[Senate Prints 109-61]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



109th Congress                                                  S. Prt.
 2d Session                 COMMITTEE PRINT                      109-61
_______________________________________________________________________


 
                        U.S.-INDIA ATOMIC ENERGY
                       COOPERATION: STRATEGIC AND
                     NONPROLIFERATION IMPLICATIONS

                               __________

                            A COMPILATION OF

                        STATEMENTS BY WITNESSES

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                       One Hundred Ninth Congress

                             Second Session

                             April 26, 2006

                                     



           Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations


  Available via World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate


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                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                  RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska                JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island         PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia               CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota              JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio            RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee           BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire        BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska               BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
                 Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
              Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director

                                  (ii)




                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                                                                   Page
Letter of Introduction...........................................     v


Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, Chairman, 
  Senate Committee on Foreign Relations..........................     1

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, Ranking 
  Member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations..................     3

Carter, Hon. Ashton B., Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, 
  John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.......     7

Perry, Hon. William J., Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, 
  Stanford University, Stanford, California......................    17

Gallucci, Hon. Robert L., Dean, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign 
  Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC.................    19

Tellis, Dr. Ashley J., Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for 
  International Peace, Washington, DC............................    23

Lehman, Hon. Ronald F., II, Director, Center for Global Security 
  Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA    31

Einhorn, Hon. Robert J., Senior Adviser, International Security 
  Program, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 
  Washington, DC.................................................    35

Milhollin, Dr. Gary, Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms 
  Control, Washington, DC........................................    45

Cohen, Dr. Stephen P., Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution, 
  Washington, DC.................................................    53

 Material Relating to the Committee's November 2, 2005 Hearing, ``U.S.-
   Indian Nuclear Energy Cooperation: Security and Nonproliferation 
                             Implications''

Responses to Senator Lugar's Questions to the Hon. R. Nicholas 
  Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and the Hon. 
  Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms Control and 
  International Security, Department of State, Washington, DC

    Responses of Under Secretaries Burns and Joseph..............    57

    Responses of Under Secretary Burns...........................    66

    Responses of Under Secretary Joseph..........................    68

                                 (iii)




                         LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

                              ----------                              

                                                       May 8, 2006.
Dear Colleagues:

    Dear Colleague: On April 26, the Committee on Foreign 
Relations held a hearing titled ``U.S.-Indian Nuclear Energy 
Cooperation: Strategic and Nonproliferation Implications.'' 
Given the ongoing committee consideration of this U.S.-Indian 
Civilian Nuclear Agreement, we wish to make the testimony of 
all our witnesses available to the entire Senate. Additionally, 
the answers to initial questions for the record that were posed 
some months ago are included.
    On our first panel, which focused on the strategic dynamics 
of the U.S.-India nuclear agreement, the witnesses included: 
former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry; former Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter; Robert Gallucci, Dean of 
the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown 
University; and Dr. Ashley Tellis from the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace. Members of the second panel, which 
considered the issue of the nonproliferation implications of 
nuclear cooperation between the United States and India, 
included: Dr. Ronald Lehman, Director of the Center for Global 
Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and 
formerly the head of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency; Mr. Robert Einhorn, Senior Advisor at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies and formerly Assistant 
Secretary of State for Nonproliferation; Dr. Gary Milhollin, 
Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control; and 
Dr. Stephen Cohen, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution.
    We believe that their testimony can be helpful in preparing 
members for subsequent Senate consideration of the U.S.-Indian 
Civilian Nuclear Agreement.
            Sincerely,

                                          Richard G. Lugar,
                                                          Chairman.

                                      Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
                                                    Ranking Member.

                                  (v)

                          Opening Statement of

                         HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR

                       U.S. Senator From Indiana,

            Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations


                             april 26, 2006


                              ----------                              

    The Foreign Relations Committee meets today to continue its 
examination of the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement. On 
April 5, the committee met in open session with Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice. On March 29, we examined the agreement 
in closed session with Under Secretaries Nick Burns and Bob 
Joseph. Today, we will have the opportunity to hear the views 
of eight esteemed experts from outside the U.S. government.
    Some months ago, I submitted 82 questions related to the 
agreement to the State Department as an initial step toward 
establishing a dialogue that would help Congress make an 
informed decision. The State Department provided answers to 
those 82 questions. After the hearing with Secretary Rice, I 
submitted about 90 additional questions for the record. The 
Ranking Member and several other members of the committee also 
submitted questions after the hearing. We appreciate the 
administration's attention to these questions as the committee 
carefully works through the intricacies of the nuclear 
agreement with India.
    The committee is cognizant of how valuable a closer 
relationship with India could be for the United States. At our 
last hearing, many members commented on the importance of 
improving ties with India. Our nations share common democratic 
values, and the potential of our economic engagement is 
limitless.
    Energy cooperation between the United States and India is 
particularly important. India's energy needs are expected to 
double by 2025. The United States has an interest in expanding 
energy cooperation with India to develop new technologies, 
cushion supply disruptions, cut green house gas emissions, and 
prepare for declining global fossil fuel reserves. The United 
States' own energy problems will be exacerbated if we do not 
forge energy partnerships with India, China, and other nations 
experiencing rapid economic growth. That is why I have 
introduced S. 2435, the Energy Diplomacy and Security Act, 
which would encourage international energy dialogues and 
advance a broad range of energy diplomacy goals.
    But even as we pursue closer ties with India, we must 
examine the implications and risks of initiating a cooperative 
nuclear relationship. India has not signed the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty; it has built and tested nuclear weapons; 
and it has declared its intention to continue its nuclear 
weapons programs and the production of fissile material. If 
Congress approves this agreement, we will be establishing a new 
course after decades of declining any cooperation with India's 
nuclear program. Consequently, our committee has spent much 
time probing the details of the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear 
Agreement.
    Among many questions, we are attempting to evaluate the 
potential benefits of drawing India into a deeper relationship 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency and placing more 
Indian reactors under safeguards. The committee has also 
expressed great interest in the timing and sequence of how the 
India Nuclear Agreement would be implemented. Since the 
committee last met with Secretary Rice, India has initiated 
discussions with the International Atomic Energy Agency on a 
safeguards agreement and an additional protocol. This is a 
welcome development, but I urge India andthe IAEA to work hard 
to conclude an effective agreement in a timely fashion. All 
parties involved in the negotiations, including the Bush 
administration, should facilitate the maximum amount of 
transparency possible, so that Congress is better equipped to 
make informed judgments.
    Today we will hear from two panels of highly knowledgeable 
experts. Our first panel will focus on the strategic dynamics 
of the agreement, and the second panel will take up the 
question of the non-proliferation implications of nuclear 
cooperation between the United States and India.
    On our first panel, we welcome the distinguished former 
Secretary of Defense William Perry. Presently, he is Co-
Director of the Preventive Defense Project. He is joined by Dr. 
Ashton Carter, also a Co-Director of the Preventive Defense 
Project and a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Policy. Joining them will be Dr. Robert 
Gallucci, Dean of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service 
at Georgetown. Dr. Gallucci served as a chief U.S. negotiator 
during the 1994 crisis over North Korea's nuclear program. 
Finally, Dr. Ashley Tellis is with us from the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. Dr. Tellis played a leading 
role in the formulation of the U.S.-India nuclear agreement, 
serving in key State Department positions.
    On our second panel, we welcome Dr. Ronald Lehman, director 
of the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory and formerly the head of the U.S. 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Mr. Robert Einhorn, a 
Senior Adviser at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies and formerly Assistant Secretary of State for 
Nonproliferation; Dr. Gary Milhollin, Director of the Wisconsin 
Project on Nuclear Arms Control; and Dr. Stephen Cohen, a 
Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution.
    We are pleased to have with us so many good friends of the 
committee. Most of our witnesses have provided invaluable 
service to the Foreign Relations Committee as we have struggled 
with non-proliferation and other geo-political issues. We thank 
each of them for their willingness to again lend us their 
extraordinary expertise.
                          Opening Statement of

                       HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.

                      U.S. Senator From Delaware,

         Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

                             APRIL 26, 2006

                              ----------                              

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for chairing this 
series of hearings on the administration's nuclear deal with 
India.
    The administration did not consult us as it negotiated the 
July 18 Joint Statement between President Bush and Prime 
Minister Singh.
    It paid little attention to our concerns as it negotiated 
with India regarding India's plan for separating its civil 
nuclear facilities from its military ones.
    And it submitted a legislative proposal to us and a 
decision proposal to the Nuclear Suppliers Group that were so 
poorly drafted as to cast doubt on the administration's 
seriousness of purpose.
    Despite this, I indicated three weeks ago that I will 
probably support the agreement at the end of the day. I did so 
because I agree that the time has come to develop a new 
relationship between India and the parties to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
    And I did so also because undoing this deal could do more 
damage--in terms of our relationship with India--than approving 
it, with carefully drafted conditions.
    This deal brings risks, and I believe the administration 
and Congress must minimize those risks.
    So far, Mr. Chairman, the administration has done a lot 
more to lobby us than to work with us.

   It has yet to answer our questions for the record.

   It has yet to share its negotiating record or 
        explain just what it agreed to when it accepted the 
        idea of ``India-specific safeguards,'' or ``corrective 
        measures that India may take . . . in the event of 
        disruption of foreign fuel supplies,'' or U.S. 
        ``assurances regarding fuel supply,'' or ``a strategic 
        reserve of nuclear fuel'' for India.

   The administration has yet to share with us the full 
        list of India's civil nuclear facilities--even in 
        classified form.

   And it has reneged on an earlier promise to share 
        drafts of the peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement 
        that it is negotiating with India.

    Mr. Chairman, I still think that a new deal for India makes 
sense. But it isn't a ``slam dunk,'' as they say, and that is 
why we are here today to take testimony from some of our 
country's best thinkers on nuclear policy.
    Today's witnesses all have impressive backgrounds, and I 
have relied upon the wisdom of many of them over the years. I 
look forward to hearing their insights today.
    I want to especially thank Bill Perry for coming in from 
California and for upsetting his schedule in Washington in 
order to help us today. Dr. Perry is a man who answers his 
country's call, just as he did regarding North Korea policy 
after he had retired as Secretary of Defense.
    I would recommend that we also schedule a follow-up hearing 
with experts on the Atomic Energy Act, to discuss possible 
amendments to S. 2429, and experts on India who could tell us 
what the consequences of enacting those amendments might be.
    Finally, Mr. Chairman, I hope that you will make clear to 
the administration that the Senate and this committee should 
not be taken for granted.
    We expect the administration to answer our questions, to 
provide us the details on the related agreements that India is 
negotiating with the United States and with the IAEA, and to 
work with us to make S. 2429 a respectable bill.
    Until the administration does that, we simply should not 
act on its proposed legislation.
    Mr. Chairman, we recently received a letter from Ambassador 
John Ritch, a former staff member of this committee, in support 
of the India nuclear deal. I ask that his letter and an 
attached op-ed from the International Herald Tribune be 
included in today's hearing record.
    Thank you.
                                ------                                

    [The material to which Senator Biden referred follows:]


                                                     23 April 2006.

Hon. Richard G. Lugar, Chairman,
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Ranking Member,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

SUBJECT: Submission on U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation

    Dear Senators Lugar and Biden: For the committee's 
consideration and record in connection with the 26 April 
hearing on proposed U.S.-India nuclear cooperation, I offer the 
attached summary of my views, as published recently in the 
International Herald Tribune. My perspective derives from:

   22 years of service on the staff of the Foreign 
        Relations Committee;

   7 years as U.S. representative to the IAEA and other 
        UN agencies in Vienna; and

   5 years interacting with the Indian nuclear 
        establishment in my current capcity.

            With respect and warm regards,

                           John B. Ritch, Director General,
                                         World Nuclear Association.

                                ------                                


            It Makes Sense To End India's Nuclear Isolation

              John B. Ritch, International Herald Tribune

                        THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 2006

    LONDON--President George W. Bush has taken a momentous step 
in shelving a U.S. policy that for three decades cast India as 
a nuclear pariah- state and isolated the world's largest 
democracy from nuclear commerce, even for the peaceful purpose 
of generating electricity.
    In Washington a fierce debate has erupted over the impact 
on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
    The U.S.-India deal conforms to the treaty by ensuring that 
nuclear commerce remains in the civil realm. But critics say it 
jeopardizes the treaty by legitimizing India's nuclear 
deterrent. Supporters counter that India's weapon is a long-
standing fact, that India has used nuclear technology 
responsibly and that it is time to close ranks with a 
democracy.
    Before the Bush initiative, two truths coexisted uneasily. 
First, the nonproliferation regime is one of history's great 
diplomatic achievements. Since its inception in 1970, the 
treaty has kept the number of nuclear-armed nations under 10.
    Episodes of non-compliance have shown the treaty's value. 
After the first Gulf War revealed Iraq's covert nuclear 
efforts, the treaty regime gained strength as the International 
Atomic Energy Agency acquired new detection capabilities and 
broader authority for its inspectors. Treaty inspections 
``caught'' both North Korea and Iran, and have spurred 
collective diplomacy against these violations.
    A second, less convenient truth is that the treaty was, 
from the outset, unfair to India as a great nation. The treaty 
drew a line in time, recognizing only the UN Security Council's 
five permanent members as ``nuclear-weapon states.'' Thus, when 
India became the world's sixth nuclear power in 1974, it faced 
Hobson's choice: Disarm or remain outside the treaty.
    For reasons of principle and strategic interest India 
remained outside, declaring that it would eliminate its small 
deterrent as soon as the five favored ``weapon states'' 
fulfilled a treaty pledge to dismantle their own much larger 
nuclear arsenals.
    Indians went on, for three decades, to become proud 
developers and careful custodians of their own sophisticated 
nuclear technologies. To supply power for economic growth, 
India now plans to build hundreds of reactors by mid-century, 
even without the new agreement.
    The Bush initiative would accept India's reality. Critics 
complain that the accord leaves India's military program 
``unconstrained.'' Advocates counter that India's civil power 
reactors will fall under inspection safeguards.
    This debate is sterile. Inspections on India's civil 
facilities cannot affect its military program. But neither will 
civil nuclear trade with India spur an Asian arms race. India's 
leaders have no motive to abandon India's long-standing policy 
of maintaining minimal nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis Pakistan's 
smaller nuclear force and China's larger one.
    Although legal under the nonproliferation treaty, the deal 
will require change in a U.S. law enacted in 1978 that made 
treaty membership a condition of nuclear trade. In 1992, the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group of nations embraced the same coercive 
approach. Now these countries are set to follow the U.S. lead, 
with only China expressing resistance.
    The new policy would revert--in the unique case of India--
to the basic treaty requirement of confining nuclear trade to 
the civil realm. It would also welcome India as a partner in 
world nuclear trade controls and collaborative projects to 
develop nuclear technology.
    Some say that ending India's nuclear isolation sends a 
dangerous message to potential proliferators. This charge does 
not withstand analysis. How will the ambitions of Iran, North 
Korea, and Pakistan be inflamed by the principle now being 
affirmed?
    The principle is this: In sensitive nuclear technology, we 
will trade legally--and with nations that have earned the 
world's trust. As a practical matter, no nation appears likely 
to ``proliferate'' because India is allowed civil nuclear 
commerce.
    Thus has the new policy been endorsed by Hans Blix and 
Mohamed Elbaradei, the IAEA leaders entrusted over the last 
quarter century to oversee the nonproliferation regime.
    Nuclear cooperation with India offers some economic 
opportunity--and potentially enormous environmental value. 
India has recognized the urgency of a worldwide clean-energy 
revolution if humankind is to avoid unleashing devastating 
climate change.
    The U.S.-India deal promises a partnership between the two 
largest democracies to deliver this environmental benefit--
within India and to a wider world--on a scale that can make a 
difference.
    With a strong legal, strategic and environmental rationale, 
this is a Bush initiative that has gained a broad coalition of 
support abroad.


    John B. Ritch, U.S. ambassador to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in the Clinton administration, is the director 
general of the World Nuclear Association and president of the 
World Nuclear University.
                         Prepared Statement of

                     THE HONORABLE ASHTON B. CARTER

  Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, John F. Kennedy School of 
                     Government, Harvard University

                               BEFORE THE

                 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

                       WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 2006

                              ----------                              


                      ASSESSING THE INDIA DEAL \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ An edited version of this statement appeared in the July/August 
issue of Foreign Affairs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During a state visit to Washington in July of 2005, Indian 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and U.S. President George W. Bush 
announced a potentially far-reaching ``strategic partnership'' 
between what will probably be the 21st century's most powerful 
democracies. To inaugurate what came to be known as the India 
Deal, Bush abruptly fulfilled a thirty-year quest by Delhi to 
be recognized as a sixth ``legitimate'' nuclear power, 
alongside the five victors of World War II. In March of 2006, 
in a reciprocal visit to India, Bush settled most of the 
remaining details of the nuclear part of the India Deal in 
Delhi's favor.
    Debate in both Washington and Delhi has swirled around the 
nuclear aspects of the India Deal. This is understandable, 
since preventing nuclear war and terrorism is the highest 
American national security priority in this era, as Bush 
himself has acknowledged. The decade has already witnessed a 
stunning defeat for the United States in North Korea's runaway 
nuclear program. The same could be unfolding more slowly in 
Iran. Meanwhile, an unbowed Osama bin Laden has declared to his 
followers that obtaining weapons of mass destruction is a 
``religious duty.''
    Indeed, if the nuclear aspects of the India Deal are 
assessed in isolation, one must conclude that the Deal was a 
bad one for the United States. Washington recognized Delhi's 
nuclear status in return for little in the way of new steps by 
India to combat nuclear proliferation and terrorism that Delhi 
was not already committed or inclined to give, and for almost 
no technical restraints on India's growing nuclear arsenal. 
Through the U.S. concession, the nonproliferation regime also 
paid a palpable, although probably manageable, price to its 
integrity and support.
    But it would be a mistake to assess the India Deal in a 
nuclear-only frame. President Bush and his key advisors were 
clearly looking through a wider lens, and so should the public 
and the U.S. Congress, which must amend U.S. nonproliferation 
laws that forbid the policies Bush agreed to. Viewed through 
such a wider geopolitical lens, the Deal has the United States 
giving the Indians what they have craved for so long--nuclear 
recognition--in return for a strategic partnership between 
Washington and Delhi as the two democracies face similar 
potential challenges from China, Pakistan, Iran, and elsewhere 
in the coming decades. In short, Washington gave on the nuclear 
front to get something on the non-nuclear front. Powerful 
arguments can be made that strategic partnership with India 
will prove to be in the deep and long-term U.S. security 
interest. Indo-U.S. partnership seems not only logical but 
eminently achievable in India's democracy: in an influential 
2005 Pew Research Center poll of 15 leading nations, India 
reported the highest proportion of favorable views of the 
United States at 71%. A nuclear-recognition quid for a 
strategic-partnership quo is therefore a reasonable framework 
for an India Deal.
    However, as a diplomatic transaction the India Deal as 
negotiated by President Bush is quite uneven. First of all, a 
U.S.-Indian strategic partnership would seem to be in Delhi's 
interest as well as America's. So why pay them for it? Second, 
the Deal is uneven in its specifics--what the U.S. gives is 
spelled out quite clearly, but what India gives in return is 
vaguer. Third, the Deal is uneven in timing--the United States 
gave its big quid of nuclear recognition up front, but what it 
stands to get in return from partnership with India lies 
further out in the uncertain future.
Rebalancing the Deal
    Despite the Deal's flaws, Congress should not attempt to 
renegotiate the Deal to win a more balanced version than the 
Bush administration obtained. The big U.S. card of nuclear 
recognition has already been played and cannot be taken back by 
Congress at this point without casting a lasting cloud over the 
whole idea of Indo-U.S. partnership. Haggling over some of the 
details of the implementation of the nuclear parts of the Deal 
is unlikely to restore much of whatever lost reputation for 
nonproliferation consistency that the U.S. has already 
suffered, and would probably be viewed as grudging and punitive 
in Delhi. The result would be to undermine the goodwill that 
was supposedly the whole purpose of giving nuclear recognition 
in the first place.
    Rather than subtracting from the Indian side of the ledger 
in an effort to rebalance the India Deal, Congress should 
instead emphasize what the U.S. expects on its side of the 
ledger to give meaning to the new ``strategic partnership.'' 
The United States should expect India to join it in countering 
any destabilizing effects China's future rise might have on 
Asian security; assisting in any emergency in Pakistan such as 
radicalization of its government or loss of control of its 
nuclear weapons; reversing traditional Indian opposition to 
controls on transfer of nuclear technology and especially using 
its diplomatic clout against potential proliferators like Iran; 
growing its military-to-military relationships, including arms 
cooperation, to match in time those the United States has with 
its closest allies; and giving preferential treatment to the 
U.S. defense and nuclear industries when the Indian government 
makes investments in these sectors.
    To see how the ledger can be rebalanced over time, one 
needs first to consider what India already got from the Deal on 
the nuclear front, and its repercussions for the 
nonproliferation regime; second, to prescribe the broader 
benefits the United States should aim to get from strategic 
partnership from India in coming decades; and third, to assess 
the chances that U.S. expectations will actually be met.
What Delhi Got
    India obtained defacto recognition of its nuclear weapons 
status: the United States will behave, and urge others to 
behave, as if India were a nuclear weapons state under the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The U.S. will not deny 
it most civil nuclear technology or commerce, nor require it to 
put all of its nuclear facilities under International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards--only those it declares to be 
civil. India can now import uranium, which has been a 
bottleneck in its nuclear program. It is worth noting that even 
if the Bush administration wished to make India a formal 
Nuclear Weapons State under the NPT (which it refused to do), 
it probably could not persuade all the other signatories of the 
NPT to agree to the change (such amendments require unanimity).
    Besides the new access to technology, nuclear recognition 
grants an enormous political benefit to India. With one stroke 
India joins the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, 
and France as ``legitimate'' wielders of the power and 
influence that nuclear weapons confer. The Deal allows India to 
transcend the nuclear box that has for so long defined and 
constrained its place in the international order, hopefully 
jettison at last its outdated Non-Aligned Movement stances and 
rhetoric, and occupy a more normal and modern place in the 
diplomatic world. Critics of the Deal contend that India's past 
and likely future behavior do not warrant this free pass. 
Proponents predict that with the nuclear issue (which the Bush 
administration describes as the ``basic irritant'' in Indo-U.S. 
relations) out of its psychological way, India will pivot from 
detractor of much of the international order, including 
especially the nonproliferation regime, to responsible 
stakeholder. Both sides agree that nuclear recognition is huge.
    The Deal has naturally been popular in India. Supporters of 
Congress Party Prime Minister Singh have emphasized Bush's 
nuclear recognition and downplayed any sense that India has 
taken on important obligations in return. Criticism from the 
opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has been narrow and 
technical and probably reflects chagrin that a Congress Party 
government and not the BJP secured the Deal. The other source 
of criticism has been leftists in the Left Front parties. They 
are wedded to the old politics of the Non-Aligned Movement 
which was overtaken by the end of the Cold War, but they are 
unlikely to be able to block the Deal.
Measuring the Impact of Nuclear Recognition for India
    Previous U.S. administrations have adopted the stance that 
India's nuclear arsenal, first tested in 1974, is illegitimate 
and should be eliminated, or at least sharply constrained. They 
have done so for two reasons: First, India's nuclear arsenal is 
watched closely by arch-rival and nuclear-armed Pakistan and by 
China, with which India has fought no fewer than three wars 
since its independence from Great Britain. Recognizing the 
Indian arsenal, the argument went, might spur its open growth 
and thus an arms race in South Asia. Second, Washington wanted 
to stick strictly to the principles underlying the NPT: that 
signatories would get the benefits of international standing 
and peaceful nuclear commerce, but those like India that stood 
outside the regime would not. Compromising these principles 
would, it was feared, give heart to nuclear aspirants that they 
could ``end run'' the NPT if only they waited thirty years like 
India; it would also dishearten the many countries that were 
not about to go nuclear but which loyally supported the NPT 
against new proliferators.
    But a stance is not a policy. As policy, elimination of 
India's arsenal became increasingly unrealistic as Pakistan 
went nuclear in the 1980s, and then more so when India tested 
five bombs underground and openly declared itself a nuclear 
power in 1998. As the Bush administration conducted its nuclear 
negotiations with India in the fall of 2005 and spring of 2006, 
it ultimately abandoned efforts by nonproliferation specialists 
to attach further conditions to the Deal that would constrain 
India from increasing its nuclear arsenal further. The U.S. 
insisted that the Deal is a broad strategic agreement, not an 
arms control treaty. For example, some have argued that India 
should be required to stop making fissile material for bombs 
now like the other acknowledged nuclear powers have done rather 
than wait for the negotiation of an international Fissile 
Material Cutoff Treaty. Others contend that India should have 
to place more of its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, 
to prevent diversion of fissile materials from its nuclear 
power program to its nuclear weapons program. Yet others would 
have India sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty rather than 
abide, as it has since 1998, by a unilateral moratorium on 
further underground testing of its nuclear arsenal.
    The Indian government, with strong public support, has 
resisted all these efforts to constrain its future nuclear 
arsenal in technical ways. If the objective of U.S. proponents 
of these ways of rebalancing the India Deal is to prevent 
Indian arms racing with Pakistan and China, then that important 
goal would be better pursued in non-technical ways. India has 
stated its intention to pursue a ``minimum deterrent'' rather 
than an all-out arms race. The Bush administration has 
encouraged this path, and can now make it an expectation of 
India as a responsible member of the nuclear club. But if the 
objective of seeking additional constraints on India's nuclear 
program is to ``take back'' some of the gain India got from 
nuclear recognition, then such a grudging move is likely to 
backfire. Indians will understandably view such a move as 
inconsistent with Bush's whole intent to use nuclear 
forgiveness as a way to open the way for strategic partnership.
    The second impact of nuclear recognition for India has to 
do with the integrity of the NPT regime and is more serious, 
though probably manageable. It is inconceivable that North 
Korea's Kim Jong Il pays much heed to the internal consistency 
of the NPT regime as he calculates how far he can get with his 
nuclear breakout. North Korea's governing ideology is less 
communism than a fanatical embrace of autarky and ``self-
reliance,'' including open defiance of international norms like 
the nonproliferation regime. North Korea's tolerance for 
international ostracism is legendary. If Kim's nuclear program 
can be stopped at all at this point, it will be through a tough 
and focused diplomacy of sticks and carrots in which the NPT 
will play little part. Likewise, after 1995 Saddam Hussein 
simply ceased paying attention to the NPT.
    Iran's cat-and-mouse game with the EU-3, the U.S., and the 
IAEA over its recently-revealed nuclear program bespeaks at 
least a smidgen of sensitivity to international opinion as 
embodied in the NPT. Nuclear recognition for India gives 
Teheran a new talking point: If India gets a free pass, why not 
Iran which is also an important nation with an ancient culture? 
But like North Korea, Iran's nuclear program has deeper roots 
in its sense of security threat and Persian pride. Against 
these the NPT will not weigh in very heavily. Besides, for now 
Teheran denies it is seeking a nuclear arsenal at all but only 
nuclear power, so it will be hard-pressed to use India as a 
precedent for its current diplomatic position.
    The impact of the Bush-Singh deal on the ``rogues'' is 
therefore minimal. Its main impact will be felt among two other 
groups of countries. First, there are the ``in-betweens''--
states that are not rogues but that flirt with nuclear status. 
In the recent past the in-betweens have included South Africa, 
Argentina and Brazil, the post-Soviet states of Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan, and Belarus, South Korea, Taiwan, and (only 
recently joining this category) Libya. These in-betweens turned 
away from nuclear weapons for many reasons specific to their 
own individual circumstances, but in each of these cases the 
lasting international ostracism threatening them if they stood 
outside the NPT regime was an influential factor for both 
governments and their people. Nuclear recognition for India 
suggests that forgiveness will eventually come to proliferators 
who wait, and tomorrow's in-betweens--Brazil comes to mind--
might be tempted by the Bush-Singh precedent.
    The most nonproliferation damage, curiously, might be done 
among the stalwarts of the regime: governments that have no 
nuclear ambitions at all but that faithfully uphold the rules, 
and the nuclear powers that already enjoy a privileged place in 
it. These groups not only provide political support to 
discourage in-betweens and confront rogues, they provide vital 
and direct technical support by denying critical exports to 
those who infringe the NPT's rules. The Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG), in particular, coordinates controls on exports by the 
nations with advanced nuclear power technology. The NSG was 
created through U.S. leadership, and it is the U.S. that has 
long stood against backsliding by member governments that come 
under pressure from their nuclear industries to sell technology 
abroad more liberally, including especially to India. Now all 
of a sudden the United States has decided to change policy, and 
others too might consider themselves free to pick and choose 
where they apply the nonproliferation rules--the Chinese with 
Pakistan, the Russians with Iran, and some European vendors 
everywhere.
    Damage-limitation from the Bush-Singh deal must therefore 
center on the in-betweens and stalwarts. A plan for doing so 
was a logical part of the U.S. diplomatic initiative, but it is 
clear that the Bush administration did not have one until after 
the Deal was concluded, still less did it consult widely before 
Bush made his dramatic volte-face in July 2005. But most of the 
nations whose adherence to the NPT regime is critical will 
either support the Deal or acquiesce in it. First, most accept 
the U.S. argument that India's nuclear nonproliferation 
behavior has been good--there have apparently been no Indian 
A.Q. Khans--and that India's possession of nuclear weapons is 
an established fact and cannot be reversed. Second, all can see 
that India is hardly a rogue state, but a stable democracy 
likely to play a large and constructive role in the world of 
the 21st century. Third, many will regard India's thirty years 
in the ``penalty box,'' which exacted a heavy price from Delhi 
in both prestige and technology, as sufficient to make the 
point that the regime's adherents are serious about enforcing 
its norms. These arguments have won over many in the 
international nonproliferation community, notably IAEA Director 
General and Nobel Laureate Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei And so while 
there is some grumbling within the NPT regime over the Deal, a 
revolt or collapse is not likely, and the damage to the regime 
can be limited.
    As critics have exaggerated the nonproliferation costs of 
the nuclear part of the India Deal, so also its proponents have 
exaggerated its benefits in terms of energy security and 
nuclear security. Bush administration spokesmen have defended 
the Deal's nuclear power provisions as critical to stopping 
India's rise from posing an oil and environmental crisis. But 
this claim does not survive close scrutiny. Energy security is 
terribly important to both India and the United States. All 
want India's huge population to satisfy its energy needs, which 
will grow faster than its GDP, increasing as much as fourfold 
within 25 years, without contributing further to dependence on 
Middle East oil, pollution, and global warming. But the 
arithmetic does not support the case that nuclear power will 
add up to make the critical difference for India, though it can 
and should play a role. For the foreseeable future, electricity 
generation in India will be dominated by coal burning whereas 
nuclear plants (which today produce only 3% of India's 
electricity) will remain a single-digit contributor even under 
the most extravagant projections of U.S.-assisted nuclear 
expansion in India. Indian coal is plentiful but of poor 
quality and highly polluting. Burning coal more cheaply and 
more cleanly will do more than any conceivable expansion of 
nuclear power to aid India's economy and the environment. 
India's share of world oil consumption will grow from 3% to 4% 
over the next twenty years. But nuclear power does nothing to 
address the principal Indian oil consuming sector--cars and 
trucks--since these don't run off the electrical grid and won't 
for a long time. Finally, the type of assistance the United 
States is best positioned to provide to India's nuclear 
generation capacity (light water reactors operating on low-
enriched uranium fuel) is at odds with the Indian 
establishment's uneconomical vision of a civil nuclear power 
program built primarily around breeder reactors.
    The administration also claims the Deal will require India 
to improve its laws and procedures for controlling exports or 
diversions of sensitive nuclear technology--preventing an 
Indian A.Q. Khan. But at the same time, the administration 
acknowledges India's apparently excellent record of controlling 
nuclear exports (though not always ballistic missile exports). 
India is already bound by the U.S.-sponsored U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1540 which requires such good conduct, so on 
paper at least Delhi has sold the same horse a second time in 
the Deal. In any event, the United States is justifying the 
Deal's nuclear recognition to other nations around the world on 
the grounds that India's nuclear proliferation behavior is 
already exemplary, It will be difficult for the U.S. to argue 
this point both ways at the same time.
What Washington Should Get
    What is it then that the United States might expect from 
the ``strategic partnership'' in return for the nuclear 
recognition it conferred upon India?
    First and foremost, the United States should expect India 
to serve as a potential future Asian counterweight to China. 
Though no one wants to see China and the United States fall 
into strategic competition, neither can anyone rule this out. 
The evolution of U.S.-China relations will depend on the 
attitudes of China's younger generation and new leaders, on 
Chinese and U.S. policies, and on unpredictable events like a 
crisis over Taiwan. It is reasonable for the United States to 
hedge against a downturn in relations with China by improving 
its relations with India, and for India to do the same. But for 
now both are intent on improving their relations and trade with 
China, not antagonizing China. Neither government will wish to 
talk publicly, let alone take actions now, pursuant to this 
shared--but hypothetical and future--common interest.
    Second, the U.S. will want Indian assistance in a range of 
possible contingencies involving neighboring Pakistan--another 
common interest that is awkward for either party to the Deal to 
acknowledge. Pakistan, alongside Russia, belongs at the very 
center of urgent concern about nuclear terrorism. Terrorists 
cannot make nuclear bombs unless they obtain enriched uranium 
or plutonium from governments that have made these materials. 
The exposure of the A.Q. Khan network in Pakistan makes clear 
that Pakistan has to be regarded as a potential source of such 
materials--whether by theft, sale, diversion by internal 
radical elements with access to bombs or materials, change of 
government from Mushanaf to a radical regime, or some sort of 
internal chaos. Which version of the A.Q. Khan story is more 
alarming--that the government and military of Pakistan was 
unaware of what he was doing, or that they were aware and 
permitted it? Either way it illustrates a serious danger. Were 
there to be a threat or incident of nuclear terrorism 
originating in Pakistan, the United States would want to act in 
concert with as many regional players as possible, including 
India.
    The Pakistan contingency is even more difficult than the 
China counterweight contingency for the newly-minted strategic 
partners in Washington and Delhi to acknowledge. India seems 
intent on improving its relations with Pakistan--despite last 
year's bombings in Delhi and their impact on Indian public 
opinion--and a rapprochement between these long-time 
antagonists is in the U.S. interest. The United States, for its 
part, has important interests at stake with the Musharraf 
government--among them supporting the search for Osama bin 
Laden and other terrorists on Pakistani territory, arresting 
the growth of radicalism in Pakistan's population, and 
stabilizing Afghanistan--and can ill afford the perception of a 
``tilt towards India.'' For now, therefore, the Pakistan 
contingency, like the China counterweight, remains a 
hypothetical and future benefit of the India Deal.
    Third, and most urgently, India should be expected to weigh 
in against Iran's nuclear ambitions and to compromise to a 
considerable extent its friendly relations with Iran in the 
interests of nonproliferation. Whether Delhi does this will be 
the clearest test of whether nuclear recognition ``brings India 
into the nuclear mainstream,'' as the Bush administration 
predicts, or whether India persists in its pre-Deal (actually, 
Cold war) positions of rhetorical support for the spread of 
nuclear fuel-cycle activities (uranium enrichment and plutonium 
reprocessing). India's September 24, 2005 and February 4, 2006 
votes with the United States and its European partners in the 
IAEA Board of Governors, finding Iran in noncompliance with its 
NPT obligations and referring the matter to the United National 
Security Council were a welcome suggestion that India will 
support the international campaign to curb Iran's nuclear 
ambitions. But India's willingness truly to join the nuclear 
club, reversing old non-aligned habits and putting its 
diplomatic shoulder to the wheel in the case of Iran and other 
urgent counter-proliferation efforts will be an early and major 
test of the value of strategic partnership and its new status.
    Fourth, the United States should expect a continued 
intensification of Indo-U.S. military-to-military contacts, 
ultimately envisioning joint action in operations outside of a 
United Nations context. India has historically refused to join 
the United States military in operations that were not mandated 
and commanded by the United Nations. In the future, when the 
United States needs partners in disaster relief, humanitarian 
intervention, peacekeeping missions, or stability operations, 
the United States can reasonably expect India to cooperate. 
Judging from the evolution of U.S. security partnerships in 
Asia and Europe (especially NATO's expanded membership and 
Partnership for Peace), anticipation of joint action can lead 
first to joint military planning, then progressively to joint 
exercises, intelligence sharing and forging of a common threat 
assessment, and finally to joint capabilities. This is the path 
foreseen for a deepening U.S.-India strategic partnership in 
the defense field. Additionally, there could be occasions when 
access for and, if needed, basing of U.S. military forces on 
Indian territory would be desirable. At first this might be 
limited to port access for U.S. naval vessels transiting the 
Indian Ocean and overflight rights for U.S. military aircraft, 
but in time it could lead to such steps as use of Indian 
training facilities for U.S. forces deploying to locations with 
similar climate (the way German training areas were used for 
forces deploying to the Balkans). Ultimately, India could 
provide U.S. forces with ``over-the-horizon'' basing for Middle 
East contingencies of the sort preferred by Saudi Arabia and 
other Gulf states.
    Fifth, the United States will expect preferential treatment 
for U.S. industry in India's civil nuclear expansion and 
modernization of its military. The authors of the India Deal 
might have anticipated preferential treatment for U.S. industry 
in construction of Indian nuclear reactors and other civil 
power infrastructure made possible by the Deal. But there are 
two barriers to realization of this U.S. benefit. First, the 
United States must secure preferential access for its nuclear 
industry at the expense of Russian and European suppliers who 
are also seeking access to the Indian market. Second, the 
United States will also need to persuade India to focus its 
nuclear power expansion on light water reactors, not the exotic 
and uneconomical technologies (e.g., fast breeders) that the 
Indian nuclear scientific community favors. This benefit should 
therefore not be exaggerated. India is expected to increase the 
scale and sophistication of its military, in part by purchasing 
weapons systems abroad. In view of its concessions in the India 
Deal, the United States can reasonably expect preferential 
treatment for U.S. vendors relative to Russian or European 
vendors. Early discussions have included the F-16 and F-18 
tactical aircraft and the P-3C Orion maritime surveillance 
aircraft.
Will the United States Get the Benefits of the India Deal?
    The list above is a very substantial--even breathtaking--
set of potential benefits to the United States of a strategic 
partnership with India. How realistic is it?
    Some of the items on this list reflect common national 
interests of India and the United States. The United States 
might therefore have had many of these benefits without having 
to pay the nonproliferation costs associated with nuclear 
recognition for India. Most of the items on the list are also 
hypothetical and lie in a future that neither side can 
predict--this is certainly the case with regard to the China 
counterweight and Pakistan contingency items. Other items on 
the list, like Iran's nuclear program, will unfold sooner. The 
United States can certainly hope that India will behave as a 
true ``strategic partner'' in the future across all the items 
on this list. But there is a risk that when the United States 
comes to ask India to do something it is reluctant to do, that 
it comes to regret having played its big diplomatic card--
nuclear recognition--so early in the process.
    India, as befits a great nation on its way to global 
prominence, will have its own opinions about this list. Some 
American proponents of the India Deal have compared it to 
Nixon's opening to China--a bold move based on a firm 
foundation of mutual interest, but more a leap of trust than a 
shrewd bargain. Mao and Nixon, however, had a clear and present 
common enemy--the Soviet Union--not a hypothetical set of 
possible future opponents. But the real difference between the 
Nixon/Kissinger deal and the India Deal is that India, unlike 
Mao's China, is a democracy. No government in Delhi can turn 
decades of Indian policy on a dime or commit it to a broad set 
of actions in support of U.S. interests--only a profound and 
probably slow change in the views of India's elites can do 
this. India's bureaucracies and diplomats are fabled for their 
stubborn adherence to independent positions regarding the world 
order, economic development, and nuclear security. Proponents 
of the India Deal suggest that these positions will yield to 
the grand gesture of nuclear recognition by the United States. 
This expectation is naive. Americans view the change of long-
standing and principled nonproliferation policy to accommodate 
India as a concession. Indians view it as acknowledgement of 
something to which they have long been entitled. This is not a 
durable basis for a diplomatic transaction.
    It is therefore premature to judge whether the expectations 
of this strategic partnership as apparently foreseen on the 
U.S. side are shared by India and will, in fact, materialize. 
The Deal itself was premature. The risk with a hastily prepared 
diplomatic initiative is that disenchantment will set in on 
both sides. At this point, the United States, including the 
Congress, can only do its best to ensure that its benefits are 
fully realized--by both parties.
                              ----------                              

                              Testimony of

                     THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. PERRY

                 Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution

                               BEFORE THE

                 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

                       WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 2006

                              ----------                              

    My views on the recently concluded Civilian Nuclear 
Cooperation Agreement between India and the United States can 
be summarized in three points.
    Firstly, I enthusiastically support the development of a 
strategic partnership between the United States and India, of 
which this agreement could be an important step. The benefits 
of a strategic partnership were convincingly outlined in the 
earlier testimony of Secretary of Rice to this committee. I 
associate myself with her views on the importance of a 
strategic partnership. In particular, I expect that this could 
include a robust military-to-military partnership, including, 
for example, joint exercises in humanitarian relief operations, 
in responding to emergencies at sea, and in peacekeeping 
operations. Those exercises could be modeled after the 
comparable exercises conducted in Europe by the Partnership for 
Peace.
    Secondly, I understand the need of India to aggressively 
develop nuclear power for its growing industrial base, and I 
believe that the United States should support India in that 
development. The importance of nuclear power to India and to 
the global environment were convincingly outlined by Dr. David 
Victor in his op-ed piece in the International Herald Tribune 
on 17 March. And I commend this to the committee. I associate 
myself with Dr. Victor's views on this subject.
    Thirdly, I am disappointed that the United States did not 
seize the opportunity presented in the formulation of this 
agreement to undertake a joint program with India directed at 
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Stopping nuclear 
proliferation is an important American objective. It is an 
important international objective. And it should be an 
important Indian objective. I believe that it is not too late 
to join forces with India to further this critical objective.
    I'd like to highlight four actions that India could take 
that would make a significant difference in preventing the 
spread of nuclear weapons:

          First, India could join other nuclear powers in 
        implementing strong controls on the transfer of nuclear 
        technology and materials.

          Secondly, India could take a leadership position in 
        promoting an international cutoff in the production of 
        fissile material.

          Third, India could cooperate with the United States 
        and the EU-3 in pressuring Iran to stop the programs 
        that are facilitating an Iranian nuclear bomb.

          And, fourth, India could explicitly reaffirm its 
        intention of limiting its nuclear arsenal to minimal 
        deterrence levels.

    Secretary Rice, in her testimony, has suggested that India 
is prepared to take many of these actions, but they are not an 
explicit part of the agreement. I do not recommend that the 
Senate try to modify the agreement to include them. Instead, I 
recommend that the Senate task the administration to vigorously 
pursue continuing diplomacy to facilitate these actions, and 
that should be as a follow-on to the agreement. Indeed, I 
believe that these actions are strongly in the interest of 
India, and I believe that the Indian Government understands 
that.
    What is the motivation--what is the incentive that the 
administration would have to actually carry out this diplomacy? 
First of all, they are in India's interest. And, secondly, only 
if India moves aggressively to carry out these actions will 
they be providing the foundation on which the strategic 
partnership desired by both countries can, in fact, be 
achieved.
                              ----------                              

                         Prepared Statement of

                        HON. ROBERT L. GALLUCCI

   Dean of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown 
                               University

                               BEFORE THE

               U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

                             26 APRIL 2006

                              ----------                              

    In this brief statement, I wish to make only three points. 
The first is that those who advocate making this special 
arrangements to permit nuclear cooperation with India ought to 
be clear--and honest--about why they are doing so. The second 
is that the reasons for making the particular deal they 
propose, while important, do not justify the cost to the 
national security of doing so. And third, that there is an 
arrangement which would, in fact, strike the right balance 
between competing national security interests, an arrangement 
that may be negotiable at some future time, if not now.
    The United States has good reasons for improving its 
relations with India, both political and economic. Part of the 
calculation must turn on our uncertainties about China, about 
whether Beijing will turn out to be more of a strategic 
competitor than partner in the decades ahead. If internal 
developments in China do not proceed as we hope, and if Chinese 
foreign policy turns out to be more hegemonic than we expect, a 
solid political relationship with India could be important to 
our security. Moreover, independent of such considerations, 
India's enormous and growing economic and political importance 
make the improvement of relations with New Delhi a prudent 
objective for the United States.
    If this is obvious, so also is the chronic irritant that 
our non-proliferation policy has been to U.S.-India relations 
over the last thirty years. We should acknowledge the 
importance that India attaches to American willingness to 
change that policy so that the United States can begin to sell 
it nuclear equipment, material and technology. We should also 
admit that the proposed deal would grant what New Delhi values 
most, namely our acceptance of India as a nuclear weapons 
state. And while we are at it, we should admit that although 
the deal would be critically important to our goal of improving 
relations with India, it will really do nothing to help us deal 
with the risks posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Assertions to the contrary are less than honest.
    There is no reason why we should attach any positive value 
to India's willingness to submit a few additional nuclear 
facilities of its choosing to international safeguards, so long 
as other fissile material producing facilities are free from 
safeguards. This move has been called ``symbolic'' by critics, 
but it is not at all clear what useful purpose it symbolizes. 
The other elements of the deal that are supposed to contribute 
to its non-proliferation value were in place before the deal 
was struck. The first point then, is that the administration 
proposes this deal to address a genuine regional security 
objective and not because it helps in any way our global 
security concern over nuclear proliferation.
    The second point is that the proposed arrangement will be 
too costly to the national security to be justified by the gain 
in relations with India.
    Since the dawn of the nuclear age and the arrival of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, our nation has been 
defenseless against devastating attack--leaving us to rely on 
deterrence, the promise of retaliation, to deal with nuclear 
armed enemies. From the beginning, we recognized that this left 
us vulnerable to anyone who could not be deterred, and so, in 
some basic way, our security depended on limiting the number of 
countries who ultimately acquired nuclear weapons. Most 
analysts believe that fifty years of non-proliferation policy 
has something to do with explaining why the spread of nuclear 
technology has not led to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
why we live in a world of eight or nine nuclear weapons states, 
rather then eighty or ninety. A key part of that policy has 
been our support for an international norm captured in the very 
nearly universally adhered to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT). The norm is simple: in the interest of international 
security, no more states should acquire nuclear weapons. There 
are many provisions in the treaty and details to be understood 
to fully appreciate the norm, but that is its essence. 
Certainly the fact that we have eight or nine states with 
nuclear weapons rather than only the original five, means that 
the norm has not held perfectly well. But it has had 
substantial force in the face of widespread acquisition of 
critical nuclear technologies, and that has been of vital 
importance to America's security. Simply put, the 
administration now proposes to destroy that norm.
    Some claim the deal would only recognize the reality of 
India's nuclear weapons program. But that is not accurate. 
Recognizing that India and a few additional countries have 
acquired nuclear weapons over the last three decades is not the 
issue. The damage will be done to the non-proliferation norm by 
legitimatizing India's condition, by exempting it from a policy 
that has held for decades. And we would do this, we assert less 
than honestly, because of its exceptionally good behavior. In 
truth, we would reward India with nuclear cooperation because 
we now place such a high value on improved relations with New 
Delhi, not because of its uniquely good behavior.
    Critics ask, if we do this deal, how will we explain, 
defend, and promote our policy of stopping Iran's proposed 
uranium enrichment program? Iran is, after all, a party to the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and as far as we know, has no 
fissile material outside of international safeguards and has 
never detonated a nuclear explosive device. A good question, 
but not the best one because India has arguably been a more 
responsible member of the international community than Iran. 
Rather, if we do this deal, ask how we will avoid offering a 
similar one to Brazil or Argentina if they decide on nuclear 
weapons acquisition, or our treaty ally South Korea. Dozens of 
countries around the world have exhibited good behavior in 
nuclear matters, and have the capability to produce nuclear 
weapons but choose not to, at least in part, because of the 
international norm against nuclear weapons acquisition 
reinforced by a policy we would now propose to abandon. Will we 
legitimatize only India because it never joined the NPT and 
thus did not have to withdraw from it to pursue nuclear 
weapons? No, if India was truly unique, there might not be much 
risk to that non-proliferation norm we so depend upon, but it 
is not unique: the deal would set a dangerous precedent. If we 
do this, we will put at risk a world of very few nuclear 
weapons states, and open the door to the true proliferation of 
nuclear weapons in the years ahead.
    Finally, if there are two national security objectives in 
conflict here, one regional and the other global, is it 
possible to reconcile them? The answer is probably yes, but not 
now, not in the current context. Clearly and regrettably, if 
the administration's proposal does not succeed in much the same 
form in which it has been put forth, U.S.-India relations will 
deteriorate for a time. But acknowledging that does not mean 
that we should go ahead with a deal that would do irreparable 
damage to our long-term national security interests. Instead, 
we should put forth a proposal that more nearly balances 
regional and global security interests, recognizing that it 
will be some time, at best, before it will appeal to New Delhi.
    In looking for that balance, we should understand that 
there is something of a continuum to be considered in terms of 
non-proliferation provisions. At one end, for purists, is 
nothing less than Indian adherence to the NPT. This is nearly 
impossible to foresee. Next, for non-proliferation realists, is 
an Indian commitment to end fissile material production for any 
purpose and forego those facilities, enrichment and 
reprocessing, that yield it. This would leave India with 
nuclear weapons, but no means to produce the material to make 
more. Significantly, it would also deny India the option of 
exploring breeder reactor technology, something the Indian 
nuclear energy establishment very much wants to do.
    Finally, there is a more practical posture, which is to 
permit nuclear cooperation with India if it accepts a 
reasonably verifiable ban on the production of any more fissile 
material for nuclear weapons purposes. This approach would 
permit India reprocessing and enrichment facilities, but 
effectively require international safeguards on all its nuclear 
facilities and any nuclear material produced in the future. Its 
appeal in regional terms is that it would allow India to pursue 
nuclear energy without restrictions of any kind--more than we 
are willing to do for Iran at the moment. From the global 
security perspective, we will have succeeded in capping a 
nuclear weapons program, a substantive achievement which 
arguably offsets a breach of the long-standing policy against 
nuclear cooperation with a state such as India that does not 
accept full-scope safeguards. The deal would have to have other 
provisions, such as rigorous nuclear export control policies, a 
ban on export of enrichment or reprocessing technology, and a 
permanent prohibition on nuclear explosive testing, but this is 
its essence.
    The deal described above would require India to choose 
between the opportunity to expand its nuclear energy program on 
the one hand, and the expansion of its nuclear weapons arsenal 
on the other. The administration proposes to allow India to do 
both, and that would be a mistake. Our security depends on 
maintaining the norm against nuclear weapons proliferation.
                              ----------                              

                         Prepared Statement of

                          DR. ASHLEY J. TELLIS

                  Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment
                        for International Peace

                               BEFORE THE

               U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

                             APRIL 26, 2006

                              ----------                              

    Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the committee. 
Thank you for inviting me to testify on the proposed 
cooperation between the United States and India in regards to 
atomic energy. This is obviously a complex subject with 
different facets stretching from the political to the 
technical. It is also a subject I have given some thought to 
and have written about in the past.\1\ As requested in your 
letter, I will focus my oral and written remarks this morning 
mainly on the strategic logic underlying the President's 
initiative on civil nuclear cooperation and its importance for 
the transforming U. S.-Indian relationship. I will be happy, 
however, to cover those aspects that I have not touched on in 
my formal testimony during the discussion that follows. I 
respectfully request that my statement be entered into the 
record.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ My previous reflections on different aspects of the U.S.-Indian 
nuclear cooperation initiative can be found in Ashley J. Tellis, 
``South Asian Seesaw: A New U.S. Policy on the Subcontinent,'' Policy 
Brief, 38 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, May 2005); Ashley J. Tellis, India as a New Global Power: An 
Action Agenda for the United States (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, June 2005); Ashley J. Tellis, 
Testimony to the House Committee on International Relations, 
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, on ``The United States and South 
Asia,'' June 14, 2005; Ashley J. Tellis, ``Should the US Sell Nuclear 
Technology to India?--Part II,'' YaleGlobal Online, November 10, 2005; 
and, Ashley J. Tellis, Prepared Testimony to the House Committee on 
International Relations on ``The U.S.-India `Global Partnership': How 
Significant for American Interests?'' November 16, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The United States and India today are confronted by an 
incredible opportunity to craft a new global partnership that 
promises to advance a range of common interests in a way that 
was simply impossible during the Cold War. These interests 
encompass a wide variety of issues ranging from the 
preservation of peace and stability in a resurgent Asia over 
the long term, through the current exigencies relating to the 
global war on terror, to promoting complex collective goods 
such as arresting the spread of weapons of mass destruction, 
managing climate change, and promoting liberal democracy and an 
open trading system.
    Thanks to the tight bipolarity of the Cold War, U.S.-Indian 
relations during that entire epoch were characterized by 
alternation: in almost every decade, troughs of estrangement 
invariably followed peaks of strong cooperation. Despite the 
desires of leaders on both sides, the quest for a strong 
bilateral relationship was repeatedly frustrated, which from an 
American perspective appeared to be the case for at least three 
reasons unique to India: first, New Delhi's emphatic 
determination to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy at a time 
when liberal states were under threat from global communism; 
second, India's relative weakness during much of the Cold War 
caused by its pervasive economic underperformance that, in 
turn, sealed its strategic irrelevance to the global system; 
and, third, India's anomalous nuclear status since 1974 when, 
in becoming ``a state with nuclear weapons, but not a nuclear 
weapon state,'' New Delhi found itself cast into a netherworld 
where it soon became the most important target of global anti-
proliferation efforts.
    By the time the Cold War ended, the first two impediments 
were on their way to being resolved. The demise of the Soviet 
Union destroyed the international system that made non-
alignment structurally relevant and freed both the United 
States and India to seek better relations undistracted by the 
pressures of Cold War geopolitics. By 1991--and although it was 
difficult to see this clearly at the time because of New 
Delhi's financial crisis--the Indian economy was also on its 
way to becoming a star performer, having left behind the 
abysmal 3.5 percent ``Hindu rate of growth'' that had 
characterized its productive performance since independence.
    To its credit, the Clinton administration, perceiving both 
these realities, made an initial effort to construct a new 
relationship with India. A wide-ranging diplomatic dialogue was 
instituted in the hope that the two democracies could find 
common ground, and India was designated a ``big emerging 
market'' worthy of special U.S. commercial attention. But, 
despite its good intentions, the Clinton administration could 
not redress the third impediment that had by now come to haunt 
U.S.-Indian relations, namely India's anomalous nuclear status 
which made it the single most important target of U.S. anti-
proliferation activities worldwide. Confronted by this 
challenge, the administration attempted to implement two 
different policies towards India. It began with an effort to 
improve ties with New Delhi across the board, while simply 
quarantining the nuclear issue in the hope of preventing it 
from contaminating improvements that might be realized in other 
areas of the bilateral relationship. This approach, however, 
quickly reached the limits of its success because the U.S.-led 
anti-proliferation efforts since 1974 had effectively succeeded 
in institutionalizing a complex global technology denial regime 
that prevented India from getting access even to important non-
strategic technologies because of fears that these might 
eventually leach into its nuclear programs. India's irregular 
nuclear status under the Non-Proliferation Treaty had in fact 
become such an impediment that the Clinton administration's 
strategy of quarantining the nuclear issue failed either to 
resolve the nuclear disagreement or to transform the bilateral 
relationship.
    By the second term, the Clinton administration emphasized 
an alternative strategy, driven largely by its efforts to 
tighten the global nonproliferation regime. While continuing 
its previous effort to improve relations with India in a 
variety of areas such as diplomatic engagement and defense 
cooperation, the administration focused its energies 
simultaneously on capping, rolling back, and eventually 
eliminating India's nuclear weapons program. This shift in 
emphasis, unfortunately, turned out to be unsuccessful: not 
only did it exacerbate the already high Indian frustration with 
the U.S.-led technology denial regime, but it finally provoked 
New Delhi into a spectacular act of defiance through the 
nuclear test series of 1998 when India in a deliberate 
challenge to the international order declared itself to be a 
``nuclear weapon state.''
    Although much of this story may sound like ancient history, 
it is worth remembering for two important reasons that are 
critical to understanding the strategic wisdom underlying 
President Bush's decision to initiate civilian nuclear 
cooperation with India.
    First, the transformation of U.S.-Indian relations, as 
desired by the President and which enjoys bipartisan support in 
Congress, cannot be consummated without resolving the problems 
caused by India's anomalous status in the nuclear non-
proliferation order. The Clinton administration spent eight 
long years trying to improve U.S. relations with India, while 
at the same time avoiding any effort to alter India's status as 
an outlier in the global non-proliferation system. The 
historical record shows conclusively that well intentioned 
though it was--and perhaps even necessary--this strategy 
ultimately failed. An old maxim of military strategy calls on 
leaders to ``reinforce success, abandon failure.'' President 
Bush's initiative on civil nuclear cooperation with India is an 
effort to do just that, given that all other U.S. policies 
since at least 1974 have by now proven to be less than 
successful.
    Second, the transformation of U.S.-Indian relations, as 
desired by the President and which enjoys bipartisan support in 
Congress, cannot be inherently schizophrenic if it is to be 
successful enough to advance common American and Indian 
interests in this new century. As our ties with friends and 
allies in Europe and Asia demonstrate, the United States has a 
variety of bilateral relationships defined by different degrees 
of intensity and intimacy. What all these relationships have in 
common, however, is that in no case is any U.S. partner made 
the deliberate target of a punitive policy concertedly pursued 
by Washington. Through his proposal for full civil nuclear 
cooperation with India, President Bush has in effect conveyed 
his belief that if India is to become a full strategic partner 
of the United States in this new century, a comparable courtesy 
must be extended to New Delhi as well. Stated in a different 
way, the President has recognized that it is impossible to 
pursue a policy that simultaneously seeks to transform New 
Delhi into a strategic partner of the United States on the one 
hand, even as India remains permanently anchored as 
Washington's nonproliferation target on the other.
    These two reasons combine to underscore the point that 
Secretary Rice made in her recent testimony to this committee. 
Far from being an appendage to growing U.S.-Indian ties, 
bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation promises to become ``the 
key that will unlock the progress of our expanding 
relationship.'' Congressional action to implement this 
initiative is therefore critical not simply because it will 
help address India's vast and growing energy needs--though it 
will certainly do that--or because it will mitigate the burdens 
of environmental pollution and climate change in South Asia--
though those must be counted among its benefits as well--but 
because it symbolizes, first and foremost, a renewed American 
commitment to assisting India meet its enormous developmental 
goals and thereby take its place in the community of nations as 
a true great power.
    Renewed civilian nuclear cooperation thus becomes the 
vehicle by which the Indian people are reassured that the 
United States is a true friend and ally responsive to their 
deepest aspirations. By altering the existing web of legal 
constraints on civilian nuclear cooperation with India, 
Congress would also expand simultaneously India's access to a 
wide range of controlled technologies that are useful for 
numerous peaceful economic endeavors going beyond merely the 
production of electricity. The successful implementation of the 
civilian nuclear cooperation agreement would therefore 
epitomize'as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told Under Secretary 
of State Nicholas Burns in New Delhi in February 2006--``a 
historic reconciliation between the United States and India and 
a new concord after many decades of anxiety, distrust, and 
suspicion in our bilateral relations.''
    The increasing value of this transforming bilateral 
relationship with India for the United States will be 
manifested most clearly in three areas that will be vitally 
important to American security in this century.
    To begin with, a strong American partnership with a 
democratic India will be essential if we are to be able to 
construct a stable geopolitical order in Asia that is conducive 
to peace and prosperity. There is little doubt today that the 
Asian continent is poised to become the new center of gravity 
in international politics. Most analyses suggest that although 
national growth rates in several key Asian states--in 
particular Japan, South Korea, and possibly China--are likely 
to decline in comparison to the latter half of the Cold War 
period, the spurt in Indian growth rates, coupled with the 
relatively high though still marginally declining growth rates 
in China, will propel Asia's share of the global economy to 
some 43 percent by 2025, thus making the continent the largest 
single locus of economic power worldwide. An Asia that hosts 
economic power of such magnitude, along with its strong and 
growing connectivity to the American economy, will become an 
arena vital to the United States--in much the same way that 
Europe was the grand prize during the Cold War. In such 
circumstances, the administration's policy of developing a new 
global partnership with India represents a considered effort at 
``shaping'' the emerging Asian environment to suit American 
interests in the twenty-first century.
    This should not be interpreted as some kind of thinly 
veiled code signifying the polite containment of China, which 
many argue is in fact the administration's secret intention. 
Such claims are, in my judgment, erroneous. A policy of 
containing China is neither feasible nor necessary for the 
United States at this point in time. Further, it is not at all 
obvious that India, currently, has any interest in becoming 
part of any coalition aimed at containing China. Rather, the 
objective of strengthening ties with India is part of a 
larger--and sensible--administration strategy of developing 
good relations with all the major Asian states. As part of this 
general effort, it is eminently reasonable for the United 
States not only to invest additional resources in strengthening 
the continent's democratic powers but also to deepen the 
bilateral relationship enjoyed with each of these countries--on 
the assumption that the proliferation of strong democratic 
states in Asia represents the best insurance against intra-
continental instability as well as threats that may emerge 
against the United States and its regional presence. 
Strengthening New Delhi and transforming U.S-Indian ties, 
therefore, has everything to do with American confidence in 
Indian democracy and the conviction that its growing strength, 
tempered by its liberal values, brings only benefits for Asian 
stability and American security. As Under Secretary of State 
Nicholas Burns succinctly stated in his testimony before the 
House International Relations Committee, ``By cooperating with 
India now, we accelerate the arrival of the benefits that 
India's rise brings to the region and the world.''
    Further, a strong American partnership with a democratic 
India will be essential if we are to succeed in preserving an 
efective non-proliferation system that stems the difusion of 
nuclear materials and technologies required for the creation of 
nuclear weapons. The central component of civilian nuclear 
cooperation is critical in this regard because it formalizes a 
bargain that gives India access to nuclear fuel, technology, 
and knowledge on the condition that New Delhi institutionalizes 
stringent export controls, separates its civilian from its 
strategic facilities and places the former under safeguards, 
and assists the United States in preventing further 
proliferation. Bringing India into the global non-proliferation 
regime in this way produces vital benefits both for the United 
States and for all non-nuclear weapons states insofar as it 
transforms India's hitherto commendable nonproliferation 
record, which is owed entirely to voluntary sovereign decisions 
made by successive Indian governments, into a formal and 
binding adherence through a set of international agreements. 
Thanks to the President's initiative, India has now agreed to 
obligations that in fact go beyond those ordinarily required of 
NPT signatories, such as refraining from transfers of 
enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not 
already possess them and supporting efforts to limit their 
spread; working with the United States to conclude a 
multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty; continuing its 
unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing; and adhering to the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.
    Bringing India into the global nonproliferation regime 
through a lasting international agreement that defines clearly 
enforceable benefits and obligations not only strengthens 
American efforts to stem further proliferation but also 
enhances U.S. national security. The President's accord with 
India advances these objectives in a fair and direct way. It 
recognizes that it is unreasonable to ask India to continue to 
bear the burdens of contributing towards ensuring the viability 
of the global nonproliferation regime in perpetuity, while it 
suffers stiff and encompassing sanctions from that same regime. 
And so the President has asked the Congress to support his 
proposal to give India access to nuclear fuel, technology, and 
knowledge in exchange for New Delhi formally becoming part of 
the global coalition to defeat the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. In other words, he offers India the benefits 
of peaceful nuclear cooperation in exchange for transforming 
what is currently a unilateral Indian commitment to 
nonproliferation into a formally verifiable and permanent 
international responsibility.
    The fruits of this initiative are already in evidence, for 
example, in connection with India's strong support for the 
U.S.-led efforts to persuade Iran to live up to its freely 
accepted non-proliferation obligations. This Indian decision 
has not been easy because of New Delhi's otherwise good 
relations with Tehran. India and Iran share historical links 
that go back thousands of years; India and Iran played a 
pivotal role in ensuring the viability of the Northern Alliance 
in Afghanistan during the darkest days of Taliban rule; India 
remains one of Iran's most important customers for oil and 
natural gas, and it continues discussions with Islamabad and 
Tehran about the construction of a gas pipeline that would link 
the three countries and help meet India's large and growing 
energy needs. Many voices in the American debate on the 
civilian nuclear initiative have demanded that India curtail 
its economic and diplomatic links to Iran as the price of 
securing U.S. cooperation in regards to civilian nuclear 
energy. Such demands are unreasonable. The negotiations over 
the Iranian-Pakistani-Indian gas pipeline are unlikely to 
succeed simply because of economic considerations, but New 
Delhi is unlikely to concede to any demands that rupture its 
diplomatic and economic relationship with Tehran if these are 
seen to have no relationship with the issue of nuclear 
proliferation. On this score, India is likely to behave in a 
fashion identical to that of our close allies such as Japan and 
Italy. It will demand--as it has done thus far--that Tehran 
live up to its international non-proliferation commitments and 
obligations, and it will abide by any decisions made by the 
international community to enforce these responsibilities, but 
it is unlikely to unilaterally sacrifice its bilateral 
relationship with Iran in areas that are not perceived to have 
any connection with non-proliferation and which do not pose a 
threat to common security.
    Finally, a strong American partnership with a democratic 
India will be essential if we are to successfully preserve a 
global order that protects liberal societies and advances 
freedom in myriad ways. This objective encompasses a congeries 
of diverse goals, including promoting democracy, defeating 
terrorism and religious extremism, collaborating to protect the 
energy routes and lines of communication supporting free trade 
and commerce, expanding the liberal international economic 
order, and managing climate change--each of which is critical 
to the well being of the United States. It does not take a 
great deal of imagination to recognize that for the first time 
in recent memory Indian and American interests on each of these 
issues are strongly convergent and that India's contribution 
ranges from important to indispensable as far as achieving U.S. 
objectives is concerned.
    The President's intention in proposing civilian nuclear 
cooperation with India is fundamentally driven by his 
conviction that every impediment to a closer relationship ought 
to be eliminated, so that both our countries can enjoy the 
fullest fruits of an ever-tighter partnership in regards to 
each of the issues above. It is also driven by his desire to 
assist New Delhi's growth in power on the assumption that a 
strong democratic India would ultimately advance America's own 
global interests far better than a weak and failing India 
would. The key word, which the administration understands very 
well in this context, is ``partnership.'' A strengthened 
bilateral relationship does not imply that India will become a 
treaty-bound ally of the United States at some point in the 
future. It also does not imply that India will become a meek, 
compliant and uncritical collaborator of the United States in 
all its global endeavors. Rather, India's large size, its proud 
history, and its great ambitions, ensure that it will always 
pursue its own interests--just like any other great power.
    During his recent visit to the United States in March this 
year, India's Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, appealed to his 
American interlocutors to recognize that ``when an open society 
like India pursues its own interests, this is more likely than 
not to be of benefit to the United States.'' If the President's 
views on India going back to the campaign in 2000 are any 
indication, George W. Bush had already reached this conclusion 
at least five years ago. In fact, every initiative involving 
India, beginning with the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership 
in the first term and ending up with the proposal on civilian 
nuclear cooperation in the second, suggest that the President 
has concluded--correctly--that a strong and independent India 
represents a strategic asset, even when it remains only a 
partner and not a formal ally. This judgment is rooted in the 
belief that there are no intrinsic conflicts of interest 
between India and the United States. And, consequently, 
transformed ties that enhance the prospect for consistent 
``strategic coordination'' between Washington and New Delhi on 
all the issues of global order identified above serve U.S. 
interests just as well as any recognized alliance.
    The question that is sometimes asked in this connection is 
whether a close U.S.-Indian partnership would be impossible in 
the absence of civilian nuclear cooperation. The considered 
answer to this question is ``Yes.'' This is not to say that 
U.S.-Indian collaboration will evaporate if civilian nuclear 
cooperation between the two countries cannot be consummated, 
but merely that such collaboration would be hesitant, troubled, 
episodic, and unable to realize its full potential without 
final resolution of the one issue that symbolically, 
substantively, and materially kept the two sides apart for over 
thirty years. At a time when U.S.-Indian cooperation promises 
to become more important than ever, given the threats and 
uncertainties looming in the international system, the risk of 
unsatisfactory collaboration is one that both countries ought 
not to take.
    Through the civilian nuclear cooperation initiative, 
President Bush has embarked on a bold and decisive step to 
eliminate those long-standing impediments between Washington 
and New Delhi and to place the evolving U.S-Indian relationship 
on a firm footing guided by a clear understanding of the geo-
strategic challenges likely to confront the United States in 
the twenty-first century. Recognizing that a new global 
partnership would require engaging New Delhi not only on issues 
important to the United States, the administration has moved 
rapidly to expand bilateral collaboration on a wide range of 
subjects, including those of greatest importance to India. The 
proposal pertaining to extending civilian atomic energy 
cooperation to India is, thus, part of a larger set of 
Presidential initiatives involving agriculture, cybersecurity, 
education, energy, health, science and technology, space, dual-
use high technology, advanced military equipment, and trade.
    Irrespective of the issues involved in each of these 
realms, the President has approached them through an entirely 
new prism, viewing India, in contrast to the past, as part of 
the solution rather than as part of the problem. He has judged 
the growth of Indian power to be beneficial to America and its 
geopolitical interests in Asia and, hence, worthy of strong 
support. And, he is convinced that the success of Indian 
democracy, the common interests shared with the United States, 
and the human ties that bind our two societies together, offer 
a sufficiently lasting assurance of New Delhi's responsible 
behavior so as to justify the burdens of requesting Congress to 
amend the relevant U.S. laws (and the international community, 
the relevant regimes) pertaining to peaceful nuclear trade. On 
all these matters, I believe--without any qualification--that 
the President has made the right judgment with respect to India 
and its importance to the United States. I hope that Congress 
will agree.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your attention and 
consideration.
                              ----------                              

                         Prepared Statement of

                        HON. RONALD F. LEHMAN II

   Director, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore 
                               Laboratory

                               BEFORE THE

               U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

                             APRIL 26, 2006

                              ----------                              

    Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: In November of last 
year, the committee asked me to join in its consideration of 
the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement of President George W. Bush 
and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on civil nuclear cooperation. 
You have that testimony before you. Today's hearing considers 
the strategic and nonproliferation implications of the Joint 
Statement in the context of S. 2429, legislation to advance 
that agreement.
    In the last six months, intense negotiations have taken 
place. Uncertainty still exists and warrants caution, but both 
sides have taken steps and made clarifications. Nothing has 
become known, however, that would cause me to change my basic 
conclusions and concerns, which again are my personal views. 
Let me briefly recall that analysis:

          The Joint Statement is an historic milestone for 
        nonproliferation that creates both great opportunity 
        and great risk. It creates an opportunity to strengthen 
        a nuclear nonproliferation regime that is suffering 
        from its own internal weaknesses such as inadequate 
        enforcement, the threat of breakout once an advanced 
        nuclear capability has been achieved, and an inability 
        to engage effectively the non-parties to the NPT. 
        Because the terms of the Joint Statement, however, also 
        spotlight those weaknesses, mishandling of the 
        implementation of its terms can have adverse 
        consequences even when the best of intentions are 
        involved.

                               * * * * *

          If the basic approach contained in the Joint 
        Statement collapses, we will not return to the status 
        quo ante. U.S.-Indian cooperation will be set back, but 
        also the weaknesses in the existing regime will be 
        exposed to even greater pressure. Bringing India into a 
        more comprehensive regime of nonproliferation and 
        restraint, however, could significantly enhance our 
        ability to reduce the dangers associated with weapons 
        of mass destruction. Congress can help insure that this 
        is a sufficiently ambitious agenda. India could do much 
        to help within its borders, in South Asia, in other 
        troubled regions, and globally.

                               * * * * *

          I would urge the Congress to focus on the dynamics of 
        the process and the goals to be achieved as a result of 
        the U.S.-India Joint Statement rather than attempting 
        to rearrange the pieces of the initial package. Much 
        that one might have detailed in the original package 
        may be more successfully achieved by driving subsequent 
        interactions in the right direction. This can only be 
        done, I believe, if nonproliferation is a centerpiece 
        of strategic engagement rather than a trade-off. It is 
        best achieved by retaining a viable Nuclear Non-
        Proliferation Treaty at the core of a broader 
        nonproliferation regime that uses more targeted, 
        embedded engagement to address the fundamental causes 
        and conditions of proliferation. In short, widely 
        shared goals should guide our actions, but 
        implementation will fail if a ``one size fits all'' 
        mentality is applied rigidly to different 
        circumstances.

    The legislation before you is intended to support these 
goals by memorializing the principles for a bi-partisan 
consensus between both executive and legislative branches that 
can provide a stable basis over time for both India and the 
United States to work together. Such cohesion and clarity of 
purpose, as the United States engages India, would be very 
valuable, particularly in support of our nonproliferation 
efforts.
    That is not the same as saying that partnership with India 
will be easy. My own view is that the road ahead with India 
will be rocky, certainly when measured against the current 
euphoria about India even among those who have concerns about 
civil nuclear cooperation. The overselling of the new 
relationship today by many will become more obvious in the near 
term, but in the long term, common interests and steady foreign 
policy could result in achieving or exceeding expectations. 
This is not a certain outcome, however.
    At the same time, many of the concerns about the strategic 
partnership's impact on nonproliferation are also overstated or 
manageable. Too often the friends of the NPT act as if they are 
rearranging the deck chairs of what their rhetoric describes as 
a sinking nonproliferation ``Titanic.'' The nuclear 
nonproliferation regime is under stress, but the Indo-U.S. 
Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement did not put it there. 
Indeed, the agreement offers an opportunity to strengthen the 
regime through partnership with India, especially if India 
calls a truce in its more than thirty years guerrilla war 
against the NPT. Real nonproliferation needs real, embedded 
engagement. Again, the successful execution of the partnership 
over time must be the measure of merit, not the initial 
ceremonies or even enabling legislation.
    It is right to take the time now to codify clear 
nonproliferation commitments that will guide the strategic 
partnership, but, in the future, we must also insure that the 
parties live up to those commitments and adjust to new 
challenges. We must not let time erode the emphasis on 
nonproliferation that should be integral to the Indo-U.S. 
relationship. This legislation can be consistent with that 
approach, but changing circumstances could also undermine our 
clarity of purpose over time, particularly in nonproliferation. 
In the early 1990s erosion of purpose perhaps fatally damaged 
our nonproliferation prospects and achievements with respect to 
North Korea, and one sees similar developments emerging on Iran 
among allies, friends, and non-governmental organizations. In 
this age of rapidly advancing technology, time is not always on 
the side of nonproliferation.
    S. 2429 gives emphasis to the nonproliferation objectives 
of the new Indo-U.S. partnership. It conditions civil nuclear 
cooperation on the President's determination that India:

   has provided the US and the IAEA a credible plan to 
        separate its civil and military facilities,

   has an IAEA safeguards agreement in force,

   is making progress with the IAEA ``toward 
        implementing'' an Additional Protocol,

   ``is working with the United States for the 
        conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off 
        Treaty,''

   ``is supporting international efforts to prevent the 
        spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology,''

   is securing nuclear materials and technology through 
        export controls and adherence to the Missile Technology 
        Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
        guidelines, and

   the Section 123 Agreement between the U.S. and India 
        is consistent with U.S. ``participation in the Nuclear 
        Suppliers Group.''

    An eighth condition is dealt with separately, differently, 
and more emphatically; namely that India not ``have detonated a 
nuclear explosive device after the date of enactment.''
    All of these are important conditions, not only when we 
begin going down this path of partnership, but also in the 
years ahead. The Executive Branch seems legitimately concerned 
that an annual process of determinations and legislative 
enactment would be corrosive and counterproductive over time in 
the real world of political give and take at home and abroad. 
That view is not wrong.
                              ----------                              

                         Prepared Statement of

                         HON. ROBERT J. EINHORN

                  Senior Adviser, Center for Strategic
                       and International Studies

                               BEFORE THE

                   Senate Committee Foreign Relations

                             APRIL 26, 2006

                              ----------                              

    Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify 
before the committee on the nonproliferation implications of 
the U.S.-India agreement on civil nuclear cooperation.
    The argument for overcoming the nuclear impasse with 
India--for altering the nuclear status quo that cut India off 
from international civil nuclear cooperation for over 30 
years--has become increasingly persuasive. It has been clear 
for many years that maintaining existing U.S. laws and Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines prohibiting such cooperation 
would not succeed in inducing New Delhi to join the NPT or give 
up nuclear weapons. And as the Bush administration has argued, 
modifying those laws and guidelines for India could give a 
boost to U.S. relations with a rising democratic world power 
and assist in addressing India's growing energy needs.
    The dilemma we now face is how to achieve the benefits of 
changing the rules without undermining the vital U.S. interest 
of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. How, for 
example, can the United States seek exceptions to the rules for 
India without opening the door to exceptions in less worthy 
cases--indeed, without weakening the overall fabric of rules 
the U.S. worked so hard to create? How would U.S. allies and 
friends who had to choose between nuclear weapons and civil 
nuclear cooperation (and who made what the U.S. regarded as the 
right choice) view giving India the opportunity to have its 
cake and eat it too? How can we avoid conveying the impression 
to countries contemplating the nuclear option in the future 
that, if they opted for nuclear weapons, the world would 
eventually accept them into the nuclear club?
    Given the inevitable nonproliferation risks involved in 
reversing three decades of U.S. law and multilateral policy to 
permit nuclear cooperation with India, it is essential that 
such a major shift be accompanied by Indian steps that, on 
balance, strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Moreover, a 
policy departure of such magnitude should be preceded by 
thorough discussions with the Congress and key international 
partners to ensure they are comfortable with the initiative and 
share the view that it does not undercut nonproliferation 
interests.
    But the U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation deal 
negotiated by the Bush administration doesn't meet those 
requirements. In the administration's eagerness for a foreign 
policy success, the deal was concluded in great haste, driven 
by the calendar of Bush-Singh meetings rather than by the 
seriousness and complexity of the task at hand. Key 
stakeholders in the U.S. Congress and the 45-nation Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG) were not consulted in advance. While 
speed and exclusivity are often necessary to overcome 
bureaucratic and international resistance to major initiatives, 
this must be balanced against the need for buy-in, especially 
when the success of the initiative depends on approval by both 
the Congress and NSG. In its desire to show boldness and 
demonstrate a clean break with the past, the administration 
gave too little weight to the nonproliferation downsides and 
too much weight to proving to the Indians its dedication to 
building a qualitatively new relationship. In the process, it 
failed to use the leverage available to it to achieve U.S. 
objectives.
    As a result, the deal outlined in the Joint Statement 
concluded when Prime Minister Singh visited Washington last 
July, and further elaborated on March 2nd when President Bush 
was in Delhi, gave the Indians virtually all that they wanted--
the ability to acquire nuclear equipment and technology and 
desperately needed uranium on the world market, acceptance as a 
nuclear weapon state in all consequential respects, and 
complete freedom to continue and expand production of fissile 
material for nuclear weapons. What the U.S. got from the deal 
was, for the most part, speculative--the hope that a stronger 
partnership with India will pay strategic dividends down the 
road.

                BENEFITS FOR NONPROLIFERATION ARE MODEST

    Recognizing that much of the criticism of the civil nuclear 
deal would be based on its implications for nonproliferation, 
the administration has made a special effort to show that the 
deal strengthens the global nonproliferation regime. But the 
arguments are not very convincing.
    Several of the steps promised by India are simply 
reaffirmations of existing commitments, including its pledges 
to continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons 
testing, strengthen its national system of export controls, and 
work toward the conclusion of a multilateral fissile material 
cutoff treaty. Some other steps--including adherence to the 
guidelines of the NSG and the Missile Technology Control 
Regime--were actions India was already planning to take before 
the July 18 th Joint Statement as part of a U.S.-Indian 
dialogue on technology transfer and export control. Still 
others--such as the promise to refrain from transferring 
enrichment and reprocessing technologies to countries that do 
not yet possess them--were codifications of existing Indian 
policies and practices.
    The potentially significant new development was India's 
commitment in July to separate civilian and military nuclear 
facilities and put the civilian facilities under International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, thereby placing them 
off-limits for the production of plutonium for India's nuclear 
weapons program. But the separation plan insisted upon by 
India's nuclear establishment, backed by Prime Minister Singh, 
and accepted by President Bush in March would put only 14 of 22 
existing or planned nuclear power reactors under safeguards 
(including the six imported reactors India has no choice but to 
put under safeguards) and would allow New Delhi to decide 
entirely on its own which future reactors it wished to 
designate as civilian and submit to safeguards.
    The administration has trumpeted as a major 
nonproliferation gain that India will have 65 percent of its 
thermal reactors under safeguards. As a gesture of support for 
the IAEA's safeguards system, India's putting eight more 
reactors under safeguards than it would otherwise be obliged to 
do is welcome. But strategically, the percentage of reactors 
under safeguards is meaningless.
    The purpose of IAEA safeguards is to prevent non-nuclear 
weapon states from diverting nuclear materials from civilian 
facilities to a nuclear weapons program. For nuclear powers 
like India, which can use unsafeguarded facilities to produce 
fissile material for their weapons programs, safeguards 
covering only a portion of their facilities serve primarily a 
symbolic function--to reduce the perceived discrimination 
between countries that are obliged to accept safeguards on all 
their facilities (i.e., NPT non-nuclear states) and those that 
are not. Much more meaningful than the percentage of reactors 
covered by safeguards is the amount of fissile material that 
could be produced at facilities not covered by safeguards. 
Under the separation plan approved on March 2nd, India has kept 
open plenty of options for producing fissile material for its 
weapons program (including at fast breeder reactors well-suited 
to producing bomb-grade plutonium).
    The administration claims that the nuclear deal is a major 
breakthrough because ``for the first time'' it brings India 
into the international nonproliferation ``mainstream.'' In her 
April 5th testimony, Secretary Rice argued that: ``We better 
secure our future by bringing India into the international 
nonproliferation system, not by allowing India to remain 
isolated for the next thirty years the way it has been for the 
last thirty. We are clearly better off having India most of the 
way in rather than all the way out.''
    This statement creates the impression that India today is 
totally outside the rules and, because of that, perhaps even a 
potential source of proliferation difficulties. But India, to 
its credit, has been moving into the nonproliferation 
``mainstream'' for quite some time--in such areas as export 
controls, physical protection of nuclear materials, and 
interdictions of WMD-related shipments. It still has a distance 
to go before its export controls meet the highest international 
standards (and indeed the U.S. has sanctioned Indian entities 
for sensitive assistance to Iraq, Libya, and Iran). But it is 
working hard to strengthen its controls--and it will continue 
to do so because it is a responsible country that recognizes 
that nonproliferation controls are in its own self interest. 
The civil nuclear deal would reinforce these positive trends, 
but they will continue with or without the deal.

                       THE RISKS ARE SUBSTANTIAL

    While the nonproliferation gains that can be attributed 
directly to the civil nuclear deal are modest, the potential 
downsides are substantial.
    By seeking an exception to the rules for a country with 
which the United States wishes to build a special friendship, 
the nuclear deal will reinforce the impression internationally 
that the U.S. approach to nonproliferation has become selective 
and self-serving, not consistent and principled. Rules the U.S. 
previously championed will be perceived as less binding and 
more optional. In general, the deal will send the signal that 
the U.S.--the country the world has always looked to as the 
leader in the global fight against proliferation--is now de-
emphasizing nonproliferation and giving it a back seat to other 
foreign policy and commercial goals.
    If the U.S. is seen as changing or bending the rules when 
they no longer suit us, others can be expected to follow suit. 
Indeed, that already seems to be happening. Russia, which a 
year ago said it couldn't provide nuclear fuel to India's 
Tarapur reactors because of its Nuclear Suppliers Group 
obligations, recently sent a large fuel shipment to those 
reactors, arguing (over the objections of most NSG members) 
that it was entitled to do so under the NSG's ``safety 
exception.'' It is highly unlikely that Russia would have 
played so fast and loose with the NSG's rules in the absence of 
the U.S.-India nuclear deal. It is also not by coincidence 
that, not long after the U.S.-India deal, China and Pakistan 
began discussing additional reactor sales. It is not clear 
whether they will await NSG approval for such sales or simply 
proceed outside the guidelines of the NSG.
    The U.S.-India deal could make it harder to achieve Bush 
administration nonproliferation initiatives. The U.S. is now 
asking the NSG to permit nuclear cooperation only with 
countries that adhere to the IAEA's Additional Protocol and to 
ban transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to 
states that do not already possess fuel-cycle facilities. But 
getting NSG partners to tighten the rules in ways favored by 
the U.S. will be much harder if they are also being asked to 
bend one of their cardinal rules (i.e., no nuclear trade with 
non-parties to the NPT) because the U.S. now finds it too 
constraining.
    The civil nuclear deal could also reduce the perceived 
costs to states that might consider ``going nuclear'' in the 
future. In calculating whether to pursue nuclear weapons, a 
major factor for most countries will be how the U.S. is likely 
to react. Implementation of the deal with India will inevitably 
send the signal, especially to countries with good relations 
with Washington, that the U.S. will tolerate and eventually 
accommodate to a decision to acquire nuclear weapons.
    In the near term, U.S. plans to engage in nuclear 
cooperation with India will make it more difficult to address 
proliferation challenges such as Iran. Of course, Iran's 
interest in nuclear weapons long pre-dated the India deal and 
its motives for seeking nuclear weapons have nothing to do with 
the deal. But the U.S.-India agreement has strengthened the 
case Iran can make--and is already making--internationally and 
at home. Why, Iranian officials ask publicly, should Iran give 
up its right as an NPT party to an enrichment capability when 
India, a non-party to the NPT, can keep even its nuclear 
weapons and still benefit from nuclear cooperation? It is an 
argument, however flawed and disingenuous, that resonates well 
with the Iranian public and with developing countries around 
the world and weakens the pressures that can be brought to bear 
on Tehran.
    The most serious defect of the U. S.-India nuclear deal is 
its failure to constrain the further production of bomb-making 
fissile material--plutonium and highly enriched uranium--for 
nuclear weapons. Indeed, as it now stands, the deal could 
actually help India dramatically increase its fissile material 
stocks.
    India's indigenous uranium supplies are limited. Domestic 
uranium ore is of low quality and expensive to mine and process 
into yellowcake. Annual production is low and has difficulty 
keeping up with demand for both the civil energy and nuclear 
weapons programs. Under current nonproliferation restrictions, 
which prevent India from buying uranium on the world market, 
India will soon face serious shortages and painful trade-offs. 
Under the Bush administration plan to change U.S. law and NSG 
guidelines, India could satisfy the needs of an expanding civil 
nuclear energy program through imports, while freeing up its 
domestic uranium reserves for military purposes. It would be a 
windfall gain for the nuclear weapons program.
    In negotiations leading up to the July 18th Joint 
Statement, the Bush administration proposed that India stop 
producing fissile material for nuclear weapons, which would 
have prevented India from taking advantage of freed-up uranium 
supplies for weapons purposes. India rejected the proposal. The 
administration then made a further attempt to limit fissile 
material production by proposing that most Indian nuclear 
facilities, including its fast breeder reactors, be placed 
under IAEA safeguards and therefore made ineligible for weapons 
plutonium production.
    But India's nuclear establishment dug in its heels, calling 
publicly for minimizing safeguards coverage and avoiding 
constraints on India's bomb-making capacity. Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh, already under attack on the nuclear deal from 
his left-wing coalition partners, backed up the nuclear 
establishment's demands. Anxious to conclude the nuclear deal 
lest the Delhi summit be seen as a failure and calculating that 
Singh had less political room for maneuver than President Bush, 
the administration threw in the towel on placing meaningful 
limits on India's fissile material production capacity.
    As a result, a third of India's reactors that currently 
exist or are under construction will be outside safeguards and 
available for plutonium production. Any future reactor, thermal 
or breeder, can be designated by India as outside safeguards. 
Of course, the Indians will not devote all their unsafeguarded 
nuclear reactors to weapons plutonium production. Indeed, given 
India's ambitious nuclear energy goals, we would expect most of 
those reactors to be used for civilian purposes. But even if 
only two or three large reactors were used as bomb factories, 
India could produce enough plutonium for well over 50 nuclear 
weapons each year.
    Why should the U.S. care about Indian production of fissile 
material? After all, India is a friend and a responsible 
nuclear power. One reason we should care is that, especially 
after 9/11, we have a vital interest in limiting the 
availability of bomb-making materials around the world and 
preventing such materials from falling into the hands of 
terrorist groups who, we know, are actively seeking to acquire 
them. If India steps up production, Pakistan can be expected to 
follow suit, China could decide to resume production, and 
others may be encouraged to seek their own production 
capabilities. The more materials produced, the more difficult 
and costly it will be to secure them, and the greater the risks 
of nuclear terrorism.
    Another reason we should care about stepped up Indian 
production of fissile materials is that it could lead to 
increased tensions and destabilizing arms competition in 
southern Asia, involving India, Pakistan, and China. Pakistani 
authorities have publicly taken special note of the failure of 
the U.S.-India nuclear deal to limit Indian fissile material 
production. Reportedly, the Pakistani National Command 
Authority recently met to assess the impact of the deal and 
consider adjustments Pakistan may need to make to its own 
strategic plans. President Musharraf said, ``We cannot remain 
oblivious to the changes evolving in the region. All the steps 
will be taken for the defense, security, and safety of 
Pakistan.'' Moreover, China has warned that the deal threatens 
to ``undermine global disarmament moves,'' suggesting that 
Beijing may also decide that it needs to respond 
programmatically.
    Of course, continued or even stepped up nuclear weapons 
production in the region would not necessarily translate into 
increased tensions. Relations between Indian and Pakistan and 
between Indian and China have both been improving in recent 
years. But India's insistence on keeping substantial fissile 
material production capacity outside of safeguards--thereby 
keeping options open for a substantial strategic build-up--
could raise suspicions about its intentions in the minds of its 
neighbors and have an adverse effect on the processes of 
reconciliation underway in the region.

                     CAN THE DEAL BE STRENGTHENED?

    As it currently stands, the U.S.-India civil nuclear 
cooperation deal is a net loss for nonproliferation. Can it be 
transformed into a net nonproliferation gain? The answer, at 
this stage, lies mainly with the U.S. Congress.
    The Bush administration and the Indian Government would 
naturally like to see the Congress approve the deal as is, on 
the basis of the draft legislation the administration has 
already submitted, and to do so as quickly as possible. But 
especially given the unprecedented character of the deal and 
its far-reaching implications, Congress has a responsibility to 
scrutinize it carefully before passing judgment and to adopt 
any modifications or conditions it deems necessary to protect 
U.S. interests, including in preventing the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons or fissile materials.
    Implementation of the civil nuclear deal will require 
Congressional approval of amendments to the Atomic Energy Act 
as well as a bilateral U.S.-India agreement for peaceful 
nuclear cooperation. In addition, India and the IAEA will have 
to conclude an agreement that applies IAEA safeguards to Indian 
nuclear facilities as well as an Additional Protocol to that 
agreement. And finally, the NSG will have to agree by consensus 
to modify its guideline that currently precludes nuclear 
cooperation with states outside the NPT. All of these 
arrangements are interrelated. For example, the Bush 
administration's willingness to seek changes in U.S. law and 
NSG policies depended on India's willingness to accept IAEA 
safeguards on certain Indian nuclear facilities in perpetuity.
    Before deciding to amend the Atomic Energy Act, the 
Congress should therefore insist on seeing as much of the 
overall package as possible, including the IAEA-India 
safeguards agreements (concluded but not necessarily already 
approved by the IAEA Board) and a concluded U.S.-India 
agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation. The need to assess 
these arrangements as a package is particularly justified 
because some of them will be unprecedented. India has put the 
IAEA on notice that its safeguards agreement will not follow 
standard models but will be ``India-specific.'' The meaning of 
India-specific is not yet clear. Moreover, because India is a 
nuclear power that must still be treated as a non-nuclear state 
for the purposes of U.S. law, the U.S.-India peaceful nuclear 
cooperation agreement will be different from any previous U.S. 
agreement for cooperation. Negotiations on the IAEA-India 
safeguards agreements and the U.S.-India agreement for peaceful 
nuclear cooperation have already gotten underway; and so 
assuming those negotiations go smoothly, Congressional 
insistence on looking at the package as a whole need not cause 
significant delays.
    Congress should not permit normal approval processes to be 
short-circuited. The Atomic Energy Act provides that agreements 
for peaceful nuclear cooperation that meet all the requirements 
of U.S. law will be approved automatically if the Congress does 
not pass a joint resolution of disapproval within 90 days; 
whereas agreements that do not meet all the statutory 
requirements (i.e., in cases where those requirements are 
waived) must be approved by both houses of Congress. Although 
the U.S.-India agreement for cooperation will not meet all the 
requirements of law (it is the first of about 40 such U.S. 
agreements not to do so) and will therefore require a waiver 
(because India will not have safeguards on all of its nuclear 
facilities), the administration is nonetheless proposing that 
the agreement be fast-tracked with the much less demanding 
approval procedure. Clearly, the India case deserves more 
scrutiny, not less. Congress should insist that both houses of 
Congress get the opportunity to review and vote on the U.S.-
India agreement.
    In terms of the substantive elements of the U.S.-India 
civil nuclear deal, there are several the Congress will want to 
probe and understand more clearly. Among them will be whether 
an Indian nuclear test explosion--or some other Indian 
actions--would trigger the termination of U.S. nuclear 
cooperation. A related question is whether the U.S. would be 
committed to assist India in obtaining reactor fuel from third 
parties if U.S. fuel supplies had to be cut off as a result of 
an Indian nuclear test or some other action.
    Based on its review of the nuclear deal, Congress may wish 
to adopt legislation that strengthens the deal and minimizes 
the risks it poses to the global nonproliferation regime.
    One means of minimizing those risks would be to restrict 
the scope of nuclear cooperation with India that would be 
permitted by the new legislation. A long-standing element of 
the nonproliferation regime has been the ``NPT preference 
policy,'' which has meant giving NPT parties benefits in the 
civil nuclear energy area not available to those outside the 
NPT. A way of maintaining some preferential treatment for NPT 
parties would be to modify U.S. law (and NSG guidelines) to 
permit nuclear-related exports to India except equipment, 
materials, or technologies related to sensitive fuel-cycle 
facilities, including enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water 
production. Such a distinction would permit India to acquire 
uranium, enriched fuel, nuclear reactors and components, and a 
wide range of other nuclear items, but would retain the ban on 
transfers of those items that are most closely related to a 
nuclear weapons program. The British and French, both of whom 
are strong supporters of nuclear cooperation with India, 
reportedly believe that nuclear cooperation with India should 
not include fuel-cycle equipment and technologies.
    Another way of reducing nonproliferation risks would be to 
implement the nuclear deal in a country-neutral manner--not as 
a special exception to the rules for India alone, which is what 
the administration has proposed. A problem with the country-
specific approach is that it accentuates concerns that the U.S. 
is acting selectively on the basis of foreign policy 
considerations rather than on the basis of objective factors 
related to nonproliferation performance.
    To avoid the pitfalls of making a country-specific 
exception without opening the door to nuclear cooperation in 
cases where it is clearly not yet merited, the Congress might 
consider permitting nuclear cooperation with any state not 
party to the NPT that meets certain criteria of responsible 
nuclear behavior (e.g., moratorium on nuclear testing, 
effective export controls, strong nuclear security measures, 
cooperation in stopping illicit nuclear trafficking). While 
such an approach would be country-neutral, it would still 
enable the U.S. Government (and other NSG members) to 
distinguish among non-parties to the NPT in terms of whether--
and how soon--they would be eligible for nuclear cooperation.
    By far the most important way to reduce nonproliferation 
risks--and to turn the civil nuclear deal into a net 
nonproliferation gain--would be for Congress to take action 
that would make the deal a catalyst for curbing or even capping 
the worldwide buildup of fissile material. In particular, 
Congress should adopt legislation that permits nuclear 
cooperation to proceed when India stops producing fissile 
material for nuclear weapons, either by ceasing production 
unilaterally, by joining other nuclear powers (including China 
and Pakistan) in a multilateral moratorium, or by adhering to a 
multilateral, verifiable treaty banning the production of 
fissile material for nuclear weapons (i.e., a fissile material 
cutoff treaty, or FMCT).
    In the run-up to the July 18th Joint Statement, India 
rejected a Bush administration proposal that it stop producing 
fissile material for nuclear weapons. But it is possible New 
Delhi might take a different view toward ending production not 
unilaterally but as part of a multilateral moratorium or 
treaty. After all, India has long declared its support for a 
multilateral FMCT. Indeed, in their July 18th Joint Statement, 
India and the United States agreed to work together to achieve 
an FMCT. If that is a serious undertaking and not a throwaway 
line, it would not be unrealistic for the key nuclear powers to 
reach agreement on a cutoff in a reasonably short period of 
time. The U.S., UK, France, and Russia have all ceased 
producing fissile material for nuclear weapons as a matter of 
policy. China is also believed to have stopped production. With 
intensive diplomatic effort, it should be possible for India 
and the U.S. to persuade Pakistan to join them and these other 
nuclear powers in a multilateral moratorium pending completion 
of a formal multilateral treaty. By linking nuclear cooperation 
to the termination of fissile material production, Congress 
could provide additional incentive for Washington and New Delhi 
to reach agreement at an early date.

                               CONCLUSION

    In seeking to make India an exception to longstanding 
nonproliferation rules, the Bush administration has given India 
virtually all that it wanted and has run major risks with the 
future of the nonproliferation regime. It is therefore 
reasonable to ask India to take steps to minimize the risks and 
demonstrate its own strong commitment to fighting 
proliferation. But the administration has settled for far less 
than what is required to make the civil nuclear deal a net gain 
for nonproliferation.
    India has long wanted to be regarded as a legitimate member 
of the nuclear club, not a pariah or outsider. The 
administration is right that it is time that India be brought 
into the nonproliferation mainstream. But with membership comes 
responsibilities--not just in ensuring against leakage of 
nuclear equipment or technology to other countries but also in 
practicing strategic restraint that can increase international 
security generally. India has stated that it is prepared to 
assume the same responsibilities and practices as other nuclear 
powers. It so happens that the five original nuclear weapons 
states have all stopped producing fissile material for nuclear 
weapons. Should India not be asked to join them?
    Indian leaders might be expected to say that, since the 
original five nuclear powers have produced more bomb-grade 
material than India, India should be entitled to catch up. But 
since its May 1998 nuclear tests, India has often stated that 
its strategic requirements are not open-ended and that it 
doesn't seek nuclear parity with China or any other country. 
Instead, it has consistently maintained that it requires only a 
``credible, minimum deterrent capability.'' If that remains the 
case, perhaps it can soon decide that it has accumulated 
sufficient fissile material for its minimum deterrent needs and 
can afford to forgo further production.
    A multilateral cap on the accumulation of fissile material 
would make a major contribution to fighting nuclear 
proliferation and preventing nuclear terrorism. Making a U.S.-
India civil nuclear deal a catalyst for achieving such an 
outcome would transform the deal from a substantial loss to a 
substantial gain. It would enable the U.S. to advance its 
strategic interest in a qualitatively improved relationship 
with India as well as serve its nonproliferation interests--not 
promote one at the expense of the other. Congress can play a 
key role in achieving such an outcome.
                              ----------                              

                         Prepared Statement of

                           DR. GARY MILHOLLIN

   Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control and Professor 
              Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School

                               BEFORE THE

               U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

                             APRIL 26, 2006

                              ----------                              

    Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I would like to 
thank you for inviting me to testify today on the 
administration's plan for nuclear cooperation with India, and 
particularly on the plan's strategic impact.
    The committee is right to emphasize the strategic nature of 
the plan. The legislation to implement it goes to the heart of 
our national security. The bill now before Congress would 
change our export control laws--laws that have been in effect 
for almost thirty years, and that were adopted in response to 
India's nuclear test in 1974. It is worth remembering that 
India achieved that test by diverting plutonium made with a 
peaceful U.S. nuclear export, which is why India had to call 
the test a ``peaceful nuclear explosion.''
    The broad question before us is this: Why, after 9/11, when 
we should be doing all we can to fight terrorism, and when we 
talk almost every day about states or terrorists getting their 
hands on an atomic bomb, should we weaken the controls on the 
export of nuclear material? Is this the right time to do that? 
And if we do it, will it make us safer?
    These are the questions that Congress should ask. So far, 
the debate has emphasized diplomacy and trade. The most 
important questions, however, are strategic. The answers, I'm 
afraid, are that the legislation will not make us safer. 
Instead, it will put us more at risk.
    Why? Because it is impossible to weaken export controls for 
India without weakening them for everyone else. The ``everyone 
else'' includes Iran, Pakistan, and even terrorist groups--
working through a national government or not--who might want to 
buy the means to make mass destruction weapons. And if we do 
weaken export controls for everyone, which is bound to happen 
if we weaken them for India, we may hasten the day when a 
nuclear explosion destroys an American city.
    The great flaw in the administration's proposal is that it 
considers India an isolated case. This is simply impossible. To 
do so contradicts the fundamental principle upon which export 
controls are based. The controls today are administered through 
international regimes. The regimes include the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. The 
first tries to stop the spread of nuclear arms, the second the 
missiles to deliver them.
    A cardinal principle of both regimes is that they are 
``country neutral.'' That is, they do not make exceptions for 
specific countries. The MTCR uses objective criteria to target 
``projects of concern'' for missile proliferation. The NSG 
requires all non-nuclear weapon states that import items 
designed or prepared for nuclear use to accept comprehensive 
inspections. Under such inspections, all critical nuclear 
material must be accounted for, regardless of the country. In 
this way, the regimes have avoided making politically motivated 
decisions.
    There is good reason for this practice. If the United 
States decides to drop controls to help one of its friends--in 
this case India--other supplier countries will do the same for 
their friends. China will drop controls on its friend Pakistan, 
and Russia will drop controls on its friend Iran. There will be 
no way to convince either China or Russia not to do that. They 
will say that what is good for your friend is good for mine. If 
you want to develop your market in India, I want just as much 
to develop my market in Pakistan or Iran. No country will give 
up a market unless other countries do the same. That is the way 
international regimes work.
    The regimes also rely on coordination, and on consensus. 
The United States acted unilaterally when it made its deal with 
India. There was no reported notification or coordination with 
the NSG or MTCR before the deal was concluded. By violating the 
consensus norm of these regimes, the United States has invited 
other members to act the same way. If they do, they may make 
unilateral deals with Iran or Pakistan without informing the 
United States. This risk has been created by our own action, 
and certainly does not make us safer.
    The regimes also require enforcement. The member countries 
are required to investigate and shut down unauthorized exports 
by their own companies. Since the attacks on 9/11, we have been 
asking the other countries to do more of this. But can we 
really ask them to crack down on companies that are exporting 
the same kind of goods to Pakistan or Iran that we are 
exporting to India? The same kind of technology will be going 
to the same kind of projects. What sense will there be in 
trying to interdict the one and not the other? Even if we can 
convince the other supplier countries to give lip service to an 
exception for India, it is unrealistic to expect them to follow 
through with enforcement against their own companies.
    Once we start tinkering with the regimes, they could 
unravel quickly. As one expert in the Pentagon told me, they 
are like a spring-loaded box. If you raise the lid, you may 
never get it closed again. What he meant was that the United 
States has always set the standard for export controls, and 
other countries have often taken a long time to follow the U.S. 
lead in strengthening them. But if the United States decides to 
loosen controls, it will take only an instant for other 
countries to follow. The lid will fly off, and we may never be 
able to get it back on.
    I would also like to add a personal note to this point. I 
have just returned from trips to Jordan and the United Arab 
Emirates, where I helped provide training and information to 
assist these countries in improving their export controls. I 
hope to go to Turkey next. These are all Muslim countries in 
which the U.S. government is trying to improve export control 
performance. The export control officials in these countries 
are now the front-line troops in the fight against terrorism. 
They must do their jobs well in order to keep terrorists from 
getting their hands on dangerous technology.
    In Jordan, one of the first questions I was asked was: 
``What about India? Why has the United States decided to export 
to India?'' There is no way I, or any other American, can 
answer that question in a credible way in a Muslim country. 
India, Pakistan and Iran all decided to develop nuclear weapons 
under the guise of peaceful nuclear cooperation. From this 
standpoint, they are indistinguishable. Why punish Pakistan and 
Iran but not India? They are all guilty. There is no persuasive 
reason for treating them differently. India is no different 
today than it was in 1998, when it tested a nuclear weapon. So, 
the second question, hiding behind the first, is ``what is the 
ground for the discrimination?'' None of us wants to think of 
the word religion, but it is a word that is in the mind of 
Muslim countries. If the United States is only against 
proliferation by countries it does not like, which now appears 
to be the case after the deal with India, why does it like some 
countries but not others?
    Congress should look deeply into these questions before 
approving the legislation. So far, it does not appear that 
anyone has done so, including the administration. The 
administration's plan was arrived at hastily, with no 
consultation with other regime members, and virtually none with 
Congress. If the press is to be believed, there was even little 
consultation with arms control experts within the 
administration itself. The proponents of the deal have 
presented it as if it were simply a matter of trade and 
diplomacy. Congress should insist upon a full review of the 
strategic impact.
    If one looks at the strategic side, it is hard to see why 
we should be helping India. Only three countries have refused 
to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: India, Israel and 
Pakistan. Of the three, India is the least important 
strategically.
    Under any calculation of America's strategic relations, 
Pakistan ranks higher than India. Pakistan is essential to our 
ongoing military and political efforts in Afghanistan. Pakistan 
is also essential to our campaign against Al Qaeda. Without the 
aid of General Musharraf, we would have a much harder time 
accomplishing our goals in either of these endeavors. Pakistan 
is also a leading power in the Muslim world, a world with which 
the United States needs better relations. Yet, our deal with 
India is a blow to General Musharraf's prestige at best, and at 
worst a public humiliation. We should not give General 
Musharraf more trouble than he already has.
    Israel, of course, has always been a close U.S. ally, and 
will continue to be. Israel would like to have U.S. nuclear 
cooperation. In addition, Israel is located in a part of the 
world that is of the highest importance to U.S. foreign policy 
interests.
    In any competition for strategic favor from the United 
States, India finishes a distant third.
    Is India nevertheless important because it will become a 
counterweight to China? Proponents of the deal so argue. But 
the notion that India might assist the United States 
diplomatically or militarily in some future conflict is pure 
speculation. India's long history as the leader of the ``non-
aligned'' movement points in the opposite direction. India will 
follow its own interests as it always has. An example is 
India's decision to train Iranian sailors and import Iranian 
gas. In addition, India shares a border with China, is keen to 
have good relations with China, and does have good relations 
with China. It will not sour such relations simply from a vague 
desire to please the United States.
    This India-as-counterweight-to-China theory reminds one of 
the argument made by the first Bush administration in the 
1980s, when it contended that the United States should export 
sensitive dual-use equipment to Saddam Hussein in order to 
build up Iraq as a counterweight to Iran. U.S. pilots were 
later killed in Iraq trying to bomb things that U.S. companies 
had provided. History shows that such predictions can be 
dangerous.
    Then why choose India for preferential treatment? If it is 
not because of our need to fight terrorism, and not because of 
our desire to reward a faithful ally, what is it? There seems 
to be only one answer: India is the biggest market. Secretary 
of State Rice readily admits the commercial interest. On April 
5 she testified to this committee that the agreement with India 
was ``crafted with the private sector firmly in mind.'' She 
cited a 13 billion dollar deal by Boeing; she cited the hope of 
reactor sales by our nuclear industry; she cited the 
opportunity for ``U.S. companies to enter the lucrative and 
growing Indian market.''
    She might also have mentioned India's defense market. That 
market seems to be the one that is really motivating the deal. 
India is shopping for billions of dollars worth of military 
aircraft, and the administration is hoping it will buy both the 
F-16 and the F-18. According to the American press, officials 
in the defense industry and the Pentagon are saying that the 
main effect of the nuclear deal will be to remove India from 
the ranks of violators of international norms. And once this 
change in India's status occurs, there will be no impediment to 
arms exports. The Russian press is even more explicit. It 
complains that in addition to ``recognition of India's nuclear 
status by the United States,'' the nuclear deal ``opened the 
door to the Indian market for American arms merchants,'' with 
the result that Russia may be squeezed out.
    Boiled down to the essentials, the message is clear: Export 
controls are less important to the United States than money. 
They are a messy hindrance, ready to be swept aside for trade. 
But, a decision to put money above export controls is precisely 
what we don't want China and Russia to do when they sell to 
Iran. We don't want China and Russia to tell us that money in 
their pockets is more important than stopping Iran's march 
toward the bomb. But China and Russia are now hearing the new 
commercial message coming from America, and they are not 
stupid. If they see that we are willing to put money above 
security, and willing to take the risk that dangerous exports 
won't come back to bite us, they will do the same. Everyone's 
security will diminish as a result.
    Thus, this legislation has clear costs to our security. Are 
these outweighed by the benefits? What are the benefits?
    The principal benefit cited by the administration is that 
India will place 14 of its 22 power reactors under inspection. 
But, as others have pointed out, this leaves a great number of 
reactors off-limits. In fact, the reactors that are off-limits 
will be sufficient to produce enough plutonium for dozens of 
nuclear weapons per year. This is more than India will ever 
need. India is not restricting its nuclear weapon production in 
any way. Therefore, there is no ``non-proliferation benefit'' 
from such a step.
    In effect, India's offer is like that of a counterfeiter 
with a 22 room house, who offers to let the police look into 14 
rooms as long as they stay out of all the others. Why would any 
policeman in his right mind accept such an offer, or want to 
inspect one of the 14 rooms? It would be the only place where 
he was sure not to find anything. It would waste his time, just 
as it will waste the time of international inspectors to look 
at India's 14 declared reactors. Everyone knows that it will be 
the eight undeclared ones that make the bombs. India, in fact, 
appears to have calculated the number of reactors to put off-
limits according to how much plutonium they will make. India 
has assured itself that the resulting amount of plutonium will 
be enough to allow it to continue making bombs at an unfettered 
pace.
    This point about wasting inspection time may seem minor, 
but it isn't. The International Atomic Energy Agency has a 
limited number of inspectors. They are already having trouble 
meeting their responsibilities. To send them to India on a 
fool's errand will mean that they won't be going to places like 
Iran, where something may really be amiss. Unless the Agency's 
budget is increased to meet the new burden in India, the 
inspection of India's declared reactors will produce a net loss 
for the world's non-proliferation effort.
    The other major benefit that the administration cites is 
that India may buy American reactors. Such a possibility 
exists, but is remote. The precedent is our experience with 
China. Some members of the committee may remember the intense 
debate in Congress over the U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement 
with China in the 1980's. At the time, our industry was citing 
the large number of reactors that China was planning to buy, 
and predicting that many of the orders would come to us. How 
many American reactors did China actually buy? The answer is: 
none. Exactly zero. The main effect of China's agreement with 
us was to increase the number of vendors who were in 
competition. The result was to drive the price down for the 
Chinese reactor buyers. That was good for China, but did 
nothing for us. The Chinese import orders went to France, 
Russia and Canada.
    We are not likely to fare any better this time. New Delhi 
is already building a string of reactors on its own that are 
less expensive to put up than ours. And if India wants to 
import reactors, it can turn to the Russians, who will charge 
less money and attach fewer conditions, and who are already 
ahead of us in the Indian market. It can also turn to the 
French or even perhaps the Canadians. All of these countries 
will compete with us if we sell to India. The chance that we 
will defeat this competition is slim.
    The administration also argues that India has a great need 
for nuclear power to meet its electricity demand. This too is 
far-fetched. India has been generating electricity with nuclear 
reactors for more than 40 years. Yet, reactors supply only 
about 2 percent to 3 percent of its electricity today. If 
reactors are so vital to India's energy needs, why hasn't India 
built more? The answer is that reactors have not turned out to 
be as safe, or as clean, or--most important--as economical as 
originally thought. Nuclear power has been virtually 
insignificant in India's energy mix in the past, and will be no 
more important in the future. It is worth noting that the 
United States hasn't ordered a new reactor for about thirty 
years. Why do we expect India to buy American reactors when 
even we aren't buying them?
    I would also like to comment on the effect that the 
administration's new policy will have on missile proliferation. 
President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed 
to cooperate in ``space exploration,'' including ``satellite 
navigation and launch.'' This language is broad enough to allow 
missile-useable components and technology to be exported. The 
United States seem entirely ready to permit such sales. The 
U.S. Commerce Department recently dropped restraints on 
American exports of missile-related equipment to three 
subsidiaries of the Indian Space Research Organization, despite 
the fact that all three are active in Indian missile 
development. This appears to be only a first step in a general 
loosening of U.S. missile export controls for India.
    It is difficult to predict where this will lead. One cannot 
help a country like India build better space launchers without 
helping it build better missiles. Our experience with China is 
again the precedent. In the 1990's China got crucial American 
help in rocket design, guidance, launch operation, and payload 
integration, all of which were directly useable in making 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. The help came from 
American companies that were supposed to be engaged only in a 
peaceful space effort.
    India will be no different. India, in fact, is the first 
country to develop a long-range nuclear missile from a civilian 
space-launch program. India's Agni missile, tested in 1989, was 
built by using the design of the American ``Scout'' space 
rocket. India imported the blueprints from NASA under the cover 
of peaceful space cooperation.
    India has every intention of building nuclear missiles that 
will reach the United States. For some years, India has been 
working to develop a nuclear submarine, which will be able to 
threaten every coastal city in the world with a nuclear 
payload. India has also been working on an intercontinental 
ballistic missile, known as the Surya, which will fly much 
farther than any target in China. Two questions come to mind. 
Why should India want to reach such targets? And does the 
United States really want to make it easier for India to 
succeed?
    The final point I would like to make has to do with the 
power of Congress. That power will be greatly reduced if the 
administration's legislation passes.
    The important question to ask about the power of Congress 
is this: Why is this bill necessary? What is wrong with present 
U.S. law?
    Under the present Atomic Energy Act, the president could 
make an agreement tomorrow for nuclear cooperation with India. 
All the president has to do is submit to Congress what is known 
as an ``exempt'' agreement--that is, an agreement that does not 
satisfy the Act's present criteria for nuclear cooperation.
    India does not satisfy the criteria because it has refused 
to put all of its nuclear material under international 
inspection and is, in fact, running a secret nuclear weapon 
program. That is why the president must ``exempt'' the 
agreement before submitting it to Congress. After such a 
submission, Congress must adopt a joint resolution saying that 
it favors the agreement. If Congress disagrees, or does not 
act, the agreement does not go into effect.
    The president must meet a high standard to justify the 
exemption. He must find that holding India to the present 
criteria ``would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of 
United States non-proliferation objectives'' or that it would 
``otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.'' He 
must also persuade Congress that he is right, because Congress 
must take action for the agreement to operate.
    Why hasn't the president taken this course of action? 
Apparently, because he cannot meet the standard. He cannot find 
that it ``would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of 
United States non-proliferation objectives'' to make India meet 
the existing criteria. To the contrary, it would advance U.S. 
non-proliferation objectives if India met the criteria, because 
India would be giving up its bomb program and putting its 
fissile material under international inspection. That would be 
a clear gain for non-proliferation instead of a loss.
    Because the administration cannot meet the present 
standard, the administration has asked Congress to lower it. 
India would only have to meet a list of weaker criteria that 
the administration is already confident India can comply with.
    But the administration has not been content to stop there. 
It also wants to shift the burden of proof. Under the new 
legislation, the burden of proof would shift to Congress. 
Instead of having to convince Congress to act after submitting 
an ``exempt'' agreement, the agreement would take effect 
automatically after 90 days unless Congress voted affirmatively 
to block it. Any such vote could be vetoed, so Congress would 
have to muster a 2/3 majority in both houses in order to have 
its view prevail. That is in direct contradiction to present 
law, under which an exempted agreement would have to be 
affirmatively agreed to by a joint resolution.
    Thus, the effect of the bill is twofold: it makes it easier 
for the president to exempt an agreement, and it makes it 
harder for Congress to prevent an exempted agreement from 
taking effect. If Congress wishes to preserve its existing 
power, it could require that an exempted agreement still be 
reviewed under the present process. The administration has not 
advanced any persuasive reason why the process of Congressional 
review should be changed.
    Preserving the existing process would have several 
advantages. Congress would have more than 90 days to study the 
agreement; Congress would not have to muster a veto-proof 
majority to block the agreement, or attach conditions to it; 
and Congress would be able to see the actual agreement before 
taking a vote.
    Under the new legislation, Congress is being asked to lower 
the standards for nuclear cooperation and to shift the burden 
of proof before any agreement with India has been reached. 
Congress is being asked to vote without knowing what kind of 
inspections India will eventually agree to, without knowing 
whether India will really improve its own export controls, and 
without knowing whether India's plan for separating its 
civilian from its military nuclear facilities is ``credible,'' 
as the new criteria require. Congress would be buying a pig in 
a poke. It would be giving the administration carte blanche 
authority to make an agreement that, because of Congress' 
reduced power of review, there would be little opportunity to 
change.
                              ----------                              

                         Prepared Statement of

                          DR. STEPHEN P. COHEN

                Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution

                               BEFORE THE

                 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

                       WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 2006

                              ----------                              

    Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for 
the opportunity to share my knowledge of South Asian security, 
non-proliferation and arms control issues as you grapple with 
this important initiative. On balance, the initiative should be 
welcomed. I have argued in print for a non-proliferation half-
way house since 1990--an admittedly imperfect response to an 
imperfect situation, but far better than the status quo. By 
minor modifications in the proposed legislation and changes in 
American policy the nuclear cooperation agreement could be 
still further improved.
    I am a signatory of a March 10 letter backing the 
initiative. That letter argues that the agreement enhances 
American strategic interests, and if properly implemented, it 
will advance, not retard, American non-proliferation 
objectives. We also argue that the initiative will help India 
move to an energy strategy that makes it less dependant on 
imported oil and that it will positively address our global 
environmental concerns.
    I was resident in India during many of the major Indian 
debates over its nuclear weapons policy. In 1964-65 it debated 
its response to the Chinese nuclear test at Lop Nor; in 1967-68 
it debated whether or not to sign the NPT, and in 1974, after 
its phony ``peaceful nuclear explosion,'' India debated whether 
to weaponize. In the late 1980s there was a major debate over 
the proper response to evidence of a Chinese-assisted Pakistani 
nuclear weapons program. The Rajiv Gandhi ``Action Plan'' of 
1988 was in part a last-minute attempt to forestall a response-
in-kind to Pakistan's program; in the early 1990s Indians 
grappled with the highly publicized American effort to cap, 
roll back, and eliminate its nuclear weapons program and that 
of Pakistan. More recently, I spent a month in New Delhi 
observing the Indian debate over the Bush-Manmohan Singh 
initiative.
    There are two major conclusions to draw from this forty-
year history:

          First, in most of these cases India was responding to 
        nuclear developments elsewhere. It's strategic elite 
        was sharply divide as to the utility and morality of 
        nuclear weapons, and until the 1998 tests India's 
        policy was one of maintaining an ``option'' or a 
        ``recessed'' (i.e. unannounced) deterrent. As opponents 
        of this agreement have noted, India simply lied about 
        its small weapons program and it certainly violated the 
        spirit and the letter of agreements reached with 
        foreign governments concerning the peaceful use of 
        nuclear assistance. For that India has been subjected 
        to thirty years' of sanctions.

          Second, in all of these debates the military, and 
        purely military calculations, have been notably absent. 
        The Indian nuclear program was nurtured by a small 
        enclave of scientists and bureaucrats who were largely 
        responsive, not pro-active in their thinking. As George 
        Tanham wrote, Indian strategic thought is notable by 
        its lack of interest in military things. There was and 
        remains a curious blend of extravagant idealism 
        (epitomized in the many plans for global nuclear 
        disarmament generated in India over the years) and 
        Kautilyan-Machiavellian realism (epitomized by the 
        secrecy that shrouded the covert weapons program).

    It is my judgment that this initiative need not trigger an 
arms race with Pakistan, and it is certainly not a green light 
to India to build a thousand or more nuclear weapons. It does 
provide the United States with an opportunity to work with 
India to help prevent a broader nuclear arms race, something 
that is certainly not in the interest of India, Pakistan, 
China, or America.
    Therefore, I would propose the following steps:

          First, The agreement with India should eventually be 
        folded into legislation that would develop criteria 
        that would allow other states to enter such a nuclear 
        half-way house. This half-way house would provide 
        civilian nuclear assistance in exchange for impeccable 
        horizontal non-proliferation record. Right now India 
        seems to meet most reasonable tests, as does Israel, 
        but Pakistan and North Korea would not.

          Second, the administration should undertake an 
        initiative that would constrain vertical proliferation 
        via a nuclear restraint regime in Asia, this initiative 
        would include India, Pakistan and China. Such a regime 
        need not involve formal, negotiated limits, which would 
        be very difficult to achieve, but certainly could be 
        based upon a fissile material cutoff, continued 
        restraint on testing, and limited deployment of 
        weapons. The first two feature in the US-India nuclear 
        initiative, but they need to be made multilateral, 
        especially to ward off an arms race between Pakistan 
        and India. Of course, China's decision on renewing 
        testing will be shaped by its response to the United 
        States, and I believe that we can continue our own ban 
        on tests indefinitely without damaging nuclear 
        preparedness.

          Third, with this agreement in place New Delhi should 
        feel less paranoid about discussing its own nuclear 
        capabilities and their interaction with those of other 
        states. As long as India felt that the U.S. was trying 
        to strip it of its weapons program Indian officials 
        talked on endlessly about global nuclear disarmament, 
        but they refused to discuss concrete steps that would 
        enhance India's security through cooperative agreements 
        with others. Indeed, the Indians are still reluctant to 
        allow their country to be the venue for such 
        discussions by non-government organizations, unless 
        they are strictly scripted. Under the auspices of the 
        new Indo-U.S. Agreement on Science and Technology the 
        U.S. should assist India in setting up a center to 
        study ``best practices'' gleaned from the American and 
        Russian/Soviet nuclear and missile experience. We 
        should also expect that India will eventually join the 
        process of nuclear arms reduction that began with U.S. 
        and Russian nuclear cuts; I am disappointed that such a 
        long-term goal was not even mentioned in the various 
        U.S.-Indian communiques, we do not want to continue 
        down the process of arms reduction only to see some of 
        the new nuclear weapons states such as India and 
        Pakistan pass us on their way up.

    To summarize, while supporting the agreement I believe that 
it should be the initial step in a process of crafting a 
diplomacy that addresses wider complex arms control and 
security concerns, not just meeting India's energy needs. 
America has such concerns in an area that stretches from Israel 
to China; this includes at least five states that have nuclear 
weapons and two that may be trying to acquire them. This 
agreement does much to repair the torn US-Indian strategic tie, 
it is important in reshaping and revitalizing India's massive 
energy shortfall, and it has already been helpful in our 
attempt to constrain an Iranian program, but this 
administration and its successor--with Congress'' assistance--
should regard it as a beginning, not an end as far as our 
nonproliferation and strategic interests are concerned.
                              ----------                              

 Material Relating to the Committee's November 2, 2005 Hearing, ``U.S.-
   Indian Nuclear Energy Cooperation: Security and Nonproliferation 
                              Implications

                              ----------                              


 Responses to Senator Lugar's Questions to the Hon. R. Nicholas Burns, 
 Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and the Hon. Robert G. Joseph, 
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, Department 
                        of State, Washington, DC

The Administration's Legislative Proposal and the July 18 Joint 
        Statement
    Question. When will the administration present this 
committee with legislation regarding nuclear energy cooperation 
with India?

    Answer. We do not intend to ask Congress to take 
legislative action to facilitate this agreement until the 
Indian Government takes certain important steps. We have made 
it clear to the Indians that they need to begin to follow 
through on their commitments, including to present--and begin 
to implement--a credible and transparent plan for separation of 
their civilian and military nuclear facilities that is 
defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint before we would 
further seek to adjust our legal frameworks.
    We have agreed to work closely with the Indians over the 
next several weeks to months on this plan and on other Indian 
steps which will allow us to seek changes to our laws. We hope 
to be in a position to seek formal legislative relief in the 
first quarter of 2006.

    Question. When do you anticipate that India will have 
completed all of the steps it has committed to undertaking in 
the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement?

    Answer. Some of the actions to which India has committed 
are ongoing, such as its pledge to continue its moratorium on 
nuclear testing and its commitment to refrain from the transfer 
of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do 
not already have them. Others can be completed with additional 
effort, such as India's adherence to the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Some of the 
actions that India must take are complex, and will take time to 
complete. There is not yet an established timetable for the 
separation of India's civil and military nuclear 
infrastructure, for instance. Implementation of the plan will, 
as the Joint Statement suggests, take place in a phased manner. 
We intend to move expeditiously and will assess progress on all 
aspects of the Joint Statement prior to President Bush's 
expected trip to India in early 2006. We hope that India will 
have developed and begun to implement a plan for civil-military 
separation and also be engaged in substantive discussions with 
the IAEA by that time.

    Question. In your view, when should Congress act to change 
U.S. law? Before or after completion by India of all its 
undertakings in the July 18 Joint Statement or after the 
completion of certain parts of the Joint Statement?

    Answer. Because the Joint Statement will take considerable 
time to implement fully, we do not intend to wait until all 
Indian commitments are fully realized to submit proposed 
legislation to the Congress. Rather, once India develops a 
transparent and credible civil-military separation plan for its 
nuclear facilities and programs and begins to implement it, we 
will then seek appropriate legislative solutions. Ideally, U.S. 
law would be properly adjusted before the Nuclear Supplies 
Group Guidelines are adjusted.

    Question. What are the interim forms of legislation being 
considered by the Department in this area? Will there be a new 
nuclear cooperative agreement with India, one for which 
statutory amendments would be required, or does the 
administration prefer to create a broad, new authority outside 
of the current Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011, et 
seq.) for India?

    Answer. In consultation with Congress, our objective is to 
conclude a new agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation with 
India that satisfies all requirements of section 123(a) of the 
Atomic Energy Act, except for the requirement that full-scope 
IAEA safeguards be applied in India. India has agreed to 
separate its military and civilian nuclear facilities and 
programs, and to place its civilian components under IAEA 
safeguards. The result will not be ``full-scope'' IAEA 
safeguards, so the agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation 
will not provide for that; but the agreement will allow for 
appropriate controls to help ensure that material or goods 
provided for civilian purposes remain within the civilian 
sector. The administration prefers stand-alone, India-specific 
legislation, but could envision alternatives as well. We look 
forward to continuing consultations with both the Senate and 
the House in the coming weeks.

    Question. Could you please provide me with your 
understanding of current U.S. law, i.e., which U.S. laws or 
regulations prohibit exports to India of nuclear and dual-use 
nuclear items and which U.S. laws or regulations provide a 
presumption (of approval or denial) of such exports to India, 
and which such laws and regulations would need to be modified 
to implement the Joint Statement?

    Answer. Under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 
1954, as amended, an agreement for cooperation between the 
United States and India will be required in order for the 
United States to engage in major nuclear cooperation (e.g., 
nuclear material, nuclear facilities, and major nuclear 
components) with India as contemplated by the Joint Statement. 
One of the requirements is that an agreement for cooperation 
(outside of the NPT-recognized five nuclear weapon states) must 
include full-scope safeguards unless exempted by the President 
as provided in section 123. An agreement that has been exempted 
by the President from one or more requirements in section 
123(a) cannot become effective until Congress adopts, and there 
is enacted, a joint resolution stating that Congress favors the 
agreement. We believe stand-alone legislation offers a 
preferable long-term solution.
    Section 128 of the AEA requires, as one of the export 
license criteria for significant nuclear exports, that a 
recipient nonnuclear weapon state have full-scope safeguards. 
The AEA's full-scope safeguards requirement is incorporated in 
the regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 10 CFR 
Sec. 110.42(a)(6), as one of the export licensing criteria for 
exports of nuclear facilities and material. Section 129 of the 
AEA prohibits significant nuclear cooperation with a nonnuclear 
weapon state that is found by the President to have undertaken 
certain activities, including detonating a nuclear explosive 
device, or to have engaged ``in activities involving source or 
special nuclear material and having direct significance for the 
manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, and 
has failed to take steps which, in the President's judgment, 
represent sufficient progress toward terminating such 
activities.'' The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's regulations 
at 10 CFR Sec. 110.46 incorporate section 129 of the AEA. Both 
section 128 and section 129 provide Presidential waiver 
authority.
    With respect to dual use nuclear items under the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), there would be no need to 
make a regulatory change. Dual-use items are reviewed on a 
case-by-case basis. As a matter of policy, Commerce does not 
approve exports to unsafeguarded facilities. Moreover, the 
United States remains committed to not ``in any way'' assist 
weapons programs in nonnuclear weapon states as defined by the 
NPT.

    Question. The Joint Statement commits the United States to 
``full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India.'' As the 
United States has different forms of nuclear energy cooperation 
with many nations, differing even among NPT Parties, what is 
the meaning of this phrase in relation to U.S. law and 
regulation regarding nuclear commerce with India?

    Answer. For the United States, ``full civil nuclear 
cooperation'' with India means trade in most civil nuclear 
technologies, including fuel and reactors. But we do not intend 
to provide enrichment or reprocessing technology to India. As 
the President said in February 2004, ``enrichment and 
reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.'' We do not currently 
provide enrichment or reprocessing equipment to any country.
    We will also need to ensure that any cooperation is fully 
consistent with U.S. obligations under the NPT not to ``in any 
way'' assist India's nuclear weapons program, and with 
provisions of U.S. law.

    Question. What regulatory changes (beyond those already 
made under the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership or NSSP) 
would need to be made to implement full civil nuclear energy 
cooperation with India?

    Answer. Many of the specifics of required regulatory 
changes to implement full civil nuclear energy cooperation with 
India have yet to be determined by the administration. U.S. 
regulations that incorporate or reflect statutory language will 
need to be modified or waived in order to permit civil nuclear 
cooperation consistent with the Joint Statement, and will need 
to be addressed along with modification or waiver of the 
related statute. No Department of Commerce regulatory changes 
will be required in order to implement full civil nuclear 
cooperation, except as facilities are put under IAEA 
safeguards, they could in principle be removed from the Entity 
List.

    Question. Presuming Congressional approval of statutory 
amendments and Nuclear Suppliers Group approval of an exception 
to its Guidelines for India, when would the United States 
Government begin to approve the export of nuclear items or 
technical data to India, and what are those items or technical 
data likely to be?

    Answer. Should the NSG and the Congress approve, in 
principle, supply would be feasible when the United States and 
other potential suppliers assess they can confidently supply to 
Indian facilities and remain in compliance with our obligations 
under the NPT and NSG. This will occur once IAEA safeguards are 
put in place and applied in perpetuity. Further, the separation 
plan must ensure--and the safeguards must confirm--that 
cooperation does not ``in any way assist'' in the development 
or production of nuclear weapons. In this context, nuclear 
materials in the civil sector must remain within the civil 
sector. A clear and transparent separation between India's 
civil and military facilities is essential. We will be unable 
to supply facilities that are not under appropriate safeguards.
    We cannot say precisely which nuclear technologies the 
United States (or other suppliers) would export to India, 
except that we would exclude reprocessing and enrichment 
technologies from our list. In our view, once India makes 
demonstrable progress in implementing key Joint Statement 
commitments--with the presentation of a credible, transparent, 
and defensible separation plan foremost on the list--we will be 
ready to engage with our NSG partners in developing a formal 
proposal to allow the shipment of Trigger List items and 
related technology to properly safeguarded facilities in India.

Nuclear Suppliers Group Issues
    Question. What are the positions of each of the 44 members 
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group on the comments and proposals 
made by A/S Rocca and A/S Rademaker during their consultations 
with NSG members in Vienna, Austria, last October?

    Answer. Not every member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
expressed an opinion on the comments made by A/S Rocca and A/S 
Rademaker during their consultations with NSG Participants at 
the Consultative Group meeting in October. The meeting provided 
many NSG partners the first opportunity to consider our 
proposed approach to realizing full civil nuclear cooperation 
without amending the NSG Guidelines, per se.
    Of those delegations expressing an opinion, some 
governments, including the Czech Republic, France, Russia, and 
the U.K., expressed support for the proposal; several 
governments, including Argentina, China, Greece, Japan, and 
South Korea, said that their governments would require further 
information on implementation, including details of India's 
plans for the separation of civilian and military nuclear 
facilities, before they could make a decision on the proposals; 
and some governments, such as Sweden and Switzerland, expressed 
initial reservations and indicated a need for further study.

    Question. Could you please furnish the remarks made by 
Assistant Secretary Rocca and Assistant Secretary Rademaker in 
Vienna to the NSG members to the committee?

    Answer. Yes. To satisfy standard NSG confidentiality 
practices, Assistant Secretary Rocca's and Assistant Secretary 
Rademaker's statements are reproduced below. These are not 
intended for open publication.

    Question. Did the remarks made by the U.S. delegation 
present specific proposals regarding changes to specific parts 
of the NSG Guidelines for Nuclear Exports for India?

    Answer. We have not yet tabled any formal proposals. We 
expressed a preference at the October meeting of the NSG 
Consultative Group to treat India as an exceptional case in 
light of its substantial and growing energy needs, its nuclear 
nonproliferation record, and the enhanced nonproliferation 
commitments it has now undertaken. We also expressed our firm 
intention that the NSG maintain its effectiveness, and 
emphasized that we will not undercut this important 
nonproliferation policy tool. The U.S. proposal neither seeks 
to alter the decisionmaking procedures of the NSG nor amend the 
current full-scope safeguards requirement in the NSG 
Guidelines.

    Question. Has the United States shown proposed changes to 
NSG Guidelines to Indian Government officials?

    Answer. No. Our discussions with India to date have 
centered on implementation of Indian and U.S. commitments 
rather than on what the NSG should do.

    Question. Will India join the NSG?

    Answer. In the 18 July Joint Statement, PM Singh committed 
India not to join but to adhere to Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Guidelines. 
The practice of unilateral adherence to the MTCR or NSG is not 
unique to India. Unilateral adherents voluntarily abide by the 
Guidelines of the regime--as do regime members--but are not 
formal members, per se. We expect to hold unilateral adherents, 
such as India, to the same standards specified in the 
Guidelines.

    Question. Do you anticipate that the NSG will be able to 
make a consensus decision on the U.S. proposal(s) regarding 
India at its next plenary meeting?

    Answer. While we will certainly consider advancing a formal 
proposal for NSG consideration at the next plenary, the pace 
and scope of India's implementation will help determine the 
specific timing. Should its actions, and our ongoing 
consultations with NSG partners support it, we may be in a 
position to seek agreement on a formal proposal at the 2006 
plenary session, expected in the May/June timeframe.

INPA Sanctions
    Question. On September 23, 2004, the administration 
sanctioned two Indian scientists for their activities in Iran 
under the authority of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 
(P.L. 106-178, or INPA).

   Has the administration considered other sanctions 
        against Indian entities or persons under INPA or any 
        other relevant U.S. law or executive order since last 
        September?

    Answer. While we believe India has a solid record overall 
of ensuring that its nuclear-related expertise and technologies 
do not pose a proliferation risk, we continue to review 
information and take action to implement U.S. law as 
appropriate. In an unclassified response, it would not be 
appropriate to comment on the consideration of any other 
sanctions cases due to intelligence sensitivities that would 
surround any such case. However, if additional details are 
required, we could provide a classified response separately.

   What was the reaction of the Indian Government to 
        the INPA sanctions last year?

    Answer. In the context of our ongoing dialog with India, we 
informed the Indian Government when sanctions were imposed. At 
that time, they expressed serious concerns, and we discussed 
the sanctions cases as part of the dialog. The Indian 
Government has made clear to us its commitment to close any 
loopholes and ensure that its entities are not a proliferation 
source of sensitive technologies in the future. Among recent 
steps, India has improved its export control legislation and 
has harmonized its national control list with the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group Guidelines.

   What steps has India taken to prevent Indian 
        interactions with Iranian entities or persons closely 
        involved with Iran's atomic energy activities?

    Answer. We cannot comment in unclassified channels on 
specific Indian actions, but would be able to discuss this 
further in a classified setting.
    We believe India has a solid record overall of ensuring 
that its nuclear-related expertise and technologies do not pose 
a proliferation risk, and we have an ongoing dialog with India 
on proliferation issues. India has clearly demonstrated over 
the past several years its desire to work with the United 
States and the international community to fight the spread of 
sensitive nuclear technologies.
    As part of an effort launched with India during the 
administration's first term--the Next Steps in Strategic 
Partnership--India took a number of significant steps to 
strengthen export controls and to ensure that Indian companies 
would not be a source of future proliferation. Not only did 
India pledge to bring its export control laws, regulations, and 
enforcement practices in line with modern export control 
standards, but also passed an extensive export control law and 
issued an upgraded national control list that will help it 
achieve this goal.
    Other measures were also instituted as a part of the NSSP 
process, which included India permitting U.S. Government end-
use verifications and agreement to increase bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation on nonproliferation.
    In addition, India has become a party to the Convention on 
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and has taken 
significant steps toward meeting its obligations under UNSCR 
1540.
    The additional nonproliferation commitments India made as 
part of the Joint Statement go even further and, once 
implemented, will bring it into closer conformity with 
international nuclear nonproliferation standards and practices.
    In our view, it is clear that India agrees that Iran's 
pursuit of a full nuclear fuel cycle makes no sense from an 
economic or energy-security standpoint. India has called on 
Iran to return to negotiations with the EU-3 aimed at ending 
Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability in exchange for 
expanded cooperation from Europe and others in the field of 
peaceful nuclear energy, as well as economic, commercial, 
political, and security incentives. India has also called on 
Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA's ongoing investigations, 
and to resume a suspension of all enrichment-related and 
reprocessing activities as a way of building confidence. We 
welcomed India's decision to join 21 other IAEA Board members 
in voting to adopt the September 24 resolution that found Iran 
in noncompliance with its safeguards obligations. That outcome 
demonstrated to Iran that it is not just the United States and 
other Western countries that have concerns about Iran's nuclear 
activities, but the entire international community. India has 
offered full support to the EU-3's efforts to seek an end to 
Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions.

India and Iran
    Question. India's vote in favor of IAEA Board of Governors 
(BOG) Resolution GOV/2005/77 was seen by some as a departure 
from its traditional siding with developing countries in 
multilateral fora.
    Prior to the vote, it had been my understanding that the 
goal of the United States and the EU-3 at that BOG meeting was 
to report Iran's noncompliance to the U.N. Security Council.
    Indian officials have taken credit for preventing such a 
report by supporting language that found Iran's noncompliance 
``within the competence of the Security Council.'' An earlier 
Indian Ministry of External Affairs press release regarding a 
telephone conversation between Indian Prime Minister Singh and 
Iranian President Ahmadinejad stated that ``India supports the 
resolution of all issues through discussion and consensus in 
the IAEA.''

   What were the reasons India did not support 
        reporting Iranian noncompliance to the Security Council 
        at the last meeting of the BOG?

    Answer. India voted for a resolution that requires a report 
to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and finds Iran in 
noncompliance with its NPT safeguards obligations under Article 
XII.C of the IAEA Statute. However, the timing and content of 
this report to the UNSC are still to be determined.

   Under what circumstances would India support 
        reporting Iranian noncompliance to the Security 
        Council?

    Answer. In its support for IAEA BOG Resolution GOV/2005/77, 
India endorsed sending a report to the Security Council. The 
contents of the report and the timing of transmitting the 
report are unclear at this point. In our view, it would not be 
useful to speculate further on this hypothetical question.

   Is it the Administration's position that Iran's 
        noncompliance should be reported to the Security 
        Council?

    Answer. The United States has long expressed the view that 
Iran should be reported to the United Nations Security Council. 
At the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Board of 
Governors meeting on September 24, India voted--along with the 
United States and our EU-3 partners--in favor of a resolution 
that requires a report to the United Nations Security Council 
and finds Iran in noncompliance with its NPT safeguards 
obligations under Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute. In 
addition, for the first time, the IAEA Board concluded with 
this resolution that Iran's pattern of deception and denial, 
continued lack of cooperation with the IAEA, and continued 
pursuit of nuclear fuel cycle capabilities in defiance of the 
international community, is a matter that falls within the 
competence of the United Nations Security Council, under 
Article III.B.4 of the IAEA Statute.

   Does the administration consider Iran's July-August 
        2005 resumption of uranium conversion activities at 
        UCF-Isfahan to be a breach of its suspension of fuel-
        cycle activities agreed to with the EU-3?

    Answer. Yes. Under the November 2004 Paris Agreement, Iran 
agreed ``on a voluntary basis, to continue and extend its 
suspension to include all enrichment related and reprocessing 
activities, and specifically: The manufacture and import of gas 
centrifuges and their components; the assembly, installation, 
testing or operation of gas centrifuges; work to undertake any 
plutonium separation, or to construct or operate any plutonium 
separation installation; and all tests or production at any 
uranium conversion installation.'' Iran's uranium conversion 
activities represent a breach of its commitments under the 
Paris Agreement with the EU-3 and defy the September 24 IAEA 
Board resolution, which called on Iran to suspend all 
enrichment-related activity including uranium conversion.

   Does the Indian Government consider Iran's July-
        August 2005 resumption of uranium conversion activities 
        at UCF-Isfahan to be a breach of its suspension of 
        fuel-cycle activities agreed to with the EU-3?

    Answer. We do not know whether India considers Iran in 
breach of the Paris agreement, an agreement between Iran and 
the EU-3. Certainly, the EU-3 considers Iran in breach.

    Question.I understand that India has a formal defense 
cooperation agreement with Iran. Has the Department been 
provided with a copy of that Agreement, and if so, could you 
please furnish it to this committee?

    Answer. We do not know of a formal defense cooperation 
agreement between Iran and India. A Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Government of the Republic of India and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on Road Map to 
Strategic Cooperation, was signed on January 23, 2003, in New 
Delhi by the previous administrations in both countries. 
According to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, this MOU 
set out, among other things, ``to agree to explore 
opportunities for cooperation in defense in agreed areas, 
including training and exchange of visits.''

    Question. Public reports in late 2004 suggested that India 
was considering the sale to Iran of an advanced radar system 
known as ``Super Fledermaus,'' a system capable of detecting 
low-flying objects such as the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 
the United States frequently uses to conduct surveillance 
operations. The radar system is produced by Bharat Electronics 
Limited (BEL) under license from Ericsson Radar Electronics, a 
U.S. firm.
    (a) Has India decided not to proceed with this sale?
    (b) Do you know of other significant defense equipment 
sales to Iran being considered by India?

    Answer.
    (a) We understand that the sale of the Super Fledermaus 
system has not occurred.
    (b) We do not know of other significant defense equipment 
sales to Iran being considered by India.

Interaction with Other Nonproliferation Policies and Countries
    Question. Could you please explain how the policy the 
administration adopted in the Joint Statement is consistent 
with other administration policies and statements regarding the 
ongoing crises of noncompliance in North Korea and Iran?

    Answer. The Joint Statement represents a carefully tailored 
approach that helps solve a real-world nonproliferation issue: 
How to integrate the world's largest democracy and rising 21st 
power into the nonproliferation mainstream.
    We need to adjust our approaches to take into account the 
conditions that exist, so that we can achieve our 
nonproliferation objectives. This has been a premise of 
administration policy since the outset of President Bush's 
first term, in which he established non- and 
counterproliferation as top national security priorities. 
Recognizing that traditional nonproliferation measures were 
essential but no longer sufficient, the President has 
established new concepts and new capabilities for countering 
WMD proliferation by hostile states and terrorists.
    There is no comparison between India's nonproliferation 
history and energy needs, and the compliance violations 
incurred by Iran and North Korea.
    Our position on Iran's nuclear program is well known and is 
unrelated to our increasing cooperation with India. We do not 
want to see any additional states developing nuclear weapons, 
whether Iran, North Korea, or others. Iran's compliance 
violations are a national security concern to the United States 
and many of its international partners--not just the EU-3. 
Indeed, India's September vote in the IAEA Board of Governors 
which found Iran in noncompliance with its nuclear 
nonproliferation obligations, demonstrated India's coming of 
age as a partner in global nonproliferation efforts.
    Further, our understanding with India should not affect the 
Six-Party Talks in any way. India has taken a number of steps 
to deepen its commitment to nonproliferation and did not 
violate the NPT in order to pursue its nuclear weapons 
ambitions since it was not a party to the treaty. There can be 
no comparison of North Korea's record with that of India. North 
Korea has violated its NPT and IAEA safeguards commitments; it 
must abandon its nuclear weapons program.
                                ------                                


 Responses of Under Secretary Nicholas Burns to Questions Submitted by 
                             Senator Lugar

The Administration's Legislative Proposal and the July 18 Joint 
        Statement
    Question. During your testimony before the committee, you 
seemed to indicate that the administration would prefer India-
specific legislative language rather than country-neutral 
criteria. What are the strengths, in your view, of an India-
specific exception to current U.S. law as opposed to a country-
neutral exception?

    Answer. An India-specific exception would build on the 
precedent set by the Brownback II amendment, which created a 
South Asia-specific waiver authority for four different 
statutory sanctions without amending those statutes. An India-
specific exception is appropriate to this country-specific 
initiative and well reflects the need for tailored, actor-
specific strategies to combat WMD. It would confirm that the 
confluence of India's solid nuclear nonproliferation record, 
enhanced nonproliferation commitments, growing energy needs and 
strategic position in the world requires an unique approach. 
Finally, singling out India through legislation would also 
provide assurances to the Indian Government that the United 
States intends to develop key aspects of this partnership for 
the long-term.

    Question. Is it your view that if Congress did not approve 
provisions for India related to nuclear energy that the U.S.-
India relationship would be harmed?

    Answer. The initiative to reach civil nuclear cooperation 
with India recasts one of the most divisive issues in our 
relationship, and is viewed by many in India as a litmus test 
for our strategic partnership. If Congress does not approve 
provisions for India related to nuclear energy, it is likely 
that the nuclear issue will continue to constrain our 
diplomatic relationship, as well as our strategic, commercial, 
defense, and scientific ties, thereby having a negative impact 
on many of the bilateral activities mentioned in the July 18 
Joint Statement.

    Question. Have Indian officials stated to you that if 
Congress does not approve a legislative exception for India 
from current law for nuclear commerce that India would either 
look differently on its new relationship with the United States 
or respond negatively to the lack of congressional action?

    Answer. Indian officials have not stated that they will 
treat the United States differently if Congress does not take 
action. They have, however, expressed concern about achieving 
extensive advances in the future of U.S.-India relations if 
either side does not complete its Joint Statement commitments.

    Question. What does India's current plan for its nuclear 
power sector call for in terms of the types of reactors (heavy- 
or light-water reactors) it will seek from foreign providers?

    Answer. Because of the current international restrictions 
on nuclear commerce with India, India's plan for its nuclear 
power sector seeks to provide for a 20-fold increase in 
nuclear-generated electricity by 2020 without reactors from 
foreign suppliers. In support of this objective, India's 
Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) has committed extensive 
resources to develop a three-stage nuclear fuel cycle, based on 
its plentiful domestic thorium reserves, that involves fast-
breeder reactors, which could pose proliferation risks. 
Moreover, some specialists assess that such an approach would 
not prove cost-effective, and there are clear technical 
challenges to overcome.
    Opening the Indian market to foreign suppliers provides 
India with a vast array of new civil nuclear energy options. 
Access to new technologies, such as pebble-bed reactors and 
low-enriched uranium reactors, and participation in the 
Generation-IV Forum (GIF) on advanced nuclear energy systems 
would encourage more viable and proliferation-resistant 
alternatives.

Place in the New Relationship
    Question. In testimony before the committee, several 
experts suggested that creating an exception from long-standing 
U.S. law and policy, and asking the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG) to do the same with respect to NSG Guidelines, damages 
U.S. nonproliferation leadership, and that the strategic 
rationale for the Joint Statement does not provide a basis for 
such changes.
    Why does nuclear energy figure so prominently among the 
many ways the United States can forge a new, strategic 
partnership with India?

    Answer. The initiative to reach civil nuclear cooperation 
with India recasts a divisive issue that has for decades 
constrained our diplomatic relationship, as well as our 
strategic, commercial, defense, and scientific ties. In 
addition to firmly aligning the United States with a country 
that shares our democratic values and commitment to freedom, it 
holds substantial, concrete benefits for the United States, 
India, and the global community.
    When implemented, all the steps that India pledged on July 
18 will strengthen the international nonproliferation regime, 
and bolster our efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction. Commercially, the opening of India's 
lucrative and growing civil nuclear energy market to U.S. firms 
could provide jobs for thousands of Americans, and provide 
India with a vast array of clean and viable options to meet its 
skyrocketing energy needs. India's participation in the 
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) program 
will add significant resources and critical talent to global 
efforts to develop fusion as a cheap energy source program. If 
India joins the Generation-IV International Forum (GIF), it 
could contribute to GIF's mission to make the next generation 
of reactors safer, more efficient and more proliferation 
resistant. Finally, these efforts will also help India pursue 
its ambitious plans for power development and electrification 
in a more environmentally friendly manner.
                                ------                                


 Responses of Under Secretary Robert Joseph to Questions Submitted by 
                             Senator Lugar

The Administration's Legislative Proposal and the July 18 Joint 
        Statement
    Question. In your statement you note that Congress should 
not ``make the perfect the enemy of the good'' and that adding 
any conditions to the eventual changes to law that Congress 
might make for India would be a ``deal breaker.''

   Do you mean that the entire set of things contained 
        in the Joint Statement, beyond civil nuclear 
        cooperation, would also be sacrificed if Congress 
        conditioned nuclear commerce with India on things not 
        detailed in the Joint Statement?

    Answer. I testified that, based on our interactions with 
the Indian Government, we believe that additional conditions 
such as implementing a moratorium on fissile material 
production, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and/or 
joining the NPT as a nonnuclear weapon state ``would likely be 
deal breakers.''
    The initiative to reach civil nuclear cooperation with 
India will remove one of the most divisive issues in our 
bilateral relationship. If the civil nuclear aspects of the 
Joint Statement are not realized, we believe that our 
diplomatic relationship and our strategic, commercial, and 
scientific ties will remain constrained; many of the bilateral 
activities delineated in the statement will be adversely 
affected.
    The critical point is that we must resist the temptation to 
pile on conditions that will prejudice our ability to realize 
the important and long-standing nonproliferation objectives 
embodied in the Joint Statement. We assess that additional 
conditions such as those specified above remain deal breakers 
for India. We are better off with India undertaking the 
nonproliferation commitments to which it has now agreed than in 
allowing status quo stalemates to prevail.

    Question. Does the administration oppose any additional 
nonproliferation measures for India beyond those stipulated in 
the Joint Statement?

    Answer. I testified that, based on our interactions with 
the Indian Government, we believe that additional conditions 
such as implementing a moratorium on fissile material 
production, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and/or 
joining the NPT as a nonnuclear weapon state ``would likely be 
deal breakers.''
    In our ongoing dialogs, we strongly encourage India to take 
additional steps to strengthen nonproliferation, such as 
joining PSI and harmonizing its national control lists with 
those of the Australia Group and Wassenaar Arrangement. We have 
indicated that we also plan to continue to discuss such issues 
as a fissile material cutoff. But we strongly recommend against 
adding additional conditions to Joint Statement implementation. 
The Joint Statement reached by President Bush and Prime 
Minister Singh is good both for India and for the United 
States, and when implemented, offers a net gain for global 
nonproliferation efforts. Rather than add additional conditions 
or seek to renegotiate the Joint Statement, we believe it would 
be better to lock in this deal and then seek to achieve further 
results as our strategic partnership advances. We believe that 
this is a sound arrangement that should be supported because 
the commitments India has made, will, when implemented, bring 
it into closer alignment with international nuclear 
nonproliferation standards and practices and, as such, 
strengthen the global nonproliferation regime.

    Question. Could you please provide me with your views with 
regard to each of the following items, items which have been 
proposed as those I might consider including in legislation:

   A requirement that India stop producing fissile 
        materials for nuclear weapons.

    Answer. I testified that, based on our interactions with 
the Indian Government, we believe that additional conditions 
such as implementing a moratorium on fissile material 
production, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and/or 
joining the NPT as a nonnuclear weapon state ``would likely be 
deal breakers.''
    We have sought India's curtailment of fissile material 
production but have not reached agreement on this issue. In our 
assessment, insisting on such a cutoff as a precondition for 
implementing the Joint Statement would likely be a deal breaker 
for the Indian Government. We believe that we achieved an 
important objective, however, by obtaining India's commitment 
to designate, separate, and safeguard its civilian nuclear 
program. Moreover, the commitment to work toward the completion 
of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) is a significant 
step.
    We continue to encourage India, as well as Pakistan, to 
move in the direction of a fissile material cap or moratorium 
as part of our discussions with both governments. We also are 
willing to explore other intermediate options that might serve 
such an objective.
    The Joint Statement does not alter our policy on FMCT. We 
continue to support immediate commencement of negotiations in 
the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning production of 
fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices. We welcome India's support for the FMCT, 
which should help to build a consensus to begin those 
negotiations.

   A requirement that India declare it will not conduct 
        any more tests of its nuclear weapons.

    Answer. I testified that, based on our interactions with 
the Indian Government, we believe that additional conditions 
such as implementing a moratorium on fissile material 
production, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and/or 
joining the NPT as a nonnuclear weapon state ``would likely be 
deal breakers.''
    In principle, making new U.S. law or waivers contingent on 
India fulfilling its commitments in the Joint Statement is a 
sound idea. As reflected in its pledge in the Joint Statement, 
India has already declared that it will maintain its nuclear 
testing moratorium. Since to date Pakistan has test-exploded 
nuclear weapons only in response to Indian nuclear tests, this 
commitment should help diminish the prospects for future 
nuclear testing in South Asia.

   A distinction between India and NPT parties that 
        would provide different treatment in terms of the 
        nuclear exports for non-NPT parties, i.e., India would 
        be eligible for most U.S. exports except equipment, 
        materials, or technology related to enrichment, 
        reprocessing, and heavy water production.

    Answer. I testified that, based on our interactions with 
the Indian Government, we believe that additional conditions 
such as implementing a moratorium on fissile material 
production, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and/or 
joining the NPT as a nonnuclear weapon state ``would likely be 
deal breakers.''
    We do not export enrichment or reprocessing technology to 
any state. Therefore, ``full civil nuclear cooperation'' with 
India will not include enrichment or reprocessing technology. 
We have not yet determined whether such a prohibition would 
extend to heavy water production.

   Permitting U.S. nuclear exports only to those Indian 
        facilities, sites, and locations that are under IAEA 
        safeguards in perpetuity--not to facilities, sites, or 
        locations under voluntary safeguards arrangements.

    Answer. I testified that, based on our interactions with 
the Indian government, we believe that additional conditions 
such as implementing a moratorium on fissile material 
production, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and/or 
joining the NPT as a nonnuclear weapon state ``would likely be 
deal breakers.''
    To ensure that the United States and other potential 
suppliers can confidently supply to India and meet our 
obligations under the NPT, IAEA safeguards on civil facilities 
must be applied in perpetuity. We, and other potential 
suppliers, will be unable to supply facilities that are not 
under permanent safeguards.
India's Violations of U.S. Law
    Question. In testimony before the House on October 26, 
2005, Leonard S. Spector, Deputy Director of the Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of 
International Studies, stated that

          India's misuse of plutonium produced in the Canadian-
        supplied CIRUS research reactor is not a matter of 
        ancient history; it is an ongoing offense. The original 
        transgression took place in the 1970s, when India 
        misused the reactor, along with U.S.-supplied heavy 
        water that was essential for the reactor's operation, 
        in order to produce the plutonium for India's 1974 
        nuclear detonation.

   What is the status of India's violation of its 
        peaceful use undertakings in the 1956 U.S. heavy-water 
        contract, are they ``ongoing'' or are they, as a result 
        of the termination of U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation, 
        no longer operative?

    Answer. India used heavy water that the United States 
provided under a 1956 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
contract--along with Indian and third-country heavy water--as a 
moderator for the Canadian-provided CIRUS research reactor, the 
reactor India reportedly used to generate plutonium for its 
weapons program.
    After India detonated a nuclear device in 1974, the U.S. 
Government examined whether India's actions were inconsistent 
with a clause under the 1956 contract stating that the heavy 
water would be used for ``research into and the use of atomic 
energy for peaceful purposes.'' The outcome was that a 
conclusive answer was not possible due to both the factual 
uncertainty as to whether U.S.-supplied heavy water contributed 
to the production of the plutonium used for the device and the 
lack of a mutual understanding of scope of the 1956 contract 
language.

   Has any of the plutonium from CIRUS that was 
        produced using U.S.-origin heavy water been 
        incorporated into Indian nuclear explosive devices or 
        used in any Indian tests of nuclear explosive devices?

    Answer. As noted above, a conclusive answer has not been 
possible as to whether U.S.-supplied heavy water contributed to 
the production of the plutonium used for Indian nuclear 
explosive devices.

   Will the administration, as a part of the process 
        under the Joint Statement, obtain from India a full, 
        accurate, and complete account of the disposition of 
        any U.S.-origin heavy water in India?

    Answer. The administration believes the most productive 
approach is to focus on India's new commitments under the Joint 
Statement. These commitments include, among other things, 
acceptance of IAEA safeguards (including monitoring and 
inspections of its civil nuclear facilities and programs), and 
agreement to sign and implement the Additional Protocol, which 
provides for broadened access to locations and information 
regarding nuclear and nuclear-related activities.

   Does the Government of India acknowledge that its 
        unauthorized end use of U.S.-origin heavy water 
        supplied for the CIRUS reactor was a violation of U.S. 
        law?

    Answer. Following India's 1974 detonation of a nuclear 
device, the Government of India plainly stated its disagreement 
with the United States over the meaning and scope of the clause 
in the 1956 contract that stipulated that the heavy water would 
be used for ``research into and the use of atomic energy for 
peaceful purposes.''
    At the time, the debate on whether India had violated the 
contract was inconclusive owing to the uncertainty as to 
whether U.S.-supplied heavy water contributed to the production 
of the plutonium used for the 1974 device and the lack of a 
mutual understanding of scope of the 1956 contract language on 
``peaceful purposes.''
    We have since made it clear that we exclude so-called 
``peaceful nuclear explosions''--and any nuclear explosive 
activity--from the scope of peaceful nuclear cooperation.
    India has not acknowledged to the United States that it 
considered that its use of U.S.-supplied heavy water was a 
violation of the 1956 contract.

   Does the Government of India acknowledge that its 
        1974 nuclear weapon test was not a ``peaceful nuclear 
        explosion''?

    Answer. It is our understanding that it remains the view of 
the Indian Government that its test of a nuclear explosive 
device in 1974 was a ``peaceful nuclear explosion.''

   If India declares that CIRUS is a peaceful reactor, 
        would any plutonium produced there need to be removed 
        from those plutonium stocks that India has set aside 
        for weapons and placed under permanent IAEA safeguards?

    Answer. We do not yet have from the Government of India a 
plan outlining which of its nuclear facilities will be declared 
civilian; our discussions continue.
    The details of the safeguards agreement which India has 
undertaken to negotiate with the IAEA will presumably follow. 
However, as most such agreements are not retroactive, we would 
not expect the agreement to specify that previously produced 
material must be returned to the plant in order to be placed 
under safeguards. Were the plant to be placed under safeguards, 
those safeguards would be applicable in perpetuity to any 
material produced by, used by, or stored in the plant after the 
effective date of the agreement.

Safeguards Verification and Compliance
    Question. Has the Government of India entered into 
discussions with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
officials regarding a new declaration of civil nuclear sites, 
facilities, or locations?

    Answer. To our knowledge, the Government of India has not 
yet entered into discussions with the IAEA. Such a step might 
be viewed as premature, considering that India has not yet 
developed a separation plan upon which such a declaration would 
be based. We have indicated that such a plan must be credible, 
transparent, and defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint.

    Question. When will India submit a new declaration to the 
IAEA of its civil sites, facilities, or locations that would be 
subject to safeguards?

    Answer. There is no set date. The first step is for India 
to develop a credible and transparent plan for separating its 
civil and military facilities and programs. We hope that such a 
separation plan and subsequent declaration to the IAEA of what 
is to be civilian--as well as initial implementation toward 
safeguarding its facilities--can be accomplished by early 2006.

    Question. What kinds of safeguards will be applied to 
India's declared civil sites, facilities, or locations (please 
specify IAEA Information Circular (INFCIRC) number)?

    Answer. Safeguards agreements are modeled after INFCIRC/153 
(the NPT safeguards agreement) or INFCIRC/66 (the Agency's 
safeguards system predating the NPT). India will not likely 
sign a safeguards agreement based strictly on INFCIRC/153, as 
this would require safeguards on India's nuclear weapons 
program. NPT-acknowledged nuclear weapon states have so-called 
``voluntary'' safeguards agreements that draw on INFCIRC/153 
language, but do not obligate the IAEA to actually apply 
safeguards and do allow for the removal of facilities or 
material from safeguards. We heard from other states at the 
recent NSG meeting that they would not support a ``voluntary 
offer'' arrangement as, in their view, it would be tantamount 
to granting de facto nuclear weapon state status to India. We 
have similarly indicated to India that we would not view such 
an arrangement as defensible from a nonproliferation 
standpoint. We, therefore, believe that the logical approach to 
formulating a safeguards agreement for India is to use INFCIRC/
66, which is currently used at India's four safeguarded 
reactors. For the most part, INFCIRC/66 and INFCIRC/153 
agreements result in very similar technical measures actually 
applied at nuclear facilities.

    Question. Will India allow the safeguards applied to its 
declared civil sites, facilities, or locations to be permanent, 
i.e., that no declared site, facility, or location may be 
removed from India's declaration to the IAEA and that the 
safeguards in place on those declared sites, facilities, or 
locations are to be in place in perpetuity?

    Answer. We do not view a safeguards agreement that would 
allow India to withdraw facilities or material from safeguards 
as acceptable, and we have informed India of this view. Among 
other considerations, we must be assured that safeguards will 
be applied in perpetuity, that ``civil'' material remains in 
the civil sector, and that any assistance provided in no way 
contributes to India's nuclear weapons program. The safeguards 
must effectively cover India's civil nuclear fuel cycle and 
provide strong assurances to supplier states and the IAEA that 
material and technology provided or created through civil 
cooperation will not be diverted to the military sphere.

    Question. Has the administration briefed the IAEA on its 
discussions of a civil-military split in Indian sites, 
facilities, or locations, and if so, when?

    Answer. No, we have not briefed the IAEA Secretariat on our 
discussions of a civil-military split in Indian sites, 
facilities, or locations. The IAEA Secretariat will play an 
essential role in this process, but that role is still in the 
future, once India has taken certain key steps and there is a 
clearer understanding and acceptance of India's separation 
plan.

    Question. What are the general ``phases'' (not dates) that 
will unfold under the Joint Statement's terms with respect to 
India's separation of its civil and military nuclear 
facilities, sites, or locations?

    Answer. The first step in the process will be for India to 
produce a general plan for the separation of its civil and 
military facilities and programs. We expect that India will 
propose a civil-military separation plan that is credible, 
transparent, and defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint. 
Such a plan would form the basis for a declaration by India to 
the IAEA of its civil facilities. It would also form the basis 
for the negotiation of a safeguards agreement between the IAEA 
and India. Negotiation of an Additional Protocol would probably 
proceed in parallel with the negotiation of the basic 
safeguards agreement, but this remains to be determined. Upon 
completion and entry into force of the safeguards agreement, 
the IAEA would begin inspections of Indian nuclear facilities. 
Based on the language of the Joint Statement, we expect that it 
will take some time to complete full implementation of 
safeguards at India's civil facilities, and thus implementation 
would occur in a ``phased'' manner, based on a sequence 
identified in the separation plan and as agreed to with the 
IAEA and as specified in the safeguards agreement.

    Question. The IAEA, because of budgetary pressures, 
discontinued inspections in the United States in 1993, largely 
because the value of such inspections is of limited utility in 
states with declared and lawful nuclear weapons programs. At 
the request of the U.S. Government, the IAEA resumed 
inspections in 1994 by applying safeguards to several tons of 
weapons-usable nuclear material, which had been declared excess 
to U.S. national security stockpiles. The IAEA undertook this 
effort on the condition that the United States reimburse the 
IAEA.
    The Joint Statement notes that India will ``assume the same 
responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits 
and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear 
technology, such as the United States.''

   Will India declare a portion of its weapons-useable 
        materials excess to its defense needs and place them 
        under permanent IAEA safeguards?

    Answer. India has not informed us of whether it views any 
existing weapons-usable material as ``excess.''

   Will India reimburse the IAEA for any inspections 
        conducted in India on safeguarded facilities, sites, 
        locations, and materials?

    Answer. To our knowledge, the IAEA and India have not yet 
discussed whether India will reimburse the IAEA for any 
inspections conducted in India on safeguarded facilities, 
sites, locations, and materials.

    Question. Do you assess that the IAEA currently has the 
staff, funding, and necessary information to support safeguards 
monitoring for India without taking away from inspection and 
verification efforts in other countries?

    Answer. We recognize that implementing safeguards in India 
will entail significant costs that are not currently included 
in the IAEA's budget. We look forward to working with the IAEA 
and the Government of India to estimate those costs and to 
identify how best to meet them without undercutting 
inspections/verification efforts in other countries.

    Question. Would India permit the IAEA, as a confidence-
building measure, to conduct inspections of its declared 
facilities, sites, or locations, and if so, how many such 
inspections and how many facilities, locations, or sites would 
be inspected?

    Answer. The safeguards agreement that India negotiates with 
the IAEA after developing a separation plan will require 
sustained IAEA inspections on all Indian civil facilities 
containing nuclear material, with frequency to be determined by 
the IAEA. The Additional Protocol will allow inspections of 
additional nuclear-related locations.

    Question. Will the Additional Protocol (AP) that India 
signs be identical to the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/
540)?

    Answer. No. The Model Additional Protocol is structured to 
accompany a country's full-scope safeguards agreement. Because 
India's safeguards agreement will differ from a full-scope 
safeguards agreement, India's Additional Protocol will differ 
from the Model as well.

    Question. In the Joint Statement the Indian Prime Minister 
states that India commits to ``signing and adhering to an 
Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear 
facilities.'' Does this mean that India would not ratify and 
implement its Additional Protocol?

    Answer. No. We expect that India will ratify and implement 
both its safeguards agreement and its Additional Protocol.

    Question. Is it permissible for any Non-Nuclear Weapon 
State (NNWS) under the NPT to sign and adhere to, but not to 
ratify and implement, the Additional Protocol?

    Answer. While India is not a party to the NPT, nonnuclear 
weapon states party to the NPT are obliged under the NPT to 
bring into force a full-scope safeguards agreement, effectively 
covering all nuclear material in the state. The NPT does not, 
however, require such a party to either sign or bring into 
force an Additional Protocol, whose provisions strengthen the 
safeguards agreement beyond what is required by the NPT. The 
Additional Protocol's provisions include, for example, 
requirements to declare information regarding, and to allow 
access to, locations that do not involve nuclear material. The 
NPT also does not, unlike the NSG, condition full scope 
safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply. Rather the NPT 
requires that cooperation does not ``in any way assist'' any 
weapon program in nonnuclear weapon states.

    Question. Is it permissible for any Nuclear Weapon State 
(NWS) under the NPT to sign and adhere to, but not to ratify 
and implement, the Additional Protocol?

    Answer. Nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT are not 
required by the NPT to sign any type of safeguards or 
inspection agreement, including an Additional Protocol. All 
such undertakings by the nuclear weapon states are voluntary.

    Question. Will the Additional Protocol that India signs 
permit it to exclude the application of safeguards to any 
facilities, sites, or locations in India?

    Answer. India has not yet negotiated an Additional Protocol 
with the IAEA. The Joint Statement indicates that India's 
Additional Protocol will apply to Indian civil nuclear 
facilities, and we expect that there will be some language in 
the Indian Additional Protocol making its scope consistent with 
that concept. We believe it is unlikely that India will permit 
access to its nuclear military facilities under its Additional 
Protocol.

    Question. When will India sign an AP?

    Answer. There is not yet an established timetable for this 
step. The actions India committed to, in the Joint Statement, 
involve complex issues, and they will take time to implement 
fully. We hope to move expeditiously on all aspects of the 
civil nuclear initiative and will assess progress prior to 
President Bush's expected trip to India in early 2006.

    Question. What would be the relationship between India's 
list of declared civil sites subject to safeguards and its AP? 
Are the provisions of its AP binding on its declared civil 
sites?

    Answer. Two types of inspections would presumably occur at 
civil facilities in India: Safeguards inspections that would 
take place at nuclear facilities containing nuclear material of 
a defined purity, and complementary access inspections that 
would take place at other facilities, which, with minor 
exceptions, do not contain such material. The first type of 
facilities is declared and inspected as specified by the 
safeguards agreement, and the second type is declared and 
inspected as described by the Additional Protocol. The two 
types of facilities are distinct, but we anticipate that both 
would be part of an Indian declaration. The requirements on the 
state to provide information and access are equally binding in 
the two cases.

    Question. With regard to the plan that GOI will bring here 
this month, and in connection with the principle of 
``Transparency'': If we are talking about an INFCIRC/66 Rev.2 
[safeguards agreement] (SGA), it would clearly spell out which 
facilities were covered by the terms of that SGA. But if India 
does a voluntary safeguards agreement, or has some sites 
covered under a voluntary SGA, or sites, facilities, and 
locations colocated with sites that are not covered by the 
terms of an INFCIRC/66 Rev.2 SGA, then some of the list of 
eligible, declared civilian facilities would be considered 
``safeguards-confidential'' not under an INFCIRC/66 Rev.2 SGA 
nor made all that transparent. In other words, there would be 
an INFCIRC agreement, but no one would have access to the 
actual list of sites, facilities, and locations (like our 
Voluntary Offer SGA).

   Are we prepared to accept a mixed situation in 
        India? Some sites under VOA-type SGAs and some under 
        INFCIRC/66 Rev.2 SGAs? Does the IAEA hold such a 
        situation with any other countries?

    Answer. Because the IAEA publishes a list of all facilities 
to which safeguards are applied, all exporters will be aware of 
which facilities in India they can export to. So-called 
``voluntary offer'' agreements are used only by the five NPT-
recognized nuclear weapon states. In general, voluntary 
arrangements allow the covered state to withdraw facilities and 
material from safeguards at will. In our view, a voluntary 
offer arrangement for India would be inconsistent with the 
Joint Statement and would not be defensible from a 
nonproliferation standpoint.

   Is the administration looking to accept a 
        cooperation agreement that would already be covered by 
        an existing 66 agreements (i.e., Tarapur), and then let 
        India put additional civilian facilities on an eligible 
        list?

    Answer. Both an Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation 
between the United States and India and a new safeguards 
agreement between India, the IAEA, and possibly other parties, 
would have to be negotiated.
    There is no ``eligible list'' associated with current 
Indian safeguards arrangements, which conform to INFCIRC/66. We 
expect India ``to place all its civil nuclear facilities under 
full IAEA safeguards and that includes monitoring and 
inspections,'' as Under Secretary Burns said July 20, 2005. 
Since a voluntary offer arrangement would not require the IAEA 
to apply safeguards to facilities on a list of those eligible 
for safeguards, it would not meet that standard. Furthermore, 
in order to provide reasonable assurances to potential 
suppliers that they are not assisting the Indian nuclear 
weapons program, among other things safeguards must be applied 
in perpetuity and ``civil'' nuclear material must remain civil.

India's Export Control Laws, Regulations, and Policies
    Question. Has the administration undertaken an expert-level 
legal analysis of India's export control laws and regulations?

    Answer. Department of State and Commerce lawyers and export 
control experts have reviewed India's Weapons of Mass 
Destruction and Their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful 
Activities) Act, adopted in 2005, consistent with India's NSSP 
and Joint Statement commitments. We continue to discuss export 
control related issues with the Government of India.

    Question. If so, could you please furnish that analysis to 
this committee?

    Answer. There is today no consolidated analytical document 
representing an interagency assessment of India's export 
control law and regulations. As always, we stand ready to brief 
the committee on the results of our review.

    Question. I understand that the State Department sent a 
number of questions concerning India's export control law(s) 
(what is termed its ``WMD law'') to New Delhi some time ago. 
Has the Government of India answered all of those questions, 
and could you please furnish (a) those questions and (b) 
answers to this committee?

    Answer. Given the sensitivities of the diplomatic 
communications involved, we cannot provide the information for 
the record. However, we would be happy to provide the committee 
with a briefing on our exchanges with India on this issue. We 
intend to have follow-on discussions regarding the 
implementation of the WMD law within the High Technology 
Cooperation Group meetings in early December 2005.

    Question. Does Indian law specify anything with regard to 
the reexport or resale of foreign-origin dual-use equipment?

    Answer. As we understand the Indian legislation, export 
from India of foreign-origin dual-use equipment exported to 
India, if of types covered by India's own control list and 
catch-all controls, would be subject to the same requirements 
that apply to export of Indian-origin goods.

    Question. What does Indian law specify about the access of 
either foreign nationals or dual-nationals to sensitive items 
exported from other nations to India?

    Answer. India's new WMD law deals specifically with the 
possession, export, reexport, transfer, and other conveyance or 
trafficking of WMD and their delivery systems, their 
components, and related technology by Indian and foreign 
nationals. The law, however, does not address access by foreign 
nationals or dual nationals to such items or technology in the 
course of those individuals' legitimate employment in India.
    Clause 13(4) of the WMD law seems to address in-country 
transfers of items to foreigners, but the operation of this 
provision is not entirely clear.

    Question. Do any foreign nationals or dual-nationals work 
at or have access to sites currently subject to IAEA safeguards 
in India (Rajasthan 1 & 2 and Tarapur 1 & 2)?

    Answer. We do not have sufficient information as to which 
specific foreign nationals may work or have access to these 
facilities. In general, however, IAEA inspectors, who are 
foreign nationals, have access to Rajasthan 1 & 2 and Tarapur 1 
& 2, since these sites are subject to IAEA safeguards. The 
Indians have also granted Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
delegations limited access to those facilities, most recently 
in February 2005. Additionally, the World Association of 
Nuclear Operators (WANO) is able to conduct peer reviews at 
these sites.

    Question. Do any foreign nationals or dual-nationals work 
at or have access to the Indian nuclear facilities Kundankulam 
1 and 2?

    Answer. We do not have sufficient information as to which 
specific foreign nationals may work or have access to these 
facilities. In general, however, Kundankulam 1 & 2 are being 
constructed under a contract between India and the Russian 
Federation, so we presume that Russian nationals have access to 
these sites. IAEA inspectors, who are foreign nationals, will 
eventually have access to Kundankulam 1 & 2, once they are 
placed under IAEA safeguards.

    Question. Do any foreign nationals or dual-nationals work 
at or have access to the Indian Space Research Organization 
(ISRO) Headquarters in Bangalore, India; ISRO Telemetry, 
Tracking and Command Network (ISTRAC); ISRO Inertial Systems 
Unit (IISU), Thiruvananthapuram; Liquid Propulsion Systems 
Center; Solid Propellant Space Booster Plant (SPROB); Space 
Applications Center (SAC), Ahmadabad; Sriharikota Space Center 
(SHAR); Vikram Sarabhai Space Center (VSSC), 
Thiruvananthapuram?

    Answer. We do not have sufficient information as to which, 
if any, foreign nationals may work or have access to these 
facilities. We stand ready to discuss this and other 
considerations relating to these organizations further with the 
committee in a separate classified forum.

    Question. Do any foreign nationals or dual-nationals work 
at or have access to the following Indian Department of Atomic 
Energy entities: Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC); Indira 
Gandhi Atomic Research Center (IGCAR); Indian Rare Earths; 
Nuclear reactors (including power plants) not under 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, fuel 
reprocessing and enrichment facilities, heavy water production 
facilities and their collocated ammonia plants?

    Answer. We do not have sufficient information as to which, 
if any, foreign nationals may work or have access to these 
facilities. We stand ready to discuss this and other 
considerations relating to these organizations further with the 
committee in a separate classified forum.

    Question. Does Indian law contain ``catch-all'' controls on 
items not otherwise stipulated in national controls?

    Answer. Clause 11 of the 2005 WMD law prohibits export of 
any material, equipment, or technology if the exporter knows 
that the exported items are intended for use in the design or 
manufacture of a biological weapon, chemical weapon, nuclear 
weapon, or other nuclear explosive device, or in their missile 
delivery systems, but does not specifically refer to transfers, 
retransfers, items brought in transit or transshipment. We read 
Clause 11 of the 2005 WMD law as a catch-all provision similar 
to the ``knows'' portion of the U.S. catch-all control 
provisions. Clause 5 of the 2005 WMD law may provide the 
equivalent of the ``is informed'' portion of the U.S. catch-all 
controls over exports, reexports, transshipments, and transits.

    Question. Have there been successful prosecutions of 
entities or persons brought by the Government of India for 
violations of its export control laws?

    Answer. The Government of India has been actively 
prosecuting the Indian entity NEC Engineers Private Ltd.'s 
cooperation with Iraq. According to Indian press reports, NEC 
sent 10 shipments containing titanium vessels, filters, 
titanium centrifugal pumps, atomized and spherical aluminum 
powder, and titanium anodes to Iraq. The NEC prosecution is 
ongoing.
    We do not have information on other examples of Indian 
prosecutions regarding violations of its export control laws. 
One reason for this is that, before India passed its WMD law 
this year, its governmental authority over such export 
activities was relatively limited. India's new WMD law has 
greatly increased its ability to hold its entities and 
individuals accountable for activities that impinge on 
nonproliferation practices.

    Question. Did India pursue any action (civil or criminal) 
against Dr. Y.S.R. Prasad and Dr. C. Surendar after the United 
States sanctioned them under the authority of the Iran 
Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-178)?

    Answer. We understand that India investigated the 
activities of the retired scientists Dr. Y.S.R. Prasad and Dr. 
C. Surendar after the United States imposed sanctions on them 
in September 2004. As far as we are aware, India did not pursue 
any civil or criminal action against Drs. Prasad or Surendar.

    Question. Does the United States have any information that 
Indian entities or persons in the United States have engaged in 
attempts to falsify necessary bona fides in transactions with 
U.S. entities or persons?

    Answer. Any such activities would be regarded as a law 
enforcement matter in this country. Any such matters would need 
to be addressed to the Department of Justice, Department of 
Commerce, and/or the Department of Homeland Security.

    Question. In oral remarks made at the Department of 
Commerce's annual Bureau of Industry Security (BIS) ``Update'' 
Conference recently held in Washington, DC, Steven Goldman, 
director of the BIS Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty 
Compliance, stated that ``India has modified its approach, has 
made major commitments, in many respects commitments that 
exceed those of our closest allies.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ As found at http://www.exportcontrolblog.com/blog/2005/10/
update_day_one_4.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Do you concur with this assessment, and if so, how does 
India exceed the nonproliferation commitments made by our 
closest allies, in particular, those who are nuclear weapon 
states (such as the United Kingdom) under Article I of the NPT?

    Answer. The Department of State agrees that India has made 
major commitments which, when implemented, will bring it closer 
into conformity with nonproliferation standards and practices. 
India has committed to a number of important nonproliferation 
steps. Some of these steps exceed NPT requirements, such as 
India's export-restraint of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies and its willingness to sign and adhere to an 
Additional Protocol.

RMP Facility
    Question. Do you concur with the assessment of alleged 
Indian attempts to illicitly acquire certain dual-use nuclear 
technology provided by David Albright during testimony before 
the House on October 26, 2005? Which states in relevant part:

          Indian nuclear organizations use a system that hires 
        domestic or foreign nonnuclear companies to acquire 
        items for these nuclear organizations. Such procurement 
        appears to continue for its secret gas centrifuge 
        enrichment plant near Mysore. In an attempt to hide its 
        true purpose from suppliers and others when it started 
        this project in the 1980s, India called the facility 
        the Rare Materials Plant (RMP) and placed it under 
        Indian Rare Earths (IRE) Ltd, an Indian Department of 
        Atomic Energy company focused on mining and refining of 
        minerals. Since the mid-1980s, IRE has served as a 
        management company for RMP and appears to be the 
        declared end-user of its procurements of centrifuge-
        related equipment and materials.\2\ 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Available at http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/109/
alb102605.pdf.

    Answer. We cannot comment in any detail in unclassified 
channels on assessments of activities of Indian entities or 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
facilities. We could discuss further in classified session.

    Question. What is the purpose of the RMP facility?

    Answer. We cannot comment in any detail in unclassified 
channels on assessments of activities of Indian entities or 
facilities. We could discuss further in classified session.

    Question. The Commerce Department issued revised U.S. 
regulations for balance of plant exports to certain Indian 
entities last September.\3\  The Indian Department of Atomic 
Energy entity called ``Indian Rare Earths'' is named in those 
FR notices, but could you please explain for the record the 
current regulatory treatment provided to the entity Indian Rare 
Earths under current law and regulation?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ 69 FR 56,693 (2004), revised in 69 FR 58,049 (2004).

    Answer. The September 22, 2004, regulatory change did not 
change the regulatory treatment for Indian Rare Earths. India 
Rare Earths is still a listed entity under Commerce 
regulations, as it has been since the sanctions were imposed in 
1998. Therefore, under the Export Administration Regulations, 
exporters need to apply for licenses to export even 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
uncontrolled commodities to this end-user.

Proliferation Security Initiative
    Question. Why has India not joined the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI)?

    Answer. The United States has encouraged India to join PSI, 
given its geographic location along several key routes for 
proliferation trafficking and its significant operational 
capabilities in the region. Officials of the Government of 
India have told us that they are continuing their internal 
review of PSI, including an examination of the international 
and national legal underpinnings for their possible 
participation in PSI. We are hopeful that India will soon 
endorse PSI, and join the more than 70 countries around the 
world--and United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan--that 
have expressed their support for PSI.

    Question. What are the views of the Government of India on 
the Statement of Interdiction Principles?

    Answer. Officials of the Government of India have told us 
that they are continuing their internal review of PSI, 
including an examination of the international and national 
legal underpinnings for their possible participation in PSI. We 
are hopeful that India will soon endorse the PSI Statement of 
Interdiction Principles, and join the more than 70 countries 
around the world--and United Nations Secretary General Kofi 
Annan--that have expressed their support for PSI.

                                             

      
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