[House Prints 110-B]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


110th Congress                                                Committee
2nd Session                 COMMITTEE PRINT                 Print 110-B
                                                     
_______________________________________________________________________
 
                              COMPILATION 

                                   of

                           HOMELAND SECURITY 
                     PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES (HSPD) 

                  (Updated through December 31, 2007) 

                               __________

                      Prepared for the use of the 

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

                                 of the

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                                     
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                              JANUARY 2008

                     U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

39-618 PDF                 WASHINGTON DC:  2008















                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

               Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California          Peter T. King, New York
Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts      Lamar Smith, Texas
Norman D. Dicks, Washington          Christopher Shays, Connecticut
Jane Harman, California              Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon             Tom Davis, Virginia
Nita M. Lowey, New York              Daniel E. Lungren, California
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of   Mike Rogers, Alabama
    Columbia                         Bobby Jindal, Louisiana
Zoe Lofgren, California              Dave G. Reichert, Washington
Donna M. Christensen, Virgin         Michael T. McCaul, Texas
    Islands                          Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Bob Etheridge, North Carolina        Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island      Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Henry Cuellar, Texas                 David Davis, Tennessee
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania  Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Al Green, Texas
Ed Perlmutter, Colorado
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey

       Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
                     Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
                    Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
                Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director

                                  (II)



























                            C O N T E N T S



Homeland Security Presidential Directives

    1.  Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security 
      Council....................................................     1
    2.  Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies.........     5
    3.  Homeland Security Advisory System........................     9
    4.  National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction..    15
    5.  Management of Domestic Incidents.........................    23
    6.  IIntegration and Use of Screening Information to Protect 
      Against Terrorism..........................................    31
    7.  Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, 
      and Protection.............................................    33
    8.  National Preparedness....................................    43
    9.  Defense of United States Agriculture and Food............    51
    10. Biodefense for the 21st Century..........................    57
    11. Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures.....    67
    12. IPolicy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal 
      Employees and Contractors..................................    71
    13. Maritime Security Policy.................................    73
    14. Domestic Nuclear Detection...............................    81
    15.   (Classified - Not Available)...........................    85
    16. National Strategy for Aviation Security..................    87
    17.   (Classified - Not Available)...........................   115
    18. Medical Countermeasures Against Weapons of Mass 
      Destruction................................................   117
    19. Combating Terrorism Use of Explosives in the United 
      States.....................................................   127
    20. National Continuity Policy...............................   133
    21. Public Health and Medical Preparedness...................   141

                                 (III)
              Homeland Security Presidential Directive--1

      Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council

                              ----------                              


A. Homeland Security Council
            Securing Americans from terrorist threats or 
        attacks is a critical national security function. It 
        requires extensive coordination across a broad spectrum 
        of Federal, State, and local agencies to reduce the 
        potential for terrorist attacks and to mitigate damage 
        should such an attack occur. The Homeland Security 
        Council (HSC) shall ensure coordination of all homeland 
        security-related activities among executive departments 
        and agencies and promote the effective development and 
        implementation of all homeland security policies.

B. The Homeland Security Council Principals Committee
            The HSC Principals Committee (HSC/PC) shall be the 
        senior interagency forum under the HSC for homeland 
        security issues. The HSC/PC is composed of the 
        following members: the Secretary of the Treasury; the 
        Secretary of Defense; the Attorney General; the 
        Secretary of Health and Human Services; the Secretary 
        of Transportation; the Director of the Office 
        Management and Budget; the Assistant to the President 
        for Homeland Security (who serves as Chairman); the 
        Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff; the 
        Director of CentralIntelligence; the Director of the 
        Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Director of the 
        Federal Emergency Management Agency; and the Assistant 
        to the President and Chief of Staff to the Vice 
        President. The Assistant to the President for National 
        Security Affairs shall be invited to attend all 
        meetings of the HSC/PC. The following people shall be 
        invited to HSC/PC meetings when issues pertaining to 
        their responsibilities and expertise are discussed: the 
        Secretary of State; the Secretary of the Interior; the 
        Secretary of Agriculture; the Secretary of Commerce; 
        the Secretary of Labor; the Secretary of Energy; the 
        Secretary of Veterans Affairs; the Administrator of the 
        Environmental Protection Agency; and the Deputy 
        National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism. The 
        Counsel to the President shall be consulted regarding 
        the agenda of HSC/PC meetings and shall attend any 
        meeting when, in consultation with the Assistant to the 
        President for Homeland Security, the Counsel deems it 
        appropriate. The Deputy Director of the Office of 
        Homeland Security shall serve as Executive Secretary of 
        the HSC/PC. Other heads of departments and agencies and 
        senior officials shall be invited, when appropriate.
            The HSC/PC shall meet at the call of the Assistant 
        to the President for Homeland Security, in consultation 
        with the regular attendees of the HSC/PC. The Assistant 
        to the President for Homeland Security shall determine 
        the agenda, in consultation with the regular attendees, 
        and shall ensure that all necessary papers are 
        prepared. When global terrorism with domestic 
        implications is on the agenda of the HSC/PC, the 
        Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
        the Assistant to the President for National Security 
        Affairs shall perform these tasks in concert.

C. Homeland Security Council Deputies Committee
            The HSC Deputies Committee (HSC/DC) shall serve as 
        the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for 
        consideration of policy issues affecting homeland 
        security. The HSC/DC can task and review the work of 
        the HSC interagency groups discussed below. The HSC/DC 
        shall help ensure that issues brought before the HSC/PC 
        or the HSC have been properly analyzed and prepared for 
        action. The HSC/DC shall have the following as its 
        regular members: the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury; 
        the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Deputy Attorney 
        General; the Deputy Secretary of Health and Human 
        Services; the Deputy Secretary of Transportation; the 
        Deputy Director of the Office of Homeland Security (who 
        serves as Chairman); the Deputy Director of Central 
        Intelligence; the Deputy Director of the Federal Bureau 
        of Investigation; the Deputy Director of the Federal 
        Emergency Management Agency; the Deputy Director of the 
        Office of Management and Budget; and the Assistant to 
        the President and Chief of Staff to the Vice President. 
        The Assistant to the President and Deputy National 
        Security Advisor shall be invited to attend all 
        meetings of the HSC/DC. The following people shall be 
        invited to attend when issues pertaining to their 
        responsibilities and expertise are to be discussed: the 
        Deputy Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of the 
        Interior; the Deputy Secretary of Agriculture; the 
        Deputy Secretary of Commerce; the Deputy Secretary of 
        Labor; the Deputy Secretary of Energy; the Deputy 
        Secretary of Veterans Affairs; the Deputy Administrator 
        of the Environmental Protection Agency; the Deputy 
        National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism; and 
        the Special Advisor to the President for Cyber-space 
        Security. The Executive Secretary of the Office of 
        Homeland Security shall serve as Executive Secretary of 
        the HSC/DC. Other senior officials shall be invited, 
        when appropriate.
            The HSC/DC shall meet at the call of its Chairman. 
        Any regular member of the HSC/DC may request a meeting 
        of the HSC/DC for prompt crisis management. For all 
        meetings, the Chairman shall determine the agenda, in 
        consultation with the regular members, and shall ensure 
        that necessary papers are prepared.

D. Homeland Security Council Policy Coordination Committees
            HSC Policy Coordination Committees (HSC/PCCs) shall 
        coordinate the development and implementation of 
        homeland security policies by multiple departments and 
        agencies throughout the Federal government, and shall 
        coordinate those policies with State and local 
        government. The HSC/PCCs shall be the main day-to-day 
        fora for interagency coordination of homeland security 
        policy. They shall provide policy analysis for 
        consideration by the more senior committees of the HSC 
        system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by 
        the President. Each HSC/PCC shall include 
        representatives from the executive departments, 
        offices, and agencies represented in the HSC/DC.
            Eleven HSC/PCCs are hereby established for the 
        following functional areas, each to be chaired by the 
        designated Senior Director from the Office of Homeland 
        Security:
                    1.    Detection, Surveillance, and 
                Intelligence (by the Senior Director, 
                Intelligence and Detection);
                    2.    Plans, Training, Exercises, and 
                Evaluation (by the Senior Director, Policy 
                andPlans);
                    3.    Law Enforcement and Investigation (by 
                the Senior Director, Intelligence and 
                Detection);
                    4.    Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
                Consequence Management (by the Senior Director, 
                Response and Recovery);
                    5.    Key Asset, Border, Territorial 
                Waters, and Airspace Security (by the Senior 
                Director, Protection and Prevention);
                    6.    Domestic Transportation Security (by 
                the Senior Director, Protection and 
                Prevention);
                    7.    Research and Development (by the 
                Senior Director, Research and Development);
                    8.    Medical and Public Health 
                Preparedness (by the Senior Director, 
                Protection and Prevention);
                    9.    Domestic Threat Response and Incident 
                Management (by the Senior Director, Response 
                and Recovery);
                    10.    Economic Consequences (by the Senior 
                Director, Response and Recovery); and
                    11.    Public Affairs (by the Senior 
                Director, Communications).
                    Each HSC/PCC shall also have an Executive 
                Secretary to be designated by the Assistant to 
                the President for Homeland Security (from the 
                staff of the HSC). The Executive Secretary of 
                each HSC/PCC shall assist his or her Chair in 
                scheduling the meetings of the HSC/PCC, 
                determining the agenda, recording the actions 
                taken and tasks assigned, and ensuring timely 
                responses to the central policy-making 
                committees of the HSC system. The Chairman of 
                each HSC/PCC, in consultation with its 
                Executive Secretary, may invite representatives 
                of other executive departments and agencies to 
                attend meetings of the HSC/PCC, when 
                appropriate.
                    The Assistant to the President for Homeland 
                Security, at the direction of the President and 
                in consultation with the Vice President, the 
                Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the 
                Secretary of Health and Human Services, the 
                Secretary of Transportation, and the Director 
                of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, may 
                establish additional HSC/PCCs, as appropriate.
                    The Chairman of each HSC/PCC, with the 
                agreement of its Executive Secretary, may 
                establish subordinate working groups to assist 
                the PCC in the performance of its duties.
                    The Vice President may attend any and all 
                meetings of any entity established by or under 
                this directive.
                    This directive shall be construed in a 
                manner consistent with Executive Order 13228.

                      GEORGE W. BUSH
              Homeland Security Presidential Directive--2

            Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies

                        (As amended by HSPD--5)

                              ----------                              


A.    National Policy
            The United States has a long and valued tradition 
        of welcoming immigrants and visitors. But the attacks 
        of September 11, 2001, showed that some come to the 
        United States to commit terrorist acts, to raise funds 
        for illegal terrorist activities, or to provide other 
        support for terrorist operations, here and abroad. It 
        is the policy of the United States to work aggressively 
        to prevent aliens who engage in or support terrorist 
        activity from entering the United States and to detain, 
        prosecute, or deport any such aliens who are within the 
        United States.

1.    Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force
            By November 1, 2001, the Attorney General shall 
        create the Foreign Terrorist TrackingTask Force (Task 
        Force), with assistance from the Secretary of State, 
        the Director of Central Intelligence and other officers 
        of the government, as appropriate. The Task Force shall 
        ensure that, to the maximum extent permitted by law, 
        Federal agencies coordinate programs to accomplish the 
        following: 1) deny entry into the United States of 
        aliens associated with, suspected of being engaged in, 
        or supporting terrorist activity; and 2) locate, 
        detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens already 
        present in the United States. The Attorney General 
        shall appoint a senior official as the full-time 
        Director of the Task Force. The Director shall report 
        to the Deputy Attorney General, serve as a Senior 
        Advisor to the Assistant to the President for Homeland 
        Security, and maintain direct liaison with the 
        [Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization 
        Service (INS)] the Department of Homeland Security on 
        issues related to immigration and the foreign terrorist 
        presence in the United States. The Director shall also 
        consult with the Assistant Secretary of State for 
        Consular Affairs on issues related to visa matters.
            The Task Force shall be staffed by expert personnel 
        from the Department of State, the INS, the Federal 
        Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, the 
        Customs Service, the Intelligence Community, military 
        support components, and other Federal agencies as 
        appropriate to accomplish the Task Force's mission.
            The Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland 
        Security, and the Director of Central Intelligence 
        shall ensure, to the maximum extent permitted by law, 
        that the Task Force has access to all available 
        information necessary to perform its mission, and they 
        shall request information from State and local 
        governments, where appropriate.
            With the concurrence of the Attorney General, the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of 
        Central Intelligence, foreign liaison officers from 
        cooperating countries shall be invited to serve as 
        liaisons to the Task Force, where appropriate, to 
        expedite investigation and data sharing.
            Other Federal entities, such as the Migrant 
        Smuggling and Trafficking in Persons Coordination 
        Center and the Foreign Leads Development Activity, 
        shall provide the Task Force with any relevant 
        information they possess concerning aliens suspected of 
        engaging in or supporting terrorist activity.

2.    Enhanced INS and Customs Enforcement Capability

            The Attorney General and the [Secretary of the 
        Treasury] Secretary of Homeland Security, assisted by 
        the Director of Central Intelligence, shall immediately 
        develop and implement multi-year plans to enhance the 
        investigative and intelligence analysis capabilities of 
        the [INS and the Customs Service] Department of 
        Homeland Security. The goal of this enhancement is to 
        increase significantly efforts to identify, locate, 
        detain, prosecute or deport aliens associated with, 
        suspected of being engaged in, or supporting terrorist 
        activity within the United States.
            The new multi-year plans should significantly 
        increase the number of [Customs and INS] Department of 
        Homeland Security special agents assigned to Joint 
        Terrorism Task Forces, as deemed appropriate by the 
        Attorney General and the [Secretary of the Treasury] 
        Secretary of Homeland Security. These officers shall 
        constitute new positions over and above the existing 
        on-duty special agent forces of the [two agencies] 
        Department of Homeland Security.

3.    Abuse of International Student Status

            The United States benefits greatly from 
        international students who study in our country. The 
        United States Government shall continue to foster and 
        support international students. The Government shall 
        implement measures to end the abuse of student visas 
        and prohibit certain international students from 
        receiving education and training in sensitive areas, 
        including areas of study with direct application to the 
        development and use of weapons of mass destruction.
            The Government shall also prohibit the education 
        and training of foreign nationals who would use such 
        training to harm the United States or its Allies.
            The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland 
        Security, and the Attorney General, working in 
        conjunction with the Secretary of Education, the 
        Director of the Office of Science and Technology 
        Policy, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of 
        Energy, and any other departments or entities they deem 
        necessary, shall develop a program to accomplish this 
        goal. The program shall identify sensitive courses of 
        study, and shall include measures whereby the 
        Department of State, the Department of Homeland 
        Security, the Department of Justice, and United States 
        academic institutions, working together, can identify 
        problematic applicants for student visas and deny their 
        applications. The program shall provide for tracking 
        the status of a foreign student who receives a visa (to 
        include the proposed major course of study, the status 
        of the individual as a full-time student, the classes 
        in which the student enrolls, and the source of the 
        funds supporting the student's education). The program 
        shall develop guidelines that may include control 
        mechanisms, such as limited duration student 
        immigration status, and may implement strict criteria 
        for renewing such student immigration status.
            The program shall include guidelines for exempting 
        students from countries or groups of countries from 
        this set of requirements.
            In developing this new program of control, the 
        Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
        the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Education 
        shall consult with the academic community and other 
        interested parties. This new program shall be presented 
        through the Homeland Security Council to the President 
        within 60 days.
            The [INS] Department of Homeland Security, in 
        consultation with the Department of Education, shall 
        conduct periodic reviews of all institutions certified 
        to receive nonimmigrant students and exchange visitor 
        program students. These reviews shall include checks 
        for compliance with record keeping and reporting 
        requirements. Failure of institutions to comply may 
        result in the termination of the institution's approval 
        to receive such students.

4.    North American Complementary Immigration Policies

            The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
        Secretary of [the Treasury] Homeland Security and the 
        Attorney General, shall promptly initiate negotiations 
        with Canada and Mexico to assure maximum possible 
        compatibility of immigration, customs, and visa 
        policies. The goal of the negotiations shall be to 
        provide all involved countries the highest possible 
        level of assurance that only individuals seeking entry 
        for legitimate purposes enter any of the countries, 
        while at the same time minimizing border restrictions 
        that hinder legitimate trans-border commerce.
            As part of this effort, the Secretaries of State 
        and [the Treasury] Homeland Security and the Attorney 
        General shall seek to substantially increase sharing of 
        immigration and customs information. They shall also 
        seek to establish a shared immigration and customs 
        control data-base with both countries. The Secretary of 
        State, the Secretary of [the Treasury] Homeland 
        Security, and the Attorney General shall explore 
        existing mechanisms to accomplish this goal and, to the 
        maximum extent possible, develop new methods to achieve 
        optimal effectiveness and relative transparency. To the 
        extent statutory provisions prevent such information 
        sharing, the Attorney General and the Secretaries of 
        State and [the Treasury]Homeland Security shall submit 
        to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
        proposed remedial legislation.

5.    Use of Advanced Technologies for Data Sharing and 
Enforcement Efforts

            The Director of the OSTP, in conjunction with the 
        Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
        and the Director of Central Intelligence, shall make 
        recommendations about the use of advanced technology to 
        help enforce United States immigration laws, to 
        implement United States immigration programs, to 
        facilitate the rapid identification of aliens who are 
        suspected of engaging in or supporting terrorist 
        activity, to deny them access to the United States, and 
        to recommend ways in which existing government 
        databases can be best utilized to maximize the ability 
        of the government to detect, identify, locate, and 
        apprehend potential terrorists in the United States. 
        Databases from all appropriate Federal agencies, state 
        and local governments, and commercial databases should 
        be included in this review. The utility of advanced 
        data mining software should also be addressed. To the 
        extent that there may be legal barriers to such data 
        sharing, the Director of the OSTP shall submit to the 
        Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
        proposed legislative remedies. The study also should 
        make recommendations, propose timelines, and project 
        budgetary requirements.
            The Director of the OSTP shall make these 
        recommendations to the President through the Homeland 
        Security Council within 60 days.

6.    Budgetary Support

            The Office of Management and Budget shall work 
        closely with the Attorney General, the Secretaries of 
        State and of the Treasury, the Assistant to the 
        President for Homeland Security, and all other 
        appropriate agencies to review the budgetary support 
        and identify changes in legislation necessary for the 
        implementation of this directive and recommend 
        appropriate support for a multi-year program to provide 
        the United States a robust capability to prevent aliens 
        who engage in or support terrorist activity from 
        entering or remaining in the United States or the 
        smuggling of implements of terrorism into the United 
        States. The Director of the Office of Management and 
        Budget shall make an interim report through the 
        Homeland Security Council to the President on the 
        recommended program within 30 days, and shall make a 
        final report through the Homeland Security Council to 
        the President on the recommended program within 60 
        days.

              GEORGE W. BUSH
              Homeland Security Presidential Directive--3

                   Homeland Security Advisory System

                        (As amended by HSPD--5)

                              ----------                              


        Purpose
            The Nation requires a Homeland Security Advisory 
        System to provide a comprehensive and effective means 
        to disseminate information regarding the risk of 
        terrorist acts to Federal, State, and local authorities 
        and to the American people. Such a system would provide 
        warnings in the form of a set of graduated ``Threat 
        Conditions'' that would increase as the risk of the 
        threat increases. At each Threat Condition, Federal 
        departments and agencies would implement a 
        corresponding set of ``Protective Measures'' to further 
        reduce vulnerability or increase response capability 
        during a period of heightened alert.
            This system is intended to create a common 
        vocabulary, context, and structure for an ongoing 
        national discussion about the nature of the threats 
        that confront the homeland and the appropriate measures 
        that should be taken in response. It seeks to inform 
        and facilitate decisions appropriate to different 
        levels of government and to private citizens at home 
        and at work.

        Homeland Security Advisory System
            The Homeland Security Advisory System shall be 
        binding on the executive branch and suggested, although 
        voluntary, to other levels of government and the 
        private sector. There are five Threat Conditions, each 
        identified by a description and corresponding color. 
        From lowest to highest, the levels and colors are:
                        Low =Green;
                        Guarded = Blue;
                        Elevated = Yellow;
                        High = Orange;
                        Severe = Red.
            The higher the Threat Condition, the greater the 
        risk of a terrorist attack. Risk includes both the 
        probability of an attack occurring and its potential 
        gravity. Threat Conditions shall be assigned by the 
        [Attorney General] Secretary of Homeland Security in 
        consultation with the Assistant to the President for 
        Homeland Security. [Except in exigent circumstances, 
        the Attorney General shall seek the views of the 
        appropriate Homeland Security Principals or their 
        subordinates, and other parties as appropriate, on the 
        Threat Condition to be assigned.] Except in exigent 
        circumstances, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
        seek the views of the Attorney General, and any other 
        federal agency heads the Secretary deems appropriate, 
        including other members of the Homeland Security 
        Council, on the Threat Condition to be assigned. Threat 
        Conditions may be assigned for the entire Nation, or 
        they may be set for a particular geographic area or 
        industrial sector. Assigned Threat Conditions shall be 
        reviewed at regular intervals to determine whether 
        adjustments are warranted.
            For facilities, personnel, and operations inside 
        the territorial United States, all Federal departments, 
        agencies, and offices other than military facilities 
        shall conform their existing threat advisory systems to 
        this system and henceforth administer their systems 
        consistent with the determination of the Attorney 
        General with regard to the Threat Condition in effect.
            The assignment of a Threat Condition shall prompt 
        the implementation of an appropriate set of Protective 
        Measures. Protective Measures are the specific steps an 
        organization shall take to reduce its vulnerability or 
        increase its ability to respond during a period of 
        heightened alert. The authority to craft and implement 
        Protective Measures rests with the Federal departments 
        and agencies. It is recognized that departments and 
        agencies may have several preplanned sets of responses 
        to a particular Threat Condition to facilitate a rapid, 
        appropriate, and tailored response. Department and 
        agency heads are responsible for developing their own 
        Protective Measures and other antiterrorism or self-
        protection and continuity plans, and resourcing, 
        rehearsing, documenting, and maintaining these plans. 
        Likewise, they retain the authority to respond, as 
        necessary, to risks, threats, incidents, or events at 
        facilities within the specific jurisdiction of their 
        department or agency, and, as authorized by law, to 
        direct agencies and industries to implement their own 
        Protective Measures. They shall continue to be 
        responsible for taking all appropriate proactive steps 
        to reduce the vulnerability of their personnel and 
        facilities to terrorist attack. Federal department and 
        agency heads shall submit an annual written report to 
        the President, through the Assistant to the President 
        for Homeland Security, describing the steps they have 
        taken to develop and implement appropriate Protective 
        Measures for each Threat Condition. Governors, mayors, 
        and the leaders of other organizations are encouraged 
        to conduct a similar review of their organizations' 
        Protective Measures.
            The decision whether to publicly announce Threat 
        Conditions shall be made on a case-by-case basis by the 
        Attorney General in consultation with the Assistant to 
        the President for Homeland Security. Every effort shall 
        be made to share as much information regarding the 
        threat as possible, consistent with the safety of the 
        Nation. The [Attorney General] Secretary of Homeland 
        Security shall ensure, consistent with the safety of 
        the Nation, that State and local government officials 
        and law enforcement authorities are provided the most 
        relevant and timely information. The [Attorney General] 
        Secretary of Homeland Security shall be responsible for 
        identifying any other information developed in the 
        threat assessment process that would be useful to State 
        and local officials and others and conveying it to them 
        as permitted consistent with the constraints of 
        classification. The [Attorney General] Secretary of 
        Homeland Security shall establish a process and a 
        system for conveying relevant information to Federal, 
        State, and local government officials, law enforcement 
        authorities, and the private sector expeditiously.
             At the request of the Secretary of Homeland 
        Security, the Department of Justice shall permit and 
        facilitate the use of delivery systems administered or 
        managed by the Department of Justice for the purposes 
        of delivering threat information pursuant to the 
        Homeland Security Advisory System.
            The Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary 
        of Homeland Security and the Attorney General shall 
        ensure that a continuous and timely flow of integrated 
        threat assessments and reports is provided to the 
        President, the Vice President, Assistant to the 
        President and Chief of Staff, the Assistant to the 
        President for Homeland Security, and the Assistant to 
        the President for National Security Affairs. Whenever 
        possible and practicable, these integrated threat 
        assessments and reports shall be reviewed and commented 
        upon by the wider interagency community.
            A decision on which Threat Condition to assign 
        shall integrate a variety of considerations. This 
        integration will rely on qualitative assessment, not 
        quantitative calculation. Higher Threat Conditions 
        indicate greater risk of a terrorist act, with risk 
        including both probability and gravity. Despite best 
        efforts, there can be no guarantee that, at any given 
        Threat Condition, a terrorist attack will not occur. An 
        initial and important factor is the quality of the 
        threat information itself. The evaluation of this 
        threat information shall include, but not be limited 
        to, the following factors:
                1.    To what degree is the threat information 
                credible?
                2.    To what degree is the threat information 
                corroborated?
                3.    To what degree is the threat specific 
                and/ or imminent?
                4.    How grave are the potential consequences 
                of the threat?

Threat Conditions and Associated Protective Measures
            The world has changed since September 11, 2001. We 
        remain a Nation at risk to terrorist attacks and will 
        remain at risk for the foreseeable future. At all 
        Threat Conditions, we must remain vigilant, prepared, 
        and ready to deter terrorist attacks. The following 
        Threat Conditions each represent an increasing risk of 
        terrorist attacks. Beneath each Threat Condition are 
        some suggested Protective Measures, recognizing that 
        the heads of Federal departments and agencies are 
        responsible for developing and implementing appropriate 
        agency-specific Protective Measures:
                1. Low Condition (Green). This condition is 
                declared when there is a low risk of terrorist 
                attacks. Federal departments and agencies 
                should consider the following general measures 
                in addition to the agency-specific Protective 
                Measures they develop and implement:
                        a) Refining and exercising as 
                        appropriate preplanned Protective 
                        Measures;
                        b) Ensuring personnel receive proper 
                        training on the Homeland Security 
                        Advisory System and specific preplanned 
                        department or agency Protective 
                        Measures; and
                        c) Institutionalizing a process to 
                        assure that all facilities and 
                        regulated sectors are regularly 
                        assessed for vulnerabilities to 
                        terrorist attacks, and all reasonable 
                        measures are taken to mitigate these 
                        vulnerabilities.
                2. Guarded Condition (Blue). This condition is 
                declared when there is a general risk of 
                terrorist attacks. In addition to the 
                Protective Measures taken in the previous 
                Threat Condition, Federal departments and 
                agencies should consider the following general 
                measures in addition to the agency-specific 
                Protective Measures that they will develop and 
                implement:
                        a) Checking communications with 
                        designated emergency response or 
                        command locations;
                        b) Reviewing and updating emergency 
                        response procedures; and
                        c) Providing the public with any 
                        information that would strengthen its 
                        ability to act appropriately.
                3. Elevated Condition (Yellow). An Elevated 
                Condition is declared when there is a 
                significant risk of terrorist attacks. In 
                addition to the Protective Measures taken in 
                the previous Threat Conditions, Federal 
                departments and agencies should consider the 
                following general measures in addition to the 
                Protective Measures that they will develop and 
                implement:
                        a) Increasing surveillance of critical 
                        locations;
                        b) Coordinating emergency plans as 
                        appropriate with nearby jurisdictions;
                        c) Assessing whether the precise 
                        characteristics of the threat require 
                        the further refinement of preplanned 
                        Protective Measures; and
                        d) Implementing, as appropriate, 
                        contingency and emergency response 
                        plans.
                4. High Condition (Orange). A High Condition is 
                declared when there is a high risk of terrorist 
                attacks. In addition to the Protective Measures 
                taken in the previous Threat Conditions, 
                Federal departments and agencies should 
                consider the following general measures in 
                addition to the agency-specific Protective 
                Measures that they will develop and implement:
                        a) Coordinating necessary security 
                        efforts with Federal, State, and local 
                        law enforcement agencies or any 
                        National Guard or other appropriate 
                        armed forces organizations;
                        b) Taking additional precautions at 
                        public events and possibly considering 
                        alternative venues or even 
                        cancellation;
                        c) Preparing to execute contingency 
                        procedures, such as moving to an 
                        alternate site or dispersing their 
                        workforce; and
                        d) Restricting threatened facility 
                        access to essential personnel only.
                5. Severe Condition (Red). A Severe Condition 
                reflects a severe risk of terrorist attacks. 
                Under most circumstances, the Protective 
                Measures for a Severe Condition are not 
                intended to be sustained for substantial 
                periods of time. In addition to the Protective 
                Measures in the previous Threat Conditions, 
                Federal departments and agencies also should 
                consider the following general measures in 
                addition to the agency-specific Protective 
                Measures that they will develop and implement:
                        a) Increasing or redirecting personnel 
                        to address critical emergency needs;
                        b) Assigning emergency response 
                        personnel and pre-positioning and 
                        mobilizing specially trained teams or 
                        resources;
                        c) Monitoring, redirecting, or 
                        constraining transportation systems; 
                        and
                        d) Closing public and government 
                        facilities.

[Comment and Review Periods]
            [The Attorney General, in consultation and 
        coordination with the Assistant to the President for 
        Homeland Security, shall, for 45 days from the date of 
        this directive, seek the views of government officials 
        at all levels and of public interest groups and the 
        private sector on the proposed Homeland Security 
        Advisory System.
            One hundred thirty-five days from the date of this 
        directive the Attorney General, after consultation and 
        coordination with the Assistant to the President for 
        Homeland Security, and having considered the views 
        received during the comment period, shall recommend to 
        the President in writing proposed refinements to the 
        Homeland Security Advisory System.]

              GEORGE W. BUSH
              Homeland Security Presidential Directive--4

             (National Security Presidential Directive--17)

        National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

                              ----------                              


``The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of 
radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared 
that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence 
indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United 
States will not allow these efforts to succeed. ... History 
will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed 
to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to 
peace and security is the path of action.''

    PRESIDENT BUSH


Introduction
            Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) - nuclear, 
        biological, and chemical - in the possession of hostile 
        states and terrorists represent one of the greatest 
        security challenges facing the United States. We must 
        pursue a comprehensive strategy to counter this threat 
        in all of its dimensions.
            An effective strategy for countering WMD, including 
        their use and further proliferation, is an integral 
        component of the National Security Strategy of the 
        United States of America. As with the war on terrorism, 
        our strategy for homeland security, and our new concept 
        of deterrence, the U.S. approach to combat WMD 
        represents a fundamental change from the past. To 
        succeed, we must take full advantage of today's 
        opportunities, including the application of new 
        technologies, increased emphasis on intelligence 
        collection and analysis, the strengthening of alliance 
        relationships, and the establishment of new 
        partnerships with former adversaries.
            Weapons of mass destruction could enable 
        adversaries to inflict massive harm on the United 
        States, our military forces at home and abroad, and our 
        friends and allies. Some states, including several that 
        have supported and continue to support terrorism, 
        already possess WMD and are seeking even greater 
        capabilities, as tools of coercion and intimidation. 
        For them, these are not weapons of last resort, but 
        militarily useful weapons of choice intended to 
        overcome our nation's advantages in conventional forces 
        and to deter us from responding to aggression against 
        our friends and allies in regions of vital interest. In 
        addition, terrorist groups are seeking to acquire WMD 
        with the stated purpose of killing large numbers of our 
        people and those of friends and allies - without 
        compunction and without warning.
            We will not permit the world's most dangerous 
        regimes and terrorists to threaten us with the world's 
        most destructive weapons. We must accord the highest 
        priority to the protection of the United States, our 
        forces, and our friends and allies from the existing 
        and growing WMD threat.

Pillars of Our National Strategy
            Our National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
        Destruction has three principal pillars:

Counterproliferation to Combat WMD Use
            The possession and increased likelihood of use of 
        WMD by hostile states and terrorists are realities of 
        the contemporary security environment. It is therefore 
        critical that the U.S. military and appropriate 
        civilian agencies be prepared to deter and defend 
        against the full range of possible WMD employment 
        scenarios. We will ensure that all needed capabilities 
        to combat WMD are fully integrated into the emerging 
        defense transformation plan and into our homeland 
        security posture. Counterproliferation will also be 
        fully integrated into the basic doctrine, training, and 
        equipping of all forces, in order to ensure that they 
        can sustain operations to decisively defeat WMD-armed 
        adversaries.

Strengthened Nonproliferation to Combat WMD Proliferation
            The United States, our friends and allies, and the 
        broader international community must undertake every 
        effort to prevent states and terrorists from acquiring 
        WMD and missiles. We must enhance traditional measures 
        - diplomacy, arms control, multilateral agreements, 
        threat reduction assistance, and export controls - that 
        seek to dissuade or impede proliferant states and 
        terrorist networks, as well as to slow and make more 
        costly their access to sensitive technologies, 
        material, and expertise. We must ensure compliance with 
        relevant international agreements, including the 
        Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical 
        Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological Weapons 
        Convention (BWC). The United States will continue to 
        work with other states to improve their capability to 
        prevent unauthorized transfers of WMD and missile 
        technology, expertise, and material. We will identify 
        and pursue new methods of prevention, such as national 
        criminalization of proliferation activities and 
        expanded safety and security measures.

        2Consequence Management to Respond to WMD Use
            Finally, the United States must be prepared to 
        respond to the use of WMD against our citizens, our 
        military forces, and those of friends and allies. We 
        will develop and maintain the capability to reduce to 
        the extent possible the potentially horrific 
        consequences of WMD attacks at home and abroad. The 
        three pillars of the U.S. national strategy to combat 
        WMD are seamless elements of a comprehensive approach. 
        Serving to integrate the pillars are four cross-cutting 
        enabling functions that need to be pursued on a 
        priority basis: intelligence collection and analysis on 
        WMD, delivery systems, and related technologies; 
        research and development to improve our ability to 
        respond to evolving threats; bilateral and multilateral 
        cooperation; and targeted strategies against hostile 
        states and terrorists.

Counterproliferation
            We know from experience that we cannot always be 
        successful in preventing and containing the 
        proliferation of WMD to hostile states and terrorists. 
        Therefore, U.S. military and appropriate civilian 
        agencies must possess the full range of operational 
        capabilities to counter the threat and use of WMD by 
        states and terrorists against the United States, our 
        military forces, and friends and allies.

        Interdiction
            Effective interdiction is a critical part of the 
        U.S. strategy to combat WMD and their delivery means. 
        We must enhance the capabilities of our military, 
        intelligence, technical, and law enforcement 
        communities to prevent the movement of WMD materials, 
        technology, and expertise to hostile states and 
        terrorist organizations.

        Deterrence
            Today's threats are far more diverse and less 
        predictable than those of the past. States hostile to 
        the United States and to our friends and allies have 
        demonstrated their willingness to take high risks to 
        achieve their goals, and are aggressively pursuing WMD 
        and their means of delivery as critical tools in this 
        effort. As a consequence, we require new methods of 
        deterrence. A strong declaratory policy and effective 
        military forces are essential elements of our 
        contemporary deterrent posture, along with the full 
        range of political tools to persuade potential 
        adversaries not to seek or use WMD. The United States 
        will continue to make clear that it reserves the right 
        to respond with overwhelming force - including through 
        resort to all of our options - to the use of WMD 
        against the United States, our forces abroad, and 
        friends and allies.
            In addition to our conventional and nuclear 
        response and defense capabilities, our overall 
        deterrent posture against WMD threats is reinforced by 
        effective intelligence, surveillance, interdiction, and 
        domestic law enforcement capabilities. Such combined 
        capabilities enhance deterrence both by devaluing an 
        adversary's WMD and missiles, and by posing the 
        prospect of an overwhelming response to any use of such 
        weapons.

        Defense and Mitigation
            Because deterrence may not succeed, and because of 
        the potentially devastating consequences of WMD use 
        against our forces and civilian population, U.S. 
        military forces and appropriate civilian agencies must 
        have the capability to defend against WMD-armed 
        adversaries, including in appropriate cases through 
        preemptive measures. This requires capabilities to 
        detect and destroy an adversary's WMD assets before 
        these weapons are used. In addition, robust active and 
        passive defenses and mitigation measures must be in 
        place to enable U.S. military forces and appropriate 
        civilian agencies to accomplish their missions, and to 
        assist friends and allies when WMD are used.
            Active defenses disrupt, disable, or destroy WMD en 
        route to their targets. Active defenses include 
        vigorous air defense and effective missile defenses 
        against today's threats. Passive defenses must be 
        tailored to the unique characteristics of the various 
        forms of WMD. The United States must also have the 
        ability rapidly and effectively to mitigate the effects 
        of a WMD attack against our deployed forces.
            Our approach to defend against biological threats 
        has long been based on our approach to chemical 
        threats, despite the fundamental differences between 
        these weapons. The United States is developing a new 
        approach to provide us and our friends and allies with 
        an effective defense against biological weapons.
            Finally, U.S. military forces and domestic law 
        enforcement agencies as appropriate must stand ready to 
        respond against the source of any WMD attack. The 
        primary objective of a response is to disrupt an 
        imminent attack or an attack in progress, and eliminate 
        the threat of future attacks. As with deterrence and 
        prevention, an effective response requires rapid 
        attribution and robust strike capability. We must 
        accelerate efforts to field new capabilities to defeat 
        WMD-related assets. The United States needs to be 
        prepared to conduct post-conflict operations to destroy 
        or dismantle any residual WMD capabilities of the 
        hostile state or terrorist network. An effective U.S. 
        response not only will eliminate the source of a WMD 
        attack but will also have a powerful deterrent effect 
        upon other adversaries that possess or seek WMD or 
        missiles.

Nonproliferation

        Active Nonproliferation Diplomacy
            The United States will actively employ diplomatic 
        approaches in bilateral and multilateral settings in 
        pursuit of our nonproliferation goals. We must dissuade 
        supplier states from cooperating with proliferant 
        states and induce proliferant states to end their WMD 
        and missile programs. We will hold countries 
        responsible for complying with their commitments. In 
        addition, we will continue to build coalitions to 
        support our efforts, as well as to seek their increased 
        support for nonproliferation and threat reduction 
        cooperation programs. However, should our wide-ranging 
        nonproliferation efforts fail, we must have available 
        the full range of operational capabilities necessary to 
        defend against the possible employment of WMD.

        Multilateral Regimes
            Existing nonproliferation and arms control regimes 
        play an important role in our overall strategy. The 
        United States will support those regimes that are 
        currently in force, and work to improve the 
        effectiveness of, and compliance with, those regimes. 
        Consistent with other policy priorities, we will also 
        promote new agreements and arrangements that serve our 
        nonproliferation goals. Overall, we seek to cultivate 
        an international environment that is more conducive to 
        nonproliferation. Our efforts will include:
                 1A Nuclear
                 1A Strengthening of the Nuclear 
                Nonproliferation Treaty and International 
                Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including through 
                ratification of an IAEA Additional Protocol by 
                all NPT states parties, assurances that all 
                states put in place full-scope IAEA safeguards 
                agreements, and appropriate increases in 
                funding for the Agency;
                 1A Negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-Off 
                Treaty that advances U.S. security interests; 
                and
                 1A Strengthening the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
                and Zangger Committee.
                 1A Chemical and Biological
                 1A Effective functioning of the Organization 
                for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;
                 1A Identification and promotion of 
                constructive and realistic measures to 
                strengthen the BWC and thereby to help meet the 
                biological weapons threat; and
                 1A Strengthening of the Australia Group.
                 1A Missile
                 1A Strengthening the Missile Technology 
                Control Regime (MTCR), including through 
                support for universal adherence to the 
                International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic 
                Missile Proliferation.

        Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Cooperation
            The United States pursues a wide range of programs, 
        including the Nunn-Lugar program, designed to address 
        the proliferation threat stemming from the large 
        quantities of Soviet-legacy WMD and missile-related 
        expertise and materials. Maintaining an extensive and 
        efficient set of nonproliferation and threat reduction 
        assistance programs to Russia and other former Soviet 
        states is a high priority. We will also continue to 
        encourage friends and allies to increase their 
        contributions to these programs, particularly through 
        the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of 
        Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. In addition, 
        we will work with other states to improve the security 
        of their WMD-related materials.

        Controls on Nuclear Materials
            In addition to programs with former Soviet states 
        to reduce fissile material and improve the security of 
        that which remains, the United States will continue to 
        discourage the worldwide accumulation of separated 
        plutonium and to minimize the use of highly-enriched 
        uranium. As outlined in the National Energy Policy, the 
        United States will work in collaboration with 
        international partners to develop recycle and fuel 
        treatment technologies that are cleaner, more 
        efficient, less waste-intensive, and more 
        proliferation-resistant.

        U.S. Export Controls
            We must ensure that the implementation of U.S. 
        export controls furthers our nonproliferation and other 
        national security goals, while recognizing the 
        realities that American businesses face in the 
        increasingly globalized marketplace. We will work to 
        update and strengthen export controls using existing 
        authorities. We also seek new legislation to improve 
        the ability of our export control system to give full 
        weight to both nonproliferation objectives and 
        commercial interests. Our overall goal is to focus our 
        resources on truly sensitive exports to hostile states 
        or those that engage in onward proliferation, while 
        removing unnecessary barriers in the global 
        marketplace.

        Nonproliferation Sanctions
            Sanctions can be a valuable component of our 
        overall strategy against WMD proliferation. At times, 
        however, sanctions have proven inflexible and 
        ineffective. We will develop a comprehensive sanctions 
        policy to better integrate sanctions into our overall 
        strategy and work with Congress to consolidate and 
        modify existing sanctions legislation.

WMD Consequence Management
            Defending the American homeland is the most basic 
        responsibility of our government. As part of our 
        defense, the United States must be fully prepared to 
        respond to the consequences of WMD use on our soil, 
        whether by hostile states or by terrorists. We must 
        also be prepared to respond to the effects of WMD use 
        against our forces deployed abroad, and to assist 
        friends and allies.
            The National Strategy for Homeland Security 
        discusses U.S. Government programs to deal with the 
        consequences of the use of a chemical, biological, 
        radiological, or nuclear weapon in the United States. A 
        number of these programs offer training, planning, and 
        assistance to state and local governments. To maximize 
        their effectiveness, these efforts need to be 
        integrated and comprehensive. Our first responders must 
        have the full range of protective, medical, and 
        remediation tools to identify, assess, and respond 
        rapidly to a WMD event on our territory.
            The White House Office of Homeland Security will 
        coordinate all federal efforts to prepare for and 
        mitigate the consequences of terrorist attacks within 
        the United States, including those involving WMD. The 
        Office of Homeland Security will also work closely with 
        state and local governments to ensure their planning, 
        training, and equipment requirements are addressed. 
        These issues, including the roles of the Department of 
        Homeland Security, are addressed in detail in the 
        National Strategy for Homeland Security.
            The National Security Council's Office of Combating 
        Terrorism coordinates and helps improve U.S. efforts to 
        respond to and manage the recovery from terrorist 
        attacks outside the United States. In cooperation with 
        the Office of Combating Terrorism, the Department of 
        State coordinates interagency efforts to work with our 
        friends and allies to develop their own emergency 
        preparedness and consequence management capabilities.

Integrating the Pillars
            Several critical enabling functions serve to 
        integrate the three pillars -counterproliferation, 
        nonproliferation, and consequence management - of the 
        U.S. National Strategy to Combat WMD.

        Improved Intelligence Collection and Analysis
            A more accurate and complete understanding of the 
        full range of WMD threats is, and will remain, among 
        the highest U.S. intelligence priorities, to enable us 
        to prevent proliferation, and to deter or defend 
        against those who would use those capabilities against 
        us. Improving our ability to obtain timely and accurate 
        knowledge of adversaries' offensive and defensive 
        capabilities, plans, and intentions is key to 
        developing effective counter-and nonproliferation 
        policies and capabilities. Particular emphasis must be 
        accorded to improving: intelligence regarding WMD-
        related facilities and activities; interaction among 
        U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, and military 
        agencies; and intelligence cooperation with friends and 
        allies.

        Research and Development
            The United States has a critical need for cutting-
        edge technology that can quickly and effectively 
        detect, analyze, facilitate interdiction of, defend 
        against, defeat, and mitigate the consequences of WMD. 
        Numerous U.S. Government departments and agencies are 
        currently engaged in the essential research and 
        development to support our overall strategy against WMD 
        proliferation. The new Counterproliferation Technology 
        Coordination Committee, consisting of senior 
        representatives from all concerned agencies, will act 
        to improve interagency coordination of U.S. Government 
        counterproliferation research and development efforts. 
        The Committee will assist in identifying priorities, 
        gaps, and overlaps in existing programs and in 
        examining options for future investment strategies.

        Strengthened International Cooperation
            WMD represent a threat not just to the United 
        States, but also to our friends and allies and the 
        broader international community. For this reason, it is 
        vital that we work closely with like-minded countries 
        on all elements of our comprehensive proliferation 
        strategy.

        Targeted Strategies Against Proliferants
            All elements of the overall U.S. strategy to combat 
        WMD must be brought to bear in targeted strategies 
        against supplier and recipient states of WMD 
        proliferation concern, as well as against terrorist 
        groups which seek to acquire WMD.
            A few states are dedicated proliferators, whose 
        leaders are determined to develop, maintain, and 
        improve their WMD and delivery capabilities, which 
        directly threaten the United States, U.S. forces 
        overseas, and/ or our friends and allies. Because each 
        of these regimes is different, we will pursue country-
        specific strategies that best enable us and our friends 
        and allies to prevent, deter, and defend against WMD 
        and missile threats from each of them. These strategies 
        must also take into account the growing cooperation 
        among proliferant states - so-called secondary 
        proliferation - which challenges us to think in new 
        ways about specific country strategies.
            One of the most difficult challenges we face is to 
        prevent, deter, and defend against the acquisition and 
        use of WMD by terrorist groups. The current and 
        potential future linkages between terrorist groups and 
        state sponsors of terrorism are particularly dangerous 
        and require priority attention. The full range of 
        counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence 
        management measures must be brought to bear against the 
        WMD terrorist threat, just as they are against states 
        of greatest proliferation concern.

End Note
            Our National Strategy to Combat WMD requires much 
        of all of us the Executive Branch, the Congress, state 
        and local governments, the American people, and our 
        friends and allies. The requirements to prevent, deter, 
        defend against, and respond to today's WMD threats are 
        complex and challenging. But they are not daunting. We 
        can and will succeed in the tasks laid out in this 
        strategy; we have no other choice.
               Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5

                    Management of Domestic Incidents

        (1)  To enhance the ability of the United States to 
        manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, 
        comprehensive national incident management system.

                              ----------                              


Definitions
        (2)  In this directive:
                (a)  the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
                of Homeland Security.
                (b)  the term ``Federal departments and 
                agencies'' means those executive departments 
                enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101, together with the 
                Department of Homeland Security; independent 
                establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C. 104(1); 
                government corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C. 
                103(1); and the United States Postal Service.
                (c)  the terms ``State,'' ``local,'' and the 
                ``United States'' when it is used in a 
                geographical sense, have the same meanings as 
                used in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 
                Public Law 107-296.

 Policy
        (3)  To prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover 
        from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 
        emergencies, the United States Government shall 
        establish a single, comprehensive approach to domestic 
        incident management. The objective of the United States 
        Government is to ensure that all levels of government 
        across the Nation have the capability to work 
        efficiently and effectively together, using a national 
        approach to domestic incident management. In these 
        efforts, with regard to domestic incidents, the United 
        States Government treats crisis management and 
        consequence management as a single, integrated 
        function, rather than as two separate functions.
        (4)  The Secretary of Homeland Security is the 
        principal Federal official for domestic incident 
        management. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 
        2002, the Secretary is responsible for coordinating 
        Federal operations within the United States to prepare 
        for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, 
        major disasters, and other emergencies. The Secretary 
        shall coordinate the Federal Government's resources 
        utilized in response to or recovery from terrorist 
        attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies if and 
        when any one of the following four conditions applies: 
        (1) a Federal department or agency acting under its own 
        authority has requested the assistance of the 
        Secretary; (2) the resources of State and local 
        authorities are overwhelmed and Federal assistance has 
        been requested by the appropriate State and local 
        authorities; (3) more than one Federal department or 
        agency has become substantially involved in responding 
        to the incident; or (4) the Secretary has been directed 
        to assume responsibility for managing the domestic 
        incident by the President.
        (5)  Nothing in this directive alters, or impedes the 
        ability to carry out, the authorities of Federal 
        departments and agencies to perform their 
        responsibilities under law. All Federal departments and 
        agencies shall cooperate with the Secretary in the 
        Secretary's domestic incident management role.
        (6)  The Federal Government recognizes the roles and 
        responsibilities of State and local authorities in 
        domestic incident management. Initial responsibility 
        for managing domestic incidents generally falls on 
        State and local authorities. The Federal Government 
        will assist State and local authorities when their 
        resources are overwhelmed, or when Federal interests 
        are involved. The Secretary will coordinate with State 
        and local governments to ensure adequate planning, 
        equipment, training, and exercise activities. The 
        Secretary will also provide assistance to State and 
        local governments to develop all-hazards plans and 
        capabilities, including those of greatest importance to 
        the security of the United States, and will ensure that 
        State, local, and Federal plans are compatible.
        (7)  The Federal Government recognizes the role that 
        the private and nongovernmental sectors play in 
        preventing, preparing for, responding to, and 
        recovering from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and 
        other emergencies. The Secretary will coordinate with 
        the private and nongovernmental sectors to ensure 
        adequate planning, equipment, training, and exercise 
        activities and to promote partnerships to address 
        incident management capabilities.
        (8)  The Attorney General has lead responsibility for 
        criminal investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist 
        threats by individuals or groups inside the United 
        States, or directed at United States citizens or 
        institutions abroad, where such acts are within the 
        Federal criminal jurisdiction of the United States, as 
        well as for related intelligence collection activities 
        within the United States, subject to the National 
        Security Act of 1947 and other applicable law, 
        Executive Order 12333, and Attorney General-approved 
        procedures pursuant to that Executive Order. Generally 
        acting through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
        Attorney General, in cooperation with other Federal 
        departments and agencies engaged in activities to 
        protect our national security, shall also coordinate 
        the activities of the other members of the law 
        enforcement community to detect, prevent, preempt, and 
        disrupt terrorist attacks against the United States. 
        Following a terrorist threat or an actual incident that 
        falls within the criminal jurisdiction of the United 
        States, the full capabilities of the United States 
        shall be dedicated, consistent with United States law 
        and with activities of other Federal departments and 
        agencies to protect our national security, to assisting 
        the Attorney General to identify the perpetrators and 
        bring them to justice. The Attorney General and the 
        Secretary shall establish appropriate relationships and 
        mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between 
        their two departments.
        (9)  Nothing in this directive impairs or otherwise 
        affects the authority of the Secretary of Defense over 
        the Department of Defense, including the chain of 
        command for military forces from the President as 
        Commander in Chief, to the Secretary of Defense, to the 
        commander of military forces, or military command and 
        control procedures. The Secretary of Defense shall 
        provide military support to civil authorities for 
        domestic incidents as directed by the President or when 
        consistent with military readiness and appropriate 
        under the circumstances and the law. The Secretary of 
        Defense shall retain command of military forces 
        providing civil support. The Secretary of Defense and 
        the Secretary shall establish appropriate relationships 
        and mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between 
        their two departments.
        (10)  The Secretary of State has the responsibility, 
        consistent with other United States Government 
        activities to protect our national security, to 
        coordinate international activities related to the 
        prevention, preparation, response, and recovery from a 
        domestic incident, and for the protection of United 
        States citizens and United States interests overseas. 
        The Secretary of State and the Secretary shall 
        establish appropriate relationships and mechanisms for 
        cooperation and coordination between their two 
        departments.
        (11)  The Assistant to the President for Homeland 
        Security and the Assistant to the President for 
        National Security Affairs shall be responsible for 
        interagency policy coordination on domestic and 
        international incident management, respectively, as 
        directed by the President. The Assistant to the 
        President for Homeland Security and the Assistant to 
        the President for National Security Affairs shall work 
        together to ensure that the United States domestic and 
        international incident management efforts are 
        seamlessly united.
        (12)  The Secretary shall ensure that, as appropriate, 
        information related to domestic incidents is gathered 
        and provided to the public, the private sector, State 
        and local authorities, Federal departments and 
        agencies, and, generally through the Assistant to the 
        President for Homeland Security, to the President. The 
        Secretary shall provide standardized, quantitative 
        reports to the Assistant to the President for Homeland 
        Security on the readiness and preparedness of the 
        Nation -- at all levels of government -- to prevent, 
        prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic 
        incidents.
        (13)  Nothing in this directive shall be construed to 
        grant to any Assistant to the President any authority 
        to issue orders to Federal departments and agencies, 
        their officers, or their employees.

 Tasking
        (14)  The heads of all Federal departments and agencies 
        are directed to provide their full and prompt 
        cooperation, resources, and support, as appropriate and 
        consistent with their own responsibilities for 
        protecting our national security, to the Secretary, the 
        Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and the 
        Secretary of State in the exercise of the individual 
        leadership responsibilities and missions assigned in 
        paragraphs (4), (8), (9), and (10), respectively, 
        above.
        (15)  The Secretary shall develop, submit for review to 
        the Homeland Security Council, and administer a 
        National Incident Management System (NIMS). This system 
        will provide a consistent nationwide approach for 
        Federal, State, and local governments to work 
        effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, 
        respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, 
        regardless of cause, size, or complexity. To provide 
        for interoperability and compatibility among Federal, 
        State, and local capabilities, the NIMS will include a 
        core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and 
        technologies covering the incident command system; 
        multi-agency coordination systems; unified command; 
        training; identification and management of resources 
        (including systems for classifying types of resources); 
        qualifications and certification; and the collection, 
        tracking, and reporting of incident information and 
        incident resources.
        (16)  The Secretary shall develop, submit for review to 
        the Homeland Security Council, and administer a 
        National Response Plan (NRP). The Secretary shall 
        consult with appropriate Assistants to the President 
        (including the Assistant to the President for Economic 
        Policy) and the Director of the Office of Science and 
        Technology Policy, and other such Federal officials as 
        may be appropriate, in developing and implementing the 
        NRP. This plan shall integrate Federal Government 
        domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and 
        recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards 
        plan. The NRP shall be unclassified. If certain 
        operational aspects require classification, they shall 
        be included in classified annexes to the NRP.
                (a)  The NRP, using the NIMS, shall, with 
                regard to response to domestic incidents, 
                provide the structure and mechanisms for 
                national level policy and operational direction 
                for Federal support to State and local incident 
                managers and for exercising direct Federal 
                authorities and responsibilities, as 
                appropriate.
                (b)  The NRP will include protocols for 
                operating under different threats or threat 
                levels; incorporation of existing Federal 
                emergency and incident management plans (with 
                appropriate modifications and revisions) as 
                either integrated components of the NRP or as 
                supporting operational plans; and additional 
                operational plans or annexes, as appropriate, 
                including public affairs and intergovernmental 
                communications.
                (c)  The NRP will include a consistent approach 
                to reporting incidents, providing assessments, 
                and making recommendations to the President, 
                the Secretary, and the Homeland Security 
                Council.
                (d)  The NRP will include rigorous requirements 
                for continuous improvements from testing, 
                exercising, experience with incidents, and new 
                information and technologies.
        (17)  The Secretary shall:
                (a)  By April 1, 2003,
                        (1)  develop and publish an initial 
                        version of the NRP, in consultation 
                        with other Federal departments and 
                        agencies; and
                        (2)  provide the Assistant to the 
                        President for Homeland Security with a 
                        plan for full development and 
                        implementation of the NRP.
                (b)  By June 1, 2003,
                        (1)  in consultation with Federal 
                        departments and agencies and with State 
                        and local governments, develop a 
                        national system of standards, 
                        guidelines, and protocols to implement 
                        the NIMS; and
                        (2)  establish a mechanism for ensuring 
                        ongoing management and maintenance of 
                        the NIMS, including regular 
                        consultation with other Federal 
                        departments and agencies and with State 
                        and local governments.
                (c)  By September 1, 2003, in consultation with 
                Federal departments and agencies and the 
                Assistant to the President for Homeland 
                Security, review existing authorities and 
                regulations and prepare recommendations for the 
                President on revisions necessary to implement 
                fully the NRP.
        (18)  The heads of Federal departments and agencies 
        shall adopt the NIMS within their departments and 
        agencies and shall provide support and assistance to 
        the Secretary in the development and maintenance of the 
        NIMS. All Federal departments and agencies will use the 
        NIMS in their domestic incident management and 
        emergency prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, 
        and mitigation activities, as well as those actions 
        taken in support of State or local entities. The heads 
        of Federal departments and agencies shall participate 
        in the NRP, shall assist and support the Secretary in 
        the development and maintenance of the NRP, and shall 
        participate in and use domestic incident reporting 
        systems and protocols established by the Secretary.
        (19)  The head of each Federal department and agency 
        shall:
                (a)  By June 1, 2003, make initial revisions to 
                existing plans in accordance with the initial 
                version of the NRP.
                (b)  By August 1, 2003, submit a plan to adopt 
                and implement the NIMS to the Secretary and the 
                Assistant to the President for Homeland 
                Security. The Assistant to the President for 
                Homeland Security shall advise the President on 
                whether such plans effectively implement the 
                NIMS.
        (20)  Beginning in Fiscal Year 2005, Federal 
        departments and agencies shall make adoption of the 
        NIMS a requirement, to the extent permitted by law, for 
        providing Federal preparedness assistance through 
        grants, contracts, or other activities. The Secretary 
        shall develop standards and guidelines for determining 
        whether a State or local entity has adopted the NIMS.

 Technical and Conforming Amendments to National Security 
Presidential Directive-1 (NSPD-1)
        (21)  NSPD-1 (``Organization of the National Security 
        Council System'') is amended by replacing the fifth 
        sentence of the third paragraph on the first page with 
        the following: ``The Attorney General, the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security, and the Director of the Office of 
        Management and Budget shall be invited to attend 
        meetings pertaining to their responsibilities.''.

Technical and Conforming Amendments to National Security 
Presidential Directive-8 (NSPD-8)
        (22)  NSPD-8 (``National Director and Deputy National 
        Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism'') is amended 
        by striking ``and the Office of Homeland Security,'' on 
        page 4, and inserting ``the Department of Homeland 
        Security, and the Homeland Security Council'' in lieu 
        thereof.

Technical and Conforming Amendments to Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-2 (HSPD-2)
        (23)  HSPD-2 (``Combating Terrorism Through Immigration 
        Policies'') is amended as follows:
                (a)  striking ``the Commissioner of the 
                Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)'' 
                in the second sentence of the second paragraph 
                in section 1, and inserting ``the Secretary of 
                Homeland Security'' in lieu thereof ;
                (b)  striking ``the INS,'' in the third 
                paragraph in section 1, and inserting ``the 
                Department of Homeland Security'' in lieu 
                thereof;
                (c)  inserting ``, the Secretary of Homeland 
                Security,'' after ``The Attorney General'' in 
                the fourth paragraph in section 1;
                (d)  inserting ``, the Secretary of Homeland 
                Security,'' after ``the Attorney General'' in 
                the fifth paragraph in section 1;
                (e)  striking ``the INS and the Customs 
                Service'' in the first sentence of the first 
                paragraph of section 2, and inserting ``the 
                Department of Homeland Security'' in lieu 
                thereof;
                (f)  striking ``Customs and INS'' in the first 
                sentence of the second paragraph of section 2, 
                and inserting ``the Department of Homeland 
                Security'' in lieu thereof;
                (g)  striking ``the two agencies'' in the 
                second sentence of the second paragraph of 
                section 2, and inserting ``the Department of 
                Homeland Security'' in lieu thereof;
                (h)  striking ``the Secretary of the Treasury'' 
                wherever it appears in section 2, and inserting 
                ``the Secretary of Homeland Security'' in lieu 
                thereof;
                (i)  inserting ``, the Secretary of Homeland 
                Security,'' after ``The Secretary of State'' 
                wherever the latter appears in section 3;
                (j)  inserting ``, the Department of Homeland 
                Security,'' after ``the Department of State,'' 
                in the second sentence in the third paragraph 
                in section 3;
                (k)  inserting ``the Secretary of Homeland 
                Security,'' after ``the Secretary of State,'' 
                in the first sentence of the fifth paragraph of 
                section 3;
                (l)  striking ``INS'' in the first sentence of 
                the sixth paragraph of section 3, and inserting 
                ``Department of Homeland Security'' in lieu 
                thereof;
                (m)  striking ``the Treasury'' wherever it 
                appears in section 4 and inserting ``Homeland 
                Security'' in lieu thereof;
                (n)  inserting ``, the Secretary of Homeland 
                Security,'' after ``the Attorney General'' in 
                the first sentence in section 5; and
                (o)  inserting ``, Homeland Security'' after 
                ``State'' in the first sentence of section 6.

Technical and Conforming Amendments to Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-3 (HSPD-3)
        (24)  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 assigned the 
        responsibility for administering the Homeland Security 
        Advisory System to the Secretary of Homeland Security. 
        Accordingly, HSPD-3 of March 11, 2002 (``Homeland 
        Security Advisory System'') is amended as follows:
                (a)  replacing the third sentence of the second 
                paragraph entitled ``Homeland Security Advisory 
                System'' with ``Except in exigent 
                circumstances, the Secretary of Homeland 
                Security shall seek the views of the Attorney 
                General, and any other federal agency heads the 
                Secretary deems appropriate, including other 
                members of the Homeland Security Council, on 
                the Threat Condition to be assigned.''
                (b)  inserting ``At the request of the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security, the Department 
                of Justice shall permit and facilitate the use 
                of delivery systems administered or managed by 
                the Department of Justice for the purposes of 
                delivering threat information pursuant to the 
                Homeland Security Advisory System.'' as a new 
                paragraph after the fifth paragraph of the 
                section entitled ``Homeland Security Advisory 
                System.''
                (c)  inserting ``, the Secretary of Homeland 
                Security'' after ``The Director of Central 
                Intelligence'' in the first sentence of the 
                seventh paragraph of the section entitled 
                ``Homeland Security Advisory System''.
                (d)  striking ``Attorney General'' wherever it 
                appears (except in the sentences referred to in 
                subsections (a) and (c) above), and inserting 
                ``the Secretary of Homeland Security'' in lieu 
                thereof; and
                (e)  striking the section entitled ``Comment 
                and Review Periods.''

                      GEORGE W. BUSH
              Homeland Security Presidential Directive--6

                              ----------                              


            To protect against terrorism it is the policy of 
        the United States to (1) develop, integrate, and 
        maintain thorough, accurate, and current information 
        about individuals known or appropriately suspected to 
        be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in 
        preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism 
        (Terrorist Information); and (2) use that information 
        as appropriate and to the full extent permitted by law 
        to support (a) Federal, State, local, territorial, 
        tribal, foreign-government, and private-sector 
        screening processes, and (b) diplomatic, military, 
        intelligence, law enforcement, immigration, visa, and 
        protective processes.
            This directive shall be implemented in a manner 
        consistent with the provisions of the Constitution and 
        applicable laws, including those protecting the rights 
        of all Americans.
            To further strengthen the ability of the United 
        States Government to protect the people, property, and 
        territory of the United States against acts of 
        terrorism, and to the full extent permitted by law and 
        consistent with the policy set forth above:
                    (1)  The Attorney General shall establish 
                an organization to consolidate the Government's 
                approach to terrorism screening and provide for 
                the appropriate and lawful use of Terrorist 
                Information in screening processes.
                    (2)  The heads of executive departments and 
                agencies shall, to the extent permitted by law, 
                provide to the Terrorist Threat Integration 
                Center (TTIC) on an ongoing basis all 
                appropriate Terrorist Information in their 
                possession, custody, or control. The Attorney 
                General, in coordination with the Secretary of 
                State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and 
                the Director of Central Intelligence shall 
                implement appropriate procedures and safeguards 
                with respect to all such information about 
                United States persons. The TTIC will provide 
                the organization referenced in paragraph (1) 
                with access to all appropriate information or 
                intelligence in the TTIC's custody, possession, 
                or control that the organization requires to 
                perform its functions.
                    (3)  The heads of executive departments and 
                agencies shall conduct screening using such 
                information at all appropriate opportunities, 
                and shall report to the Attorney General not 
                later than 90 days from the date of this 
                directive, as to the opportunities at which 
                such screening shall and shall not be 
                conducted.
                    (4)  The Secretary of Homeland Security 
                shall develop guidelines to govern the use of 
                such information to support State, local, 
                territorial, and tribal screening processes, 
                and private sector screening processes that 
                have a substantial bearing on homeland 
                security.
                    (5)  The Secretary of State shall develop a 
                proposal for my approval for enhancing 
                cooperation with certain foreign governments, 
                beginning with those countries for which the 
                United States has waived visa requirements, to 
                establish appropriate access to terrorism 
                screening information of the participating 
                governments.
            This directive does not alter existing authorities 
        or responsibilities of department and agency heads to 
        carry out operational activities or provide or receive 
        information. This directive is intended only to improve 
        the internal management of the executive branch and is 
        not intended to, and does not, create any right or 
        benefit enforceable at law or in equity by any party 
        against the United States, its departments, agencies, 
        entities, officers, employees or agents, or any other 
        person.
            The Attorney General, in consultation with the 
        Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
        and the Director of Central Intelligence, shall report 
        to me through the Assistant to the President for 
        Homeland Security not later than October 31, 2003, on 
        progress made to implement this directive and shall 
        thereafter report to me on such progress or any 
        recommended changes from time to time as appropriate.

            GEORGE W. BUSH
              Homeland Security Presidential Directive--7

      Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and 
                               Protection

                              ----------                              


Purpose
            (1)  This directive establishes a national policy 
        for Federal departments and agencies to identify and 
        prioritize United States critical infrastructure and 
        key resources and to protect them from terrorist 
        attacks.

Background
            (2)  Terrorists seek to destroy, incapacitate, or 
        exploit critical infrastructure and key resources 
        across the United States to threaten national security, 
        cause mass casualties, weaken our economy, and damage 
        public morale and confidence.
            (3)  America's open and technologically complex 
        society includes a wide array of critical 
        infrastructure and key resources that are potential 
        terrorist targets. The majority of these are owned and 
        operated by the private sector and State or local 
        governments. These critical infrastructures and key 
        resources are both physical and cyber-based and span 
        all sectors of the economy.
            (4)  Critical infrastructure and key resources 
        provide the essential services that underpin American 
        society. The Nation possesses numerous key resources, 
        whose exploitation or destruction by terrorists could 
        cause catastrophic health effects or mass casualties 
        comparable to those from the use of a weapon of mass 
        destruction, or could profoundly affect our national 
        prestige and morale. In addition, there is critical 
        infrastructure so vital that its incapacitation, 
        exploitation, or destruction, through terrorist attack, 
        could have a debilitating effect on security and 
        economic well-being.
            (5)  While it is not possible to protect or 
        eliminate the vulnerability of all critical 
        infrastructure and key resources throughout the 
        country, strategic improvements in security can make it 
        more difficult for attacks to succeed and can lessen 
        the impact of attacks that may occur. In addition to 
        strategic security enhancements, tactical security 
        improvements can be rapidly implemented to deter, 
        mitigate, or neutralize potential attacks.

Definitions
            (6)  In this directive:
                    (a)  The term ``critical infrastructure'' 
                has the meaning given to that term in section 
                1016(e) of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (42 
                U.S.C. 5195c(e)).
                    (b)  The term ``key resources'' has the 
                meaning given that term in section 2(9) of the 
                Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 
                101(9)).
                    (c)  The term ``the Department'' means the 
                Department of Homeland Security.
                    (d)  The term ``Federal departments and 
                agencies'' means those executive departments 
                enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101, and the Department 
                of Homeland Security; independent 
                establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C. 104(1); 
                Government corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C. 
                103(1); and the United States Postal Service.
                    (e)  The terms `State,'' and ``local 
                government,'' when used in a geographical 
                sense, have the same meanings given to those 
                terms in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act 
                of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101).
                    (f)  The term ``the Secretary'' means the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security.
                    (g)  The term ``Sector-Specific Agency'' 
                means a Federal department or agency 
                responsible for infrastructure protection 
                activities in a designated critical 
                infrastructure sector or key resources 
                category. Sector-Specific Agencies will conduct 
                their activities under this directive in 
                accordance with guidance provided by the 
                Secretary.
                    (h)  The terms ``protect'' and ``secure'' 
                mean reducing the vulnerability of critical 
                infrastructure or key resources in order to 
                deter, mitigate, or neutralize terrorist 
                attacks.

Policy
            (7)  It is the policy of the United States to 
        enhance the protection of our Nation's critical 
        infrastructure and key resources against terrorist acts 
        that could:
                    (a)  cause catastrophic health effects or 
                mass casualties comparable to those from the 
                use of a weapon of mass destruction;
                    (b)  impair Federal departments and 
                agencies' abilities to perform essential 
                missions, or to ensure the public's health and 
                safety;
                    (c)  undermine State and local government 
                capacities to maintain order and to deliver 
                minimum essential public services;
                    (d)  damage the private sector's capability 
                to ensure the orderly functioning of the 
                economy and delivery of essential services;
                    (e)  have a negative effect on the economy 
                through the cascading disruption of other 
                critical infrastructure and key resources; or
                    (f)  undermine the public's morale and 
                confidence in our national economic and 
                political institutions.
            (8)  Federal departments and agencies will 
        identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of 
        critical infrastructure and key resources in order to 
        prevent, deter, and mitigate the effects of deliberate 
        efforts to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit them. 
        Federal departments and agencies will work with State 
        and local governments and the private sector to 
        accomplish this objective.
            (9)  Federal departments and agencies will ensure 
        that homeland security programs do not diminish the 
        overall economic security of the United States.
            (10)  Federal departments and agencies will 
        appropriately protect information associated with 
        carrying out this directive, including handling 
        voluntarily provided information and information that 
        would facilitate terrorist targeting of critical 
        infrastructure and key resources consistent with the 
        Homeland Security Act of 2002 and other applicable 
        legal authorities.
            (11)  Federal departments and agencies shall 
        implement this directive in a manner consistent with 
        applicable provisions of law, including those 
        protecting the rights of United States persons.

Roles and Responsibilities of the Secretary
            (12)  In carrying out the functions assigned in the 
        Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary shall be 
        responsible for coordinating the overall national 
        effort to enhance the protection of the critical 
        infrastructure and key resources of the United States. 
        The Secretary shall serve as the principal Federal 
        official to lead, integrate, and coordinate 
        implementation of efforts among Federal departments and 
        agencies, State and local governments, and the private 
        sector to protect critical infrastructure and key 
        resources.
            (13)  Consistent with this directive, the Secretary 
        will identify, prioritize, and coordinate the 
        protection of critical infrastructure and key resources 
        with an emphasis on critical infrastructure and key 
        resources that could be exploited to cause catastrophic 
        health effects or mass casualties comparable to those 
        from the use of a weapon of mass destruction.
            (14)  The Secretary will establish uniform 
        policies, approaches, guidelines, and methodologies for 
        integrating Federal infrastructure protection and risk 
        management activities within and across sectors along 
        with metrics and criteria for related programs and 
        activities.
            (15)  The Secretary shall coordinate protection 
        activities for each of the following critical 
        infrastructure sectors: information technology; 
        telecommunications; chemical; transportation systems, 
        including mass transit, aviation, maritime, ground/
        surface, and rail and pipeline systems; emergency 
        services; and postal and shipping. The Department shall 
        coordinate with appropriate departments and agencies to 
        ensure the protection of other key resources including 
        dams, government facilities, and commercial facilities. 
        In addition, in its role as overall cross-sector 
        coordinator, the Department shall also evaluate the 
        need for and coordinate the coverage of additional 
        critical infrastructure and key resources categories 
        over time, as appropriate.
            (16)  The Secretary will continue to maintain an 
        organization to serve as a focal point for the security 
        of cyberspace. The organization will facilitate 
        interactions and collaborations between and among 
        Federal departments and agencies, State and local 
        governments, the private sector, academia and 
        international organizations. To the extent permitted by 
        law, Federal departments and agencies with cyber 
        expertise, including but not limited to the Departments 
        of Justice, Commerce, the Treasury, Defense, Energy, 
        and State, and the Central Intelligence Agency, will 
        collaborate with and support the organization in 
        accomplishing its mission. The organization's mission 
        includes analysis, warning, information sharing, 
        vulnerability reduction, mitigation, and aiding 
        national recovery efforts for critical infrastructure 
        information systems. The organization will support the 
        Department of Justice and other law enforcement 
        agencies in their continuing missions to investigate 
        and prosecute threats to and attacks against 
        cyberspace, to the extent permitted by law.
            (17)  The Secretary will work closely with other 
        Federal departments and agencies, State and local 
        governments, and the private sector in accomplishing 
        the objectives of this directive.

Roles and Responsibilities of Sector-Specific Federal Agencies
            (18)  Recognizing that each infrastructure sector 
        possesses its own unique characteristics and operating 
        models, there are designated Sector-Specific Agencies, 
        including:
                    (a)  Department of Agriculture - 
                agriculture, food (meat, poultry, egg 
                products);
                    (b)  Health and Human Services - public 
                health, healthcare, and food (other than meat, 
                poultry, egg products);
                    (c)  Environmental Protection Agency - 
                drinking water and water treatment systems;
                    (d)  Department of Energy - energy, 
                including the production refining, storage, and 
                distribution of oil and gas, and electric power 
                except for commercial nuclear power facilities;
                    (e)  Department of the Treasury - banking 
                and finance;
                    (f)  Department of the Interior - national 
                monuments and icons; and
                    (g)  Department of Defense - defense 
                industrial base.
            (19)  In accordance with guidance provided by the 
        Secretary, Sector-Specific Agencies shall: (a)  
        collaborate with all relevant Federal departments and 
        agencies, State and local governments, and the private 
        sector, including with key persons and entities in 
        their infrastructure sector; (b)  conduct or facilitate 
        vulnerability assessments of the sector; and (c)  
        encourage risk management strategies to protect against 
        and mitigate the effects of attacks against critical 
        infrastructure and key resources.
            (20)  Nothing in this directive alters, or impedes 
        the ability to carry out, the authorities of the 
        Federal departments and agencies to perform their 
        responsibilities under law and consistent with 
        applicable legal authorities and presidential guidance.
            (21)  Federal departments and agencies shall 
        cooperate with the Department in implementing this 
        directive, consistent with the Homeland Security Act of 
        2002 and other applicable legal authorities.

Roles and Responsibilities of Other Departments, Agencies, and 
Offices
            (22)  In addition to the responsibilities given the 
        Department and Sector-Specific Agencies, there are 
        special functions of various Federal departments and 
        agencies and components of the Executive Office of the 
        President related to critical infrastructure and key 
        resources protection.
                    (a)  The Department of State, in 
                conjunction with the Department, and the 
                Departments of Justice, Commerce, Defense, the 
                Treasury and other appropriate agencies, will 
                work with foreign countries and international 
                organizations to strengthen the protection of 
                United States critical infrastructure and key 
                resources.
                    (b)  The Department of Justice, including 
                the Federal Bureau of Investigation, will 
                reduce domestic terrorist threats, and 
                investigate and prosecute actual or attempted 
                terrorist attacks on, sabotage of, or 
                disruptions of critical infrastructure and key 
                resources. The Attorney General and the 
                Secretary shall use applicable statutory 
                authority and attendant mechanisms for 
                cooperation and coordination, including but not 
                limited to those established by presidential 
                directive.
                    (c)  The Department of Commerce, in 
                coordination with the Department, will work 
                with private sector, research, academic, and 
                government organizations to improve technology 
                for cyber systems and promote other critical 
                infrastructure efforts, including using its 
                authority under the Defense Production Act to 
                assure the timely availability of industrial 
                products, materials, and services to meet 
                homeland security requirements.
                    (d)  A Critical Infrastructure Protection 
                Policy Coordinating Committee will advise the 
                Homeland Security Council on interagency policy 
                related to physical and cyber infrastructure 
                protection. This PCC will be chaired by a 
                Federal officer or employee designated by the 
                Assistant to the President for Homeland 
                Security.
                    (e)  The Office of Science and Technology 
                Policy, in coordination with the Department, 
                will coordinate interagency research and 
                development to enhance the protection of 
                critical infrastructure and key resources.
                    (f)  The Office of Management and Budget 
                (OMB)  shall oversee the implementation of 
                government-wide policies, principles, 
                standards, and guidelines for Federal 
                government computer security programs. The 
                Director of OMB will ensure the operation of a 
                central Federal information security incident 
                center consistent with the requirements of the 
                Federal Information Security Management Act of 
                2002.
                    (g)  Consistent with the E-Government Act 
                of 2002, the Chief Information Officers Council 
                shall be the principal interagency forum for 
                improving agency practices related to the 
                design, acquisition, development, 
                modernization, use, operation, sharing, and 
                performance of information resources of Federal 
                departments and agencies.
                    (h)  The Department of Transportation and 
                the Department will collaborate on all matters 
                relating to transportation security and 
                transportation infrastructure protection. The 
                Department of Transportation is responsible for 
                operating the national air space system. The 
                Department of Transportation and the Department 
                will collaborate in regulating the 
                transportation of hazardous materials by all 
                modes (including pipelines).
                    (i)  All Federal departments and agencies 
                shall work with the sectors relevant to their 
                responsibilities to reduce the consequences of 
                catastrophic failures not caused by terrorism.
            (23)  The heads of all Federal departments and 
        agencies will coordinate and cooperate with the 
        Secretary as appropriate and consistent with their own 
        responsibilities for protecting critical infrastructure 
        and key resources.
            (24)  All Federal department and agency heads are 
        responsible for the identification, prioritization, 
        assessment, remediation, and protection of their 
        respective internal critical infrastructure and key 
        resources. Consistent with the Federal Information 
        Security Management Act of 2002, agencies will identify 
        and provide information security protections 
        commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm 
        resulting from the unauthorized access, use, 
        disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of 
        information.

Coordination with the Private Sector
            (25)  In accordance with applicable laws or 
        regulations, the Department and the Sector-Specific 
        Agencies will collaborate with appropriate private 
        sector entities and continue to encourage the 
        development of information sharing and analysis 
        mechanisms. Additionally, the Department and Sector-
        Specific Agencies shall collaborate with the private 
        sector and continue to support sector-coordinating 
        mechanisms:
                    (a)  to identify, prioritize, and 
                coordinate the protection of critical 
                infrastructure and key resources; and
                    (b)  to facilitate sharing of information 
                about physical and cyber threats, 
                vulnerabilities, incidents, potential 
                protective measures, and best practices.

National Special Security Events
            (26)  The Secretary, after consultation with the 
        Homeland Security Council, shall be responsible for 
        designating events as ``National Special Security 
        Events'' (NSSEs). This directive supersedes language in 
        previous presidential directives regarding the 
        designation of NSSEs that is inconsistent herewith.

Implementation
            (27)  Consistent with the Homeland Security Act of 
        2002, the Secretary shall produce a comprehensive, 
        integrated National Plan for Critical Infrastructure 
        and Key Resources Protection to outline national goals, 
        objectives, milestones, and key initiatives within 1 
        year from the issuance of this directive. The Plan 
        shall include, in addition to other Homeland Security-
        related elements as the Secretary deems appropriate, 
        the following elements:
                    (a)  a strategy to identify, prioritize, 
                and coordinate the protection of critical 
                infrastructure and key resources, including how 
                the Department intends to work with Federal 
                departments and agencies, State and local 
                governments, the private sector, and foreign 
                countries and international organizations;
                    (b)  a summary of activities to be 
                undertaken in order to: define and prioritize, 
                reduce the vulnerability of, and coordinate the 
                protection of critical infrastructure and key 
                resources;
                    (c)  a summary of initiatives for sharing 
                critical infrastructure and key resources 
                information and for providing critical 
                infrastructure and key resources threat warning 
                data to State and local governments and the 
                private sector; and
                    (d)  coordination and integration, as 
                appropriate, with other Federal emergency 
                management and preparedness activities 
                including the National Response Plan and 
                applicable national preparedness goals.
            (28)  The Secretary, consistent with the Homeland 
        Security Act of 2002 and other applicable legal 
        authorities and presidential guidance, shall establish 
        appropriate systems, mechanisms, and procedures to 
        share homeland security information relevant to threats 
        and vulnerabilities in national critical infrastructure 
        and key resources with other Federal departments and 
        agencies, State and local governments, and the private 
        sector in a timely manner.
            (29)  The Secretary will continue to work with the 
        Nuclear Regulatory Commission and, as appropriate, the 
        Department of Energy in order to ensure the necessary 
        protection of:
                    (a)  commercial nuclear reactors for 
                generating electric power and non-power nuclear 
                reactors used for research, testing, and 
                training;
                    (b)  nuclear materials in medical, 
                industrial, and academic settings and 
                facilities that fabricate nuclear fuel; and
                    (c)  the transportation, storage, and 
                disposal of nuclear materials and waste.
            (30)  In coordination with the Director of the 
        Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Secretary 
        shall prepare on an annual basis a Federal Research and 
        Development Plan in support of this directive.
            (31)  The Secretary will collaborate with other 
        appropriate Federal departments and agencies to develop 
        a program, consistent with applicable law, to 
        geospatially map, image, analyze, and sort critical 
        infrastructure and key resources by utilizing 
        commercial satellite and airborne systems, and existing 
        capabilities within other agencies. National technical 
        means should be considered as an option of last resort. 
        The Secretary, with advice from the Director of Central 
        Intelligence, the Secretaries of Defense and the 
        Interior, and the heads of other appropriate Federal 
        departments and agencies, shall develop mechanisms for 
        accomplishing this initiative. The Attorney General 
        shall provide legal advice as necessary.
            (32)  The Secretary will utilize existing, and 
        develop new, capabilities as needed to model 
        comprehensively the potential implications of terrorist 
        exploitation of vulnerabilities in critical 
        infrastructure and key resources, placing specific 
        focus on densely populated areas. Agencies with 
        relevant modeling capabilities shall cooperate with the 
        Secretary to develop appropriate mechanisms for 
        accomplishing this initiative.
            (33)  The Secretary will develop a national 
        indications and warnings architecture for 
        infrastructure protection and capabilities that will 
        facilitate:
                    (a)  an understanding of baseline 
                infrastructure operations;
                    (b)  the identification of indicators and 
                precursors to an attack; and
                    (c)  a surge capacity for detecting and 
                analyzing patterns of potential attacks. In 
                developing a national indications and warnings 
                architecture, the Department will work with 
                Federal, State, local, and non-governmental 
                entities to develop an integrated view of 
                physical and cyber infrastructure and key 
                resources.
            (34)  By July 2004, the heads of all Federal 
        departments and agencies shall develop and submit to 
        the Director of the OMB for approval plans for 
        protecting the physical and cyber critical 
        infrastructure and key resources that they own or 
        operate. These plans shall address identification, 
        prioritization, protection, and contingency planning, 
        including the recovery and reconstitution of essential 
        capabilities.
            (35)  On an annual basis, the Sector-Specific 
        Agencies shall report to the Secretary on their efforts 
        to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection 
        of critical infrastructure and key resources in their 
        respective sectors. The report shall be submitted 
        within 1 year from the issuance of this directive and 
        on an annual basis thereafter.
            (36)  The Assistant to the President for Homeland 
        Security and the Assistant to the President for 
        National Security Affairs will lead a national security 
        and emergency preparedness communications policy 
        review, with the heads of the appropriate Federal 
        departments and agencies, related to convergence and 
        next generation architecture. Within 6 months after the 
        issuance of this directive, the Assistant to the 
        President for Homeland Security and the Assistant to 
        the President for National Security Affairs shall 
        submit for my consideration any recommended changes to 
        such policy.
            (37)  This directive supersedes Presidential 
        Decision Directive/NSC-63 of May 22, 1998 (``Critical 
        Infrastructure Protection''), and any Presidential 
        directives issued prior to this directive to the extent 
        of any inconsistency. Moreover, the Assistant to the 
        President for Homeland Security and the Assistant to 
        the President for National Security Affairs shall 
        jointly submit for my consideration a Presidential 
        directive to make changes in Presidential directives 
        issued prior to this date that conform such directives 
        to this directive.
            (38)  This directive is intended only to improve 
        the internal management of the executive branch of the 
        Federal Government, and it is not intended to, and does 
        not, create any right or benefit, substantive or 
        procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against 
        the United States, its departments, agencies, or other 
        entities, its officers or employees, or any other 
        person.

            GEORGE W. BUSH
              Homeland Security Presidential Directive--8

                         National Preparedness

                              ----------                              


Purpose
            (1)  This directive establishes policies to 
        strengthen the preparedness of the United States to 
        prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic 
        terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 
        emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-
        hazards preparedness goal, establishing mechanisms for 
        improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to 
        State and local governments, and outlining actions to 
        strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, State, 
        and local entities. Definitions
            (2)  For the purposes of this directive:
                    (a)  The term ``all-hazards preparedness'' 
                refers to preparedness for domestic terrorist 
                attacks, major disasters, and other 
                emergencies.
                    (b)  The term ``Federal departments and 
                agencies'' means those executive departments 
                enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101, and the Department 
                of Homeland Security; independent 
                establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C. 104(1); 
                Government corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C. 
                103(1); and the United States Postal Service.
                    (c)  The term ``Federal preparedness 
                assistance'' means Federal department and 
                agency grants, cooperative agreements, loans, 
                loan guarantees, training, and/ or technical 
                assistance provided to State and local 
                governments and the private sector to prevent, 
                prepare for, respond to, and recover from 
                terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 
                emergencies. Unless noted otherwise, the term 
                ``assistance'' will refer to Federal assistance 
                programs.
                    (d)  The term ``first responder'' refers to 
                those individuals who in the early stages of an 
                incident are responsible for the protection and 
                preservation of life, property, evidence, and 
                the environment, including emergency response 
                providers as defined in section 2 of the 
                Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101), 
                as well as emergency management, public health, 
                clinical care, public works, and other skilled 
                support personnel (such as equipment operators)  
                that provide immediate support services during 
                prevention, response, and recovery operations.
                    (e)  The terms ``major disaster'' and 
                ``emergency'' have the meanings given in 
                section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster 
                Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 
                5122).
                    (f)  The term ``major events'' refers to 
                domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, 
                and other emergencies.
                    (g)  The term ``national homeland security 
                preparedness-related exercises'' refers to 
                homeland security-related exercises that train 
                and test national decision makers and utilize 
                resources of multiple Federal departments and 
                agencies. Such exercises may involve State and 
                local first responders when appropriate. Such 
                exercises do not include those exercises 
                conducted solely within a single Federal 
                department or agency.
                    (h)  The term ``preparedness'' refers to 
                the existence of plans, procedures, policies, 
                training, and equipment necessary at the 
                Federal, State, and local level to maximize the 
                ability to prevent, respond to, and recover 
                from major events. The term ``readiness'' is 
                used interchangeably with preparedness.
                    (i)  The term ``prevention'' refers to 
                activities undertaken by the first responder 
                community during the early stages of an 
                incident to reduce the likelihood or 
                consequences of threatened or actual terrorist 
                attacks. More general and broader efforts to 
                deter, disrupt, or thwart terrorism are not 
                addressed in this directive.
                    (j)  The term ``Secretary'' means the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security.
                    (k)  The terms ``State,'' and ``local 
                government,'' when used in a geographical 
                sense, have the same meanings given to those 
                terms in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act 
                of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101).

Relationship to HSPD-5
            (3)  This directive is a companion to HSPD-5, which 
        identifies steps for improved coordination in response 
        to incidents. This directive describes the way Federal 
        departments and agencies will prepare for such a 
        response, including prevention activities during the 
        early stages of a terrorism incident.

Development of a National Preparedness Goal
            (4)  The Secretary is the principal Federal 
        official for coordinating the implementation of all-
        hazards preparedness in the United States. In 
        cooperation with other Federal departments and 
        agencies, the Secretary coordinates the preparedness of 
        Federal response assets, and the support for, and 
        assessment of, the preparedness of State and local 
        first responders.
            (5)  To help ensure the preparedness of the Nation 
        to prevent, respond to, and recover from threatened and 
        actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and 
        other emergencies, the Secretary, in coordination with 
        the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and 
        agencies and in consultation with State and local 
        governments, shall develop a national domestic all-
        hazards preparedness goal. Federal departments and 
        agencies will work to achieve this goal by:
                    (a)  providing for effective, efficient, 
                and timely delivery of Federal preparedness 
                assistance to State and local governments; and
                    (b)  supporting efforts to ensure first 
                responders are prepared to respond to major 
                events, especially prevention of and response 
                to threatened terrorist attacks.
            (6)  The national preparedness goal will establish 
        measurable readiness priorities and targets that 
        appropriately balance the potential threat and 
        magnitude of terrorist attacks, major disasters, and 
        other emergencies with the resources required to 
        prevent, respond to, and recover from them. It will 
        also include readiness metrics and elements that 
        support the national preparedness goal including 
        standards for preparedness assessments and strategies, 
        and a system for assessing the Nation's overall 
        preparedness to respond to major events, especially 
        those involving acts of terrorism.
            (7)  The Secretary will submit the national 
        preparedness goal to me through the Homeland Security 
        Council (HSC) for review and approval prior to, or 
        concurrently with, the Department of Homeland 
        Security's Fiscal Year 2006 budget submission to the 
        Office of Management and Budget.

Federal Preparedness Assistance
            (8)  The Secretary, in coordination with the 
        Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human 
        Services (HHS), and the heads of other Federal 
        departments and agencies that provide assistance for 
        first responder preparedness, will establish a single 
        point of access to Federal preparedness assistance 
        program information within 60 days of the issuance of 
        this directive. The Secretary will submit to me through 
        the HSC recommendations of specific Federal department 
        and agency programs to be part of the coordinated 
        approach. All Federal departments and agencies will 
        cooperate with this effort. Agencies will continue to 
        issue financial assistance awards consistent with 
        applicable laws and regulations and will ensure that 
        program announcements, solicitations, application 
        instructions, and other guidance documents are 
        consistent with other Federal preparedness programs to 
        the extent possible. Full implementation of a closely 
        coordinated interagency grant process will be completed 
        by September 30, 2005.
            (9)  To the extent permitted by law, the primary 
        mechanism for delivery of Federal preparedness 
        assistance will be awards to the States. Awards will be 
        delivered in a form that allows the recipients to apply 
        the assistance to the highest priority preparedness 
        requirements at the appropriate level of government. To 
        the extent permitted by law, Federal preparedness 
        assistance will be predicated on adoption of Statewide 
        comprehensive all-hazards preparedness strategies. The 
        strategies should be consistent with the national 
        preparedness goal, should assess the most effective 
        ways to enhance preparedness, should address areas 
        facing higher risk, especially to terrorism, and should 
        also address local government concerns and Citizen 
        Corps efforts. The Secretary, in coordination with the 
        heads of other appropriate Federal departments and 
        agencies, will review and approve strategies submitted 
        by the States. To the extent permitted by law, adoption 
        of approved Statewide strategies will be a requirement 
        for receiving Federal preparedness assistance at all 
        levels of government by September 30, 2005.
            (10)  In making allocations of Federal preparedness 
        assistance to the States, the Secretary, the Attorney 
        General, the Secretary of HHS, the Secretary of 
        Transportation, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary 
        of Veterans Affairs, the Administrator of the 
        Environmental Protection Agency, and the heads of other 
        Federal departments and agencies that provide 
        assistance for first responder preparedness will base 
        those allocations on assessments of population 
        concentrations, critical infrastructures, and other 
        significant risk factors, particularly terrorism 
        threats, to the extent permitted by law.
            (11)  Federal preparedness assistance will support 
        State and local entities' efforts including planning, 
        training, exercises, interoperability, and equipment 
        acquisition for major events as well as capacity 
        building for prevention activities such as information 
        gathering, detection, deterrence, and collaboration 
        related to terrorist attacks. Such assistance is not 
        primarily intended to support existing capacity to 
        address normal local first responder operations, but to 
        build capacity to address major events, especially 
        terrorism.
            (12)  The Attorney General, the Secretary of HHS, 
        the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of 
        Energy, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the 
        Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, 
        and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies 
        that provide assistance for first responder 
        preparedness shall coordinate with the Secretary to 
        ensure that such assistance supports and is consistent 
        with the national preparedness goal.
            (13)  Federal departments and agencies will develop 
        appropriate mechanisms to ensure rapid obligation and 
        disbursement of funds from their programs to the 
        States, from States to the local community level, and 
        from local entities to the end users to derive maximum 
        benefit from the assistance provided. Federal 
        departments and agencies will report annually to the 
        Secretary on the obligation, expenditure status, and 
        the use of funds associated with Federal preparedness 
        assistance programs.

Equipment
            (14)  The Secretary, in coordination with State and 
        local officials, first responder organizations, the 
        private sector and other Federal civilian departments 
        and agencies, shall establish and implement streamlined 
        procedures for the ongoing development and adoption of 
        appropriate first responder equipment standards that 
        support nationwide interoperability and other 
        capabilities consistent with the national preparedness 
        goal, including the safety and health of first 
        responders.
            (15)  To the extent permitted by law, equipment 
        purchased through Federal preparedness assistance for 
        first responders shall conform to equipment standards 
        in place at time of purchase. Other Federal departments 
        and agencies that support the purchase of first 
        responder equipment will coordinate their programs with 
        the Department of Homeland Security and conform to the 
        same standards.
            (16)  The Secretary, in coordination with other 
        appropriate Federal departments and agencies and in 
        consultation with State and local governments, will 
        develop plans to identify and address national first 
        responder equipment research and development needs 
        based upon assessments of current and future threats. 
        Other Federal departments and agencies that support 
        preparedness research and development activities shall 
        coordinate their efforts with the Department of 
        Homeland Security and ensure they support the national 
        preparedness goal.

Training and Exercises
            (17)  The Secretary, in coordination with the 
        Secretary of HHS, the Attorney General, and other 
        appropriate Federal departments and agencies and in 
        consultation with State and local governments, shall 
        establish and maintain a comprehensive training program 
        to meet the national preparedness goal. The program 
        will identify standards and maximize the effectiveness 
        of existing Federal programs and financial assistance 
        and include training for the Nation's first responders, 
        officials, and others with major event preparedness, 
        prevention, response, and recovery roles. Federal 
        departments and agencies shall include private 
        organizations in the accreditation and delivery of 
        preparedness training as appropriate and to the extent 
        permitted by law.
            (18)  The Secretary, in coordination with other 
        appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall 
        establish a national program and a multi-year planning 
        system to conduct homeland security preparedness-
        related exercises that reinforces identified training 
        standards, provides for evaluation of readiness, and 
        supports the national preparedness goal. The 
        establishment and maintenance of the program will be 
        conducted in maximum collaboration with State and local 
        governments and appropriate private sector entities. 
        All Federal departments and agencies that conduct 
        national homeland security preparedness-related 
        exercises shall participate in a collaborative, 
        interagency process to designate such exercises on a 
        consensus basis and create a master exercise calendar. 
        The Secretary will ensure that exercises included in 
        the calendar support the national preparedness goal. At 
        the time of designation, Federal departments and 
        agencies will identify their level of participation in 
        national homeland security preparedness- related 
        exercises. The Secretary will develop a multi-year 
        national homeland security preparedness-related 
        exercise plan and submit the plan to me through the HSC 
        for review and approval.
            (19)  The Secretary shall develop and maintain a 
        system to collect, analyze, and disseminate lessons 
        learned, best practices, and information from 
        exercises, training events, research, and other 
        sources, including actual incidents, and establish 
        procedures to improve national preparedness to prevent, 
        respond to, and recover from major events. The 
        Secretary, in coordination with other Federal 
        departments and agencies and State and local 
        governments, will identify relevant classes of 
        homeland-security related information and appropriate 
        means of transmission for the information to be 
        included in the system. Federal departments and 
        agencies are directed, and State and local governments 
        are requested, to provide this information to the 
        Secretary to the extent permitted by law.

Federal Department and Agency Preparedness
            (20)  The head of each Federal department or agency 
        shall undertake actions to support the national 
        preparedness goal, including adoption of quantifiable 
        performance measurements in the areas of training, 
        planning, equipment, and exercises for Federal incident 
        management and asset preparedness, to the extent 
        permitted by law. Specialized Federal assets such as 
        teams, stockpiles, and caches shall be maintained at 
        levels consistent with the national preparedness goal 
        and be available for response activities as set forth 
        in the National Response Plan, other appropriate 
        operational documents, and applicable authorities or 
        guidance. Relevant Federal regulatory requirements 
        should be consistent with the national preparedness 
        goal. Nothing in this directive shall limit the 
        authority of the Secretary of Defense with regard to 
        the command and control, training, planning, equipment, 
        exercises, or employment of Department of Defense 
        forces, or the allocation of Department of Defense 
        resources.
            (21)  The Secretary, in coordination with other 
        appropriate Federal civilian departments and agencies, 
        shall develop and maintain a Federal response 
        capability inventory that includes the performance 
        parameters of the capability, the timeframe within 
        which the capability can be brought to bear on an 
        incident, and the readiness of such capability to 
        respond to domestic incidents. The Department of 
        Defense will provide to the Secretary information 
        describing the organizations and functions within the 
        Department of Defense that may be utilized to provide 
        support to civil authorities during a domestic crisis.

Citizen Participation
            (22)  The Secretary shall work with other 
        appropriate Federal departments and agencies as well as 
        State and local governments and the private sector to 
        encourage active citizen participation and involvement 
        in preparedness efforts. The Secretary shall 
        periodically review and identify the best community 
        practices for integrating private citizen capabilities 
        into local preparedness efforts.

Public Communication
            (23)  The Secretary, in consultation with other 
        Federal departments and agencies, State and local 
        governments, and non-governmental organizations, shall 
        develop a comprehensive plan to provide accurate and 
        timely preparedness information to public citizens, 
        first responders, units of government, the private 
        sector, and other interested parties and mechanisms for 
        coordination at all levels of government.

Assessment and Evaluation
            (24)  The Secretary shall provide to me through the 
        Assistant to the President for Homeland Security an 
        annual status report of the Nation's level of 
        preparedness, including State capabilities, the 
        readiness of Federal civil response assets, the 
        utilization of mutual aid, and an assessment of how the 
        Federal first responder preparedness assistance 
        programs support the national preparedness goal. The 
        first report will be provided within 1 year of 
        establishment of the national preparedness goal.
            (25)  Nothing in this directive alters, or impedes 
        the ability to carry out, the authorities of the 
        Federal departments and agencies to perform their 
        responsibilities under law and consistent with 
        applicable legal authorities and presidential guidance.
            (26)  Actions pertaining to the funding and 
        administration of financial assistance and all other 
        activities, efforts, and policies in this directive 
        shall be executed in accordance with law. To the extent 
        permitted by law, these policies will be established 
        and carried out in consultation with State and local 
        governments.
            (27)  This directive is intended only to improve 
        the internal management of the executive branch of the 
        Federal Government, and it is not intended to, and does 
        not, create any right or benefit, substantive or 
        procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against 
        the United States, its departments, agencies, or other 
        entities, its officers or employees, or any other 
        person.

            GEORGE W. BUSH
                   Homeland Security Presidential--9

             Defense of United States Agriculture and Food

                              ----------                              


Purpose
            (1)  This directive establishes a national policy 
        to defend the agriculture and food system against 
        terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 
        emergencies.

Background
            (2)  The United States agriculture and food systems 
        are vulnerable to disease, pest, or poisonous agents 
        that occur naturally, are unintentionally introduced, 
        or are intentionally delivered by acts of terrorism. 
        Americas agriculture and food system is an extensive, 
        open, interconnected, diverse, and complex structure 
        providing potential targets for terrorist attacks. We 
        should provide the best protection possible against a 
        successful attack on the United States agriculture and 
        food system, which could have catastrophic health and 
        economic effects.

Definitions
            (3)  In this directive:
                    (a)  The term critical infrastructure has 
                the meaning given to that term in section 
                1016(e) of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (42 
                U.S.C. 5195c(e)).
                    (b)  The term key resources has the meaning 
                given that term in section 2(9) of the Homeland 
                Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101(9)).
                    (c)  The term Federal departments and 
                agencies means those executive departments 
                enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101, and the Department 
                of Homeland Security; independent 
                establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C. 104(1); 
                Government corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C. 
                103(1); and the United States Postal Service.
                    (d)  The terms State, and local government, 
                when used in a geographical sense, have the 
                same meanings given to those terms in section 2 
                of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 
                101).
                    (e)  The term Sector-Specific Agency means 
                a Federal department or agency responsible for 
                infrastructure protection activities in a 
                designated critical infrastructure sector or 
                key resources category.

Policy
            (4)  It is the policy of the United States to 
        protect the agriculture and food system from terrorist 
        attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by:
                    (a)  identifying and prioritizing sector-
                critical infrastructure and key resources for 
                establishing protection requirements;
                    (b)  developing awareness and early warning 
                capabilities to recognize threats;
                    (c)  mitigating vulnerabilities at critical 
                production and processing nodes;
                    (d)  enhancing screening procedures for 
                domestic and imported products; and
                    (e)  enhancing response and recovery 
                procedures.
            (5)  In implementing this directive, Federal 
        departments and agencies will ensure that homeland 
        security programs do not diminish the overall economic 
        security of the United States

Roles and Responsibilities
            (6)  As established in Homeland Security 
        Presidential Directive-7 (HSPD-7), the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security is responsible for coordinating the 
        overall national effort to enhance the protection of 
        the critical infrastructure and key resources of the 
        United States. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
        serve as the principal Federal official to lead, 
        integrate, and coordinate implementation of efforts 
        among Federal departments and agencies, State and local 
        governments, and the private sector to protect critical 
        infrastructure and key resources. This directive shall 
        be implemented in a manner consistent with HSPD-7.
            (7)  The Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and 
        Human Services, and the Administrator of the 
        Environmental Protection Agency will perform their 
        responsibilities as Sector-Specific Agencies as 
        delineated in HSPD-7.

Awareness and Warning
            (8)  The Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, 
        Health and Human Services, the Administrator of the 
        Environmental Protection Agency, and the heads of other 
        appropriate Federal departments and agencies shall 
        build upon and expand current monitoring and 
        surveillance programs to:
                    (a)  develop robust, comprehensive, and 
                fully coordinated surveillance and monitoring 
                systems, including international information, 
                for animal disease, plant disease, wildlife 
                disease, food, public health, and water quality 
                that provides early detection and awareness of 
                disease, pest, or poisonous agents;
                    (b)  develop systems that, as appropriate, 
                track specific animals and plants, as well as 
                specific commodities and food; and
                    (c)  develop nationwide laboratory networks 
                for food, veterinary, plant health, and water 
                quality that integrate existing Federal and 
                State laboratory resources, are interconnected, 
                and utilize standardized diagnostic protocols 
                and procedures.
                    (9)  The Attorney General, the Secretary of 
                Homeland Security, and the Director of Central 
                Intelligence, in coordination with the 
                Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human 
                Services, and the Administrator of the 
                Environmental Protection Agency, shall develop 
                and enhance intelligence operations and 
                analysis capabilities focusing on the 
                agriculture, food, and water sectors. These 
                intelligence capabilities will include 
                collection and analysis of information 
                concerning threats, delivery systems, and 
                methods that could be directed against these 
                sectors.
            (10)  The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
        coordinate with the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health 
        and Human Services, and the Administrator of the 
        Environmental Protection Agency, and the heads of other 
        appropriate Federal departments and agencies to create 
        a new biological threat awareness capacity that will 
        enhance detection and characterization of an attack. 
        This new capacity will build upon the improved and 
        upgraded surveillance systems described in paragraph 8 
        and integrate and analyze domestic and international 
        surveillance and monitoring data collected from human 
        health, animal health, plant health, food, and water 
        quality systems. The Secretary of Homeland Security 
        will submit a report to me through the Homeland 
        Security Council within 90 days of the date of this 
        directive on specific options for establishing this 
        capability, including recommendations for its 
        organizational location and structure.

Vulnerability Assessments
            (11)  The Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and 
        Human Services, and Homeland Security shall expand and 
        continue vulnerability assessments of the agriculture 
        and food sectors. These vulnerability assessments 
        should identify requirements of the National 
        Infrastructure Protection Plan developed by the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security, as appropriate, and 
        shall be updated every 2 years.

Mitigation Strategies
            (12)  The Secretary of Homeland Security and the 
        Attorney General, working with the Secretaries of 
        Agriculture, Health and Human Services, the 
        Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, 
        the Director of Central Intelligence, and the heads of 
        other appropriate Federal departments and agencies 
        shall prioritize, develop, and implement, as 
        appropriate, mitigation strategies to protect 
        vulnerable critical nodes of production or processing 
        from the introduction of diseases, pests, or poisonous 
        agents.
            (13)  The Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and 
        Human Services, and Homeland Security shall build on 
        existing efforts to expand development of common 
        screening and inspection procedures for agriculture and 
        food items entering the United States and to maximize 
        effective domestic inspection activities for food items 
        within the United States.

Response Planning and Recovery
            (14)  The Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
        coordination with the Secretaries of Agriculture, 
        Health and Human Services, the Attorney General, and 
        the Administrator of the Environmental Protection 
        Agency, will ensure that the combined Federal, State, 
        and local response capabilities are adequate to respond 
        quickly and effectively to a terrorist attack, major 
        disease outbreak, or other disaster affecting the 
        national agriculture or food infrastructure. These 
        activities will be integrated with other national 
        homeland security preparedness activities developed 
        under HSPD-8 on National Preparedness.
            (15)  The Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
        coordination with the Secretaries of Agriculture, 
        Health and Human Services, the Attorney General, and 
        the Administrator of the Environmental Protection 
        Agency, shall develop a coordinated agriculture and 
        food-specific standardized response plan that will be 
        integrated into the National Response Plan. This plan 
        will ensure a coordinated response to an agriculture or 
        food incident and will delineate the appropriate roles 
        of Federal, State, local, and private sector partners, 
        and will address risk communication for the general 
        public.
            (16)  The Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and 
        Human Services, in coordination with the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security and the Administrator of the 
        Environmental Protection Agency, shall enhance recovery 
        systems that are able to stabilize agriculture 
        production, the food supply, and the economy, rapidly 
        remove and effectively dispose of contaminated 
        agriculture and food products or infected plants and 
        animals, and decontaminate premises.
            (17)  The Secretary of Agriculture shall study and 
        make recommendations to the Homeland Security Council, 
        within 120 days of the date of this directive, for the 
        use of existing, and the creation of new, financial 
        risk management tools encouraging self-protection for 
        agriculture and food enterprises vulnerable to losses 
        due to terrorism.
            (18)  The Secretary of Agriculture, in coordination 
        with the Secretary of Homeland Security, and in 
        consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human 
        Services and the Administrator of the Environmental 
        Protection Agency, shall work with State and local 
        governments and the private sector to develop:
                    (a)  A National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) 
                containing sufficient amounts of animal 
                vaccine, antiviral, or therapeutic products to 
                appropriately respond to the most damaging 
                animal diseases affecting human health and the 
                economy and that will be capable of deployment 
                within 24 hours of an outbreak. The NVS shall 
                leverage where appropriate the mechanisms and 
                infrastructure that have been developed for the 
                management, storage, and distribution of the 
                Strategic National Stockpile.
                    (b)  A National Plant Disease Recovery 
                System (NPDRS) capable of responding to a high-
                consequence plant disease with pest control 
                measures and the use of resistant seed 
                varieties within a single growing season to 
                sustain a reasonable level of production for 
                economically important crops. The NPDRS will 
                utilize the genetic resources contained in the 
                U.S. National Plant Germplasm System, as well 
                as the scientific capabilities of the Federal-
                State-industry agricultural research and 
                extension system. The NPDRS shall include 
                emergency planning for the use of resistant 
                seed varieties and pesticide control measures 
                to prevent, slow, or stop the spread of a high-
                consequence plant disease, such as wheat smut 
                or soybean rust.

Outreach and Professional Development
            (19)  The Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
        coordination with the Secretaries of Agriculture, 
        Health and Human Services, and the heads of other 
        appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall 
        work with appropriate private sector entities to 
        establish an effective information sharing and analysis 
        mechanism for agriculture and food.
            (20)  The Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and 
        Human Services, in consultation with the Secretaries of 
        Homeland Security and Education, shall support the 
        development of and promote higher education programs 
        for the protection of animal, plant, and public health. 
        To the extent permitted by law and subject to 
        availability of funds, the program will provide 
        capacity building grants to colleges and schools of 
        veterinary medicine, public health, and agriculture 
        that design higher education training programs for 
        veterinarians in exotic animal diseases, epidemiology, 
        and public health as well as new programs in plant 
        diagnosis and treatment.
            (21)  The Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and 
        Human Services, in consultation with the Secretaries of 
        Homeland Security and Education, shall support the 
        development of and promote a higher education program 
        to address protection of the food supply. To the extent 
        permitted by law and subject to the availability of 
        funds, the program will provide capacity-building 
        grants to universities for interdisciplinary degree 
        programs that combine training in food sciences, 
        agriculture sciences, medicine, veterinary medicine, 
        epidemiology, microbiology, chemistry, engineering, and 
        mathematics (statistical modeling) to prepare food 
        defense professionals.
            (22)  The Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and 
        Human Services, and Homeland Security shall establish 
        opportunities for professional development and 
        specialized training in agriculture and food 
        protection, such as internships, fellowships, and other 
        post-graduate opportunities that provide for homeland 
        security professional workforce needs.

Research and Development
            (23)  The Secretaries of Homeland Security, 
        Agriculture, and Health and Human Services, the 
        Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, 
        and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments 
        and agencies, in consultation with the Director of the 
        Office of Science and Technology Policy, will 
        accelerate and expand development of current and new 
        countermeasures against the intentional introduction or 
        natural occurrence of catastrophic animal, plant, and 
        zoonotic diseases. The Secretary of Homeland Security 
        will coordinate these activities. This effort will 
        include countermeasure research and development of new 
        methods for detection, prevention technologies, agent 
        characterization, and dose response relationships for 
        high-consequence agents in the food and the water 
        supply.
            (24)  The Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland 
        Security will develop a plan to provide safe, secure, 
        and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment 
        laboratories that research and develop diagnostic 
        capabilities for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases.
            (25)  The Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
        consultation with the Secretaries of Agriculture and 
        Health and Human Services, shall establish university-
        based centers of excellence in agriculture and food 
        security.

Budget
            (26)  For all future budgets, the Secretaries of 
        Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Homeland 
        Security shall submit to the Director of the Office of 
        Management and Budget, concurrent with their budget 
        submissions, an integrated budget plan for defense of 
        the United States food system.

Implementation
            (27)  Nothing in this directive alters, or impedes 
        the ability to carry out, the authorities of the 
        Federal departments and agencies to perform their 
        responsibilities under law and consistent with 
        applicable legal authorities and Presidential guidance.
            (28)  This directive is intended only to improve 
        the internal management of the executive branch of the 
        Federal Government, and it is not intended to, and does 
        not, create any right or benefit, substantive or 
        procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against 
        the United States, its departments, agencies, or other 
        entities, its officers or employees, or any other 
        person.

            GEORGE W. BUSH
              Homeland Security Presidential Directive--10

                    Biodefense for the 21st Century

                              ----------                              


``Bioterrorism is a real threat to our country. It's a threat 
to every nation that loves freedom. Terrorist groups seek 
biological weapons; we know some rogue states already have 
them....It's important that we confront these real threats to 
our country and prepare for future emergencies.''

    President George W. Bush
    June 12, 2002

``Armed with a single vial of a biological agent small groups 
of fanatics, or failing states, could gain the power to 
threaten great nations, threaten the world peace. America, and 
the entire civilized world, will face this threat for decades 
to come. We must confront the danger with open eyes, and 
unbending purpose.''

    President Bush
    February 11, 2004


    Biological weapons in the possession of hostile states or 
terrorists pose unique and grave threats to the safety and 
security of the United States and our allies. Biological 
weapons attacks could cause catastrophic harm. They could 
inflict widespread injury and result in massive casualties and 
economic disruption. Bioterror attacks could mimic naturally-
occurring disease, potentially delaying recognition of an 
attack and creating uncertainty about whether one has even 
occurred. An attacker may thus believe that he could escape 
identification and capture or retaliation.
    Biological weapons attacks could be mounted either inside 
or outside the United States and, because some biological 
weapons agents are contagious, the effects of an initial attack 
could spread widely. Disease outbreaks, whether natural or 
deliberate, respect no geographic or political borders.
    Preventing and controlling future biological weapons 
threats will be even more challenging. Advances in 
biotechnology and life sciences - including the spread of 
expertise to create modified or novel organisms - present the 
prospect of new toxins, live agents, and bioregulators that 
would require new detection methods, preventive measures, and 
treatments. These trends increase the risk for surprise. 
Anticipating such threats through intelligence efforts is made 
more difficult by the dual-use nature of biological 
technologies and infrastructure, and the likelihood that 
adversaries will use denial and deception to conceal their 
illicit activities. The stakes could not be higher for our 
Nation. Attacks with biological weapons could:
            1A Cause catastrophic numbers of acute casualties, 
        long-term disease and disability, psychological trauma, 
        and mass panic;
            1A Disrupt critical sectors of our economy and the 
        day-to-day lives of Americans; and
            1A Create cascading international effects by 
        disrupting and damaging international trade 
        relationships, potentially globalizing the impacts of 
        an attack on United States soil.
    Fortunately, the United States possesses formidable 
capabilities to mount credible biodefenses. We have mobilized 
our unrivaled biomedical research infrastructure and expanded 
our international research relationships. In addition, we have 
an established medical and public health infrastructure that is 
being revitalized and expanded. These capabilities provide a 
critical foundation on which to build improved and 
comprehensive biodefenses.
    The United States has pursued aggressively a broad range of 
programs and capabilities to confront the biological weapons 
threat. These actions, taken together, represent an 
extraordinary level of effort by any measure. Among our 
significant accomplishments, we have:
                 1A Expanded international efforts to keep 
                dangerous biological materials out of the hands 
                of terrorists;
         1A Launched the Proliferation Security Initiative to 
        stem the trafficking in weapons of mass destruction 
        (WMD), including biological weapons;
         1A Established the BioWatch program, a network of 
        environmental sensors to detect biological weapons 
        attacks against major cities in the United States;
         1A Initiated new programs to secure and defend our 
        agriculture and food systems against biological 
        contamination;
         1A Increased funding for bioterrorism research within 
        the Department of Health and Human Services by thirty-
        fold;
         1A Expanded the Strategic National Stockpile of 
        medicines for treating victims of bioterror attacks, 
        ensuring that the stockpile's ``push packages'' can be 
        anywhere in the United States within 12 hours;
         1A Stockpiled enough smallpox vaccine for every 
        American, and vaccinated over 450,000 members of the 
        armed services;
         1A Launched and funded Project BioShield to speed the 
        development and acquisition of new medical 
        countermeasures against biological weapons;
         1A Provided Federal funds to improve the capacities 
        of state and local health systems to detect, diagnose, 
        prevent, and respond to biological weapons attacks; and
         1A Worked with the international community to 
        strengthen global, regional and national programs to 
        prevent, detect, and respond to biological weapons 
        attacks.
    Building on these accomplishments, we conducted a 
comprehensive evaluation of our biological defense capabilities 
to identify future priorities and actions to support them. The 
results of that study provide a blueprint for our future 
biodefense program, Biodefense for the 21st Century, that fully 
integrates the sustained efforts of the national and homeland 
security, medical, public health, intelligence, diplomatic, and 
law enforcement communities.
    Specific direction to departments and agencies to carry out 
this biodefense program is contained in a classified version of 
this directive.

Biodefense for the 21st Century
    The United States will continue to use all means necessary 
to prevent, protect against, and mitigate biological weapons 
attacks perpetrated against our homeland and our global 
interests. Defending against biological weapons attacks 
requires us to further sharpen our policy, coordination, and 
planning to integrate the biodefense capabilities that reside 
at the Federal, state, local, and private sector levels. We 
must further strengthen the strong international dimension to 
our efforts, which seeks close international cooperation and 
coordination with friends and allies to maximize our 
capabilities for mutual defense against biological weapons 
threats.
    While the public health philosophy of the 20th Century 
emphasizing prevention is ideal for addressing natural disease 
outbreaks, it is not sufficient to confront 21st Century 
threats where adversaries may use biological weapons agents as 
part of a long-term campaign of aggression and terror. Health 
care providers and public health officers are among our first 
lines of defense. Therefore, we are building on the progress of 
the past three years to further improve the preparedness of our 
public health and medical systems to address current and future 
BW threats and to respond with greater speed and flexibility to 
multiple or repetitive attacks.
    Private, local, and state capabilities are being augmented 
by and coordinated with Federal assets, to provide layered 
defenses against biological weapons attacks. These improvements 
will complement and enhance our defense against emerging or 
reemerging natural infectious diseases.
    The traditional approach toward protecting agriculture, 
food, and water - focusing on the natural or unintentional 
introduction of a disease - also is being greatly strengthened 
by focused efforts to address current and anticipated future 
biological weapons threats that may be deliberate, multiple, 
and repetitive.
    Finally, we are continuing to adapt United States military 
forces to meet the biological weapons challenge. We have long 
recognized that adversaries may seek biological weapons to 
overcome our conventional strength and to deter us from 
responding to aggression. A demonstrated military capability to 
defend against biological weapons and other WMD strengthens our 
forward military presence in regions vital to United States 
security, promotes deterrence, and provides reassurance to 
critical friends and allies. The Department of Defense will 
continue to ensure that United States military forces can 
operate effectively in the face of biological weapons attacks, 
and that our troops and our critical domestic and overseas 
installations are effectively protected against such threats.

Pillars of Our Biodefense Program
    The essential pillars of our national biodefense program 
are: Threat Awareness, Prevention and Protection, Surveillance 
and Detection, and Response and Recovery.
    Successful implementation of our program requires 
optimizing critical cross-cutting functions such as: 
information management and communications; research development 
and acquisition; creation and maintenance of needed biodefense 
infrastructure, including the human capital to support it; 
public preparedness; and strengthened bilateral, multilateral, 
and international cooperation.
    National biodefense preparedness and response requires the 
involvement of a wide range of Federal departments and 
agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal 
Federal official for domestic incident management and is 
responsible for coordinating domestic Federal operations to 
prepare for, respond to, and recover from biological weapons 
attacks. The Secretary of Homeland Security coordinates, as 
appropriate, with the heads of other Federal departments and 
agencies, to effectively accomplish this mission.
    The Secretary of State is the principal Federal officer 
responsible for international terrorist incidents that take 
place outside the U.S. territory, including United States 
support for foreign consequence management and coordinates, as 
appropriate, with heads of other Federal departments and 
agencies, to effectively accomplish this mission. When 
requested by the Secretary of State, and approved by the 
Secretary of Defense, the Department of Defense will support 
United States foreign consequence management operations, as 
appropriate.
    The following sections describe our aims and objectives for 
further progress under each of the pillars of our national 
biodefense program, as well as highlight key roles played by 
Federal departments and agencies.

Threat Awareness Biological Warfare Related Intelligence
    Timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence enables all 
aspects of our national biodefense program. Despite the 
inherent challenges of identifying and characterizing 
biological weapons programs and anticipating biological 
attacks, we are improving the Intelligence Community's ability 
to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence. We are 
increasing the resources dedicated to these missions and 
adopting more aggressive approaches for accomplishing them. 
Among our many initiatives, we are continuing to develop more 
forward-looking analyses, to include Red Teaming efforts, to 
understand new scientific trends that may be exploited by our 
adversaries to develop biological weapons and to help position 
intelligence collectors ahead of the problem.

Assessments
    Another critical element of our biodefense policy is the 
development of periodic assessments of the evolving biological 
weapons threat. First, the United States requires a continuous, 
formal process for conducting routine capabilities assessments 
to guide prioritization of our on-going investments in 
biodefense-related research, development, planning, and 
preparedness. These assessments will be tailored to meet the 
requirements in each of these areas. Second, the United States 
requires a periodic senior-level policy net assessment that 
evaluates progress in implementing this policy, identifies 
continuing gaps or vulnerabilities in our biodefense posture, 
and makes recommendations for re-balancing and refining 
investments among the pillars of our overall biodefense policy. 
The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with other 
appropriate Federal departments and agencies, will be 
responsible for conducting these assessments.

Anticipation of Future Threats
    The proliferation of biological materials, technologies, 
and expertise increases the potential for adversaries to design 
a pathogen to evade our existing medical and non-medical 
countermeasures. To address this challenge, we are taking 
advantage of these same technologies to ensure that we can 
anticipate and prepare for the emergence of this threat. We are 
building the flexibility and speed to characterize such agents, 
assess existing defenses, and rapidly develop safe and 
effective countermeasures. In addition, we must guard against 
the spread of potentially infectious agents from beyond our 
borders. We are strengthening the ability of our medical, 
public health, agricultural, defense, law enforcement, 
diplomatic, environmental, and transportation infrastructures 
to recognize and confront such threats and to contain their 
impact. The Department of Health and Human Services, in 
coordination with other appropriate Federal departments and 
agencies, is working to ensure an integrated and focused 
national effort to anticipate and respond to emerging 
biological weapons threats.

Prevention and Protection

Proactive Prevention
    Preventing biological weapons attacks is by far the most 
cost-effective approach to biodefense. Prevention requires the 
continuation and expansion of current multilateral initiatives 
to limit the access of agents, technology, and know-how to 
countries, groups, or individuals seeking to develop, produce, 
and use these agents.
    To address this challenge, we are further enhancing 
diplomacy, arms control, law enforcement, multilateral export 
controls, and threat reduction assistance that impede 
adversaries seeking biological weapons capabilities. Federal 
departments and agencies with existing authorities will 
continue to expand threat reduction assistance programs aimed 
at preventing the proliferation of biological weapons 
expertise. We will continue to build international coalitions 
to support these efforts, encouraging increased political and 
financial support for nonproliferation and threat reduction 
programs. We will also continue to expand efforts to control 
access and use of pathogens to strengthen security and 
prevention.
    The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, released in December 2002, places special emphasis 
on the need for proactive steps to confront WMD threats. 
Consistent with this approach, we have improved and will 
further improve our ability to detect and destroy an 
adversary's biological weapons assets before they can be used. 
We are also further expanding existing capabilities to 
interdict enabling technologies and materials, including 
through the Proliferation Security Initiative. Additionally, we 
are working to improve supporting intelligence capabilities to 
provide timely and accurate information to support proactive 
prevention.
    Responsibilities for proactive prevention are wide-ranging, 
with the Department of State, Department of Defense, Department 
of Justice, and the Intelligence Community playing critical 
roles in our overall government-wide effort.

Critical Infrastructure Protection
    Protecting our critical infrastructure from the effects of 
biological weapons attacks is a priority. A biological weapons 
attack might deny us access to essential facilities and 
response capabilities. Therefore, we are working to improve the 
survivability and ensure the continuity and restoration of 
operations of critical infrastructure sectors following 
biological weapons attacks. Assessing the vulnerability of this 
infrastructure, particularly the medical, public health, food, 
water, energy, agricultural, and transportation sectors, is the 
focus of current efforts. The Department of Homeland Security, 
in coordination with other appropriate Federal departments and 
agencies, leads these efforts, which include developing and 
deploying biodetection technologies and decontamination 
methodologies.

Surveillance and Detection

Attack Warning
    Early warning, detection, or recognition of biological 
weapons attacks to permit a timely response to mitigate their 
consequences is an essential component of biodefense. Through 
the President's recently proposed biosurveillance initiative, 
the United States is working to develop an integrated and 
comprehensive attack warning system to rapidly recognize and 
characterize the dispersal of biological agents in human and 
animal populations, food, water, agriculture, and the 
environment. Creating a national bioawareness system will 
permit the recognition of a biological attack at the earliest 
possible moment and permit initiation of a robust response to 
prevent unnecessary loss of life, economic losses, and social 
disruption. Such a system will be built upon and reinforce 
existing Federal, state, local, and international surveillance 
systems. The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination 
with other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, 
integrates these efforts.

Attribution
    Deterrence is the historical cornerstone of our defense, 
and attribution - the identification of the perpetrator as well 
as method of attack .- forms the foundation upon which 
deterrence rests. Biological weapons, however, lend themselves 
to covert or clandestine attacks that could permit the 
perpetrator to remain anonymous. We are enhancing our 
deterrence posture by improving attribution capabilities. We 
are improving our capability to perform technical forensic 
analysis and to assimilate all-source information to enable 
attribution assessments. We have created and designated the 
National Bioforensic Analysis Center of the National Biodefense 
Analysis and Countermeasure Center, under the Department of 
Homeland Security, as the lead Federal facility to conduct and 
facilitate the technical forensic analysis and interpretation 
of materials recovered following a biological attack in support 
of the appropriate lead Federal agency.

Response and Recovery
    Once a biological weapons attack is detected, the speed and 
coordination of the Federal, state, local, private sector, and 
international response will be critical in mitigating the 
lethal, medical, psychological, and economic consequences of 
such attacks. Responses to biological weapons attacks depend on 
pre-attack planning and preparedness, capabilities to treat 
casualties, risk communications, physical control measures, 
medical countermeasures, and decontamination capabilities.

Response Planning
    A biological response annex is being drafted as part of our 
National Response Plan (NRP). We are catalyzing the development 
of state and local plans that are consistent with the NRP and 
ensure a seamless coordinated effort. Capabilities required for 
response and mitigation against biological attacks will be 
based on interagency-agreed scenarios that are derived from 
plausible threat assessments. These plans will be regularly 
tested as part of Federal, state, local, and international 
exercises. The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination 
with other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, is 
developing comprehensive plans that provide for seamless, 
coordinated Federal, state, local, and international responses 
to a biological attack.

Mass Casualty Care
    Following a biological weapons attack, all necessary means 
must be rapidly brought to bear to prevent loss of life, 
illness, psychological trauma, and to contain the spread of 
potentially contagious diseases. Provision of timely preventive 
treatments such as antibiotics or vaccines saves lives, 
protects scarce medical capabilities, preserves social order, 
and is cost effective.
    The Administration is working closely with state and local 
public health officials to strengthen plans to swiftly 
distribute needed medical countermeasures. Moreover, we are 
working to expand and, where needed, create new Federal, state, 
and local medical and public health capabilities for all-hazard 
mass casualty care.
    The Department of Health and Human Services, in 
coordination with other appropriate Federal departments and 
agencies, is the principal Federal agency responsible for 
coordinating all Federal-level assets activated to support and 
augment the state and local medical and public health response 
to mass casualty events. For those mass casualty incidents that 
require parallel deployment of Federal assets in other 
functional areas such as transportation or law enforcement, the 
Department of Homeland Security will coordinate the overall 
Federal response in accordance with its statutory authorities 
for domestic incident management. Under certain circumstances, 
the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of 
Defense, given their specialized expertise and experience, may 
be called upon to play important supporting roles in mass 
casualty care.

Risk Communication
    A critical adjunct capability to mass casualty care is 
effective risk communication. Timely communications with the 
general public and the medical and public health communities 
can significantly influence the success of response efforts, 
including health- and life-sustaining interventions. Efforts 
will be made to develop communication strategies, plans, 
products, and channels to reach all segments of our society, 
including those with physical or language limitations. These 
efforts will ensure timely domestic and international 
dissemination of information that educates and reassures the 
general public and relevant professional sectors before, 
during, and after an attack or other public health emergency.
    The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with 
other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, is 
developing comprehensive coordinated risk communication 
strategies to facilitate emergency preparedness for biological 
weapons attacks. This includes travel and citizen advisories, 
international coordination and communication, and response and 
recovery communications in the event of a large-scale 
biological attack.

Medical Countermeasure Development
    Development and deployment of safe, effective medical 
countermeasures against biological weapons agents of concern 
remains an urgent priority. The National Institutes of Health 
(NIH), under the direction of the Department of Health and 
Human Services, is working with the Department of Homeland 
Security, the Department of Defense, and other agencies to 
shape and execute an aggressive research program to develop 
better medical countermeasures. NIH.s work increasingly will 
reflect the potential for novel or genetically engineered 
biological weapons agents and possible scenarios that require 
providing broad-spectrum coverage against a range of possible 
biological threats to prevent illness even after exposure. 
Additionally, we have begun construction of new labs. We are 
striving to assure the nation has the infrastructure required 
to test and evaluate existing, proposed, or promising 
countermeasures, assess their safety and effectiveness, 
expedite their development, and ensure rapid licensure.
    The Department of Health and Human Services, in 
coordination with other appropriate Federal departments and 
agencies, will continue to ensure the development and 
availability of sufficient quantities of safe and efficacious 
medical countermeasures to mitigate illness and death in the 
event of a biological weapons attack.

Decontamination
    Recovering from a biological weapons attack may require 
significant decontamination and remediation activities. We are 
working to improve Federal capabilities to support states and 
localities in their efforts to rapidly assess, decontaminate, 
and return to pre-attack activities, and are developing 
standards and protocols for the most effective approaches for 
these activities.
    The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, 
in coordination with the Attorney General and the Secretaries 
of Defense, Agriculture, Labor, Health and Human Services, and 
Homeland Security, is developing specific standards, protocols, 
and capabilities to address the risks of contamination 
following a biological weapons attack and developing 
strategies, guidelines, and plans for decontamination of 
persons, equipment, and facilities.
              Homeland Security Presidential Directive--11

          Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures

                              ----------                              


            (1)  In order more effectively to detect and 
        interdict individuals known or reasonably suspected to 
        be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in 
        preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism 
        (``suspected terrorists'') and terrorist activities, it 
        is the policy of the United States to:
                    (a)  enhance terrorist-related screening 
                (as defined below) through comprehensive, 
                coordinated procedures that detect, identify, 
                track, and interdict people, cargo, 
                conveyances, and other entities and objects 
                that pose a threat to homeland security, and to 
                do so in a manner that safeguards legal rights, 
                including freedoms, civil liberties, and 
                information privacy guaranteed by Federal law, 
                and builds upon existing risk assessment 
                capabilities while facilitating the efficient 
                movement of people, cargo, conveyances, and 
                other potentially affected activities in 
                commerce; and
                    (b)  implement a coordinated and 
                comprehensive approach to terrorist-related 
                screening - in immigration, law enforcement, 
                intelligence, counterintelligence, and 
                protection of the border, transportation 
                systems, and critical infrastructure - that 
                supports homeland security, at home and abroad.
            (2)  This directive builds upon HSPD-6, 
        ``Integration and Use of Screening Information to 
        Protect Against Terrorism.'' The Terrorist Screening 
        Center (TSC), which was established and is administered 
        by the Attorney General pursuant to HSPD-6, enables 
        Government officials to check individuals against a 
        consolidated Terrorist Screening Center Database. Other 
        screening activities underway within the Terrorist 
        Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and the Department of 
        Homeland Security further strengthen the ability of the 
        United States Government to protect the people, 
        property, and territory of the United States against 
        acts of terrorism.
            (3)  In this directive, the term ``terrorist-
        related screening'' means the collection, analysis, 
        dissemination, and use of information related to 
        people, cargo, conveyances, and other entities and 
        objects that pose a threat to homeland security. 
        Terrorist-related screening also includes risk 
        assessment, inspection, and credentialing.
            (4)  Not later than 75 days after the date of this 
        directive, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
        coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretaries 
        of State, Defense, Transportation, Energy, Health and 
        Human Services, Commerce, and Agriculture, the 
        Directors of Central Intelligence and the Office of 
        Management and Budget, and the heads of other 
        appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall 
        submit to me, through the Assistant to the President 
        for Homeland Security, a report setting forth plans and 
        progress in the implementation of this directive, 
        including as further described in sections 5 and 6 of 
        this directive.
            (5)  The report shall outline a strategy to enhance 
        the effectiveness of terrorist-related screening 
        activities, in accordance with the policy set forth in 
        section 1 of this directive, by developing 
        comprehensive, coordinated, systematic terrorist-
        related screening procedures and capabilities that also 
        take into account the need to:
                    (a)  maintain no less than current levels 
                of security created by existing screening and 
                protective measures;
                    (b)  encourage innovations that exceed 
                established standards;
                    (c)  ensure sufficient flexibility to 
                respond rapidly to changing threats and 
                priorities;
                    (d)  permit flexibility to incorporate 
                advancements into screening applications and 
                technology rapidly;
                    (e)  incorporate security features, 
                including unpredictability, that resist 
                circumvention to the greatest extent possible;
                    (f)  build upon existing systems and best 
                practices and, where appropriate, integrate, 
                consolidate, or eliminate duplicative systems 
                used for terrorist-related screening;
                    (g)  facilitate legitimate trade and 
                travel, both domestically and internationally;
                    (h)  limit delays caused by screening 
                procedures that adversely impact foreign 
                relations, or economic, commercial, or 
                scientific interests of the United States; and
                    (i)  enhance information flow between 
                various screening programs.
            (6)  The report shall also include the following:
                    (a)  the purposes for which individuals 
                will undergo terrorist-related screening;
                    (b)  a description of the screening 
                opportunities to which terrorist-related 
                screening will be applied;
                    (c)  the information individuals must 
                present, including, as appropriate, the type of 
                biometric identifier or other form of 
                identification or identifying information to be 
                presented, at particular screening 
                opportunities;
                    (d)  mechanisms to protect data, including 
                during transfer of information;
                    (e)  mechanisms to address data 
                inaccuracies, including names inaccurately 
                contained in the terrorist screening data 
                consolidated pursuant to HSPD-6;
                    (f)  the procedures and frequency for 
                screening people, cargo, and conveyances;
                    (g)  protocols to support consistent risk 
                assessment and inspection procedures;
                    (h)  the skills and training required for 
                the screeners at screening opportunities;
                    (i)  the hierarchy of consequences that 
                should occur if a risk indicator is generated 
                as a result of a screening opportunity;
                    (j)  mechanisms for sharing information 
                among screeners and all relevant Government 
                agencies, including results of screening and 
                new information acquired regarding suspected 
                terrorists between screening opportunities;
                    (k)  recommended research and development 
                on technologies designed to enhance screening 
                effectiveness and further protect privacy 
                interests; and
                    (l)  a plan for incorporating known 
                traveler programs into the screening 
                procedures, where appropriate.
            (7)  Not later than 90 days after the date of this 
        directive, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
        coordination with the heads of the Federal departments 
        and agencies listed in section 4 of this directive, 
        shall also provide to me, through the Assistant to the 
        President for Homeland Security and the Director of the 
        Office of Management and Budget, a prioritized 
        investment and implementation plan for a systematic 
        approach to terrorist-related screening that optimizes 
        detection and interdiction of suspected terrorists and 
        terrorist activities. The plan shall describe the 
        scope, governance, principles, outcomes, milestones, 
        training objectives, metrics, costs, and schedule of 
        activities to implement the policy set forth in section 
        1 of this directive. The Secretary of Homeland Security 
        shall further provide a report on the status of the 
        implementation of the plan to me through the Assistant 
        to the President for Homeland Security 6 months after 
        the date of this directive and shall thereafter report 
        to me on such progress or any recommended changes from 
        time to time as appropriate.
            (8)  In order to ensure comprehensive and 
        coordinated terrorist-related screening procedures, the 
        implementation of this directive shall be consistent 
        with Government-wide efforts to improve information 
        sharing. Additionally, the reports and plan required 
        under sections 4 and 7 of this directive shall inform 
        development of Government-wide information sharing 
        improvements.
            (9)  This directive does not alter existing 
        authorities or responsibilities of department and 
        agency heads including to carry out operational 
        activities or provide or receive information. This 
        directive is intended only to improve the internal 
        management of the executive branch of the Federal 
        Government, and it is not intended to, and does not, 
        create any right or benefit enforceable at law or in 
        equity by any party against the United States, its 
        departments, agencies, entities, officers, employees, 
        or agents, or any other person.

            GEORGE W. BUSH
              Homeland Security Presidential Directive--12

        Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal 
                       Employees and Contractors

                              ----------                              


            (1)  Wide variations in the quality and security of 
        forms of identification used to gain access to secure 
        Federal and other facilities where there is potential 
        for terrorist attacks need to be eliminated. Therefore, 
        it is the policy of the United States to enhance 
        security, increase Government efficiency, reduce 
        identity fraud, and protect personal privacy by 
        establishing a mandatory, Government-wide standard for 
        secure and reliable forms of identification issued by 
        the Federal Government to its employees and contractors 
        (including contractor employees).
            (2)  To implement the policy set forth in paragraph 
        (1), the Secretary of Commerce shall promulgate in 
        accordance with applicable law a Federal standard for 
        secure and reliable forms of identification (the 
        ``Standard'') not later than 6 months after the date of 
        this directive in consultation with the Secretary of 
        State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, 
        the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the 
        Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Director 
        of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. The 
        Secretary of Commerce shall periodically review the 
        Standard and update the Standard as appropriate in 
        consultation with the affected agencies.
            (3)  ``Secure and reliable forms of 
        identification'' for purposes of this directive means 
        identification that
                    (a)  is issued based on sound criteria for 
                verifying an individual employee's identity;
                    (b)  is strongly resistant to identity 
                fraud, tampering, counterfeiting, and terrorist 
                exploitation;
                    (c)  can be rapidly authenticated 
                electronically; and
                    (d)  is issued only by providers whose 
                reliability has been established by an official 
                accreditation process. The Standard will 
                include graduated criteria, from least secure 
                to most secure, to ensure flexibility in 
                selecting the appropriate level of security for 
                each application. The Standard shall not apply 
                to identification associated with national 
                security systems as defined by 44 U.S.C. 
                3542(b)(2).
            (4)  Not later than 4 months following promulgation 
        of the Standard, the heads of executive departments and 
        agencies shall have a program in place to ensure that 
        identification issued by their departments and agencies 
        to Federal employees and contractors meets the 
        Standard. As promptly as possible, but in no case later 
        than 8 months after the date of promulgation of the 
        Standard, the heads of executive departments and 
        agencies shall, to the maximum extent practicable, 
        require the use of identification by Federal employees 
        and contractors that meets the Standard in gaining 
        physical access to Federally controlled facilities and 
        logical access to Federally controlled information 
        systems. Departments and agencies shall implement this 
        directive in a manner consistent with ongoing 
        Government-wide activities, policies and guidance 
        issued by OMB, which shall ensure compliance.
            (5)  Not later than 6 months following promulgation 
        of the Standard, the heads of executive departments and 
        agencies shall identify to the Assistant to the 
        President for Homeland Security and the Director of OMB 
        those Federally controlled facilities, Federally 
        controlled information systems, and other Federal 
        applications that are important for security and for 
        which use of the Standard in circumstances not covered 
        by this directive should be considered. Not later than 
        7 months following the promulgation of the Standard, 
        the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security 
        and the Director of OMB shall make recommendations to 
        the President concerning possible use of the Standard 
        for such additional Federal applications.
            (6)  This directive shall be implemented in a 
        manner consistent with the Constitution and applicable 
        laws, including the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) and 
        other statutes protecting the rights of Americans.
            (7)  Nothing in this directive alters, or impedes 
        the ability to carry out, the authorities of the 
        Federal departments and agencies to perform their 
        responsibilities under law and consistent with 
        applicable legal authorities and presidential guidance. 
        This directive is intended only to improve the internal 
        management of the executive branch of the Federal 
        Government, and it is not intended to, and does not, 
        create any right or benefit enforceable at law or in 
        equity by any party against the United States, its 
        departments, agencies, entities, officers, employees or 
        agents, or any other person.
            (8)  The Assistant to the President for Homeland 
        Security shall report to me not later than 7 months 
        after the promulgation of the Standard on progress made 
        to implement this directive, and shall thereafter 
        report to me on such progress or any recommended 
        changes from time to time as appropriate.

            GEORGE W. BUSH
              Homeland Security Presidential Directive--13

             (National Security Presidential Directive--41)

                        Maritime Security Policy

                              ----------                              


    Memorandum for
            The Vice President
            The Secretary of State
            The Secretary of the Treasury
            The Secretary of Defense
            The Attorney General
            The Secretary of the Interior
            The Secretary of Commerce
            The Secretary of Transportation
            The Secretary of Energy
            The Secretary of Homeland Security
            Chief of Staff to the President
            Director, Office of Management and Budget
            The United States Trade Representative
            Assistant to the President for National Security 
        Affairs
            Counsel to the President
            Assistant to the President for Homeland Security
            Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality
            Director of Central Intelligence
            Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
            Commandant of the Coast Guard
            Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
            Director, National Counterterrorism Center

    This directive establishes U.S. policy, guidelines, and 
implementation actions to enhance U.S. national security and 
homeland security by protecting U.S. maritime interests. It 
directs the coordination of United States Government maritime 
security programs and initiatives to achieve a comprehensive 
and cohesive national effort involving appropriate Federal, 
State, local, and private sector entities. This directive also 
establishes a Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee 
to coordinate interagency maritime security policy efforts. As 
specified herein, the Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security, in cooperation with appropriate Federal 
departments and agencies, will jointly coordinate the 
implementation of the policy set forth in Section II of this 
directive.

I. BACKGROUND
            For the purposes of this directive, ``Maritime 
        Domain'' means all areas and things of, on, under, 
        relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, 
        or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-
        related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and 
        vessels and other conveyances. Due to its complex 
        nature and immense size, the Maritime Domain is 
        particularly susceptible to exploitation and disruption 
        by individuals, organizations, and States. The Maritime 
        Domain facilitates a unique freedom of movement and 
        flow of goods while allowing people, cargo, and 
        conveyances to transit with anonymity not generally 
        available by movement over land or by air. Individuals 
        and organizations hostile to the United States have 
        demonstrated a continuing desire to exploit such 
        vulnerabilities. The United States must deploy the full 
        range of its operational assets and capabilities to 
        prevent the Maritime Domain from being used by 
        terrorists, criminals, and hostile States to commit 
        acts of terrorism and criminal or other unlawful or 
        hostile acts against the United States, its people, 
        economy, property, territory, allies, and friends, 
        while recognizing that maritime security policies are 
        most effective when the strategic importance of 
        international trade, economic cooperation, and the free 
        flow of commerce are considered appropriately.

II. POLICY
            The security of the Maritime Domain is a global 
        issue. The United States, in cooperation with our 
        allies and friends around the world and our State, 
        local, and private sector partners, will work to ensure 
        that lawful private and public activities in the 
        Maritime Domain are protected against attack and 
        criminal and otherwise unlawful or hostile 
        exploitation. These efforts are critical to global 
        economic stability and growth and are vital to the 
        interests of the United States.
            It is the policy of the United States to take all 
        necessary and appropriate actions, consistent with U.S. 
        law, treaties and other international agreements to 
        which the United States is a party, and customary 
        international law as determined for the United States 
        by the President, to enhance the security of and 
        protect U.S. interests in the Maritime Domain, 
        including the following:
                 1A Preventing terrorist attacks or criminal 
                acts or hostile acts in, or the unlawful 
                exploitation of, the Maritime Domain, and 
                reducing the vulnerability of the Maritime 
                Domain to such acts and exploitation;
                 1A Enhancing U.S. national security and 
                homeland security by protecting U.S. population 
                centers, critical infrastructure, borders, 
                harbors, ports, and coastal approaches in the 
                Maritime Domain;
                 1A Expediting recovery and response from 
                attacks within the Maritime Domain;
                 1A Maximizing awareness of security issues in 
                the Maritime Domain in order to support U.S. 
                forces and improve United States Government 
                actions in response to identified threats;
                 1A Enhancing international relationships and 
                promoting the integration of U.S. allies and 
                international and private sector partners into 
                an improved global maritime security framework 
                to advance common security interests in the 
                Maritime Domain; and
                 1A Ensuring seamless, coordinated 
                implementation of authorities and 
                responsibilities relating to the security of 
                the Maritime Domain by and among Federal 
                departments and agencies. These actions must be 
                undertaken in a manner that facilitates global 
                commerce and preserves the freedom of the seas 
                for legitimate military and commercial 
                navigation and other legitimate activities as 
                well as civil liberties and the rights 
                guaranteed under the Constitution.

III. POLICY COORDINATION
            The Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee 
        (MSPCC) is hereby established, consistent with NSPD-1 
        and HSPD-1. The MSPCC, in consultation with the 
        relevant regional and functional policy coordinating 
        committees of the Federal Government, and without 
        exercising operational oversight, shall act as the 
        primary forum for interagency coordination of the 
        implementation of this directive. As part of that 
        effort, the MSPCC shall review existing interagency 
        practices, coordination, and execution of U.S. policies 
        and strategies relating to maritime security, and shall 
        recommend specific improvements to all of them as 
        warranted. The MSPCC shall provide analysis of new U.S. 
        policies, strategies, and initiatives relating to 
        maritime security for consideration by the Deputies and 
        Principals Committees of the NSC and the HSC, and 
        subsequently by the NSC and the HSC, and shall ensure 
        ongoing coordination and implementation of such 
        policies, strategies, and initiatives.
            The reviews, plans, and recommendations required by 
        this directive (as set forth in Sections IV and V 
        below) shall be completed by the departments and 
        agencies designated herein in coordination with the 
        MSPCC, and shall then be prepared for consideration by 
        and submitted to the Deputies and Principals Committees 
        of the NSC and the HSC, and subsequently to the NSC and 
        the HSC.
            The MSPCC shall be co-chaired by an NSC staff 
        representative selected by the Assistant to the 
        President for National Security Affairs and an HSC 
        representative selected by the Assistant to the 
        President for Homeland Security, and shall include the 
        following officers or their designated representatives:
                 1A The Vice President
                 1A The Secretary of State
                 1A The Secretary of the Treasury
                 1A The Secretary of Defense
                 1A The Attorney General
                 1A The Secretary of the Interior
                 1A The Secretary of Commerce
                 1A The Secretary of Transportation
                 1A The Secretary of Energy
                 1A The Secretary of Homeland Security
                 1A Director, Office of Management and Budget
                 1A The United States Trade Representative
                 1A Chairman of the Council on Environmental 
                Quality
                 1A Director of Central Intelligence
                 1A Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
                 1A Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
                 1A Director, National Counterterrorism Center
            The co-chairs of the MSPCC may invite 
        representatives of other departments and agencies to 
        attend MSPCC meetings as they deem appropriate.

IV. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
        National Strategy for Maritime Security.
            A coordinated and integrated government-wide effort 
        to enhance the security of the Maritime Domain requires 
        an over-arching strategy. The Secretaries of Defense 
        and Homeland Security shall jointly lead a 
        collaborative interagency effort to draft a recommended 
        National Strategy for Maritime Security, which shall be 
        submitted for my consideration within 180 days after 
        the effective date of this directive. Such a strategy 
        must present an over-arching plan to implement this 
        directive and address all of the components of the 
        Maritime Domain, including domestic, international, 
        public, and private components. It shall further 
        incorporate a global, cross-discipline approach to the 
        Maritime Domain centered on a layered, defense-in-depth 
        framework that may be adjusted based on the threat 
        level. The strategy shall build on current efforts and 
        those initiated by this directive, as well as 
        complement existing strategies, tools, and resources. 
        All relevant Federal departments and agencies shall 
        cooperate with the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland 
        Security in this effort and provide all appropriate 
        assistance.

V. POLICY ACTIONS
            In concert with the development of a National 
        Strategy for Maritime Security, the following actions 
        shall be taken: Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). 
        Maritime Domain Awareness is the effective 
        understanding of anything associated with the global 
        Maritime Domain that could impact the security, safety, 
        economy, or environment of the United States. It is 
        critical that the United States develop an enhanced 
        capability to identify threats to the Maritime Domain 
        as early and as distant from our shores as possible by 
        integrating intelligence, surveillance, observation, 
        and navigation systems into a common operating picture 
        accessible throughout the United States Government.
            The Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security 
        have established a Maritime Domain Awareness Senior 
        Steering Group (MDASSG). The MDASSG is co-chaired by 
        representatives of the Secretaries of Defense and 
        Homeland Security and includes representatives from 
        departments and agencies that will participate in the 
        MSPCC.
            The MDASSG shall coordinate national efforts to 
        achieve maximum Maritime Domain Awareness. No later 
        than 180 days after the effective date of this 
        directive, the MDASSG will develop and submit to me, 
        through the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland 
        Security, a national plan to improve Maritime Domain 
        Awareness, which shall include near-term and long-term 
        objectives, required program and resource implications, 
        and any recommendations for organizational or policy 
        changes.

        Global Maritime Intelligence Integration.
            A robust and coordinated intelligence effort serves 
        as the foundation for effective security efforts in the 
        Maritime Domain. In support of this effort, I direct 
        the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, with 
        the support of the Director of Central Intelligence, 
        and in coordination with the Director of the National 
        Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the Director of the 
        Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to use existing 
        intelligence capabilities to integrate all available 
        intelligence on a global basis regarding the location, 
        identity, and operational capabilities and intentions 
        of potential threats to U.S. interests in the Maritime 
        Domain. The Secretaries of Defense and Homeland 
        Security, with the support of the Director of Central 
        Intelligence, and in coordination with the Director of 
        the NCTC, the Director of the FBI, and other 
        appropriate departments and agencies, shall submit to 
        me for approval, through the Assistants to the 
        President for National Security Affairs and Homeland 
        Security, a plan for global maritime intelligence 
        integration within 180 days after the effective date of 
        this directive. The plan shall include appropriate 
        interagency participation to ensure effective 
        government-wide sharing of information and data 
        critical to intelligence production.

        Domestic Outreach.
            A successful strategy to implement this directive 
        must include coordination with State and local 
        authorities and consultation with appropriate private 
        sector persons and entities. The Secretary of Homeland 
        Security, in coordination with the Attorney General and 
        the Secretaries of the Treasury, Interior, Commerce, 
        and Transportation, shall lead the development of a 
        comprehensive engagement plan that ensures that the 
        interests of State and local governments and the 
        private sector are considered in the Federal 
        Government's implementation of this directive. The plan 
        shall be completed within 180 days after the effective 
        date of this directive and shall take effect upon 
        approval by the Secretary of Homeland Security.

        Coordination of International Efforts and International 
        Outreach.
            Ensuring the security of the Maritime Domain must 
        be a global effort, in which United States Government 
        efforts are developed and furthered with the support of 
        other governments and international organizations 
        resulting in lasting international cooperation. The 
        Secretary of State shall lead the coordination of 
        United States Government initiatives in the 
        implementation of this directive with regard to 
        activities with foreign governments and international 
        organizations. All Federal departments and agencies 
        shall coordinate with the Department of State on 
        policies, programs, and initiatives relating to the 
        implementation of this directive that could affect the 
        conduct of foreign policy. In addition, the Secretary 
        of State, in coordination with the Secretaries of 
        Defense, Commerce, Transportation, and Homeland 
        Security, and the U.S. Trade Representative, and in 
        consultation with appropriate private sector persons 
        and entities, shall develop, within 180 days after the 
        effective date of this directive, a comprehensive plan 
        to solicit international support for an improved global 
        maritime security framework. Such plan shall take 
        effect upon approval by the Secretary of State.

        Maritime Threat Response.
            The Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, 
        in consultation with the Attorney General and the 
        Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Commerce, and 
        Transportation, shall develop a comprehensive National 
        Maritime Security Response Plan to ensure seamless 
        United States Government response to maritime threats 
        against the United States. This plan, when approved by 
        me, shall supplement the National Response Plan 
        required by HSPD-5 and complement the critical 
        infrastructure protection plans required by HSPD-7 and 
        the domestic all-hazards preparedness goals and 
        structures required by HSPD-8. The plan, at a minimum, 
        shall reflect lead agency roles and responsibilities, 
        including recommendations regarding changes to existing 
        policy, including those reflected in PDD-39 and PDD-62, 
        in the following areas:
                    1) maritime security response and 
                counterterrorism operations;
                    2) maritime interception operations;
                    3) prevention and detection of, and 
                response to, the mining of U.S. ports;
                    4) detection, interdiction and disposition 
                of targeted cargo, people, and vessels; and
                    5) attacks on vessels with U.S. citizens 
                aboard or that affect U.S. interests anywhere 
                in the world.
            The plan also shall:
                    1) include recommended protocols that 
                establish clear coordination relationships 
                governing protection and defense of the United 
                States against threats to its interests in the 
                Maritime Domain; and
                    2) provide recommendations concerning the 
                designation of an interagency planning and 
                command-and-control entity to ensure unity of 
                command for national execution of maritime 
                security policy. An interim plan shall be 
                submitted no later than 180 days after the 
                effective date of this directive, through the 
                Assistants to the President for National 
                Security Affairs and Homeland Security, and 
                shall be finalized after completion of the 
                National Strategy for Maritime Security.

        Maritime Infrastructure Recovery.
            Rapid recovery from an attack or similar disruption 
        in the Maritime Domain is critical to the economic 
        well-being of our Nation. A credible capability for 
        rapid recovery will not only minimize an incident's 
        economic impact but also serve as a deterrent. The 
        Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with 
        other appropriate officials, including the Secretaries 
        of Defense, State, the Treasury, the Interior, 
        Commerce, and Transportation, and in consultation with 
        key industry stakeholders, shall be responsible for the 
        development of recommended minimum Federal standards, 
        where appropriate, for maritime recovery operations, 
        and shall develop comprehensive national maritime 
        infrastructure recovery standards and a plan, 
        complementary to the national preparedness goals and 
        standards required by HSPD-8. Such standards and plan 
        shall be completed no later than 180 days after the 
        effective date of this directive, shall focus on the 
        restoration of physical assets and transportation 
        systems, and shall take effect when approved by the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security. The standards and plan 
        also shall describe a maritime infrastructure recovery 
        exercise program consistent with the National Exercise 
        Program administered by the Department of Homeland 
        Security. The program shall address coordination with 
        State, local, and private sector partners, and 
        cooperation with foreign governments and international 
        entities as appropriate.

        Maritime Transportation System Security.
            The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination 
        with the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce, and 
        Transportation, and the U.S. Trade Representative, and 
        in consultation with appropriate industry 
        representatives, shall develop recommendations for 
        improvements to the national and international 
        regulatory framework with respect to licensing, 
        carriage, communications, safety equipment, and other 
        critical systems for all private vessels, including 
        commercial vessels, operating in the Maritime 
        Domain.The recommendations shall be submitted to me, 
        through the Assistants to the President for National 
        Security Affairs and Homeland Security, no later than 
        180 days after the effective date of this directive.

        Maritime Commerce Security.
            To implement this directive effectively and to 
        enhance economic growth, the United States must promote 
        global supply chain security practices to reduce the 
        risk of terrorists or criminals acting against the 
        United States from within the Maritime Domain. The 
        Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with 
        the Secretaries of Defense, State, the Treasury, 
        Commerce, Transportation, and Energy and the U.S. Trade 
        Representative shall lead a collaborative interagency 
        effort, in consultation with appropriate industry 
        representatives, to develop a comprehensive 
        international maritime supply chain security plan no 
        later than 180 days after the effective date of this 
        directive. The plan shall define supply-chain security 
        requirements, include recommendations to further secure 
        commercial operations from point of origin to point of 
        destination, build on available resources, and provide 
        a recommended framework of roles, responsibilities, and 
        implementation actions. The plan shall define 
        measurable national ``end state'' supply chain security 
        goals and develop contingency plans to continue the 
        flow of commerce in the event of an incident 
        necessitating total or partial closure of U.S. borders 
        to maritime commerce. The plan shall take effect upon 
        approval by the Secretary of Homeland Security.

VI. GENERAL.
            This directive does not alter existing authorities 
        or responsibilities of the department and agency heads, 
        including their authorities, to carry out operational 
        activities or to provide or receive information. This 
        directive is intended only to improve the internal 
        management of the Executive Branch and is not intended 
        to, and does not; create any right or benefit 
        enforceable at law or in equity by any party against 
        the United States, its departments, agencies, entities, 
        officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
            Nothing in this directive impairs or otherwise 
        affects the authority of the Secretary of Defense over 
        the Department of Defense, including the chain of 
        command for military forces from the President and 
        Commander-in-Chief, to the Secretary of Defense, to the 
        commander of military forces, or military command and 
        control procedures.
            The Assistants to the President for National 
        Security Affairs and Homeland Security and the Chairman 
        of the Council on Environmental Quality shall 
        coordinate as appropriate the work of the MSPCC under 
        this directive and the work of the Committee on Ocean 
        Policy under the Executive Order of December 17, 2004.
              Homeland Security Presidential Directive--14

             (National Security Presidential Directive--43)

                       Domestic Nuclear Detection

                              ----------                              


            (1)  To protect against the unauthorized 
        importation, possession, storage, transportation, 
        development, or use of a nuclear explosive device, 
        fissile material, or radiological material in the 
        United States, and to protect against attack using such 
        devices or materials against the people, territory, or 
        interests of the United States, it is the policy of the 
        United States to:
                    (a)  Continue to develop, deploy, and 
                enhance national nuclear and radiological 
                detection capabilities in an effort to better 
                detect, report on, disrupt, and prevent 
                attempts to import, possess, store, transport, 
                develop, or use such devices and materials;
                    (b)  Continue to enhance the effective 
                integration of nuclear and radiological 
                detection capabilities across Federal, State, 
                local, and tribal governments and the private 
                sector for a managed, coordinated response; and
                    (c)  Continue to advance the science of 
                nuclear and radiological detection through an 
                aggressive, expedited, evolutionary, and 
                transformational program of research and 
                development in such detection technologies.
            (2)  To implement the policy set forth in paragraph 
        (1), the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
        coordination with the Secretaries of State, Defense, 
        and Energy, and the Attorney General, shall establish a 
        national level Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) 
        within the Department of Homeland Security. The DNDO 
        shall include personnel from the departments of 
        Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), 
        State (DOS), Justice (DOJ), and other Federal 
        departments and agencies as appropriate. The Secretary 
        of Homeland Security shall have authority, direction, 
        and control over the DNDO as provided in section 102 
        (a)(2) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The DNDO 
        shall:
                    (a)  Serve as the primary entity in the 
                United States Government to further develop, 
                acquire, and support the deployment of an 
                enhanced domestic system to detect and report 
                on attempts to import, possess, store, 
                transport, develop, or use an unauthorized 
                nuclear explosive device, fissile material, or 
                radiological material in the United States, and 
                improve that system over time;
                    (b)  Enhance and coordinate the nuclear 
                detection efforts of Federal, State, local, and 
                tribal governments and the private sector to 
                ensure a managed, coordinated response;
                    (c)  Establish, with the approval of the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security and in 
                coordination with the Attorney General and the 
                Secretaries of Defense and Energy, additional 
                protocols and procedures for use within the 
                United States to ensure that the detection of 
                unauthorized nuclear explosive devices, fissile 
                material, or radiological material is promptly 
                reported to the Attorney General, the 
                Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, and 
                Energy, and other appropriate officials or 
                their respective designees for appropriate 
                action by law enforcement, military, emergency 
                response, or other authorities;
                    (d)  Develop, with the approval of the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security and in 
                coordination with the Attorney General and the 
                Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy, an 
                enhanced global nuclear detection architecture 
                with the following implementation:
                            (i)  the DNDO will be responsible 
                        for the implementation of the domestic 
                        portion of the global architecture;
                            (ii)  the Secretary of Defense will 
                        retain responsibility for 
                        implementation of DOD requirements 
                        within and outside the United States; 
                        and
                            (iii)  the Secretaries of State, 
                        Defense, and Energy will maintain their 
                        respective responsibilities for policy 
                        guidance and implementation of the 
                        portion of the global architecture 
                        outside the United States, which will 
                        be implemented consistent with 
                        applicable law and relevant 
                        international arrangements;
                    (e)  Conduct, support, coordinate, and 
                encourage an aggressive, expedited, 
                evolutionary, and transformational program of 
                research and development efforts to support the 
                policy set forth in paragraph (1);
                    (f)  Support and enhance the effective 
                sharing and use of appropriate information 
                generated by the intelligence community, law 
                enforcement agencies, counterterrorism 
                community, other government agencies, and 
                foreign governments, as well as provide 
                appropriate information to these entities; and
                    (g)  Further enhance and maintain 
                continuous awareness by analyzing information 
                from all DNDO mission--related detection 
                systems.
            (3)  To ensure the success of DNDO efforts in 
        support of the policy, the Secretaries of State, 
        Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security, and the 
        Attorney General shall:
                            (i)  determine and provide 
                        appropriate nuclear, scientific, and 
                        other expertise to the DNDO;
                            (ii)  participate within the DNDO 
                        in jointly developing and coordinating 
                        detection and response guidance, 
                        protocols, and training for Federal. 
                        State, local, and tribal officials;
                            (iii)  participate within the DNDO 
                        in jointly developing and coordinating 
                        the global nuclear detection 
                        architecture; and
                            (iv)  where appropriate, 
                        participate in the conduct of research 
                        and development for nuclear detection.
            (4)  The Secretary of Energy shall lead the 
        development of nonproliferation research and 
        development and, where appropriate, make available 
        dual-use counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism 
        nuclear detection research and development to DNDO and 
        other entities and officials to support the development 
        of the domestic nuclear and radiological detection 
        system. The Secretary of Energy will make maximum 
        appropriate use of DNDO research, development, test and 
        evaluation programs, and procedures for deploying 
        equipment, taking due account of foreign sensitivities. 
        The Secretary of Energy shall also report information 
        related to detection events to the DNDO. Nothing in 
        this Directive shall be construed to limit or otherwise 
        affect any of the authorities or responsibilities of 
        the Secretary of Energy under any statute, regulation, 
        or executive order.
            (5)  The Secretary of Defense shall consult with 
        the Secretary of Homeland Security on all aspects of 
        the DNDO to ensure efficiencies, interoperability, and 
        sharing of innovative concepts and operational 
        procedures designed to protect the United States. 
        Nothing in this Directive shall be construed to impair 
        or otherwise affect the authority of the Secretary of 
        Defense over the Department of Defense, including the 
        chain of command for military forces from the President 
        as Commander in Chief, to the Secretary of Defense, to 
        the commanders of the combatant commands, or military 
        command and control procedures.
            (6)  The Attorney General shall coordinate with the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security on all aspects of DNDO's 
        global nuclear detection architecture, particularly as 
        they relate to the development of response guidance 
        protocols and training for Federal, State, local, and 
        tribal law enforcement and information sharing 
        activities. Nothing in this Directive shall be 
        construed to impair or otherwise affect the authority 
        of the Attorney General as stated in Homeland Security 
        Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, ``Management of Domestic 
        Incidents,'' of February 28, 2003.
            (7)  The Secretary of State shall coordinate with 
        the Secretary of Homeland Security on all aspects of 
        DNDO's global nuclear detection architecture, 
        particularly as they relate to overseas detection and 
        reporting activities and to the formulation and 
        implementation of U.S. foreign policy.
            (8)  The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) 
        shall coordinate with the Secretary of Homeland 
        Security on all aspects of DNDO's global nuclear 
        detection architecture. The DNI also shall ensure the 
        timely dissemination to the DNDO of all radiological, 
        nuclear, and related threats to the United States and 
        other intelligence information relevant to the support, 
        development, and maintenance of the global nuclear 
        detection architecture and related efforts. Functions 
        assigned by this Directive to the DNI shall be 
        performed by the Director of Central Intelligence until 
        the first DNI is appointed by the President.
            (9)  This Directive shall be implemented in a 
        manner consistent with applicable law, including the 
        Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Homeland Security Act of 
        2002, and the National Security Act of 1947 (all as 
        amended), and presidential guidance, and subject to the 
        availability of appropriations. Nothing in this 
        Directive alters, or impedes the ability to carry out, 
        existing authorities or responsibilities of department 
        and agency heads to perform their responsibilities 
        under law and consistent with applicable legal 
        authorities and presidential guidance. With regard to 
        nuclear search activities, nothing in this Directive 
        alters in any way existing directives, 
        responsibilities, and roles. This Directive is intended 
        only to improve the internal management of the 
        executive branch of the Federal Government, and it is 
        not intended to, and does not, create any right or 
        benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law 
        or in equity, against the United States, its 
        departments, agencies, entities, officers, employees, 
        or any other person.
            (10)  Within 120 days after the date of this 
        Directive, and thereafter not less than annually, the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security shall report to me 
        through the Assistant to the President for Homeland 
        Security and the Assistant to the President for 
        National Security Affairs on the implementation of this 
        Directive, including an assessment of the effectiveness 
        of DNDO and any recommendations for additional 
        enhancements or efforts. The initial implementation 
        report shall include:
                    (a)  the plans for integrated program and 
                budget planning between the appropriate 
                agencies needed to properly execute the DNDO 
                responsibilities and
                    (b)  a joint staffing plan for the DNDO.
              Homeland Security Presidential Directive--15

                       [on the war on terrorism]

                              ----------                              



HSPD--17 is a Classified document and not available for 
release.
              Homeland Security Presidential Directive--16

                National Strategy for Aviation Security

                              ----------                              


Prologue
            The security and economic prosperity of the United 
        States depend significantly upon the secure operation 
        of its aviation system and use of the world's airspace 
        by the Nation, its international partners, and 
        legitimate commercial interests. Terrorists, criminals, 
        and hostile nation-states have long viewed aviation as 
        a target for attack and exploitation. The tragic events 
        of September 11, 2001 and the Heathrow plot of August 
        2006 are telling reminders of the threats facing 
        aviation and the intent and capabilities of adversaries 
        that mean to do harm to the United States and its 
        people.
            In June 2006, building upon the Administration's 
        successful efforts since 9/11, the President directed 
        the development of a comprehensive National Strategy 
        for Aviation Security (hereafter referred to as ``the 
        Strategy'') to protect the Nation and its interests 
        from threats in the Air Domain.\1\ The Secretary of 
        Homeland Security, in accordance with National Security 
        Presidential Directive-47/Homeland Security 
        Presidential Directive-16 (NSPD-47/HSPD-16), will 
        coordinate the operational implementation of the 
        Strategy, including the integration and synchronization 
        of related Federal programs and initiatives.
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    \1\ Air Domain is defined as the global airspace, including 
domestic, international, and foreign airspace, as well as all manned 
and unmanned aircraft operating, and people and cargo present in that 
airspace, and all aviation-related infrastructures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Aviation security is best achieved by integrating 
        public and private aviation security global activities 
        into a coordinated effort to detect, deter, prevent, 
        and defeat threats to the Air Domain, reduce 
        vulnerabilities, and minimize the consequences of, and 
        expedite the recovery from, attacks that might occur. 
        The Strategy aligns Federal government aviation 
        security programs and initiatives into a comprehensive 
        and cohesive national effort involving appropriate 
        Federal, State, local, and tribal governments and the 
        private sector to provide active layered aviation 
        security for, and support defense in-depth of, the 
        United States.
            Through a collaborative interagency effort and with 
        input from aviation stakeholders, seven supporting 
        plans will be developed to address the specific threats 
        and challenges identified in NSPD-47/HSPD-16. Although 
        the plans will address different aspects of aviation 
        security, they will be mutually linked and reinforce 
        each other. The supporting plans are:
                 1A Aviation Transportation System Security 
                Plan;
                 1A Aviation Operational Threat Response Plan;
                 1A Aviation Transportation System Recovery 
                Plan;
                 1A Air Domain Surveillance and Intelligence 
                Integration Plan;
                 1A International Aviation Threat Reduction 
                Plan;
                 1A Domestic Outreach Plan; and
                 1A International Outreach Plan.
            Development of these plans will be guided by the 
        need to revalidate and further enhance current aviation 
        security principles. These plans will be updated on a 
        periodic basis in response to changes in perceived 
        risks to aviation security, the world environment, 
        technology, air transport demands, the global aviation 
        system, and national and homeland security policies. 
        Together, the Strategy and seven supporting plans 
        present a comprehensive national effort to prevent 
        hostile or illegal acts within the Air Domain, promote 
        global economic stability, and protect legitimate 
        aviation activities.

Introduction

``America historically has relied heavily on two vast oceans 
and two friendly neighbors for border security, and on the 
private sector for most forms of domestic transportation 
security. The increasing mobility and destructive potential of 
modern terrorism has required the United States to rethink and 
renovate fundamentally its systems for border and 
transportation security. Indeed, we must now begin to conceive 
of border security and transportation security as fully 
integrated requirements because our domestic transportation 
systems are inextricably intertwined with the global transport 
infrastructure. Virtually every community in America is 
connected to the global transportation network by the seaports, 
airports, highways, pipelines, railroads, and waterways that 
move people and goods into, within, and out of the Nation. We 
must therefore promote the efficient and reliable flow of 
people, goods, and services across borders, while preventing 
terrorists from using transportation conveyances or systems to 
deliver implements of destruction.''
      National Strategy for Homeland Security

    The United States has a vital national interest in 
protecting its people, infrastructure, and other interests from 
threats in the Air Domain. The differences between ground-based 
and airborne aviation security measures implemented in 
different jurisdictions throughout the world, the volume of 
domestic and international air traffic, the speed with which 
events unfold, and the complexity of aviation assets make the 
Air Domain uniquely susceptible to attack or exploitation by 
terrorist groups, hostile nation-states, and criminals.
    Adversaries have demonstrated the ability and a continuing 
desire to exploit vulnerabilities and to adapt to changes in 
aviation security measures by conducting multiple, 
simultaneous, catastrophic attacks against the United States 
and its global interests. Exploitation of the Air Domain by 
terrorists and hostile nation-states using unconventional 
attack methods is not a recent phenomenon. In the 1970s, 
overseas militant groups hijacked commercial passenger aircraft 
as a means of garnering international media attention to 
further their causes. The rise of Islamic religious extremism 
and state-sponsored terrorism spawned further attacks against 
civil aviation, including: the hijacking of Trans World 
Airlines Flight 847 in 1985; the hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 
in 1986 in Karachi, Pakistan; the destruction of Pan Am Flight 
103 over Scotland in 1988; and the downing of a French UTA 
aircraft over Niger in 1989. The attacks of September 11, 2001, 
brought the reality of these methods to the United States; the 
Heathrow plot of August 2006 reminds us of the continuing 
danger.
    Over the past five years, the security of the aviation 
sector has been significantly strengthened through the efforts 
of the Federal government working with State, local, and tribal 
governments, the international community, and the private 
sector. Together these partners continue to implement a broad 
range of aviation security measures through innovative 
initiatives and by leveraging pre-existing capabilities to 
provide the Nation with an active, layered aviation security, 
and defense in-depth. Such measures include: a federalized 
Transportation Security Officer workforce that screens 
passengers and baggage traveling on passenger aircraft; 
hardened cockpit doors to prevent unauthorized access to the 
flight deck; Federal Air Marshals who fly anonymously on 
commercial passenger aircraft to provide a law enforcement 
presence; enhanced explosives and threat detection technology 
deployed in hundreds of airports; airspace and air traffic 
management security measures; and a cadre of canine explosives 
detection teams screening baggage, cargo, and increasingly, 
carry-on items.
    Other important security activities include: thousands of 
pilots who voluntarily participate in the Federal Flight Deck 
Officer program, which permits trained pilots to carry 
firearms; flight crew members, including flight attendants who 
have voluntarily taken the Transportation Security 
Administration's (TSA) Advanced Flight Crew Self-Defense 
course; other Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement 
officers who travel armed as part of their normal duties; 
establishment of a program to collect and analyze suspicious 
events; efforts to streamline operational coordination on 
incidents both in the air and on the ground; daily vetting of 
thousands of crew members and passengers on flights to and from 
the United States; and improvement of surveillance and 
intelligence sharing. In addition, the Nation's air defense 
mission has been transformed by expanding surveillance and air 
interdiction efforts inward to counter terrorist air threats, 
as well as by continuing traditional air defense activities 
against the threats from hostile nation-states.
    In today's global and interconnected economy, the safe 
movement of people and cargo across the open skies is a crucial 
factor in promoting free trade and advancing prosperity and 
freedom. Defeating the array of threats to the Air Domain 
requires a common understanding of, and a coordinated effort 
for, action on a global scale. Nations have a common interest 
to protect global air travel. Since all nations benefit from 
this collective security, the United States must encourage all 
nations to share the responsibility for maintaining aviation 
security by countering the threats in this domain.
    The Aviation Transportation System\2\ comprises a broad 
spectrum of private and public sector elements, including: 
aircraft and airport operators; over 19,800 private and public 
use airports; the aviation sector; and a dynamic system of 
facilities, equipment, services, and airspace. The Aviation 
Transportation System continues to grow rapidly, as more and 
more passengers regularly choose to fly. On a daily basis, 
thousands of carrier flights arrive, depart, or overfly the 
continental United States, while each year millions of tons of 
freight and thousands of tons of mail are transported by air in 
the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\The Aviation Transportation System is defined as U.S. airspace, 
all manned and unmanned aircraft operating in that airspace, all U.S. 
aviation operators, airports, airfields, air navigation services, and 
related infrastructure, and all aviation-related industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Nation must be capable of stopping terrorist groups, 
hostile nation-states, and criminals before they can threaten 
or engage in attacks against the United States and its 
international partners, including through the use of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD). To achieve these ends, Federal, State, 
local, and tribal governments and the private sector must take 
full advantage of strengthened intelligence collection, 
analysis, and appropriate dissemination; increased sharing of 
surveillance and other aviation resources; advances in 
technology; continued enhancements in aviation protective 
measures; innovations in the use of law enforcement personnel; 
and strengthened alliances within the public and private sector 
and other international cooperative arrangements. Military air 
defense assets are integrated into those activities to provide 
seamless coverage.
    The Strategy does not alter existing authorities or 
responsibilities of department and agency heads, including 
their authorities to carry out operational activities or to 
provide or receive information. It does not change or otherwise 
affect the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the 
Department of Defense, including the chain of command for 
military forces from the President, to the Secretary of 
Defense, to the military commanders or military command and 
control procedures.
    Three broad principles provide overarching guidance to the 
Strategy, its objectives, and its actions. First, the Nation 
must use the full range of its assets and capabilities to 
prevent the Air Domain from being exploited by terrorist 
groups, hostile nation-states, and criminals to commit acts 
against the United States, its people, its infrastructure, and 
its other interests. Second, the Nation must ensure the safe 
and efficient use of the Air Domain. Third, the Nation must 
continue to facilitate travel and commerce. These guiding 
principles are critical to global stability and economic growth 
and are vital to the interests of the United States.

Threats to the Air Domain
            Threats to the Air Domain are numerous, complex, 
        and adaptive. While conventional military threats in 
        the Air Domain continue and will likely increase in 
        times of international tension or conflict, the 
        greatest current threat, as demonstrated in the 
        Heathrow plot of August 2006 reminds us of the 
        continuing danger, and therefore the focus of the 
        Strategy, is terrorism.
            Globalization, technological advances, the 
        proliferation of WMD, and the emergence of terrorism as 
        a global phenomenon have enabled threats to the Air 
        Domain to extend in reach, accelerate in speed, and 
        increase in potential impact. Aviation is a global 
        enterprise with a distributed infrastructure and 
        multiple access points. Successful attacks in the Air 
        Domain can inflict mass casualties and grave economic 
        damage, and attract significant public attention 
        because of the impact on the modern transportation 
        system.
            Intelligence on threats to the Air Domain plays a 
        critical role in assessing terrorist groups' intentions 
        and capabilities and requires regular update and review 
        to ensure that Federal, State, local, and tribal 
        governments, the private sector, and the international 
        community are taking appropriate measures. However, 
        even the best intelligence will not uncover every 
        specific terrorist plot because of terrorists' efforts 
        at operational secrecy.
            Threats focused on the Air Domain can be analyzed 
        in two ways: by originator and by targets and tactics.

Threat Originators
            There are three main originators of threats: 
        terrorist groups; hostile nation-states; and other 
        criminals.

Terrorist Groups.
            Terrorist groups are politically, as well as 
        religiously in some cases, motivated and use 
        premeditated violence, usually against noncombatants, 
        to affect a particular audience. Because of their clear 
        intent to do harm to the United States and its 
        interests, terrorist groups remain the most severe 
        threat to America's security. Their ultimate goal in 
        the Air Domain is to conduct multiple, simultaneous, 
        catastrophic attacks exploiting the Aviation 
        Transportation System because of its visibility as a 
        symbol of the U.S. global presence and economic 
        influence. In addition, the attacks of September 11, 
        2001, and other successful or attempted attacks have 
        inspired emulation.
            The terrorist threat is changing in form and 
        intensity as terrorists' intentions and capabilities 
        change and countermeasures are instituted. Their 
        techniques are adapting on multiple fronts, including 
        modality of planning, complexity of attack, and style 
        of execution. The type, location, and frequency of 
        terrorist attacks cannot be reliably extrapolated from 
        historical patterns, and therefore current threats must 
        be regularly reassessed.
            Terrorist groups, best typified by al-Qa'ida and 
        its affiliates, pose several threats to the Air Domain. 
        The most prominent threat is physical attack, discussed 
        at greater length in the Targets and Tactics section of 
        the Strategy. Terrorists might also take advantage of 
        the same tactics, techniques, and methods pioneered by 
        criminals to counter immigration, customs, and border 
        security measures to move people and materiel. They 
        might deploy in regions of political and economic 
        instability where aviation law enforcement is stretched 
        thin or readily corruptible, bribe officials, use 
        forged fraudulent documents, and make illegal 
        transactions to hide their true intentions. Terrorists 
        might use unsecured air transportation routes to 
        transport arms, explosives, or operatives clandestinely 
        to safe havens, training sites, or attack-staging 
        locations. Ultimately, terrorists might use these 
        access points and routes to transport more dangerous 
        cargo, including WMD and their associated components. 
        Such threats are particularly worrisome in areas where 
        governments are weak or provide safe haven to 
        terrorists.

Hostile Nation-States.
            While most countries have an explicit interest in 
        being able to operate safely, effectively, and reliably 
        in the Air Domain, some pose threats, either due to 
        actual hostile intent or weak infrastructure 
        safeguards. For example, some countries directly 
        sponsor international terrorism, providing training, 
        funding, supplies, WMD and related components, and 
        operational direction to surrogates. Other nation-
        states knowingly or unknowingly provide safe havens for 
        terrorists who plan, prepare, or facilitate attacks or 
        deploy materiel or operatives through the Air Domain. 
        Some states have weak command and control over their 
        aviation infrastructure, such as their internal air 
        defenses or airport security apparatus, which 
        terrorists can then exploit. Additionally, nation-
        states could present a military threat, such as cruise 
        missiles, to the United States and U.S. interests 
        globally in the Air Domain.

Criminals
            Criminals, including individuals and groups, use 
        the Air Domain to pursue objectives that are illegal 
        under U.S. law or international convention. Domestic 
        extremists in the United States have not, to date, 
        engaged in organized efforts to attack the Aviation 
        Transportation System. However, there are potentially 
        violent domestic groups and individuals who have 
        extensive knowledge of the aviation sector coupled with 
        a demonstrated expertise in manufacturing and employing 
        targeted-attack techniques, including improvised or 
        conventional explosive devices.

Targets and Tactics
            There are three primary categories of threats: to 
        and from aircraft; to the Aviation Transportation 
        System infrastructure; and from hostile exploitation of 
        cargo.

Threats to and from Aircraft.
            Aircraft can be disaggregated into four categories 
        of threats:
                 1A large passenger aircraft;
                 1A large all-cargo aircraft;
                 1A small aircraft, such as aircraft used 
                primarily to transport small numbers of people 
                or to provide unique services, including light 
                private and corporate aircraft, and 
                helicopters; and
                 1A non-traditional aircraft, such as unmanned 
                aerial vehicles (UAVs), ultra-light aircraft, 
                gliders, and aerial-application aircraft.
            These categories might be susceptible to, or could 
        pose a threat from, similar basic tactics: explosives; 
        stand-off weapons including man-portable air defense 
        systems (MANPADS); hijackings; WMD delivery and 
        dissemination; and smuggling of terrorists and 
        instruments of terror.

Large passenger aircraft.
            Historically, large passenger aircraft have been at 
        the greatest risk to terrorism because terrorists 
        perceive that such aircraft have great potential to 
        inflict catastrophic damage and are likely to disrupt 
        the Aviation Transportation System. Two tactics have 
        appeared to date. First, aircraft and passengers have 
        been used as targets, such as the detonation of a bomb 
        onboard as was central to the Heathrow plot of 2006, 
        the taking of hostages, traditional hijacking, and 
        attack from stand-off weapons including MANPADS. 
        Second, aircraft have been used as weapons, most 
        notably seen during the September 11, 2001, attacks. 
        The Nation must closely monitor other tactics as they 
        emerge.

Large all-cargo aircraft.
            Absent more attractive targets, such as large 
        passenger aircraft, terrorists might seek to take 
        advantage of the varying degrees and sophistication of 
        security measures employed for all-cargo aircraft. If 
        terrorist tactics adapt in this way, large all-cargo 
        aircraft are likely more attractive as weapons, such as 
        through a hijacking to attack ground-based targets or 
        as conveyance mechanisms, rather than as targets. These 
        aircraft also remain at risk from attacks using MANPADS 
        or other stand-off weapons.

Small aircraft.
            As with large passenger aircraft, small aircraft 
        face two varieties of threats: as the target of attack; 
        or as weapons used to attack other targets. Small 
        aircraft are relatively unattractive as targets because 
        they carry few passengers, and thus would have less 
        dramatic impact if attacked. As weapons, however, there 
        are several potential threat scenarios. Terrorists 
        might use a wide range of small aircraft, such as 
        business jets or helicopters, to destroy a critical 
        asset or portion of infrastructure. The most serious 
        threat stems from terrorists using small aircraft to 
        transport or deliver WMD or related materiel. The 
        Nation must be especially watchful for terrorists 
        adopting this tactic. Transnational criminal elements 
        employ small aircraft to conduct illicit activities in 
        the Air Domain, including smuggling of persons and 
        contraband.

Non-traditional aircraft.
            While ultra-lights, remote-controlled aircraft, 
        gliders, aerial-application aircraft, and UAVs have 
        limited potential as targets, terrorists might employ 
        these non-traditional aircraft as weapons or as a means 
        to disseminate WMD. For example, terrorists might use 
        them for missions that are of limited range, require 
        limited accuracy, and have a specific and small target. 
        Adoption of this tactic deserves very close monitoring.
            While attacks against the Air Domain and the United 
        States and its interests are currently more likely to 
        originate from terrorists, the threat posed by military 
        aircraft of hostile nation-states, such as long range 
        strategic aviation, air-to-air missiles, long-range 
        air-to-surface missiles, or cruise missiles must be 
        considered.
Threats to the Aviation Transportation System Infrastructure.
            Reported threats to Aviation Transportation System 
        infrastructure, which comprises airports and those 
        facilities and systems that are used to provide Air 
        Navigation Services (ANS) and other important related 
        services needed to support air operations in U.S. 
        airspace, are relatively few. In part, this is due to 
        the relatively low public profile of ANS infrastructure 
        such as Air Traffic Control facilities and systems, the 
        robustness and resilience of these systems due to many 
        layers of redundancies, and the Nation's likely 
        capacity to recover rapidly and thus limit the 
        psychological or economic impact of any attack.
            There is a range of potential threat scenarios at 
        different types of airport facilities that require 
        vigilance. Terrorists might target passenger 
        concentrations at commercial airports, recycling 
        tactics from many years ago. They might place 
        explosives near or inside passenger facilities. 
        Terrorists might target multi-use airports, such as 
        those combining commercial and military operations or 
        commercial and general aviation operations, where 
        unrelated security authorities and dissimilar security 
        procedures often co-exist.
            Other Aviation Transportation System-related 
        threats are less likely to materialize. For example, 
        general aviation airports have relatively few 
        passengers in transit and an attack on one would 
        present limited opportunities for causing major 
        symbolic or economic damage. In addition, facilities 
        that process high volumes of cargo have great 
        redundancy and involve few people relative to the 
        commercial passenger aviation system.

Threats from Hostile Exploitation of Cargo.
            The air-cargo industry is highly dynamic and 
        encompasses a wide range of users, making it subject to 
        potential exploitation by terrorists. Many users are 
        regulated, from large all-cargo carriers, such as 
        express consignment carriers that operate complex 
        sorting operations at major hubs for time-definite 
        cargo delivery, to small regional carriers, such as 
        those that move high-value cargo or service rural 
        areas. Since the adoption of enhanced security measures 
        at airfreight terminals following September 11, 2001, 
        threats such as stowaways aboard air freighters and the 
        use of explosives for detonation have waned. However, 
        the regulatory framework for cargo systems is not 
        immune to exploitation, especially to methods that have 
        been used by criminals for years. For example, 
        terrorists may infiltrate the cargo handling system to 
        transport people, conventional or WMD, or weapon 
        components.

Risk Methodology
            The Strategy will use a risk-based, cross-
        discipline, and global approach to aviation security to 
        ensure that resources are allocated to those Federal, 
        State, local, and tribal governments and private sector 
        aviation security efforts with the greatest potential 
        to prevent, detect, deter, and defeat attacks, and to 
        mitigate the consequences if an attack occurs. The risk 
        methodology used is outlined in the National 
        Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and defined in 
        more detail by the NIPP Transportation Sector-Specific 
        Plan (TSSP). These plans define risk as a function of 
        threat, vulnerability, and consequence. The United 
        States Government will regularly conduct formal 
        assessments of the risks to the Aviation Transportation 
        System.

Strategic Objectives
            The Strategy describes how the United States 
        Government will enhance the security of the Air Domain 
        while preserving the freedom of the domain for 
        legitimate pursuits. The Strategy recognizes the 
        critical importance of the Air Domain to the United 
        States and the global economy, and is flexible enough 
        to anticipate the dramatic growth in U.S. air traffic 
        and infrastructure as well as emerging threats.
            Today's terrorists have demonstrated the capability 
        and intent to inflict a level of damage once reserved 
        exclusively for nation-states. The nations of the world 
        have a shared interest in maintaining and strengthening 
        global aviation security by adopting comprehensive and 
        cohesive policies, programs, and procedures. The Nation 
        reserves its inherent right to self-defense and its 
        right to act to protect its essential national security 
        interests while protecting the United States and its 
        interests. Defending against enemies is a fundamental 
        responsibility of the United States Government.
            In keeping with the principles from NSPD-47/HSPD-
        16, and consistent with the National Strategy for 
        Combating Terrorism, that provide overarching guidance 
        to the Strategy, and in accordance with the values 
        enshrined in the U.S. Constitution and applicable 
        domestic and international law, the following 
        objectives will guide the Nation's aviation security 
        activities:
                 1A deter and prevent terrorist attacks and 
                criminal or hostile acts in the Air Domain;
                 1A protect the United States and its 
                interests in the Air Domain;
                 1A mitigate damage and expedite recovery;
                 1A minimize the impact on the Aviation 
                Transportation System and the U.S. economy; and
                 1A actively engage domestic and international 
                partners.

Deter and Prevent Terrorist Attacks and Criminal or Hostile 
Acts in the Air Domain
            The United States will prevent terrorist attacks 
        and other criminal or hostile acts in the Air Domain by 
        maximizing shared awareness of domestic and 
        international airspace, aviation infrastructure, and 
        those who have access to the system. International and 
        foreign airspace may also be of national security 
        interest. The United States will work to: detect 
        adversaries before they strike; deny them safe haven in 
        which to operate unobstructed; block their freedom of 
        movement between locations; stop them from entering the 
        United States; identify, disrupt, and dismantle their 
        capacities, including the capacity to possess and 
        access weapons and financial infrastructure; use all 
        means of attribution for maximum legal accountability 
        including criminal prosecution; and take decisive 
        action to eliminate the threat they pose. These actions 
        are addressed in separate executive orders and 
        directives and other presidential guidance.
            The basis for effective prevention measures 
        operations and security programs is shared awareness 
        and sharing of risk assessment information, along with 
        credible deterrent and interdiction capabilities. 
        Without effective shared awareness of activities within 
        the Air Domain, crucial opportunities for prevention or 
        an early response can be lost. Advance warning grants 
        time and distance to counter adversaries whether they 
        are planning an operation or are en route to attack or 
        to commit an unlawful act.
            Effective prevention requires close cooperation 
        between Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, 
        the private sector, the international community, and 
        the general public to gain shared awareness and 
        increase security in the Air Domain while minimizing 
        the impact of security measures on daily operations. 
        This collaborative effort serves as a force multiplier 
        against adversaries.

Protect the United States and its Interests in the Air Domain
            Criminals and terrorists have and will continue to 
        consider the use of the Air Domain as a means to attack 
        the United States. The Nation must therefore 
        continuously monitor, and exert unambiguous control 
        over, its airspace and access to it. Security measures, 
        combined with enhanced surveillance coverage, 
        information collection, shared awareness, dissemination 
        of information, and a ready response capability, will 
        allow the United States to seize the initiative and 
        influence events before adversaries can cause harm.
            The security of the United States also depends on 
        the security of the Aviation Transportation System's 
        critical infrastructure, including physical and cyber 
        networks. Complicating the security challenge is the 
        fact that major metropolitan areas within the United 
        States not only have airport and other Aviation 
        Transportation System facilities, but these areas are 
        in close proximity to other critical infrastructure 
        such as military facilities, power plants, refineries, 
        nuclear facilities, chemical plants, tunnels, and 
        bridges.
            Maintaining the integrity and viability of the 
        Aviation Transportation System critical infrastructure 
        is essential for the free movement of passengers and 
        goods throughout the world. Some physical and cyber 
        assets, as well as associated infrastructure, also 
        function as defense critical infrastructure, the 
        availability of which must be constantly assured for 
        national security operations worldwide. Beyond the 
        immediate casualties, the consequences of an attack on 
        a node of critical infrastructure may include 
        disruption of entire systems, significant damage to the 
        economy, or the inability to deploy military forces. 
        Protection of infrastructure networks must address 
        individual elements, interconnecting systems, and their 
        interdependencies.
            The Department of Homeland Security is responsible 
        for coordinating the overall national effort to enhance 
        the protection of critical infrastructure. However, 
        public and private sectors must work together to 
        improve national security by: sharing threat 
        information; conducting prudent risk assessments; 
        working to implement essential upgrades; and investing 
        in protective measures such as staff identification and 
        credentialing, access control, and physical security of 
        fixed sites.

Mitigate Damage and Expedite Recovery
            The Nation must take actions to mitigate damage and 
        expedite recovery from an attack on the Air Domain. The 
        fundamental key to effective recovery is pre-event 
        planning and established coordination, in conjunction 
        with exercising national mitigation and recovery 
        options. Mitigation and recovery actions promote 
        resilience by preserving life, property, social, 
        economic, and political structures, as well as 
        restoring order and essential services for those who 
        use the Air Domain for their livelihood. However, the 
        Aviation Transportation System will not be shut down as 
        an automatic response to an aviation incident; instead, 
        the United States will be prepared to minimize the 
        impact on the system by isolating particular portions 
        of the Aviation Transportation System, and implementing 
        contingency measures to ensure public safety and 
        continuity of commerce.
            The response to incidents will be in accordance 
        with the National Response Plan (NRP), which 
        incorporates the National Incident Management System 
        (NIMS). The NRP provides the structure and mechanisms 
        for national-level policy and operational coordination 
        for domestic incident management. Pursuant to HSPD-5, 
        the Secretary of Homeland Security serves as the 
        principal Federal official for domestic incident 
        management.
            A terrorist attack or other disruptive incident 
        involving the Aviation Transportation System can cause 
        severe ripple effects on other modes of transportation 
        as well as adverse economic or national security 
        effects. From the onset of such an incident, Federal, 
        State, local, and tribal governments, along with 
        private sector entities, require the capability to 
        assess the human and economic consequences in affected 
        areas, and to rapidly estimate the effects on other 
        regional, national, or global interests. These entities 
        must also develop and implement contingency procedures 
        to ensure continuity of operations, essential public 
        services, and the resumption or redirection of 
        commercial aviation activities, including the 
        prioritized movement of cargo to mitigate the larger 
        economic, social, and potential national security 
        effects of the incident. For example, the public and 
        private sectors must be ready expeditiously to: detect 
        and identify potential WMD agents; react without 
        endangering first responders; treat the injured; 
        contain and minimize damage; rapidly reconstitute 
        operations; and mitigate long-term hazards through 
        effective decontamination measures.

Minimize the Impact on the Aviation Transportation System and 
the U.S. Economy
            The Aviation Transportation System demands 
        extremely high standards of security implemented in an 
        efficient manner. Security measures should be balanced 
        with commercial, private, and trade requirements, the 
        safe and efficient movement of cargo and people, and 
        economic and market competition drivers, and should 
        protect privacy and other legal rights. To support the 
        accelerating growth of global commerce and associated 
        U.S. interests, security concerns and measures should, 
        to the extent possible, be: aligned and embedded with 
        business practices; implemented by private sector 
        stakeholders, including air operators and related 
        industries; optimized through the use of information 
        technology; and implemented with the minimum essential 
        impact on commercial and trade-flow costs and 
        operations. The Strategy will require new and enhanced 
        partnerships, as well as cost-sharing and burden-
        sharing between the public and private sectors.
            To accomplish the aforementioned initiatives, the 
        Nation must develop security measures that can be 
        integrated with the unique needs of the aviation sector 
        and provide a high degree of protection, while 
        minimizing the impact to the efficient flow of people 
        and goods through the system. The Nation must depend on 
        new and emerging technologies to assist in this effort, 
        such as the enhancement of biometric solutions for 
        access control initiatives. This effort must also be 
        supported by building and strengthening partnerships 
        between the government and the private sector to: 
        facilitate the continued implementation of security 
        measures; maximize collaborative planning; and 
        coordinate operational responses to incidents.
            The effects of response and recovery efforts should 
        also reflect aviation sector needs. On September 11, 
        2001, the National Airspace System was completely shut 
        down, causing significant operational and economic 
        impacts to the aviation sector. Recognizing the need 
        for diverse and flexible options that allow for an 
        effective response, the United States Government has 
        developed plans allowing for the selective suspension 
        or restriction of air traffic on a local or regional 
        basis as necessary. Plans such as the Emergency 
        Security Control of Air Traffic and other available 
        tools and resources provide government leaders with 
        options for the closure and the reconstitution of the 
        system and include identifying the steps necessary to 
        prevent the recurrence of an event. Efforts such as 
        these will allow the government to continue to provide 
        the security required to protect the Aviation 
        Transportation System while minimizing the impact of 
        those actions on the system and the U.S. economy.

Actively Engage Domestic and International Partners
            Effective aviation security includes efforts at 
        home and abroad. Active engagement among Federal, 
        State, local, and tribal governments and private sector 
        stakeholders during the planning process and subsequent 
        follow-up actions is vital for success. Maintaining 
        transparency in the planning effort and promoting 
        dialogue will help increase the effectiveness of risk 
        mitigation actions and reduce burdens on the private 
        sector.
            In addition to strengthening relationships among 
        Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, the 
        private sector, and the general public, the Nation must 
        forge cooperative partnerships and alliances with other 
        nations, as well as with public and private 
        stakeholders in the international community. To foster 
        this cooperation, a coordinated policy for United 
        States Government aviation security activities with 
        foreign governments, international and regional 
        organizations, and the private sector must be achieved. 
        Such coordination can help solicit support for improved 
        global aviation security while furthering United States 
        Government policies and goals. Through these domestic 
        and international efforts, the Nation can inculcate 
        common security measures throughout the global aviation 
        community.

Strategic Actions
            The differences in ground-based and airborne 
        aviation security measures enacted by the nations of 
        the world, the volume of international air traffic, and 
        the speed of aviation operations make the Air Domain 
        uniquely susceptible to exploitation and disruption by 
        individuals, organizations, and states. Individuals and 
        groups hostile to the United States have demonstrated 
        the ability, and a continuing desire, to exploit 
        vulnerabilities and to adapt to changes in aviation 
        security measures to attack the Nation and its global 
        interests.
            The United States recognizes that, because of the 
        extensive global connectivity among businesses, 
        governments, and populations, its aviation security 
        policies affect other nations, and that significant 
        local and regional incidents may have global effects. 
        Success in securing the Air Domain will not come from 
        the United States acting alone, but through a coalition 
        of nations maintaining a strong and united 
        international front. The need for a strong and 
        effective coalition is reinforced by the fact that most 
        of the Air Domain is under no single nation's 
        sovereignty or jurisdiction. Additionally, increased 
        economic interdependency and globalization, made 
        possible by air passenger and cargo transportation, 
        underscore the need for a coordinated international 
        approach. The United States recognizes that the vast 
        majority of actors and activities within the Air Domain 
        are legitimate. The security of the Air Domain can be 
        accomplished only by employing all instruments of 
        national power in a fully coordinated manner in concert 
        with other nation-states.
            Aviation security is best achieved by combining 
        public and private aviation security activities on a 
        global scale into a comprehensive and integrated effort 
        that addresses all aviation threats. Aviation security 
        crosses disciplines, builds upon current and future 
        efforts, and depends on scalable, layered security to 
        minimize single points of vulnerability. Full and 
        complete national and international coordination, in 
        concert with cooperative intelligence and information 
        sharing among public and private entities, is required 
        to protect and secure the Air Domain.
            The broad principles that provide overarching 
        guidance to the Strategy have been used to direct the 
        development of five strategic actions, which 
        collectively advance the strategic objectives. The 
        Strategy recognizes that collectively these strategic 
        actions support strategic objectives:
                 1A maximize domain awareness;
                 1A deploy layered security;
                 1A promote a safe, efficient, and secure 
                Aviation Transportation System;
                 1A enhance international cooperation; and
                 1A assure continuity of the Aviation 
                Transportation System.
            Domain awareness is a critical enabler for all 
        strategic actions. Deploying layered security addresses 
        not only prevention and protection activities, but also 
        the integration of domestic and international security. 
        Clearly, international cooperation is vital to 
        enhancing the effectiveness of each of the other 
        strategic actions.
            The Strategy and appropriate supporting plans 
        should ensure bridging toward achieving the Next 
        Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS). NGATS 
        provides an overall and integrated view of future 
        operations beyond the Strategy that will integrate key 
        transformation activities by coordinating applicable 
        policies, procedures, research and development with 
        participating departments and agencies from today's 
        operations into the Aviation Transportation System of 
        2025.

Maximize Domain Awareness
            Maximizing Air Domain awareness is critical to 
        achieving all of the strategic objectives including 
        deterring and preventing terrorist attacks, as well as 
        protecting the United States and its interests in the 
        Air Domain and mitigating the effects of an attack. 
        Achieving shared awareness of the Air Domain is 
        challenging and certain threats to the Air Domain are 
        difficult to detect and interdict. The complexity of 
        aircraft registration and ownership processes, as well 
        as the fluid nature of these activities, offer 
        additional challenges.
            To maximize domain awareness the Nation must have 
        the ability to integrate surveillance data, all-source 
        intelligence, law enforcement information, and relevant 
        open-source data from public and private sectors, 
        including international partners. Domain awareness is 
        heavily dependent on advanced information collection, 
        analysis, and sharing of that information, and requires 
        unprecedented cooperation and action among the various 
        elements of the public and private sectors, both 
        nationally and internationally, while adhering to laws 
        protecting U.S. civil liberties. To maximize domain 
        awareness, the United States must leverage the diverse 
        capabilities of the intelligence and law enforcement 
        communities to collect, analyze, integrate, and 
        disseminate timely intelligence to provide a shared 
        awareness for United States Government agencies and 
        international partners.
            Additionally, the Nation must refine ongoing 
        efforts to develop shared situational awareness that 
        integrates intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, 
        flight, and other aeronautical data, navigation 
        systems, and other operational information. To ensure 
        effective and coordinated action, access to this domain 
        awareness information must be made available at the 
        appropriate classification level to agencies across the 
        U.S. Government, other local government actors, 
        industry partners and the international community. The 
        Nation will continue to enhance the capabilities of 
        current information systems and develop new 
        capabilities and procedures to locate and track 
        aviation threats and illicit activities. Initiatives to 
        maximize domain awareness include:
                 1A The United States Government will maximize 
                its capability to detect and monitor aircraft 
                within its airspace, from large commercial 
                aircraft to low-altitude, low-observable manned 
                or unmanned aircraft, as well as the area 
                contiguous to U.S. airspace and other airspace 
                that might be of national security interest. 
                Priority for surveillance will be given to 
                those assets and those regions identified in 
                specific national level documents.
                 1A The United States Government will enhance 
                its situational awareness through monitoring to 
                include the combination of information sources 
                regarding a flight (for example, airframe 
                characteristic, onboard sensors, crew, 
                passengers, Federal Air Marshals onboard, 
                Federal Flight Deck Officers and domestic and 
                foreign law enforcement).
                 1A The United States Government will develop 
                and encourage regulatory and private sector 
                initiatives to enhance supply chain security 
                practices and advance robust information 
                collection for persons and cargo.
                 1A The United States Government will work 
                with international partners to develop 
                agreements that promote enhanced visibility 
                into the aviation supply chain and the movement 
                of cargo and passengers and will participate in 
                international coalitions to share aviation 
                situational awareness, as protocols permit, on 
                a timely basis.
                 1A The United States Government will continue 
                to improve and invest in an analytic work 
                force, enhanced sensor technology, human 
                intelligence collection, and information 
                processing tools to persistently monitor the 
                Air Domain.
                 1A The United States Government will enhance 
                the global aviation intelligence capability to 
                strengthen intelligence analysis, coordination, 
                and integration.
                 1A The United States Government will enhance 
                the Aviation Transportation System to provide 
                shared situational awareness to disseminate 
                information to both public and private users at 
                the Federal, State, local, and tribal levels.
                 1A The United States Government will support 
                transformational research and development 
                programs in information fusion and analysis to 
                advance to the next level of threat assessment.
                 1A The United States Government, with the 
                cooperation of its foreign partners, will 
                monitor those aircraft, cargo, and persons of 
                interest from the point of origin, throughout 
                the route of flight, to the point of entry, to 
                ensure the integrity of the transit, to manage 
                aviation traffic routing, and if necessary, to 
                interdict and/ or divert aircraft for law 
                enforcement or defensive action.

Deploy Layered Security
            Deploying layered security will be a critical 
        enabler for strategic objectives such as deterring and 
        preventing terrorist attacks, protecting the United 
        States and its interests in the Air Domain, and 
        mitigating damage and expediting recovery. The ability 
        to achieve aviation security is contingent upon an 
        active, layered aviation security and defense in-depth 
        that integrates the capabilities of public and private 
        sector entities acting in concert and using diverse and 
        complementary measures, rather than relying on a single 
        point solution. At a minimum, a layered approach to 
        aviation security means further applying some measure 
        of security to each of the following points: 
        transportation; staff; passengers; conveyances; access 
        control; cargo and baggage; airports; and in-flight 
        security. Together, as one integrated system, these 
        measures allow for resilience against expected and 
        unexpected attack scenarios. Not only does each layer 
        add to security, but its combination serves as a force 
        multiplier. This layered security deters attacks, which 
        otherwise might be executed in a multiple, 
        simultaneous, catastrophic manner, by continually 
        disrupting an adversary's deliberate planning process. 
        The implementation of a new security layer must be cost 
        effective, both in absolute terms and relative to other 
        possible measures, and must protect information privacy 
        and other rights provided by law. Initiatives to 
        enhance layered security include the following:
                 1A The United States Government will further 
                integrate and align all aviation security 
                programs and initiatives into a comprehensive, 
                cohesive national effort of scalable, layered 
                security.
                 1A The United States Government will enhance 
                its capabilities and procedures to identify, 
                intercept, and defeat aviation threats in the 
                air or on the ground.
                 1A The United States Government will expand 
                domestic partnerships with the public and 
                private sector to train and equip domestic 
                security forces, consistent with their 
                jurisdiction and legal authority, to provide 
                physical security for key assets and critical 
                infrastructure to detect, identify, interdict, 
                and defeat aviation threats on the ground.
                 1A The United States Government will conduct 
                and sponsor further development, and where 
                appropriate, encourage implementation of new 
                and emerging technologies including both 
                aircraft-borne and ground-based systems for 
                detection of WMD, as well as for reducing 
                susceptibility/ vulnerability or increasing 
                survivability of aircraft to these and other 
                terrorist threats.
                 1A The United States Government will enhance 
                procedures for identifying and designating 
                flights of interest, as well as coordinating 
                procedures for any subsequent operational 
                response.
                 1A The United States must have well-trained, 
                properly equipped, and ready ground-based 
                aviation security response forces from State, 
                regional, local, and tribal law enforcement 
                agencies, in addition to a Federal response 
                force ready to detect, deter, interdict, and 
                defeat any potential adversary.
                 1A The United States Government will further 
                collaborate with State, local, and tribal 
                governments and the private sector to assess 
                and prioritize critical facilities, resources, 
                infrastructure, and venues that are at greatest 
                risk from hostile or unlawful acts.
                 1A The United States Government will enhance 
                and expand its capability to assess risks posed 
                by individuals with access to the Air Domain.
                 1A The United States Government, using a 
                risk-based methodology, will continue to 
                develop measures for the prevention and 
                detection of MANPADS or other stand-off weapon 
                attack on domestic commercial aircraft.
            Integrating diverse aviation security layers not 
        only requires a clear delineation of roles and 
        responsibilities but also a mutual understanding and 
        acceptance of the supporting nature of overlapping 
        authorities and capabilities of U.S. Government 
        departments and agencies. In particular, to achieve 
        unity of effort and operational effectiveness, aviation 
        security assets must have a high degree of 
        interoperability, reinforced by joint interagency and 
        international training and exercises to ensure a high 
        rate of readiness. Coordination protocols must define 
        procedures for ensuring national execution of aviation 
        security policy for specific threats or incidents.
            The integrated planning and management of Federal, 
        State, local, and tribal resources, reinforced with 
        regular exercises, is essential for an effective 
        response. Therefore, agencies will further coordinate 
        training, planning, and other resources, where 
        practical and permissible, to standardize operational 
        concepts, develop common technology requirements, and 
        coordinate budget planning for aviation security 
        missions. Interagency acquisition and logistics 
        processes must support the continuous assessment of all 
        requirements to optimize the allocation of appropriate 
        resources and capabilities. Cooperative research and 
        development efforts, coupled with reformed acquisition 
        processes with coordinated requirements, funding, and 
        scheduling, along with management, will identify 
        current and future needs.

Promote a Safe, Efficient, and Secure Aviation Transportation 
System
            Promoting a safe, efficient, and secure system will 
        help meet the strategic objectives of protecting the 
        United States and its interests in the Air Domain and 
        minimizing the impact on the Aviation Transportation 
        System and the U.S. economy. Potential adversaries will 
        attempt to exploit existing vulnerabilities, choosing 
        the time and place to act according to the weaknesses 
        they perceive. Private owners and operators of 
        infrastructure, facilities, and resources are the first 
        line of defense and should undertake basic facility 
        security improvements. Defenses against terrorist 
        attacks and criminal acts can be improved by embedding 
        scalable security measures that reduce systemic or 
        physical vulnerabilities. The elimination of 
        vulnerabilities depends upon incorporating best 
        practices and establishing centers of excellence, 
        including feedback mechanisms for lessons learned, and 
        open avenues for internal and external stakeholders to 
        propose and develop security innovations, as well as a 
        periodic review of each country's security standards 
        for mutual compatibility. Initiatives to promote a 
        safe, efficient, and secure Aviation Transportation 
        System include the following:
                 1A The United States Government will assume 
                the function, currently performed by the 
                airlines, of checking passenger information 
                against terrorist watchlist information 
                maintained by the United States Government and 
                vetting such information before the departure 
                of any regularly scheduled commercial flight 
                for which the place of departure, the place of 
                destination, or any scheduled stopping place is 
                within the United States (a ``U.S. Flight''). 
                The United States Government will also 
                determine the security utility of performing 
                such function with respect to flights that only 
                pass through U.S. airspace and, if necessary, 
                develop a system by which this function will be 
                performed for such flights.
                 1A The United States Government will continue 
                to collaborate with domestic and international 
                partners to identify options to enhance risk-
                based screening of passengers, including, the 
                checking of passenger information against 
                terrorist watchlist information for regularly 
                scheduled commercial passenger flights that 
                overfly the territorial airspace of the United 
                States.
                 1A The United States Government, in 
                coordination with public and private partners, 
                will establish requirements for the continued 
                implementation of air cargo transportation 
                security measures, including all-cargo 
                carriers, combination carriers, and indirect 
                air carriers operating to, from, or within the 
                United States.
                 1A The United States Government will develop 
                requirements for the improvement of airspace 
                and air traffic management-related security 
                measures.
                 1A The United States Government and the 
                private sector will continue to conduct 
                vulnerability assessments to identify security 
                measures that require improvement. A consistent 
                risk management approach, which requires a 
                comprehensive assessment of threat, likelihood, 
                vulnerability, and criticality, will allow the 
                private sector to invest in protective measures 
                as a supporting business function.
                 1A The United States Government will 
                encourage the private sector, by means of 
                outcome-based security standards, incentives, 
                and market mechanisms, to conduct comprehensive 
                self-assessments of its supply chain security 
                practices.
                 1A The United States Government will 
                recommend measures to strengthen the prevention 
                of entry by, and detection of, individuals with 
                malicious intent who possess or seek to possess 
                clearance or credentials that permit entry into 
                secure or restricted areas within the Aviation 
                Transportation System.

Enhance International Cooperation
            Enhancing international cooperation will be a 
        critical enabler for strategic objectives such as 
        protecting the United States and the Air Domain, 
        actively engaging domestic and international partners, 
        as well as deterring and preventing terrorist attacks 
        and criminal or hostile acts. The United States 
        supports enhancing cooperation among nations and 
        international organizations that share common interests 
        regarding the security of the Air Domain. New 
        initiatives are needed to ensure that all nations 
        fulfill their responsibilities to prevent and respond 
        to terrorist or criminal actions with timely and 
        effective enforcement, including:
                 1A The United States Government will work 
                with foreign partners to enhance international 
                mechanisms to improve transparency in the 
                registration of aircraft, identification of 
                aircraft owners, and transparency of the cargo 
                supply chain.
                 1A The United States Government will further 
                cooperate with foreign partners to enhance and 
                encourage adoption of international standards 
                and best practices as well as to align 
                regulation and enforcement measures. This will 
                include initiatives pursued through 
                international organizations, such as the 
                International Civil Aviation Organization 
                (ICAO), that include industry participation.
                 1A The United States Government will enhance 
                cooperative mechanisms for coordinating 
                international responses to aviation threats 
                that may span national boundaries and 
                jurisdictions.
                 1A The United States will continue to work 
                closely with other governments and 
                international and regional organizations to 
                enhance the aviation security capabilities of 
                other key nations by offering aviation and 
                airport security assistance, training, and 
                consultation.
                 1A The United States Government will promote 
                the implementation of the international anti-
                air piracy conventions and other international 
                aviation security arrangements and initiatives.

Assure Continuity of the Aviation Transportation System
            Assuring the continuity of the Aviation 
        Transportation System will be a critical enabler for 
        strategic objectives such as mitigating damage and 
        expediting recovery, as well as minimizing the impact 
        on the Aviation Transportation System. The United 
        States will be prepared to maintain vital commerce and 
        defense readiness in the aftermath of an attack or 
        other similarly disruptive incident that may occur 
        within the Air Domain. Threats in the Air Domain are 
        dynamic and adaptive; therefore, prevention and 
        protection efforts cannot be relied upon to prevent all 
        attacks. Resiliency of the Aviation Transportation 
        System and response and recovery efforts are important 
        to minimize the consequences of a disruption within the 
        system and U.S. economy. This requires: a common 
        framework with clearly defined roles for those charged 
        with response and recovery; ready forces that are 
        properly trained and equipped to manage incidents, 
        especially those involving WMD; carefully crafted and 
        exercised contingency plans for response, recovery, and 
        reconstitution; and extensive coordination among 
        public, private, and international communities. 
        Initiatives to assure the continuity of the Aviation 
        Transportation System include:
                 1A The United States Government will develop 
                response and recovery protocols, consistent 
                with the NIMS, to ensure a comprehensive and 
                integrated national effort. Ultimately, these 
                efforts will also need to be aligned with the 
                National Preparedness Goal (NPG), which will 
                establish readiness priorities, targets, and 
                metrics.
                 1A The United States Government will enhance 
                the emergency preparedness for the Aviation 
                Transportation System. This will include pre-
                staging of resources as necessary, 
                coordinating, and planning exercises with first 
                responders, and planning for restoring the 
                function of the Aviation Transportation System 
                in the event of an incident.
                 1A The United States Government will develop 
                protocols, mechanisms, and processes to 
                mitigate the operational and economic damage 
                from an attack, including the possibility of 
                temporarily suspending or restricting flight 
                operations in select areas of the National 
                Airspace System.
                 1A The United States Government, in 
                coordination with public and private sector 
                partners, will establish near-term and long-
                term recovery strategies to support the 
                Aviation Transportation System in the event of 
                an attack.
                 1A The United States Government will identify 
                gaps in recovery option capabilities and, 
                working with our State, local, and tribal 
                government, private sector, and international 
                partners, develop appropriate operational and 
                technical solutions to address those gaps.
            The direct and indirect costs associated with a 
        prolonged and systemic disruption of the Aviation 
        Transportation System can be significantly reduced by 
        following the provisions of in-place contingency and 
        continuity plans. These plans for assessment, recovery, 
        and reconstitution must prioritize local, regional, and 
        national interests, as well as manage risk and 
        uncertainty within acceptable levels. These contingency 
        and continuity plans must be developed and exercised in 
        a coordinated fashion by the public and private 
        sectors.

Roles and Responsibilities
            Because of the complexity and global nature of the 
        Aviation Transportation System, responsibility for 
        preventing, responding to, and, if necessary, 
        recovering from attacks in the Air Domain extends 
        across all levels of government and across private and 
        public sectors. No single entity alone can prevent or 
        mitigate the impact of an attack in the Air Domain. The 
        entities below have roles and responsibilities that 
        fulfill executive orders or statutory responsibilities 
        for Air Domain activities. Given the unique operating 
        environment of the Air Domain, any of these entities 
        may need to perform a specific lead or supporting 
        functional role based on the threat scenario and the 
        outcome desired by the United States Government. In 
        determining whether a specific entity is suitable to 
        perform this role, the following criteria will be 
        considered:
                 1A existing law;
                 1A desired outcome;
                 1A response capabilities required;
                 1A asset availability; and
                 1A authority to act.
            To the maximum extent feasible and appropriate, 
        Federal departments and agencies must coordinate their 
        activities with other Federal, State, local, and tribal 
        governments, as well as law enforcement and emergency 
        response agencies.

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
            In accordance with NSPD-47/HSPD-16, the Secretary 
        of Homeland Security is responsible for closely 
        coordinating United States Government activities 
        encompassing the national aviation security programs 
        including identifying conflicting procedures, 
        identifying vulnerabilities and consequences, and 
        coordinating corresponding interagency solutions. In 
        support of these responsibilities, the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security:
                 1A will conduct regular reviews of national 
                aviation security programs to identify 
                conflicting procedures, identify changes to 
                threats, vulnerabilities, and resulting 
                consequences, and coordinate corresponding 
                interagency mitigation measures;
                 1A will inform Federal government departments 
                when there have been fundamentally significant 
                recommended or actual changes resulting from 
                regular reviews of national aviation security 
                programs;
                 1A will undertake additional initiatives, as 
                appropriate, to maximize aviation security for 
                the United States and its interests;
                 1A is responsible for aviation security law 
                enforcement operations and enforcement and 
                investigation of criminal law violations within 
                the jurisdiction of its law enforcement 
                components;
                 1A is responsible at borders and ports-of-
                entry for inspection, determining 
                admissibility, and monitoring of persons, 
                conveyances, and cargo traveling via air to 
                ensure compliance with all U.S. laws, including 
                those designed to prevent terrorists, 
                criminals, and terrorist weapons and contraband 
                from entering or exiting the United States; for 
                securing the transport of passengers and cargo 
                by air through domestic and international 
                screening of passengers, baggage, and air 
                cargo; for issuing regulations and security 
                directives necessary to ensure the security of 
                commercial and general aviation aircraft and 
                airport operations; for deployment of law 
                enforcement on U.S. flagged commercial flights; 
                and for coordination of airport access control 
                and other security measures;
                 1A is responsible for directing law 
                enforcement activity related to the safety of 
                passengers onboard aircraft that are involved 
                in acts of hijackings and air piracy from the 
                moment all external doors of the aircraft are 
                closed following boarding until those doors are 
                opened to allow passengers to leave the 
                aircraft;
                 1A is responsible for collaborating with 
                State, local, and tribal governments and the 
                private sector to assess and prioritize 
                critical facilities, resources, infrastructure, 
                and venues that are at greatest risk from 
                hostile or unlawful acts;
                 1A is responsible for developing technologies 
                to protect assets in the Air Domain against 
                threats such as WMD, MANPADS, and carry-on/ 
                cargo weapons (but not high-end military 
                threats like cruise missiles, which are the 
                purview of the Department of Defense (DoD)), 
                and developing other technologies that 
                facilitate protective measures such as voice 
                and data communications with Federal law 
                enforcement officers;
                 1A is responsible for operational 
                coordination with other United States 
                Government departments and agencies, as well as 
                with foreign governments, in the prevention of 
                and response to aviation security incidents;
                 1A is responsible for advancing common 
                security interests in the Air Domain; and
                 1A is responsible for effecting information 
                sharing related to aviation security in support 
                of an improved global aviation security 
                network.

Department of Transportation (DOT)
            The Secretary of Transportation, whose Department 
        includes the country's civil aviation authority and air 
        navigation services provider, is responsible for the 
        regulation and operation of the National Airspace 
        System (NAS). As an integral part of his 
        responsibilities, the Secretary of Transportation is 
        responsible for protecting the nation and U.S. 
        interests in the Air Domain by conducting a broad range 
        of national defense, homeland security, law 
        enforcement, and crisis response related activities, 
        including, but not limited to the following:
                 1A the safe, efficient, and, in cooperation 
                with the Secretaries of Homeland Security and 
                Defense, and other key stakeholders, secure 
                operation of aircraft flying within the 
                country's airspace and that airspace that has 
                been delegated to the United States for the 
                purposes of air navigation services;
                 1A coordinating and managing the air 
                navigation services, regulatory activities, and 
                related functions to support national defense, 
                homeland security, law enforcement, and crisis 
                response missions undertaken by Federal, State, 
                local, and tribal entities, including the 
                imposition of temporary flight restrictions and 
                provision of Air Traffic Control support;
                 1A ensuring the safety of aviation security 
                driven modifications to U.S. registered 
                aircraft and of other aviation security 
                systems, which could affect civil air traffic 
                and the country's air navigation services; the 
                security of the NAS's critical infrastructure, 
                including Air Traffic Control facilities; and
                 1A designated leadership of NGATS/JPDO 
                development, responsible for coordinating of 
                Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DHS, 
                DoD, National Aeronautics and Space 
                Administration, Department of Commerce, and the 
                Office of Science and Technology Policy 
                participation.

Department of Justice (DOJ)
            The Attorney General is responsible for:
                 1A the ground-based tactical response to 
                resolve or defeat a hijacking, air piracy, or 
                other terrorist threat;
                 1A the investigation and prosecution of 
                terrorist acts or terrorist threats by 
                individuals or groups inside the United States, 
                or directed at U.S. citizens or institutions 
                abroad, where such acts are within the Federal 
                criminal jurisdiction of the United States;
                 1A enforcement and investigation of criminal 
                law violations within its jurisdiction that 
                occur in the Air Domain, and all Federal 
                prosecutions arising from these incidents;
                 1A coordinating the activities of other 
                members of the law enforcement community to 
                detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist 
                attacks against the United States; and
                 1A intelligence collection, 
                counterintelligence, and foreign intelligence 
                sharing under guidelines established in statute 
                and policy.

Department of Defense (DoD)
            The Secretary of Defense is responsible for:
                 1A deterring, defending against, and 
                defeating aviation threats to the United States 
                and its global interests;
                 1A airborne response and resolution of 
                nation-state threats within the Air Domain;
                 1A the operational response to actual or 
                potential airborne threats in U.S. airspace or 
                the air approaches to the United States, until 
                the threat has either been resolved or 
                defeated;
                 1A taking a lead or supporting role for 
                response to aviation terrorist threats globally 
                as part of the United States Government's 
                active, layered defense of the Nation;
                 1A conducting defense support of civil 
                authorities as directed by the President of the 
                United States or the Secretary of Defense; and
                 1A advising Federal civilian agencies on 
                possible technology development solutions to 
                capability gaps and shall consider 
                collaborative development efforts where 
                appropriate.
            DoD is a formally designated partner in NGATS/JPDO 
        initiative through its leadership of the Shared 
        Situational Awareness Integrated Product Team (IPT).

Department of State (DOS)
            The Secretary of State is responsible for:
                 1A coordinating United States Government 
                initiatives that involve foreign governments 
                and international organizations, including 
                regional aviation security cooperation;
                 1A visa adjudication;
                 1A giving foreign policy guidance on the U.S. 
                response to actual or potential airborne 
                threats in the air approaches to the United 
                States if those threats are in foreign or 
                international airspace and this is possible in 
                the time available;
                 1A notifying international partners of 
                measures that may affect the exercise of rights 
                under bilateral or multilateral aviation 
                agreements;
                 1A conducting global diplomatic coordination 
                in support of aviation operational threat 
                response, including coordination with foreign 
                states to obtain required authorizations for 
                operations and to facilitate United States 
                Government assistance to operational threat 
                response activities within the jurisdiction of 
                those states, when requested;
                 1A leading operational threat response public 
                affairs activity when it is decided to take an 
                action or refrain from an action based 
                primarily on considerations of foreign policy, 
                and in these cases, the Secretary of State 
                shall also coordinate with other applicable 
                agencies in developing public statements 
                regarding the operational threat response 
                activities and in relaying appropriate press 
                guidance to agencies requesting it;
                 1A evaluating and granting flight clearance 
                into the United States and its territories for 
                foreign military and government-owned aircraft 
                along with any aircraft chartered to transport 
                a cabinet minister or other senior foreign 
                government official, or other official 
                delegation intending to land in, or overfly, 
                the U.S. and its possessions;
                 1A enhancing multilateral nonproliferation 
                controls on MANPADS, and other stand-off 
                weapons systems that pose a threat to civilian 
                and military aviation, and engaging states to 
                seek their adherence to and implementation of 
                those controls;
                 1A implementing MANPADS destruction programs 
                to reduce the global availability of these 
                weapons and provides training and assistance to 
                help states fulfill their MANPADS counter-
                proliferation obligations and combat illicit 
                arms trade and trafficking within and across 
                their borders; and
                 1A administering and authorizing sanctions 
                that could be applied to governments, entities, 
                or individuals that engage in the proliferation 
                of WMD, MANPADS and other stand-off weapons 
                systems, when those activities meet the 
                statutory and regulatory criteria.

Department of Energy (DOE)
            The Secretary of Energy is responsible for:
                 1A providing scientific and technical 
                expertise in nuclear weapons design and 
                specially equipped teams to conduct search, 
                support response, and assist in recovery, and 
                consequence management operations during any 
                radiological or nuclear incident;
                 1A providing radiation detection systems and 
                associated training at foreign border 
                crossings, airports, and seaports to detect and 
                deter illicit trafficking in nuclear and other 
                radioactive materials across international 
                borders; and
                 1A coordinating radiologically contaminated 
                debris management associated with disposition 
                of WMD-related materials and aircraft that may 
                be affected by such materials or attacks.

Department of Commerce (DOC)
            The Secretary of Commerce is responsible for:
                 1A providing aviation industry and trade 
                policy expertise in both interagency policy 
                efforts and international negotiations;
                 1A engaging in cooperative efforts on 
                aviation trade issues in numerous international 
                bodies and fora, including ICAO, the Security 
                and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) with Canada 
                and Mexico, the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
                and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
                (APEC) forum;
                 1A providing analysis of the impact of 
                domestic regulations and international trade 
                agreements on the aviation industry and the 
                broader economy;
                 1A providing the scientific and technical 
                expertise necessary to measure and verify that 
                devices, equipment, and technologies meet or 
                exceed the requirements necessary to maintain 
                and advance the security of the Air Domain;
                 1A providing weather forecast and analysis 
                services integral to the operations of the 
                Aviation Transportation System;
                 1A providing harmonization of U.S. and 
                international standards that are necessary for 
                facilitation of aviation-related commerce; and
                 1A participating in the NGATS initiative 
                through its leadership of the Weather IPT.

Office of The Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
            The Director of National Intelligence is 
        responsible for:
                 1A developing, sustaining, and continually 
                strengthening a unified Intelligence Community 
                enterprise that supports Federal, State, 
                regional, local, tribal, and private sector 
                entities by collecting, analyzing, and 
                disseminating accurate, timely, and relevant 
                all-source intelligence for the safe and 
                effective use of the air, related 
                transportation, and other threat domains;
                 1A defining, creating, and propagating the 
                business rules, policies, and technical 
                standards for an Intelligence Community 
                enterprise environment for information sharing 
                and intelligence integration across the air 
                related transportation, and other threat 
                domains;
                 1A overseeing the primary organization in the 
                U.S. Government for analyzing and integrating 
                all intelligence possessed or acquired by the 
                United States Government pertaining to 
                terrorism and counterterrorism, except 
                intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic 
                terrorists and domestic counterterrorism; and
                 1A overseeing National Intelligence Program 
                activities that support transportation 
                security, including in the Air Domain, by 
                leveraging innovative collection and analytical 
                techniques, developing and employing effective 
                counterintelligence measures that preserve the 
                integrity of aviation security information, and 
                respecting the civil liberties and privacy of 
                all Americans.

State, Local, and Tribal Governments
            Some of the Nation's aviation infrastructure is 
        owned and operated by State, local, and tribal 
        governments. State Governors and/ or homeland security 
        agencies, in addition to local and tribal governments, 
        hold a leadership position to address specific aviation 
        security needs or issues and response. During 
        extraordinary circumstances, the Federal government may 
        assume lead security responsibility. Typically, except 
        for cross-border traffic, lead responsibility will 
        remain with the States, localities, or tribes. Specific 
        responsibilities of State, local, and tribal 
        governments are discussed in the NIPP and corresponding 
        TSSP. State, local, and tribal governments are 
        currently working with the Federal government to 
        identify critical transportation assets, conduct the 
        necessary vulnerability assessments, and develop 
        security plans to protect those assets. They are also 
        developing their response and recovery capabilities to 
        address terrorist attacks and other disruptive 
        incidents, and to meet the NPG.

Private Sector
            Substantial segments of the Nation's aviation 
        transportation infrastructure are owned and operated by 
        private sector entities. As such, an effective national 
        aviation security strategy must be supported by a 
        private sector that internalizes a strong security 
        culture, embedding best practices and government 
        requirements into day-to-day operations. It is the 
        responsibility of private sector owners to conduct and 
        execute business continuity planning, integrate 
        security planning with disaster recovery planning, and 
        to actively participate with Federal, State, local, and 
        tribal governments to improve security in the aviation 
        sector.

Conclusion
            The Strategy presents a vision for aviation 
        security that seeks to secure the people and interests 
        of the United States. Moreover, it underscores the 
        Nation's commitment to strengthening international 
        partnerships and advancing economic well-being around 
        the globe by facilitating commerce and abiding by the 
        principles of freedom of the airways. The sheer 
        magnitude of the Air Domain complicates the arduous and 
        complex task of maintaining aviation security. The 
        United States confronts a diverse set of adversaries 
        fully prepared to exploit this vast domain for 
        nefarious purposes. The Air Domain serves as the medium 
        for a variety of threats that honor no national 
        frontier and that seek to imperil the peace and 
        prosperity of the world. Many of these threats mingle 
        with legitimate commerce, either to provide concealment 
        for carrying out hostile acts, or to make available 
        weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, 
        and related materials to nations and non-state actors 
        of concern.
            In this ambiguous security environment, responding 
        to these unpredictable threats requires teamwork to 
        prevent attacks, protect people and infrastructure, 
        minimize damage, and expedite recovery. The response 
        necessitates the integration and alignment of all 
        aviation security programs and initiatives into a far-
        reaching and unified national effort involving Federal, 
        State, local, and tribal governments, as well as 
        private sector organizations. Since September 11, 2001, 
        Federal departments and agencies have risen 
        uncompromisingly to the challenge of ensuring aviation 
        security. The challenges that remain ahead for the 
        Nation, the adversaries it confronts, and the 
        environment in which it operates compel the United 
        States to strengthen its ties with international 
        partners and to seek new relationships with others. 
        Therefore, international cooperation is critical to 
        ensuring that lawful private and public activities in 
        the Air Domain are protected from attack and hostile or 
        unlawful exploitation. Such collaboration is 
        fundamental to worldwide economic stability and growth, 
        and it is vital to the interests of the United States. 
        It is only through such an integrated approach among 
        all aviation partners, governmental and non-
        governmental, public, and private, that the United 
        States can improve the security of the Air Domain.
            Thus, effective implementation of the Strategy 
        requires greater cooperation. It requires deeper trust 
        and confidence, not less. It requires a concerted 
        application of collective capabilities to: increase 
        awareness of all people, activities, and events in the 
        Air Domain; enhance aviation security frameworks 
        domestically and internationally through constant 
        innovation; deploy an active, layered aviation security 
        and defense in-depth based on law enforcement 
        authorities, military capabilities, and private sector 
        partners' competencies; pursue transformational 
        research and development to move to the next level of 
        information fusion and analysis and WMD detection 
        technologies for qualitative improvements in threat 
        detection; improve our response posture should a threat 
        emerge; and enhance our recovery should an incident 
        occur.


              Homeland Security Presidential Directive--17



                              ----------                              



HSPD--17 is a Classified document and not available for 
release.
              Homeland Security Presidential Directive--18

      Medical Countermeasures Against Weapons of Mass Destruction

                              ----------                              


BACKGROUND
            (1)  Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) chemical, 
        biological, radiological, and nuclear agents (CBRN) in 
        the possession of hostile states or terrorists 
        represent one of the greatest security challenges 
        facing the United States. An attack utilizing WMD 
        potentially could cause mass casualties, compromise 
        critical infrastructure, adversely affect our economy, 
        and inflict social and psychological damage that could 
        negatively affect the American way of life.
            (2)  Our National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 
        Mass Destruction (December 2002) and Biodefense for the 
        21st Century (April 2004) identify response and 
        recovery as key components of our Nation's ability to 
        manage the consequences of a WMD attack. Our primary 
        goal is to prevent such an attack, but we must be fully 
        prepared to respond to and recover from an attack if 
        one occurs. Accordingly, we have made significant 
        investments in our WMD consequence management 
        capabilities in order to mitigate impacts to the 
        public's health, the economy, and our critical 
        infrastructure. The development and acquisition of 
        effective medical countermeasures to mitigate illness, 
        suffering, and death resulting from CBRN agents is 
        central to our consequence management efforts.
            (3)  It is not presently feasible to develop and 
        stockpile medical countermeasures against every 
        possible threat. The development of vaccines and drugs 
        to prevent or mitigate adverse health effects caused by 
        exposure to biological agents, chemicals, or radiation 
        is a time-consuming and costly process. This directive 
        builds upon the vision and objectives articulated in 
        our National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
        Destruction and Biodefense for the 21st Century to 
        ensure that our Nation's medical countermeasure 
        research, development, and acquisition efforts:
                    (a)  Target threats that have potential for 
                catastrophic impact on our public health and 
                are subject to medical mitigation;
                    (b)  Yield a rapidly deployable and 
                flexible capability to address both existing 
                and evolving threats;
                    (c)  Are part of an integrated WMD 
                consequence management approach informed by 
                current risk assessments of threats, 
                vulnerabilities, and capabilities; and
                    (d)  Include the development of effective, 
                feasible, and pragmatic concepts of operation 
                for responding to and recovering from an 
                attack.
            (4)  In order to address the challenges presented 
        by the diverse CBRN threat spectrum, optimize the 
        investments necessary for medical countermeasures 
        development, and ensure that our activities 
        significantly enhance our domestic and international 
        response and recovery capabilities, our decisions as to 
        the research, development, and acquisition of medical 
        countermeasures will be guided by three overarching 
        principles:
                    (a)  Our preparations will focus on 
                countering current and anticipated threat 
                agents that have the greatest potential for use 
                by state and non-state actors to cause 
                catastrophic public health consequences to the 
                American people.
                    (b)  We will invest in medical 
                countermeasures and public health interventions 
                that have the greatest potential to prevent, 
                treat, and mitigate the consequences of WMD 
                threats.
                    (c)  We will link acquisition of medical 
                countermeasures to the existence of effective 
                deployment strategies that are supportable by 
                the present and foreseeable operational and 
                logistic capabilities of Federal, State, and 
                local assets following a WMD attack or other 
                event that presents a catastrophic public 
                health impact.
            (5)  Mitigating illness and preventing death are 
        the principal goals of our medical countermeasure 
        efforts. As a class, biological agents offer the 
        greatest opportunity for such medical mitigation, and 
        this directive prioritizes our countermeasure efforts 
        accordingly. This directive also provides for tailoring 
        our Nation's ongoing research and acquisition efforts 
        to continue to yield new countermeasures against CBRN 
        agents and for incorporating such new discoveries into 
        our domestic and international response and recovery 
        planning efforts.

Biological Threats
            (6)  The biological threat spectrum can be framed 
        in four distinct categories, each of which presents 
        unique challenges and significant opportunities for 
        developing medical countermeasures:
                    (a)  Traditional Agents: Traditional agents 
                are naturally occurring microorganisms or toxin 
                products with the potential to be disseminated 
                to cause mass casualties. Examples of 
                traditional agents include Bacillus anthracis 
                (anthrax) and Yersinia pestis (plague).
                    (b)  Enhanced Agents: Enhanced agents are 
                traditional agents that have been modified or 
                selected to enhance their ability to harm human 
                populations or circumvent current 
                countermeasures, such as a bacterium that has 
                been modified to resist antibiotic treatment.
                    (c)  Emerging Agents: Emerging agents are 
                previously unrecognized pathogens that might be 
                naturally occurring and present a serious risk 
                to human populations, such as the virus 
                responsible for Severe Acute Respiratory 
                Syndrome (SARS). Tools to detect and treat 
                these agents might not exist or might not be 
                widely available.
                    (d)  Advanced Agents: Advanced agents are 
                novel pathogens or other materials of 
                biological nature that have been artificially 
                engineered in the laboratory to bypass 
                traditional countermeasures or produce a more 
                severe or otherwise enhanced spectrum of 
                disease.

Nuclear and Radiological Threats
            (7)  Threats posed by fissile and other 
        radiological material will persist. Our Nation must 
        improve its biodosimetry capabilities and continue to 
        develop medical countermeasures as appropriate to 
        mitigate the health effects of radiation exposure from 
        the following threats:
                    (a)  Improvised Nuclear Devices: Improvised 
                nuclear devices incorporate radioactive 
                materials designed to result in the formation 
                of a nuclear-yield reaction. Such devices can 
                be wholly fabricated or can be created by 
                modifying a nuclear weapon.
                    (b)  Radiological Dispersal Devices: 
                Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs) are 
                devices, other than a nuclear explosive device, 
                designed to disseminate radioactive material to 
                cause destruction, damage, or injury.
                    (c)  Intentional Damage or Destruction of a 
                Nuclear Power Plant: Deliberate acts that cause 
                damage to a reactor core and destruction of the 
                containment facility of a nuclear reactor could 
                contaminate a wide geographic area with 
                radioactive material.

Chemical Threats
            (8)  Existing and new types of chemicals present a 
        range of threats. Development of targeted medical 
        countermeasures might be warranted for materials in the 
        following categories:
                    (a)  Toxic Industrial Materials and 
                Chemicals: Toxic Industrial Materials and 
                Chemicals are toxic substances in solid, 
                liquid, or gaseous form that are used or stored 
                for use for military or commercial purposes.
                    (b)  Traditional Chemical Warfare Agents: 
                Traditional chemical warfare agents encompass 
                the range of blood, blister, choking, and nerve 
                agents historically developed for warfighter 
                use.
                    (c)  Non-traditional Agents: Non-
                traditional agents (NTAs) are novel chemical 
                threat agents or toxicants requiring adapted 
                countermeasures.
            (9)  Creating defenses against a finite number of 
        known or anticipated agents is a sound approach for 
        mitigating the most catastrophic CBRN threats; however, 
        we also must simultaneously employ a broad-spectrum 
        ``flexible'' approach to address other current and 
        future threats. We must be capable of responding to a 
        wide variety of potential challenges, including a novel 
        biological agent that is highly communicable, 
        associated with a high rate of morbidity or mortality, 
        and without known countermeasure at the time of its 
        discovery. Although significant technological, 
        organizational, and procedural challenges will have to 
        be overcome, such a balanced strategic approach would 
        mitigate current and future CBRN threats and benefit 
        public health.

POLICY
            (10)  It is the policy of the United States to draw 
        upon the considerable potential of the scientific 
        community in the public and private sectors to address 
        our medical countermeasure requirements relating to 
        CBRN threats. Our Nation will use a two-tiered approach 
        for development and acquisition of medical 
        countermeasures, which will balance the immediate need 
        to provide a capability to mitigate the most 
        catastrophic of the current CBRN threats with long-term 
        requirements to develop more flexible, broader spectrum 
        countermeasures to address future threats. Our approach 
        also will support regulatory decisions and will permit 
        us to address the broadest range of current and future 
        CBRN threats.

Tier I: Focused Development of Agent-Specific Medical 
Countermeasures
            (11)  The first tier uses existing, proven 
        approaches for developing medical countermeasures to 
        address challenges posed by select current and 
        anticipated threats, such as traditional CBRN agents. 
        Recognizing that as threats change our countermeasures 
        might become less effective, we will invest in an 
        integrated and multi-layered defense. Department-level 
        strategies and implementation plans will reflect the 
        following three guiding principles and objectives:
                    (a)  Evaluate and clearly define 
                investments in near- and mid-term defenses: We 
                will develop and use risk assessment processes 
                that integrate data and threat assessments from 
                the life science, consequence management, 
                public health, law enforcement, and 
                intelligence communities to guide investment 
                priorities for current and anticipated threats. 
                We will openly identify the high-risk threats 
                that hold potential for catastrophic 
                consequences to civilian populations and 
                warrant development of targeted 
                countermeasures.
                    (b)  Target medical countermeasure 
                strategies to satisfy practical operational 
                requirements: We will model the potential 
                impact of high-risk threats and develop 
                scenario-based concepts of operations for 
                medical consequence management and public 
                health mitigation and treatment of a large-
                scale attack on our population. These concepts 
                of operations will guide complementary 
                decisions regarding medical countermeasure 
                development and acquisition.
                    (c)  Take advantage of opportunities to 
                buttress U.S. defenses: We will coordinate 
                interagency efforts to identify and evaluate 
                vulnerabilities in our current arsenal of 
                countermeasures to protect the U.S. population. 
                Where appropriate, we will target the 
                development of alternate or supplementary 
                medical countermeasures to ensure that a multi-
                layered defense against the most significant 
                high-impact CBRN threats is established.

Tier II: Development of a Flexible Capability for New Medical 
Countermeasures
            (12)  Second tier activities will emphasize the 
        need to capitalize upon the development of emerging and 
        future technologies that will enhance our ability to 
        respond flexibly to anticipated, emerging, and future 
        CBRN threats. Importantly, this end-state will foster 
        innovations in medical technologies that will provide 
        broad public health benefit. Department-level strategic 
        and implementation plans will reflect the following 
        guiding principles and objectives:
                    (a)  Integrate fundamental discovery and 
                medical development to realize novel medical 
                countermeasure capabilities: We will target 
                some investments to support the development of 
                broad spectrum approaches to surveillance, 
                diagnostics, prophylactics, and therapeutics 
                that utilize platform technologies. This will 
                require targeted, balanced, and sustained 
                investments between fundamental research to 
                discover new technologies and applied research 
                for technology development to deliver new 
                medical capabilities and countermeasures. 
                Although by no means all-inclusive, our goals 
                could include identification and use of early 
                markers for exposure, greater understanding of 
                host responses to target therapeutics, and 
                development of integrated technologies for 
                rapid production of new countermeasures.
                    (b)  Establish a favorable environment for 
                evaluating new approaches: We must ensure that 
                our investments lead to products that expand 
                the scientific data base, increase the 
                efficiency with which safety and efficacy can 
                be evaluated, and improve the rate at which 
                products under Investigational New Drug or 
                Investigational Device Exemption status 
                progress through the regulatory or approval 
                process. In addition, we must continue to use 
                new tools to evaluate and utilize promising 
                candidates in a time of crisis. Examples of 
                such tools include the ``Animal Rule'' for 
                testing the efficacy of medical countermeasures 
                against threat agents when human trials are not 
                ethically feasible and the Emergency Use 
                Authorization. Although by no means all-
                inclusive, our desired end-state could include 
                the use of novel approaches for improved 
                evaluation tools, streamlined clinical trials 
                that meet safety and regulatory needs, and the 
                development and use of novel approaches to 
                manufacturing.
                    (c)  Integrate the products of new and 
                traditional approaches: We must address the 
                challenges that will arise from integrating 
                these new approaches with existing processes. 
                We must incorporate the use of non-
                pharmacological interventions in our response 
                planning. This integration will forge a 
                flexible biodefense capability that aligns our 
                national requirements for medical 
                countermeasures with the concepts of operation 
                that are used in conjunction with other 
                strategies for mitigating the public health 
                impacts of WMD attacks.
            (13)  In order to achieve our Tier I and II 
        objectives, it will be necessary to facilitate the 
        development of products and technologies that show 
        promise but are not yet eligible for procurement 
        through BioShield or the Strategic National Stockpile. 
        We will support the advanced development of these 
        products through targeted investments across a broad 
        portfolio, with the understanding that some of these 
        products may be deemed unsuitable for further 
        investment as additional data becomes available, but 
        the expectation that others will become candidates for 
        procurement.

POLICY ACTIONS
            (14)  We will employ an integrated approach to WMD 
        medical countermeasure development that draws upon the 
        expertise of the public health, life science, defense, 
        homeland security, intelligence, first responder, and 
        law enforcement communities, as well as the private 
        sector, to promote a seamless integration throughout 
        the product development life cycle.
                    (a)  The Secretary of Health and Human 
                Services (Secretary) will lead Federal 
                Government efforts to research, develop, 
                evaluate, and acquire public health emergency 
                medical countermeasures to prevent or mitigate 
                the health effects of CBRN threats facing the 
                U.S. civilian population. The Department of 
                Health and Human Services (HHS) will lead the 
                interagency process and strategic planning and 
                will manage programs supporting medical 
                countermeasures development and acquisition for 
                domestic preparedness.
                            (i)  Stewardship. Not later than 60 
                        days after the date of this directive, 
                        the Secretary shall establish an 
                        interagency committee to provide advice 
                        in setting medical countermeasure 
                        requirements and coordinate HHS 
                        research, development, and procurement 
                        activities. The committee will include 
                        representatives designated by the 
                        Secretaries of Defense and Homeland 
                        Security and the heads of other 
                        appropriate executive departments and 
                        agencies. This committee will serve as 
                        the primary conduit for communication 
                        among entities involved in medical 
                        countermeasure development. The chair 
                        of the committee shall keep the joint 
                        Homeland Security Council/National 
                        Security Council Biodefense Policy 
                        Coordination Committee apprised of HHS 
                        efforts to integrate investment 
                        strategies and the Federal Government's 
                        progress in the development and 
                        acquisition of medical countermeasures.
                            (ii)  Strategic Planning. Not later 
                        than 60 days after the date of this 
                        directive, the Secretary shall 
                        establish a dedicated strategic 
                        planning activity to integrate risk-
                        based requirements across the threat 
                        spectrum and over the full range of 
                        research, early-, mid-, and late-stage 
                        development, acquisition, deployment, 
                        and life-cycle management of medical 
                        countermeasures. The Secretary shall 
                        align all relevant HHS programs and 
                        functions to support this strategic 
                        planning.
                            (iii)  Execution. The Secretary 
                        shall ensure that the efforts of 
                        component agencies, centers and 
                        institutes are coordinated and targeted 
                        to facilitate both development of near-
                        term medical countermeasures and 
                        transformation of our capability to 
                        address future challenges. The 
                        Secretary shall also establish an 
                        advanced development portfolio that 
                        targets investments in promising 
                        countermeasures and technologies that 
                        are beyond early development, but not 
                        yet ready for acquisition 
                        consideration. In order to realize the 
                        full potential for broad partnership 
                        with academia and industry, the 
                        Secretary shall ensure that HHS 
                        coordinates strategies and 
                        implementation plans in a manner that 
                        conveys integrated priorities, 
                        activities, and objectives across the 
                        spectrum of relevant Federal 
                        participants.
                            (iv)  Engaging the Private Sector 
                        and Nongovernmental Entities. The 
                        Secretary shall develop and implement a 
                        strategy to engage the unique expertise 
                        and capabilities of the private sector 
                        in developing medical countermeasures 
                        to combat WMD, and shall provide clear 
                        and timely communication of HHS 
                        priorities and objectives. The 
                        Secretary shall consider creating an 
                        advisory committee composed of leading 
                        experts from academia and the biotech 
                        and pharmaceutical industries to 
                        provide insight on barriers to progress 
                        and help identify promising innovations 
                        and solutions to problems such as life-
                        cycle management of medical 
                        countermeasures. The Secretary shall 
                        designate one office within HHS as the 
                        principal liaison for nongovernmental 
                        entities who wish to bring new 
                        technologies, approaches, or potential 
                        medical countermeasures to the 
                        attention of the Federal Government.
            (b)  The Secretary of Defense shall retain 
        exclusive responsibility for research, development, 
        acquisition, and deployment of medical countermeasures 
        to prevent or mitigate the health effects of WMD 
        threats and naturally occurring threats to the Armed 
        Forces and shall continue to direct strategic planning 
        for and oversight of programs to support medical 
        countermeasures development and acquisition for our 
        Armed Forces personnel. The Secretaries of Health and 
        Human Services and Defense shall ensure that the 
        efforts of the Department of Defense (DOD) and HHS are 
        coordinated to promote synergy, minimize redundancy, 
        and, to the extent feasible, use common requirements 
        for medical countermeasure development. The Secretary 
        of Defense shall ensure that DOD continues to draw upon 
        its longstanding investment and experience in WMD 
        medical countermeasure research, development, 
        acquisition, and deployment to ensure protection of the 
        Armed Forces, but also to accelerate and improve the 
        overall national effort, consistent with Departmental 
        authorities and responsibilities, and shall ensure that 
        DOD continues to place a special focus on medical 
        countermeasure development for CBRN threat agents 
        because of the unique facilities, testing capabilities, 
        and trained and experienced personnel within the 
        Department. These efforts will constitute the basis for 
        interagency partnership and combined investment to 
        safeguard the American people.
            (c)  The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
        develop a strategic, integrated all-CBRN risk 
        assessment that integrates the findings of the 
        intelligence and law enforcement communities with input 
        from the scientific, medical, and public health 
        communities. Not later than June 1, 2008, the Secretary 
        of Homeland Security shall submit a report to the 
        President through the Assistant to the President for 
        Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, which shall 
        summarize the key findings of this assessment, and 
        shall update those findings when appropriate, but not 
        less frequently than every 2 years. The Department of 
        Homeland Security shall continue to issue Material 
        Threat Determinations for those CBRN agents that pose a 
        material threat to national security.
            (d)  The Secretaries of Health and Human Services, 
        Defense, and Homeland Security shall ensure the 
        availability of the infrastructure required to test and 
        evaluate medical countermeasures for CBRN threat 
        agents.
                        (i)  The Secretaries of Health and 
                        Human Services, Defense, and Veterans 
                        Affairs shall leverage their 
                        partnership to identify and accelerate 
                        research, development, testing, and 
                        evaluation programs for the acquisition 
                        of medical countermeasures for CBRN 
                        threats.
                        (ii)  The Secretary of Health and Human 
                        Services and the Secretary of Homeland 
                        Security shall develop effective and 
                        streamlined processes, including 
                        mutually agreed-upon timelines, to 
                        assist the respective Secretaries in 
                        jointly recommending that the Special 
                        Reserve Fund (SRF) be used for the 
                        acquisition of specified security 
                        countermeasures.
                        (iii)  The Director of National 
                        Intelligence shall facilitate 
                        coordination across the intelligence 
                        community and, in coordination with the 
                        Attorney General, engage the law 
                        enforcement community to provide all 
                        relevant and appropriate WMD-related 
                        intelligence information to DHS for the 
                        development of the integrated CBRN risk 
                        assessment that is used in prioritizing 
                        the development, acquisition, and 
                        maintenance of medical countermeasures.

GENERAL
            (15)  This directive:
                    (a)  shall be implemented consistent with 
                applicable law and the authorities of executive 
                departments and agencies, or heads of such 
                departments and agencies, vested by law, and 
                subject to the availability of appropriations;
                    (b)  shall not be construed to impair or 
                otherwise affect the functions of the Director 
                of the Office of Management and Budget relating 
                to budget, administrative, and legislative 
                proposals; and
                    (c)  is not intended to, and does not, 
                create any rights or benefits, substantive or 
                procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by 
                a party against the United States, its 
                agencies, instrumentalities, or entities, its 
                officers, employees, or agents, or any other 
                person.

                    GEORGE W. BUSH
              Homeland Security Presidential Directive--19

       Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States

                              ----------                              


Purpose
            (1)  This directive establishes a national policy, 
        and calls for the development of a national strategy 
        and implementation plan, on the prevention and 
        detection of, protection against, and response to 
        terrorist use of explosives in the United States. 
        Definitions
            (2)  In this directive:
                    (a)  ``agencies'' means those executive 
                departments enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101, 
                independent establishments as defined by 5 
                U.S.C. 104(1), Government corporations as 
                defined by 5 U.S.C. 103(1), and the United 
                States Postal Service;
                    (b)  ``explosive attack'' means an act of 
                terrorism in the United States using an 
                explosive;
                    (c)  ``explosive'' means any chemical 
                compound mixture, or device, the primary or 
                common purpose of which is to function by 
                explosion, including improvised explosive 
                devices, but excluding nuclear and radiological 
                devices;
                    (d)  ``improvised explosive device'' or 
                ``IED'' means an explosive device that is 
                fabricated in an improvised manner 
                incorporating explosives or other destructive, 
                lethal, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals;
                    (e)  ``NIPP'' means the National 
                Infrastructure Protection Plan developed 
                pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential 
                Directive-7 of December 17, 2003 (Critical 
                Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, 
                and Protection)(HSPD-7); and
                    (f)  ``risk'' means the product of credible 
                threat, consequence, and vulnerability, as 
                defined in the NIPP. Background
            (3)  Terrorists have repeatedly shown their 
        willingness and ability to use explosives as weapons 
        worldwide, and there is ample intelligence to support 
        the conclusion that they will continue to use such 
        devices to inflict harm. The threat of explosive 
        attacks in the United States is of great concern 
        considering terrorists' ability to make, obtain, and 
        use explosives, the ready availability of components 
        used in IED construction, the relative technological 
        ease with which an IED can be fashioned, and the nature 
        of our free society. Policy
            (4)  It is the policy of the United States to 
        counter the threat of explosive attacks aggressively by 
        coordinating Federal, State, local, territorial, and 
        tribal government efforts and collaborating with the 
        owners and operators of critical infrastructure and key 
        resources to deter, prevent, detect, protect against, 
        and respond to explosive attacks, including the 
        following:
                    (a)  applying techniques of psychological 
                and behavioral sciences in the analysis of 
                potential threats of explosive attack;
                    (b)  using the most effective technologies, 
                capabilities, and explosives search procedures, 
                and applications thereof, to detect, locate, 
                and render safe explosives before they detonate 
                or function as part of an explosive attack, 
                including detection of explosive materials and 
                precursor chemicals used to make improvised 
                explosive or incendiary mixtures;
                    (c)  applying all appropriate resources to 
                pre-blast or pre-functioning search and 
                explosives render-safe procedures, and to post-
                blast or post-functioning investigatory and 
                search activities, in order to detect secondary 
                and tertiary explosives and for the purposes of 
                attribution;
                    (d)  employing effective capabilities, 
                technologies, and methodologies, including 
                blast mitigation techniques, to mitigate or 
                neutralize the physical effects of an explosive 
                attack on human life, critical infrastructure, 
                and key resources; and
                    (e)  clarifying specific roles and 
                responsibilities of agencies and heads of 
                agencies through all phases of incident 
                management from prevention and protection 
                through response and recovery. Implementation 
                Actions
            (5)  As soon as practicable and not later than 150 
        days after the effective date of this directive, the 
        Attorney General, in coordination with the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security and the heads of other Sector-
        Specific Agencies (as defined in HSPD-7) and agencies 
        that conduct explosive attack detection, prevention, 
        protection, or response activities, shall submit to the 
        President for approval, through the Assistant to the 
        President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, a 
        report, including a national strategy and 
        recommendations, on how more effectively to deter, 
        prevent, detect, protect against, and respond to 
        explosive attacks, including the coordination of 
        Federal Government efforts with State, local, 
        territorial, and tribal governments, first responders, 
        and private sector organizations. The report shall 
        include the following:
                    (a)  a descriptive list of all Federal 
                statutes, regulations, policies, and guidance 
                that
                        (i)  set forth agency authorities and 
                        responsibilities relating to the 
                        prevention or detection of, protection 
                        against, or response to explosive 
                        attacks, or
                        (ii)  govern the use of the assets and 
                        capabilities described in paragraph (b) 
                        of this section;
                    (b)  an inventory and description of all 
                current Federal Government assets and 
                capabilities specifically relating to the 
                detection of explosives or the protection 
                against or response to explosive attacks, 
                catalogued by geographic location, including 
                the asset's transportability and, to the extent 
                feasible, similar assets and capabilities of 
                State, local, territorial, and tribal 
                governments;
                    (c)  an inventory and description of 
                current research, development, testing, and 
                evaluation initiatives relating to the 
                detection of and protection against explosives 
                and anticipated advances in capabilities for 
                reducing the threat of explosive attacks, and 
                recommendations for the best means of 
                disseminating the results of such initiatives 
                to and among Federal, State, local, 
                territorial, and tribal governments and first 
                responders, as appropriate;
                    (d)  for the purpose of identifying needed 
                improvements in our homeland security posture, 
                an assessment of our ability to deter, prevent, 
                detect, protect against, and respond to an 
                explosive attack based on a review of risk and 
                the list, inventories, and descriptions 
                developed pursuant to paragraphs (a), (b), and 
                (c) of this section, and recommendations to 
                address any such needed improvements;
                    (e)  recommendations for improved detection 
                of explosive chemical compounds, precursor 
                chemicals used to make improvised explosive 
                chemical compounds, and explosive device 
                components;
                    (f)  recommendations for developing a 
                comprehensive understanding of terrorist 
                training and construction methods relating to 
                explosive attacks and the production of 
                explosive and incendiary materials;
                    (g)  recommendations for protecting 
                critical infrastructure and key resources 
                against an explosive attack that can be used to 
                inform sector-specific plans developed pursuant 
                to the NIPP, including specific actions 
                applicable to each of the critical 
                infrastructure and key resources sectors;
                    (h)  a recommended draft incident annex to 
                the National Response Plan developed pursuant 
                to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 
                of February 28, 2003 (Management of Domestic 
                Incidents), for explosive attacks, detailing 
                specific roles and responsibilities of agencies 
                and heads of agencies through all phases of 
                incident management from prevention and 
                protection through response and recovery;
                    (i)  an assessment of the effectiveness of, 
                and, as necessary, recommendations for 
                improving Federal Government training and 
                education initiatives relating to explosive 
                attack detection, including canine training and 
                performance standards;
                    (j)  recommended components of a national 
                public awareness and vigilance campaign 
                regarding explosive attacks; and
                    (k)  a recommendation on whether any 
                additional Federal Government entity should be 
                established to coordinate Federal Government 
                explosive attack prevention, detection, 
                protection, and response efforts and 
                collaboration with State, local, territorial, 
                and tribal government officials, first 
                responders, and private sector organizations.
            (6)  Not later than 90 days after the President 
        approves the report, the Attorney General, in 
        coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and 
        Homeland Security and the heads of other Sector-
        Specific Agencies (as defined in HSPD-7) and agencies 
        that conduct explosive attack detection, prevention, 
        protection, or response activities, shall develop an 
        implementation plan. The implementation plan shall 
        implement the policy set forth in this directive and 
        any recommendations in the report that are approved by 
        the President, and shall include measures to
                    (a)  coordinate the efforts of Federal, 
                State, local, territorial, and tribal 
                government entities to develop related 
                capabilities,
                    (b)  allocate Federal grant funds 
                effectively,
                    (c)  coordinate training and exercise 
                activities, and
                    (d)  incorporate, and strengthen as 
                appropriate, existing plans and procedures to 
                communicate accurate, coordinated, and timely 
                information regarding a potential or actual 
                explosive attack to the public, the media, and 
                the private sector. The implementation plan 
                shall include an implementation timetable, 
                shall be effective upon the approval of the 
                plan by the Attorney General, and shall be 
                implemented by the heads of agencies as 
                specified in the plan. Roles and 
                Responsibilities
            (7)  The Attorney General, in coordination with the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of 
        National Intelligence, shall maintain and make 
        available to Federal, State, local, territorial, and 
        tribal law enforcement entities, and other first 
        responders at the discretion of the Attorney General, a 
        web-based secure portal that includes information on 
        incidents involving the suspected criminal misuse of 
        explosives, including those voluntarily reported by 
        State, local, territorial, and tribal authorities.
            (8)  The Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
        coordination with the Attorney General, the Director of 
        National Intelligence, and the Secretaries of State and 
        Defense, shall maintain secure information-sharing 
        systems that make available to law enforcement 
        agencies, and other first responders at the discretion 
        of the Secretary of Homeland Security, information, 
        including lessons learned and best practices, 
        concerning the use of explosives as a terrorist weapon 
        and related insurgent war fighting tactics, both 
        domestically and internationally, for use in enhancing 
        the preparedness of Federal, State, local, territorial, 
        and tribal government personnel to deter, prevent, 
        detect, protect against, and respond to explosive 
        attacks in the United States.
            (9)  The Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
        coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary 
        of Defense, and the Director of the Office of Science 
        and Technology Policy, shall coordinate Federal 
        Government research, development, testing, and 
        evaluation activities relating to the detection and 
        prevention of, protection against, and response to 
        explosive attacks and the development of explosives 
        render-safe tools and technologies. The heads of all 
        other agencies that conduct such activities shall 
        cooperate with the Secretary of Homeland Security in 
        carrying out such responsibility. General Provisions
            (10)  This directive:
                    (a)  shall be implemented consistent with 
                applicable law and the authorities of agencies, 
                or heads of agencies, vested by law, and 
                subject to the availability of appropriations;
                    (b)  shall not be construed to impair or 
                otherwise affect the functions of the Director 
                of the Office of Management and Budget relating 
                to budget, administrative, and legislative 
                proposals; and
                    (c)  is not intended to, and does not, 
                create any rights or benefits, substantive or 
                procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by 
                a party against the United States, its 
                agencies, instrumentalities, or entities, its 
                officers, employees, or agents, or any other 
                person.
              Homeland Security Presidential Directive--20

             (National Security Presidential Directive--51)

                       National Continuity Policy

                              ----------                              


Purpose
            (1)  This directive establishes a comprehensive 
        national policy on the continuity of Federal Government 
        structures and operations and a single National 
        Continuity Coordinator responsible for coordinating the 
        development and implementation of Federal continuity 
        policies. This policy establishes ``National Essential 
        Functions,'' prescribes continuity requirements for all 
        executive departments and agencies, and provides 
        guidance for State, local, territorial, and tribal 
        governments, and private sector organizations in order 
        to ensure a comprehensive and integrated national 
        continuity program that will enhance the credibility of 
        our national security posture and enable a more rapid 
        and effective response to and recovery from a national 
        emergency.

Definitions
            (2)  In this directive:
                    (a)  ``Category'' refers to the categories 
                of executive departments and agencies listed in 
                Annex A to this directive;
                    (b)  ``Catastrophic Emergency'' means any 
                incident, regardless of location, that results 
                in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, 
                damage, or disruption severely affecting the 
                U.S. population, infrastructure, environment, 
                economy, or government functions;
                    (c)  ``Continuity of Government,'' or 
                ``COG,'' means a coordinated effort within the 
                Federal Government's executive branch to ensure 
                that National Essential Functions continue to 
                be performed during a Catastrophic Emergency;
                    (d)  ``Continuity of Operations,'' or 
                ``COOP,'' means an effort within individual 
                executive departments and agencies to ensure 
                that Primary Mission-Essential Functions 
                continue to be performed during a wide range of 
                emergencies, including localized acts of 
                nature, accidents, and technological or attack-
                related emergencies;
                    (e)  ``Enduring Constitutional 
                Government,'' or ``ECG,'' means a cooperative 
                effort among the executive, legislative, and 
                judicial branches of the Federal Government, 
                coordinated by the President, as a matter of 
                comity with respect to the legislative and 
                judicial branches and with proper respect for 
                the constitutional separation of powers among 
                the branches, to preserve the constitutional 
                framework under which the Nation is governed 
                and the capability of all three branches of 
                government to execute constitutional 
                responsibilities and provide for orderly 
                succession, appropriate transition of 
                leadership, and interoperability and support of 
                the National Essential Functions during a 
                catastrophic emergency;
                    (f)  ``Executive Departments and Agencies'' 
                means the executive departments enumerated in 5 
                U.S.C. 101, independent establishments as 
                defined by 5 U.S.C. 104(1), Government 
                corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C. 103(1), and 
                the United States Postal Service;
                    (g)  ``Government Functions'' means the 
                collective functions of the heads of executive 
                departments and agencies as defined by statute, 
                regulation, presidential direction, or other 
                legal authority, and the functions of the 
                legislative and judicial branches;
                    (h)  ``National Essential Functions,'' or 
                ``NEFs,'' means that subset of Government 
                Functions that are necessary to lead and 
                sustain the Nation during a catastrophic 
                emergency and that, therefore, must be 
                supported through COOP and COG capabilities; 
                and
                    (i)  ``Primary Mission Essential 
                Functions,'' or ``PMEFs,'' means those 
                Government Functions that must be performed in 
                order to support or implement the performance 
                of NEFs before, during, and in the aftermath of 
                an emergency.

Policy
            (3)  It is the policy of the United States to 
        maintain a comprehensive and effective continuity 
        capability composed of Continuity of Operations and 
        Continuity of Government programs in order to ensure 
        the preservation of our form of government under the 
        Constitution and the continuing performance of National 
        Essential Functions under all conditions. 
        Implementation Actions
            (4)  Continuity requirements shall be incorporated 
        into daily operations of all executive departments and 
        agencies. As a result of the asymmetric threat 
        environment, adequate warning of potential emergencies 
        that could pose a significant risk to the homeland 
        might not be available, and therefore all continuity 
        planning shall be based on the assumption that no such 
        warning will be received. Emphasis will be placed upon 
        geographic dispersion of leadership, staff, and 
        infrastructure in order to increase survivability and 
        maintain uninterrupted Government Functions. Risk 
        management principles shall be applied to ensure that 
        appropriate operational readiness decisions are based 
        on the probability of an attack or other incident and 
        its consequences.
            (5)  The following NEFs are the foundation for all 
        continuity programs and capabilities and represent the 
        overarching responsibilities of the Federal Government 
        to lead and sustain the Nation during a crisis, and 
        therefore sustaining the following NEFs shall be the 
        primary focus of the Federal Government leadership 
        during and in the aftermath of an emergency that 
        adversely affects the performance of Government 
        Functions:
                    (a)  Ensuring the continued functioning of 
                our form of government under Constitution, 
                including the functioning of the three separate 
                branches of government;
                    (b)  Providing leadership visible to the 
                Nation and the world and maintaining the trust 
                and confidence of the American people;
                    (c)  Defending the Constitution of the 
                United States against all enemies, foreign and 
                domestic, and preventing or interdicting 
                attacks against the United States or its 
                people, property, or interests;
                    (d)  Maintaining and fostering effective 
                relationships with foreign nations;
                    (e)  Protecting against threats to the 
                homeland and bringing to justice perpetrators 
                of crimes or attacks against the United States 
                or its people, property, or interests;
                    (f)  Providing rapid and effective response 
                to and recovery from the domestic consequences 
                of an attack or other incident;
                    (g)  Protecting and stabilizing the 
                Nation's economy and ensuring public confidence 
                in its financial systems; and
                    (h)  Providing for critical Federal 
                Government services that address the national 
                health, safety, and welfare needs of the United 
                States.
            (6)  The President shall lead the activities of the 
        Federal Government for ensuring constitutional 
        government. In order to advise and assist the President 
        in that function, the Assistant to the President for 
        Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (APHS/CT) is 
        hereby designated as the National Continuity 
        Coordinator. The National Continuity Coordinator, in 
        coordination with the Assistant to the President for 
        National Security Affairs (APNSA), without exercising 
        directive authority, shall coordinate the development 
        and implementation of continuity policy for executive 
        departments and agencies. The Continuity Policy 
        Coordination Committee (CPCC), chaired by a Senior 
        Director from the Homeland Security Council staff, 
        designated by the National Continuity Coordinator, 
        shall be the main day-to-day forum for such policy 
        coordination.
            (7)  For continuity purposes, each executive 
        department and agency is assigned to a category in 
        accordance with the nature and characteristics of its 
        national security roles and responsibilities in support 
        of the Federal Government's ability to sustain the 
        NEFs. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall serve as 
        the President's lead agent for coordinating overall 
        continuity operations and activities of executive 
        departments and agencies, and in such role shall 
        perform the responsibilities set forth for the 
        Secretary in sections 10 and 16 of this directive.
            (8)  The National Continuity Coordinator, in 
        consultation with the heads of appropriate executive 
        departments and agencies, will lead the development of 
        a National Continuity Implementation Plan (Plan), which 
        shall include prioritized goals and objectives, a 
        concept of operations, performance metrics by which to 
        measure continuity readiness, procedures for continuity 
        and incident management activities, and clear direction 
        to executive department and agency continuity 
        coordinators, as well as guidance to promote 
        interoperability of Federal Government continuity 
        programs and procedures with State, local, territorial, 
        and tribal governments, and private sector owners and 
        operators of critical infrastructure, as appropriate. 
        The Plan shall be submitted to the President for 
        approval not later than 90 days after the date of this 
        directive.
            (9)  Recognizing that each branch of the Federal 
        Government is responsible for its own continuity 
        programs, an official designated by the Chief of Staff 
        to the President shall ensure that the executive 
        branch's COOP and COG policies in support of ECG 
        efforts are appropriately coordinated with those of the 
        legislative and judicial branches in order to ensure 
        interoperability and allocate national assets 
        efficiently to maintain a functioning Federal 
        Government.
            (10)  Federal Government COOP, COG, and ECG plans 
        and operations shall be appropriately integrated with 
        the emergency plans and capabilities of State, local, 
        territorial, and tribal governments, and private sector 
        owners and operators of critical infrastructure, as 
        appropriate, in order to promote interoperability and 
        to prevent redundancies and conflicting lines of 
        authority. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
        coordinate the integration of Federal continuity plans 
        and operations with State, local, territorial, and 
        tribal governments, and private sector owners and 
        operators of critical infrastructure, as appropriate, 
        in order to provide for the delivery of essential 
        services during an emergency.
            (11)  Continuity requirements for the Executive 
        Office of the President (EOP) and executive departments 
        and agencies shall include the following:
                    (a)  The continuation of the performance of 
                PMEFs during any emergency must be for a period 
                up to 30 days or until normal operations can be 
                resumed, and the capability to be fully 
                operational at alternate sites as soon as 
                possible after the occurrence of an emergency, 
                but not later than 12 hours after COOP 
                activation;
                    (b)  Succession orders and pre-planned 
                devolution of authorities that ensure the 
                emergency delegation of authority must be 
                planned and documented in advance in accordance 
                with applicable law;
                    (c)  Vital resources, facilities, and 
                records must be safeguarded, and official 
                access to them must be provided;
                    (d)  Provision must be made for the 
                acquisition of the resources necessary for 
                continuity operations on an emergency basis;
                    (e)  Provision must be made for the 
                availability and redundancy of critical 
                communications capabilities at alternate sites 
                in order to support connectivity between and 
                among key government leadership, internal 
                elements, other executive departments and 
                agencies, critical partners, and the public;
                    (f)  Provision must be made for 
                reconstitution capabilities that allow for 
                recovery from a catastrophic emergency and 
                resumption of normal operations; and
                    (g)  Provision must be made for the 
                identification, training, and preparedness of 
                personnel capable of relocating to alternate 
                facilities to support the continuation of the 
                performance of PMEFs.
            (12)  In order to provide a coordinated response to 
        escalating threat levels or actual emergencies, the 
        Continuity of Government Readiness Conditions (COGCON) 
        system establishes executive branch continuity program 
        readiness levels, focusing on possible threats to the 
        National Capital Region. The President will determine 
        and issue the COGCON Level. Executive departments and 
        agencies shall comply with the requirements and 
        assigned responsibilities under the COGCON program. 
        During COOP activation, executive departments and 
        agencies shall report their readiness status to the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security or the Secretary's 
        designee.
            (13)  The Director of the Office of Management and 
        Budget shall:
                    (a)  Conduct an annual assessment of 
                executive department and agency continuity 
                funding requests and performance data that are 
                submitted by executive departments and agencies 
                as part of the annual budget request process, 
                in order to monitor progress in the 
                implementation of the Plan and the execution of 
                continuity budgets;
                    (b)  In coordination with the National 
                Continuity Coordinator, issue annual continuity 
                planning guidance for the development of 
                continuity budget requests; and
                    (c)  Ensure that heads of executive 
                departments and agencies prioritize budget 
                resources for continuity capabilities, 
                consistent with this directive.
            (14)  The Director of the Office of Science and 
        Technology Policy shall:
                    (a)  Define and issue minimum requirements 
                for continuity communications for executive 
                departments and agencies, in consultation with 
                the APHS/ CT, the APNSA, the Director of the 
                Office of Management and Budget, and the Chief 
                of Staff to the President;
                    (b)  Establish requirements for, and 
                monitor the development, implementation, and 
                maintenance of, a comprehensive communications 
                architecture to integrate continuity 
                components, in consultation with the APHS/ CT, 
                the APNSA, the Director of the Office of 
                Management and Budget, and the Chief of Staff 
                to the President; and
                    (c)  Review quarterly and annual 
                assessments of continuity communications 
                capabilities, as prepared pursuant to section 
                16(d) of this directive or otherwise, and 
                report the results and recommended remedial 
                actions to the National Continuity Coordinator.
            (15)  An official designated by the Chief of Staff 
        to the President shall:
                    (a)  Advise the President, the Chief of 
                Staff to the President, the APHS/CT, and the 
                APNSA on COGCON operational execution options; 
                and
                    (b)  Consult with the Secretary of Homeland 
                Security in order to ensure synchronization and 
                integration of continuity activities among the 
                four categories of executive departments and 
                agencies.
            (16)  The Secretary of Homeland Security shall:
                    (a)  Coordinate the implementation, 
                execution, and assessment of continuity 
                operations and activities;
                    (b)  Develop and promulgate Federal 
                Continuity Directives in order to establish 
                continuity planning requirements for executive 
                departments and agencies;
                    (c)  Conduct biennial assessments of 
                individual department and agency continuity 
                capabilities as prescribed by the Plan and 
                report the results to the President through the 
                APHS/CT;
                    (d)  Conduct quarterly and annual 
                assessments of continuity communications 
                capabilities in consultation with an official 
                designated by the Chief of Staff to the 
                President;
                    (e)  Develop, lead, and conduct a Federal 
                continuity training and exercise program, which 
                shall be incorporated into the National 
                Exercise Program developed pursuant to Homeland 
                Security Presidential Directive 8 of December 
                17, 2003 (``National Preparedness''), in 
                consultation with an official designated by the 
                Chief of Staff to the President;
                    (f)  Develop and promulgate continuity 
                planning guidance to State, local, territorial, 
                and tribal governments, and private sector 
                critical infrastructure owners and operators;
                    (g)  Make available continuity planning and 
                exercise funding, in the form of grants as 
                provided by law, to State, local, territorial, 
                and tribal governments, and private sector 
                critical infrastructure owners and operators; 
                and
                    (h)  As Executive Agent of the National 
                Communications System, develop, implement, and 
                maintain a comprehensive continuity 
                communications architecture.
            (17)  The Director of National Intelligence, in 
        coordination with the Attorney General and the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security, shall produce a 
        biennial assessment of the foreign and domestic threats 
        to the Nation's continuity of government.
            (18)  The Secretary of Defense, in coordination 
        with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall provide 
        secure, integrated, Continuity of Government 
        communications to the President, the Vice President, 
        and, at a minimum, Category I executive departments and 
        agencies.
            (19)  Heads of executive departments and agencies 
        shall execute their respective department or agency 
        COOP plans in response to a localized emergency and 
        shall:
                    (a)  Appoint a senior accountable official, 
                at the Assistant Secretary level, as the 
                Continuity Coordinator for the department or 
                agency;
                    (b)  Identify and submit to the National 
                Continuity Coordinator the list of PMEFs for 
                the department or agency and develop continuity 
                plans in support of the NEFs and the 
                continuation of essential functions under all 
                conditions;
                    (c)  Plan, program, and budget for 
                continuity capabilities consistent with this 
                directive;
                    (d)  Plan, conduct, and support annual 
                tests and training, in consultation with the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security, in order to 
                evaluate program readiness and ensure adequacy 
                and viability of continuity plans and 
                communications systems; and
                    (e)  Support other continuity requirements, 
                as assigned by category, in accordance with the 
                nature and characteristics of its national 
                security roles and responsibilities

General Provisions
            (20)  This directive shall be implemented in a 
        manner that is consistent with, and facilitates 
        effective implementation of, provisions of the 
        Constitution concerning succession to the Presidency or 
        the exercise of its powers, and the Presidential 
        Succession Act of 1947 (3 U.S.C. 19), with consultation 
        of the Vice President and, as appropriate, others 
        involved. Heads of executive departments and agencies 
        shall ensure that appropriate support is available to 
        the Vice President and others involved as necessary to 
        be prepared at all times to implement those provisions.
            (21)  This directive:
                    (a)  Shall be implemented consistent with 
                applicable law and the authorities of agencies, 
                or heads of agencies, vested by law, and 
                subject to the availability of appropriations;
                    (b)  Shall not be construed to impair or 
                otherwise affect
                        (i)  the functions of the Director of 
                        the Office of Management and Budget 
                        relating to budget, administrative, and 
                        legislative proposals, or
                        (ii)  the authority of the Secretary of 
                        Defense over the Department of Defense, 
                        including the chain of command for 
                        military forces from the President, to 
                        the Secretary of Defense, to the 
                        commander of military forces, or 
                        military command and control 
                        procedures; and
                    (c)  Is not intended to, and does not, 
                create any rights or benefits, substantive or 
                procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by 
                a party against the United States, its 
                agencies, instrumentalities, or entities, its 
                officers, employees, or agents, or any other 
                person.
            (22)  Revocation. Presidential Decision Directive 
        67 of October 21, 1998 (``Enduring Constitutional 
        Government and Continuity of Government Operations''), 
        including all Annexes thereto, is hereby revoked.
            (23)  Annex A and the classified Continuity 
        Annexes, attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into 
        and made a part of this directive.
            (24)  Security. This directive and the information 
        contained herein shall be protected from unauthorized 
        disclosure, provided that, except for Annex A, the 
        Annexes attached to this directive are classified and 
        shall be accorded appropriate handling, consistent with 
        applicable Executive Orders.

            George W. Bush
              Homeland Security Presidential Directive--21

                 Public Health and Medical Preparedness

                              ----------                              


Purpose
            (1)  This directive establishes a National Strategy 
        for Public Health and Medical Preparedness (Strategy), 
        which builds upon principles set forth in Biodefense 
        for the 21st Century (April 2004) and will transform 
        our national approach to protecting the health of the 
        American people against all disasters.
Definitions
            (2)  In this directive:
                    (a)  The term ``biosurveillance'' means the 
                process of active data-gathering with 
                appropriate analysis and interpretation of 
                biosphere data that might relate to disease 
                activity and threats to human or animal health 
                _ whether infectious, toxic, metabolic, or 
                otherwise, and regardless of intentional or 
                natural origin_ in order to achieve early 
                warning of health threats, early detection of 
                health events, and overall situational 
                awareness of disease activity;
                    (b)  The term ``catastrophic health event'' 
                means any natural or manmade incident, 
                including terrorism, that results in a number 
                of ill or injured persons sufficient to 
                overwhelm the capabilities of immediate local 
                and regional emergency response and health care 
                systems;
                    (c)  The term ``epidemiologic 
                surveillance'' means the process of actively 
                gathering and analyzing data related to human 
                health and disease in a population in order to 
                obtain early warning of human health events, 
                rapid characterization of human disease events, 
                and overall situational awareness of disease 
                activity in the human population;
                    (d)  The term ``medical'' means the science 
                and practice of maintenance of health and 
                prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and 
                alleviation of disease or injury and the 
                provision of those services to individuals;
                    (e)  The term ``public health'' means the 
                science and practice of protecting and 
                improving the overall health of the community 
                through disease prevention and early diagnosis, 
                control of communicable diseases, health 
                education, injury prevention, sanitation, and 
                protection from environmental hazards;
                    (f)  The term ``public health and medical 
                preparedness'' means the existence of plans, 
                procedures, policies, training, and equipment 
                necessary to maximize the ability to prevent, 
                respond to, and recover from major events, 
                including efforts that result in the capability 
                to render an appropriate public health and 
                medical response that will mitigate the effects 
                of illness and injury, limit morbidity and 
                mortality to the maximum extent possible, and 
                sustain societal, economic, and political 
                infrastructure; and
                    (g)  The terms ``State'' and ``local 
                government,'' when used in a geographical 
                sense, have the meanings ascribed to such terms 
                respectively in section 2 of the Homeland 
                Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101).
Background
            (3)  A catastrophic health event, such as a 
        terrorist attack with a weapon of mass destruction 
        (WMD), a naturally-occurring pandemic, or a calamitous 
        meteorological or geological event, could cause tens or 
        hundreds of thousands of casualties or more, weaken our 
        economy, damage public morale and confidence, and 
        threaten our national security. It is therefore 
        critical that we establish a strategic vision that will 
        enable a level of public health and medical 
        preparedness sufficient to address a range of possible 
        disasters.
            (4)  The United States has made significant 
        progress in public health and medical preparedness 
        since 2001, but we remain vulnerable to events that 
        threaten the health of large populations. The attacks 
        of September 11 and Hurricane Katrina were the most 
        significant recent disasters faced by the United 
        States, yet casualty numbers were small in comparison 
        to the 1995 Kobe earthquake; the 2003 Bam, Iran, 
        earthquake; the 2004 Sumatra tsunami; and what we would 
        expect from a 1918-like influenza pandemic or large-
        scale WMD attack. Such events could immediately 
        overwhelm our public health and medical systems.
            (5)  This Strategy draws key principles from the 
        National Strategy for Homeland Security (October 2007), 
        the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
        Destruction (December 2002), and Biodefense for the 
        21st Century (April 2004) that can be generally applied 
        to public health and medical preparedness. Those key 
        principles are the following: (1) preparedness for all 
        potential catastrophic health events; (2) vertical and 
        horizontal coordination across levels of government, 
        jurisdictions, and disciplines; (3) a regional approach 
        to health preparedness; (4) engagement of the private 
        sector, academia, and other nongovernmental entities in 
        preparedness and response efforts; and (5) the 
        important roles of individuals, families, and 
        communities.
            (6)  Present public health and medical preparedness 
        plans incorporate the concept of "surging" existing 
        medical and public health capabilities in response to 
        an event that threatens a large number of lives. The 
        assumption that conventional public health and medical 
        systems can function effectively in catastrophic health 
        events has, however, proved to be incorrect in real-
        world situations. Therefore, it is necessary to 
        transform the national approach to health care in the 
        context of a catastrophic health event in order to 
        enable U.S. public health and medical systems to 
        respond effectively to a broad range of incidents.
            (7)  The most effective complex service delivery 
        systems result from rigorous end-to-end system design. 
        A critical and formal process by which the functions of 
        public health and medical preparedness and response are 
        designed to integrate all vertical (through all levels 
        of government) and horizontal (across all sectors in 
        communities) components can achieve a much greater 
        capability than we currently have.
            (8)  The United States has tremendous resources in 
        both public and private sectors that could be used to 
        prepare for and respond to a catastrophic health event. 
        To exploit those resources fully, they must be 
        organized in a rationally designed system that is 
        incorporated into pre-event planning, deployed in a 
        coordinated manner in response to an event, and guided 
        by a constant and timely flow of relevant information 
        during an event. This Strategy establishes principles 
        and objectives to improve our ability to respond 
        comprehensively to catastrophic health events. It also 
        identifies critical antecedent components of this 
        capability and directs the development of an 
        implementation plan that will delineate further 
        specific actions and guide the process to fruition.
            (9)  This Strategy focuses on human public health 
        and medical systems; it does not address other areas 
        critical to overall public health and medical 
        preparedness, such as animal health systems, food and 
        agriculture defense, global partnerships in public 
        health, health threat intelligence activities, domestic 
        and international biosecurity, and basic and applied 
        research in threat diseases and countermeasures. 
        Efforts in those areas are addressed in other policy 
        documents.
            (10)  It is not possible to prevent all casualties 
        in catastrophic events, but strategic improvements in 
        our Federal, State, and local planning can prepare our 
        Nation to deliver appropriate care to the largest 
        possible number of people, lessen the impact on limited 
        health care resources, and support the continuity of 
        society and government.
Policy
            (11)  It is the policy of the United States to plan 
        and enable provision for the public health and medical 
        needs of the American people in the case of a 
        catastrophic health event through continual and timely 
        flow of information during such an event and rapid 
        public health and medical response that marshals all 
        available national capabilities and capacities in a 
        rapid and coordinated manner.
Implementation Actions
            (12)  Biodefense for the 21st Century provides a 
        foundation for the transformation of our catastrophic 
        health event response and preparedness efforts. 
        Although the four pillars of that framework - Threat 
        Awareness, Prevention and Protection, Surveillance and 
        Detection, and Response and Recovery - were developed 
        to guide our efforts to defend against a bioterrorist 
        attack, they are applicable to a broad array of natural 
        and manmade public health and medical challenges and 
        are appropriate to serve as the core functions of the 
        Strategy for Public Health and Medical Preparedness.
            (13)  To accomplish our objectives, we must create 
        a firm foundation for community medical preparedness. 
        We will increase our efforts to inform citizens and 
        empower communities, buttress our public health 
        infrastructure, and explore options to relieve current 
        pressures on our emergency departments and emergency 
        medical systems so that they retain the flexibility to 
        prepare for and respond to events.
            (14)  Ultimately, the Nation must collectively 
        support and facilitate the establishment of a 
        discipline of disaster health. The specialty of 
        emergency medicine evolved as a result of the 
        recognition of the special considerations in emergency 
        patient care, and similarly the recognition of the 
        unique principles in disaster-related public health and 
        medicine merit the establishment of their own formal 
        discipline. Such a discipline will provide a foundation 
        for doctrine, education, training, and research and 
        will integrate preparedness into the public health and 
        medical communities.
Critical Components of Public Health and Medical Preparedness
            (15)  Currently, the four most critical components 
        of public health and medical preparedness are 
        biosurveillance, countermeasure distribution, mass 
        casualty care, and community resilience. Although those 
        capabilities do not address all public health and 
        medical preparedness requirements, they currently hold 
        the greatest potential for mitigating illness and death 
        and therefore will receive the highest priority in our 
        public health and medical preparedness efforts. Those 
        capabilities constitute the focus and major objectives 
        of this Strategy.
            (16)  Biosurveillance: The United States must 
        develop a nationwide, robust, and integrated 
        biosurveillance capability, with connections to 
        international disease surveillance systems, in order to 
        provide early warning and ongoing characterization of 
        disease outbreaks in near real-time. Surveillance must 
        use multiple modalities and an in-depth architecture. 
        We must enhance clinician awareness and participation 
        and strengthen laboratory diagnostic capabilities and 
        capacity in order to recognize potential threats as 
        early as possible. Integration of biosurveillance 
        elements and other data (including human health, animal 
        health, agricultural, meteorological, environmental, 
        intelligence, and other data) will provide a 
        comprehensive picture of the health of communities and 
        the associated threat environment for incorporation 
        into the national ``common operating picture.'' A 
        central element of biosurveillance must be an 
        epidemiologic surveillance system to monitor human 
        disease activity across populations. That system must 
        be sufficiently enabled to identify specific disease 
        incidence and prevalence in heterogeneous populations 
        and environments and must possess sufficient 
        flexibility to tailor analyses to new syndromes and 
        emerging diseases. State and local government health 
        officials, public and private sector health care 
        institutions, and practicing clinicians must be 
        involved in system design, and the overall system must 
        be constructed with the principal objective of 
        establishing or enhancing the capabilities of State and 
        local government entities.
            (17)  Countermeasure Stockpiling and Distribution: 
        In the context of a catastrophic health event, rapid 
        distribution of medical countermeasures (vaccines, 
        drugs, and therapeutics) to a large population requires 
        significant resources within individual communities. 
        Few if any cities are presently able to meet the 
        objective of dispensing countermeasures to their entire 
        population within 48 hours after the decision to do so. 
        Recognizing that State and local government authorities 
        have the primary responsibility to protect their 
        citizens, the Federal Government will create the 
        appropriate framework and policies for sharing 
        information on best practices and mechanisms to address 
        the logistical challenges associated with this 
        requirement. The Federal Government must work with 
        nonfederal stakeholders to create effective templates 
        for countermeasure distribution and dispensing that 
        State and local government authorities can use to build 
        their own capabilities.
            (18)  Mass Casualty Care: The structure and 
        operating principles of our day-to-day public health 
        and medical systems cannot meet the needs created by a 
        catastrophic health event. Collectively, our Nation 
        must develop a disaster medical capability that can 
        immediately re-orient and coordinate existing resources 
        within all sectors to satisfy the needs of the 
        population during a catastrophic health event. Mass 
        casualty care response must be (1) rapid, (2) flexible, 
        (3) scalable, (4) sustainable, (5) exhaustive (drawing 
        upon all national resources), (6) comprehensive 
        (addressing needs from acute to chronic care and 
        including mental health and special needs populations), 
        (7) integrated and coordinated, and (8) appropriate 
        (delivering the correct treatment in the most ethical 
        manner with available capabilities). We must enhance 
        our capability to protect the physical and mental 
        health of survivors; protect responders and health care 
        providers; properly and respectfully dispose of the 
        deceased; ensure continuity of society, economy, and 
        government; and facilitate long-term recovery of 
        affected citizens.
            (19)  The establishment of a robust disaster health 
        capability requires us to develop an operational 
        concept for the medical response to catastrophic health 
        events that is substantively distinct from and broader 
        than that which guides day-to-day operations. In order 
        to achieve that transformation, the Federal Government 
        will facilitate and provide leadership for key 
        stakeholders to establish the following four 
        foundational elements: Doctrine, System Design, 
        Capacity, and Education and Training. The establishment 
        of those foundational elements must result from efforts 
        within the relevant professional communities and will 
        require many years, but the Federal Government can 
        serve as an important catalyst for this process.
            (20)  Community Resilience: The above components 
        address the supply side of the preparedness function, 
        ultimately providing enhanced services to our citizens. 
        The demand side is of equal importance. Where local 
        civic leaders, citizens, and families are educated 
        regarding threats and are empowered to mitigate their 
        own risk, where they are practiced in responding to 
        events, where they have social networks to fall back 
        upon, and where they have familiarity with local public 
        health and medical systems, there will be community 
        resilience that will significantly attenuate the 
        requirement for additional assistance. The Federal 
        Government must formulate a comprehensive plan for 
        promoting community public health and medical 
        preparedness to assist State and local authorities in 
        building resilient communities in the face of potential 
        catastrophic health events.
Biosurveillance
            (21)  The Secretary of Health and Human Services 
        shall establish an operational national epidemiologic 
        surveillance system for human health, with 
        international connectivity where appropriate, that is 
        predicated on State, regional, and community-level 
        capabilities and creates a networked system to allow 
        for two-way information flow between and among Federal, 
        State, and local government public health authorities 
        and clinical health care providers. The system shall 
        build upon existing Federal, State, and local 
        surveillance systems where they exist and shall enable 
        and provide incentive for public health agencies to 
        implement local surveillance systems where they do not 
        exist. To the extent feasible, the system shall be 
        built using electronic health information systems. It 
        shall incorporate flexibility and depth of data 
        necessary to respond to previously unknown or emerging 
        threats to public health and integrate its data into 
        the national biosurveillance common operating picture 
        as appropriate. The system shall protect patient 
        privacy by restricting access to identifying 
        information to the greatest extent possible and only to 
        public health officials with a need to know. The 
        Implementation Plan to be developed pursuant to section 
        43 of this directive shall specify milestones for this 
        system.
            (22)  Within 180 days after the date of this 
        directive, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
        in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense, 
        Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security, shall 
        establish an Epidemiologic Surveillance Federal 
        Advisory Committee, including representatives from 
        State and local government public health authorities 
        and appropriate private sector health care entities, in 
        order to ensure that the Federal Government is meeting 
        the goal of enabling State and local government public 
        health surveillance capabilities.
Countermeasure Stockpiling and Distribution
            (23)  In accordance with the schedule set forth 
        below, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
        shall develop templates, using a variety of tools and 
        including private sector resources when necessary, that 
        provide minimum operational plans to enable communities 
        to distribute and dispense countermeasures to their 
        populations within 48 hours after a decision to do so. 
        The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall ensure 
        that this process utilizes current cooperative programs 
        and engages Federal, State, local government, and 
        private sector entities in template development, 
        modeling, testing, and evaluation. The Secretary shall 
        also assist State, local government, and regional 
        entities in tailoring templates to fit differing 
        geographic sizes, population densities, and 
        demographics, and other unique or specific local needs. 
        In carrying out such actions, the Secretary shall:
                    (a)  within 270 days after the date of this 
                directive, (i) publish an initial template or 
                templates meeting the requirements above, 
                including basic testing of component 
                distribution mechanisms and modeling of 
                template systems to predict performance in 
                large-scale implementation, (ii) establish 
                standards and performance measures for State 
                and local government countermeasure 
                distribution systems, including demonstration 
                of specific capabilities in tactical exercises 
                in accordance with the National Exercise 
                Program, and (iii) establish a process to 
                gather performance data from State and local 
                participants on a regular basis to assess 
                readiness; and
                    (b)  within 180 days after the completion 
                of the tasks set forth in (a), and with 
                appropriate notice, commence collecting and 
                using performance data and metrics as 
                conditions for future public health 
                preparedness grant funding.
            (24)  Within 270 days after the date of this 
        directive, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
        in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense, 
        Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security and the 
        Attorney General, shall develop Federal Government 
        capabilities and plans to complement or supplement 
        State and local government distribution capacity, as 
        appropriate and feasible, if such entities' resources 
        are deemed insufficient to provide access to 
        countermeasures in a timely manner in the event of a 
        catastrophic health event.
            (25)  The Secretary of Health and Human Services 
        shall ensure that the priority-setting process for the 
        acquisition of medical countermeasures and other 
        critical medical materiel for the Strategic National 
        Stockpile (SNS) is transparent and risk-informed with 
        respect to the scope, quantities, and forms of the 
        various products. Within 180 days after the date of 
        this directive, the Secretary, in coordination with the 
        Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, and Veterans 
        Affairs, shall establish a formal mechanism for the 
        annual review of SNS composition and development of 
        recommendations that utilizes input from accepted 
        national risk assessments and threat assessments, 
        national planning scenarios, national modeling 
        resources, and subject matter experts. The results of 
        each such annual review shall be provided to the 
        Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the 
        Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
        Counterterrorism at the time of the Department of 
        Health and Human Services' next budget submission.
            (26)  Within 90 days after the date of this 
        directive, the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
        shall establish a process to share relevant information 
        regarding the contents of the SNS with Federal, State, 
        and local government health officers with appropriate 
        clearances and a need to know.
            (27)  Within 180 days after the date of this 
        directive, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
        in coordination with the Secretaries of State, Defense, 
        Agriculture, Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security, 
        shall develop protocols for sharing countermeasures and 
        medical goods between the SNS and other Federal 
        stockpiles and shall explore appropriate reciprocal 
        arrangements with foreign and international stockpiles 
        of medical countermeasures to ensure the availability 
        of necessary supplies for use in the United States.
Mass Casualty Care
            (28)  The Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
        in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense, 
        Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security, shall directly 
        engage relevant State and local government, academic, 
        professional, and private sector entities and experts 
        to provide feedback on the review of the National 
        Disaster Medical System and national medical surge 
        capacity required by the Pandemic and All-Hazards 
        Preparedness Act (PAHPA) (Public Law 109-417). Within 
        270 days after the completion of such review, the 
        Secretary shall identify, through a systems-based 
        approach involving expertise from such entities and 
        experts, high-priority gaps in mass casualty care 
        capabilities, and shall submit to the Assistant to the 
        President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism a 
        concept plan that identifies and coordinates all 
        Federal, State, and local government and private sector 
        public health and medical disaster response resources, 
        and identifies options for addressing critical 
        deficits, in order to achieve the system attributes 
        described in this Strategy.
            (29)  Within 180 days after the date of this 
        directive, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
        in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense, 
        Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security, shall:
                    (a)  build upon the analysis of Federal 
                facility use to provide enhanced medical surge 
                capacity in disasters required by section 302 
                of PAHPA to analyze the use of Federal medical 
                facilities as a foundational element of public 
                health and medical preparedness; and
                    (b)  develop and implement plans and enter 
                into agreements to integrate such facilities 
                more effectively into national and regional 
                education, training, and exercise preparedness 
                activities.
            (30)  The Secretary of Health and Human Services 
        shall lead an interagency process, in coordination with 
        the Secretaries of Defense, Veterans Affairs, and 
        Homeland Security and the Attorney General, to identify 
        any legal, regulatory, or other barriers to public 
        health and medical preparedness and response from 
        Federal, State, or local government or private sector 
        sources that can be eliminated by appropriate 
        regulatory or legislative action and shall, within 120 
        days after the date of this directive, submit a report 
        on such barriers to the Assistant to the President for 
        Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.
            (31)  The impact of the ``worried well'' in past 
        disasters is well documented, and it is evident that 
        mitigating the mental health consequences of disasters 
        can facilitate effective response. Recognizing that 
        maintaining and restoring mental health in disasters 
        has not received sufficient attention to date, within 
        180 days after the date of this directive, the 
        Secretary of Health and Human Services, in coordination 
        with the Secretaries of Defense, Veterans Affairs, and 
        Homeland Security, shall establish a Federal Advisory 
        Committee for Disaster Mental Health. The committee 
        shall consist of appropriate subject matter experts 
        and, within 180 days after its establishment, shall 
        submit to the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
        recommendations for protecting, preserving, and 
        restoring individual and community mental health in 
        catastrophic health event settings, including pre-
        event, intra-event, and post-event education, 
        messaging, and interventions.
Community Resilience
            (32)  The Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
        in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense, 
        Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security, shall ensure 
        that core public health and medical curricula and 
        training developed pursuant to PAHPA address the needs 
        to improve individual, family, and institutional public 
        health and medical preparedness, enhance private 
        citizen opportunities for contributions to local, 
        regional, and national preparedness and response, and 
        build resilient communities.
            (33)  Within 270 days after the date of this 
        directive, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
        in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense, 
        Commerce, Labor, Education, Veterans Affairs, and 
        Homeland Security and the Attorney General, shall 
        submit to the President for approval, through the 
        Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
        Counterterrorism, a plan to promote comprehensive 
        community medical preparedness.
Risk Awareness
            (34)  The Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of Health and Human 
        Services, shall prepare an unclassified briefing for 
        non-health professionals that clearly outlines the 
        scope of the risks to public health posed by relevant 
        threats and catastrophic health events (including 
        attacks involving weapons of mass destruction), shall 
        coordinate such briefing with the heads of other 
        relevant executive departments and agencies, shall 
        ensure that full use is made of Department of Defense 
        expertise and resources, and shall ensure that all 
        State governors and the mayors and senior county 
        officials from the 50 largest metropolitan statistical 
        areas in the United States receive such briefing, 
        unless specifically declined, within 150 days after the 
        date of this directive.
            (35)  Within 180 days after the date of this 
        directive, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
        coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary 
        of Health and Human Services, and the Director of 
        National Intelligence, shall establish a mechanism by 
        which up-to-date and specific public health threat 
        information shall be relayed, to the greatest extent 
        possible and not inconsistent with the established 
        guidance relating to the Information Sharing 
        Environment, to relevant public health officials at the 
        State and local government levels and shall initiate a 
        process to ensure that qualified heads of State and 
        local government entities have the opportunity to 
        obtain appropriate security clearances so that they may 
        receive classified threat information when applicable.
Education and Training
            (36)  Within 180 days after the date of this 
        directive, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
        in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland 
        Security, shall develop and thereafter maintain 
        processes for coordinating Federal grant programs for 
        public health and medical preparedness using grant 
        application guidance, investment justifications, 
        reporting, program performance measures, and 
        accountability for future funding in order to promote 
        cross-sector, regional, and capability-based 
        coordination, consistent with section 201 of PAHPA and 
        the National Preparedness Guidelines developed pursuant 
        to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 of 
        December 17, 2003 (``National Preparedness'').
            (37)  Within 1 year after the date of this 
        directive, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
        in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense, 
        Transportation, Veterans Affairs, and Homeland 
        Security, and consistent with section 304 of PAHPA, 
        shall develop a mechanism to coordinate public health 
        and medical disaster preparedness and response core 
        curricula and training across executive departments and 
        agencies, to ensure standardization and commonality of 
        knowledge, procedures, and terms of reference within 
        the Federal Government that also can be communicated to 
        State and local government entities, as well as 
        academia and the private sector.
            (38)  Within 1 year after the date of this 
        directive, the Secretaries of Health and Human Services 
        and Defense, in coordination with the Secretaries of 
        Veterans Affairs and Homeland Security, shall establish 
        an academic Joint Program for Disaster Medicine and 
        Public Health housed at a National Center for Disaster 
        Medicine and Public Health at the Uniformed Services 
        University of the Health Sciences. The Program shall 
        lead Federal efforts to develop and propagate core 
        curricula, training, and research related to medicine 
        and public health in disasters. The Center will be an 
        academic center of excellence in disaster medicine and 
        public health, co-locating education and research in 
        the related specialties of domestic medical 
        preparedness and response, international health, 
        international disaster and humanitarian medical 
        assistance, and military medicine. Department of Health 
        and Human Services and Department of Defense 
        authorities will be used to carry out respective 
        civilian and military missions within this joint 
        program.
Disaster Health System
            (39)  Within 180 days after the date of this 
        directive, the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
        shall commission the Institute of Medicine to lead a 
        forum engaging Federal, State, and local governments, 
        the private sector, academia, and appropriate 
        professional societies in a process to facilitate the 
        development of national disaster public health and 
        medicine doctrine and system design and to develop a 
        strategy for long-term enhancement of disaster public 
        health and medical capacity and the propagation of 
        disaster public health and medicine education and 
        training.
            (40)  Within 120 days after the date of this 
        directive, the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
        shall submit to the President through the Assistant to 
        the President for Homeland Security and 
        Counterterrorism, and shall commence the implementation 
        of, a plan to use current grant funding programs, 
        private payer incentives, market forces, Center for 
        Medicare and Medicaid Services requirements, and other 
        means to create financial incentives to enhance private 
        sector health care facility preparedness in such a 
        manner as to not increase health care costs.
            (41)  Within 180 days after the date of this 
        directive, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
        in coordination with the Secretaries of Transportation 
        and Homeland Security, shall establish within the 
        Department of Health and Human Services an Office for 
        Emergency Medical Care. Under the direction of the 
        Secretary, such Office shall lead an enterprise to 
        promote and fund research in emergency medicine and 
        trauma health care; promote regional partnerships and 
        more effective emergency medical systems in order to 
        enhance appropriate triage, distribution, and care of 
        routine community patients; promote local, regional, 
        and State emergency medical systems' preparedness for 
        and response to public health events. The Office shall 
        address the full spectrum of issues that have an impact 
        on care in hospital emergency departments, including 
        the entire continuum of patient care from pre-hospital 
        to disposition from emergency or trauma care. The 
        Office shall coordinate with existing executive 
        departments and agencies that perform functions 
        relating to emergency medical systems in order to 
        ensure unified strategy, policy, and implementation.
National Health Security Strategy
            (42)  The PAHPA requires that the Secretary of 
        Health and Human Services submit in 2009, and 
        quadrennially afterward, a National Health Security 
        Strategy (NHSS) to the Congress. The principles and 
        actions in this directive, and in the Implementation 
        Plan required by section 43, shall be incorporated into 
        the initial NHSS, as appropriate, and shall serve as a 
        foundation for the preparedness goals contained 
        therein.
Task Force and Implementation Plan
            (43)  In order to facilitate the implementation of 
        the policy outlined in this Strategy, there is 
        established the Public Health and Medical Preparedness 
        Task Force (Task Force). Within 120 days after the date 
        of this directive, the Task Force shall submit to the 
        President for approval, through the Assistant to the 
        President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, 
        an Implementation Plan (Plan) for this Strategy, and 
        annually thereafter shall submit to the Assistant to 
        the President for Homeland Security and 
        Counterterrorism a status report on the implementation 
        of the Plan and any recommendations for changes to this 
        Strategy.
                    (a)  The Task Force shall consist 
                exclusively of the following members (or their 
                designees who shall be full-time officers or 
                employees of the members' respective agencies):
                            (i)  The Secretary of Health and 
                        Human Services, who shall serve as 
                        Chair;
                            (ii)  The Secretary of State;
                            (ii)  The Secretary of Defense;
                            (iii)  The Attorney General;
                            (iv)  The Secretary of Agriculture;
                            (v)  The Secretary of Commerce;
                            (vi)  The Secretary of Labor;
                            (vii)  The Secretary of 
                        Transportation;
                            (viii)  The Secretary of Veterans 
                        Affairs
                            (ix)  The Secretary of Homeland 
                        Security;
                            (x)  The Director of the Office of 
                        Management and Budget;
                            (xi)  The Director of National 
                        Intelligence; and
                            (xii)  such other officers of the 
                        United States as the Chair of the Task 
                        Force may designate from time to time.
                    (b)  The Chair of the Task Force shall, as 
                appropriate to deal with particular subject 
                matters, establish subcommittees of the Task 
                Force that shall consist exclusively of members 
                of the Task Force (or their designees under 
                subsection (a) of this section), and such other 
                full-time or permanent part-time officers or 
                employees of the Federal Government as the 
                Chair may designate.
                    (c)  The Plan shall:
                            (i)  provide additional detailed 
                        roles and responsibilities of heads of 
                        executive departments and agencies 
                        relating to and consistent with the 
                        Strategy and actions set forth in this 
                        directive;
                            (ii)  provide additional guidance 
                        on public health and medical directives 
                        in Biodefense for the 21st Century; and
                            (iii)  direct the full examination 
                        of resource requirements.
                    (d)  The Plan and all Task Force reports 
                shall be developed in coordination with the 
                Biodefense Policy Coordination Committee of the 
                Homeland Security Council and shall then be 
                prepared for consideration by and submitted to 
                the more senior committees of the Homeland 
                Security Council, as deemed appropriate by the 
                Assistant to the President for Homeland 
                Security and Counterterrorism.
General Provisions
            (44)  This directive:
                    (a)  shall be implemented consistent with 
                applicable law and the authorities of executive 
                departments and agencies, or heads of such 
                departments and agencies, vested by law, and 
                subject to the availability of appropriations 
                and within the current projected spending 
                levels for Federal health entitlement programs;
                    (b)  shall not be construed to impair or 
                otherwise affect the functions of the Director 
                of the Office of Management and Budget relating 
                to budget, administrative, and legislative 
                proposals; and
                    (c)  is not intended, and does not, create 
                any rights or benefits, substantive or 
                procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by 
                a party against the United States, its 
                departments, agencies, instrumentalities, or 
                entities, its officers, employees, or agents, 
                or any other person.

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