states, and criminals before they can threaten
or engage in attacks against the United States and its
international partners, including through the use of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD). To achieve these ends, Federal, State,
local, and tribal governments and the private sector must take
full advantage of strengthened intelligence collection,
analysis, and appropriate dissemination; increased sharing of
surveillance and other aviation resources; advances in
technology; continued enhancements in aviation protective
measures; innovations in the use of law enforcement personnel;
and strengthened alliances within the public and private sector
and other international cooperative arrangements. Military air
defense assets are integrated into those activities to provide
seamless coverage.
The Strategy does not alter existing authorities or
responsibilities of department and agency heads, including
their authorities to carry out operational activities or to
provide or receive information. It does not change or otherwise
affect the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the
Department of Defense, including the chain of command for
military forces from the President, to the Secretary of
Defense, to the military commanders or military command and
control procedures.
Three broad principles provide overarching guidance to the
Strategy, its objectives, and its actions. First, the Nation
must use the full range of its assets and capabilities to
prevent the Air Domain from being exploited by terrorist
groups, hostile nation-states, and criminals to commit acts
against the United States, its people, its infrastructure, and
its other interests. Second, the Nation must ensure the safe
and efficient use of the Air Domain. Third, the Nation must
continue to facilitate travel and commerce. These guiding
principles are critical to global stability and economic growth
and are vital to the interests of the United States.
Threats to the Air Domain
Threats to the Air Domain are numerous, complex,
and adaptive. While conventional military threats in
the Air Domain continue and will likely increase in
times of international tension or conflict, the
greatest current threat, as demonstrated in the
Heathrow plot of August 2006 reminds us of the
continuing danger, and therefore the focus of the
Strategy, is terrorism.
Globalization, technological advances, the
proliferation of WMD, and the emergence of terrorism as
a global phenomenon have enabled threats to the Air
Domain to extend in reach, accelerate in speed, and
increase in potential impact. Aviation is a global
enterprise with a distributed infrastructure and
multiple access points. Successful attacks in the Air
Domain can inflict mass casualties and grave economic
damage, and attract significant public attention
because of the impact on the modern transportation
system.
Intelligence on threats to the Air Domain plays a
critical role in assessing terrorist groups' intentions
and capabilities and requires regular update and review
to ensure that Federal, State, local, and tribal
governments, the private sector, and the international
community are taking appropriate measures. However,
even the best intelligence will not uncover every
specific terrorist plot because of terrorists' efforts
at operational secrecy.
Threats focused on the Air Domain can be analyzed
in two ways: by originator and by targets and tactics.
Threat Originators
There are three main originators of threats:
terrorist groups; hostile nation-states; and other
criminals.
Terrorist Groups.
Terrorist groups are politically, as well as
religiously in some cases, motivated and use
premeditated violence, usually against noncombatants,
to affect a particular audience. Because of their clear
intent to do harm to the United States and its
interests, terrorist groups remain the most severe
threat to America's security. Their ultimate goal in
the Air Domain is to conduct multiple, simultaneous,
catastrophic attacks exploiting the Aviation
Transportation System because of its visibility as a
symbol of the U.S. global presence and economic
influence. In addition, the attacks of September 11,
2001, and other successful or attempted attacks have
inspired emulation.
The terrorist threat is changing in form and
intensity as terrorists' intentions and capabilities
change and countermeasures are instituted. Their
techniques are adapting on multiple fronts, including
modality of planning, complexity of attack, and style
of execution. The type, location, and frequency of
terrorist attacks cannot be reliably extrapolated from
historical patterns, and therefore current threats must
be regularly reassessed.
Terrorist groups, best typified by al-Qa'ida and
its affiliates, pose several threats to the Air Domain.
The most prominent threat is physical attack, discussed
at greater length in the Targets and Tactics section of
the Strategy. Terrorists might also take advantage of
the same tactics, techniques, and methods pioneered by
criminals to counter immigration, customs, and border
security measures to move people and materiel. They
might deploy in regions of political and economic
instability where aviation law enforcement is stretched
thin or readily corruptible, bribe officials, use
forged fraudulent documents, and make illegal
transactions to hide their true intentions. Terrorists
might use unsecured air transportation routes to
transport arms, explosives, or operatives clandestinely
to safe havens, training sites, or attack-staging
locations. Ultimately, terrorists might use these
access points and routes to transport more dangerous
cargo, including WMD and their associated components.
Such threats are particularly worrisome in areas where
governments are weak or provide safe haven to
terrorists.
Hostile Nation-States.
While most countries have an explicit interest in
being able to operate safely, effectively, and reliably
in the Air Domain, some pose threats, either due to
actual hostile intent or weak infrastructure
safeguards. For example, some countries directly
sponsor international terrorism, providing training,
funding, supplies, WMD and related components, and
operational direction to surrogates. Other nation-
states knowingly or unknowingly provide safe havens for
terrorists who plan, prepare, or facilitate attacks or
deploy materiel or operatives through the Air Domain.
Some states have weak command and control over their
aviation infrastructure, such as their internal air
defenses or airport security apparatus, which
terrorists can then exploit. Additionally, nation-
states could present a military threat, such as cruise
missiles, to the United States and U.S. interests
globally in the Air Domain.
Criminals
Criminals, including individuals and groups, use
the Air Domain to pursue objectives that are illegal
under U.S. law or international convention. Domestic
extremists in the United States have not, to date,
engaged in organized efforts to attack the Aviation
Transportation System. However, there are potentially
violent domestic groups and individuals who have
extensive knowledge of the aviation sector coupled with
a demonstrated expertise in manufacturing and employing
targeted-attack techniques, including improvised or
conventional explosive devices.
Targets and Tactics
There are three primary categories of threats: to
and from aircraft; to the Aviation Transportation
System infrastructure; and from hostile exploitation of
cargo.
Threats to and from Aircraft.
Aircraft can be disaggregated into four categories
of threats:
1A large passenger aircraft;
1A large all-cargo aircraft;
1A small aircraft, such as aircraft used
primarily to transport small numbers of people
or to provide unique services, including light
private and corporate aircraft, and
helicopters; and
1A non-traditional aircraft, such as unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs), ultra-light aircraft,
gliders, and aerial-application aircraft.
These categories might be susceptible to, or could
pose a threat from, similar basic tactics: explosives;
stand-off weapons including man-portable air defense
systems (MANPADS); hijackings; WMD delivery and
dissemination; and smuggling of terrorists and
instruments of terror.
Large passenger aircraft.
Historically, large passenger aircraft have been at
the greatest risk to terrorism because terrorists
perceive that such aircraft have great potential to
inflict catastrophic damage and are likely to disrupt
the Aviation Transportation System. Two tactics have
appeared to date. First, aircraft and passengers have
been used as targets, such as the detonation of a bomb
onboard as was central to the Heathrow plot of 2006,
the taking of hostages, traditional hijacking, and
attack from stand-off weapons including MANPADS.
Second, aircraft have been used as weapons, most
notably seen during the September 11, 2001, attacks.
The Nation must closely monitor other tactics as they
emerge.
Large all-cargo aircraft.
Absent more attractive targets, such as large
passenger aircraft, terrorists might seek to take
advantage of the varying degrees and sophistication of
security measures employed for all-cargo aircraft. If
terrorist tactics adapt in this way, large all-cargo
aircraft are likely more attractive as weapons, such as
through a hijacking to attack ground-based targets or
as conveyance mechanisms, rather than as targets. These
aircraft also remain at risk from attacks using MANPADS
or other stand-off weapons.
Small aircraft.
As with large passenger aircraft, small aircraft
face two varieties of threats: as the target of attack;
or as weapons used to attack other targets. Small
aircraft are relatively unattractive as targets because
they carry few passengers, and thus would have less
dramatic impact if attacked. As weapons, however, there
are several potential threat scenarios. Terrorists
might use a wide range of small aircraft, such as
business jets or helicopters, to destroy a critical
asset or portion of infrastructure. The most serious
threat stems from terrorists using small aircraft to
transport or deliver WMD or related materiel. The
Nation must be especially watchful for terrorists
adopting this tactic. Transnational criminal elements
employ small aircraft to conduct illicit activities in
the Air Domain, including smuggling of persons and
contraband.
Non-traditional aircraft.
While ultra-lights, remote-controlled aircraft,
gliders, aerial-application aircraft, and UAVs have
limited potential as targets, terrorists might employ
these non-traditional aircraft as weapons or as a means
to disseminate WMD. For example, terrorists might use
them for missions that are of limited range, require
limited accuracy, and have a specific and small target.
Adoption of this tactic deserves very close monitoring.
While attacks against the Air Domain and the United
States and its interests are currently more likely to
originate from terrorists, the threat posed by military
aircraft of hostile nation-states, such as long range
strategic aviation, air-to-air missiles, long-range
air-to-surface missiles, or cruise missiles must be
considered.
Threats to the Aviation Transportation System Infrastructure.
Reported threats to Aviation Transportation System
infrastructure, which comprises airports and those
facilities and systems that are used to provide Air
Navigation Services (ANS) and other important related
services needed to support air operations in U.S.
airspace, are relatively few. In part, this is due to
the relatively low public profile of ANS infrastructure
such as Air Traffic Control facilities and systems, the
robustness and resilience of these systems due to many
layers of redundancies, and the Nation's likely
capacity to recover rapidly and thus limit the
psychological or economic impact of any attack.
There is a range of potential threat scenarios at
different types of airport facilities that require
vigilance. Terrorists might target passenger
concentrations at commercial airports, recycling
tactics from many years ago. They might place
explosives near or inside passenger facilities.
Terrorists might target multi-use airports, such as
those combining commercial and military operations or
commercial and general aviation operations, where
unrelated security authorities and dissimilar security
procedures often co-exist.
Other Aviation Transportation System-related
threats are less likely to materialize. For example,
general aviation airports have relatively few
passengers in transit and an attack on one would
present limited opportunities for causing major
symbolic or economic damage. In addition, facilities
that process high volumes of cargo have great
redundancy and involve few people relative to the
commercial passenger aviation system.
Threats from Hostile Exploitation of Cargo.
The air-cargo industry is highly dynamic and
encompasses a wide range of users, making it subject to
potential exploitation by terrorists. Many users are
regulated, from large all-cargo carriers, such as
express consignment carriers that operate complex
sorting operations at major hubs for time-definite
cargo delivery, to small regional carriers, such as
those that move high-value cargo or service rural
areas. Since the adoption of enhanced security measures
at airfreight terminals following September 11, 2001,
threats such as stowaways aboard air freighters and the
use of explosives for detonation have waned. However,
the regulatory framework for cargo systems is not
immune to exploitation, especially to methods that have
been used by criminals for years. For example,
terrorists may infiltrate the cargo handling system to
transport people, conventional or WMD, or weapon
components.
Risk Methodology
The Strategy will use a risk-based, cross-
discipline, and global approach to aviation security to
ensure that resources are allocated to those Federal,
State, local, and tribal governments and private sector
aviation security efforts with the greatest potential
to prevent, detect, deter, and defeat attacks, and to
mitigate the consequences if an attack occurs. The risk
methodology used is outlined in the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and defined in
more detail by the NIPP Transportation Sector-Specific
Plan (TSSP). These plans define risk as a function of
threat, vulnerability, and consequence. The United
States Government will regularly conduct formal
assessments of the risks to the Aviation Transportation
System.
Strategic Objectives
The Strategy describes how the United States
Government will enhance the security of the Air Domain
while preserving the freedom of the domain for
legitimate pursuits. The Strategy recognizes the
critical importance of the Air Domain to the United
States and the global economy, and is flexible enough
to anticipate the dramatic growth in U.S. air traffic
and infrastructure as well as emerging threats.
Today's terrorists have demonstrated the capability
and intent to inflict a level of damage once reserved
exclusively for nation-states. The nations of the world
have a shared interest in maintaining and strengthening
global aviation security by adopting comprehensive and
cohesive policies, programs, and procedures. The Nation
reserves its inherent right to self-defense and its
right to act to protect its essential national security
interests while protecting the United States and its
interests. Defending against enemies is a fundamental
responsibility of the United States Government.
In keeping with the principles from NSPD-47/HSPD-
16, and consistent with the National Strategy for
Combating Terrorism, that provide overarching guidance
to the Strategy, and in accordance with the values
enshrined in the U.S. Constitution and applicable
domestic and international law, the following
objectives will guide the Nation's aviation security
activities:
1A deter and prevent terrorist attacks and
criminal or hostile acts in the Air Domain;
1A protect the United States and its
interests in the Air Domain;
1A mitigate damage and expedite recovery;
1A minimize the impact on the Aviation
Transportation System and the U.S. economy; and
1A actively engage domestic and international
partners.
Deter and Prevent Terrorist Attacks and Criminal or Hostile
Acts in the Air Domain
The United States will prevent terrorist attacks
and other criminal or hostile acts in the Air Domain by
maximizing shared awareness of domestic and
international airspace, aviation infrastructure, and
those who have access to the system. International and
foreign airspace may also be of national security
interest. The United States will work to: detect
adversaries before they strike; deny them safe haven in
which to operate unobstructed; block their freedom of
movement between locations; stop them from entering the
United States; identify, disrupt, and dismantle their
capacities, including the capacity to possess and
access weapons and financial infrastructure; use all
means of attribution for maximum legal accountability
including criminal prosecution; and take decisive
action to eliminate the threat they pose. These actions
are addressed in separate executive orders and
directives and other presidential guidance.
The basis for effective prevention measures
operations and security programs is shared awareness
and sharing of risk assessment information, along with
credible deterrent and interdiction capabilities.
Without effective shared awareness of activities within
the Air Domain, crucial opportunities for prevention or
an early response can be lost. Advance warning grants
time and distance to counter adversaries whether they
are planning an operation or are en route to attack or
to commit an unlawful act.
Effective prevention requires close cooperation
between Federal, State, local, and tribal governments,
the private sector, the international community, and
the general public to gain shared awareness and
increase security in the Air Domain while minimizing
the impact of security measures on daily operations.
This collaborative effort serves as a force multiplier
against adversaries.
Protect the United States and its Interests in the Air Domain
Criminals and terrorists have and will continue to
consider the use of the Air Domain as a means to attack
the United States. The Nation must therefore
continuously monitor, and exert unambiguous control
over, its airspace and access to it. Security measures,
combined with enhanced surveillance coverage,
information collection, shared awareness, dissemination
of information, and a ready response capability, will
allow the United States to seize the initiative and
influence events before adversaries can cause harm.
The security of the United States also depends on
the security of the Aviation Transportation System's
critical infrastructure, including physical and cyber
networks. Complicating the security challenge is the
fact that major metropolitan areas within the United
States not only have airport and other Aviation
Transportation System facilities, but these areas are
in close proximity to other critical infrastructure
such as military facilities, power plants, refineries,
nuclear facilities, chemical plants, tunnels, and
bridges.
Maintaining the integrity and viability of the
Aviation Transportation System critical infrastructure
is essential for the free movement of passengers and
goods throughout the world. Some physical and cyber
assets, as well as associated infrastructure, also
function as defense critical infrastructure, the
availability of which must be constantly assured for
national security operations worldwide. Beyond the
immediate casualties, the consequences of an attack on
a node of critical infrastructure may include
disruption of entire systems, significant damage to the
economy, or the inability to deploy military forces.
Protection of infrastructure networks must address
individual elements, interconnecting systems, and their
interdependencies.
The Department of Homeland Security is responsible
for coordinating the overall national effort to enhance
the protection of critical infrastructure. However,
public and private sectors must work together to
improve national security by: sharing threat
information; conducting prudent risk assessments;
working to implement essential upgrades; and investing
in protective measures such as staff identification and
credentialing, access control, and physical security of
fixed sites.
Mitigate Damage and Expedite Recovery
The Nation must take actions to mitigate damage and
expedite recovery from an attack on the Air Domain. The
fundamental key to effective recovery is pre-event
planning and established coordination, in conjunction
with exercising national mitigation and recovery
options. Mitigation and recovery actions promote
resilience by preserving life, property, social,
economic, and political structures, as well as
restoring order and essential services for those who
use the Air Domain for their livelihood. However, the
Aviation Transportation System will not be shut down as
an automatic response to an aviation incident; instead,
the United States will be prepared to minimize the
impact on the system by isolating particular portions
of the Aviation Transportation System, and implementing
contingency measures to ensure public safety and
continuity of commerce.
The response to incidents will be in accordance
with the National Response Plan (NRP), which
incorporates the National Incident Management System
(NIMS). The NRP provides the structure and mechanisms
for national-level policy and operational coordination
for domestic incident management. Pursuant to HSPD-5,
the Secretary of Homeland Security serves as the
principal Federal official for domestic incident
management.
A terrorist attack or other disruptive incident
involving the Aviation Transportation System can cause
severe ripple effects on other modes of transportation
as well as adverse economic or national security
effects. From the onset of such an incident, Federal,
State, local, and tribal governments, along with
private sector entities, require the capability to
assess the human and economic consequences in affected
areas, and to rapidly estimate the effects on other
regional, national, or global interests. These entities
must also develop and implement contingency procedures
to ensure continuity of operations, essential public
services, and the resumption or redirection of
commercial aviation activities, including the
prioritized movement of cargo to mitigate the larger
economic, social, and potential national security
effects of the incident. For example, the public and
private sectors must be ready expeditiously to: detect
and identify potential WMD agents; react without
endangering first responders; treat the injured;
contain and minimize damage; rapidly reconstitute
operations; and mitigate long-term hazards through
effective decontamination measures.
Minimize the Impact on the Aviation Transportation System and
the U.S. Economy
The Aviation Transportation System demands
extremely high standards of security implemented in an
efficient manner. Security measures should be balanced
with commercial, private, and trade requirements, the
safe and efficient movement of cargo and people, and
economic and market competition drivers, and should
protect privacy and other legal rights. To support the
accelerating growth of global commerce and associated
U.S. interests, security concerns and measures should,
to the extent possible, be: aligned and embedded with
business practices; implemented by private sector
stakeholders, including air operators and related
industries; optimized through the use of information
technology; and implemented with the minimum essential
impact on commercial and trade-flow costs and
operations. The Strategy will require new and enhanced
partnerships, as well as cost-sharing and burden-
sharing between the public and private sectors.
To accomplish the aforementioned initiatives, the
Nation must develop security measures that can be
integrated with the unique needs of the aviation sector
and provide a high degree of protection, while
minimizing the impact to the efficient flow of people
and goods through the system. The Nation must depend on
new and emerging technologies to assist in this effort,
such as the enhancement of biometric solutions for
access control initiatives. This effort must also be
supported by building and strengthening partnerships
between the government and the private sector to:
facilitate the continued implementation of security
measures; maximize collaborative planning; and
coordinate operational responses to incidents.
The effects of response and recovery efforts should
also reflect aviation sector needs. On September 11,
2001, the National Airspace System was completely shut
down, causing significant operational and economic
impacts to the aviation sector. Recognizing the need
for diverse and flexible options that allow for an
effective response, the United States Government has
developed plans allowing for the selective suspension
or restriction of air traffic on a local or regional
basis as necessary. Plans such as the Emergency
Security Control of Air Traffic and other available
tools and resources provide government leaders with
options for the closure and the reconstitution of the
system and include identifying the steps necessary to
prevent the recurrence of an event. Efforts such as
these will allow the government to continue to provide
the security required to protect the Aviation
Transportation System while minimizing the impact of
those actions on the system and the U.S. economy.
Actively Engage Domestic and International Partners
Effective aviation security includes efforts at
home and abroad. Active engagement among Federal,
State, local, and tribal governments and private sector
stakeholders during the planning process and subsequent
follow-up actions is vital for success. Maintaining
transparency in the planning effort and promoting
dialogue will help increase the effectiveness of risk
mitigation actions and reduce burdens on the private
sector.
In addition to strengthening relationships among
Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, the
private sector, and the general public, the Nation must
forge cooperative partnerships and alliances with other
nations, as well as with public and private
stakeholders in the international community. To foster
this cooperation, a coordinated policy for United
States Government aviation security activities with
foreign governments, international and regional
organizations, and the private sector must be achieved.
Such coordination can help solicit support for improved
global aviation security while furthering United States
Government policies and goals. Through these domestic
and international efforts, the Nation can inculcate
common security measures throughout the global aviation
community.
Strategic Actions
The differences in ground-based and airborne
aviation security measures enacted by the nations of
the world, the volume of international air traffic, and
the speed of aviation operations make the Air Domain
uniquely susceptible to exploitation and disruption by
individuals, organizations, and states. Individuals and
groups hostile to the United States have demonstrated
the ability, and a continuing desire, to exploit
vulnerabilities and to adapt to changes in aviation
security measures to attack the Nation and its global
interests.
The United States recognizes that, because of the
extensive global connectivity among businesses,
governments, and populations, its aviation security
policies affect other nations, and that significant
local and regional incidents may have global effects.
Success in securing the Air Domain will not come from
the United States acting alone, but through a coalition
of nations maintaining a strong and united
international front. The need for a strong and
effective coalition is reinforced by the fact that most
of the Air Domain is under no single nation's
sovereignty or jurisdiction. Additionally, increased
economic interdependency and globalization, made
possible by air passenger and cargo transportation,
underscore the need for a coordinated international
approach. The United States recognizes that the vast
majority of actors and activities within the Air Domain
are legitimate. The security of the Air Domain can be
accomplished only by employing all instruments of
national power in a fully coordinated manner in concert
with other nation-states.
Aviation security is best achieved by combining
public and private aviation security activities on a
global scale into a comprehensive and integrated effort
that addresses all aviation threats. Aviation security
crosses disciplines, builds upon current and future
efforts, and depends on scalable, layered security to
minimize single points of vulnerability. Full and
complete national and international coordination, in
concert with cooperative intelligence and information
sharing among public and private entities, is required
to protect and secure the Air Domain.
The broad principles that provide overarching
guidance to the Strategy have been used to direct the
development of five strategic actions, which
collectively advance the strategic objectives. The
Strategy recognizes that collectively these strategic
actions support strategic objectives:
1A maximize domain awareness;
1A deploy layered security;
1A promote a safe, efficient, and secure
Aviation Transportation System;
1A enhance international cooperation; and
1A assure continuity of the Aviation
Transportation System.
Domain awareness is a critical enabler for all
strategic actions. Deploying layered security addresses
not only prevention and protection activities, but also
the integration of domestic and international security.
Clearly, international cooperation is vital to
enhancing the effectiveness of each of the other
strategic actions.
The Strategy and appropriate supporting plans
should ensure bridging toward achieving the Next
Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS). NGATS
provides an overall and integrated view of future
operations beyond the Strategy that will integrate key
transformation activities by coordinating applicable
policies, procedures, research and development with
participating departments and agencies from today's
operations into the Aviation Transportation System of
2025.
Maximize Domain Awareness
Maximizing Air Domain awareness is critical to
achieving all of the strategic objectives including
deterring and preventing terrorist attacks, as well as
protecting the United States and its interests in the
Air Domain and mitigating the effects of an attack.
Achieving shared awareness of the Air Domain is
challenging and certain threats to the Air Domain are
difficult to detect and interdict. The complexity of
aircraft registration and ownership processes, as well
as the fluid nature of these activities, offer
additional challenges.
To maximize domain awareness the Nation must have
the ability to integrate surveillance data, all-source
intelligence, law enforcement information, and relevant
open-source data from public and private sectors,
including international partners. Domain awareness is
heavily dependent on advanced information collection,
analysis, and sharing of that information, and requires
unprecedented cooperation and action among the various
elements of the public and private sectors, both
nationally and internationally, while adhering to laws
protecting U.S. civil liberties. To maximize domain
awareness, the United States must leverage the diverse
capabilities of the intelligence and law enforcement
communities to collect, analyze, integrate, and
disseminate timely intelligence to provide a shared
awareness for United States Government agencies and
international partners.
Additionally, the Nation must refine ongoing
efforts to develop shared situational awareness that
integrates intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance,
flight, and other aeronautical data, navigation
systems, and other operational information. To ensure
effective and coordinated action, access to this domain
awareness information must be made available at the
appropriate classification level to agencies across the
U.S. Government, other local government actors,
industry partners and the international community. The
Nation will continue to enhance the capabilities of
current information systems and develop new
capabilities and procedures to locate and track
aviation threats and illicit activities. Initiatives to
maximize domain awareness include:
1A The United States Government will maximize
its capability to detect and monitor aircraft
within its airspace, from large commercial
aircraft to low-altitude, low-observable manned
or unmanned aircraft, as well as the area
contiguous to U.S. airspace and other airspace
that might be of national security interest.
Priority for surveillance will be given to
those assets and those regions identified in
specific national level documents.
1A The United States Government will enhance
its situational awareness through monitoring to
include the combination of information sources
regarding a flight (for example, airframe
characteristic, onboard sensors, crew,
passengers, Federal Air Marshals onboard,
Federal Flight Deck Officers and domestic and
foreign law enforcement).
1A The United States Government will develop
and encourage regulatory and private sector
initiatives to enhance supply chain security
practices and advance robust information
collection for persons and cargo.
1A The United States Government will work
with international partners to develop
agreements that promote enhanced visibility
into the aviation supply chain and the movement
of cargo and passengers and will participate in
international coalitions to share aviation
situational awareness, as protocols permit, on
a timely basis.
1A The United States Government will continue
to improve and invest in an analytic work
force, enhanced sensor technology, human
intelligence collection, and information
processing tools to persistently monitor the
Air Domain.
1A The United States Government will enhance
the global aviation intelligence capability to
strengthen intelligence analysis, coordination,
and integration.
1A The United States Government will enhance
the Aviation Transportation System to provide
shared situational awareness to disseminate
information to both public and private users at
the Federal, State, local, and tribal levels.
1A The United States Government will support
transformational research and development
programs in information fusion and analysis to
advance to the next level of threat assessment.
1A The United States Government, with the
cooperation of its foreign partners, will
monitor those aircraft, cargo, and persons of
interest from the point of origin, throughout
the route of flight, to the point of entry, to
ensure the integrity of the transit, to manage
aviation traffic routing, and if necessary, to
interdict and/ or divert aircraft for law
enforcement or defensive action.
Deploy Layered Security
Deploying layered security will be a critical
enabler for strategic objectives such as deterring and
preventing terrorist attacks, protecting the United
States and its interests in the Air Domain, and
mitigating damage and expediting recovery. The ability
to achieve aviation security is contingent upon an
active, layered aviation security and defense in-depth
that integrates the capabilities of public and private
sector entities acting in concert and using diverse and
complementary measures, rather than relying on a single
point solution. At a minimum, a layered approach to
aviation security means further applying some measure
of security to each of the following points:
transportation; staff; passengers; conveyances; access
control; cargo and baggage; airports; and in-flight
security. Together, as one integrated system, these
measures allow for resilience against expected and
unexpected attack scenarios. Not only does each layer
add to security, but its combination serves as a force
multiplier. This layered security deters attacks, which
otherwise might be executed in a multiple,
simultaneous, catastrophic manner, by continually
disrupting an adversary's deliberate planning process.
The implementation of a new security layer must be cost
effective, both in absolute terms and relative to other
possible measures, and must protect information privacy
and other rights provided by law. Initiatives to
enhance layered security include the following:
1A The United States Government will further
integrate and align all aviation security
programs and initiatives into a comprehensive,
cohesive national effort of scalable, layered
security.
1A The United States Government will enhance
its capabilities and procedures to identify,
intercept, and defeat aviation threats in the
air or on the ground.
1A The United States Government will expand
domestic partnerships with the public and
private sector to train and equip domestic
security forces, consistent with their
jurisdiction and legal authority, to provide
physical security for key assets and critical
infrastructure to detect, identify, interdict,
and defeat aviation threats on the ground.
1A The United States Government will conduct
and sponsor further development, and where
appropriate, encourage implementation of new
and emerging technologies including both
aircraft-borne and ground-based systems for
detection of WMD, as well as for reducing
susceptibility/ vulnerability or increasing
survivability of aircraft to these and other
terrorist threats.
1A The United States Government will enhance
procedures for identifying and designating
flights of interest, as well as coordinating
procedures for any subsequent operational
response.
1A The United States must have well-trained,
properly equipped, and ready ground-based
aviation security response forces from State,
regional, local, and tribal law enforcement
agencies, in addition to a Federal response
force ready to detect, deter, interdict, and
defeat any potential adversary.
1A The United States Government will further
collaborate with State, local, and tribal
governments and the private sector to assess
and prioritize critical facilities, resources,
infrastructure, and venues that are at greatest
risk from hostile or unlawful acts.
1A The United States Government will enhance
and expand its capability to assess risks posed
by individuals with access to the Air Domain.
1A The United States Government, using a
risk-based methodology, will continue to
develop measures for the prevention and
detection of MANPADS or other stand-off weapon
attack on domestic commercial aircraft.
Integrating diverse aviation security layers not
only requires a clear delineation of roles and
responsibilities but also a mutual understanding and
acceptance of the supporting nature of overlapping
authorities and capabilities of U.S. Government
departments and agencies. In particular, to achieve
unity of effort and operational effectiveness, aviation
security assets must have a high degree of
interoperability, reinforced by joint interagency and
international training and exercises to ensure a high
rate of readiness. Coordination protocols must define
procedures for ensuring national execution of aviation
security policy for specific threats or incidents.
The integrated planning and management of Federal,
State, local, and tribal resources, reinforced with
regular exercises, is essential for an effective
response. Therefore, agencies will further coordinate
training, planning, and other resources, where
practical and permissible, to standardize operational
concepts, develop common technology requirements, and
coordinate budget planning for aviation security
missions. Interagency acquisition and logistics
processes must support the continuous assessment of all
requirements to optimize the allocation of appropriate
resources and capabilities. Cooperative research and
development efforts, coupled with reformed acquisition
processes with coordinated requirements, funding, and
scheduling, along with management, will identify
current and future needs.
Promote a Safe, Efficient, and Secure Aviation Transportation
System
Promoting a safe, efficient, and secure system will
help meet the strategic objectives of protecting the
United States and its interests in the Air Domain and
minimizing the impact on the Aviation Transportation
System and the U.S. economy. Potential adversaries will
attempt to exploit existing vulnerabilities, choosing
the time and place to act according to the weaknesses
they perceive. Private owners and operators of
infrastructure, facilities, and resources are the first
line of defense and should undertake basic facility
security improvements. Defenses against terrorist
attacks and criminal acts can be improved by embedding
scalable security measures that reduce systemic or
physical vulnerabilities. The elimination of
vulnerabilities depends upon incorporating best
practices and establishing centers of excellence,
including feedback mechanisms for lessons learned, and
open avenues for internal and external stakeholders to
propose and develop security innovations, as well as a
periodic review of each country's security standards
for mutual compatibility. Initiatives to promote a
safe, efficient, and secure Aviation Transportation
System include the following:
1A The United States Government will assume
the function, currently performed by the
airlines, of checking passenger information
against terrorist watchlist information
maintained by the United States Government and
vetting such information before the departure
of any regularly scheduled commercial flight
for which the place of departure, the place of
destination, or any scheduled stopping place is
within the United States (a ``U.S. Flight'').
The United States Government will also
determine the security utility of performing
such function with respect to flights that only
pass through U.S. airspace and, if necessary,
develop a system by which this function will be
performed for such flights.
1A The United States Government will continue
to collaborate with domestic and international
partners to identify options to enhance risk-
based screening of passengers, including, the
checking of passenger information against
terrorist watchlist information for regularly
scheduled commercial passenger flights that
overfly the territorial airspace of the United
States.
1A The United States Government, in
coordination with public and private partners,
will establish requirements for the continued
implementation of air cargo transportation
security measures, including all-cargo
carriers, combination carriers, and indirect
air carriers operating to, from, or within the
United States.
1A The United States Government will develop
requirements for the improvement of airspace
and air traffic management-related security
measures.
1A The United States Government and the
private sector will continue to conduct
vulnerability assessments to identify security
measures that require improvement. A consistent
risk management approach, which requires a
comprehensive assessment of threat, likelihood,
vulnerability, and criticality, will allow the
private sector to invest in protective measures
as a supporting business function.
1A The United States Government will
encourage the private sector, by means of
outcome-based security standards, incentives,
and market mechanisms, to conduct comprehensive
self-assessments of its supply chain security
practices.
1A The United States Government will
recommend measures to strengthen the prevention
of entry by, and detection of, individuals with
malicious intent who possess or seek to possess
clearance or credentials that permit entry into
secure or restricted areas within the Aviation
Transportation System.
Enhance International Cooperation
Enhancing international cooperation will be a
critical enabler for strategic objectives such as
protecting the United States and the Air Domain,
actively engaging domestic and international partners,
as well as deterring and preventing terrorist attacks
and criminal or hostile acts. The United States
supports enhancing cooperation among nations and
international organizations that share common interests
regarding the security of the Air Domain. New
initiatives are needed to ensure that all nations
fulfill their responsibilities to prevent and respond
to terrorist or criminal actions with timely and
effective enforcement, including:
1A The United States Government will work
with foreign partners to enhance international
mechanisms to improve transparency in the
registration of aircraft, identification of
aircraft owners, and transparency of the cargo
supply chain.
1A The United States Government will further
cooperate with foreign partners to enhance and
encourage adoption of international standards
and best practices as well as to align
regulation and enforcement measures. This will
include initiatives pursued through
international organizations, such as the
International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), that include industry participation.
1A The United States Government will enhance
cooperative mechanisms for coordinating
international responses to aviation threats
that may span national boundaries and
jurisdictions.
1A The United States will continue to work
closely with other governments and
international and regional organizations to
enhance the aviation security capabilities of
other key nations by offering aviation and
airport security assistance, training, and
consultation.
1A The United States Government will promote
the implementation of the international anti-
air piracy conventions and other international
aviation security arrangements and initiatives.
Assure Continuity of the Aviation Transportation System
Assuring the continuity of the Aviation
Transportation System will be a critical enabler for
strategic objectives such as mitigating damage and
expediting recovery, as well as minimizing the impact
on the Aviation Transportation System. The United
States will be prepared to maintain vital commerce and
defense readiness in the aftermath of an attack or
other similarly disruptive incident that may occur
within the Air Domain. Threats in the Air Domain are
dynamic and adaptive; therefore, prevention and
protection efforts cannot be relied upon to prevent all
attacks. Resiliency of the Aviation Transportation
System and response and recovery efforts are important
to minimize the consequences of a disruption within the
system and U.S. economy. This requires: a common
framework with clearly defined roles for those charged
with response and recovery; ready forces that are
properly trained and equipped to manage incidents,
especially those involving WMD; carefully crafted and
exercised contingency plans for response, recovery, and
reconstitution; and extensive coordination among
public, private, and international communities.
Initiatives to assure the continuity of the Aviation
Transportation System include:
1A The United States Government will develop
response and recovery protocols, consistent
with the NIMS, to ensure a comprehensive and
integrated national effort. Ultimately, these
efforts will also need to be aligned with the
National Preparedness Goal (NPG), which will
establish readiness priorities, targets, and
metrics.
1A The United States Government will enhance
the emergency preparedness for the Aviation
Transportation System. This will include pre-
staging of resources as necessary,
coordinating, and planning exercises with first
responders, and planning for restoring the
function of the Aviation Transportation System
in the event of an incident.
1A The United States Government will develop
protocols, mechanisms, and processes to
mitigate the operational and economic damage
from an attack, including the possibility of
temporarily suspending or restricting flight
operations in select areas of the National
Airspace System.
1A The United States Government, in
coordination with public and private sector
partners, will establish near-term and long-
term recovery strategies to support the
Aviation Transportation System in the event of
an attack.
1A The United States Government will identify
gaps in recovery option capabilities and,
working with our State, local, and tribal
government, private sector, and international
partners, develop appropriate operational and
technical solutions to address those gaps.
The direct and indirect costs associated with a
prolonged and systemic disruption of the Aviation
Transportation System can be significantly reduced by
following the provisions of in-place contingency and
continuity plans. These plans for assessment, recovery,
and reconstitution must prioritize local, regional, and
national interests, as well as manage risk and
uncertainty within acceptable levels. These contingency
and continuity plans must be developed and exercised in
a coordinated fashion by the public and private
sectors.
Roles and Responsibilities
Because of the complexity and global nature of the
Aviation Transportation System, responsibility for
preventing, responding to, and, if necessary,
recovering from attacks in the Air Domain extends
across all levels of government and across private and
public sectors. No single entity alone can prevent or
mitigate the impact of an attack in the Air Domain. The
entities below have roles and responsibilities that
fulfill executive orders or statutory responsibilities
for Air Domain activities. Given the unique operating
environment of the Air Domain, any of these entities
may need to perform a specific lead or supporting
functional role based on the threat scenario and the
outcome desired by the United States Government. In
determining whether a specific entity is suitable to
perform this role, the following criteria will be
considered:
1A existing law;
1A desired outcome;
1A response capabilities required;
1A asset availability; and
1A authority to act.
To the maximum extent feasible and appropriate,
Federal departments and agencies must coordinate their
activities with other Federal, State, local, and tribal
governments, as well as law enforcement and emergency
response agencies.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
In accordance with NSPD-47/HSPD-16, the Secretary
of Homeland Security is responsible for closely
coordinating United States Government activities
encompassing the national aviation security programs
including identifying conflicting procedures,
identifying vulnerabilities and consequences, and
coordinating corresponding interagency solutions. In
support of these responsibilities, the Secretary of
Homeland Security:
1A will conduct regular reviews of national
aviation security programs to identify
conflicting procedures, identify changes to
threats, vulnerabilities, and resulting
consequences, and coordinate corresponding
interagency mitigation measures;
1A will inform Federal government departments
when there have been fundamentally significant
recommended or actual changes resulting from
regular reviews of national aviation security
programs;
1A will undertake additional initiatives, as
appropriate, to maximize aviation security for
the United States and its interests;
1A is responsible for aviation security law
enforcement operations and enforcement and
investigation of criminal law violations within
the jurisdiction of its law enforcement
components;
1A is responsible at borders and ports-of-
entry for inspection, determining
admissibility, and monitoring of persons,
conveyances, and cargo traveling via air to
ensure compliance with all U.S. laws, including
those designed to prevent terrorists,
criminals, and terrorist weapons and contraband
from entering or exiting the United States; for
securing the transport of passengers and cargo
by air through domestic and international
screening of passengers, baggage, and air
cargo; for issuing regulations and security
directives necessary to ensure the security of
commercial and general aviation aircraft and
airport operations; for deployment of law
enforcement on U.S. flagged commercial flights;
and for coordination of airport access control
and other security measures;
1A is responsible for directing law
enforcement activity related to the safety of
passengers onboard aircraft that are involved
in acts of hijackings and air piracy from the
moment all external doors of the aircraft are
closed following boarding until those doors are
opened to allow passengers to leave the
aircraft;
1A is responsible for collaborating with
State, local, and tribal governments and the
private sector to assess and prioritize
critical facilities, resources, infrastructure,
and venues that are at greatest risk from
hostile or unlawful acts;
1A is responsible for developing technologies
to protect assets in the Air Domain against
threats such as WMD, MANPADS, and carry-on/
cargo weapons (but not high-end military
threats like cruise missiles, which are the
purview of the Department of Defense (DoD)),
and developing other technologies that
facilitate protective measures such as voice
and data communications with Federal law
enforcement officers;
1A is responsible for operational
coordination with other United States
Government departments and agencies, as well as
with foreign governments, in the prevention of
and response to aviation security incidents;
1A is responsible for advancing common
security interests in the Air Domain; and
1A is responsible for effecting information
sharing related to aviation security in support
of an improved global aviation security
network.
Department of Transportation (DOT)
The Secretary of Transportation, whose Department
includes the country's civil aviation authority and air
navigation services provider, is responsible for the
regulation and operation of the National Airspace
System (NAS). As an integral part of his
responsibilities, the Secretary of Transportation is
responsible for protecting the nation and U.S.
interests in the Air Domain by conducting a broad range
of national defense, homeland security, law
enforcement, and crisis response related activities,
including, but not limited to the following:
1A the safe, efficient, and, in cooperation
with the Secretaries of Homeland Security and
Defense, and other key stakeholders, secure
operation of aircraft flying within the
country's airspace and that airspace that has
been delegated to the United States for the
purposes of air navigation services;
1A coordinating and managing the air
navigation services, regulatory activities, and
related functions to support national defense,
homeland security, law enforcement, and crisis
response missions undertaken by Federal, State,
local, and tribal entities, including the
imposition of temporary flight restrictions and
provision of Air Traffic Control support;
1A ensuring the safety of aviation security
driven modifications to U.S. registered
aircraft and of other aviation security
systems, which could affect civil air traffic
and the country's air navigation services; the
security of the NAS's critical infrastructure,
including Air Traffic Control facilities; and
1A designated leadership of NGATS/JPDO
development, responsible for coordinating of
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DHS,
DoD, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, Department of Commerce, and the
Office of Science and Technology Policy
participation.
Department of Justice (DOJ)
The Attorney General is responsible for:
1A the ground-based tactical response to
resolve or defeat a hijacking, air piracy, or
other terrorist threat;
1A the investigation and prosecution of
terrorist acts or terrorist threats by
individuals or groups inside the United States,
or directed at U.S. citizens or institutions
abroad, where such acts are within the Federal
criminal jurisdiction of the United States;
1A enforcement and investigation of criminal
law violations within its jurisdiction that
occur in the Air Domain, and all Federal
prosecutions arising from these incidents;
1A coordinating the activities of other
members of the law enforcement community to
detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist
attacks against the United States; and
1A intelligence collection,
counterintelligence, and foreign intelligence
sharing under guidelines established in statute
and policy.
Department of Defense (DoD)
The Secretary of Defense is responsible for:
1A deterring, defending against, and
defeating aviation threats to the United States
and its global interests;
1A airborne response and resolution of
nation-state threats within the Air Domain;
1A the operational response to actual or
potential airborne threats in U.S. airspace or
the air approaches to the United States, until
the threat has either been resolved or
defeated;
1A taking a lead or supporting role for
response to aviation terrorist threats globally
as part of the United States Government's
active, layered defense of the Nation;
1A conducting defense support of civil
authorities as directed by the President of the
United States or the Secretary of Defense; and
1A advising Federal civilian agencies on
possible technology development solutions to
capability gaps and shall consider
collaborative development efforts where
appropriate.
DoD is a formally designated partner in NGATS/JPDO
initiative through its leadership of the Shared
Situational Awareness Integrated Product Team (IPT).
Department of State (DOS)
The Secretary of State is responsible for:
1A coordinating United States Government
initiatives that involve foreign governments
and international organizations, including
regional aviation security cooperation;
1A visa adjudication;
1A giving foreign policy guidance on the U.S.
response to actual or potential airborne
threats in the air approaches to the United
States if those threats are in foreign or
international airspace and this is possible in
the time available;
1A notifying international partners of
measures that may affect the exercise of rights
under bilateral or multilateral aviation
agreements;
1A conducting global diplomatic coordination
in support of aviation operational threat
response, including coordination with foreign
states to obtain required authorizations for
operations and to facilitate United States
Government assistance to operational threat
response activities within the jurisdiction of
those states, when requested;
1A leading operational threat response public
affairs activity when it is decided to take an
action or refrain from an action based
primarily on considerations of foreign policy,
and in these cases, the Secretary of State
shall also coordinate with other applicable
agencies in developing public statements
regarding the operational threat response
activities and in relaying appropriate press
guidance to agencies requesting it;
1A evaluating and granting flight clearance
into the United States and its territories for
foreign military and government-owned aircraft
along with any aircraft chartered to transport
a cabinet minister or other senior foreign
government official, or other official
delegation intending to land in, or overfly,
the U.S. and its possessions;
1A enhancing multilateral nonproliferation
controls on MANPADS, and other stand-off
weapons systems that pose a threat to civilian
and military aviation, and engaging states to
seek their adherence to and implementation of
those controls;
1A implementing MANPADS destruction programs
to reduce the global availability of these
weapons and provides training and assistance to
help states fulfill their MANPADS counter-
proliferation obligations and combat illicit
arms trade and trafficking within and across
their borders; and
1A administering and authorizing sanctions
that could be applied to governments, entities,
or individuals that engage in the proliferation
of WMD, MANPADS and other stand-off weapons
systems, when those activities meet the
statutory and regulatory criteria.
Department of Energy (DOE)
The Secretary of Energy is responsible for:
1A providing scientific and technical
expertise in nuclear weapons design and
specially equipped teams to conduct search,
support response, and assist in recovery, and
consequence management operations during any
radiological or nuclear incident;
1A providing radiation detection systems and
associated training at foreign border
crossings, airports, and seaports to detect and
deter illicit trafficking in nuclear and other
radioactive materials across international
borders; and
1A coordinating radiologically contaminated
debris management associated with disposition
of WMD-related materials and aircraft that may
be affected by such materials or attacks.
Department of Commerce (DOC)
The Secretary of Commerce is responsible for:
1A providing aviation industry and trade
policy expertise in both interagency policy
efforts and international negotiations;
1A engaging in cooperative efforts on
aviation trade issues in numerous international
bodies and fora, including ICAO, the Security
and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) with Canada
and Mexico, the World Trade Organization (WTO),
and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) forum;
1A providing analysis of the impact of
domestic regulations and international trade
agreements on the aviation industry and the
broader economy;
1A providing the scientific and technical
expertise necessary to measure and verify that
devices, equipment, and technologies meet or
exceed the requirements necessary to maintain
and advance the security of the Air Domain;
1A providing weather forecast and analysis
services integral to the operations of the
Aviation Transportation System;
1A providing harmonization of U.S. and
international standards that are necessary for
facilitation of aviation-related commerce; and
1A participating in the NGATS initiative
through its leadership of the Weather IPT.
Office of The Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
The Director of National Intelligence is
responsible for:
1A developing, sustaining, and continually
strengthening a unified Intelligence Community
enterprise that supports Federal, State,
regional, local, tribal, and private sector
entities by collecting, analyzing, and
disseminating accurate, timely, and relevant
all-source intelligence for the safe and
effective use of the air, related
transportation, and other threat domains;
1A defining, creating, and propagating the
business rules, policies, and technical
standards for an Intelligence Community
enterprise environment for information sharing
and intelligence integration across the air
related transportation, and other threat
domains;
1A overseeing the primary organization in the
U.S. Government for analyzing and integrating
all intelligence possessed or acquired by the
United States Government pertaining to
terrorism and counterterrorism, except
intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic
terrorists and domestic counterterrorism; and
1A overseeing National Intelligence Program
activities that support transportation
security, including in the Air Domain, by
leveraging innovative collection and analytical
techniques, developing and employing effective
counterintelligence measures that preserve the
integrity of aviation security information, and
respecting the civil liberties and privacy of
all Americans.
State, Local, and Tribal Governments
Some of the Nation's aviation infrastructure is
owned and operated by State, local, and tribal
governments. State Governors and/ or homeland security
agencies, in addition to local and tribal governments,
hold a leadership position to address specific aviation
security needs or issues and response. During
extraordinary circumstances, the Federal government may
assume lead security responsibility. Typically, except
for cross-border traffic, lead responsibility will
remain with the States, localities, or tribes. Specific
responsibilities of State, local, and tribal
governments are discussed in the NIPP and corresponding
TSSP. State, local, and tribal governments are
currently working with the Federal government to
identify critical transportation assets, conduct the
necessary vulnerability assessments, and develop
security plans to protect those assets. They are also
developing their response and recovery capabilities to
address terrorist attacks and other disruptive
incidents, and to meet the NPG.
Private Sector
Substantial segments of the Nation's aviation
transportation infrastructure are owned and operated by
private sector entities. As such, an effective national
aviation security strategy must be supported by a
private sector that internalizes a strong security
culture, embedding best practices and government
requirements into day-to-day operations. It is the
responsibility of private sector owners to conduct and
execute business continuity planning, integrate
security planning with disaster recovery planning, and
to actively participate with Federal, State, local, and
tribal governments to improve security in the aviation
sector.
Conclusion
The Strategy presents a vision for aviation
security that seeks to secure the people and interests
of the United States. Moreover, it underscores the
Nation's commitment to strengthening international
partnerships and advancing economic well-being around
the globe by facilitating commerce and abiding by the
principles of freedom of the airways. The sheer
magnitude of the Air Domain complicates the arduous and
complex task of maintaining aviation security. The
United States confronts a diverse set of adversaries
fully prepared to exploit this vast domain for
nefarious purposes. The Air Domain serves as the medium
for a variety of threats that honor no national
frontier and that seek to imperil the peace and
prosperity of the world. Many of these threats mingle
with legitimate commerce, either to provide concealment
for carrying out hostile acts, or to make available
weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems,
and related materials to nations and non-state actors
of concern.
In this ambiguous security environment, responding
to these unpredictable threats requires teamwork to
prevent attacks, protect people and infrastructure,
minimize damage, and expedite recovery. The response
necessitates the integration and alignment of all
aviation security programs and initiatives into a far-
reaching and unified national effort involving Federal,
State, local, and tribal governments, as well as
private sector organizations. Since September 11, 2001,
Federal departments and agencies have risen
uncompromisingly to the challenge of ensuring aviation
security. The challenges that remain ahead for the
Nation, the adversaries it confronts, and the
environment in which it operates compel the United
States to strengthen its ties with international
partners and to seek new relationships with others.
Therefore, international cooperation is critical to
ensuring that lawful private and public activities in
the Air Domain are protected from attack and hostile or
unlawful exploitation. Such collaboration is
fundamental to worldwide economic stability and growth,
and it is vital to the interests of the United States.
It is only through such an integrated approach among
all aviation partners, governmental and non-
governmental, public, and private, that the United
States can improve the security of the Air Domain.
Thus, effective implementation of the Strategy
requires greater cooperation. It requires deeper trust
and confidence, not less. It requires a concerted
application of collective capabilities to: increase
awareness of all people, activities, and events in the
Air Domain; enhance aviation security frameworks
domestically and internationally through constant
innovation; deploy an active, layered aviation security
and defense in-depth based on law enforcement
authorities, military capabilities, and private sector
partners' competencies; pursue transformational
research and development to move to the next level of
information fusion and analysis and WMD detection
technologies for qualitative improvements in threat
detection; improve our response posture should a threat
emerge; and enhance our recovery should an incident
occur.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive--17
----------
HSPD--17 is a Classified document and not available for
release.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive--18
Medical Countermeasures Against Weapons of Mass Destruction
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BACKGROUND
(1) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear agents (CBRN) in
the possession of hostile states or terrorists
represent one of the greatest security challenges
facing the United States. An attack utilizing WMD
potentially could cause mass casualties, compromise
critical infrastructure, adversely affect our economy,
and inflict social and psychological damage that could
negatively affect the American way of life.
(2) Our National Strategy to Combat Weapons of
Mass Destruction (December 2002) and Biodefense for the
21st Century (April 2004) identify response and
recovery as key components of our Nation's ability to
manage the consequences of a WMD attack. Our primary
goal is to prevent such an attack, but we must be fully
prepared to respond to and recover from an attack if
one occurs. Accordingly, we have made significant
investments in our WMD consequence management
capabilities in order to mitigate impacts to the
public's health, the economy, and our critical
infrastructure. The development and acquisition of
effective medical countermeasures to mitigate illness,
suffering, and death resulting from CBRN agents is
central to our consequence management efforts.
(3) It is not presently feasible to develop and
stockpile medical countermeasures against every
possible threat. The development of vaccines and drugs
to prevent or mitigate adverse health effects caused by
exposure to biological agents, chemicals, or radiation
is a time-consuming and costly process. This directive
builds upon the vision and objectives articulated in
our National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Biodefense for the 21st Century to
ensure that our Nation's medical countermeasure
research, development, and acquisition efforts:
(a) Target threats that have potential for
catastrophic impact on our public health and
are subject to medical mitigation;
(b) Yield a rapidly deployable and
flexible capability to address both existing
and evolving threats;
(c) Are part of an integrated WMD
consequence management approach informed by
current risk assessments of threats,
vulnerabilities, and capabilities; and
(d) Include the development of effective,
feasible, and pragmatic concepts of operation
for responding to and recovering from an
attack.
(4) In order to address the challenges presented
by the diverse CBRN threat spectrum, optimize the
investments necessary for medical countermeasures
development, and ensure that our activities
significantly enhance our domestic and international
response and recovery capabilities, our decisions as to
the research, development, and acquisition of medical
countermeasures will be guided by three overarching
principles:
(a) Our preparations will focus on
countering current and anticipated threat
agents that have the greatest potential for use
by state and non-state actors to cause
catastrophic public health consequences to the
American people.
(b) We will invest in medical
countermeasures and public health interventions
that have the greatest potential to prevent,
treat, and mitigate the consequences of WMD
threats.
(c) We will link acquisition of medical
countermeasures to the existence of effective
deployment strategies that are supportable by
the present and foreseeable operational and
logistic capabilities of Federal, State, and
local assets following a WMD attack or other
event that presents a catastrophic public
health impact.
(5) Mitigating illness and preventing death are
the principal goals of our medical countermeasure
efforts. As a class, biological agents offer the
greatest opportunity for such medical mitigation, and
this directive prioritizes our countermeasure efforts
accordingly. This directive also provides for tailoring
our Nation's ongoing research and acquisition efforts
to continue to yield new countermeasures against CBRN
agents and for incorporating such new discoveries into
our domestic and international response and recovery
planning efforts.
Biological Threats
(6) The biological threat spectrum can be framed
in four distinct categories, each of which presents
unique challenges and significant opportunities for
developing medical countermeasures:
(a) Traditional Agents: Traditional agents
are naturally occurring microorganisms or toxin
products with the potential to be disseminated
to cause mass casualties. Examples of
traditional agents include Bacillus anthracis
(anthrax) and Yersinia pestis (plague).
(b) Enhanced Agents: Enhanced agents are
traditional agents that have been modified or
selected to enhance their ability to harm human
populations or circumvent current
countermeasures, such as a bacterium that has
been modified to resist antibiotic treatment.
(c) Emerging Agents: Emerging agents are
previously unrecognized pathogens that might be
naturally occurring and present a serious risk
to human populations, such as the virus
responsible for Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS). Tools to detect and treat
these agents might not exist or might not be
widely available.
(d) Advanced Agents: Advanced agents are
novel pathogens or other materials of
biological nature that have been artificially
engineered in the laboratory to bypass
traditional countermeasures or produce a more
severe or otherwise enhanced spectrum of
disease.
Nuclear and Radiological Threats
(7) Threats posed by fissile and other
radiological material will persist. Our Nation must
improve its biodosimetry capabilities and continue to
develop medical countermeasures as appropriate to
mitigate the health effects of radiation exposure from
the following threats:
(a) Improvised Nuclear Devices: Improvised
nuclear devices incorporate radioactive
materials designed to result in the formation
of a nuclear-yield reaction. Such devices can
be wholly fabricated or can be created by
modifying a nuclear weapon.
(b) Radiological Dispersal Devices:
Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs) are
devices, other than a nuclear explosive device,
designed to disseminate radioactive material to
cause destruction, damage, or injury.
(c) Intentional Damage or Destruction of a
Nuclear Power Plant: Deliberate acts that cause
damage to a reactor core and destruction of the
containment facility of a nuclear reactor could
contaminate a wide geographic area with
radioactive material.
Chemical Threats
(8) Existing and new types of chemicals present a
range of threats. Development of targeted medical
countermeasures might be warranted for materials in the
following categories:
(a) Toxic Industrial Materials and
Chemicals: Toxic Industrial Materials and
Chemicals are toxic substances in solid,
liquid, or gaseous form that are used or stored
for use for military or commercial purposes.
(b) Traditional Chemical Warfare Agents:
Traditional chemical warfare agents encompass
the range of blood, blister, choking, and nerve
agents historically developed for warfighter
use.
(c) Non-traditional Agents: Non-
traditional agents (NTAs) are novel chemical
threat agents or toxicants requiring adapted
countermeasures.
(9) Creating defenses against a finite number of
known or anticipated agents is a sound approach for
mitigating the most catastrophic CBRN threats; however,
we also must simultaneously employ a broad-spectrum
``flexible'' approach to address other current and
future threats. We must be capable of responding to a
wide variety of potential challenges, including a novel
biological agent that is highly communicable,
associated with a high rate of morbidity or mortality,
and without known countermeasure at the time of its
discovery. Although significant technological,
organizational, and procedural challenges will have to
be overcome, such a balanced strategic approach would
mitigate current and future CBRN threats and benefit
public health.
POLICY
(10) It is the policy of the United States to draw
upon the considerable potential of the scientific
community in the public and private sectors to address
our medical countermeasure requirements relating to
CBRN threats. Our Nation will use a two-tiered approach
for development and acquisition of medical
countermeasures, which will balance the immediate need
to provide a capability to mitigate the most
catastrophic of the current CBRN threats with long-term
requirements to develop more flexible, broader spectrum
countermeasures to address future threats. Our approach
also will support regulatory decisions and will permit
us to address the broadest range of current and future
CBRN threats.
Tier I: Focused Development of Agent-Specific Medical
Countermeasures
(11) The first tier uses existing, proven
approaches for developing medical countermeasures to
address challenges posed by select current and
anticipated threats, such as traditional CBRN agents.
Recognizing that as threats change our countermeasures
might become less effective, we will invest in an
integrated and multi-layered defense. Department-level
strategies and implementation plans will reflect the
following three guiding principles and objectives:
(a) Evaluate and clearly define
investments in near- and mid-term defenses: We
will develop and use risk assessment processes
that integrate data and threat assessments from
the life science, consequence management,
public health, law enforcement, and
intelligence communities to guide investment
priorities for current and anticipated threats.
We will openly identify the high-risk threats
that hold potential for catastrophic
consequences to civilian populations and
warrant development of targeted
countermeasures.
(b) Target medical countermeasure
strategies to satisfy practical operational
requirements: We will model the potential
impact of high-risk threats and develop
scenario-based concepts of operations for
medical consequence management and public
health mitigation and treatment of a large-
scale attack on our population. These concepts
of operations will guide complementary
decisions regarding medical countermeasure
development and acquisition.
(c) Take advantage of opportunities to
buttress U.S. defenses: We will coordinate
interagency efforts to identify and evaluate
vulnerabilities in our current arsenal of
countermeasures to protect the U.S. population.
Where appropriate, we will target the
development of alternate or supplementary
medical countermeasures to ensure that a multi-
layered defense against the most significant
high-impact CBRN threats is established.
Tier II: Development of a Flexible Capability for New Medical
Countermeasures
(12) Second tier activities will emphasize the
need to capitalize upon the development of emerging and
future technologies that will enhance our ability to
respond flexibly to anticipated, emerging, and future
CBRN threats. Importantly, this end-state will foster
innovations in medical technologies that will provide
broad public health benefit. Department-level strategic
and implementation plans will reflect the following
guiding principles and objectives:
(a) Integrate fundamental discovery and
medical development to realize novel medical
countermeasure capabilities: We will target
some investments to support the development of
broad spectrum approaches to surveillance,
diagnostics, prophylactics, and therapeutics
that utilize platform technologies. This will
require targeted, balanced, and sustained
investments between fundamental research to
discover new technologies and applied research
for technology development to deliver new
medical capabilities and countermeasures.
Although by no means all-inclusive, our goals
could include identification and use of early
markers for exposure, greater understanding of
host responses to target therapeutics, and
development of integrated technologies for
rapid production of new countermeasures.
(b) Establish a favorable environment for
evaluating new approaches: We must ensure that
our investments lead to products that expand
the scientific data base, increase the
efficiency with which safety and efficacy can
be evaluated, and improve the rate at which
products under Investigational New Drug or
Investigational Device Exemption status
progress through the regulatory or approval
process. In addition, we must continue to use
new tools to evaluate and utilize promising
candidates in a time of crisis. Examples of
such tools include the ``Animal Rule'' for
testing the efficacy of medical countermeasures
against threat agents when human trials are not
ethically feasible and the Emergency Use
Authorization. Although by no means all-
inclusive, our desired end-state could include
the use of novel approaches for improved
evaluation tools, streamlined clinical trials
that meet safety and regulatory needs, and the
development and use of novel approaches to
manufacturing.
(c) Integrate the products of new and
traditional approaches: We must address the
challenges that will arise from integrating
these new approaches with existing processes.
We must incorporate the use of non-
pharmacological interventions in our response
planning. This integration will forge a
flexible biodefense capability that aligns our
national requirements for medical
countermeasures with the concepts of operation
that are used in conjunction with other
strategies for mitigating the public health
impacts of WMD attacks.
(13) In order to achieve our Tier I and II
objectives, it will be necessary to facilitate the
development of products and technologies that show
promise but are not yet eligible for procurement
through BioShield or the Strategic National Stockpile.
We will support the advanced development of these
products through targeted investments across a broad
portfolio, with the understanding that some of these
products may be deemed unsuitable for further
investment as additional data becomes available, but
the expectation that others will become candidates for
procurement.
POLICY ACTIONS
(14) We will employ an integrated approach to WMD
medical countermeasure development that draws upon the
expertise of the public health, life science, defense,
homeland security, intelligence, first responder, and
law enforcement communities, as well as the private
sector, to promote a seamless integration throughout
the product development life cycle.
(a) The Secretary of Health and Human
Services (Secretary) will lead Federal
Government efforts to research, develop,
evaluate, and acquire public health emergency
medical countermeasures to prevent or mitigate
the health effects of CBRN threats facing the
U.S. civilian population. The Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) will lead the
interagency process and strategic planning and
will manage programs supporting medical
countermeasures development and acquisition for
domestic preparedness.
(i) Stewardship. Not later than 60
days after the date of this directive,
the Secretary shall establish an
interagency committee to provide advice
in setting medical countermeasure
requirements and coordinate HHS
research, development, and procurement
activities. The committee will include
representatives designated by the
Secretaries of Defense and Homeland
Security and the heads of other
appropriate executive departments and
agencies. This committee will serve as
the primary conduit for communication
among entities involved in medical
countermeasure development. The chair
of the committee shall keep the joint
Homeland Security Council/National
Security Council Biodefense Policy
Coordination Committee apprised of HHS
efforts to integrate investment
strategies and the Federal Government's
progress in the development and
acquisition of medical countermeasures.
(ii) Strategic Planning. Not later
than 60 days after the date of this
directive, the Secretary shall
establish a dedicated strategic
planning activity to integrate risk-
based requirements across the threat
spectrum and over the full range of
research, early-, mid-, and late-stage
development, acquisition, deployment,
and life-cycle management of medical
countermeasures. The Secretary shall
align all relevant HHS programs and
functions to support this strategic
planning.
(iii) Execution. The Secretary
shall ensure that the efforts of
component agencies, centers and
institutes are coordinated and targeted
to facilitate both development of near-
term medical countermeasures and
transformation of our capability to
address future challenges. The
Secretary shall also establish an
advanced development portfolio that
targets investments in promising
countermeasures and technologies that
are beyond early development, but not
yet ready for acquisition
consideration. In order to realize the
full potential for broad partnership
with academia and industry, the
Secretary shall ensure that HHS
coordinates strategies and
implementation plans in a manner that
conveys integrated priorities,
activities, and objectives across the
spectrum of relevant Federal
participants.
(iv) Engaging the Private Sector
and Nongovernmental Entities. The
Secretary shall develop and implement a
strategy to engage the unique expertise
and capabilities of the private sector
in developing medical countermeasures
to combat WMD, and shall provide clear
and timely communication of HHS
priorities and objectives. The
Secretary shall consider creating an
advisory committee composed of leading
experts from academia and the biotech
and pharmaceutical industries to
provide insight on barriers to progress
and help identify promising innovations
and solutions to problems such as life-
cycle management of medical
countermeasures. The Secretary shall
designate one office within HHS as the
principal liaison for nongovernmental
entities who wish to bring new
technologies, approaches, or potential
medical countermeasures to the
attention of the Federal Government.
(b) The Secretary of Defense shall retain
exclusive responsibility for research, development,
acquisition, and deployment of medical countermeasures
to prevent or mitigate the health effects of WMD
threats and naturally occurring threats to the Armed
Forces and shall continue to direct strategic planning
for and oversight of programs to support medical
countermeasures development and acquisition for our
Armed Forces personnel. The Secretaries of Health and
Human Services and Defense shall ensure that the
efforts of the Department of Defense (DOD) and HHS are
coordinated to promote synergy, minimize redundancy,
and, to the extent feasible, use common requirements
for medical countermeasure development. The Secretary
of Defense shall ensure that DOD continues to draw upon
its longstanding investment and experience in WMD
medical countermeasure research, development,
acquisition, and deployment to ensure protection of the
Armed Forces, but also to accelerate and improve the
overall national effort, consistent with Departmental
authorities and responsibilities, and shall ensure that
DOD continues to place a special focus on medical
countermeasure development for CBRN threat agents
because of the unique facilities, testing capabilities,
and trained and experienced personnel within the
Department. These efforts will constitute the basis for
interagency partnership and combined investment to
safeguard the American people.
(c) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall
develop a strategic, integrated all-CBRN risk
assessment that integrates the findings of the
intelligence and law enforcement communities with input
from the scientific, medical, and public health
communities. Not later than June 1, 2008, the Secretary
of Homeland Security shall submit a report to the
President through the Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, which shall
summarize the key findings of this assessment, and
shall update those findings when appropriate, but not
less frequently than every 2 years. The Department of
Homeland Security shall continue to issue Material
Threat Determinations for those CBRN agents that pose a
material threat to national security.
(d) The Secretaries of Health and Human Services,
Defense, and Homeland Security shall ensure the
availability of the infrastructure required to test and
evaluate medical countermeasures for CBRN threat
agents.
(i) The Secretaries of Health and
Human Services, Defense, and Veterans
Affairs shall leverage their
partnership to identify and accelerate
research, development, testing, and
evaluation programs for the acquisition
of medical countermeasures for CBRN
threats.
(ii) The Secretary of Health and Human
Services and the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall develop effective and
streamlined processes, including
mutually agreed-upon timelines, to
assist the respective Secretaries in
jointly recommending that the Special
Reserve Fund (SRF) be used for the
acquisition of specified security
countermeasures.
(iii) The Director of National
Intelligence shall facilitate
coordination across the intelligence
community and, in coordination with the
Attorney General, engage the law
enforcement community to provide all
relevant and appropriate WMD-related
intelligence information to DHS for the
development of the integrated CBRN risk
assessment that is used in prioritizing
the development, acquisition, and
maintenance of medical countermeasures.
GENERAL
(15) This directive:
(a) shall be implemented consistent with
applicable law and the authorities of executive
departments and agencies, or heads of such
departments and agencies, vested by law, and
subject to the availability of appropriations;
(b) shall not be construed to impair or
otherwise affect the functions of the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget relating
to budget, administrative, and legislative
proposals; and
(c) is not intended to, and does not,
create any rights or benefits, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by
a party against the United States, its
agencies, instrumentalities, or entities, its
officers, employees, or agents, or any other
person.
GEORGE W. BUSH
Homeland Security Presidential Directive--19
Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States
----------
Purpose
(1) This directive establishes a national policy,
and calls for the development of a national strategy
and implementation plan, on the prevention and
detection of, protection against, and response to
terrorist use of explosives in the United States.
Definitions
(2) In this directive:
(a) ``agencies'' means those executive
departments enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101,
independent establishments as defined by 5
U.S.C. 104(1), Government corporations as
defined by 5 U.S.C. 103(1), and the United
States Postal Service;
(b) ``explosive attack'' means an act of
terrorism in the United States using an
explosive;
(c) ``explosive'' means any chemical
compound mixture, or device, the primary or
common purpose of which is to function by
explosion, including improvised explosive
devices, but excluding nuclear and radiological
devices;
(d) ``improvised explosive device'' or
``IED'' means an explosive device that is
fabricated in an improvised manner
incorporating explosives or other destructive,
lethal, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals;
(e) ``NIPP'' means the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan developed
pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential
Directive-7 of December 17, 2003 (Critical
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization,
and Protection)(HSPD-7); and
(f) ``risk'' means the product of credible
threat, consequence, and vulnerability, as
defined in the NIPP. Background
(3) Terrorists have repeatedly shown their
willingness and ability to use explosives as weapons
worldwide, and there is ample intelligence to support
the conclusion that they will continue to use such
devices to inflict harm. The threat of explosive
attacks in the United States is of great concern
considering terrorists' ability to make, obtain, and
use explosives, the ready availability of components
used in IED construction, the relative technological
ease with which an IED can be fashioned, and the nature
of our free society. Policy
(4) It is the policy of the United States to
counter the threat of explosive attacks aggressively by
coordinating Federal, State, local, territorial, and
tribal government efforts and collaborating with the
owners and operators of critical infrastructure and key
resources to deter, prevent, detect, protect against,
and respond to explosive attacks, including the
following:
(a) applying techniques of psychological
and behavioral sciences in the analysis of
potential threats of explosive attack;
(b) using the most effective technologies,
capabilities, and explosives search procedures,
and applications thereof, to detect, locate,
and render safe explosives before they detonate
or function as part of an explosive attack,
including detection of explosive materials and
precursor chemicals used to make improvised
explosive or incendiary mixtures;
(c) applying all appropriate resources to
pre-blast or pre-functioning search and
explosives render-safe procedures, and to post-
blast or post-functioning investigatory and
search activities, in order to detect secondary
and tertiary explosives and for the purposes of
attribution;
(d) employing effective capabilities,
technologies, and methodologies, including
blast mitigation techniques, to mitigate or
neutralize the physical effects of an explosive
attack on human life, critical infrastructure,
and key resources; and
(e) clarifying specific roles and
responsibilities of agencies and heads of
agencies through all phases of incident
management from prevention and protection
through response and recovery. Implementation
Actions
(5) As soon as practicable and not later than 150
days after the effective date of this directive, the
Attorney General, in coordination with the Secretary of
Homeland Security and the heads of other Sector-
Specific Agencies (as defined in HSPD-7) and agencies
that conduct explosive attack detection, prevention,
protection, or response activities, shall submit to the
President for approval, through the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, a
report, including a national strategy and
recommendations, on how more effectively to deter,
prevent, detect, protect against, and respond to
explosive attacks, including the coordination of
Federal Government efforts with State, local,
territorial, and tribal governments, first responders,
and private sector organizations. The report shall
include the following:
(a) a descriptive list of all Federal
statutes, regulations, policies, and guidance
that
(i) set forth agency authorities and
responsibilities relating to the
prevention or detection of, protection
against, or response to explosive
attacks, or
(ii) govern the use of the assets and
capabilities described in paragraph (b)
of this section;
(b) an inventory and description of all
current Federal Government assets and
capabilities specifically relating to the
detection of explosives or the protection
against or response to explosive attacks,
catalogued by geographic location, including
the asset's transportability and, to the extent
feasible, similar assets and capabilities of
State, local, territorial, and tribal
governments;
(c) an inventory and description of
current research, development, testing, and
evaluation initiatives relating to the
detection of and protection against explosives
and anticipated advances in capabilities for
reducing the threat of explosive attacks, and
recommendations for the best means of
disseminating the results of such initiatives
to and among Federal, State, local,
territorial, and tribal governments and first
responders, as appropriate;
(d) for the purpose of identifying needed
improvements in our homeland security posture,
an assessment of our ability to deter, prevent,
detect, protect against, and respond to an
explosive attack based on a review of risk and
the list, inventories, and descriptions
developed pursuant to paragraphs (a), (b), and
(c) of this section, and recommendations to
address any such needed improvements;
(e) recommendations for improved detection
of explosive chemical compounds, precursor
chemicals used to make improvised explosive
chemical compounds, and explosive device
components;
(f) recommendations for developing a
comprehensive understanding of terrorist
training and construction methods relating to
explosive attacks and the production of
explosive and incendiary materials;
(g) recommendations for protecting
critical infrastructure and key resources
against an explosive attack that can be used to
inform sector-specific plans developed pursuant
to the NIPP, including specific actions
applicable to each of the critical
infrastructure and key resources sectors;
(h) a recommended draft incident annex to
the National Response Plan developed pursuant
to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5
of February 28, 2003 (Management of Domestic
Incidents), for explosive attacks, detailing
specific roles and responsibilities of agencies
and heads of agencies through all phases of
incident management from prevention and
protection through response and recovery;
(i) an assessment of the effectiveness of,
and, as necessary, recommendations for
improving Federal Government training and
education initiatives relating to explosive
attack detection, including canine training and
performance standards;
(j) recommended components of a national
public awareness and vigilance campaign
regarding explosive attacks; and
(k) a recommendation on whether any
additional Federal Government entity should be
established to coordinate Federal Government
explosive attack prevention, detection,
protection, and response efforts and
collaboration with State, local, territorial,
and tribal government officials, first
responders, and private sector organizations.
(6) Not later than 90 days after the President
approves the report, the Attorney General, in
coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and
Homeland Security and the heads of other Sector-
Specific Agencies (as defined in HSPD-7) and agencies
that conduct explosive attack detection, prevention,
protection, or response activities, shall develop an
implementation plan. The implementation plan shall
implement the policy set forth in this directive and
any recommendations in the report that are approved by
the President, and shall include measures to
(a) coordinate the efforts of Federal,
State, local, territorial, and tribal
government entities to develop related
capabilities,
(b) allocate Federal grant funds
effectively,
(c) coordinate training and exercise
activities, and
(d) incorporate, and strengthen as
appropriate, existing plans and procedures to
communicate accurate, coordinated, and timely
information regarding a potential or actual
explosive attack to the public, the media, and
the private sector. The implementation plan
shall include an implementation timetable,
shall be effective upon the approval of the
plan by the Attorney General, and shall be
implemented by the heads of agencies as
specified in the plan. Roles and
Responsibilities
(7) The Attorney General, in coordination with the
Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of
National Intelligence, shall maintain and make
available to Federal, State, local, territorial, and
tribal law enforcement entities, and other first
responders at the discretion of the Attorney General, a
web-based secure portal that includes information on
incidents involving the suspected criminal misuse of
explosives, including those voluntarily reported by
State, local, territorial, and tribal authorities.
(8) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in
coordination with the Attorney General, the Director of
National Intelligence, and the Secretaries of State and
Defense, shall maintain secure information-sharing
systems that make available to law enforcement
agencies, and other first responders at the discretion
of the Secretary of Homeland Security, information,
including lessons learned and best practices,
concerning the use of explosives as a terrorist weapon
and related insurgent war fighting tactics, both
domestically and internationally, for use in enhancing
the preparedness of Federal, State, local, territorial,
and tribal government personnel to deter, prevent,
detect, protect against, and respond to explosive
attacks in the United States.
(9) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in
coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary
of Defense, and the Director of the Office of Science
and Technology Policy, shall coordinate Federal
Government research, development, testing, and
evaluation activities relating to the detection and
prevention of, protection against, and response to
explosive attacks and the development of explosives
render-safe tools and technologies. The heads of all
other agencies that conduct such activities shall
cooperate with the Secretary of Homeland Security in
carrying out such responsibility. General Provisions
(10) This directive:
(a) shall be implemented consistent with
applicable law and the authorities of agencies,
or heads of agencies, vested by law, and
subject to the availability of appropriations;
(b) shall not be construed to impair or
otherwise affect the functions of the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget relating
to budget, administrative, and legislative
proposals; and
(c) is not intended to, and does not,
create any rights or benefits, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by
a party against the United States, its
agencies, instrumentalities, or entities, its
officers, employees, or agents, or any other
person.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive--20
(National Security Presidential Directive--51)
National Continuity Policy
----------
Purpose
(1) This directive establishes a comprehensive
national policy on the continuity of Federal Government
structures and operations and a single National
Continuity Coordinator responsible for coordinating the
development and implementation of Federal continuity
policies. This policy establishes ``National Essential
Functions,'' prescribes continuity requirements for all
executive departments and agencies, and provides
guidance for State, local, territorial, and tribal
governments, and private sector organizations in order
to ensure a comprehensive and integrated national
continuity program that will enhance the credibility of
our national security posture and enable a more rapid
and effective response to and recovery from a national
emergency.
Definitions
(2) In this directive:
(a) ``Category'' refers to the categories
of executive departments and agencies listed in
Annex A to this directive;
(b) ``Catastrophic Emergency'' means any
incident, regardless of location, that results
in extraordinary levels of mass casualties,
damage, or disruption severely affecting the
U.S. population, infrastructure, environment,
economy, or government functions;
(c) ``Continuity of Government,'' or
``COG,'' means a coordinated effort within the
Federal Government's executive branch to ensure
that National Essential Functions continue to
be performed during a Catastrophic Emergency;
(d) ``Continuity of Operations,'' or
``COOP,'' means an effort within individual
executive departments and agencies to ensure
that Primary Mission-Essential Functions
continue to be performed during a wide range of
emergencies, including localized acts of
nature, accidents, and technological or attack-
related emergencies;
(e) ``Enduring Constitutional
Government,'' or ``ECG,'' means a cooperative
effort among the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of the Federal Government,
coordinated by the President, as a matter of
comity with respect to the legislative and
judicial branches and with proper respect for
the constitutional separation of powers among
the branches, to preserve the constitutional
framework under which the Nation is governed
and the capability of all three branches of
government to execute constitutional
responsibilities and provide for orderly
succession, appropriate transition of
leadership, and interoperability and support of
the National Essential Functions during a
catastrophic emergency;
(f) ``Executive Departments and Agencies''
means the executive departments enumerated in 5
U.S.C. 101, independent establishments as
defined by 5 U.S.C. 104(1), Government
corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C. 103(1), and
the United States Postal Service;
(g) ``Government Functions'' means the
collective functions of the heads of executive
departments and agencies as defined by statute,
regulation, presidential direction, or other
legal authority, and the functions of the
legislative and judicial branches;
(h) ``National Essential Functions,'' or
``NEFs,'' means that subset of Government
Functions that are necessary to lead and
sustain the Nation during a catastrophic
emergency and that, therefore, must be
supported through COOP and COG capabilities;
and
(i) ``Primary Mission Essential
Functions,'' or ``PMEFs,'' means those
Government Functions that must be performed in
order to support or implement the performance
of NEFs before, during, and in the aftermath of
an emergency.
Policy
(3) It is the policy of the United States to
maintain a comprehensive and effective continuity
capability composed of Continuity of Operations and
Continuity of Government programs in order to ensure
the preservation of our form of government under the
Constitution and the continuing performance of National
Essential Functions under all conditions.
Implementation Actions
(4) Continuity requirements shall be incorporated
into daily operations of all executive departments and
agencies. As a result of the asymmetric threat
environment, adequate warning of potential emergencies
that could pose a significant risk to the homeland
might not be available, and therefore all continuity
planning shall be based on the assumption that no such
warning will be received. Emphasis will be placed upon
geographic dispersion of leadership, staff, and
infrastructure in order to increase survivability and
maintain uninterrupted Government Functions. Risk
management principles shall be applied to ensure that
appropriate operational readiness decisions are based
on the probability of an attack or other incident and
its consequences.
(5) The following NEFs are the foundation for all
continuity programs and capabilities and represent the
overarching responsibilities of the Federal Government
to lead and sustain the Nation during a crisis, and
therefore sustaining the following NEFs shall be the
primary focus of the Federal Government leadership
during and in the aftermath of an emergency that
adversely affects the performance of Government
Functions:
(a) Ensuring the continued functioning of
our form of government under Constitution,
including the functioning of the three separate
branches of government;
(b) Providing leadership visible to the
Nation and the world and maintaining the trust
and confidence of the American people;
(c) Defending the Constitution of the
United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic, and preventing or interdicting
attacks against the United States or its
people, property, or interests;
(d) Maintaining and fostering effective
relationships with foreign nations;
(e) Protecting against threats to the
homeland and bringing to justice perpetrators
of crimes or attacks against the United States
or its people, property, or interests;
(f) Providing rapid and effective response
to and recovery from the domestic consequences
of an attack or other incident;
(g) Protecting and stabilizing the
Nation's economy and ensuring public confidence
in its financial systems; and
(h) Providing for critical Federal
Government services that address the national
health, safety, and welfare needs of the United
States.
(6) The President shall lead the activities of the
Federal Government for ensuring constitutional
government. In order to advise and assist the President
in that function, the Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (APHS/CT) is
hereby designated as the National Continuity
Coordinator. The National Continuity Coordinator, in
coordination with the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs (APNSA), without exercising
directive authority, shall coordinate the development
and implementation of continuity policy for executive
departments and agencies. The Continuity Policy
Coordination Committee (CPCC), chaired by a Senior
Director from the Homeland Security Council staff,
designated by the National Continuity Coordinator,
shall be the main day-to-day forum for such policy
coordination.
(7) For continuity purposes, each executive
department and agency is assigned to a category in
accordance with the nature and characteristics of its
national security roles and responsibilities in support
of the Federal Government's ability to sustain the
NEFs. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall serve as
the President's lead agent for coordinating overall
continuity operations and activities of executive
departments and agencies, and in such role shall
perform the responsibilities set forth for the
Secretary in sections 10 and 16 of this directive.
(8) The National Continuity Coordinator, in
consultation with the heads of appropriate executive
departments and agencies, will lead the development of
a National Continuity Implementation Plan (Plan), which
shall include prioritized goals and objectives, a
concept of operations, performance metrics by which to
measure continuity readiness, procedures for continuity
and incident management activities, and clear direction
to executive department and agency continuity
coordinators, as well as guidance to promote
interoperability of Federal Government continuity
programs and procedures with State, local, territorial,
and tribal governments, and private sector owners and
operators of critical infrastructure, as appropriate.
The Plan shall be submitted to the President for
approval not later than 90 days after the date of this
directive.
(9) Recognizing that each branch of the Federal
Government is responsible for its own continuity
programs, an official designated by the Chief of Staff
to the President shall ensure that the executive
branch's COOP and COG policies in support of ECG
efforts are appropriately coordinated with those of the
legislative and judicial branches in order to ensure
interoperability and allocate national assets
efficiently to maintain a functioning Federal
Government.
(10) Federal Government COOP, COG, and ECG plans
and operations shall be appropriately integrated with
the emergency plans and capabilities of State, local,
territorial, and tribal governments, and private sector
owners and operators of critical infrastructure, as
appropriate, in order to promote interoperability and
to prevent redundancies and conflicting lines of
authority. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall
coordinate the integration of Federal continuity plans
and operations with State, local, territorial, and
tribal governments, and private sector owners and
operators of critical infrastructure, as appropriate,
in order to provide for the delivery of essential
services during an emergency.
(11) Continuity requirements for the Executive
Office of the President (EOP) and executive departments
and agencies shall include the following:
(a) The continuation of the performance of
PMEFs during any emergency must be for a period
up to 30 days or until normal operations can be
resumed, and the capability to be fully
operational at alternate sites as soon as
possible after the occurrence of an emergency,
but not later than 12 hours after COOP
activation;
(b) Succession orders and pre-planned
devolution of authorities that ensure the
emergency delegation of authority must be
planned and documented in advance in accordance
with applicable law;
(c) Vital resources, facilities, and
records must be safeguarded, and official
access to them must be provided;
(d) Provision must be made for the
acquisition of the resources necessary for
continuity operations on an emergency basis;
(e) Provision must be made for the
availability and redundancy of critical
communications capabilities at alternate sites
in order to support connectivity between and
among key government leadership, internal
elements, other executive departments and
agencies, critical partners, and the public;
(f) Provision must be made for
reconstitution capabilities that allow for
recovery from a catastrophic emergency and
resumption of normal operations; and
(g) Provision must be made for the
identification, training, and preparedness of
personnel capable of relocating to alternate
facilities to support the continuation of the
performance of PMEFs.
(12) In order to provide a coordinated response to
escalating threat levels or actual emergencies, the
Continuity of Government Readiness Conditions (COGCON)
system establishes executive branch continuity program
readiness levels, focusing on possible threats to the
National Capital Region. The President will determine
and issue the COGCON Level. Executive departments and
agencies shall comply with the requirements and
assigned responsibilities under the COGCON program.
During COOP activation, executive departments and
agencies shall report their readiness status to the
Secretary of Homeland Security or the Secretary's
designee.
(13) The Director of the Office of Management and
Budget shall:
(a) Conduct an annual assessment of
executive department and agency continuity
funding requests and performance data that are
submitted by executive departments and agencies
as part of the annual budget request process,
in order to monitor progress in the
implementation of the Plan and the execution of
continuity budgets;
(b) In coordination with the National
Continuity Coordinator, issue annual continuity
planning guidance for the development of
continuity budget requests; and
(c) Ensure that heads of executive
departments and agencies prioritize budget
resources for continuity capabilities,
consistent with this directive.
(14) The Director of the Office of Science and
Technology Policy shall:
(a) Define and issue minimum requirements
for continuity communications for executive
departments and agencies, in consultation with
the APHS/ CT, the APNSA, the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, and the Chief
of Staff to the President;
(b) Establish requirements for, and
monitor the development, implementation, and
maintenance of, a comprehensive communications
architecture to integrate continuity
components, in consultation with the APHS/ CT,
the APNSA, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, and the Chief of Staff
to the President; and
(c) Review quarterly and annual
assessments of continuity communications
capabilities, as prepared pursuant to section
16(d) of this directive or otherwise, and
report the results and recommended remedial
actions to the National Continuity Coordinator.
(15) An official designated by the Chief of Staff
to the President shall:
(a) Advise the President, the Chief of
Staff to the President, the APHS/CT, and the
APNSA on COGCON operational execution options;
and
(b) Consult with the Secretary of Homeland
Security in order to ensure synchronization and
integration of continuity activities among the
four categories of executive departments and
agencies.
(16) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall:
(a) Coordinate the implementation,
execution, and assessment of continuity
operations and activities;
(b) Develop and promulgate Federal
Continuity Directives in order to establish
continuity planning requirements for executive
departments and agencies;
(c) Conduct biennial assessments of
individual department and agency continuity
capabilities as prescribed by the Plan and
report the results to the President through the
APHS/CT;
(d) Conduct quarterly and annual
assessments of continuity communications
capabilities in consultation with an official
designated by the Chief of Staff to the
President;
(e) Develop, lead, and conduct a Federal
continuity training and exercise program, which
shall be incorporated into the National
Exercise Program developed pursuant to Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 8 of December
17, 2003 (``National Preparedness''), in
consultation with an official designated by the
Chief of Staff to the President;
(f) Develop and promulgate continuity
planning guidance to State, local, territorial,
and tribal governments, and private sector
critical infrastructure owners and operators;
(g) Make available continuity planning and
exercise funding, in the form of grants as
provided by law, to State, local, territorial,
and tribal governments, and private sector
critical infrastructure owners and operators;
and
(h) As Executive Agent of the National
Communications System, develop, implement, and
maintain a comprehensive continuity
communications architecture.
(17) The Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Attorney General and the
Secretary of Homeland Security, shall produce a
biennial assessment of the foreign and domestic threats
to the Nation's continuity of government.
(18) The Secretary of Defense, in coordination
with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall provide
secure, integrated, Continuity of Government
communications to the President, the Vice President,
and, at a minimum, Category I executive departments and
agencies.
(19) Heads of executive departments and agencies
shall execute their respective department or agency
COOP plans in response to a localized emergency and
shall:
(a) Appoint a senior accountable official,
at the Assistant Secretary level, as the
Continuity Coordinator for the department or
agency;
(b) Identify and submit to the National
Continuity Coordinator the list of PMEFs for
the department or agency and develop continuity
plans in support of the NEFs and the
continuation of essential functions under all
conditions;
(c) Plan, program, and budget for
continuity capabilities consistent with this
directive;
(d) Plan, conduct, and support annual
tests and training, in consultation with the
Secretary of Homeland Security, in order to
evaluate program readiness and ensure adequacy
and viability of continuity plans and
communications systems; and
(e) Support other continuity requirements,
as assigned by category, in accordance with the
nature and characteristics of its national
security roles and responsibilities
General Provisions
(20) This directive shall be implemented in a
manner that is consistent with, and facilitates
effective implementation of, provisions of the
Constitution concerning succession to the Presidency or
the exercise of its powers, and the Presidential
Succession Act of 1947 (3 U.S.C. 19), with consultation
of the Vice President and, as appropriate, others
involved. Heads of executive departments and agencies
shall ensure that appropriate support is available to
the Vice President and others involved as necessary to
be prepared at all times to implement those provisions.
(21) This directive:
(a) Shall be implemented consistent with
applicable law and the authorities of agencies,
or heads of agencies, vested by law, and
subject to the availability of appropriations;
(b) Shall not be construed to impair or
otherwise affect
(i) the functions of the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget
relating to budget, administrative, and
legislative proposals, or
(ii) the authority of the Secretary of
Defense over the Department of Defense,
including the chain of command for
military forces from the President, to
the Secretary of Defense, to the
commander of military forces, or
military command and control
procedures; and
(c) Is not intended to, and does not,
create any rights or benefits, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by
a party against the United States, its
agencies, instrumentalities, or entities, its
officers, employees, or agents, or any other
person.
(22) Revocation. Presidential Decision Directive
67 of October 21, 1998 (``Enduring Constitutional
Government and Continuity of Government Operations''),
including all Annexes thereto, is hereby revoked.
(23) Annex A and the classified Continuity
Annexes, attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into
and made a part of this directive.
(24) Security. This directive and the information
contained herein shall be protected from unauthorized
disclosure, provided that, except for Annex A, the
Annexes attached to this directive are classified and
shall be accorded appropriate handling, consistent with
applicable Executive Orders.
George W. Bush
Homeland Security Presidential Directive--21
Public Health and Medical Preparedness
----------
Purpose
(1) This directive establishes a National Strategy
for Public Health and Medical Preparedness (Strategy),
which builds upon principles set forth in Biodefense
for the 21st Century (April 2004) and will transform
our national approach to protecting the health of the
American people against all disasters.
Definitions
(2) In this directive:
(a) The term ``biosurveillance'' means the
process of active data-gathering with
appropriate analysis and interpretation of
biosphere data that might relate to disease
activity and threats to human or animal health
_ whether infectious, toxic, metabolic, or
otherwise, and regardless of intentional or
natural origin_ in order to achieve early
warning of health threats, early detection of
health events, and overall situational
awareness of disease activity;
(b) The term ``catastrophic health event''
means any natural or manmade incident,
including terrorism, that results in a number
of ill or injured persons sufficient to
overwhelm the capabilities of immediate local
and regional emergency response and health care
systems;
(c) The term ``epidemiologic
surveillance'' means the process of actively
gathering and analyzing data related to human
health and disease in a population in order to
obtain early warning of human health events,
rapid characterization of human disease events,
and overall situational awareness of disease
activity in the human population;
(d) The term ``medical'' means the science
and practice of maintenance of health and
prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and
alleviation of disease or injury and the
provision of those services to individuals;
(e) The term ``public health'' means the
science and practice of protecting and
improving the overall health of the community
through disease prevention and early diagnosis,
control of communicable diseases, health
education, injury prevention, sanitation, and
protection from environmental hazards;
(f) The term ``public health and medical
preparedness'' means the existence of plans,
procedures, policies, training, and equipment
necessary to maximize the ability to prevent,
respond to, and recover from major events,
including efforts that result in the capability
to render an appropriate public health and
medical response that will mitigate the effects
of illness and injury, limit morbidity and
mortality to the maximum extent possible, and
sustain societal, economic, and political
infrastructure; and
(g) The terms ``State'' and ``local
government,'' when used in a geographical
sense, have the meanings ascribed to such terms
respectively in section 2 of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101).
Background
(3) A catastrophic health event, such as a
terrorist attack with a weapon of mass destruction
(WMD), a naturally-occurring pandemic, or a calamitous
meteorological or geological event, could cause tens or
hundreds of thousands of casualties or more, weaken our
economy, damage public morale and confidence, and
threaten our national security. It is therefore
critical that we establish a strategic vision that will
enable a level of public health and medical
preparedness sufficient to address a range of possible
disasters.
(4) The United States has made significant
progress in public health and medical preparedness
since 2001, but we remain vulnerable to events that
threaten the health of large populations. The attacks
of September 11 and Hurricane Katrina were the most
significant recent disasters faced by the United
States, yet casualty numbers were small in comparison
to the 1995 Kobe earthquake; the 2003 Bam, Iran,
earthquake; the 2004 Sumatra tsunami; and what we would
expect from a 1918-like influenza pandemic or large-
scale WMD attack. Such events could immediately
overwhelm our public health and medical systems.
(5) This Strategy draws key principles from the
National Strategy for Homeland Security (October 2007),
the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction (December 2002), and Biodefense for the
21st Century (April 2004) that can be generally applied
to public health and medical preparedness. Those key
principles are the following: (1) preparedness for all
potential catastrophic health events; (2) vertical and
horizontal coordination across levels of government,
jurisdictions, and disciplines; (3) a regional approach
to health preparedness; (4) engagement of the private
sector, academia, and other nongovernmental entities in
preparedness and response efforts; and (5) the
important roles of individuals, families, and
communities.
(6) Present public health and medical preparedness
plans incorporate the concept of "surging" existing
medical and public health capabilities in response to
an event that threatens a large number of lives. The
assumption that conventional public health and medical
systems can function effectively in catastrophic health
events has, however, proved to be incorrect in real-
world situations. Therefore, it is necessary to
transform the national approach to health care in the
context of a catastrophic health event in order to
enable U.S. public health and medical systems to
respond effectively to a broad range of incidents.
(7) The most effective complex service delivery
systems result from rigorous end-to-end system design.
A critical and formal process by which the functions of
public health and medical preparedness and response are
designed to integrate all vertical (through all levels
of government) and horizontal (across all sectors in
communities) components can achieve a much greater
capability than we currently have.
(8) The United States has tremendous resources in
both public and private sectors that could be used to
prepare for and respond to a catastrophic health event.
To exploit those resources fully, they must be
organized in a rationally designed system that is
incorporated into pre-event planning, deployed in a
coordinated manner in response to an event, and guided
by a constant and timely flow of relevant information
during an event. This Strategy establishes principles
and objectives to improve our ability to respond
comprehensively to catastrophic health events. It also
identifies critical antecedent components of this
capability and directs the development of an
implementation plan that will delineate further
specific actions and guide the process to fruition.
(9) This Strategy focuses on human public health
and medical systems; it does not address other areas
critical to overall public health and medical
preparedness, such as animal health systems, food and
agriculture defense, global partnerships in public
health, health threat intelligence activities, domestic
and international biosecurity, and basic and applied
research in threat diseases and countermeasures.
Efforts in those areas are addressed in other policy
documents.
(10) It is not possible to prevent all casualties
in catastrophic events, but strategic improvements in
our Federal, State, and local planning can prepare our
Nation to deliver appropriate care to the largest
possible number of people, lessen the impact on limited
health care resources, and support the continuity of
society and government.
Policy
(11) It is the policy of the United States to plan
and enable provision for the public health and medical
needs of the American people in the case of a
catastrophic health event through continual and timely
flow of information during such an event and rapid
public health and medical response that marshals all
available national capabilities and capacities in a
rapid and coordinated manner.
Implementation Actions
(12) Biodefense for the 21st Century provides a
foundation for the transformation of our catastrophic
health event response and preparedness efforts.
Although the four pillars of that framework - Threat
Awareness, Prevention and Protection, Surveillance and
Detection, and Response and Recovery - were developed
to guide our efforts to defend against a bioterrorist
attack, they are applicable to a broad array of natural
and manmade public health and medical challenges and
are appropriate to serve as the core functions of the
Strategy for Public Health and Medical Preparedness.
(13) To accomplish our objectives, we must create
a firm foundation for community medical preparedness.
We will increase our efforts to inform citizens and
empower communities, buttress our public health
infrastructure, and explore options to relieve current
pressures on our emergency departments and emergency
medical systems so that they retain the flexibility to
prepare for and respond to events.
(14) Ultimately, the Nation must collectively
support and facilitate the establishment of a
discipline of disaster health. The specialty of
emergency medicine evolved as a result of the
recognition of the special considerations in emergency
patient care, and similarly the recognition of the
unique principles in disaster-related public health and
medicine merit the establishment of their own formal
discipline. Such a discipline will provide a foundation
for doctrine, education, training, and research and
will integrate preparedness into the public health and
medical communities.
Critical Components of Public Health and Medical Preparedness
(15) Currently, the four most critical components
of public health and medical preparedness are
biosurveillance, countermeasure distribution, mass
casualty care, and community resilience. Although those
capabilities do not address all public health and
medical preparedness requirements, they currently hold
the greatest potential for mitigating illness and death
and therefore will receive the highest priority in our
public health and medical preparedness efforts. Those
capabilities constitute the focus and major objectives
of this Strategy.
(16) Biosurveillance: The United States must
develop a nationwide, robust, and integrated
biosurveillance capability, with connections to
international disease surveillance systems, in order to
provide early warning and ongoing characterization of
disease outbreaks in near real-time. Surveillance must
use multiple modalities and an in-depth architecture.
We must enhance clinician awareness and participation
and strengthen laboratory diagnostic capabilities and
capacity in order to recognize potential threats as
early as possible. Integration of biosurveillance
elements and other data (including human health, animal
health, agricultural, meteorological, environmental,
intelligence, and other data) will provide a
comprehensive picture of the health of communities and
the associated threat environment for incorporation
into the national ``common operating picture.'' A
central element of biosurveillance must be an
epidemiologic surveillance system to monitor human
disease activity across populations. That system must
be sufficiently enabled to identify specific disease
incidence and prevalence in heterogeneous populations
and environments and must possess sufficient
flexibility to tailor analyses to new syndromes and
emerging diseases. State and local government health
officials, public and private sector health care
institutions, and practicing clinicians must be
involved in system design, and the overall system must
be constructed with the principal objective of
establishing or enhancing the capabilities of State and
local government entities.
(17) Countermeasure Stockpiling and Distribution:
In the context of a catastrophic health event, rapid
distribution of medical countermeasures (vaccines,
drugs, and therapeutics) to a large population requires
significant resources within individual communities.
Few if any cities are presently able to meet the
objective of dispensing countermeasures to their entire
population within 48 hours after the decision to do so.
Recognizing that State and local government authorities
have the primary responsibility to protect their
citizens, the Federal Government will create the
appropriate framework and policies for sharing
information on best practices and mechanisms to address
the logistical challenges associated with this
requirement. The Federal Government must work with
nonfederal stakeholders to create effective templates
for countermeasure distribution and dispensing that
State and local government authorities can use to build
their own capabilities.
(18) Mass Casualty Care: The structure and
operating principles of our day-to-day public health
and medical systems cannot meet the needs created by a
catastrophic health event. Collectively, our Nation
must develop a disaster medical capability that can
immediately re-orient and coordinate existing resources
within all sectors to satisfy the needs of the
population during a catastrophic health event. Mass
casualty care response must be (1) rapid, (2) flexible,
(3) scalable, (4) sustainable, (5) exhaustive (drawing
upon all national resources), (6) comprehensive
(addressing needs from acute to chronic care and
including mental health and special needs populations),
(7) integrated and coordinated, and (8) appropriate
(delivering the correct treatment in the most ethical
manner with available capabilities). We must enhance
our capability to protect the physical and mental
health of survivors; protect responders and health care
providers; properly and respectfully dispose of the
deceased; ensure continuity of society, economy, and
government; and facilitate long-term recovery of
affected citizens.
(19) The establishment of a robust disaster health
capability requires us to develop an operational
concept for the medical response to catastrophic health
events that is substantively distinct from and broader
than that which guides day-to-day operations. In order
to achieve that transformation, the Federal Government
will facilitate and provide leadership for key
stakeholders to establish the following four
foundational elements: Doctrine, System Design,
Capacity, and Education and Training. The establishment
of those foundational elements must result from efforts
within the relevant professional communities and will
require many years, but the Federal Government can
serve as an important catalyst for this process.
(20) Community Resilience: The above components
address the supply side of the preparedness function,
ultimately providing enhanced services to our citizens.
The demand side is of equal importance. Where local
civic leaders, citizens, and families are educated
regarding threats and are empowered to mitigate their
own risk, where they are practiced in responding to
events, where they have social networks to fall back
upon, and where they have familiarity with local public
health and medical systems, there will be community
resilience that will significantly attenuate the
requirement for additional assistance. The Federal
Government must formulate a comprehensive plan for
promoting community public health and medical
preparedness to assist State and local authorities in
building resilient communities in the face of potential
catastrophic health events.
Biosurveillance
(21) The Secretary of Health and Human Services
shall establish an operational national epidemiologic
surveillance system for human health, with
international connectivity where appropriate, that is
predicated on State, regional, and community-level
capabilities and creates a networked system to allow
for two-way information flow between and among Federal,
State, and local government public health authorities
and clinical health care providers. The system shall
build upon existing Federal, State, and local
surveillance systems where they exist and shall enable
and provide incentive for public health agencies to
implement local surveillance systems where they do not
exist. To the extent feasible, the system shall be
built using electronic health information systems. It
shall incorporate flexibility and depth of data
necessary to respond to previously unknown or emerging
threats to public health and integrate its data into
the national biosurveillance common operating picture
as appropriate. The system shall protect patient
privacy by restricting access to identifying
information to the greatest extent possible and only to
public health officials with a need to know. The
Implementation Plan to be developed pursuant to section
43 of this directive shall specify milestones for this
system.
(22) Within 180 days after the date of this
directive, the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense,
Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security, shall
establish an Epidemiologic Surveillance Federal
Advisory Committee, including representatives from
State and local government public health authorities
and appropriate private sector health care entities, in
order to ensure that the Federal Government is meeting
the goal of enabling State and local government public
health surveillance capabilities.
Countermeasure Stockpiling and Distribution
(23) In accordance with the schedule set forth
below, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, in
coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security,
shall develop templates, using a variety of tools and
including private sector resources when necessary, that
provide minimum operational plans to enable communities
to distribute and dispense countermeasures to their
populations within 48 hours after a decision to do so.
The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall ensure
that this process utilizes current cooperative programs
and engages Federal, State, local government, and
private sector entities in template development,
modeling, testing, and evaluation. The Secretary shall
also assist State, local government, and regional
entities in tailoring templates to fit differing
geographic sizes, population densities, and
demographics, and other unique or specific local needs.
In carrying out such actions, the Secretary shall:
(a) within 270 days after the date of this
directive, (i) publish an initial template or
templates meeting the requirements above,
including basic testing of component
distribution mechanisms and modeling of
template systems to predict performance in
large-scale implementation, (ii) establish
standards and performance measures for State
and local government countermeasure
distribution systems, including demonstration
of specific capabilities in tactical exercises
in accordance with the National Exercise
Program, and (iii) establish a process to
gather performance data from State and local
participants on a regular basis to assess
readiness; and
(b) within 180 days after the completion
of the tasks set forth in (a), and with
appropriate notice, commence collecting and
using performance data and metrics as
conditions for future public health
preparedness grant funding.
(24) Within 270 days after the date of this
directive, the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense,
Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security and the
Attorney General, shall develop Federal Government
capabilities and plans to complement or supplement
State and local government distribution capacity, as
appropriate and feasible, if such entities' resources
are deemed insufficient to provide access to
countermeasures in a timely manner in the event of a
catastrophic health event.
(25) The Secretary of Health and Human Services
shall ensure that the priority-setting process for the
acquisition of medical countermeasures and other
critical medical materiel for the Strategic National
Stockpile (SNS) is transparent and risk-informed with
respect to the scope, quantities, and forms of the
various products. Within 180 days after the date of
this directive, the Secretary, in coordination with the
Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, and Veterans
Affairs, shall establish a formal mechanism for the
annual review of SNS composition and development of
recommendations that utilizes input from accepted
national risk assessments and threat assessments,
national planning scenarios, national modeling
resources, and subject matter experts. The results of
each such annual review shall be provided to the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism at the time of the Department of
Health and Human Services' next budget submission.
(26) Within 90 days after the date of this
directive, the Secretary of Health and Human Services
shall establish a process to share relevant information
regarding the contents of the SNS with Federal, State,
and local government health officers with appropriate
clearances and a need to know.
(27) Within 180 days after the date of this
directive, the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
in coordination with the Secretaries of State, Defense,
Agriculture, Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security,
shall develop protocols for sharing countermeasures and
medical goods between the SNS and other Federal
stockpiles and shall explore appropriate reciprocal
arrangements with foreign and international stockpiles
of medical countermeasures to ensure the availability
of necessary supplies for use in the United States.
Mass Casualty Care
(28) The Secretary of Health and Human Services,
in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense,
Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security, shall directly
engage relevant State and local government, academic,
professional, and private sector entities and experts
to provide feedback on the review of the National
Disaster Medical System and national medical surge
capacity required by the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act (PAHPA) (Public Law 109-417). Within
270 days after the completion of such review, the
Secretary shall identify, through a systems-based
approach involving expertise from such entities and
experts, high-priority gaps in mass casualty care
capabilities, and shall submit to the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism a
concept plan that identifies and coordinates all
Federal, State, and local government and private sector
public health and medical disaster response resources,
and identifies options for addressing critical
deficits, in order to achieve the system attributes
described in this Strategy.
(29) Within 180 days after the date of this
directive, the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense,
Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security, shall:
(a) build upon the analysis of Federal
facility use to provide enhanced medical surge
capacity in disasters required by section 302
of PAHPA to analyze the use of Federal medical
facilities as a foundational element of public
health and medical preparedness; and
(b) develop and implement plans and enter
into agreements to integrate such facilities
more effectively into national and regional
education, training, and exercise preparedness
activities.
(30) The Secretary of Health and Human Services
shall lead an interagency process, in coordination with
the Secretaries of Defense, Veterans Affairs, and
Homeland Security and the Attorney General, to identify
any legal, regulatory, or other barriers to public
health and medical preparedness and response from
Federal, State, or local government or private sector
sources that can be eliminated by appropriate
regulatory or legislative action and shall, within 120
days after the date of this directive, submit a report
on such barriers to the Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.
(31) The impact of the ``worried well'' in past
disasters is well documented, and it is evident that
mitigating the mental health consequences of disasters
can facilitate effective response. Recognizing that
maintaining and restoring mental health in disasters
has not received sufficient attention to date, within
180 days after the date of this directive, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, in coordination
with the Secretaries of Defense, Veterans Affairs, and
Homeland Security, shall establish a Federal Advisory
Committee for Disaster Mental Health. The committee
shall consist of appropriate subject matter experts
and, within 180 days after its establishment, shall
submit to the Secretary of Health and Human Services
recommendations for protecting, preserving, and
restoring individual and community mental health in
catastrophic health event settings, including pre-
event, intra-event, and post-event education,
messaging, and interventions.
Community Resilience
(32) The Secretary of Health and Human Services,
in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense,
Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security, shall ensure
that core public health and medical curricula and
training developed pursuant to PAHPA address the needs
to improve individual, family, and institutional public
health and medical preparedness, enhance private
citizen opportunities for contributions to local,
regional, and national preparedness and response, and
build resilient communities.
(33) Within 270 days after the date of this
directive, the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense,
Commerce, Labor, Education, Veterans Affairs, and
Homeland Security and the Attorney General, shall
submit to the President for approval, through the
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism, a plan to promote comprehensive
community medical preparedness.
Risk Awareness
(34) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in
coordination with the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, shall prepare an unclassified briefing for
non-health professionals that clearly outlines the
scope of the risks to public health posed by relevant
threats and catastrophic health events (including
attacks involving weapons of mass destruction), shall
coordinate such briefing with the heads of other
relevant executive departments and agencies, shall
ensure that full use is made of Department of Defense
expertise and resources, and shall ensure that all
State governors and the mayors and senior county
officials from the 50 largest metropolitan statistical
areas in the United States receive such briefing,
unless specifically declined, within 150 days after the
date of this directive.
(35) Within 180 days after the date of this
directive, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary
of Health and Human Services, and the Director of
National Intelligence, shall establish a mechanism by
which up-to-date and specific public health threat
information shall be relayed, to the greatest extent
possible and not inconsistent with the established
guidance relating to the Information Sharing
Environment, to relevant public health officials at the
State and local government levels and shall initiate a
process to ensure that qualified heads of State and
local government entities have the opportunity to
obtain appropriate security clearances so that they may
receive classified threat information when applicable.
Education and Training
(36) Within 180 days after the date of this
directive, the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland
Security, shall develop and thereafter maintain
processes for coordinating Federal grant programs for
public health and medical preparedness using grant
application guidance, investment justifications,
reporting, program performance measures, and
accountability for future funding in order to promote
cross-sector, regional, and capability-based
coordination, consistent with section 201 of PAHPA and
the National Preparedness Guidelines developed pursuant
to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 of
December 17, 2003 (``National Preparedness'').
(37) Within 1 year after the date of this
directive, the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense,
Transportation, Veterans Affairs, and Homeland
Security, and consistent with section 304 of PAHPA,
shall develop a mechanism to coordinate public health
and medical disaster preparedness and response core
curricula and training across executive departments and
agencies, to ensure standardization and commonality of
knowledge, procedures, and terms of reference within
the Federal Government that also can be communicated to
State and local government entities, as well as
academia and the private sector.
(38) Within 1 year after the date of this
directive, the Secretaries of Health and Human Services
and Defense, in coordination with the Secretaries of
Veterans Affairs and Homeland Security, shall establish
an academic Joint Program for Disaster Medicine and
Public Health housed at a National Center for Disaster
Medicine and Public Health at the Uniformed Services
University of the Health Sciences. The Program shall
lead Federal efforts to develop and propagate core
curricula, training, and research related to medicine
and public health in disasters. The Center will be an
academic center of excellence in disaster medicine and
public health, co-locating education and research in
the related specialties of domestic medical
preparedness and response, international health,
international disaster and humanitarian medical
assistance, and military medicine. Department of Health
and Human Services and Department of Defense
authorities will be used to carry out respective
civilian and military missions within this joint
program.
Disaster Health System
(39) Within 180 days after the date of this
directive, the Secretary of Health and Human Services
shall commission the Institute of Medicine to lead a
forum engaging Federal, State, and local governments,
the private sector, academia, and appropriate
professional societies in a process to facilitate the
development of national disaster public health and
medicine doctrine and system design and to develop a
strategy for long-term enhancement of disaster public
health and medical capacity and the propagation of
disaster public health and medicine education and
training.
(40) Within 120 days after the date of this
directive, the Secretary of Health and Human Services
shall submit to the President through the Assistant to
the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism, and shall commence the implementation
of, a plan to use current grant funding programs,
private payer incentives, market forces, Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services requirements, and other
means to create financial incentives to enhance private
sector health care facility preparedness in such a
manner as to not increase health care costs.
(41) Within 180 days after the date of this
directive, the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
in coordination with the Secretaries of Transportation
and Homeland Security, shall establish within the
Department of Health and Human Services an Office for
Emergency Medical Care. Under the direction of the
Secretary, such Office shall lead an enterprise to
promote and fund research in emergency medicine and
trauma health care; promote regional partnerships and
more effective emergency medical systems in order to
enhance appropriate triage, distribution, and care of
routine community patients; promote local, regional,
and State emergency medical systems' preparedness for
and response to public health events. The Office shall
address the full spectrum of issues that have an impact
on care in hospital emergency departments, including
the entire continuum of patient care from pre-hospital
to disposition from emergency or trauma care. The
Office shall coordinate with existing executive
departments and agencies that perform functions
relating to emergency medical systems in order to
ensure unified strategy, policy, and implementation.
National Health Security Strategy
(42) The PAHPA requires that the Secretary of
Health and Human Services submit in 2009, and
quadrennially afterward, a National Health Security
Strategy (NHSS) to the Congress. The principles and
actions in this directive, and in the Implementation
Plan required by section 43, shall be incorporated into
the initial NHSS, as appropriate, and shall serve as a
foundation for the preparedness goals contained
therein.
Task Force and Implementation Plan
(43) In order to facilitate the implementation of
the policy outlined in this Strategy, there is
established the Public Health and Medical Preparedness
Task Force (Task Force). Within 120 days after the date
of this directive, the Task Force shall submit to the
President for approval, through the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism,
an Implementation Plan (Plan) for this Strategy, and
annually thereafter shall submit to the Assistant to
the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism a status report on the implementation
of the Plan and any recommendations for changes to this
Strategy.
(a) The Task Force shall consist
exclusively of the following members (or their
designees who shall be full-time officers or
employees of the members' respective agencies):
(i) The Secretary of Health and
Human Services, who shall serve as
Chair;
(ii) The Secretary of State;
(ii) The Secretary of Defense;
(iii) The Attorney General;
(iv) The Secretary of Agriculture;
(v) The Secretary of Commerce;
(vi) The Secretary of Labor;
(vii) The Secretary of
Transportation;
(viii) The Secretary of Veterans
Affairs
(ix) The Secretary of Homeland
Security;
(x) The Director of the Office of
Management and Budget;
(xi) The Director of National
Intelligence; and
(xii) such other officers of the
United States as the Chair of the Task
Force may designate from time to time.
(b) The Chair of the Task Force shall, as
appropriate to deal with particular subject
matters, establish subcommittees of the Task
Force that shall consist exclusively of members
of the Task Force (or their designees under
subsection (a) of this section), and such other
full-time or permanent part-time officers or
employees of the Federal Government as the
Chair may designate.
(c) The Plan shall:
(i) provide additional detailed
roles and responsibilities of heads of
executive departments and agencies
relating to and consistent with the
Strategy and actions set forth in this
directive;
(ii) provide additional guidance
on public health and medical directives
in Biodefense for the 21st Century; and
(iii) direct the full examination
of resource requirements.
(d) The Plan and all Task Force reports
shall be developed in coordination with the
Biodefense Policy Coordination Committee of the
Homeland Security Council and shall then be
prepared for consideration by and submitted to
the more senior committees of the Homeland
Security Council, as deemed appropriate by the
Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism.
General Provisions
(44) This directive:
(a) shall be implemented consistent with
applicable law and the authorities of executive
departments and agencies, or heads of such
departments and agencies, vested by law, and
subject to the availability of appropriations
and within the current projected spending
levels for Federal health entitlement programs;
(b) shall not be construed to impair or
otherwise affect the functions of the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget relating
to budget, administrative, and legislative
proposals; and
(c) is not intended, and does not, create
any rights or benefits, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by
a party against the United States, its
departments, agencies, instrumentalities, or
entities, its officers, employees, or agents,
or any other person.
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