[Senate Prints 109-61]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
109th Congress S. Prt.
2d Session COMMITTEE PRINT 109-61
_______________________________________________________________________
U.S.-INDIA ATOMIC ENERGY
COOPERATION: STRATEGIC AND
NONPROLIFERATION IMPLICATIONS
__________
A COMPILATION OF
STATEMENTS BY WITNESSES
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Ninth Congress
Second Session
April 26, 2006
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
_____
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Letter of Introduction........................................... v
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, Chairman,
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.......................... 1
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, Ranking
Member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.................. 3
Carter, Hon. Ashton B., Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University....... 7
Perry, Hon. William J., Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution,
Stanford University, Stanford, California...................... 17
Gallucci, Hon. Robert L., Dean, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign
Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC................. 19
Tellis, Dr. Ashley J., Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Washington, DC............................ 23
Lehman, Hon. Ronald F., II, Director, Center for Global Security
Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 31
Einhorn, Hon. Robert J., Senior Adviser, International Security
Program, Center for Strategic & International Studies,
Washington, DC................................................. 35
Milhollin, Dr. Gary, Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
Control, Washington, DC........................................ 45
Cohen, Dr. Stephen P., Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution,
Washington, DC................................................. 53
Material Relating to the Committee's November 2, 2005 Hearing, ``U.S.-
Indian Nuclear Energy Cooperation: Security and Nonproliferation
Implications''
Responses to Senator Lugar's Questions to the Hon. R. Nicholas
Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and the Hon.
Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security, Department of State, Washington, DC
Responses of Under Secretaries Burns and Joseph.............. 57
Responses of Under Secretary Burns........................... 66
Responses of Under Secretary Joseph.......................... 68
(iii)
LETTER OF INTRODUCTION
----------
May 8, 2006.
Dear Colleagues:
Dear Colleague: On April 26, the Committee on Foreign
Relations held a hearing titled ``U.S.-Indian Nuclear Energy
Cooperation: Strategic and Nonproliferation Implications.''
Given the ongoing committee consideration of this U.S.-Indian
Civilian Nuclear Agreement, we wish to make the testimony of
all our witnesses available to the entire Senate. Additionally,
the answers to initial questions for the record that were posed
some months ago are included.
On our first panel, which focused on the strategic dynamics
of the U.S.-India nuclear agreement, the witnesses included:
former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry; former Assistant
Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter; Robert Gallucci, Dean of
the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown
University; and Dr. Ashley Tellis from the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace. Members of the second panel, which
considered the issue of the nonproliferation implications of
nuclear cooperation between the United States and India,
included: Dr. Ronald Lehman, Director of the Center for Global
Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and
formerly the head of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency; Mr. Robert Einhorn, Senior Advisor at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies and formerly Assistant
Secretary of State for Nonproliferation; Dr. Gary Milhollin,
Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control; and
Dr. Stephen Cohen, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution.
We believe that their testimony can be helpful in preparing
members for subsequent Senate consideration of the U.S.-Indian
Civilian Nuclear Agreement.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman.
Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Ranking Member.
(v)
Opening Statement of
HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR
U.S. Senator From Indiana,
Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
april 26, 2006
----------
The Foreign Relations Committee meets today to continue its
examination of the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement. On
April 5, the committee met in open session with Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice. On March 29, we examined the agreement
in closed session with Under Secretaries Nick Burns and Bob
Joseph. Today, we will have the opportunity to hear the views
of eight esteemed experts from outside the U.S. government.
Some months ago, I submitted 82 questions related to the
agreement to the State Department as an initial step toward
establishing a dialogue that would help Congress make an
informed decision. The State Department provided answers to
those 82 questions. After the hearing with Secretary Rice, I
submitted about 90 additional questions for the record. The
Ranking Member and several other members of the committee also
submitted questions after the hearing. We appreciate the
administration's attention to these questions as the committee
carefully works through the intricacies of the nuclear
agreement with India.
The committee is cognizant of how valuable a closer
relationship with India could be for the United States. At our
last hearing, many members commented on the importance of
improving ties with India. Our nations share common democratic
values, and the potential of our economic engagement is
limitless.
Energy cooperation between the United States and India is
particularly important. India's energy needs are expected to
double by 2025. The United States has an interest in expanding
energy cooperation with India to develop new technologies,
cushion supply disruptions, cut green house gas emissions, and
prepare for declining global fossil fuel reserves. The United
States' own energy problems will be exacerbated if we do not
forge energy partnerships with India, China, and other nations
experiencing rapid economic growth. That is why I have
introduced S. 2435, the Energy Diplomacy and Security Act,
which would encourage international energy dialogues and
advance a broad range of energy diplomacy goals.
But even as we pursue closer ties with India, we must
examine the implications and risks of initiating a cooperative
nuclear relationship. India has not signed the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty; it has built and tested nuclear weapons;
and it has declared its intention to continue its nuclear
weapons programs and the production of fissile material. If
Congress approves this agreement, we will be establishing a new
course after decades of declining any cooperation with India's
nuclear program. Consequently, our committee has spent much
time probing the details of the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear
Agreement.
Among many questions, we are attempting to evaluate the
potential benefits of drawing India into a deeper relationship
with the International Atomic Energy Agency and placing more
Indian reactors under safeguards. The committee has also
expressed great interest in the timing and sequence of how the
India Nuclear Agreement would be implemented. Since the
committee last met with Secretary Rice, India has initiated
discussions with the International Atomic Energy Agency on a
safeguards agreement and an additional protocol. This is a
welcome development, but I urge India andthe IAEA to work hard
to conclude an effective agreement in a timely fashion. All
parties involved in the negotiations, including the Bush
administration, should facilitate the maximum amount of
transparency possible, so that Congress is better equipped to
make informed judgments.
Today we will hear from two panels of highly knowledgeable
experts. Our first panel will focus on the strategic dynamics
of the agreement, and the second panel will take up the
question of the non-proliferation implications of nuclear
cooperation between the United States and India.
On our first panel, we welcome the distinguished former
Secretary of Defense William Perry. Presently, he is Co-
Director of the Preventive Defense Project. He is joined by Dr.
Ashton Carter, also a Co-Director of the Preventive Defense
Project and a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy. Joining them will be Dr. Robert
Gallucci, Dean of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
at Georgetown. Dr. Gallucci served as a chief U.S. negotiator
during the 1994 crisis over North Korea's nuclear program.
Finally, Dr. Ashley Tellis is with us from the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. Dr. Tellis played a leading
role in the formulation of the U.S.-India nuclear agreement,
serving in key State Department positions.
On our second panel, we welcome Dr. Ronald Lehman, director
of the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory and formerly the head of the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Mr. Robert Einhorn, a
Senior Adviser at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies and formerly Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation; Dr. Gary Milhollin, Director of the Wisconsin
Project on Nuclear Arms Control; and Dr. Stephen Cohen, a
Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution.
We are pleased to have with us so many good friends of the
committee. Most of our witnesses have provided invaluable
service to the Foreign Relations Committee as we have struggled
with non-proliferation and other geo-political issues. We thank
each of them for their willingness to again lend us their
extraordinary expertise.
Opening Statement of
HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.
U.S. Senator From Delaware,
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
APRIL 26, 2006
----------
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for chairing this
series of hearings on the administration's nuclear deal with
India.
The administration did not consult us as it negotiated the
July 18 Joint Statement between President Bush and Prime
Minister Singh.
It paid little attention to our concerns as it negotiated
with India regarding India's plan for separating its civil
nuclear facilities from its military ones.
And it submitted a legislative proposal to us and a
decision proposal to the Nuclear Suppliers Group that were so
poorly drafted as to cast doubt on the administration's
seriousness of purpose.
Despite this, I indicated three weeks ago that I will
probably support the agreement at the end of the day. I did so
because I agree that the time has come to develop a new
relationship between India and the parties to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
And I did so also because undoing this deal could do more
damage--in terms of our relationship with India--than approving
it, with carefully drafted conditions.
This deal brings risks, and I believe the administration
and Congress must minimize those risks.
So far, Mr. Chairman, the administration has done a lot
more to lobby us than to work with us.
It has yet to answer our questions for the record.
It has yet to share its negotiating record or
explain just what it agreed to when it accepted the
idea of ``India-specific safeguards,'' or ``corrective
measures that India may take . . . in the event of
disruption of foreign fuel supplies,'' or U.S.
``assurances regarding fuel supply,'' or ``a strategic
reserve of nuclear fuel'' for India.
The administration has yet to share with us the full
list of India's civil nuclear facilities--even in
classified form.
And it has reneged on an earlier promise to share
drafts of the peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement
that it is negotiating with India.
Mr. Chairman, I still think that a new deal for India makes
sense. But it isn't a ``slam dunk,'' as they say, and that is
why we are here today to take testimony from some of our
country's best thinkers on nuclear policy.
Today's witnesses all have impressive backgrounds, and I
have relied upon the wisdom of many of them over the years. I
look forward to hearing their insights today.
I want to especially thank Bill Perry for coming in from
California and for upsetting his schedule in Washington in
order to help us today. Dr. Perry is a man who answers his
country's call, just as he did regarding North Korea policy
after he had retired as Secretary of Defense.
I would recommend that we also schedule a follow-up hearing
with experts on the Atomic Energy Act, to discuss possible
amendments to S. 2429, and experts on India who could tell us
what the consequences of enacting those amendments might be.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I hope that you will make clear to
the administration that the Senate and this committee should
not be taken for granted.
We expect the administration to answer our questions, to
provide us the details on the related agreements that India is
negotiating with the United States and with the IAEA, and to
work with us to make S. 2429 a respectable bill.
Until the administration does that, we simply should not
act on its proposed legislation.
Mr. Chairman, we recently received a letter from Ambassador
John Ritch, a former staff member of this committee, in support
of the India nuclear deal. I ask that his letter and an
attached op-ed from the International Herald Tribune be
included in today's hearing record.
Thank you.
------
[The material to which Senator Biden referred follows:]
23 April 2006.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar, Chairman,
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Ranking Member,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
SUBJECT: Submission on U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation
Dear Senators Lugar and Biden: For the committee's
consideration and record in connection with the 26 April
hearing on proposed U.S.-India nuclear cooperation, I offer the
attached summary of my views, as published recently in the
International Herald Tribune. My perspective derives from:
22 years of service on the staff of the Foreign
Relations Committee;
7 years as U.S. representative to the IAEA and other
UN agencies in Vienna; and
5 years interacting with the Indian nuclear
establishment in my current capcity.
With respect and warm regards,
John B. Ritch, Director General,
World Nuclear Association.
------
It Makes Sense To End India's Nuclear Isolation
John B. Ritch, International Herald Tribune
THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 2006
LONDON--President George W. Bush has taken a momentous step
in shelving a U.S. policy that for three decades cast India as
a nuclear pariah- state and isolated the world's largest
democracy from nuclear commerce, even for the peaceful purpose
of generating electricity.
In Washington a fierce debate has erupted over the impact
on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
The U.S.-India deal conforms to the treaty by ensuring that
nuclear commerce remains in the civil realm. But critics say it
jeopardizes the treaty by legitimizing India's nuclear
deterrent. Supporters counter that India's weapon is a long-
standing fact, that India has used nuclear technology
responsibly and that it is time to close ranks with a
democracy.
Before the Bush initiative, two truths coexisted uneasily.
First, the nonproliferation regime is one of history's great
diplomatic achievements. Since its inception in 1970, the
treaty has kept the number of nuclear-armed nations under 10.
Episodes of non-compliance have shown the treaty's value.
After the first Gulf War revealed Iraq's covert nuclear
efforts, the treaty regime gained strength as the International
Atomic Energy Agency acquired new detection capabilities and
broader authority for its inspectors. Treaty inspections
``caught'' both North Korea and Iran, and have spurred
collective diplomacy against these violations.
A second, less convenient truth is that the treaty was,
from the outset, unfair to India as a great nation. The treaty
drew a line in time, recognizing only the UN Security Council's
five permanent members as ``nuclear-weapon states.'' Thus, when
India became the world's sixth nuclear power in 1974, it faced
Hobson's choice: Disarm or remain outside the treaty.
For reasons of principle and strategic interest India
remained outside, declaring that it would eliminate its small
deterrent as soon as the five favored ``weapon states''
fulfilled a treaty pledge to dismantle their own much larger
nuclear arsenals.
Indians went on, for three decades, to become proud
developers and careful custodians of their own sophisticated
nuclear technologies. To supply power for economic growth,
India now plans to build hundreds of reactors by mid-century,
even without the new agreement.
The Bush initiative would accept India's reality. Critics
complain that the accord leaves India's military program
``unconstrained.'' Advocates counter that India's civil power
reactors will fall under inspection safeguards.
This debate is sterile. Inspections on India's civil
facilities cannot affect its military program. But neither will
civil nuclear trade with India spur an Asian arms race. India's
leaders have no motive to abandon India's long-standing policy
of maintaining minimal nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis Pakistan's
smaller nuclear force and China's larger one.
Although legal under the nonproliferation treaty, the deal
will require change in a U.S. law enacted in 1978 that made
treaty membership a condition of nuclear trade. In 1992, the
Nuclear Suppliers Group of nations embraced the same coercive
approach. Now these countries are set to follow the U.S. lead,
with only China expressing resistance.
The new policy would revert--in the unique case of India--
to the basic treaty requirement of confining nuclear trade to
the civil realm. It would also welcome India as a partner in
world nuclear trade controls and collaborative projects to
develop nuclear technology.
Some say that ending India's nuclear isolation sends a
dangerous message to potential proliferators. This charge does
not withstand analysis. How will the ambitions of Iran, North
Korea, and Pakistan be inflamed by the principle now being
affirmed?
The principle is this: In sensitive nuclear technology, we
will trade legally--and with nations that have earned the
world's trust. As a practical matter, no nation appears likely
to ``proliferate'' because India is allowed civil nuclear
commerce.
Thus has the new policy been endorsed by Hans Blix and
Mohamed Elbaradei, the IAEA leaders entrusted over the last
quarter century to oversee the nonproliferation regime.
Nuclear cooperation with India offers some economic
opportunity--and potentially enormous environmental value.
India has recognized the urgency of a worldwide clean-energy
revolution if humankind is to avoid unleashing devastating
climate change.
The U.S.-India deal promises a partnership between the two
largest democracies to deliver this environmental benefit--
within India and to a wider world--on a scale that can make a
difference.
With a strong legal, strategic and environmental rationale,
this is a Bush initiative that has gained a broad coalition of
support abroad.
John B. Ritch, U.S. ambassador to the International Atomic
Energy Agency in the Clinton administration, is the director
general of the World Nuclear Association and president of the
World Nuclear University.
Prepared Statement of
THE HONORABLE ASHTON B. CARTER
Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University
BEFORE THE
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 2006
----------
ASSESSING THE INDIA DEAL \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ An edited version of this statement appeared in the July/August
issue of Foreign Affairs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During a state visit to Washington in July of 2005, Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and U.S. President George W. Bush
announced a potentially far-reaching ``strategic partnership''
between what will probably be the 21st century's most powerful
democracies. To inaugurate what came to be known as the India
Deal, Bush abruptly fulfilled a thirty-year quest by Delhi to
be recognized as a sixth ``legitimate'' nuclear power,
alongside the five victors of World War II. In March of 2006,
in a reciprocal visit to India, Bush settled most of the
remaining details of the nuclear part of the India Deal in
Delhi's favor.
Debate in both Washington and Delhi has swirled around the
nuclear aspects of the India Deal. This is understandable,
since preventing nuclear war and terrorism is the highest
American national security priority in this era, as Bush
himself has acknowledged. The decade has already witnessed a
stunning defeat for the United States in North Korea's runaway
nuclear program. The same could be unfolding more slowly in
Iran. Meanwhile, an unbowed Osama bin Laden has declared to his
followers that obtaining weapons of mass destruction is a
``religious duty.''
Indeed, if the nuclear aspects of the India Deal are
assessed in isolation, one must conclude that the Deal was a
bad one for the United States. Washington recognized Delhi's
nuclear status in return for little in the way of new steps by
India to combat nuclear proliferation and terrorism that Delhi
was not already committed or inclined to give, and for almost
no technical restraints on India's growing nuclear arsenal.
Through the U.S. concession, the nonproliferation regime also
paid a palpable, although probably manageable, price to its
integrity and support.
But it would be a mistake to assess the India Deal in a
nuclear-only frame. President Bush and his key advisors were
clearly looking through a wider lens, and so should the public
and the U.S. Congress, which must amend U.S. nonproliferation
laws that forbid the policies Bush agreed to. Viewed through
such a wider geopolitical lens, the Deal has the United States
giving the Indians what they have craved for so long--nuclear
recognition--in return for a strategic partnership between
Washington and Delhi as the two democracies face similar
potential challenges from China, Pakistan, Iran, and elsewhere
in the coming decades. In short, Washington gave on the nuclear
front to get something on the non-nuclear front. Powerful
arguments can be made that strategic partnership with India
will prove to be in the deep and long-term U.S. security
interest. Indo-U.S. partnership seems not only logical but
eminently achievable in India's democracy: in an influential
2005 Pew Research Center poll of 15 leading nations, India
reported the highest proportion of favorable views of the
United States at 71%. A nuclear-recognition quid for a
strategic-partnership quo is therefore a reasonable framework
for an India Deal.
However, as a diplomatic transaction the India Deal as
negotiated by President Bush is quite uneven. First of all, a
U.S.-Indian strategic partnership would seem to be in Delhi's
interest as well as America's. So why pay them for it? Second,
the Deal is uneven in its specifics--what the U.S. gives is
spelled out quite clearly, but what India gives in return is
vaguer. Third, the Deal is uneven in timing--the United States
gave its big quid of nuclear recognition up front, but what it
stands to get in return from partnership with India lies
further out in the uncertain future.
Rebalancing the Deal
Despite the Deal's flaws, Congress should not attempt to
renegotiate the Deal to win a more balanced version than the
Bush administration obtained. The big U.S. card of nuclear
recognition has already been played and cannot be taken back by
Congress at this point without casting a lasting cloud over the
whole idea of Indo-U.S. partnership. Haggling over some of the
details of the implementation of the nuclear parts of the Deal
is unlikely to restore much of whatever lost reputation for
nonproliferation consistency that the U.S. has already
suffered, and would probably be viewed as grudging and punitive
in Delhi. The result would be to undermine the goodwill that
was supposedly the whole purpose of giving nuclear recognition
in the first place.
Rather than subtracting from the Indian side of the ledger
in an effort to rebalance the India Deal, Congress should
instead emphasize what the U.S. expects on its side of the
ledger to give meaning to the new ``strategic partnership.''
The United States should expect India to join it in countering
any destabilizing effects China's future rise might have on
Asian security; assisting in any emergency in Pakistan such as
radicalization of its government or loss of control of its
nuclear weapons; reversing traditional Indian opposition to
controls on transfer of nuclear technology and especially using
its diplomatic clout against potential proliferators like Iran;
growing its military-to-military relationships, including arms
cooperation, to match in time those the United States has with
its closest allies; and giving preferential treatment to the
U.S. defense and nuclear industries when the Indian government
makes investments in these sectors.
To see how the ledger can be rebalanced over time, one
needs first to consider what India already got from the Deal on
the nuclear front, and its repercussions for the
nonproliferation regime; second, to prescribe the broader
benefits the United States should aim to get from strategic
partnership from India in coming decades; and third, to assess
the chances that U.S. expectations will actually be met.
What Delhi Got
India obtained defacto recognition of its nuclear weapons
status: the United States will behave, and urge others to
behave, as if India were a nuclear weapons state under the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The U.S. will not deny
it most civil nuclear technology or commerce, nor require it to
put all of its nuclear facilities under International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards--only those it declares to be
civil. India can now import uranium, which has been a
bottleneck in its nuclear program. It is worth noting that even
if the Bush administration wished to make India a formal
Nuclear Weapons State under the NPT (which it refused to do),
it probably could not persuade all the other signatories of the
NPT to agree to the change (such amendments require unanimity).
Besides the new access to technology, nuclear recognition
grants an enormous political benefit to India. With one stroke
India joins the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain,
and France as ``legitimate'' wielders of the power and
influence that nuclear weapons confer. The Deal allows India to
transcend the nuclear box that has for so long defined and
constrained its place in the international order, hopefully
jettison at last its outdated Non-Aligned Movement stances and
rhetoric, and occupy a more normal and modern place in the
diplomatic world. Critics of the Deal contend that India's past
and likely future behavior do not warrant this free pass.
Proponents predict that with the nuclear issue (which the Bush
administration describes as the ``basic irritant'' in Indo-U.S.
relations) out of its psychological way, India will pivot from
detractor of much of the international order, including
especially the nonproliferation regime, to responsible
stakeholder. Both sides agree that nuclear recognition is huge.
The Deal has naturally been popular in India. Supporters of
Congress Party Prime Minister Singh have emphasized Bush's
nuclear recognition and downplayed any sense that India has
taken on important obligations in return. Criticism from the
opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has been narrow and
technical and probably reflects chagrin that a Congress Party
government and not the BJP secured the Deal. The other source
of criticism has been leftists in the Left Front parties. They
are wedded to the old politics of the Non-Aligned Movement
which was overtaken by the end of the Cold War, but they are
unlikely to be able to block the Deal.
Measuring the Impact of Nuclear Recognition for India
Previous U.S. administrations have adopted the stance that
India's nuclear arsenal, first tested in 1974, is illegitimate
and should be eliminated, or at least sharply constrained. They
have done so for two reasons: First, India's nuclear arsenal is
watched closely by arch-rival and nuclear-armed Pakistan and by
China, with which India has fought no fewer than three wars
since its independence from Great Britain. Recognizing the
Indian arsenal, the argument went, might spur its open growth
and thus an arms race in South Asia. Second, Washington wanted
to stick strictly to the principles underlying the NPT: that
signatories would get the benefits of international standing
and peaceful nuclear commerce, but those like India that stood
outside the regime would not. Compromising these principles
would, it was feared, give heart to nuclear aspirants that they
could ``end run'' the NPT if only they waited thirty years like
India; it would also dishearten the many countries that were
not about to go nuclear but which loyally supported the NPT
against new proliferators.
But a stance is not a policy. As policy, elimination of
India's arsenal became increasingly unrealistic as Pakistan
went nuclear in the 1980s, and then more so when India tested
five bombs underground and openly declared itself a nuclear
power in 1998. As the Bush administration conducted its nuclear
negotiations with India in the fall of 2005 and spring of 2006,
it ultimately abandoned efforts by nonproliferation specialists
to attach further conditions to the Deal that would constrain
India from increasing its nuclear arsenal further. The U.S.
insisted that the Deal is a broad strategic agreement, not an
arms control treaty. For example, some have argued that India
should be required to stop making fissile material for bombs
now like the other acknowledged nuclear powers have done rather
than wait for the negotiation of an international Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty. Others contend that India should have
to place more of its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards,
to prevent diversion of fissile materials from its nuclear
power program to its nuclear weapons program. Yet others would
have India sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty rather than
abide, as it has since 1998, by a unilateral moratorium on
further underground testing of its nuclear arsenal.
The Indian government, with strong public support, has
resisted all these efforts to constrain its future nuclear
arsenal in technical ways. If the objective of U.S. proponents
of these ways of rebalancing the India Deal is to prevent
Indian arms racing with Pakistan and China, then that important
goal would be better pursued in non-technical ways. India has
stated its intention to pursue a ``minimum deterrent'' rather
than an all-out arms race. The Bush administration has
encouraged this path, and can now make it an expectation of
India as a responsible member of the nuclear club. But if the
objective of seeking additional constraints on India's nuclear
program is to ``take back'' some of the gain India got from
nuclear recognition, then such a grudging move is likely to
backfire. Indians will understandably view such a move as
inconsistent with Bush's whole intent to use nuclear
forgiveness as a way to open the way for strategic partnership.
The second impact of nuclear recognition for India has to
do with the integrity of the NPT regime and is more serious,
though probably manageable. It is inconceivable that North
Korea's Kim Jong Il pays much heed to the internal consistency
of the NPT regime as he calculates how far he can get with his
nuclear breakout. North Korea's governing ideology is less
communism than a fanatical embrace of autarky and ``self-
reliance,'' including open defiance of international norms like
the nonproliferation regime. North Korea's tolerance for
international ostracism is legendary. If Kim's nuclear program
can be stopped at all at this point, it will be through a tough
and focused diplomacy of sticks and carrots in which the NPT
will play little part. Likewise, after 1995 Saddam Hussein
simply ceased paying attention to the NPT.
Iran's cat-and-mouse game with the EU-3, the U.S., and the
IAEA over its recently-revealed nuclear program bespeaks at
least a smidgen of sensitivity to international opinion as
embodied in the NPT. Nuclear recognition for India gives
Teheran a new talking point: If India gets a free pass, why not
Iran which is also an important nation with an ancient culture?
But like North Korea, Iran's nuclear program has deeper roots
in its sense of security threat and Persian pride. Against
these the NPT will not weigh in very heavily. Besides, for now
Teheran denies it is seeking a nuclear arsenal at all but only
nuclear power, so it will be hard-pressed to use India as a
precedent for its current diplomatic position.
The impact of the Bush-Singh deal on the ``rogues'' is
therefore minimal. Its main impact will be felt among two other
groups of countries. First, there are the ``in-betweens''--
states that are not rogues but that flirt with nuclear status.
In the recent past the in-betweens have included South Africa,
Argentina and Brazil, the post-Soviet states of Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, and Belarus, South Korea, Taiwan, and (only
recently joining this category) Libya. These in-betweens turned
away from nuclear weapons for many reasons specific to their
own individual circumstances, but in each of these cases the
lasting international ostracism threatening them if they stood
outside the NPT regime was an influential factor for both
governments and their people. Nuclear recognition for India
suggests that forgiveness will eventually come to proliferators
who wait, and tomorrow's in-betweens--Brazil comes to mind--
might be tempted by the Bush-Singh precedent.
The most nonproliferation damage, curiously, might be done
among the stalwarts of the regime: governments that have no
nuclear ambitions at all but that faithfully uphold the rules,
and the nuclear powers that already enjoy a privileged place in
it. These groups not only provide political support to
discourage in-betweens and confront rogues, they provide vital
and direct technical support by denying critical exports to
those who infringe the NPT's rules. The Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG), in particular, coordinates controls on exports by the
nations with advanced nuclear power technology. The NSG was
created through U.S. leadership, and it is the U.S. that has
long stood against backsliding by member governments that come
under pressure from their nuclear industries to sell technology
abroad more liberally, including especially to India. Now all
of a sudden the United States has decided to change policy, and
others too might consider themselves free to pick and choose
where they apply the nonproliferation rules--the Chinese with
Pakistan, the Russians with Iran, and some European vendors
everywhere.
Damage-limitation from the Bush-Singh deal must therefore
center on the in-betweens and stalwarts. A plan for doing so
was a logical part of the U.S. diplomatic initiative, but it is
clear that the Bush administration did not have one until after
the Deal was concluded, still less did it consult widely before
Bush made his dramatic volte-face in July 2005. But most of the
nations whose adherence to the NPT regime is critical will
either support the Deal or acquiesce in it. First, most accept
the U.S. argument that India's nuclear nonproliferation
behavior has been good--there have apparently been no Indian
A.Q. Khans--and that India's possession of nuclear weapons is
an established fact and cannot be reversed. Second, all can see
that India is hardly a rogue state, but a stable democracy
likely to play a large and constructive role in the world of
the 21st century. Third, many will regard India's thirty years
in the ``penalty box,'' which exacted a heavy price from Delhi
in both prestige and technology, as sufficient to make the
point that the regime's adherents are serious about enforcing
its norms. These arguments have won over many in the
international nonproliferation community, notably IAEA Director
General and Nobel Laureate Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei And so while
there is some grumbling within the NPT regime over the Deal, a
revolt or collapse is not likely, and the damage to the regime
can be limited.
As critics have exaggerated the nonproliferation costs of
the nuclear part of the India Deal, so also its proponents have
exaggerated its benefits in terms of energy security and
nuclear security. Bush administration spokesmen have defended
the Deal's nuclear power provisions as critical to stopping
India's rise from posing an oil and environmental crisis. But
this claim does not survive close scrutiny. Energy security is
terribly important to both India and the United States. All
want India's huge population to satisfy its energy needs, which
will grow faster than its GDP, increasing as much as fourfold
within 25 years, without contributing further to dependence on
Middle East oil, pollution, and global warming. But the
arithmetic does not support the case that nuclear power will
add up to make the critical difference for India, though it can
and should play a role. For the foreseeable future, electricity
generation in India will be dominated by coal burning whereas
nuclear plants (which today produce only 3% of India's
electricity) will remain a single-digit contributor even under
the most extravagant projections of U.S.-assisted nuclear
expansion in India. Indian coal is plentiful but of poor
quality and highly polluting. Burning coal more cheaply and
more cleanly will do more than any conceivable expansion of
nuclear power to aid India's economy and the environment.
India's share of world oil consumption will grow from 3% to 4%
over the next twenty years. But nuclear power does nothing to
address the principal Indian oil consuming sector--cars and
trucks--since these don't run off the electrical grid and won't
for a long time. Finally, the type of assistance the United
States is best positioned to provide to India's nuclear
generation capacity (light water reactors operating on low-
enriched uranium fuel) is at odds with the Indian
establishment's uneconomical vision of a civil nuclear power
program built primarily around breeder reactors.
The administration also claims the Deal will require India
to improve its laws and procedures for controlling exports or
diversions of sensitive nuclear technology--preventing an
Indian A.Q. Khan. But at the same time, the administration
acknowledges India's apparently excellent record of controlling
nuclear exports (though not always ballistic missile exports).
India is already bound by the U.S.-sponsored U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1540 which requires such good conduct, so on
paper at least Delhi has sold the same horse a second time in
the Deal. In any event, the United States is justifying the
Deal's nuclear recognition to other nations around the world on
the grounds that India's nuclear proliferation behavior is
already exemplary, It will be difficult for the U.S. to argue
this point both ways at the same time.
What Washington Should Get
What is it then that the United States might expect from
the ``strategic partnership'' in return for the nuclear
recognition it conferred upon India?
First and foremost, the United States should expect India
to serve as a potential future Asian counterweight to China.
Though no one wants to see China and the United States fall
into strategic competition, neither can anyone rule this out.
The evolution of U.S.-China relations will depend on the
attitudes of China's younger generation and new leaders, on
Chinese and U.S. policies, and on unpredictable events like a
crisis over Taiwan. It is reasonable for the United States to
hedge against a downturn in relations with China by improving
its relations with India, and for India to do the same. But for
now both are intent on improving their relations and trade with
China, not antagonizing China. Neither government will wish to
talk publicly, let alone take actions now, pursuant to this
shared--but hypothetical and future--common interest.
Second, the U.S. will want Indian assistance in a range of
possible contingencies involving neighboring Pakistan--another
common interest that is awkward for either party to the Deal to
acknowledge. Pakistan, alongside Russia, belongs at the very
center of urgent concern about nuclear terrorism. Terrorists
cannot make nuclear bombs unless they obtain enriched uranium
or plutonium from governments that have made these materials.
The exposure of the A.Q. Khan network in Pakistan makes clear
that Pakistan has to be regarded as a potential source of such
materials--whether by theft, sale, diversion by internal
radical elements with access to bombs or materials, change of
government from Mushanaf to a radical regime, or some sort of
internal chaos. Which version of the A.Q. Khan story is more
alarming--that the government and military of Pakistan was
unaware of what he was doing, or that they were aware and
permitted it? Either way it illustrates a serious danger. Were
there to be a threat or incident of nuclear terrorism
originating in Pakistan, the United States would want to act in
concert with as many regional players as possible, including
India.
The Pakistan contingency is even more difficult than the
China counterweight contingency for the newly-minted strategic
partners in Washington and Delhi to acknowledge. India seems
intent on improving its relations with Pakistan--despite last
year's bombings in Delhi and their impact on Indian public
opinion--and a rapprochement between these long-time
antagonists is in the U.S. interest. The United States, for its
part, has important interests at stake with the Musharraf
government--among them supporting the search for Osama bin
Laden and other terrorists on Pakistani territory, arresting
the growth of radicalism in Pakistan's population, and
stabilizing Afghanistan--and can ill afford the perception of a
``tilt towards India.'' For now, therefore, the Pakistan
contingency, like the China counterweight, remains a
hypothetical and future benefit of the India Deal.
Third, and most urgently, India should be expected to weigh
in against Iran's nuclear ambitions and to compromise to a
considerable extent its friendly relations with Iran in the
interests of nonproliferation. Whether Delhi does this will be
the clearest test of whether nuclear recognition ``brings India
into the nuclear mainstream,'' as the Bush administration
predicts, or whether India persists in its pre-Deal (actually,
Cold war) positions of rhetorical support for the spread of
nuclear fuel-cycle activities (uranium enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing). India's September 24, 2005 and February 4, 2006
votes with the United States and its European partners in the
IAEA Board of Governors, finding Iran in noncompliance with its
NPT obligations and referring the matter to the United National
Security Council were a welcome suggestion that India will
support the international campaign to curb Iran's nuclear
ambitions. But India's willingness truly to join the nuclear
club, reversing old non-aligned habits and putting its
diplomatic shoulder to the wheel in the case of Iran and other
urgent counter-proliferation efforts will be an early and major
test of the value of strategic partnership and its new status.
Fourth, the United States should expect a continued
intensification of Indo-U.S. military-to-military contacts,
ultimately envisioning joint action in operations outside of a
United Nations context. India has historically refused to join
the United States military in operations that were not mandated
and commanded by the United Nations. In the future, when the
United States needs partners in disaster relief, humanitarian
intervention, peacekeeping missions, or stability operations,
the United States can reasonably expect India to cooperate.
Judging from the evolution of U.S. security partnerships in
Asia and Europe (especially NATO's expanded membership and
Partnership for Peace), anticipation of joint action can lead
first to joint military planning, then progressively to joint
exercises, intelligence sharing and forging of a common threat
assessment, and finally to joint capabilities. This is the path
foreseen for a deepening U.S.-India strategic partnership in
the defense field. Additionally, there could be occasions when
access for and, if needed, basing of U.S. military forces on
Indian territory would be desirable. At first this might be
limited to port access for U.S. naval vessels transiting the
Indian Ocean and overflight rights for U.S. military aircraft,
but in time it could lead to such steps as use of Indian
training facilities for U.S. forces deploying to locations with
similar climate (the way German training areas were used for
forces deploying to the Balkans). Ultimately, India could
provide U.S. forces with ``over-the-horizon'' basing for Middle
East contingencies of the sort preferred by Saudi Arabia and
other Gulf states.
Fifth, the United States will expect preferential treatment
for U.S. industry in India's civil nuclear expansion and
modernization of its military. The authors of the India Deal
might have anticipated preferential treatment for U.S. industry
in construction of Indian nuclear reactors and other civil
power infrastructure made possible by the Deal. But there are
two barriers to realization of this U.S. benefit. First, the
United States must secure preferential access for its nuclear
industry at the expense of Russian and European suppliers who
are also seeking access to the Indian market. Second, the
United States will also need to persuade India to focus its
nuclear power expansion on light water reactors, not the exotic
and uneconomical technologies (e.g., fast breeders) that the
Indian nuclear scientific community favors. This benefit should
therefore not be exaggerated. India is expected to increase the
scale and sophistication of its military, in part by purchasing
weapons systems abroad. In view of its concessions in the India
Deal, the United States can reasonably expect preferential
treatment for U.S. vendors relative to Russian or European
vendors. Early discussions have included the F-16 and F-18
tactical aircraft and the P-3C Orion maritime surveillance
aircraft.
Will the United States Get the Benefits of the India Deal?
The list above is a very substantial--even breathtaking--
set of potential benefits to the United States of a strategic
partnership with India. How realistic is it?
Some of the items on this list reflect common national
interests of India and the United States. The United States
might therefore have had many of these benefits without having
to pay the nonproliferation costs associated with nuclear
recognition for India. Most of the items on the list are also
hypothetical and lie in a future that neither side can
predict--this is certainly the case with regard to the China
counterweight and Pakistan contingency items. Other items on
the list, like Iran's nuclear program, will unfold sooner. The
United States can certainly hope that India will behave as a
true ``strategic partner'' in the future across all the items
on this list. But there is a risk that when the United States
comes to ask India to do something it is reluctant to do, that
it comes to regret having played its big diplomatic card--
nuclear recognition--so early in the process.
India, as befits a great nation on its way to global
prominence, will have its own opinions about this list. Some
American proponents of the India Deal have compared it to
Nixon's opening to China--a bold move based on a firm
foundation of mutual interest, but more a leap of trust than a
shrewd bargain. Mao and Nixon, however, had a clear and present
common enemy--the Soviet Union--not a hypothetical set of
possible future opponents. But the real difference between the
Nixon/Kissinger deal and the India Deal is that India, unlike
Mao's China, is a democracy. No government in Delhi can turn
decades of Indian policy on a dime or commit it to a broad set
of actions in support of U.S. interests--only a profound and
probably slow change in the views of India's elites can do
this. India's bureaucracies and diplomats are fabled for their
stubborn adherence to independent positions regarding the world
order, economic development, and nuclear security. Proponents
of the India Deal suggest that these positions will yield to
the grand gesture of nuclear recognition by the United States.
This expectation is naive. Americans view the change of long-
standing and principled nonproliferation policy to accommodate
India as a concession. Indians view it as acknowledgement of
something to which they have long been entitled. This is not a
durable basis for a diplomatic transaction.
It is therefore premature to judge whether the expectations
of this strategic partnership as apparently foreseen on the
U.S. side are shared by India and will, in fact, materialize.
The Deal itself was premature. The risk with a hastily prepared
diplomatic initiative is that disenchantment will set in on
both sides. At this point, the United States, including the
Congress, can only do its best to ensure that its benefits are
fully realized--by both parties.
----------
Testimony of
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. PERRY
Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution
BEFORE THE
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 2006
----------
My views on the recently concluded Civilian Nuclear
Cooperation Agreement between India and the United States can
be summarized in three points.
Firstly, I enthusiastically support the development of a
strategic partnership between the United States and India, of
which this agreement could be an important step. The benefits
of a strategic partnership were convincingly outlined in the
earlier testimony of Secretary of Rice to this committee. I
associate myself with her views on the importance of a
strategic partnership. In particular, I expect that this could
include a robust military-to-military partnership, including,
for example, joint exercises in humanitarian relief operations,
in responding to emergencies at sea, and in peacekeeping
operations. Those exercises could be modeled after the
comparable exercises conducted in Europe by the Partnership for
Peace.
Secondly, I understand the need of India to aggressively
develop nuclear power for its growing industrial base, and I
believe that the United States should support India in that
development. The importance of nuclear power to India and to
the global environment were convincingly outlined by Dr. David
Victor in his op-ed piece in the International Herald Tribune
on 17 March. And I commend this to the committee. I associate
myself with Dr. Victor's views on this subject.
Thirdly, I am disappointed that the United States did not
seize the opportunity presented in the formulation of this
agreement to undertake a joint program with India directed at
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Stopping nuclear
proliferation is an important American objective. It is an
important international objective. And it should be an
important Indian objective. I believe that it is not too late
to join forces with India to further this critical objective.
I'd like to highlight four actions that India could take
that would make a significant difference in preventing the
spread of nuclear weapons:
First, India could join other nuclear powers in
implementing strong controls on the transfer of nuclear
technology and materials.
Secondly, India could take a leadership position in
promoting an international cutoff in the production of
fissile material.
Third, India could cooperate with the United States
and the EU-3 in pressuring Iran to stop the programs
that are facilitating an Iranian nuclear bomb.
And, fourth, India could explicitly reaffirm its
intention of limiting its nuclear arsenal to minimal
deterrence levels.
Secretary Rice, in her testimony, has suggested that India
is prepared to take many of these actions, but they are not an
explicit part of the agreement. I do not recommend that the
Senate try to modify the agreement to include them. Instead, I
recommend that the Senate task the administration to vigorously
pursue continuing diplomacy to facilitate these actions, and
that should be as a follow-on to the agreement. Indeed, I
believe that these actions are strongly in the interest of
India, and I believe that the Indian Government understands
that.
What is the motivation--what is the incentive that the
administration would have to actually carry out this diplomacy?
First of all, they are in India's interest. And, secondly, only
if India moves aggressively to carry out these actions will
they be providing the foundation on which the strategic
partnership desired by both countries can, in fact, be
achieved.
----------
Prepared Statement of
HON. ROBERT L. GALLUCCI
Dean of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown
University
BEFORE THE
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
26 APRIL 2006
----------
In this brief statement, I wish to make only three points.
The first is that those who advocate making this special
arrangements to permit nuclear cooperation with India ought to
be clear--and honest--about why they are doing so. The second
is that the reasons for making the particular deal they
propose, while important, do not justify the cost to the
national security of doing so. And third, that there is an
arrangement which would, in fact, strike the right balance
between competing national security interests, an arrangement
that may be negotiable at some future time, if not now.
The United States has good reasons for improving its
relations with India, both political and economic. Part of the
calculation must turn on our uncertainties about China, about
whether Beijing will turn out to be more of a strategic
competitor than partner in the decades ahead. If internal
developments in China do not proceed as we hope, and if Chinese
foreign policy turns out to be more hegemonic than we expect, a
solid political relationship with India could be important to
our security. Moreover, independent of such considerations,
India's enormous and growing economic and political importance
make the improvement of relations with New Delhi a prudent
objective for the United States.
If this is obvious, so also is the chronic irritant that
our non-proliferation policy has been to U.S.-India relations
over the last thirty years. We should acknowledge the
importance that India attaches to American willingness to
change that policy so that the United States can begin to sell
it nuclear equipment, material and technology. We should also
admit that the proposed deal would grant what New Delhi values
most, namely our acceptance of India as a nuclear weapons
state. And while we are at it, we should admit that although
the deal would be critically important to our goal of improving
relations with India, it will really do nothing to help us deal
with the risks posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Assertions to the contrary are less than honest.
There is no reason why we should attach any positive value
to India's willingness to submit a few additional nuclear
facilities of its choosing to international safeguards, so long
as other fissile material producing facilities are free from
safeguards. This move has been called ``symbolic'' by critics,
but it is not at all clear what useful purpose it symbolizes.
The other elements of the deal that are supposed to contribute
to its non-proliferation value were in place before the deal
was struck. The first point then, is that the administration
proposes this deal to address a genuine regional security
objective and not because it helps in any way our global
security concern over nuclear proliferation.
The second point is that the proposed arrangement will be
too costly to the national security to be justified by the gain
in relations with India.
Since the dawn of the nuclear age and the arrival of
intercontinental ballistic missiles, our nation has been
defenseless against devastating attack--leaving us to rely on
deterrence, the promise of retaliation, to deal with nuclear
armed enemies. From the beginning, we recognized that this left
us vulnerable to anyone who could not be deterred, and so, in
some basic way, our security depended on limiting the number of
countries who ultimately acquired nuclear weapons. Most
analysts believe that fifty years of non-proliferation policy
has something to do with explaining why the spread of nuclear
technology has not led to the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
why we live in a world of eight or nine nuclear weapons states,
rather then eighty or ninety. A key part of that policy has
been our support for an international norm captured in the very
nearly universally adhered to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). The norm is simple: in the interest of international
security, no more states should acquire nuclear weapons. There
are many provisions in the treaty and details to be understood
to fully appreciate the norm, but that is its essence.
Certainly the fact that we have eight or nine states with
nuclear weapons rather than only the original five, means that
the norm has not held perfectly well. But it has had
substantial force in the face of widespread acquisition of
critical nuclear technologies, and that has been of vital
importance to America's security. Simply put, the
administration now proposes to destroy that norm.
Some claim the deal would only recognize the reality of
India's nuclear weapons program. But that is not accurate.
Recognizing that India and a few additional countries have
acquired nuclear weapons over the last three decades is not the
issue. The damage will be done to the non-proliferation norm by
legitimatizing India's condition, by exempting it from a policy
that has held for decades. And we would do this, we assert less
than honestly, because of its exceptionally good behavior. In
truth, we would reward India with nuclear cooperation because
we now place such a high value on improved relations with New
Delhi, not because of its uniquely good behavior.
Critics ask, if we do this deal, how will we explain,
defend, and promote our policy of stopping Iran's proposed
uranium enrichment program? Iran is, after all, a party to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and as far as we know, has no
fissile material outside of international safeguards and has
never detonated a nuclear explosive device. A good question,
but not the best one because India has arguably been a more
responsible member of the international community than Iran.
Rather, if we do this deal, ask how we will avoid offering a
similar one to Brazil or Argentina if they decide on nuclear
weapons acquisition, or our treaty ally South Korea. Dozens of
countries around the world have exhibited good behavior in
nuclear matters, and have the capability to produce nuclear
weapons but choose not to, at least in part, because of the
international norm against nuclear weapons acquisition
reinforced by a policy we would now propose to abandon. Will we
legitimatize only India because it never joined the NPT and
thus did not have to withdraw from it to pursue nuclear
weapons? No, if India was truly unique, there might not be much
risk to that non-proliferation norm we so depend upon, but it
is not unique: the deal would set a dangerous precedent. If we
do this, we will put at risk a world of very few nuclear
weapons states, and open the door to the true proliferation of
nuclear weapons in the years ahead.
Finally, if there are two national security objectives in
conflict here, one regional and the other global, is it
possible to reconcile them? The answer is probably yes, but not
now, not in the current context. Clearly and regrettably, if
the administration's proposal does not succeed in much the same
form in which it has been put forth, U.S.-India relations will
deteriorate for a time. But acknowledging that does not mean
that we should go ahead with a deal that would do irreparable
damage to our long-term national security interests. Instead,
we should put forth a proposal that more nearly balances
regional and global security interests, recognizing that it
will be some time, at best, before it will appeal to New Delhi.
In looking for that balance, we should understand that
there is something of a continuum to be considered in terms of
non-proliferation provisions. At one end, for purists, is
nothing less than Indian adherence to the NPT. This is nearly
impossible to foresee. Next, for non-proliferation realists, is
an Indian commitment to end fissile material production for any
purpose and forego those facilities, enrichment and
reprocessing, that yield it. This would leave India with
nuclear weapons, but no means to produce the material to make
more. Significantly, it would also deny India the option of
exploring breeder reactor technology, something the Indian
nuclear energy establishment very much wants to do.
Finally, there is a more practical posture, which is to
permit nuclear cooperation with India if it accepts a
reasonably verifiable ban on the production of any more fissile
material for nuclear weapons purposes. This approach would
permit India reprocessing and enrichment facilities, but
effectively require international safeguards on all its nuclear
facilities and any nuclear material produced in the future. Its
appeal in regional terms is that it would allow India to pursue
nuclear energy without restrictions of any kind--more than we
are willing to do for Iran at the moment. From the global
security perspective, we will have succeeded in capping a
nuclear weapons program, a substantive achievement which
arguably offsets a breach of the long-standing policy against
nuclear cooperation with a state such as India that does not
accept full-scope safeguards. The deal would have to have other
provisions, such as rigorous nuclear export control policies, a
ban on export of enrichment or reprocessing technology, and a
permanent prohibition on nuclear explosive testing, but this is
its essence.
The deal described above would require India to choose
between the opportunity to expand its nuclear energy program on
the one hand, and the expansion of its nuclear weapons arsenal
on the other. The administration proposes to allow India to do
both, and that would be a mistake. Our security depends on
maintaining the norm against nuclear weapons proliferation.
----------
Prepared Statement of
DR. ASHLEY J. TELLIS
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace
BEFORE THE
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
APRIL 26, 2006
----------
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the committee.
Thank you for inviting me to testify on the proposed
cooperation between the United States and India in regards to
atomic energy. This is obviously a complex subject with
different facets stretching from the political to the
technical. It is also a subject I have given some thought to
and have written about in the past.\1\ As requested in your
letter, I will focus my oral and written remarks this morning
mainly on the strategic logic underlying the President's
initiative on civil nuclear cooperation and its importance for
the transforming U. S.-Indian relationship. I will be happy,
however, to cover those aspects that I have not touched on in
my formal testimony during the discussion that follows. I
respectfully request that my statement be entered into the
record.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ My previous reflections on different aspects of the U.S.-Indian
nuclear cooperation initiative can be found in Ashley J. Tellis,
``South Asian Seesaw: A New U.S. Policy on the Subcontinent,'' Policy
Brief, 38 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, May 2005); Ashley J. Tellis, India as a New Global Power: An
Action Agenda for the United States (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, June 2005); Ashley J. Tellis,
Testimony to the House Committee on International Relations,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, on ``The United States and South
Asia,'' June 14, 2005; Ashley J. Tellis, ``Should the US Sell Nuclear
Technology to India?--Part II,'' YaleGlobal Online, November 10, 2005;
and, Ashley J. Tellis, Prepared Testimony to the House Committee on
International Relations on ``The U.S.-India `Global Partnership': How
Significant for American Interests?'' November 16, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States and India today are confronted by an
incredible opportunity to craft a new global partnership that
promises to advance a range of common interests in a way that
was simply impossible during the Cold War. These interests
encompass a wide variety of issues ranging from the
preservation of peace and stability in a resurgent Asia over
the long term, through the current exigencies relating to the
global war on terror, to promoting complex collective goods
such as arresting the spread of weapons of mass destruction,
managing climate change, and promoting liberal democracy and an
open trading system.
Thanks to the tight bipolarity of the Cold War, U.S.-Indian
relations during that entire epoch were characterized by
alternation: in almost every decade, troughs of estrangement
invariably followed peaks of strong cooperation. Despite the
desires of leaders on both sides, the quest for a strong
bilateral relationship was repeatedly frustrated, which from an
American perspective appeared to be the case for at least three
reasons unique to India: first, New Delhi's emphatic
determination to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy at a time
when liberal states were under threat from global communism;
second, India's relative weakness during much of the Cold War
caused by its pervasive economic underperformance that, in
turn, sealed its strategic irrelevance to the global system;
and, third, India's anomalous nuclear status since 1974 when,
in becoming ``a state with nuclear weapons, but not a nuclear
weapon state,'' New Delhi found itself cast into a netherworld
where it soon became the most important target of global anti-
proliferation efforts.
By the time the Cold War ended, the first two impediments
were on their way to being resolved. The demise of the Soviet
Union destroyed the international system that made non-
alignment structurally relevant and freed both the United
States and India to seek better relations undistracted by the
pressures of Cold War geopolitics. By 1991--and although it was
difficult to see this clearly at the time because of New
Delhi's financial crisis--the Indian economy was also on its
way to becoming a star performer, having left behind the
abysmal 3.5 percent ``Hindu rate of growth'' that had
characterized its productive performance since independence.
To its credit, the Clinton administration, perceiving both
these realities, made an initial effort to construct a new
relationship with India. A wide-ranging diplomatic dialogue was
instituted in the hope that the two democracies could find
common ground, and India was designated a ``big emerging
market'' worthy of special U.S. commercial attention. But,
despite its good intentions, the Clinton administration could
not redress the third impediment that had by now come to haunt
U.S.-Indian relations, namely India's anomalous nuclear status
which made it the single most important target of U.S. anti-
proliferation activities worldwide. Confronted by this
challenge, the administration attempted to implement two
different policies towards India. It began with an effort to
improve ties with New Delhi across the board, while simply
quarantining the nuclear issue in the hope of preventing it
from contaminating improvements that might be realized in other
areas of the bilateral relationship. This approach, however,
quickly reached the limits of its success because the U.S.-led
anti-proliferation efforts since 1974 had effectively succeeded
in institutionalizing a complex global technology denial regime
that prevented India from getting access even to important non-
strategic technologies because of fears that these might
eventually leach into its nuclear programs. India's irregular
nuclear status under the Non-Proliferation Treaty had in fact
become such an impediment that the Clinton administration's
strategy of quarantining the nuclear issue failed either to
resolve the nuclear disagreement or to transform the bilateral
relationship.
By the second term, the Clinton administration emphasized
an alternative strategy, driven largely by its efforts to
tighten the global nonproliferation regime. While continuing
its previous effort to improve relations with India in a
variety of areas such as diplomatic engagement and defense
cooperation, the administration focused its energies
simultaneously on capping, rolling back, and eventually
eliminating India's nuclear weapons program. This shift in
emphasis, unfortunately, turned out to be unsuccessful: not
only did it exacerbate the already high Indian frustration with
the U.S.-led technology denial regime, but it finally provoked
New Delhi into a spectacular act of defiance through the
nuclear test series of 1998 when India in a deliberate
challenge to the international order declared itself to be a
``nuclear weapon state.''
Although much of this story may sound like ancient history,
it is worth remembering for two important reasons that are
critical to understanding the strategic wisdom underlying
President Bush's decision to initiate civilian nuclear
cooperation with India.
First, the transformation of U.S.-Indian relations, as
desired by the President and which enjoys bipartisan support in
Congress, cannot be consummated without resolving the problems
caused by India's anomalous status in the nuclear non-
proliferation order. The Clinton administration spent eight
long years trying to improve U.S. relations with India, while
at the same time avoiding any effort to alter India's status as
an outlier in the global non-proliferation system. The
historical record shows conclusively that well intentioned
though it was--and perhaps even necessary--this strategy
ultimately failed. An old maxim of military strategy calls on
leaders to ``reinforce success, abandon failure.'' President
Bush's initiative on civil nuclear cooperation with India is an
effort to do just that, given that all other U.S. policies
since at least 1974 have by now proven to be less than
successful.
Second, the transformation of U.S.-Indian relations, as
desired by the President and which enjoys bipartisan support in
Congress, cannot be inherently schizophrenic if it is to be
successful enough to advance common American and Indian
interests in this new century. As our ties with friends and
allies in Europe and Asia demonstrate, the United States has a
variety of bilateral relationships defined by different degrees
of intensity and intimacy. What all these relationships have in
common, however, is that in no case is any U.S. partner made
the deliberate target of a punitive policy concertedly pursued
by Washington. Through his proposal for full civil nuclear
cooperation with India, President Bush has in effect conveyed
his belief that if India is to become a full strategic partner
of the United States in this new century, a comparable courtesy
must be extended to New Delhi as well. Stated in a different
way, the President has recognized that it is impossible to
pursue a policy that simultaneously seeks to transform New
Delhi into a strategic partner of the United States on the one
hand, even as India remains permanently anchored as
Washington's nonproliferation target on the other.
These two reasons combine to underscore the point that
Secretary Rice made in her recent testimony to this committee.
Far from being an appendage to growing U.S.-Indian ties,
bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation promises to become ``the
key that will unlock the progress of our expanding
relationship.'' Congressional action to implement this
initiative is therefore critical not simply because it will
help address India's vast and growing energy needs--though it
will certainly do that--or because it will mitigate the burdens
of environmental pollution and climate change in South Asia--
though those must be counted among its benefits as well--but
because it symbolizes, first and foremost, a renewed American
commitment to assisting India meet its enormous developmental
goals and thereby take its place in the community of nations as
a true great power.
Renewed civilian nuclear cooperation thus becomes the
vehicle by which the Indian people are reassured that the
United States is a true friend and ally responsive to their
deepest aspirations. By altering the existing web of legal
constraints on civilian nuclear cooperation with India,
Congress would also expand simultaneously India's access to a
wide range of controlled technologies that are useful for
numerous peaceful economic endeavors going beyond merely the
production of electricity. The successful implementation of the
civilian nuclear cooperation agreement would therefore
epitomize'as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told Under Secretary
of State Nicholas Burns in New Delhi in February 2006--``a
historic reconciliation between the United States and India and
a new concord after many decades of anxiety, distrust, and
suspicion in our bilateral relations.''
The increasing value of this transforming bilateral
relationship with India for the United States will be
manifested most clearly in three areas that will be vitally
important to American security in this century.
To begin with, a strong American partnership with a
democratic India will be essential if we are to be able to
construct a stable geopolitical order in Asia that is conducive
to peace and prosperity. There is little doubt today that the
Asian continent is poised to become the new center of gravity
in international politics. Most analyses suggest that although
national growth rates in several key Asian states--in
particular Japan, South Korea, and possibly China--are likely
to decline in comparison to the latter half of the Cold War
period, the spurt in Indian growth rates, coupled with the
relatively high though still marginally declining growth rates
in China, will propel Asia's share of the global economy to
some 43 percent by 2025, thus making the continent the largest
single locus of economic power worldwide. An Asia that hosts
economic power of such magnitude, along with its strong and
growing connectivity to the American economy, will become an
arena vital to the United States--in much the same way that
Europe was the grand prize during the Cold War. In such
circumstances, the administration's policy of developing a new
global partnership with India represents a considered effort at
``shaping'' the emerging Asian environment to suit American
interests in the twenty-first century.
This should not be interpreted as some kind of thinly
veiled code signifying the polite containment of China, which
many argue is in fact the administration's secret intention.
Such claims are, in my judgment, erroneous. A policy of
containing China is neither feasible nor necessary for the
United States at this point in time. Further, it is not at all
obvious that India, currently, has any interest in becoming
part of any coalition aimed at containing China. Rather, the
objective of strengthening ties with India is part of a
larger--and sensible--administration strategy of developing
good relations with all the major Asian states. As part of this
general effort, it is eminently reasonable for the United
States not only to invest additional resources in strengthening
the continent's democratic powers but also to deepen the
bilateral relationship enjoyed with each of these countries--on
the assumption that the proliferation of strong democratic
states in Asia represents the best insurance against intra-
continental instability as well as threats that may emerge
against the United States and its regional presence.
Strengthening New Delhi and transforming U.S-Indian ties,
therefore, has everything to do with American confidence in
Indian democracy and the conviction that its growing strength,
tempered by its liberal values, brings only benefits for Asian
stability and American security. As Under Secretary of State
Nicholas Burns succinctly stated in his testimony before the
House International Relations Committee, ``By cooperating with
India now, we accelerate the arrival of the benefits that
India's rise brings to the region and the world.''
Further, a strong American partnership with a democratic
India will be essential if we are to succeed in preserving an
efective non-proliferation system that stems the difusion of
nuclear materials and technologies required for the creation of
nuclear weapons. The central component of civilian nuclear
cooperation is critical in this regard because it formalizes a
bargain that gives India access to nuclear fuel, technology,
and knowledge on the condition that New Delhi institutionalizes
stringent export controls, separates its civilian from its
strategic facilities and places the former under safeguards,
and assists the United States in preventing further
proliferation. Bringing India into the global non-proliferation
regime in this way produces vital benefits both for the United
States and for all non-nuclear weapons states insofar as it
transforms India's hitherto commendable nonproliferation
record, which is owed entirely to voluntary sovereign decisions
made by successive Indian governments, into a formal and
binding adherence through a set of international agreements.
Thanks to the President's initiative, India has now agreed to
obligations that in fact go beyond those ordinarily required of
NPT signatories, such as refraining from transfers of
enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not
already possess them and supporting efforts to limit their
spread; working with the United States to conclude a
multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty; continuing its
unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing; and adhering to the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.
Bringing India into the global nonproliferation regime
through a lasting international agreement that defines clearly
enforceable benefits and obligations not only strengthens
American efforts to stem further proliferation but also
enhances U.S. national security. The President's accord with
India advances these objectives in a fair and direct way. It
recognizes that it is unreasonable to ask India to continue to
bear the burdens of contributing towards ensuring the viability
of the global nonproliferation regime in perpetuity, while it
suffers stiff and encompassing sanctions from that same regime.
And so the President has asked the Congress to support his
proposal to give India access to nuclear fuel, technology, and
knowledge in exchange for New Delhi formally becoming part of
the global coalition to defeat the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. In other words, he offers India the benefits
of peaceful nuclear cooperation in exchange for transforming
what is currently a unilateral Indian commitment to
nonproliferation into a formally verifiable and permanent
international responsibility.
The fruits of this initiative are already in evidence, for
example, in connection with India's strong support for the
U.S.-led efforts to persuade Iran to live up to its freely
accepted non-proliferation obligations. This Indian decision
has not been easy because of New Delhi's otherwise good
relations with Tehran. India and Iran share historical links
that go back thousands of years; India and Iran played a
pivotal role in ensuring the viability of the Northern Alliance
in Afghanistan during the darkest days of Taliban rule; India
remains one of Iran's most important customers for oil and
natural gas, and it continues discussions with Islamabad and
Tehran about the construction of a gas pipeline that would link
the three countries and help meet India's large and growing
energy needs. Many voices in the American debate on the
civilian nuclear initiative have demanded that India curtail
its economic and diplomatic links to Iran as the price of
securing U.S. cooperation in regards to civilian nuclear
energy. Such demands are unreasonable. The negotiations over
the Iranian-Pakistani-Indian gas pipeline are unlikely to
succeed simply because of economic considerations, but New
Delhi is unlikely to concede to any demands that rupture its
diplomatic and economic relationship with Tehran if these are
seen to have no relationship with the issue of nuclear
proliferation. On this score, India is likely to behave in a
fashion identical to that of our close allies such as Japan and
Italy. It will demand--as it has done thus far--that Tehran
live up to its international non-proliferation commitments and
obligations, and it will abide by any decisions made by the
international community to enforce these responsibilities, but
it is unlikely to unilaterally sacrifice its bilateral
relationship with Iran in areas that are not perceived to have
any connection with non-proliferation and which do not pose a
threat to common security.
Finally, a strong American partnership with a democratic
India will be essential if we are to successfully preserve a
global order that protects liberal societies and advances
freedom in myriad ways. This objective encompasses a congeries
of diverse goals, including promoting democracy, defeating
terrorism and religious extremism, collaborating to protect the
energy routes and lines of communication supporting free trade
and commerce, expanding the liberal international economic
order, and managing climate change--each of which is critical
to the well being of the United States. It does not take a
great deal of imagination to recognize that for the first time
in recent memory Indian and American interests on each of these
issues are strongly convergent and that India's contribution
ranges from important to indispensable as far as achieving U.S.
objectives is concerned.
The President's intention in proposing civilian nuclear
cooperation with India is fundamentally driven by his
conviction that every impediment to a closer relationship ought
to be eliminated, so that both our countries can enjoy the
fullest fruits of an ever-tighter partnership in regards to
each of the issues above. It is also driven by his desire to
assist New Delhi's growth in power on the assumption that a
strong democratic India would ultimately advance America's own
global interests far better than a weak and failing India
would. The key word, which the administration understands very
well in this context, is ``partnership.'' A strengthened
bilateral relationship does not imply that India will become a
treaty-bound ally of the United States at some point in the
future. It also does not imply that India will become a meek,
compliant and uncritical collaborator of the United States in
all its global endeavors. Rather, India's large size, its proud
history, and its great ambitions, ensure that it will always
pursue its own interests--just like any other great power.
During his recent visit to the United States in March this
year, India's Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, appealed to his
American interlocutors to recognize that ``when an open society
like India pursues its own interests, this is more likely than
not to be of benefit to the United States.'' If the President's
views on India going back to the campaign in 2000 are any
indication, George W. Bush had already reached this conclusion
at least five years ago. In fact, every initiative involving
India, beginning with the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership
in the first term and ending up with the proposal on civilian
nuclear cooperation in the second, suggest that the President
has concluded--correctly--that a strong and independent India
represents a strategic asset, even when it remains only a
partner and not a formal ally. This judgment is rooted in the
belief that there are no intrinsic conflicts of interest
between India and the United States. And, consequently,
transformed ties that enhance the prospect for consistent
``strategic coordination'' between Washington and New Delhi on
all the issues of global order identified above serve U.S.
interests just as well as any recognized alliance.
The question that is sometimes asked in this connection is
whether a close U.S.-Indian partnership would be impossible in
the absence of civilian nuclear cooperation. The considered
answer to this question is ``Yes.'' This is not to say that
U.S.-Indian collaboration will evaporate if civilian nuclear
cooperation between the two countries cannot be consummated,
but merely that such collaboration would be hesitant, troubled,
episodic, and unable to realize its full potential without
final resolution of the one issue that symbolically,
substantively, and materially kept the two sides apart for over
thirty years. At a time when U.S.-Indian cooperation promises
to become more important than ever, given the threats and
uncertainties looming in the international system, the risk of
unsatisfactory collaboration is one that both countries ought
not to take.
Through the civilian nuclear cooperation initiative,
President Bush has embarked on a bold and decisive step to
eliminate those long-standing impediments between Washington
and New Delhi and to place the evolving U.S-Indian relationship
on a firm footing guided by a clear understanding of the geo-
strategic challenges likely to confront the United States in
the twenty-first century. Recognizing that a new global
partnership would require engaging New Delhi not only on issues
important to the United States, the administration has moved
rapidly to expand bilateral collaboration on a wide range of
subjects, including those of greatest importance to India. The
proposal pertaining to extending civilian atomic energy
cooperation to India is, thus, part of a larger set of
Presidential initiatives involving agriculture, cybersecurity,
education, energy, health, science and technology, space, dual-
use high technology, advanced military equipment, and trade.
Irrespective of the issues involved in each of these
realms, the President has approached them through an entirely
new prism, viewing India, in contrast to the past, as part of
the solution rather than as part of the problem. He has judged
the growth of Indian power to be beneficial to America and its
geopolitical interests in Asia and, hence, worthy of strong
support. And, he is convinced that the success of Indian
democracy, the common interests shared with the United States,
and the human ties that bind our two societies together, offer
a sufficiently lasting assurance of New Delhi's responsible
behavior so as to justify the burdens of requesting Congress to
amend the relevant U.S. laws (and the international community,
the relevant regimes) pertaining to peaceful nuclear trade. On
all these matters, I believe--without any qualification--that
the President has made the right judgment with respect to India
and its importance to the United States. I hope that Congress
will agree.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your attention and
consideration.
----------
Prepared Statement of
HON. RONALD F. LEHMAN II
Director, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore
Laboratory
BEFORE THE
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
APRIL 26, 2006
----------
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: In November of last
year, the committee asked me to join in its consideration of
the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement of President George W. Bush
and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on civil nuclear cooperation.
You have that testimony before you. Today's hearing considers
the strategic and nonproliferation implications of the Joint
Statement in the context of S. 2429, legislation to advance
that agreement.
In the last six months, intense negotiations have taken
place. Uncertainty still exists and warrants caution, but both
sides have taken steps and made clarifications. Nothing has
become known, however, that would cause me to change my basic
conclusions and concerns, which again are my personal views.
Let me briefly recall that analysis:
The Joint Statement is an historic milestone for
nonproliferation that creates both great opportunity
and great risk. It creates an opportunity to strengthen
a nuclear nonproliferation regime that is suffering
from its own internal weaknesses such as inadequate
enforcement, the threat of breakout once an advanced
nuclear capability has been achieved, and an inability
to engage effectively the non-parties to the NPT.
Because the terms of the Joint Statement, however, also
spotlight those weaknesses, mishandling of the
implementation of its terms can have adverse
consequences even when the best of intentions are
involved.
* * * * *
If the basic approach contained in the Joint
Statement collapses, we will not return to the status
quo ante. U.S.-Indian cooperation will be set back, but
also the weaknesses in the existing regime will be
exposed to even greater pressure. Bringing India into a
more comprehensive regime of nonproliferation and
restraint, however, could significantly enhance our
ability to reduce the dangers associated with weapons
of mass destruction. Congress can help insure that this
is a sufficiently ambitious agenda. India could do much
to help within its borders, in South Asia, in other
troubled regions, and globally.
* * * * *
I would urge the Congress to focus on the dynamics of
the process and the goals to be achieved as a result of
the U.S.-India Joint Statement rather than attempting
to rearrange the pieces of the initial package. Much
that one might have detailed in the original package
may be more successfully achieved by driving subsequent
interactions in the right direction. This can only be
done, I believe, if nonproliferation is a centerpiece
of strategic engagement rather than a trade-off. It is
best achieved by retaining a viable Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty at the core of a broader
nonproliferation regime that uses more targeted,
embedded engagement to address the fundamental causes
and conditions of proliferation. In short, widely
shared goals should guide our actions, but
implementation will fail if a ``one size fits all''
mentality is applied rigidly to different
circumstances.
The legislation before you is intended to support these
goals by memorializing the principles for a bi-partisan
consensus between both executive and legislative branches that
can provide a stable basis over time for both India and the
United States to work together. Such cohesion and clarity of
purpose, as the United States engages India, would be very
valuable, particularly in support of our nonproliferation
efforts.
That is not the same as saying that partnership with India
will be easy. My own view is that the road ahead with India
will be rocky, certainly when measured against the current
euphoria about India even among those who have concerns about
civil nuclear cooperation. The overselling of the new
relationship today by many will become more obvious in the near
term, but in the long term, common interests and steady foreign
policy could result in achieving or exceeding expectations.
This is not a certain outcome, however.
At the same time, many of the concerns about the strategic
partnership's impact on nonproliferation are also overstated or
manageable. Too often the friends of the NPT act as if they are
rearranging the deck chairs of what their rhetoric describes as
a sinking nonproliferation ``Titanic.'' The nuclear
nonproliferation regime is under stress, but the Indo-U.S.
Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement did not put it there.
Indeed, the agreement offers an opportunity to strengthen the
regime through partnership with India, especially if India
calls a truce in its more than thirty years guerrilla war
against the NPT. Real nonproliferation needs real, embedded
engagement. Again, the successful execution of the partnership
over time must be the measure of merit, not the initial
ceremonies or even enabling legislation.
It is right to take the time now to codify clear
nonproliferation commitments that will guide the strategic
partnership, but, in the future, we must also insure that the
parties live up to those commitments and adjust to new
challenges. We must not let time erode the emphasis on
nonproliferation that should be integral to the Indo-U.S.
relationship. This legislation can be consistent with that
approach, but changing circumstances could also undermine our
clarity of purpose over time, particularly in nonproliferation.
In the early 1990s erosion of purpose perhaps fatally damaged
our nonproliferation prospects and achievements with respect to
North Korea, and one sees similar developments emerging on Iran
among allies, friends, and non-governmental organizations. In
this age of rapidly advancing technology, time is not always on
the side of nonproliferation.
S. 2429 gives emphasis to the nonproliferation objectives
of the new Indo-U.S. partnership. It conditions civil nuclear
cooperation on the President's determination that India:
has provided the US and the IAEA a credible plan to
separate its civil and military facilities,
has an IAEA safeguards agreement in force,
is making progress with the IAEA ``toward
implementing'' an Additional Protocol,
``is working with the United States for the
conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off
Treaty,''
``is supporting international efforts to prevent the
spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology,''
is securing nuclear materials and technology through
export controls and adherence to the Missile Technology
Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group
guidelines, and
the Section 123 Agreement between the U.S. and India
is consistent with U.S. ``participation in the Nuclear
Suppliers Group.''
An eighth condition is dealt with separately, differently,
and more emphatically; namely that India not ``have detonated a
nuclear explosive device after the date of enactment.''
All of these are important conditions, not only when we
begin going down this path of partnership, but also in the
years ahead. The Executive Branch seems legitimately concerned
that an annual process of determinations and legislative
enactment would be corrosive and counterproductive over time in
the real world of political give and take at home and abroad.
That view is not wrong.
----------
Prepared Statement of
HON. ROBERT J. EINHORN
Senior Adviser, Center for Strategic
and International Studies
BEFORE THE
Senate Committee Foreign Relations
APRIL 26, 2006
----------
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before the committee on the nonproliferation implications of
the U.S.-India agreement on civil nuclear cooperation.
The argument for overcoming the nuclear impasse with
India--for altering the nuclear status quo that cut India off
from international civil nuclear cooperation for over 30
years--has become increasingly persuasive. It has been clear
for many years that maintaining existing U.S. laws and Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines prohibiting such cooperation
would not succeed in inducing New Delhi to join the NPT or give
up nuclear weapons. And as the Bush administration has argued,
modifying those laws and guidelines for India could give a
boost to U.S. relations with a rising democratic world power
and assist in addressing India's growing energy needs.
The dilemma we now face is how to achieve the benefits of
changing the rules without undermining the vital U.S. interest
of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. How, for
example, can the United States seek exceptions to the rules for
India without opening the door to exceptions in less worthy
cases--indeed, without weakening the overall fabric of rules
the U.S. worked so hard to create? How would U.S. allies and
friends who had to choose between nuclear weapons and civil
nuclear cooperation (and who made what the U.S. regarded as the
right choice) view giving India the opportunity to have its
cake and eat it too? How can we avoid conveying the impression
to countries contemplating the nuclear option in the future
that, if they opted for nuclear weapons, the world would
eventually accept them into the nuclear club?
Given the inevitable nonproliferation risks involved in
reversing three decades of U.S. law and multilateral policy to
permit nuclear cooperation with India, it is essential that
such a major shift be accompanied by Indian steps that, on
balance, strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Moreover, a
policy departure of such magnitude should be preceded by
thorough discussions with the Congress and key international
partners to ensure they are comfortable with the initiative and
share the view that it does not undercut nonproliferation
interests.
But the U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation deal
negotiated by the Bush administration doesn't meet those
requirements. In the administration's eagerness for a foreign
policy success, the deal was concluded in great haste, driven
by the calendar of Bush-Singh meetings rather than by the
seriousness and complexity of the task at hand. Key
stakeholders in the U.S. Congress and the 45-nation Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) were not consulted in advance. While
speed and exclusivity are often necessary to overcome
bureaucratic and international resistance to major initiatives,
this must be balanced against the need for buy-in, especially
when the success of the initiative depends on approval by both
the Congress and NSG. In its desire to show boldness and
demonstrate a clean break with the past, the administration
gave too little weight to the nonproliferation downsides and
too much weight to proving to the Indians its dedication to
building a qualitatively new relationship. In the process, it
failed to use the leverage available to it to achieve U.S.
objectives.
As a result, the deal outlined in the Joint Statement
concluded when Prime Minister Singh visited Washington last
July, and further elaborated on March 2nd when President Bush
was in Delhi, gave the Indians virtually all that they wanted--
the ability to acquire nuclear equipment and technology and
desperately needed uranium on the world market, acceptance as a
nuclear weapon state in all consequential respects, and
complete freedom to continue and expand production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons. What the U.S. got from the deal
was, for the most part, speculative--the hope that a stronger
partnership with India will pay strategic dividends down the
road.
BENEFITS FOR NONPROLIFERATION ARE MODEST
Recognizing that much of the criticism of the civil nuclear
deal would be based on its implications for nonproliferation,
the administration has made a special effort to show that the
deal strengthens the global nonproliferation regime. But the
arguments are not very convincing.
Several of the steps promised by India are simply
reaffirmations of existing commitments, including its pledges
to continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons
testing, strengthen its national system of export controls, and
work toward the conclusion of a multilateral fissile material
cutoff treaty. Some other steps--including adherence to the
guidelines of the NSG and the Missile Technology Control
Regime--were actions India was already planning to take before
the July 18 th Joint Statement as part of a U.S.-Indian
dialogue on technology transfer and export control. Still
others--such as the promise to refrain from transferring
enrichment and reprocessing technologies to countries that do
not yet possess them--were codifications of existing Indian
policies and practices.
The potentially significant new development was India's
commitment in July to separate civilian and military nuclear
facilities and put the civilian facilities under International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, thereby placing them
off-limits for the production of plutonium for India's nuclear
weapons program. But the separation plan insisted upon by
India's nuclear establishment, backed by Prime Minister Singh,
and accepted by President Bush in March would put only 14 of 22
existing or planned nuclear power reactors under safeguards
(including the six imported reactors India has no choice but to
put under safeguards) and would allow New Delhi to decide
entirely on its own which future reactors it wished to
designate as civilian and submit to safeguards.
The administration has trumpeted as a major
nonproliferation gain that India will have 65 percent of its
thermal reactors under safeguards. As a gesture of support for
the IAEA's safeguards system, India's putting eight more
reactors under safeguards than it would otherwise be obliged to
do is welcome. But strategically, the percentage of reactors
under safeguards is meaningless.
The purpose of IAEA safeguards is to prevent non-nuclear
weapon states from diverting nuclear materials from civilian
facilities to a nuclear weapons program. For nuclear powers
like India, which can use unsafeguarded facilities to produce
fissile material for their weapons programs, safeguards
covering only a portion of their facilities serve primarily a
symbolic function--to reduce the perceived discrimination
between countries that are obliged to accept safeguards on all
their facilities (i.e., NPT non-nuclear states) and those that
are not. Much more meaningful than the percentage of reactors
covered by safeguards is the amount of fissile material that
could be produced at facilities not covered by safeguards.
Under the separation plan approved on March 2nd, India has kept
open plenty of options for producing fissile material for its
weapons program (including at fast breeder reactors well-suited
to producing bomb-grade plutonium).
The administration claims that the nuclear deal is a major
breakthrough because ``for the first time'' it brings India
into the international nonproliferation ``mainstream.'' In her
April 5th testimony, Secretary Rice argued that: ``We better
secure our future by bringing India into the international
nonproliferation system, not by allowing India to remain
isolated for the next thirty years the way it has been for the
last thirty. We are clearly better off having India most of the
way in rather than all the way out.''
This statement creates the impression that India today is
totally outside the rules and, because of that, perhaps even a
potential source of proliferation difficulties. But India, to
its credit, has been moving into the nonproliferation
``mainstream'' for quite some time--in such areas as export
controls, physical protection of nuclear materials, and
interdictions of WMD-related shipments. It still has a distance
to go before its export controls meet the highest international
standards (and indeed the U.S. has sanctioned Indian entities
for sensitive assistance to Iraq, Libya, and Iran). But it is
working hard to strengthen its controls--and it will continue
to do so because it is a responsible country that recognizes
that nonproliferation controls are in its own self interest.
The civil nuclear deal would reinforce these positive trends,
but they will continue with or without the deal.
THE RISKS ARE SUBSTANTIAL
While the nonproliferation gains that can be attributed
directly to the civil nuclear deal are modest, the potential
downsides are substantial.
By seeking an exception to the rules for a country with
which the United States wishes to build a special friendship,
the nuclear deal will reinforce the impression internationally
that the U.S. approach to nonproliferation has become selective
and self-serving, not consistent and principled. Rules the U.S.
previously championed will be perceived as less binding and
more optional. In general, the deal will send the signal that
the U.S.--the country the world has always looked to as the
leader in the global fight against proliferation--is now de-
emphasizing nonproliferation and giving it a back seat to other
foreign policy and commercial goals.
If the U.S. is seen as changing or bending the rules when
they no longer suit us, others can be expected to follow suit.
Indeed, that already seems to be happening. Russia, which a
year ago said it couldn't provide nuclear fuel to India's
Tarapur reactors because of its Nuclear Suppliers Group
obligations, recently sent a large fuel shipment to those
reactors, arguing (over the objections of most NSG members)
that it was entitled to do so under the NSG's ``safety
exception.'' It is highly unlikely that Russia would have
played so fast and loose with the NSG's rules in the absence of
the U.S.-India nuclear deal. It is also not by coincidence
that, not long after the U.S.-India deal, China and Pakistan
began discussing additional reactor sales. It is not clear
whether they will await NSG approval for such sales or simply
proceed outside the guidelines of the NSG.
The U.S.-India deal could make it harder to achieve Bush
administration nonproliferation initiatives. The U.S. is now
asking the NSG to permit nuclear cooperation only with
countries that adhere to the IAEA's Additional Protocol and to
ban transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to
states that do not already possess fuel-cycle facilities. But
getting NSG partners to tighten the rules in ways favored by
the U.S. will be much harder if they are also being asked to
bend one of their cardinal rules (i.e., no nuclear trade with
non-parties to the NPT) because the U.S. now finds it too
constraining.
The civil nuclear deal could also reduce the perceived
costs to states that might consider ``going nuclear'' in the
future. In calculating whether to pursue nuclear weapons, a
major factor for most countries will be how the U.S. is likely
to react. Implementation of the deal with India will inevitably
send the signal, especially to countries with good relations
with Washington, that the U.S. will tolerate and eventually
accommodate to a decision to acquire nuclear weapons.
In the near term, U.S. plans to engage in nuclear
cooperation with India will make it more difficult to address
proliferation challenges such as Iran. Of course, Iran's
interest in nuclear weapons long pre-dated the India deal and
its motives for seeking nuclear weapons have nothing to do with
the deal. But the U.S.-India agreement has strengthened the
case Iran can make--and is already making--internationally and
at home. Why, Iranian officials ask publicly, should Iran give
up its right as an NPT party to an enrichment capability when
India, a non-party to the NPT, can keep even its nuclear
weapons and still benefit from nuclear cooperation? It is an
argument, however flawed and disingenuous, that resonates well
with the Iranian public and with developing countries around
the world and weakens the pressures that can be brought to bear
on Tehran.
The most serious defect of the U. S.-India nuclear deal is
its failure to constrain the further production of bomb-making
fissile material--plutonium and highly enriched uranium--for
nuclear weapons. Indeed, as it now stands, the deal could
actually help India dramatically increase its fissile material
stocks.
India's indigenous uranium supplies are limited. Domestic
uranium ore is of low quality and expensive to mine and process
into yellowcake. Annual production is low and has difficulty
keeping up with demand for both the civil energy and nuclear
weapons programs. Under current nonproliferation restrictions,
which prevent India from buying uranium on the world market,
India will soon face serious shortages and painful trade-offs.
Under the Bush administration plan to change U.S. law and NSG
guidelines, India could satisfy the needs of an expanding civil
nuclear energy program through imports, while freeing up its
domestic uranium reserves for military purposes. It would be a
windfall gain for the nuclear weapons program.
In negotiations leading up to the July 18th Joint
Statement, the Bush administration proposed that India stop
producing fissile material for nuclear weapons, which would
have prevented India from taking advantage of freed-up uranium
supplies for weapons purposes. India rejected the proposal. The
administration then made a further attempt to limit fissile
material production by proposing that most Indian nuclear
facilities, including its fast breeder reactors, be placed
under IAEA safeguards and therefore made ineligible for weapons
plutonium production.
But India's nuclear establishment dug in its heels, calling
publicly for minimizing safeguards coverage and avoiding
constraints on India's bomb-making capacity. Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh, already under attack on the nuclear deal from
his left-wing coalition partners, backed up the nuclear
establishment's demands. Anxious to conclude the nuclear deal
lest the Delhi summit be seen as a failure and calculating that
Singh had less political room for maneuver than President Bush,
the administration threw in the towel on placing meaningful
limits on India's fissile material production capacity.
As a result, a third of India's reactors that currently
exist or are under construction will be outside safeguards and
available for plutonium production. Any future reactor, thermal
or breeder, can be designated by India as outside safeguards.
Of course, the Indians will not devote all their unsafeguarded
nuclear reactors to weapons plutonium production. Indeed, given
India's ambitious nuclear energy goals, we would expect most of
those reactors to be used for civilian purposes. But even if
only two or three large reactors were used as bomb factories,
India could produce enough plutonium for well over 50 nuclear
weapons each year.
Why should the U.S. care about Indian production of fissile
material? After all, India is a friend and a responsible
nuclear power. One reason we should care is that, especially
after 9/11, we have a vital interest in limiting the
availability of bomb-making materials around the world and
preventing such materials from falling into the hands of
terrorist groups who, we know, are actively seeking to acquire
them. If India steps up production, Pakistan can be expected to
follow suit, China could decide to resume production, and
others may be encouraged to seek their own production
capabilities. The more materials produced, the more difficult
and costly it will be to secure them, and the greater the risks
of nuclear terrorism.
Another reason we should care about stepped up Indian
production of fissile materials is that it could lead to
increased tensions and destabilizing arms competition in
southern Asia, involving India, Pakistan, and China. Pakistani
authorities have publicly taken special note of the failure of
the U.S.-India nuclear deal to limit Indian fissile material
production. Reportedly, the Pakistani National Command
Authority recently met to assess the impact of the deal and
consider adjustments Pakistan may need to make to its own
strategic plans. President Musharraf said, ``We cannot remain
oblivious to the changes evolving in the region. All the steps
will be taken for the defense, security, and safety of
Pakistan.'' Moreover, China has warned that the deal threatens
to ``undermine global disarmament moves,'' suggesting that
Beijing may also decide that it needs to respond
programmatically.
Of course, continued or even stepped up nuclear weapons
production in the region would not necessarily translate into
increased tensions. Relations between Indian and Pakistan and
between Indian and China have both been improving in recent
years. But India's insistence on keeping substantial fissile
material production capacity outside of safeguards--thereby
keeping options open for a substantial strategic build-up--
could raise suspicions about its intentions in the minds of its
neighbors and have an adverse effect on the processes of
reconciliation underway in the region.
CAN THE DEAL BE STRENGTHENED?
As it currently stands, the U.S.-India civil nuclear
cooperation deal is a net loss for nonproliferation. Can it be
transformed into a net nonproliferation gain? The answer, at
this stage, lies mainly with the U.S. Congress.
The Bush administration and the Indian Government would
naturally like to see the Congress approve the deal as is, on
the basis of the draft legislation the administration has
already submitted, and to do so as quickly as possible. But
especially given the unprecedented character of the deal and
its far-reaching implications, Congress has a responsibility to
scrutinize it carefully before passing judgment and to adopt
any modifications or conditions it deems necessary to protect
U.S. interests, including in preventing the proliferation of
nuclear weapons or fissile materials.
Implementation of the civil nuclear deal will require
Congressional approval of amendments to the Atomic Energy Act
as well as a bilateral U.S.-India agreement for peaceful
nuclear cooperation. In addition, India and the IAEA will have
to conclude an agreement that applies IAEA safeguards to Indian
nuclear facilities as well as an Additional Protocol to that
agreement. And finally, the NSG will have to agree by consensus
to modify its guideline that currently precludes nuclear
cooperation with states outside the NPT. All of these
arrangements are interrelated. For example, the Bush
administration's willingness to seek changes in U.S. law and
NSG policies depended on India's willingness to accept IAEA
safeguards on certain Indian nuclear facilities in perpetuity.
Before deciding to amend the Atomic Energy Act, the
Congress should therefore insist on seeing as much of the
overall package as possible, including the IAEA-India
safeguards agreements (concluded but not necessarily already
approved by the IAEA Board) and a concluded U.S.-India
agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation. The need to assess
these arrangements as a package is particularly justified
because some of them will be unprecedented. India has put the
IAEA on notice that its safeguards agreement will not follow
standard models but will be ``India-specific.'' The meaning of
India-specific is not yet clear. Moreover, because India is a
nuclear power that must still be treated as a non-nuclear state
for the purposes of U.S. law, the U.S.-India peaceful nuclear
cooperation agreement will be different from any previous U.S.
agreement for cooperation. Negotiations on the IAEA-India
safeguards agreements and the U.S.-India agreement for peaceful
nuclear cooperation have already gotten underway; and so
assuming those negotiations go smoothly, Congressional
insistence on looking at the package as a whole need not cause
significant delays.
Congress should not permit normal approval processes to be
short-circuited. The Atomic Energy Act provides that agreements
for peaceful nuclear cooperation that meet all the requirements
of U.S. law will be approved automatically if the Congress does
not pass a joint resolution of disapproval within 90 days;
whereas agreements that do not meet all the statutory
requirements (i.e., in cases where those requirements are
waived) must be approved by both houses of Congress. Although
the U.S.-India agreement for cooperation will not meet all the
requirements of law (it is the first of about 40 such U.S.
agreements not to do so) and will therefore require a waiver
(because India will not have safeguards on all of its nuclear
facilities), the administration is nonetheless proposing that
the agreement be fast-tracked with the much less demanding
approval procedure. Clearly, the India case deserves more
scrutiny, not less. Congress should insist that both houses of
Congress get the opportunity to review and vote on the U.S.-
India agreement.
In terms of the substantive elements of the U.S.-India
civil nuclear deal, there are several the Congress will want to
probe and understand more clearly. Among them will be whether
an Indian nuclear test explosion--or some other Indian
actions--would trigger the termination of U.S. nuclear
cooperation. A related question is whether the U.S. would be
committed to assist India in obtaining reactor fuel from third
parties if U.S. fuel supplies had to be cut off as a result of
an Indian nuclear test or some other action.
Based on its review of the nuclear deal, Congress may wish
to adopt legislation that strengthens the deal and minimizes
the risks it poses to the global nonproliferation regime.
One means of minimizing those risks would be to restrict
the scope of nuclear cooperation with India that would be
permitted by the new legislation. A long-standing element of
the nonproliferation regime has been the ``NPT preference
policy,'' which has meant giving NPT parties benefits in the
civil nuclear energy area not available to those outside the
NPT. A way of maintaining some preferential treatment for NPT
parties would be to modify U.S. law (and NSG guidelines) to
permit nuclear-related exports to India except equipment,
materials, or technologies related to sensitive fuel-cycle
facilities, including enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water
production. Such a distinction would permit India to acquire
uranium, enriched fuel, nuclear reactors and components, and a
wide range of other nuclear items, but would retain the ban on
transfers of those items that are most closely related to a
nuclear weapons program. The British and French, both of whom
are strong supporters of nuclear cooperation with India,
reportedly believe that nuclear cooperation with India should
not include fuel-cycle equipment and technologies.
Another way of reducing nonproliferation risks would be to
implement the nuclear deal in a country-neutral manner--not as
a special exception to the rules for India alone, which is what
the administration has proposed. A problem with the country-
specific approach is that it accentuates concerns that the U.S.
is acting selectively on the basis of foreign policy
considerations rather than on the basis of objective factors
related to nonproliferation performance.
To avoid the pitfalls of making a country-specific
exception without opening the door to nuclear cooperation in
cases where it is clearly not yet merited, the Congress might
consider permitting nuclear cooperation with any state not
party to the NPT that meets certain criteria of responsible
nuclear behavior (e.g., moratorium on nuclear testing,
effective export controls, strong nuclear security measures,
cooperation in stopping illicit nuclear trafficking). While
such an approach would be country-neutral, it would still
enable the U.S. Government (and other NSG members) to
distinguish among non-parties to the NPT in terms of whether--
and how soon--they would be eligible for nuclear cooperation.
By far the most important way to reduce nonproliferation
risks--and to turn the civil nuclear deal into a net
nonproliferation gain--would be for Congress to take action
that would make the deal a catalyst for curbing or even capping
the worldwide buildup of fissile material. In particular,
Congress should adopt legislation that permits nuclear
cooperation to proceed when India stops producing fissile
material for nuclear weapons, either by ceasing production
unilaterally, by joining other nuclear powers (including China
and Pakistan) in a multilateral moratorium, or by adhering to a
multilateral, verifiable treaty banning the production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons (i.e., a fissile material
cutoff treaty, or FMCT).
In the run-up to the July 18th Joint Statement, India
rejected a Bush administration proposal that it stop producing
fissile material for nuclear weapons. But it is possible New
Delhi might take a different view toward ending production not
unilaterally but as part of a multilateral moratorium or
treaty. After all, India has long declared its support for a
multilateral FMCT. Indeed, in their July 18th Joint Statement,
India and the United States agreed to work together to achieve
an FMCT. If that is a serious undertaking and not a throwaway
line, it would not be unrealistic for the key nuclear powers to
reach agreement on a cutoff in a reasonably short period of
time. The U.S., UK, France, and Russia have all ceased
producing fissile material for nuclear weapons as a matter of
policy. China is also believed to have stopped production. With
intensive diplomatic effort, it should be possible for India
and the U.S. to persuade Pakistan to join them and these other
nuclear powers in a multilateral moratorium pending completion
of a formal multilateral treaty. By linking nuclear cooperation
to the termination of fissile material production, Congress
could provide additional incentive for Washington and New Delhi
to reach agreement at an early date.
CONCLUSION
In seeking to make India an exception to longstanding
nonproliferation rules, the Bush administration has given India
virtually all that it wanted and has run major risks with the
future of the nonproliferation regime. It is therefore
reasonable to ask India to take steps to minimize the risks and
demonstrate its own strong commitment to fighting
proliferation. But the administration has settled for far less
than what is required to make the civil nuclear deal a net gain
for nonproliferation.
India has long wanted to be regarded as a legitimate member
of the nuclear club, not a pariah or outsider. The
administration is right that it is time that India be brought
into the nonproliferation mainstream. But with membership comes
responsibilities--not just in ensuring against leakage of
nuclear equipment or technology to other countries but also in
practicing strategic restraint that can increase international
security generally. India has stated that it is prepared to
assume the same responsibilities and practices as other nuclear
powers. It so happens that the five original nuclear weapons
states have all stopped producing fissile material for nuclear
weapons. Should India not be asked to join them?
Indian leaders might be expected to say that, since the
original five nuclear powers have produced more bomb-grade
material than India, India should be entitled to catch up. But
since its May 1998 nuclear tests, India has often stated that
its strategic requirements are not open-ended and that it
doesn't seek nuclear parity with China or any other country.
Instead, it has consistently maintained that it requires only a
``credible, minimum deterrent capability.'' If that remains the
case, perhaps it can soon decide that it has accumulated
sufficient fissile material for its minimum deterrent needs and
can afford to forgo further production.
A multilateral cap on the accumulation of fissile material
would make a major contribution to fighting nuclear
proliferation and preventing nuclear terrorism. Making a U.S.-
India civil nuclear deal a catalyst for achieving such an
outcome would transform the deal from a substantial loss to a
substantial gain. It would enable the U.S. to advance its
strategic interest in a qualitatively improved relationship
with India as well as serve its nonproliferation interests--not
promote one at the expense of the other. Congress can play a
key role in achieving such an outcome.
----------
Prepared Statement of
DR. GARY MILHOLLIN
Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control and Professor
Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School
BEFORE THE
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
APRIL 26, 2006
----------
Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I would like to
thank you for inviting me to testify today on the
administration's plan for nuclear cooperation with India, and
particularly on the plan's strategic impact.
The committee is right to emphasize the strategic nature of
the plan. The legislation to implement it goes to the heart of
our national security. The bill now before Congress would
change our export control laws--laws that have been in effect
for almost thirty years, and that were adopted in response to
India's nuclear test in 1974. It is worth remembering that
India achieved that test by diverting plutonium made with a
peaceful U.S. nuclear export, which is why India had to call
the test a ``peaceful nuclear explosion.''
The broad question before us is this: Why, after 9/11, when
we should be doing all we can to fight terrorism, and when we
talk almost every day about states or terrorists getting their
hands on an atomic bomb, should we weaken the controls on the
export of nuclear material? Is this the right time to do that?
And if we do it, will it make us safer?
These are the questions that Congress should ask. So far,
the debate has emphasized diplomacy and trade. The most
important questions, however, are strategic. The answers, I'm
afraid, are that the legislation will not make us safer.
Instead, it will put us more at risk.
Why? Because it is impossible to weaken export controls for
India without weakening them for everyone else. The ``everyone
else'' includes Iran, Pakistan, and even terrorist groups--
working through a national government or not--who might want to
buy the means to make mass destruction weapons. And if we do
weaken export controls for everyone, which is bound to happen
if we weaken them for India, we may hasten the day when a
nuclear explosion destroys an American city.
The great flaw in the administration's proposal is that it
considers India an isolated case. This is simply impossible. To
do so contradicts the fundamental principle upon which export
controls are based. The controls today are administered through
international regimes. The regimes include the Nuclear
Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. The
first tries to stop the spread of nuclear arms, the second the
missiles to deliver them.
A cardinal principle of both regimes is that they are
``country neutral.'' That is, they do not make exceptions for
specific countries. The MTCR uses objective criteria to target
``projects of concern'' for missile proliferation. The NSG
requires all non-nuclear weapon states that import items
designed or prepared for nuclear use to accept comprehensive
inspections. Under such inspections, all critical nuclear
material must be accounted for, regardless of the country. In
this way, the regimes have avoided making politically motivated
decisions.
There is good reason for this practice. If the United
States decides to drop controls to help one of its friends--in
this case India--other supplier countries will do the same for
their friends. China will drop controls on its friend Pakistan,
and Russia will drop controls on its friend Iran. There will be
no way to convince either China or Russia not to do that. They
will say that what is good for your friend is good for mine. If
you want to develop your market in India, I want just as much
to develop my market in Pakistan or Iran. No country will give
up a market unless other countries do the same. That is the way
international regimes work.
The regimes also rely on coordination, and on consensus.
The United States acted unilaterally when it made its deal with
India. There was no reported notification or coordination with
the NSG or MTCR before the deal was concluded. By violating the
consensus norm of these regimes, the United States has invited
other members to act the same way. If they do, they may make
unilateral deals with Iran or Pakistan without informing the
United States. This risk has been created by our own action,
and certainly does not make us safer.
The regimes also require enforcement. The member countries
are required to investigate and shut down unauthorized exports
by their own companies. Since the attacks on 9/11, we have been
asking the other countries to do more of this. But can we
really ask them to crack down on companies that are exporting
the same kind of goods to Pakistan or Iran that we are
exporting to India? The same kind of technology will be going
to the same kind of projects. What sense will there be in
trying to interdict the one and not the other? Even if we can
convince the other supplier countries to give lip service to an
exception for India, it is unrealistic to expect them to follow
through with enforcement against their own companies.
Once we start tinkering with the regimes, they could
unravel quickly. As one expert in the Pentagon told me, they
are like a spring-loaded box. If you raise the lid, you may
never get it closed again. What he meant was that the United
States has always set the standard for export controls, and
other countries have often taken a long time to follow the U.S.
lead in strengthening them. But if the United States decides to
loosen controls, it will take only an instant for other
countries to follow. The lid will fly off, and we may never be
able to get it back on.
I would also like to add a personal note to this point. I
have just returned from trips to Jordan and the United Arab
Emirates, where I helped provide training and information to
assist these countries in improving their export controls. I
hope to go to Turkey next. These are all Muslim countries in
which the U.S. government is trying to improve export control
performance. The export control officials in these countries
are now the front-line troops in the fight against terrorism.
They must do their jobs well in order to keep terrorists from
getting their hands on dangerous technology.
In Jordan, one of the first questions I was asked was:
``What about India? Why has the United States decided to export
to India?'' There is no way I, or any other American, can
answer that question in a credible way in a Muslim country.
India, Pakistan and Iran all decided to develop nuclear weapons
under the guise of peaceful nuclear cooperation. From this
standpoint, they are indistinguishable. Why punish Pakistan and
Iran but not India? They are all guilty. There is no persuasive
reason for treating them differently. India is no different
today than it was in 1998, when it tested a nuclear weapon. So,
the second question, hiding behind the first, is ``what is the
ground for the discrimination?'' None of us wants to think of
the word religion, but it is a word that is in the mind of
Muslim countries. If the United States is only against
proliferation by countries it does not like, which now appears
to be the case after the deal with India, why does it like some
countries but not others?
Congress should look deeply into these questions before
approving the legislation. So far, it does not appear that
anyone has done so, including the administration. The
administration's plan was arrived at hastily, with no
consultation with other regime members, and virtually none with
Congress. If the press is to be believed, there was even little
consultation with arms control experts within the
administration itself. The proponents of the deal have
presented it as if it were simply a matter of trade and
diplomacy. Congress should insist upon a full review of the
strategic impact.
If one looks at the strategic side, it is hard to see why
we should be helping India. Only three countries have refused
to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: India, Israel and
Pakistan. Of the three, India is the least important
strategically.
Under any calculation of America's strategic relations,
Pakistan ranks higher than India. Pakistan is essential to our
ongoing military and political efforts in Afghanistan. Pakistan
is also essential to our campaign against Al Qaeda. Without the
aid of General Musharraf, we would have a much harder time
accomplishing our goals in either of these endeavors. Pakistan
is also a leading power in the Muslim world, a world with which
the United States needs better relations. Yet, our deal with
India is a blow to General Musharraf's prestige at best, and at
worst a public humiliation. We should not give General
Musharraf more trouble than he already has.
Israel, of course, has always been a close U.S. ally, and
will continue to be. Israel would like to have U.S. nuclear
cooperation. In addition, Israel is located in a part of the
world that is of the highest importance to U.S. foreign policy
interests.
In any competition for strategic favor from the United
States, India finishes a distant third.
Is India nevertheless important because it will become a
counterweight to China? Proponents of the deal so argue. But
the notion that India might assist the United States
diplomatically or militarily in some future conflict is pure
speculation. India's long history as the leader of the ``non-
aligned'' movement points in the opposite direction. India will
follow its own interests as it always has. An example is
India's decision to train Iranian sailors and import Iranian
gas. In addition, India shares a border with China, is keen to
have good relations with China, and does have good relations
with China. It will not sour such relations simply from a vague
desire to please the United States.
This India-as-counterweight-to-China theory reminds one of
the argument made by the first Bush administration in the
1980s, when it contended that the United States should export
sensitive dual-use equipment to Saddam Hussein in order to
build up Iraq as a counterweight to Iran. U.S. pilots were
later killed in Iraq trying to bomb things that U.S. companies
had provided. History shows that such predictions can be
dangerous.
Then why choose India for preferential treatment? If it is
not because of our need to fight terrorism, and not because of
our desire to reward a faithful ally, what is it? There seems
to be only one answer: India is the biggest market. Secretary
of State Rice readily admits the commercial interest. On April
5 she testified to this committee that the agreement with India
was ``crafted with the private sector firmly in mind.'' She
cited a 13 billion dollar deal by Boeing; she cited the hope of
reactor sales by our nuclear industry; she cited the
opportunity for ``U.S. companies to enter the lucrative and
growing Indian market.''
She might also have mentioned India's defense market. That
market seems to be the one that is really motivating the deal.
India is shopping for billions of dollars worth of military
aircraft, and the administration is hoping it will buy both the
F-16 and the F-18. According to the American press, officials
in the defense industry and the Pentagon are saying that the
main effect of the nuclear deal will be to remove India from
the ranks of violators of international norms. And once this
change in India's status occurs, there will be no impediment to
arms exports. The Russian press is even more explicit. It
complains that in addition to ``recognition of India's nuclear
status by the United States,'' the nuclear deal ``opened the
door to the Indian market for American arms merchants,'' with
the result that Russia may be squeezed out.
Boiled down to the essentials, the message is clear: Export
controls are less important to the United States than money.
They are a messy hindrance, ready to be swept aside for trade.
But, a decision to put money above export controls is precisely
what we don't want China and Russia to do when they sell to
Iran. We don't want China and Russia to tell us that money in
their pockets is more important than stopping Iran's march
toward the bomb. But China and Russia are now hearing the new
commercial message coming from America, and they are not
stupid. If they see that we are willing to put money above
security, and willing to take the risk that dangerous exports
won't come back to bite us, they will do the same. Everyone's
security will diminish as a result.
Thus, this legislation has clear costs to our security. Are
these outweighed by the benefits? What are the benefits?
The principal benefit cited by the administration is that
India will place 14 of its 22 power reactors under inspection.
But, as others have pointed out, this leaves a great number of
reactors off-limits. In fact, the reactors that are off-limits
will be sufficient to produce enough plutonium for dozens of
nuclear weapons per year. This is more than India will ever
need. India is not restricting its nuclear weapon production in
any way. Therefore, there is no ``non-proliferation benefit''
from such a step.
In effect, India's offer is like that of a counterfeiter
with a 22 room house, who offers to let the police look into 14
rooms as long as they stay out of all the others. Why would any
policeman in his right mind accept such an offer, or want to
inspect one of the 14 rooms? It would be the only place where
he was sure not to find anything. It would waste his time, just
as it will waste the time of international inspectors to look
at India's 14 declared reactors. Everyone knows that it will be
the eight undeclared ones that make the bombs. India, in fact,
appears to have calculated the number of reactors to put off-
limits according to how much plutonium they will make. India
has assured itself that the resulting amount of plutonium will
be enough to allow it to continue making bombs at an unfettered
pace.
This point about wasting inspection time may seem minor,
but it isn't. The International Atomic Energy Agency has a
limited number of inspectors. They are already having trouble
meeting their responsibilities. To send them to India on a
fool's errand will mean that they won't be going to places like
Iran, where something may really be amiss. Unless the Agency's
budget is increased to meet the new burden in India, the
inspection of India's declared reactors will produce a net loss
for the world's non-proliferation effort.
The other major benefit that the administration cites is
that India may buy American reactors. Such a possibility
exists, but is remote. The precedent is our experience with
China. Some members of the committee may remember the intense
debate in Congress over the U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement
with China in the 1980's. At the time, our industry was citing
the large number of reactors that China was planning to buy,
and predicting that many of the orders would come to us. How
many American reactors did China actually buy? The answer is:
none. Exactly zero. The main effect of China's agreement with
us was to increase the number of vendors who were in
competition. The result was to drive the price down for the
Chinese reactor buyers. That was good for China, but did
nothing for us. The Chinese import orders went to France,
Russia and Canada.
We are not likely to fare any better this time. New Delhi
is already building a string of reactors on its own that are
less expensive to put up than ours. And if India wants to
import reactors, it can turn to the Russians, who will charge
less money and attach fewer conditions, and who are already
ahead of us in the Indian market. It can also turn to the
French or even perhaps the Canadians. All of these countries
will compete with us if we sell to India. The chance that we
will defeat this competition is slim.
The administration also argues that India has a great need
for nuclear power to meet its electricity demand. This too is
far-fetched. India has been generating electricity with nuclear
reactors for more than 40 years. Yet, reactors supply only
about 2 percent to 3 percent of its electricity today. If
reactors are so vital to India's energy needs, why hasn't India
built more? The answer is that reactors have not turned out to
be as safe, or as clean, or--most important--as economical as
originally thought. Nuclear power has been virtually
insignificant in India's energy mix in the past, and will be no
more important in the future. It is worth noting that the
United States hasn't ordered a new reactor for about thirty
years. Why do we expect India to buy American reactors when
even we aren't buying them?
I would also like to comment on the effect that the
administration's new policy will have on missile proliferation.
President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed
to cooperate in ``space exploration,'' including ``satellite
navigation and launch.'' This language is broad enough to allow
missile-useable components and technology to be exported. The
United States seem entirely ready to permit such sales. The
U.S. Commerce Department recently dropped restraints on
American exports of missile-related equipment to three
subsidiaries of the Indian Space Research Organization, despite
the fact that all three are active in Indian missile
development. This appears to be only a first step in a general
loosening of U.S. missile export controls for India.
It is difficult to predict where this will lead. One cannot
help a country like India build better space launchers without
helping it build better missiles. Our experience with China is
again the precedent. In the 1990's China got crucial American
help in rocket design, guidance, launch operation, and payload
integration, all of which were directly useable in making
intercontinental ballistic missiles. The help came from
American companies that were supposed to be engaged only in a
peaceful space effort.
India will be no different. India, in fact, is the first
country to develop a long-range nuclear missile from a civilian
space-launch program. India's Agni missile, tested in 1989, was
built by using the design of the American ``Scout'' space
rocket. India imported the blueprints from NASA under the cover
of peaceful space cooperation.
India has every intention of building nuclear missiles that
will reach the United States. For some years, India has been
working to develop a nuclear submarine, which will be able to
threaten every coastal city in the world with a nuclear
payload. India has also been working on an intercontinental
ballistic missile, known as the Surya, which will fly much
farther than any target in China. Two questions come to mind.
Why should India want to reach such targets? And does the
United States really want to make it easier for India to
succeed?
The final point I would like to make has to do with the
power of Congress. That power will be greatly reduced if the
administration's legislation passes.
The important question to ask about the power of Congress
is this: Why is this bill necessary? What is wrong with present
U.S. law?
Under the present Atomic Energy Act, the president could
make an agreement tomorrow for nuclear cooperation with India.
All the president has to do is submit to Congress what is known
as an ``exempt'' agreement--that is, an agreement that does not
satisfy the Act's present criteria for nuclear cooperation.
India does not satisfy the criteria because it has refused
to put all of its nuclear material under international
inspection and is, in fact, running a secret nuclear weapon
program. That is why the president must ``exempt'' the
agreement before submitting it to Congress. After such a
submission, Congress must adopt a joint resolution saying that
it favors the agreement. If Congress disagrees, or does not
act, the agreement does not go into effect.
The president must meet a high standard to justify the
exemption. He must find that holding India to the present
criteria ``would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of
United States non-proliferation objectives'' or that it would
``otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.'' He
must also persuade Congress that he is right, because Congress
must take action for the agreement to operate.
Why hasn't the president taken this course of action?
Apparently, because he cannot meet the standard. He cannot find
that it ``would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of
United States non-proliferation objectives'' to make India meet
the existing criteria. To the contrary, it would advance U.S.
non-proliferation objectives if India met the criteria, because
India would be giving up its bomb program and putting its
fissile material under international inspection. That would be
a clear gain for non-proliferation instead of a loss.
Because the administration cannot meet the present
standard, the administration has asked Congress to lower it.
India would only have to meet a list of weaker criteria that
the administration is already confident India can comply with.
But the administration has not been content to stop there.
It also wants to shift the burden of proof. Under the new
legislation, the burden of proof would shift to Congress.
Instead of having to convince Congress to act after submitting
an ``exempt'' agreement, the agreement would take effect
automatically after 90 days unless Congress voted affirmatively
to block it. Any such vote could be vetoed, so Congress would
have to muster a 2/3 majority in both houses in order to have
its view prevail. That is in direct contradiction to present
law, under which an exempted agreement would have to be
affirmatively agreed to by a joint resolution.
Thus, the effect of the bill is twofold: it makes it easier
for the president to exempt an agreement, and it makes it
harder for Congress to prevent an exempted agreement from
taking effect. If Congress wishes to preserve its existing
power, it could require that an exempted agreement still be
reviewed under the present process. The administration has not
advanced any persuasive reason why the process of Congressional
review should be changed.
Preserving the existing process would have several
advantages. Congress would have more than 90 days to study the
agreement; Congress would not have to muster a veto-proof
majority to block the agreement, or attach conditions to it;
and Congress would be able to see the actual agreement before
taking a vote.
Under the new legislation, Congress is being asked to lower
the standards for nuclear cooperation and to shift the burden
of proof before any agreement with India has been reached.
Congress is being asked to vote without knowing what kind of
inspections India will eventually agree to, without knowing
whether India will really improve its own export controls, and
without knowing whether India's plan for separating its
civilian from its military nuclear facilities is ``credible,''
as the new criteria require. Congress would be buying a pig in
a poke. It would be giving the administration carte blanche
authority to make an agreement that, because of Congress'
reduced power of review, there would be little opportunity to
change.
----------
Prepared Statement of
DR. STEPHEN P. COHEN
Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
BEFORE THE
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 2006
----------
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for
the opportunity to share my knowledge of South Asian security,
non-proliferation and arms control issues as you grapple with
this important initiative. On balance, the initiative should be
welcomed. I have argued in print for a non-proliferation half-
way house since 1990--an admittedly imperfect response to an
imperfect situation, but far better than the status quo. By
minor modifications in the proposed legislation and changes in
American policy the nuclear cooperation agreement could be
still further improved.
I am a signatory of a March 10 letter backing the
initiative. That letter argues that the agreement enhances
American strategic interests, and if properly implemented, it
will advance, not retard, American non-proliferation
objectives. We also argue that the initiative will help India
move to an energy strategy that makes it less dependant on
imported oil and that it will positively address our global
environmental concerns.
I was resident in India during many of the major Indian
debates over its nuclear weapons policy. In 1964-65 it debated
its response to the Chinese nuclear test at Lop Nor; in 1967-68
it debated whether or not to sign the NPT, and in 1974, after
its phony ``peaceful nuclear explosion,'' India debated whether
to weaponize. In the late 1980s there was a major debate over
the proper response to evidence of a Chinese-assisted Pakistani
nuclear weapons program. The Rajiv Gandhi ``Action Plan'' of
1988 was in part a last-minute attempt to forestall a response-
in-kind to Pakistan's program; in the early 1990s Indians
grappled with the highly publicized American effort to cap,
roll back, and eliminate its nuclear weapons program and that
of Pakistan. More recently, I spent a month in New Delhi
observing the Indian debate over the Bush-Manmohan Singh
initiative.
There are two major conclusions to draw from this forty-
year history:
First, in most of these cases India was responding to
nuclear developments elsewhere. It's strategic elite
was sharply divide as to the utility and morality of
nuclear weapons, and until the 1998 tests India's
policy was one of maintaining an ``option'' or a
``recessed'' (i.e. unannounced) deterrent. As opponents
of this agreement have noted, India simply lied about
its small weapons program and it certainly violated the
spirit and the letter of agreements reached with
foreign governments concerning the peaceful use of
nuclear assistance. For that India has been subjected
to thirty years' of sanctions.
Second, in all of these debates the military, and
purely military calculations, have been notably absent.
The Indian nuclear program was nurtured by a small
enclave of scientists and bureaucrats who were largely
responsive, not pro-active in their thinking. As George
Tanham wrote, Indian strategic thought is notable by
its lack of interest in military things. There was and
remains a curious blend of extravagant idealism
(epitomized in the many plans for global nuclear
disarmament generated in India over the years) and
Kautilyan-Machiavellian realism (epitomized by the
secrecy that shrouded the covert weapons program).
It is my judgment that this initiative need not trigger an
arms race with Pakistan, and it is certainly not a green light
to India to build a thousand or more nuclear weapons. It does
provide the United States with an opportunity to work with
India to help prevent a broader nuclear arms race, something
that is certainly not in the interest of India, Pakistan,
China, or America.
Therefore, I would propose the following steps:
First, The agreement with India should eventually be
folded into legislation that would develop criteria
that would allow other states to enter such a nuclear
half-way house. This half-way house would provide
civilian nuclear assistance in exchange for impeccable
horizontal non-proliferation record. Right now India
seems to meet most reasonable tests, as does Israel,
but Pakistan and North Korea would not.
Second, the administration should undertake an
initiative that would constrain vertical proliferation
via a nuclear restraint regime in Asia, this initiative
would include India, Pakistan and China. Such a regime
need not involve formal, negotiated limits, which would
be very difficult to achieve, but certainly could be
based upon a fissile material cutoff, continued
restraint on testing, and limited deployment of
weapons. The first two feature in the US-India nuclear
initiative, but they need to be made multilateral,
especially to ward off an arms race between Pakistan
and India. Of course, China's decision on renewing
testing will be shaped by its response to the United
States, and I believe that we can continue our own ban
on tests indefinitely without damaging nuclear
preparedness.
Third, with this agreement in place New Delhi should
feel less paranoid about discussing its own nuclear
capabilities and their interaction with those of other
states. As long as India felt that the U.S. was trying
to strip it of its weapons program Indian officials
talked on endlessly about global nuclear disarmament,
but they refused to discuss concrete steps that would
enhance India's security through cooperative agreements
with others. Indeed, the Indians are still reluctant to
allow their country to be the venue for such
discussions by non-government organizations, unless
they are strictly scripted. Under the auspices of the
new Indo-U.S. Agreement on Science and Technology the
U.S. should assist India in setting up a center to
study ``best practices'' gleaned from the American and
Russian/Soviet nuclear and missile experience. We
should also expect that India will eventually join the
process of nuclear arms reduction that began with U.S.
and Russian nuclear cuts; I am disappointed that such a
long-term goal was not even mentioned in the various
U.S.-Indian communiques, we do not want to continue
down the process of arms reduction only to see some of
the new nuclear weapons states such as India and
Pakistan pass us on their way up.
To summarize, while supporting the agreement I believe that
it should be the initial step in a process of crafting a
diplomacy that addresses wider complex arms control and
security concerns, not just meeting India's energy needs.
America has such concerns in an area that stretches from Israel
to China; this includes at least five states that have nuclear
weapons and two that may be trying to acquire them. This
agreement does much to repair the torn US-Indian strategic tie,
it is important in reshaping and revitalizing India's massive
energy shortfall, and it has already been helpful in our
attempt to constrain an Iranian program, but this
administration and its successor--with Congress'' assistance--
should regard it as a beginning, not an end as far as our
nonproliferation and strategic interests are concerned.
----------
Material Relating to the Committee's November 2, 2005 Hearing, ``U.S.-
Indian Nuclear Energy Cooperation: Security and Nonproliferation
Implications
----------
Responses to Senator Lugar's Questions to the Hon. R. Nicholas Burns,
Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and the Hon. Robert G. Joseph,
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, Department
of State, Washington, DC
The Administration's Legislative Proposal and the July 18 Joint
Statement
Question. When will the administration present this
committee with legislation regarding nuclear energy cooperation
with India?
Answer. We do not intend to ask Congress to take
legislative action to facilitate this agreement until the
Indian Government takes certain important steps. We have made
it clear to the Indians that they need to begin to follow
through on their commitments, including to present--and begin
to implement--a credible and transparent plan for separation of
their civilian and military nuclear facilities that is
defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint before we would
further seek to adjust our legal frameworks.
We have agreed to work closely with the Indians over the
next several weeks to months on this plan and on other Indian
steps which will allow us to seek changes to our laws. We hope
to be in a position to seek formal legislative relief in the
first quarter of 2006.
Question. When do you anticipate that India will have
completed all of the steps it has committed to undertaking in
the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement?
Answer. Some of the actions to which India has committed
are ongoing, such as its pledge to continue its moratorium on
nuclear testing and its commitment to refrain from the transfer
of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do
not already have them. Others can be completed with additional
effort, such as India's adherence to the Nuclear Suppliers
Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Some of the
actions that India must take are complex, and will take time to
complete. There is not yet an established timetable for the
separation of India's civil and military nuclear
infrastructure, for instance. Implementation of the plan will,
as the Joint Statement suggests, take place in a phased manner.
We intend to move expeditiously and will assess progress on all
aspects of the Joint Statement prior to President Bush's
expected trip to India in early 2006. We hope that India will
have developed and begun to implement a plan for civil-military
separation and also be engaged in substantive discussions with
the IAEA by that time.
Question. In your view, when should Congress act to change
U.S. law? Before or after completion by India of all its
undertakings in the July 18 Joint Statement or after the
completion of certain parts of the Joint Statement?
Answer. Because the Joint Statement will take considerable
time to implement fully, we do not intend to wait until all
Indian commitments are fully realized to submit proposed
legislation to the Congress. Rather, once India develops a
transparent and credible civil-military separation plan for its
nuclear facilities and programs and begins to implement it, we
will then seek appropriate legislative solutions. Ideally, U.S.
law would be properly adjusted before the Nuclear Supplies
Group Guidelines are adjusted.
Question. What are the interim forms of legislation being
considered by the Department in this area? Will there be a new
nuclear cooperative agreement with India, one for which
statutory amendments would be required, or does the
administration prefer to create a broad, new authority outside
of the current Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011, et
seq.) for India?
Answer. In consultation with Congress, our objective is to
conclude a new agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation with
India that satisfies all requirements of section 123(a) of the
Atomic Energy Act, except for the requirement that full-scope
IAEA safeguards be applied in India. India has agreed to
separate its military and civilian nuclear facilities and
programs, and to place its civilian components under IAEA
safeguards. The result will not be ``full-scope'' IAEA
safeguards, so the agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation
will not provide for that; but the agreement will allow for
appropriate controls to help ensure that material or goods
provided for civilian purposes remain within the civilian
sector. The administration prefers stand-alone, India-specific
legislation, but could envision alternatives as well. We look
forward to continuing consultations with both the Senate and
the House in the coming weeks.
Question. Could you please provide me with your
understanding of current U.S. law, i.e., which U.S. laws or
regulations prohibit exports to India of nuclear and dual-use
nuclear items and which U.S. laws or regulations provide a
presumption (of approval or denial) of such exports to India,
and which such laws and regulations would need to be modified
to implement the Joint Statement?
Answer. Under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of
1954, as amended, an agreement for cooperation between the
United States and India will be required in order for the
United States to engage in major nuclear cooperation (e.g.,
nuclear material, nuclear facilities, and major nuclear
components) with India as contemplated by the Joint Statement.
One of the requirements is that an agreement for cooperation
(outside of the NPT-recognized five nuclear weapon states) must
include full-scope safeguards unless exempted by the President
as provided in section 123. An agreement that has been exempted
by the President from one or more requirements in section
123(a) cannot become effective until Congress adopts, and there
is enacted, a joint resolution stating that Congress favors the
agreement. We believe stand-alone legislation offers a
preferable long-term solution.
Section 128 of the AEA requires, as one of the export
license criteria for significant nuclear exports, that a
recipient nonnuclear weapon state have full-scope safeguards.
The AEA's full-scope safeguards requirement is incorporated in
the regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 10 CFR
Sec. 110.42(a)(6), as one of the export licensing criteria for
exports of nuclear facilities and material. Section 129 of the
AEA prohibits significant nuclear cooperation with a nonnuclear
weapon state that is found by the President to have undertaken
certain activities, including detonating a nuclear explosive
device, or to have engaged ``in activities involving source or
special nuclear material and having direct significance for the
manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices, and
has failed to take steps which, in the President's judgment,
represent sufficient progress toward terminating such
activities.'' The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's regulations
at 10 CFR Sec. 110.46 incorporate section 129 of the AEA. Both
section 128 and section 129 provide Presidential waiver
authority.
With respect to dual use nuclear items under the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR), there would be no need to
make a regulatory change. Dual-use items are reviewed on a
case-by-case basis. As a matter of policy, Commerce does not
approve exports to unsafeguarded facilities. Moreover, the
United States remains committed to not ``in any way'' assist
weapons programs in nonnuclear weapon states as defined by the
NPT.
Question. The Joint Statement commits the United States to
``full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India.'' As the
United States has different forms of nuclear energy cooperation
with many nations, differing even among NPT Parties, what is
the meaning of this phrase in relation to U.S. law and
regulation regarding nuclear commerce with India?
Answer. For the United States, ``full civil nuclear
cooperation'' with India means trade in most civil nuclear
technologies, including fuel and reactors. But we do not intend
to provide enrichment or reprocessing technology to India. As
the President said in February 2004, ``enrichment and
reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.'' We do not currently
provide enrichment or reprocessing equipment to any country.
We will also need to ensure that any cooperation is fully
consistent with U.S. obligations under the NPT not to ``in any
way'' assist India's nuclear weapons program, and with
provisions of U.S. law.
Question. What regulatory changes (beyond those already
made under the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership or NSSP)
would need to be made to implement full civil nuclear energy
cooperation with India?
Answer. Many of the specifics of required regulatory
changes to implement full civil nuclear energy cooperation with
India have yet to be determined by the administration. U.S.
regulations that incorporate or reflect statutory language will
need to be modified or waived in order to permit civil nuclear
cooperation consistent with the Joint Statement, and will need
to be addressed along with modification or waiver of the
related statute. No Department of Commerce regulatory changes
will be required in order to implement full civil nuclear
cooperation, except as facilities are put under IAEA
safeguards, they could in principle be removed from the Entity
List.
Question. Presuming Congressional approval of statutory
amendments and Nuclear Suppliers Group approval of an exception
to its Guidelines for India, when would the United States
Government begin to approve the export of nuclear items or
technical data to India, and what are those items or technical
data likely to be?
Answer. Should the NSG and the Congress approve, in
principle, supply would be feasible when the United States and
other potential suppliers assess they can confidently supply to
Indian facilities and remain in compliance with our obligations
under the NPT and NSG. This will occur once IAEA safeguards are
put in place and applied in perpetuity. Further, the separation
plan must ensure--and the safeguards must confirm--that
cooperation does not ``in any way assist'' in the development
or production of nuclear weapons. In this context, nuclear
materials in the civil sector must remain within the civil
sector. A clear and transparent separation between India's
civil and military facilities is essential. We will be unable
to supply facilities that are not under appropriate safeguards.
We cannot say precisely which nuclear technologies the
United States (or other suppliers) would export to India,
except that we would exclude reprocessing and enrichment
technologies from our list. In our view, once India makes
demonstrable progress in implementing key Joint Statement
commitments--with the presentation of a credible, transparent,
and defensible separation plan foremost on the list--we will be
ready to engage with our NSG partners in developing a formal
proposal to allow the shipment of Trigger List items and
related technology to properly safeguarded facilities in India.
Nuclear Suppliers Group Issues
Question. What are the positions of each of the 44 members
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group on the comments and proposals
made by A/S Rocca and A/S Rademaker during their consultations
with NSG members in Vienna, Austria, last October?
Answer. Not every member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
expressed an opinion on the comments made by A/S Rocca and A/S
Rademaker during their consultations with NSG Participants at
the Consultative Group meeting in October. The meeting provided
many NSG partners the first opportunity to consider our
proposed approach to realizing full civil nuclear cooperation
without amending the NSG Guidelines, per se.
Of those delegations expressing an opinion, some
governments, including the Czech Republic, France, Russia, and
the U.K., expressed support for the proposal; several
governments, including Argentina, China, Greece, Japan, and
South Korea, said that their governments would require further
information on implementation, including details of India's
plans for the separation of civilian and military nuclear
facilities, before they could make a decision on the proposals;
and some governments, such as Sweden and Switzerland, expressed
initial reservations and indicated a need for further study.
Question. Could you please furnish the remarks made by
Assistant Secretary Rocca and Assistant Secretary Rademaker in
Vienna to the NSG members to the committee?
Answer. Yes. To satisfy standard NSG confidentiality
practices, Assistant Secretary Rocca's and Assistant Secretary
Rademaker's statements are reproduced below. These are not
intended for open publication.
Question. Did the remarks made by the U.S. delegation
present specific proposals regarding changes to specific parts
of the NSG Guidelines for Nuclear Exports for India?
Answer. We have not yet tabled any formal proposals. We
expressed a preference at the October meeting of the NSG
Consultative Group to treat India as an exceptional case in
light of its substantial and growing energy needs, its nuclear
nonproliferation record, and the enhanced nonproliferation
commitments it has now undertaken. We also expressed our firm
intention that the NSG maintain its effectiveness, and
emphasized that we will not undercut this important
nonproliferation policy tool. The U.S. proposal neither seeks
to alter the decisionmaking procedures of the NSG nor amend the
current full-scope safeguards requirement in the NSG
Guidelines.
Question. Has the United States shown proposed changes to
NSG Guidelines to Indian Government officials?
Answer. No. Our discussions with India to date have
centered on implementation of Indian and U.S. commitments
rather than on what the NSG should do.
Question. Will India join the NSG?
Answer. In the 18 July Joint Statement, PM Singh committed
India not to join but to adhere to Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Guidelines.
The practice of unilateral adherence to the MTCR or NSG is not
unique to India. Unilateral adherents voluntarily abide by the
Guidelines of the regime--as do regime members--but are not
formal members, per se. We expect to hold unilateral adherents,
such as India, to the same standards specified in the
Guidelines.
Question. Do you anticipate that the NSG will be able to
make a consensus decision on the U.S. proposal(s) regarding
India at its next plenary meeting?
Answer. While we will certainly consider advancing a formal
proposal for NSG consideration at the next plenary, the pace
and scope of India's implementation will help determine the
specific timing. Should its actions, and our ongoing
consultations with NSG partners support it, we may be in a
position to seek agreement on a formal proposal at the 2006
plenary session, expected in the May/June timeframe.
INPA Sanctions
Question. On September 23, 2004, the administration
sanctioned two Indian scientists for their activities in Iran
under the authority of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000
(P.L. 106-178, or INPA).
Has the administration considered other sanctions
against Indian entities or persons under INPA or any
other relevant U.S. law or executive order since last
September?
Answer. While we believe India has a solid record overall
of ensuring that its nuclear-related expertise and technologies
do not pose a proliferation risk, we continue to review
information and take action to implement U.S. law as
appropriate. In an unclassified response, it would not be
appropriate to comment on the consideration of any other
sanctions cases due to intelligence sensitivities that would
surround any such case. However, if additional details are
required, we could provide a classified response separately.
What was the reaction of the Indian Government to
the INPA sanctions last year?
Answer. In the context of our ongoing dialog with India, we
informed the Indian Government when sanctions were imposed. At
that time, they expressed serious concerns, and we discussed
the sanctions cases as part of the dialog. The Indian
Government has made clear to us its commitment to close any
loopholes and ensure that its entities are not a proliferation
source of sensitive technologies in the future. Among recent
steps, India has improved its export control legislation and
has harmonized its national control list with the Nuclear
Suppliers Group Guidelines.
What steps has India taken to prevent Indian
interactions with Iranian entities or persons closely
involved with Iran's atomic energy activities?
Answer. We cannot comment in unclassified channels on
specific Indian actions, but would be able to discuss this
further in a classified setting.
We believe India has a solid record overall of ensuring
that its nuclear-related expertise and technologies do not pose
a proliferation risk, and we have an ongoing dialog with India
on proliferation issues. India has clearly demonstrated over
the past several years its desire to work with the United
States and the international community to fight the spread of
sensitive nuclear technologies.
As part of an effort launched with India during the
administration's first term--the Next Steps in Strategic
Partnership--India took a number of significant steps to
strengthen export controls and to ensure that Indian companies
would not be a source of future proliferation. Not only did
India pledge to bring its export control laws, regulations, and
enforcement practices in line with modern export control
standards, but also passed an extensive export control law and
issued an upgraded national control list that will help it
achieve this goal.
Other measures were also instituted as a part of the NSSP
process, which included India permitting U.S. Government end-
use verifications and agreement to increase bilateral and
multilateral cooperation on nonproliferation.
In addition, India has become a party to the Convention on
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and has taken
significant steps toward meeting its obligations under UNSCR
1540.
The additional nonproliferation commitments India made as
part of the Joint Statement go even further and, once
implemented, will bring it into closer conformity with
international nuclear nonproliferation standards and practices.
In our view, it is clear that India agrees that Iran's
pursuit of a full nuclear fuel cycle makes no sense from an
economic or energy-security standpoint. India has called on
Iran to return to negotiations with the EU-3 aimed at ending
Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability in exchange for
expanded cooperation from Europe and others in the field of
peaceful nuclear energy, as well as economic, commercial,
political, and security incentives. India has also called on
Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA's ongoing investigations,
and to resume a suspension of all enrichment-related and
reprocessing activities as a way of building confidence. We
welcomed India's decision to join 21 other IAEA Board members
in voting to adopt the September 24 resolution that found Iran
in noncompliance with its safeguards obligations. That outcome
demonstrated to Iran that it is not just the United States and
other Western countries that have concerns about Iran's nuclear
activities, but the entire international community. India has
offered full support to the EU-3's efforts to seek an end to
Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions.
India and Iran
Question. India's vote in favor of IAEA Board of Governors
(BOG) Resolution GOV/2005/77 was seen by some as a departure
from its traditional siding with developing countries in
multilateral fora.
Prior to the vote, it had been my understanding that the
goal of the United States and the EU-3 at that BOG meeting was
to report Iran's noncompliance to the U.N. Security Council.
Indian officials have taken credit for preventing such a
report by supporting language that found Iran's noncompliance
``within the competence of the Security Council.'' An earlier
Indian Ministry of External Affairs press release regarding a
telephone conversation between Indian Prime Minister Singh and
Iranian President Ahmadinejad stated that ``India supports the
resolution of all issues through discussion and consensus in
the IAEA.''
What were the reasons India did not support
reporting Iranian noncompliance to the Security Council
at the last meeting of the BOG?
Answer. India voted for a resolution that requires a report
to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and finds Iran in
noncompliance with its NPT safeguards obligations under Article
XII.C of the IAEA Statute. However, the timing and content of
this report to the UNSC are still to be determined.
Under what circumstances would India support
reporting Iranian noncompliance to the Security
Council?
Answer. In its support for IAEA BOG Resolution GOV/2005/77,
India endorsed sending a report to the Security Council. The
contents of the report and the timing of transmitting the
report are unclear at this point. In our view, it would not be
useful to speculate further on this hypothetical question.
Is it the Administration's position that Iran's
noncompliance should be reported to the Security
Council?
Answer. The United States has long expressed the view that
Iran should be reported to the United Nations Security Council.
At the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Board of
Governors meeting on September 24, India voted--along with the
United States and our EU-3 partners--in favor of a resolution
that requires a report to the United Nations Security Council
and finds Iran in noncompliance with its NPT safeguards
obligations under Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute. In
addition, for the first time, the IAEA Board concluded with
this resolution that Iran's pattern of deception and denial,
continued lack of cooperation with the IAEA, and continued
pursuit of nuclear fuel cycle capabilities in defiance of the
international community, is a matter that falls within the
competence of the United Nations Security Council, under
Article III.B.4 of the IAEA Statute.
Does the administration consider Iran's July-August
2005 resumption of uranium conversion activities at
UCF-Isfahan to be a breach of its suspension of fuel-
cycle activities agreed to with the EU-3?
Answer. Yes. Under the November 2004 Paris Agreement, Iran
agreed ``on a voluntary basis, to continue and extend its
suspension to include all enrichment related and reprocessing
activities, and specifically: The manufacture and import of gas
centrifuges and their components; the assembly, installation,
testing or operation of gas centrifuges; work to undertake any
plutonium separation, or to construct or operate any plutonium
separation installation; and all tests or production at any
uranium conversion installation.'' Iran's uranium conversion
activities represent a breach of its commitments under the
Paris Agreement with the EU-3 and defy the September 24 IAEA
Board resolution, which called on Iran to suspend all
enrichment-related activity including uranium conversion.
Does the Indian Government consider Iran's July-
August 2005 resumption of uranium conversion activities
at UCF-Isfahan to be a breach of its suspension of
fuel-cycle activities agreed to with the EU-3?
Answer. We do not know whether India considers Iran in
breach of the Paris agreement, an agreement between Iran and
the EU-3. Certainly, the EU-3 considers Iran in breach.
Question.I understand that India has a formal defense
cooperation agreement with Iran. Has the Department been
provided with a copy of that Agreement, and if so, could you
please furnish it to this committee?
Answer. We do not know of a formal defense cooperation
agreement between Iran and India. A Memorandum of Understanding
between the Government of the Republic of India and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on Road Map to
Strategic Cooperation, was signed on January 23, 2003, in New
Delhi by the previous administrations in both countries.
According to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, this MOU
set out, among other things, ``to agree to explore
opportunities for cooperation in defense in agreed areas,
including training and exchange of visits.''
Question. Public reports in late 2004 suggested that India
was considering the sale to Iran of an advanced radar system
known as ``Super Fledermaus,'' a system capable of detecting
low-flying objects such as the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
the United States frequently uses to conduct surveillance
operations. The radar system is produced by Bharat Electronics
Limited (BEL) under license from Ericsson Radar Electronics, a
U.S. firm.
(a) Has India decided not to proceed with this sale?
(b) Do you know of other significant defense equipment
sales to Iran being considered by India?
Answer.
(a) We understand that the sale of the Super Fledermaus
system has not occurred.
(b) We do not know of other significant defense equipment
sales to Iran being considered by India.
Interaction with Other Nonproliferation Policies and Countries
Question. Could you please explain how the policy the
administration adopted in the Joint Statement is consistent
with other administration policies and statements regarding the
ongoing crises of noncompliance in North Korea and Iran?
Answer. The Joint Statement represents a carefully tailored
approach that helps solve a real-world nonproliferation issue:
How to integrate the world's largest democracy and rising 21st
power into the nonproliferation mainstream.
We need to adjust our approaches to take into account the
conditions that exist, so that we can achieve our
nonproliferation objectives. This has been a premise of
administration policy since the outset of President Bush's
first term, in which he established non- and
counterproliferation as top national security priorities.
Recognizing that traditional nonproliferation measures were
essential but no longer sufficient, the President has
established new concepts and new capabilities for countering
WMD proliferation by hostile states and terrorists.
There is no comparison between India's nonproliferation
history and energy needs, and the compliance violations
incurred by Iran and North Korea.
Our position on Iran's nuclear program is well known and is
unrelated to our increasing cooperation with India. We do not
want to see any additional states developing nuclear weapons,
whether Iran, North Korea, or others. Iran's compliance
violations are a national security concern to the United States
and many of its international partners--not just the EU-3.
Indeed, India's September vote in the IAEA Board of Governors
which found Iran in noncompliance with its nuclear
nonproliferation obligations, demonstrated India's coming of
age as a partner in global nonproliferation efforts.
Further, our understanding with India should not affect the
Six-Party Talks in any way. India has taken a number of steps
to deepen its commitment to nonproliferation and did not
violate the NPT in order to pursue its nuclear weapons
ambitions since it was not a party to the treaty. There can be
no comparison of North Korea's record with that of India. North
Korea has violated its NPT and IAEA safeguards commitments; it
must abandon its nuclear weapons program.
------
Responses of Under Secretary Nicholas Burns to Questions Submitted by
Senator Lugar
The Administration's Legislative Proposal and the July 18 Joint
Statement
Question. During your testimony before the committee, you
seemed to indicate that the administration would prefer India-
specific legislative language rather than country-neutral
criteria. What are the strengths, in your view, of an India-
specific exception to current U.S. law as opposed to a country-
neutral exception?
Answer. An India-specific exception would build on the
precedent set by the Brownback II amendment, which created a
South Asia-specific waiver authority for four different
statutory sanctions without amending those statutes. An India-
specific exception is appropriate to this country-specific
initiative and well reflects the need for tailored, actor-
specific strategies to combat WMD. It would confirm that the
confluence of India's solid nuclear nonproliferation record,
enhanced nonproliferation commitments, growing energy needs and
strategic position in the world requires an unique approach.
Finally, singling out India through legislation would also
provide assurances to the Indian Government that the United
States intends to develop key aspects of this partnership for
the long-term.
Question. Is it your view that if Congress did not approve
provisions for India related to nuclear energy that the U.S.-
India relationship would be harmed?
Answer. The initiative to reach civil nuclear cooperation
with India recasts one of the most divisive issues in our
relationship, and is viewed by many in India as a litmus test
for our strategic partnership. If Congress does not approve
provisions for India related to nuclear energy, it is likely
that the nuclear issue will continue to constrain our
diplomatic relationship, as well as our strategic, commercial,
defense, and scientific ties, thereby having a negative impact
on many of the bilateral activities mentioned in the July 18
Joint Statement.
Question. Have Indian officials stated to you that if
Congress does not approve a legislative exception for India
from current law for nuclear commerce that India would either
look differently on its new relationship with the United States
or respond negatively to the lack of congressional action?
Answer. Indian officials have not stated that they will
treat the United States differently if Congress does not take
action. They have, however, expressed concern about achieving
extensive advances in the future of U.S.-India relations if
either side does not complete its Joint Statement commitments.
Question. What does India's current plan for its nuclear
power sector call for in terms of the types of reactors (heavy-
or light-water reactors) it will seek from foreign providers?
Answer. Because of the current international restrictions
on nuclear commerce with India, India's plan for its nuclear
power sector seeks to provide for a 20-fold increase in
nuclear-generated electricity by 2020 without reactors from
foreign suppliers. In support of this objective, India's
Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) has committed extensive
resources to develop a three-stage nuclear fuel cycle, based on
its plentiful domestic thorium reserves, that involves fast-
breeder reactors, which could pose proliferation risks.
Moreover, some specialists assess that such an approach would
not prove cost-effective, and there are clear technical
challenges to overcome.
Opening the Indian market to foreign suppliers provides
India with a vast array of new civil nuclear energy options.
Access to new technologies, such as pebble-bed reactors and
low-enriched uranium reactors, and participation in the
Generation-IV Forum (GIF) on advanced nuclear energy systems
would encourage more viable and proliferation-resistant
alternatives.
Place in the New Relationship
Question. In testimony before the committee, several
experts suggested that creating an exception from long-standing
U.S. law and policy, and asking the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) to do the same with respect to NSG Guidelines, damages
U.S. nonproliferation leadership, and that the strategic
rationale for the Joint Statement does not provide a basis for
such changes.
Why does nuclear energy figure so prominently among the
many ways the United States can forge a new, strategic
partnership with India?
Answer. The initiative to reach civil nuclear cooperation
with India recasts a divisive issue that has for decades
constrained our diplomatic relationship, as well as our
strategic, commercial, defense, and scientific ties. In
addition to firmly aligning the United States with a country
that shares our democratic values and commitment to freedom, it
holds substantial, concrete benefits for the United States,
India, and the global community.
When implemented, all the steps that India pledged on July
18 will strengthen the international nonproliferation regime,
and bolster our efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of
mass destruction. Commercially, the opening of India's
lucrative and growing civil nuclear energy market to U.S. firms
could provide jobs for thousands of Americans, and provide
India with a vast array of clean and viable options to meet its
skyrocketing energy needs. India's participation in the
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) program
will add significant resources and critical talent to global
efforts to develop fusion as a cheap energy source program. If
India joins the Generation-IV International Forum (GIF), it
could contribute to GIF's mission to make the next generation
of reactors safer, more efficient and more proliferation
resistant. Finally, these efforts will also help India pursue
its ambitious plans for power development and electrification
in a more environmentally friendly manner.
------
Responses of Under Secretary Robert Joseph to Questions Submitted by
Senator Lugar
The Administration's Legislative Proposal and the July 18 Joint
Statement
Question. In your statement you note that Congress should
not ``make the perfect the enemy of the good'' and that adding
any conditions to the eventual changes to law that Congress
might make for India would be a ``deal breaker.''
Do you mean that the entire set of things contained
in the Joint Statement, beyond civil nuclear
cooperation, would also be sacrificed if Congress
conditioned nuclear commerce with India on things not
detailed in the Joint Statement?
Answer. I testified that, based on our interactions with
the Indian Government, we believe that additional conditions
such as implementing a moratorium on fissile material
production, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and/or
joining the NPT as a nonnuclear weapon state ``would likely be
deal breakers.''
The initiative to reach civil nuclear cooperation with
India will remove one of the most divisive issues in our
bilateral relationship. If the civil nuclear aspects of the
Joint Statement are not realized, we believe that our
diplomatic relationship and our strategic, commercial, and
scientific ties will remain constrained; many of the bilateral
activities delineated in the statement will be adversely
affected.
The critical point is that we must resist the temptation to
pile on conditions that will prejudice our ability to realize
the important and long-standing nonproliferation objectives
embodied in the Joint Statement. We assess that additional
conditions such as those specified above remain deal breakers
for India. We are better off with India undertaking the
nonproliferation commitments to which it has now agreed than in
allowing status quo stalemates to prevail.
Question. Does the administration oppose any additional
nonproliferation measures for India beyond those stipulated in
the Joint Statement?
Answer. I testified that, based on our interactions with
the Indian Government, we believe that additional conditions
such as implementing a moratorium on fissile material
production, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and/or
joining the NPT as a nonnuclear weapon state ``would likely be
deal breakers.''
In our ongoing dialogs, we strongly encourage India to take
additional steps to strengthen nonproliferation, such as
joining PSI and harmonizing its national control lists with
those of the Australia Group and Wassenaar Arrangement. We have
indicated that we also plan to continue to discuss such issues
as a fissile material cutoff. But we strongly recommend against
adding additional conditions to Joint Statement implementation.
The Joint Statement reached by President Bush and Prime
Minister Singh is good both for India and for the United
States, and when implemented, offers a net gain for global
nonproliferation efforts. Rather than add additional conditions
or seek to renegotiate the Joint Statement, we believe it would
be better to lock in this deal and then seek to achieve further
results as our strategic partnership advances. We believe that
this is a sound arrangement that should be supported because
the commitments India has made, will, when implemented, bring
it into closer alignment with international nuclear
nonproliferation standards and practices and, as such,
strengthen the global nonproliferation regime.
Question. Could you please provide me with your views with
regard to each of the following items, items which have been
proposed as those I might consider including in legislation:
A requirement that India stop producing fissile
materials for nuclear weapons.
Answer. I testified that, based on our interactions with
the Indian Government, we believe that additional conditions
such as implementing a moratorium on fissile material
production, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and/or
joining the NPT as a nonnuclear weapon state ``would likely be
deal breakers.''
We have sought India's curtailment of fissile material
production but have not reached agreement on this issue. In our
assessment, insisting on such a cutoff as a precondition for
implementing the Joint Statement would likely be a deal breaker
for the Indian Government. We believe that we achieved an
important objective, however, by obtaining India's commitment
to designate, separate, and safeguard its civilian nuclear
program. Moreover, the commitment to work toward the completion
of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) is a significant
step.
We continue to encourage India, as well as Pakistan, to
move in the direction of a fissile material cap or moratorium
as part of our discussions with both governments. We also are
willing to explore other intermediate options that might serve
such an objective.
The Joint Statement does not alter our policy on FMCT. We
continue to support immediate commencement of negotiations in
the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning production of
fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices. We welcome India's support for the FMCT,
which should help to build a consensus to begin those
negotiations.
A requirement that India declare it will not conduct
any more tests of its nuclear weapons.
Answer. I testified that, based on our interactions with
the Indian Government, we believe that additional conditions
such as implementing a moratorium on fissile material
production, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and/or
joining the NPT as a nonnuclear weapon state ``would likely be
deal breakers.''
In principle, making new U.S. law or waivers contingent on
India fulfilling its commitments in the Joint Statement is a
sound idea. As reflected in its pledge in the Joint Statement,
India has already declared that it will maintain its nuclear
testing moratorium. Since to date Pakistan has test-exploded
nuclear weapons only in response to Indian nuclear tests, this
commitment should help diminish the prospects for future
nuclear testing in South Asia.
A distinction between India and NPT parties that
would provide different treatment in terms of the
nuclear exports for non-NPT parties, i.e., India would
be eligible for most U.S. exports except equipment,
materials, or technology related to enrichment,
reprocessing, and heavy water production.
Answer. I testified that, based on our interactions with
the Indian Government, we believe that additional conditions
such as implementing a moratorium on fissile material
production, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and/or
joining the NPT as a nonnuclear weapon state ``would likely be
deal breakers.''
We do not export enrichment or reprocessing technology to
any state. Therefore, ``full civil nuclear cooperation'' with
India will not include enrichment or reprocessing technology.
We have not yet determined whether such a prohibition would
extend to heavy water production.
Permitting U.S. nuclear exports only to those Indian
facilities, sites, and locations that are under IAEA
safeguards in perpetuity--not to facilities, sites, or
locations under voluntary safeguards arrangements.
Answer. I testified that, based on our interactions with
the Indian government, we believe that additional conditions
such as implementing a moratorium on fissile material
production, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and/or
joining the NPT as a nonnuclear weapon state ``would likely be
deal breakers.''
To ensure that the United States and other potential
suppliers can confidently supply to India and meet our
obligations under the NPT, IAEA safeguards on civil facilities
must be applied in perpetuity. We, and other potential
suppliers, will be unable to supply facilities that are not
under permanent safeguards.
India's Violations of U.S. Law
Question. In testimony before the House on October 26,
2005, Leonard S. Spector, Deputy Director of the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies, stated that
India's misuse of plutonium produced in the Canadian-
supplied CIRUS research reactor is not a matter of
ancient history; it is an ongoing offense. The original
transgression took place in the 1970s, when India
misused the reactor, along with U.S.-supplied heavy
water that was essential for the reactor's operation,
in order to produce the plutonium for India's 1974
nuclear detonation.
What is the status of India's violation of its
peaceful use undertakings in the 1956 U.S. heavy-water
contract, are they ``ongoing'' or are they, as a result
of the termination of U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation,
no longer operative?
Answer. India used heavy water that the United States
provided under a 1956 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
contract--along with Indian and third-country heavy water--as a
moderator for the Canadian-provided CIRUS research reactor, the
reactor India reportedly used to generate plutonium for its
weapons program.
After India detonated a nuclear device in 1974, the U.S.
Government examined whether India's actions were inconsistent
with a clause under the 1956 contract stating that the heavy
water would be used for ``research into and the use of atomic
energy for peaceful purposes.'' The outcome was that a
conclusive answer was not possible due to both the factual
uncertainty as to whether U.S.-supplied heavy water contributed
to the production of the plutonium used for the device and the
lack of a mutual understanding of scope of the 1956 contract
language.
Has any of the plutonium from CIRUS that was
produced using U.S.-origin heavy water been
incorporated into Indian nuclear explosive devices or
used in any Indian tests of nuclear explosive devices?
Answer. As noted above, a conclusive answer has not been
possible as to whether U.S.-supplied heavy water contributed to
the production of the plutonium used for Indian nuclear
explosive devices.
Will the administration, as a part of the process
under the Joint Statement, obtain from India a full,
accurate, and complete account of the disposition of
any U.S.-origin heavy water in India?
Answer. The administration believes the most productive
approach is to focus on India's new commitments under the Joint
Statement. These commitments include, among other things,
acceptance of IAEA safeguards (including monitoring and
inspections of its civil nuclear facilities and programs), and
agreement to sign and implement the Additional Protocol, which
provides for broadened access to locations and information
regarding nuclear and nuclear-related activities.
Does the Government of India acknowledge that its
unauthorized end use of U.S.-origin heavy water
supplied for the CIRUS reactor was a violation of U.S.
law?
Answer. Following India's 1974 detonation of a nuclear
device, the Government of India plainly stated its disagreement
with the United States over the meaning and scope of the clause
in the 1956 contract that stipulated that the heavy water would
be used for ``research into and the use of atomic energy for
peaceful purposes.''
At the time, the debate on whether India had violated the
contract was inconclusive owing to the uncertainty as to
whether U.S.-supplied heavy water contributed to the production
of the plutonium used for the 1974 device and the lack of a
mutual understanding of scope of the 1956 contract language on
``peaceful purposes.''
We have since made it clear that we exclude so-called
``peaceful nuclear explosions''--and any nuclear explosive
activity--from the scope of peaceful nuclear cooperation.
India has not acknowledged to the United States that it
considered that its use of U.S.-supplied heavy water was a
violation of the 1956 contract.
Does the Government of India acknowledge that its
1974 nuclear weapon test was not a ``peaceful nuclear
explosion''?
Answer. It is our understanding that it remains the view of
the Indian Government that its test of a nuclear explosive
device in 1974 was a ``peaceful nuclear explosion.''
If India declares that CIRUS is a peaceful reactor,
would any plutonium produced there need to be removed
from those plutonium stocks that India has set aside
for weapons and placed under permanent IAEA safeguards?
Answer. We do not yet have from the Government of India a
plan outlining which of its nuclear facilities will be declared
civilian; our discussions continue.
The details of the safeguards agreement which India has
undertaken to negotiate with the IAEA will presumably follow.
However, as most such agreements are not retroactive, we would
not expect the agreement to specify that previously produced
material must be returned to the plant in order to be placed
under safeguards. Were the plant to be placed under safeguards,
those safeguards would be applicable in perpetuity to any
material produced by, used by, or stored in the plant after the
effective date of the agreement.
Safeguards Verification and Compliance
Question. Has the Government of India entered into
discussions with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
officials regarding a new declaration of civil nuclear sites,
facilities, or locations?
Answer. To our knowledge, the Government of India has not
yet entered into discussions with the IAEA. Such a step might
be viewed as premature, considering that India has not yet
developed a separation plan upon which such a declaration would
be based. We have indicated that such a plan must be credible,
transparent, and defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint.
Question. When will India submit a new declaration to the
IAEA of its civil sites, facilities, or locations that would be
subject to safeguards?
Answer. There is no set date. The first step is for India
to develop a credible and transparent plan for separating its
civil and military facilities and programs. We hope that such a
separation plan and subsequent declaration to the IAEA of what
is to be civilian--as well as initial implementation toward
safeguarding its facilities--can be accomplished by early 2006.
Question. What kinds of safeguards will be applied to
India's declared civil sites, facilities, or locations (please
specify IAEA Information Circular (INFCIRC) number)?
Answer. Safeguards agreements are modeled after INFCIRC/153
(the NPT safeguards agreement) or INFCIRC/66 (the Agency's
safeguards system predating the NPT). India will not likely
sign a safeguards agreement based strictly on INFCIRC/153, as
this would require safeguards on India's nuclear weapons
program. NPT-acknowledged nuclear weapon states have so-called
``voluntary'' safeguards agreements that draw on INFCIRC/153
language, but do not obligate the IAEA to actually apply
safeguards and do allow for the removal of facilities or
material from safeguards. We heard from other states at the
recent NSG meeting that they would not support a ``voluntary
offer'' arrangement as, in their view, it would be tantamount
to granting de facto nuclear weapon state status to India. We
have similarly indicated to India that we would not view such
an arrangement as defensible from a nonproliferation
standpoint. We, therefore, believe that the logical approach to
formulating a safeguards agreement for India is to use INFCIRC/
66, which is currently used at India's four safeguarded
reactors. For the most part, INFCIRC/66 and INFCIRC/153
agreements result in very similar technical measures actually
applied at nuclear facilities.
Question. Will India allow the safeguards applied to its
declared civil sites, facilities, or locations to be permanent,
i.e., that no declared site, facility, or location may be
removed from India's declaration to the IAEA and that the
safeguards in place on those declared sites, facilities, or
locations are to be in place in perpetuity?
Answer. We do not view a safeguards agreement that would
allow India to withdraw facilities or material from safeguards
as acceptable, and we have informed India of this view. Among
other considerations, we must be assured that safeguards will
be applied in perpetuity, that ``civil'' material remains in
the civil sector, and that any assistance provided in no way
contributes to India's nuclear weapons program. The safeguards
must effectively cover India's civil nuclear fuel cycle and
provide strong assurances to supplier states and the IAEA that
material and technology provided or created through civil
cooperation will not be diverted to the military sphere.
Question. Has the administration briefed the IAEA on its
discussions of a civil-military split in Indian sites,
facilities, or locations, and if so, when?
Answer. No, we have not briefed the IAEA Secretariat on our
discussions of a civil-military split in Indian sites,
facilities, or locations. The IAEA Secretariat will play an
essential role in this process, but that role is still in the
future, once India has taken certain key steps and there is a
clearer understanding and acceptance of India's separation
plan.
Question. What are the general ``phases'' (not dates) that
will unfold under the Joint Statement's terms with respect to
India's separation of its civil and military nuclear
facilities, sites, or locations?
Answer. The first step in the process will be for India to
produce a general plan for the separation of its civil and
military facilities and programs. We expect that India will
propose a civil-military separation plan that is credible,
transparent, and defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint.
Such a plan would form the basis for a declaration by India to
the IAEA of its civil facilities. It would also form the basis
for the negotiation of a safeguards agreement between the IAEA
and India. Negotiation of an Additional Protocol would probably
proceed in parallel with the negotiation of the basic
safeguards agreement, but this remains to be determined. Upon
completion and entry into force of the safeguards agreement,
the IAEA would begin inspections of Indian nuclear facilities.
Based on the language of the Joint Statement, we expect that it
will take some time to complete full implementation of
safeguards at India's civil facilities, and thus implementation
would occur in a ``phased'' manner, based on a sequence
identified in the separation plan and as agreed to with the
IAEA and as specified in the safeguards agreement.
Question. The IAEA, because of budgetary pressures,
discontinued inspections in the United States in 1993, largely
because the value of such inspections is of limited utility in
states with declared and lawful nuclear weapons programs. At
the request of the U.S. Government, the IAEA resumed
inspections in 1994 by applying safeguards to several tons of
weapons-usable nuclear material, which had been declared excess
to U.S. national security stockpiles. The IAEA undertook this
effort on the condition that the United States reimburse the
IAEA.
The Joint Statement notes that India will ``assume the same
responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits
and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear
technology, such as the United States.''
Will India declare a portion of its weapons-useable
materials excess to its defense needs and place them
under permanent IAEA safeguards?
Answer. India has not informed us of whether it views any
existing weapons-usable material as ``excess.''
Will India reimburse the IAEA for any inspections
conducted in India on safeguarded facilities, sites,
locations, and materials?
Answer. To our knowledge, the IAEA and India have not yet
discussed whether India will reimburse the IAEA for any
inspections conducted in India on safeguarded facilities,
sites, locations, and materials.
Question. Do you assess that the IAEA currently has the
staff, funding, and necessary information to support safeguards
monitoring for India without taking away from inspection and
verification efforts in other countries?
Answer. We recognize that implementing safeguards in India
will entail significant costs that are not currently included
in the IAEA's budget. We look forward to working with the IAEA
and the Government of India to estimate those costs and to
identify how best to meet them without undercutting
inspections/verification efforts in other countries.
Question. Would India permit the IAEA, as a confidence-
building measure, to conduct inspections of its declared
facilities, sites, or locations, and if so, how many such
inspections and how many facilities, locations, or sites would
be inspected?
Answer. The safeguards agreement that India negotiates with
the IAEA after developing a separation plan will require
sustained IAEA inspections on all Indian civil facilities
containing nuclear material, with frequency to be determined by
the IAEA. The Additional Protocol will allow inspections of
additional nuclear-related locations.
Question. Will the Additional Protocol (AP) that India
signs be identical to the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/
540)?
Answer. No. The Model Additional Protocol is structured to
accompany a country's full-scope safeguards agreement. Because
India's safeguards agreement will differ from a full-scope
safeguards agreement, India's Additional Protocol will differ
from the Model as well.
Question. In the Joint Statement the Indian Prime Minister
states that India commits to ``signing and adhering to an
Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear
facilities.'' Does this mean that India would not ratify and
implement its Additional Protocol?
Answer. No. We expect that India will ratify and implement
both its safeguards agreement and its Additional Protocol.
Question. Is it permissible for any Non-Nuclear Weapon
State (NNWS) under the NPT to sign and adhere to, but not to
ratify and implement, the Additional Protocol?
Answer. While India is not a party to the NPT, nonnuclear
weapon states party to the NPT are obliged under the NPT to
bring into force a full-scope safeguards agreement, effectively
covering all nuclear material in the state. The NPT does not,
however, require such a party to either sign or bring into
force an Additional Protocol, whose provisions strengthen the
safeguards agreement beyond what is required by the NPT. The
Additional Protocol's provisions include, for example,
requirements to declare information regarding, and to allow
access to, locations that do not involve nuclear material. The
NPT also does not, unlike the NSG, condition full scope
safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply. Rather the NPT
requires that cooperation does not ``in any way assist'' any
weapon program in nonnuclear weapon states.
Question. Is it permissible for any Nuclear Weapon State
(NWS) under the NPT to sign and adhere to, but not to ratify
and implement, the Additional Protocol?
Answer. Nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT are not
required by the NPT to sign any type of safeguards or
inspection agreement, including an Additional Protocol. All
such undertakings by the nuclear weapon states are voluntary.
Question. Will the Additional Protocol that India signs
permit it to exclude the application of safeguards to any
facilities, sites, or locations in India?
Answer. India has not yet negotiated an Additional Protocol
with the IAEA. The Joint Statement indicates that India's
Additional Protocol will apply to Indian civil nuclear
facilities, and we expect that there will be some language in
the Indian Additional Protocol making its scope consistent with
that concept. We believe it is unlikely that India will permit
access to its nuclear military facilities under its Additional
Protocol.
Question. When will India sign an AP?
Answer. There is not yet an established timetable for this
step. The actions India committed to, in the Joint Statement,
involve complex issues, and they will take time to implement
fully. We hope to move expeditiously on all aspects of the
civil nuclear initiative and will assess progress prior to
President Bush's expected trip to India in early 2006.
Question. What would be the relationship between India's
list of declared civil sites subject to safeguards and its AP?
Are the provisions of its AP binding on its declared civil
sites?
Answer. Two types of inspections would presumably occur at
civil facilities in India: Safeguards inspections that would
take place at nuclear facilities containing nuclear material of
a defined purity, and complementary access inspections that
would take place at other facilities, which, with minor
exceptions, do not contain such material. The first type of
facilities is declared and inspected as specified by the
safeguards agreement, and the second type is declared and
inspected as described by the Additional Protocol. The two
types of facilities are distinct, but we anticipate that both
would be part of an Indian declaration. The requirements on the
state to provide information and access are equally binding in
the two cases.
Question. With regard to the plan that GOI will bring here
this month, and in connection with the principle of
``Transparency'': If we are talking about an INFCIRC/66 Rev.2
[safeguards agreement] (SGA), it would clearly spell out which
facilities were covered by the terms of that SGA. But if India
does a voluntary safeguards agreement, or has some sites
covered under a voluntary SGA, or sites, facilities, and
locations colocated with sites that are not covered by the
terms of an INFCIRC/66 Rev.2 SGA, then some of the list of
eligible, declared civilian facilities would be considered
``safeguards-confidential'' not under an INFCIRC/66 Rev.2 SGA
nor made all that transparent. In other words, there would be
an INFCIRC agreement, but no one would have access to the
actual list of sites, facilities, and locations (like our
Voluntary Offer SGA).
Are we prepared to accept a mixed situation in
India? Some sites under VOA-type SGAs and some under
INFCIRC/66 Rev.2 SGAs? Does the IAEA hold such a
situation with any other countries?
Answer. Because the IAEA publishes a list of all facilities
to which safeguards are applied, all exporters will be aware of
which facilities in India they can export to. So-called
``voluntary offer'' agreements are used only by the five NPT-
recognized nuclear weapon states. In general, voluntary
arrangements allow the covered state to withdraw facilities and
material from safeguards at will. In our view, a voluntary
offer arrangement for India would be inconsistent with the
Joint Statement and would not be defensible from a
nonproliferation standpoint.
Is the administration looking to accept a
cooperation agreement that would already be covered by
an existing 66 agreements (i.e., Tarapur), and then let
India put additional civilian facilities on an eligible
list?
Answer. Both an Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation
between the United States and India and a new safeguards
agreement between India, the IAEA, and possibly other parties,
would have to be negotiated.
There is no ``eligible list'' associated with current
Indian safeguards arrangements, which conform to INFCIRC/66. We
expect India ``to place all its civil nuclear facilities under
full IAEA safeguards and that includes monitoring and
inspections,'' as Under Secretary Burns said July 20, 2005.
Since a voluntary offer arrangement would not require the IAEA
to apply safeguards to facilities on a list of those eligible
for safeguards, it would not meet that standard. Furthermore,
in order to provide reasonable assurances to potential
suppliers that they are not assisting the Indian nuclear
weapons program, among other things safeguards must be applied
in perpetuity and ``civil'' nuclear material must remain civil.
India's Export Control Laws, Regulations, and Policies
Question. Has the administration undertaken an expert-level
legal analysis of India's export control laws and regulations?
Answer. Department of State and Commerce lawyers and export
control experts have reviewed India's Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful
Activities) Act, adopted in 2005, consistent with India's NSSP
and Joint Statement commitments. We continue to discuss export
control related issues with the Government of India.
Question. If so, could you please furnish that analysis to
this committee?
Answer. There is today no consolidated analytical document
representing an interagency assessment of India's export
control law and regulations. As always, we stand ready to brief
the committee on the results of our review.
Question. I understand that the State Department sent a
number of questions concerning India's export control law(s)
(what is termed its ``WMD law'') to New Delhi some time ago.
Has the Government of India answered all of those questions,
and could you please furnish (a) those questions and (b)
answers to this committee?
Answer. Given the sensitivities of the diplomatic
communications involved, we cannot provide the information for
the record. However, we would be happy to provide the committee
with a briefing on our exchanges with India on this issue. We
intend to have follow-on discussions regarding the
implementation of the WMD law within the High Technology
Cooperation Group meetings in early December 2005.
Question. Does Indian law specify anything with regard to
the reexport or resale of foreign-origin dual-use equipment?
Answer. As we understand the Indian legislation, export
from India of foreign-origin dual-use equipment exported to
India, if of types covered by India's own control list and
catch-all controls, would be subject to the same requirements
that apply to export of Indian-origin goods.
Question. What does Indian law specify about the access of
either foreign nationals or dual-nationals to sensitive items
exported from other nations to India?
Answer. India's new WMD law deals specifically with the
possession, export, reexport, transfer, and other conveyance or
trafficking of WMD and their delivery systems, their
components, and related technology by Indian and foreign
nationals. The law, however, does not address access by foreign
nationals or dual nationals to such items or technology in the
course of those individuals' legitimate employment in India.
Clause 13(4) of the WMD law seems to address in-country
transfers of items to foreigners, but the operation of this
provision is not entirely clear.
Question. Do any foreign nationals or dual-nationals work
at or have access to sites currently subject to IAEA safeguards
in India (Rajasthan 1 & 2 and Tarapur 1 & 2)?
Answer. We do not have sufficient information as to which
specific foreign nationals may work or have access to these
facilities. In general, however, IAEA inspectors, who are
foreign nationals, have access to Rajasthan 1 & 2 and Tarapur 1
& 2, since these sites are subject to IAEA safeguards. The
Indians have also granted Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
delegations limited access to those facilities, most recently
in February 2005. Additionally, the World Association of
Nuclear Operators (WANO) is able to conduct peer reviews at
these sites.
Question. Do any foreign nationals or dual-nationals work
at or have access to the Indian nuclear facilities Kundankulam
1 and 2?
Answer. We do not have sufficient information as to which
specific foreign nationals may work or have access to these
facilities. In general, however, Kundankulam 1 & 2 are being
constructed under a contract between India and the Russian
Federation, so we presume that Russian nationals have access to
these sites. IAEA inspectors, who are foreign nationals, will
eventually have access to Kundankulam 1 & 2, once they are
placed under IAEA safeguards.
Question. Do any foreign nationals or dual-nationals work
at or have access to the Indian Space Research Organization
(ISRO) Headquarters in Bangalore, India; ISRO Telemetry,
Tracking and Command Network (ISTRAC); ISRO Inertial Systems
Unit (IISU), Thiruvananthapuram; Liquid Propulsion Systems
Center; Solid Propellant Space Booster Plant (SPROB); Space
Applications Center (SAC), Ahmadabad; Sriharikota Space Center
(SHAR); Vikram Sarabhai Space Center (VSSC),
Thiruvananthapuram?
Answer. We do not have sufficient information as to which,
if any, foreign nationals may work or have access to these
facilities. We stand ready to discuss this and other
considerations relating to these organizations further with the
committee in a separate classified forum.
Question. Do any foreign nationals or dual-nationals work
at or have access to the following Indian Department of Atomic
Energy entities: Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC); Indira
Gandhi Atomic Research Center (IGCAR); Indian Rare Earths;
Nuclear reactors (including power plants) not under
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, fuel
reprocessing and enrichment facilities, heavy water production
facilities and their collocated ammonia plants?
Answer. We do not have sufficient information as to which,
if any, foreign nationals may work or have access to these
facilities. We stand ready to discuss this and other
considerations relating to these organizations further with the
committee in a separate classified forum.
Question. Does Indian law contain ``catch-all'' controls on
items not otherwise stipulated in national controls?
Answer. Clause 11 of the 2005 WMD law prohibits export of
any material, equipment, or technology if the exporter knows
that the exported items are intended for use in the design or
manufacture of a biological weapon, chemical weapon, nuclear
weapon, or other nuclear explosive device, or in their missile
delivery systems, but does not specifically refer to transfers,
retransfers, items brought in transit or transshipment. We read
Clause 11 of the 2005 WMD law as a catch-all provision similar
to the ``knows'' portion of the U.S. catch-all control
provisions. Clause 5 of the 2005 WMD law may provide the
equivalent of the ``is informed'' portion of the U.S. catch-all
controls over exports, reexports, transshipments, and transits.
Question. Have there been successful prosecutions of
entities or persons brought by the Government of India for
violations of its export control laws?
Answer. The Government of India has been actively
prosecuting the Indian entity NEC Engineers Private Ltd.'s
cooperation with Iraq. According to Indian press reports, NEC
sent 10 shipments containing titanium vessels, filters,
titanium centrifugal pumps, atomized and spherical aluminum
powder, and titanium anodes to Iraq. The NEC prosecution is
ongoing.
We do not have information on other examples of Indian
prosecutions regarding violations of its export control laws.
One reason for this is that, before India passed its WMD law
this year, its governmental authority over such export
activities was relatively limited. India's new WMD law has
greatly increased its ability to hold its entities and
individuals accountable for activities that impinge on
nonproliferation practices.
Question. Did India pursue any action (civil or criminal)
against Dr. Y.S.R. Prasad and Dr. C. Surendar after the United
States sanctioned them under the authority of the Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-178)?
Answer. We understand that India investigated the
activities of the retired scientists Dr. Y.S.R. Prasad and Dr.
C. Surendar after the United States imposed sanctions on them
in September 2004. As far as we are aware, India did not pursue
any civil or criminal action against Drs. Prasad or Surendar.
Question. Does the United States have any information that
Indian entities or persons in the United States have engaged in
attempts to falsify necessary bona fides in transactions with
U.S. entities or persons?
Answer. Any such activities would be regarded as a law
enforcement matter in this country. Any such matters would need
to be addressed to the Department of Justice, Department of
Commerce, and/or the Department of Homeland Security.
Question. In oral remarks made at the Department of
Commerce's annual Bureau of Industry Security (BIS) ``Update''
Conference recently held in Washington, DC, Steven Goldman,
director of the BIS Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty
Compliance, stated that ``India has modified its approach, has
made major commitments, in many respects commitments that
exceed those of our closest allies.'' \1\
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\1\ As found at http://www.exportcontrolblog.com/blog/2005/10/
update_day_one_4.html.
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Do you concur with this assessment, and if so, how does
India exceed the nonproliferation commitments made by our
closest allies, in particular, those who are nuclear weapon
states (such as the United Kingdom) under Article I of the NPT?
Answer. The Department of State agrees that India has made
major commitments which, when implemented, will bring it closer
into conformity with nonproliferation standards and practices.
India has committed to a number of important nonproliferation
steps. Some of these steps exceed NPT requirements, such as
India's export-restraint of enrichment and reprocessing
technologies and its willingness to sign and adhere to an
Additional Protocol.
RMP Facility
Question. Do you concur with the assessment of alleged
Indian attempts to illicitly acquire certain dual-use nuclear
technology provided by David Albright during testimony before
the House on October 26, 2005? Which states in relevant part:
Indian nuclear organizations use a system that hires
domestic or foreign nonnuclear companies to acquire
items for these nuclear organizations. Such procurement
appears to continue for its secret gas centrifuge
enrichment plant near Mysore. In an attempt to hide its
true purpose from suppliers and others when it started
this project in the 1980s, India called the facility
the Rare Materials Plant (RMP) and placed it under
Indian Rare Earths (IRE) Ltd, an Indian Department of
Atomic Energy company focused on mining and refining of
minerals. Since the mid-1980s, IRE has served as a
management company for RMP and appears to be the
declared end-user of its procurements of centrifuge-
related equipment and materials.\2\
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\2\ Available at http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/109/
alb102605.pdf.
Answer. We cannot comment in any detail in unclassified
channels on assessments of activities of Indian entities or
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
facilities. We could discuss further in classified session.
Question. What is the purpose of the RMP facility?
Answer. We cannot comment in any detail in unclassified
channels on assessments of activities of Indian entities or
facilities. We could discuss further in classified session.
Question. The Commerce Department issued revised U.S.
regulations for balance of plant exports to certain Indian
entities last September.\3\ The Indian Department of Atomic
Energy entity called ``Indian Rare Earths'' is named in those
FR notices, but could you please explain for the record the
current regulatory treatment provided to the entity Indian Rare
Earths under current law and regulation?
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\3\ 69 FR 56,693 (2004), revised in 69 FR 58,049 (2004).
Answer. The September 22, 2004, regulatory change did not
change the regulatory treatment for Indian Rare Earths. India
Rare Earths is still a listed entity under Commerce
regulations, as it has been since the sanctions were imposed in
1998. Therefore, under the Export Administration Regulations,
exporters need to apply for licenses to export even
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
uncontrolled commodities to this end-user.
Proliferation Security Initiative
Question. Why has India not joined the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI)?
Answer. The United States has encouraged India to join PSI,
given its geographic location along several key routes for
proliferation trafficking and its significant operational
capabilities in the region. Officials of the Government of
India have told us that they are continuing their internal
review of PSI, including an examination of the international
and national legal underpinnings for their possible
participation in PSI. We are hopeful that India will soon
endorse PSI, and join the more than 70 countries around the
world--and United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan--that
have expressed their support for PSI.
Question. What are the views of the Government of India on
the Statement of Interdiction Principles?
Answer. Officials of the Government of India have told us
that they are continuing their internal review of PSI,
including an examination of the international and national
legal underpinnings for their possible participation in PSI. We
are hopeful that India will soon endorse the PSI Statement of
Interdiction Principles, and join the more than 70 countries
around the world--and United Nations Secretary General Kofi
Annan--that have expressed their support for PSI.