[Senate Prints 109-55]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
109th Congress S. Prt.
COMMITTEE PRINT
2d Session 109-55
_______________________________________________________________________
PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
ELECTIONS--CHALLENGES
OF HAMAS' VICTORY
__________
STAFF TRIP REPORT
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Ninth Congress
Second Session
January 2006
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
26-018 WASHINGTON : 2006
_____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Key Challenges:
Political Challenge--Counterterrorism vs. Promoting Democracy 1
Recommendation............................................... 8
Economic Challenge--Cut off Aid vs. Stability................ 8
Recommendation............................................... 12
Security Challenge--Integration, Instability, or War......... 12
Recommendation............................................... 15
Conclusion....................................................... 15
Annex I.......................................................... 17
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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January 31, 2006.
Dear Colleagues:
The Palestinian elections held on January 25, 2006,
resulted in a disconcerting victory for Hamas, a group
designated by United States law as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO). The Hamas-sponsored Coalition for Change
and Reform party won 74 of 132 seats in the Palestinian
Legislative Council, taking control from the Palestinian
Authority's ruling Fatah party. The United States and others in
the international community are assessing the challenges
presented by Hamas' victory for our national interests and
policies.
Ms. Kim Savit, a Senior Professional Staff Member of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee witnessed the election as an
official Palestinian Election Observer with the National
Democratic Institute and The Carter Center (NDI/CC). I extend
the Committee on Foreign Relations' thanks to NDI/CC for
inviting Ms. Savit to join the extraordinary Observer
Delegation of experts and officials led by former President
Jimmy Carter. I am pleased to share with you her trip report
and her recommendations which may be helpful as the Committee
on Foreign Relations considers the serious foreign policy
issues raised by the election results.
I look forward to continuing to work with you on these
issues and to any comments you might have on this report.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman.
(v)
PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
ELECTIONS--CHALLENGES
OF HAMAS' VICTORY
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The Palestinian elections on January 25, 2006, have been
described as a ``political tsunami,'' an enormous,
unpredictable, destructive wave which will change the political
landscape of the Middle East forever. No one, it seems--except,
possibly, Hamas--was prepared for the stunning victory of the
Hamas Coalition for Change and Reform, which won 74 of 132
seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council, taking control
from the ruling Fatah party. The United States, Israel, and the
international community are now struggling to assess the impact
of this profound change in the Palestinian Authority on their
national interests and policies.
As an official Palestinian Election Observer with the
National Democratic Institute and Carter Center (NDI/CC) from
January 20-27, 2006, Ms. Kim Savit, Senior Professional Staff
Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, witnessed the
elections process first hand, talked with delegation experts,
and met with United States, Palestinian, and Israeli officials
before, during and after the elections. An NDI/CC Preliminary
Statement on the elections results published January 26, 2006,
(attached at Annex I) reflects the International Observer
Delegation's relatively positive assessment of the election
administration, voting and counting process. The political,
economic, and security challenges presented by Hamas' victory,
however, are being hotly debated around the globe.
The new realities in the region require rethinking
assumptions about a wide range of issues and giving careful
consideration to how to best influence the future of the
Palestinians, the Israelis and the Middle East peace process.
United States policymakers face difficult choices within this
new Middle East landscape, but may also find unexpected new
opportunities.
The following report outlines some of the challenges
resulting from Hamas' victory in the Palestinian elections and
provides recommendations for congressional consideration as
legislation is proposed to address these issues.
Key Challenges
POLITICAL CHALLENGE--COUNTERTERRORISM VS. PROMOTING DEMOCRACY
The United States administration has pursued two primary
policy priorities in the Middle East--fighting terrorism and
promoting democracy. The success of Hamas, a U.S.-designated
terrorist organization, in a free and fair democratic election
against the more nationalist and secular Fatah, challenges
these U.S. policies. What should be our objectives and strategy
for dealing with a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority? Do we want
Hamas to moderate and change its position as the Palestinian
Liberation Organization did years ago, and become a legitimate
governing party of a new Palestinian Authority? Or, do we want
Hamas to fail, hoping that in the process, its extremist
positions and the violence it has perpetuated will be
discredited? Would either path lead to peace negotiations with
Israel and a new era of Palestinian democracy? And which path
is the best in terms of United States national security
interests related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the
entire Middle East?
Democratic Elections
The Palestinian Legislative Elections were an extraordinary
example of democracy in practice, as over 1 million people
exercised their right to choose their leaders in a process
described by international observers as ``free, fair, and
secure.'' The overwhelming victory of the Hamas Coalition for
Change and Reform Party has been characterized by most
observers as a ``protest'' vote against the corruption and
incompetence of the long ruling Fatah party, not as a mandate
for the Hamas platform of armed resistance against Israel. This
assessment may be a comfort to those who viewed the
Palestinians' choice as one between ``murderers or thieves,''
one side directed at external events, the other hitting voters
at home. But, even if the Palestinians' choice was for the
lesser of two evils, the Hamas platform, calling for armed
struggle, including the slogan ``one hand resists, while the
other builds'' cannot be discounted.
The prevailing assumption that Hamas never expected nor
wanted to have full control of the Palestinian Legislative
Council or the Cabinet seems to ignore the reality on the
ground. Hamas' success resulted from a very sophisticated,
well-calculated strategy and plan for taking over the
Palestinian Authority.
At nearly every polling station, Change and Reform
party observers were present, well prepared with voter
lists, disciplined, well-trained and professional in
getting their voters to the polls. Hamas presented a
unified, consolidated list in each district while Fatah
and other parties had multiple candidates, which
divided voter support among the different groups.\1\
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\1\ Baskin, Gershon; ``OPTICAL ILLUSION, The Hidden Results of the
Palestinian Elections'' Tuesday, January 31, 2006; IPCRI-News--
[email protected]. ``In the final outcome of the Palestinian
elections the Hamas party took 74 seats of the 132 available seats.
This equals 56%. On the district lists Hamas gained 68.18% of the seats
with non-Hamas candidates taking on 31.82% of the seats. But in
reality, in the districts Hamas candidates received only 36.45% of the
votes while non-Hamas candidates received 63.54% of the votes. In
reality, a clear majority of Palestinians voted against the Hamas.''
Hamas' success was more than just a well-run
campaign. According to one Palestinian Authority
official, the Change and Reform party had calculated
well in advance of the election that it would win at
least 72 seats, far in excess of the 67 needed for a
majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council. After
the election Hamas quickly called for formation of a
national unity government.
These actions suggest that while there may be some who were
unprepared for the magnitude of the Change and Reform party's
success, Hamas was much less surprised by its own victory than
the rest of the world.
Election officials displaying ballot to observers to verify vote.
Hamas campaign poster ``one hand resists, while the other builds.''
Hamas was less surprised by its own victory than the rest of the world.
Fatah campaign posters included Arafat and Abbas.
Policy Response
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice acknowledged that the
United States failed to anticipate the Hamas victory in the
elections.\2\ Promoting democracy has been a cornerstone of the
Bush administration's policy in the Middle East, but the United
States apparently had no plan for reacting to the democratic
choice of the Palestinians if Hamas won a majority in the
election. Initially, the U.S. response to the Hamas victory was
to reiterate existing counterterrorism policy. President Bush
and other administration officials indicated that the United
States would not deal with an elected Hamas-led Palestinian
Authority government if it did not renounce terrorism, disarm
and accept Israel's right to exist. The Quartet, (the United
States, the United Nations, the European Union, and Russia)
issued a similar statement that ``all members of a future
Palestinian government must be committed to nonviolence,
recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements
and obligations, including the Roadmap.'' \3\ Israel similarly
took a cautious position, reminding Palestinian Authority
President Abbas that Hamas was allowed to participate in the
elections based on his commitment that, after the elections,
the Palestinian Authority would work to disarm Hamas and seek
to turn it from a terrorist to a political organization.
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\2\ Weisman, Steven R., ``Rice Admits U.S. Underestimated Hamas
Strength,'' NYT, January 3, 2006.
\3\ Quartet Statement, U.S. Department of State, January 30, 2006.
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Isolation, Engagement or Containment?
The United States, the Quartet, and the Israelis appear to
have tried to leave the door open to engage with the new
Palestinian leading party if Hamas changes or moderates its
positions.
Some consider that under a democratic process, Hamas will
be co-opted over the long run merely by undertaking the burdens
of governance and responsibilities to respond to the public.
Budding Palestinian democratic institutions and a free press
could eventually result in greater accountability and
transparency in governance by the Palestinian Authority. Such
institutions might pressure Hamas representatives, in order to
stay in power, to respond to the estimated 60-70 percent of the
Palestinian population who reportedly support reaching a
peaceful settlement with Israel in a two-state solution. The
need to respond to constituent demands relating to
unemployment, personal security, and social services might
force Hamas to set aside any Islamic or extremist agenda, at
least in the short and medium term.
But, a strategy that relies solely on isolating Hamas and
expecting internal pressures from weak Palestinian democratic
institutions and civil society to succeed in co-opting or
moderating Hamas positions could well backfire. Politically
isolating and punishing the Palestinian people for voting for
Hamas could lead to further radicalization and might push the
new leadership to seek even greater support from Iran, Syria,
and other supporters of terrorism. There is little
understanding of what the newly elected Hamas leadership
intends to do and few, if any, channels of communication open
to try to influence their decision making. It is not even clear
who is making decisions.
Are Hamas members who won the election inside the
West Bank and Gaza in the lead? Are the exiled leaders
in Syria calling the shots? Is Iran already involved?
The fact that the elections were held at all, and that
Hamas participated willingly after boycotting the Palestinian
Authority Presidential elections last year, are good signs that
the organization can shift gears. The Israeli Defense Ministry
has even acknowledged that Hamas has kept the ``calm'' or
informal truce, arranged over the past year. This holds promise
that pragmatists among Hamas' ranks may prevail and be open to
engagement and dialogue. Some suggest that eventually, like
``Nixon in China,'' the Hamas election could represent an
unprecedented opportunity for the peace process. They argue
that precisely because Hamas has been extremist, it will have
the credibility among Palestinians that permits it to moderate
its charter, renounce violence and agree to engage with the
Israelis, the United States and others, and ultimately achieve
a negotiations breakthrough that the corrupt and inept Fatah
party could not.
It would be naive to assume, however, that Hamas will
reverse its extremist positions without significant pressure,
particularly if the Iranians and Syrians rush to fill any
vacuum created by punitive policies of the United States and
European Union. Engagement and dialogue with a wholly
unrepentant, unchanged Hamas could legitimize its extremist
policies and embolden its leaders. There are already fears
among the Palestinians, particularly Christian and secularist
elements, that Hamas intends to impose strict Islamism as it
gains control over the instruments of government. The more
control of the Palestinian Authority Hamas gains, including
control over Cabinet positions and ministries, the more
confident Hamas also will be to continue to reject the right of
Israel to exist and support continued violent, armed terrorist
attacks.
Palestinian women preparing to vote. Two wear green Hamas scraves; two
wear black and white Fatah scraves.
Such fears have led some to propose a policy of containment
of Hamas' power within the Palestinian Authority. Proponents of
a policy of containment seek to limit Hamas' control of
specific ministries and would support Palestinian Authority
President Abbas in naming a technocratic rather than a Hamas or
Fatah party dominated Cabinet. However, while this approach may
maintain a temporary illusion of limited Hamas control, it
risks giving Hamas acceptability and legitimacy without
requiring it to take responsibility for governing decisions. It
also risks undermining efforts to press Hamas to reform its own
political agenda and renounce the use of violence and terror.
Even if Hamas gains control over the Palestinian Authority
and ministries, it is not clear how much influence Hamas would
have over other factions such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The
limited violence during the elections could reflect some form
of agreement among the various militant Palestinian factions,
but the relationship between Hamas and other terrorist
organizations remains unclear. A Hamas-led government may allow
Palestinian Islamic Jihad or others to continue to operate
against Israel, particularly to garner or maintain Iranian
support. The difference would be that once Hamas is in power,
such attacks may no longer be considered merely terrorism, but
could be considered open acts of war bringing the wrath of
Israel down on the Palestinian people.
The stakes are high. Costs and benefits of pursuing a
strategy of isolation, engagement or containment of Hamas must
be carefully weighed and objectives clearly defined.
RECOMMENDATION
The United States, the European Union, and the Quartet
urgently need to unify their message to maximize
pressure on Hamas for reform and moderation. They also
need to develop channels of communication with the
newly elected Palestinian legislators and establish a
framework for constructive Palestinian response.
Continuation of the role of the Quartet Special
Coordinator, James Wolfensohn, might appropriately be
used to fill this need in the short term.
Alternatively, a new special envoy might be designated
to work with the Palestinians. For the longer term, a
cohesive, strategic action plan must be developed which
clarifies our short-term and long-term objectives, and
outlines steps necessary to protect and promote United
States national interests in the Middle East.
ECONOMIC CHALLENGE--CUT OFF AID VS. STABILITY
The United States, Israel, and many others in the
international community will be tempted to react quickly and
decisively to cut off all aid and all funding flows to a
Palestinian Government led by Hamas, a designated terrorist
organization. The challenge will be to temper this reaction
through an assessment of the likely consequences for our
national interests. What is envisioned will happen to the
Palestinians after all aid is cut off? And how will this be
expected to impact the Israelis?
Palestinian Dependence on Aid
As a member of NDI/CC Team Bethlehem, Ms. Savit observed
the elections in nine polling stations across the Bethlehem
area of the West Bank. Most polling stations were in schools
with little or no heat. The Bethlehem Team observed the vote
count in a small classroom where for 5 hours into the night,
they sat freezing with six election officials and five official
candidate observers. But they had lights. One of the NDI/CC
teams reported that electricity went out at their polling
station as the vote count started. This was a quick reminder
that in many parts of the West Bank and Gaza, the Palestinians
are not in control of the flow of electricity and water. Their
economic life is largely dependent on Israel and the
international community.
International donors provided over $1 billion in aid to the
Palestinian Authority in 2005, with about one-third going
toward salaries, and the rest to humanitarian and
reconstruction assistance. The United States provided an
estimated $70 million in direct assistance, $225 million for
humanitarian projects through the U.S. Agency for International
Development, and about $88 million for refugee assistance.\4\
The Palestinians have, in fact, been the largest aid recipients
per capita in the world for years. A cut in donor aid would
result in devastation of the Palestinian economy, adding tens
of thousands of government workers to the estimated 30-60
percent existing unemployment, and adding to the already
overwhelming Palestinian budget deficit. In fact, reports
indicate that the Palestinian budget crisis is immediate and
that the Palestinian Authority will be bankrupt within weeks of
the election, particularly if Israel withholds the transfer of
taxes and customs fees collected on the Palestinian's behalf.
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\4\ Barzak, Ibrahim, ``Palestinians appeal for continued aid as key
donors say Hamas must recognize Israel,'' Associated Press, January 31,
2006.
Observing the ballot count in Bethlehem school room.
Cutting-Off All Assistance
Cutting assistance is one of the few levers available to
the international community to try to curb Hamas' extremist
positions in a timely manner. The international community is
beginning to consider use of this tool to put pressure on
Hamas, but the efforts appear ad hoc and uncoordinated.
Some argue that the Palestinian people must face the
consequences of their choice and all aid should be cut. Others
consider it immoral to cut off all aid, particularly
humanitarian assistance, in order to punish the Palestinians
for exercising their democratic right to vote. Still others
view any aid cuts as counterproductive--likely to increase
radicalization of the Palestinians, decrease support for the
two-state solution, and strengthen support for Hamas.
Currently, by law, the United States cannot provide direct
cash assistance from Economic Support Funds to the Palestinian
Authority unless the President certifies that such aid is
important to the national security interests of the United
States. \5\ The President has used this waiver authority
sparingly as he did last year after the election of Palestinian
Authority President Abbas. However, it is an important tool,
giving him a degree of flexibility in dealing with a vital and
often volatile foreign policy issue and permitting, under
exceptional circumstances, injection of direct assistance at
key moments when such aid can have significant positive impact
for U.S. national interests. If there is to be any direct
United States aid to the Palestinian Authority in the future--
regardless of the political composition of the Palestinian
Authority--this existing Presidential waiver authority for
assistance must be maintained.
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\5\ Section 550 of Public Law 109-102: Sec. 550. (a) Prohibition of
Funds.--None of the funds appropriated by this Act to carry out the
provisions of chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 may be obligated or expended with respect to providing funds to
the Palestinian Authority. (b) NOTE: President. Certification.
Waiver.--The prohibition included in subsection (a) shall not apply if
the President certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate that
waiving such prohibition is important to the national security
interests of the United States. (c) NOTE: Termination date. Period of
Application of Waiver.--Any waiver pursuant to subsection (b) shall be
effective for no more than a period of 6 months at a time and shall not
apply beyond 12 months after the enactment of this Act.(d) NOTE:
President. limitation on assistance to security forces Report.--
Whenever the waiver authority pursuant to subsection (b) is exercised,
the President shall submit a report to the Committees on Appropriations
detailing the steps the Palestinian Authority has taken to arrest
terrorists, confiscate weapons and dismantle the terrorist
infrastructure. The report shall also include a description of how
funds will be spent and the accounting procedures in place to ensure
that they are properly disbursed.
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While United States law has long barred direct cash
assistance to the Palestinian Authority, United States
assistance for the West Bank and Gaza via nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs)
is permitted. Organizations and individuals receiving such aid
are required to meet stringent vetting conditions designed to
ensure that no aid goes to ``groups or individuals who are or
have been involved in terror.'' \6\ In addition, as a legally
designated foreign terrorist organization, Hamas is ineligible
to receive funds or other material support.\7\ The United
States could, in principle, continue indirect aid to the
Palestinians even with Hamas' success in the election. However,
United States law puts the onus on United States aid providers
to judge if Palestinian aid recipients are terrorists or have
been involved in terrorism. In practice, many aid providers
will likely cut off even indirect aid to the Palestinians,
including humanitarian assistance, rather than take a risk that
they will break the law.\8\
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\6\ Section 559. of (P.L. 109-102) NOTE: Deadline. Certification.
Procedures. (a) Oversight.--For fiscal year 2006, 30 days prior to the
initial obligation of funds for the bilateral West Bank and Gaza
Program, the Secretary of State shall certify to the appropriate
committees of Congress that procedures have been established to assure
the Comptroller General of the United States will have access to
appropriate United States financial information in order to review the
uses of United States assistance for the Program funded under the
heading ``Economic Support Fund'' for the West Bank and Gaza. (b)
Vetting.--Prior to the obligation of funds appropriated by this Act
under the heading ``Economic Support Fund'' for assistance for the West
Bank and Gaza, the Secretary of State shall take all appropriate steps
to ensure that such assistance is not provided to or through any
individual, private or government entity, or educational institution
that the Secretary knows or has reason to believe advocates, plans,
sponsors, engages in, or has engaged in, terrorist activity. The
Secretary of State shall, as appropriate, establish procedures
specifying the steps to be taken in carrying out this subsection and
shall terminate assistance to any individual, entity, or educational
institution which he has determined to be involved in or advocating
terrorist activity. (c) Prohibition.--None of the funds appropriated by
this Act for assistance under the West Bank and Gaza program may be
made available for the purpose of recognizing or otherwise honoring
individuals who commit, or have committed, acts of terrorism.
\7\Hamas is on the list of groups designated by the Secretary of
State as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), pursuant to section
219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The designations
carry legal consequences: It is unlawful to provide funds or other
material support to a designated FTO. Representatives and certain
members of a designated FTO can be denied visas or excluded from the
United States. U.S. financial institutions must block funds of
designated FTOs and their agents and must report the blockage to the
U.S. Department of the Treasury. U.S. State Department.
\8\ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Staff Trip Report:
``Israel's Diesengagement from Gaza and Several West Bank
Settlements,'' October 2005.
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The European Union, too, has indicated that its member
nations would cut off aid to the Palestinian Authority in the
event that Hamas does not recognize Israel, renounce violence
and disarm.
Finally, Israeli Acting Prime Minister Olmert stated after
the election that ``We are not ready in any way to allow a
situation in which money transferred by the Government of
Israel will somehow end up in the control of murderous elements
who want to harm Israeli citizens.'' \9\ Israel initially said,
``for the time being,'' that it would stop the monthly transfer
of an estimated $55 million in taxes and customs it collects
from Palestinian workers and merchants to the Palestinian
Authority if a Hamas government is installed.\10\ It went
forward with the first payment after the election, as Hamas had
not yet formed a new Palestinian Authority government, but
Israeli officials indicated future payments were under review.
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\9\ Daily Star staff, ``Hamas seeks to reassure stock market
investors, Palestinian Financial Markets Plummet in Wake of threats to
cut aid,'' Tuesday, January 31, 2006.
\10\ Entous, Adam; ``Israel expects to halt tax payment to
Palestinians,'' Jerusalem, Reuters, Tuesday, January 31, 2006, 7:18 AM
ET
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Consequences
The loss of financial assistance from the United States,
the European Union and other Western donors could push Hamas
closer to Iran and Syria and further radicalize the Palestinian
people. This threat will undoubtedly be used by Hamas to
counter pressures for the United States and others for
moderation and for changes to its charter. The Iranian
President's visit to Syria before the Palestinian elections as
well as statements in support of Hamas' victory give some
credibility to this threat.
However, Iran and Syria face their own political and
economic constraints. They may be unwilling or unable to fill
the enormous needs of the Palestinians if United States and
other donor aid sources are cut off. Moreover, as some experts
estimate, the Sunni dominated Hamas has received less than 10
percent of its funding from the Shi'ite dominated Iran and has
many other sources of funding.
The primary economic challenge is how to use the leverage
of aid to put pressure on Hamas without alienating or
radicalizing the majority of the Palestinians. The key will be
obtaining support of the moderate Arab states, particularly the
Saudis and others who have been the primary financiers of the
Palestinians. For the moment, the Saudis and other Gulf states
are hesitating to continue or increase funding for a Hamas-led
Palestinian Authority. Saudi Arabia, as well as Egypt and
Jordan, may fear that the success of Hamas, which grew out of
the extremist Muslim Brotherhood, could result in a growing
threat to their own regimes. There has been some indication
that both Egypt and Jordan will insist that Hamas renounce
violence, but it is not yet clear what the other moderate Arab
states will do. The United States, Europeans, and other members
of the Quartet, particularly the Russians, will need to consult
early and work closely with these Arab nations to gain maximum
leverage over aid resources.
There is no guarantee, however, even with the loss of
financial aid, that Hamas will moderate its positions. Yet,
with limited options, how and when such leverage is used may
make a difference. Time is of the essence.
RECOMMENDATION
Our policy should seek to take maximum advantage of the
leverage provided by assistance, and should condition
any direct aid to the Palestinian Authority on Hamas
taking action to meet specific conditions or
benchmarks. But flexibility is required to respond to
realities on the ground. Conditions on direct United
States aid to the Palestinian Authority should be
tough, to provide clear pressure on Hamas, but should
not be so onerous as to further radicalize the
Palestinian population and foreclose any possible
future efforts to re-energize the Road Map and two-
state solution. At a minimum, the United States should
continue to provide humanitarian assistance vetted
appropriately.
United States laws governing aid to the Palestinians
should be reassessed to take into account the new
political realities. The goal of any changes to these
laws should be to ensure that United States aid to the
Palestinians--direct or via nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs)--is an effective tool of United
States national interests.
Aid provided through NGOs originating from USAID
should continue to be distinguished from aid provided
directly to the Palestinian Authority.
Benchmarks should set realistic goals which would
provide a foundation for assessing progress.
SECURITY CHALLENGE--INTEGRATION, INSTABILITY, OR WAR?
With Hamas' victory, it is unclear what direction the Fatah
dominated security forces will take. Ironically, any new
Palestinian Authority government that is formed with Hamas in
the leadership could immediately have to deal with a vast array
of security threats. Palestinian Authority President Abbas
committed to disarm the militias after the elections, but it is
not clear, given Hamas' victory, whether he will seek to
integrate Hamas armed militias into the existing Fatah
dominated security forces or find a means to disarm them.
Moreover, the Palestinian security forces require daily
interaction with Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) at border
crossings and on other critical issues such as water and
electricity. How will the Hamas-led Palestinian leadership deal
with the IDF on a daily basis? How will its leaders cross
between Gaza and the West Bank? With 15 of its members in
Israeli jails, how will the majority of the new Hamas-led
Palestinian legislators actually vote?
During the January 25 election, the Palestinian Authority
Police and Security Forces were visible everywhere, in new
uniforms outside every polling site and on street corners
confronting the traffic jams. They appeared well prepared for
their role of ensuring that the elections were nonviolent--
``free, fair, and safe'' as described by the Palestinian Civil
Police. The crowds of Fatah, Hamas Change and Reform, and
Independent candidate supporters outside each of the polling
stations visited were friendly and obviously excited about the
election. There was a feeling of national unity and
celebration.
Fatah, Hamas, and Independent candidates supporters.
Each polling station displayed signs including this ``no guns.''
Consolidation and Integration
After the election, Hamas reportedly offered to form a
coalition, national unity government and indicated it expects
to build a Palestinian national army, integrating Hamas' armed
militants into the existing security forces. Fatah leaders
reportedly rejected the offer and chose instead to become an
``opposition'' party. Integration of the Hamas militias with
the remaining 3-4 different Palestinian Security Force
organizations that grew initially under Arafat's control is
expected to be strongly resisted by the existing Fatah
leadership.
For the past year, the United States and the European Union
have been providing technical assistance to facilitate reform
and consolidation of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces.
Approximately $3 million was allocated for support of the
European Union Cops training program. United States Security
Coordinator, GEN William Ward, replaced in December 2005 by GEN
Keith Dayton, has been developing a performance-based strategic
framework to promote the restructuring of the Palestinian
Security Forces, to promote law and order and to prevent
factional and political violence. These efforts have had
minimal success. Beyond the leadership levels, Palestinian
Security Forces remain in serious disarray.
Civil War?
As the Palestinian budget hits rock bottom in the aftermath
of the elections, the estimated 68,000 existing Security Forces
on the government payroll may be among the first to grow angry
over lack of salary payments. Armed and under competing and
divided leaders within Fatah, these forces may be unwilling to
accept Hamas direction and control. The existing Palestinian
security forces could become the primary source of instability
and violence within Gaza and the West Bank. Some experts have
even raised the specter of civil war between Hamas, Fatah, and
other armed militias. Although civil war may seem improbable,
as the economy deteriorates, Palestinian internal violence and
instability is likely to grow and could quickly spread and be
redirected toward Israel.
Impact on Israeli Elections
Any increasing instability among the Palestinian factions
will have an impact on the upcoming Israeli elections scheduled
for March 28, 2006, and thus, will have the potential to impact
any future negotiations. Current polls indicate that the Kadima
(centrist) party, established last year by Prime Minister
Sharon and led by Acting Prime Minister Olmert, remains the
preference of the majority of Israelis. Increasing violence and
instability may work to the advantage of the right wing Likud
party of Netanyahu. Moreover, further unilateral actions by
Israel to consolidate settlements in the West Bank and declare
its own borders may become major issues within the Israeli
election campaigns.
RECOMMENDATION
Return to the Road Map appears unlikely, but plans
should be developed to facilitate the disarmament of
Hamas militias as a condition of aid and establish
criteria for possible integration into the Palestinian
security forces. Efforts should be explored to extend
the informal cease fire and establish confidence
building measures towards a possible interim peace.
United States efforts to help reform and consolidate
the Palestinian security forces should be frozen,
reassessed, and adjusted as the situation evolves.
CONCLUSION
We were not prepared for the magnitude of Hamas' victory in
the Palestinian Legislative Council elections. The new
political, economic, and security challenges in the region
require rethinking our strategy, policies, and plans.
Given the existing Palestinian financial crisis, there
probably will never be as much leverage by aid donors on a new
Hamas-led Palestinian Authority as there is now. Effective
United States policy will require sticks, in the form of
denying direct aid to the Palestinian Authority and setting
tough requirements for action by Hamas; and carrots, in the
form of realistic benchmarks for Hamas performance, and the
continuation of assistance to the Palestinian people. Such a
strategy--especially if coordinated with the Europeans, others
in the Quartet and even moderate Arab States--could effectively
pressure and isolate Hamas, while making clear that the United
States is not seeking to punish the entire Palestinian people
for holding free and fair democratic elections.
It is critical that the United States not ``act''
precipitously. The Palestinian Authority is in an unprecedented
period of transition and the United States must maintain
flexibility to respond constructively as the situation evolves.
If we develop a strategic plan now and clearly define our
national interests and objectives, we may have greater
influence in the short term and open up some opportunities for
the future.
ANNEX I
----------
Preliminary Statement of the NDI/Carter Center International Observer
Delegation to the Palestinian Legislative Council Elections
This preliminary statement on the January 25, 2006
Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections is offered by
the international observer delegation organized by the National
Democratic Institute (NDI) in partnership with The Carter
Center. The delegation was led by former United States
President Jimmy Carter, former Albanian President Rexhep
Meidani, former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, and former
Spanish Foreign Minister Ana Palacio. It included current and
former legislators, former ambassadors, elections and human
rights experts, civic leaders and regional specialists from 22
countries in Asia, Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, and
North America. The delegation visited the Palestinian
territories from January 21-26 and deployed 85 observers to the
West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem.
This delegation is part of NDI's 2-year comprehensive
observation of Palestinian election processes, which is
supported by USAID and which began with the 2004 voter
registration process and included all five rounds of the 2004-
2005 municipal elections, the joint NDI/Carter Center
observation of the 2005 Presidential election, and the
placement of long-term observers in Jerusalem, the West Bank,
and Gaza in the lead up to these elections. The Institute
issued a series of statements on the voter registration and
municipal election processes, and NDI and The Carter Center
issued statements on the Presidential election and on the
preelection environment, all of which are available on NDI's
Web site at www.ndi.org. The Carter Center also jointly
organized an international election observation mission for the
1996 Palestinian Presidential and legislative elections.
The purposes of the delegation were twofold: To demonstrate
the international community's continued interest in and support
for the development of viable democratic institutions that will
enable Palestinians to freely choose their leaders and
representatives; and to provide Palestinians and the
international community with an impartial and accurate
assessment of the election process and the political
environment surrounding the elections to date. The delegation
conducted its assessment on the basis of the Declaration of
Principles for International Election Observation, comparative
practices for democratic elections and Palestinian law. For
more than a decade, NDI has conducted, on an impartial basis
and across the political spectrum, programs to support the
development of democratic Palestinian institutions and
processes.
Under the difficult circumstances of the ongoing conflict
and occupation, Palestinian voters turned out in large numbers
in a strong expression of their desire to choose
representatives through open and competitive elections. The
obvious pride and enthusiasm of Palestinians about the election
process was evident throughout the voting districts. This was
reinforced by the professional and impartial performance of
election officials. Through the high turnout in these elections
and in the 2005 Presidential election, as well as the notable
participation in five rounds of municipal elections over the
last year, Palestinians have clearly demonstrated a commitment
to democratic elections. It is now up to the elected leaders
and representatives to construct genuinely democratic
institutions and processes that will bring the peace and
prosperity that the Palestinian people deserve, within a free
and independent state.
The January 25 elections can be an important step on the
road to greater democracy for the Palestinian people. They
present a unique challenge in that they included a group that
advocated the use of violence as a means of achieving a
political end and refuse to give up arms. Also, it has been
committed to the destruction of a United Nations member state.
It is universally accepted that democratic elections and
democratic governance are about employing peaceful means to
achieve political goals. We hope that the elections will mark a
decisive move toward the renunciation of violence by all groups
and toward addressing corruption and other issues that are
central to improving the lives of Palestinians.
The elections were characterized by the following positive
developments.
Within the bounds of an occupied territory, the
legal framework for the elections generally compared
favorably to international standards.
The adoption of a voluntary code of conduct by all
political parties set an important precedent, though
not all points were consistently implemented.
The Central Election Commission (CEC) operated with
a high level of confidence among the political
contestants and the Palestinian population.
The election campaign proceeded relatively
peacefully and allowed voters to obtain abundant
information about the contestants.
Except for restraints in East Jerusalem, the
election process was open and highly competitive.
Election day was generally peaceful, and the
elections thus far appear to be well administered under
the difficult circumstances of ongoing conflict and
occupation.
A large number of Palestinians turned out to vote
and were able to exercise their franchise without major
difficulties. Voting procedures for illiterate persons
generally curbed problems noted in prior elections.
Israeli authorities generally eased travel through
checkpoints to facilitate freedom of movement for
election day processes.
A significant number of political party and
candidate agents and a significant number of
nonpartisan Palestinian election observers were present
in the polls, providing transparency to the process and
helping to ensure its integrity.
Women played a large role in the election process as
election officials, party and candidate agents and
nonpartisan observers. The legal framework required 20
percent of the names on the party lists for
proportional representation seats be women, though few
women appeared as candidates for district-based
majoritarian seats.
The elections, however, were not without problems,
including the following developments.
Arrangements for voting in East Jerusalem were
agreed to late in the process by Israeli authorities,
while possibilities for voting in their neighborhoods
remained inadequate for Palestinian voters in East
Jerusalem. Conditions in East Jerusalem post offices
did not provide voting privacy, as voters marked
ballots on counters in view of postal workers.
Campaigning by virtually all parties and many
independent candidates was widespread on election day
in violation of the election law, and, though in most
instances such campaigning was peaceful, it contributed
to tensions and scattered incidents of violence,
particularly in Gaza and some localities in the Hebron
governorate (Beit Awwa and Ash Shuyuk).
Though freedom of movement was generally
unobstructed on election day, there were numerous
confirmed reports that political candidates, campaign
workers, and election workers were unable to move
satisfactorily through checkpoints during the campaign
period that began on January 3.
While parties and candidates were able to get out
their messages, and they received free access to public
media through regulated spots, news coverage documented
by professional Palestinian and international media
monitors noted significant bias, and paid political
advertisements were not offered at the same price to
all candidates by certain media outlets.
There were credible reports of use of Palestinian
Authority resources for the benefit of Fateh candidates
and numerous reports of campaigning in many mosques on
behalf of Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)
candidates.
The vote tabulation process is still underway. Election
complaints may be lodged by political parties and/or
candidates. NDI and The Carter Center will continue to monitor
these developments until the election process is completed and
may issue additional statements. A final report will by issued
soon after completion of the election process.
The 2006 PLC elections present a unique challenge with the
participation of the Islamic Resistance Movement, or Hamas,
which has advocated violence, including the killing of
civilians, as a means to achieving a political end. It is also
committed to the destruction of a United Nations member state.
While it is in the long-term interest of Palestinian democratic
development, and likely in the long-term security interests of
Israel, that a wide spectrum of groups participate in lawful
and peaceful political processes. Hamas' current political
participation, while simultaneously advocating violence, is not
consistent with a fundamental principle of democratic
elections.
In an August 2002 preelection assessment, NDI, the
International Republican Institute (IRI), and the International
Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), recommended the
adoption of candidacy requirements for the expected 2003 PLC
elections. The 2002 report also suggested that a code of
conduct be developed and enforced, which committed all parties
to transparent and democratic principles, disallowed election-
related violence and restricted individuals engaged in, or
advocating violence from becoming candidates.
A voluntary code of conduct was developed by the Arab
Thought Forum with support from NDI in late 2005, which went
some way toward this goal. While stopping short of disallowing
certain candidates, the code contains important undertakings
geared to help enforce peaceful and fair campaigning and to
promote a peaceful acceptance of election results. All
political parties and movements, including Hamas, signed on to
the code. The Palestinian Authority, in successful efforts led
by President Mahmoud Abbas, engaged different factions in
dialogue over the last year, including Hamas, to consolidate
the ``State of Calm'' initiated by the Cairo Agreement signed
in 2005.
Such steps related to the elections could help set the
stage for renunciation of violence by all parties beyond the
elections in order to achieve the peace and prosperity that are
goals of democratic governance. The new PLC also has an
opportunity to address this issue with the adoption of a
political party law. Now that it has entered the political
arena, Hamas has the chance to accept and adhere to recognized
democratic norms.
There are an estimated 120,000 eligible voters in East
Jerusalem, accounting for about 9 percent of the Palestinian
electorate. Given the long-standing dispute over the status of
Jerusalem, these voters have yet to obtain a reasonable
opportunity to exercise their franchise.
A compromise was reached in 1995 (the Israeli-Palestinian
Interim Agreement Elections Protocol, Annex II, Article IV)
that, as implemented, provided an opportunity for approximately
5,000 Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem (approximately
6,300 in these elections) to vote inside the city. The
agreement, employed during the 1996 PLC elections and the 2005
Presidential election, designated Israeli post offices in East
Jerusalem as locations for that number of Palestinians to cast
ballots. Palestinian Jerusalemites not voting in post offices
were provided an opportunity to vote in special voting centers
outside the city's boundaries. Under this arrangement, voting
in East Jerusalem could be considered by Israelis as a form of
``absentee'' balloting, since ballot boxes were transported to
counting centers in the West Bank, while Palestinians could
consider the ballots as regular votes. This compromise, though
inadequate, allowed the elections to proceed.
The ability to vote within the municipal boundaries of East
Jerusalem remains important to both Palestinian rights and the
fair conduct of elections. The PLC is to have six
representatives from Jerusalem, and Jerusalemites vote for
national lists in the proportional representation system. Until
approximately 2 weeks before the January 26 PLC elections,
however, Israeli authorities refused to agree to the prior
compromise for East Jerusalem voting. Israel's ambiguous stance
was explained by its reluctance to facilitate Hamas
participation in the elections. While the compromise was again
eventually implemented, the delay hindered electoral
preparations in Jerusalem and made it difficult to mount
adequate related voter education efforts.
Some administrative procedures were modified in these
elections to avoid the large-scale confusion that was evident
in the 2005 Presidential election. However, secrecy of the
ballot remained a serious problem, with voting at counters in
view of postal workers. In these and the 2005 election, the
areas in East Jerusalem had the lowest turnout of any
Palestinian electoral district. An often stated reason for this
is the potential loss of certain social and state benefits if
Jerusalemites vote, though no evidence of such losses have been
presented to NDI or The Carter Center. NDI and The Carter
Center have urged that Israeli officials publish express
assurances that there will be no retribution against
Palestinian Jerusalemites who vote.
The legal framework for the PLC elections was provided by
the Basic Law and the Election Law. Though incomplete and not
without shortcomings, they provide a foundation for democratic
elections and compare favorably to international standards. The
legal framework provides for 132 seats in the PLC, 66 of which
are determined by proportional representation. Eleven parties
and independents groups competed for those seats with closed
national lists of candidates. The other 66 seats are divided
into electoral districts corresponding to the 16 Palestinian
governorates, with seats allocated to each district based on
population, providing at least one seat per governorate. Voters
then selected up to the number of individual candidates on the
ballot corresponding to the number of seats allocated to their
respective governate. Six seats were set aside for Christians,
with the Christian candidates receiving the highest number of
votes in designated governess being awarded the allocated seats
and the remaining seats in the governate going to the highest
vote winners that are not Christian. National party lists for
the proportional seats must contain one woman in the first
three names on the list, one woman in the next four names and
one woman in every five names thereafter, thus approximating 20
percent of each list. There were no requirements for including
women as candidates for the district-based majoritarian seats.
The CEC and its staff operated with a high level of
confidence among the political contestants and the Palestinian
population. Despite uncertainties in the timing of the
elections, the difficult circumstances of the ongoing conflict
and occupation and some political pressures, the CEC operated
as an independent, effective, and professional administrative
body. The PLC accepted a recommendation of the NDI/Carter
Center and European Union observer missions to the 2005
Presidential election to cease using the civil registry as a
source for the voter lists. This change to the law allowed the
CEC to prepare, with the exception of Jerusalem, a sound voters
list. The voters list was developed based on voters going to
registration centers, and the process was marked by extensive
voter education and registration drives organized by the CEC
that provided a genuine opportunity for all voters outside East
Jerusalem to register.
The CEC also addressed a problem in the Presidential
election by requiring closer scrutiny of those claiming
assistance as illiterate voters and of those seeking to assist
voters, thus better ensuring against undue influence and
compromising ballot secrecy. The CEC provided for voting by
security forces during the 3 days preceding January 25. Such
voting took place in 17 special polling centers located in home
governorate capitals of security force personnel. This allowed
the forces to be on duty on election day without their
disenfranchisement and avoided voting in barracks, which poses
significant potentials for undue influence on voting choices.
In addition, recruitment and training of polling station
workers and logistical preparations were completed successfully
in advance of the elections. Maintaining political
impartiality, developing effective administrative capacities,
and successfully organizing for election day is an enormous and
difficult undertaking in any environment and is particularly
commendable in the circumstances of these elections.
The election campaign was vigorously contested and
generally peaceful. These were the first parliamentary
elections where all major Palestinian political movements
competed, and they provided the first opportunity in 10 years
for Palestinians to hold their representatives accountable.
Some 738 candidates stood for the 132 seats, including on 11
national lists of candidates.
Public opinion polling indicated that the major issues of
voter concern were eliminating corruption, providing essential
government services and establishing and maintaining law and
order. The campaign provided a genuine opportunity for the
contestants to present their views on these and other issues
and allowed voters to obtain information upon which to make an
informed choice.
A voluntary code of conduct, developed by the Arab Thought
Forum with support from NDI, was signed by all political
parties. Compliance with the code's provisions concerning
peaceful and fair campaigning was monitored by nonpartisan
Palestinian observers, including the Higher National Committee
to Follow up The Code of Conduct. The process leading to
acceptance of the code and its monitoring may have contributed
to the relative peacefulness of the campaign.
Significant issues were noted by international and
Palestinian nonpartisan election observers concerning use of
Palestinian Authority resources for the benefit of Fateh and
campaigning in a significant number of mosques for Hamas
candidates. Public resources, including government funds,
vehicles, communications equipment, materials and work hours of
government officials and employees belong to the Palestinian
people and should not be used for the benefit of individual
parties or candidates. The lack of a clear and enforceable
regulatory framework for campaign activities and financing
undermines public trust. At the same time, use of religious
facilities to benefit individual parties and candidates runs
counter to standards for democratic elections and is counter to
Palestinian law and the political party code of conduct.
There were numerous confirmed reports that political
candidates and campaign workers, as well as in some cases
election workers, were unable to move satisfactorily through
checkpoints during the campaign period that began officially on
January 3. On the first day of the official campaign,
candidates in the Jerusalem district were prevented from
campaigning near the gates of the old city. Israeli police
detained some candidates and dispersed the crowd.
Incidents of violence and disorder in the Gaza Strip during
the campaign period, especially those near the Rafah border
crossing, had distinct political overtones. In addition, the
CEC offices were raided and closed by gunmen, and one party's
campaign worker was shot and killed by a rival activist. There
was, at least, one politically motivated threat that mentioned
international observers, though all factions announced publicly
that they disavowed any such threats. Police forces in Gaza
appealed to the Palestinian political leadership for more
support, refusing in some cases to intervene to stop violent
incidents on the streets, due to lack of resources to impose
law and order. These conditions added to the problems of
organizing successful elections.
The Palestinian mass media present a plurality of views.
Palestinians also have ready access to regional and
international new media, which provided significant coverage of
the elections. Parties and candidates, by law, were provided
free access to public broadcast media to offer messages to the
electorate. The media carried paid political advertisements,
and political posters were present throughout the Palestinian
territories.
The political contestants therefore were able to present
their views to the population, and voters received information
upon which to make informed political choices in the elections.
However, professional international and Palestinian media
monitors, including monitoring by the Pavia Institute for the
European Union Election Observation Mission and the Palestinian
NGO ``Filastiniyat,'' noted significant bias in the broadcast
media, with the public media favoring Fateh and privately owned
media favoring candidates who owned certain media outlets.
Media monitors also noted that some media outlets discriminated
by charging candidates different prices for political
advertisements. The lack of regulations to ensure fairness and
prevent discrimination remain a weakness in the electoral
framework.
Election day was orderly, well administered, and generally
peaceful. This was a particularly significant accomplishment in
light of the ongoing conflict and occupation, as well as the
tensions and incidents in the Gaza Strip during the leadup to
the elections. There were, however, limited instances of
disturbances and violence in Gaza and Hebron govern ate (Beit
Awwa and Ash Shuyuk).
Palestinian voters turned out in large numbers in a clear
expression of their desire to choose their representatives in
open and competitive elections. Through the high turnout in
these and the 2005 Presidential election, and notable
participation in five rounds of municipal elections over the
last year, Palestinians have demonstrated a strong commitment
to democratic elections.
As with the 2005 Presidential election, the delegation was
impressed by the dedication and professionalism of the vast
majority of polling officials, members of the District Election
Commissions and CEC members and staff, who worked diligently
for long hours and under difficult conditions. Large numbers of
political party and candidate agents and Palestinian
nonpartisan election observers were present in polling stations
and worked cooperatively with each other and election
officials, thus adding to the transparency and credibility of
the process. International election observers were granted
unhindered access to the polls.
Election monitoring by large numbers of party and candidate
agents and the strong presence of nonpartisan Palestinian
election observers, who monitored preelection events as well as
election day developments, is a substantial achievement that
represents the growing strength of Palestinian society to
safeguard electoral integrity. These efforts by political
competitors and by civil society groups, such as the Arab
Thought Forum, the Palestinian Center for Human Rights (Gaza),
the Palestinian Election Monitoring Committee, Filastiniyat,
and others, made important contributions to a generally
peaceful election day and the development of public confidence
in Palestinian election processes.
The high participation of women in the election process as
election officials, political party and candidate agents,
nonpartisan election monitors and as voters illustrates the
commitment of Palestinians to the democratic elections and
citizen participation in public affairs. The requirement that
20 percent of the political party lists be women candidates was
also a positive development, though the small number of women
candidates for constituency majoritarian seats was
disappointing (e.g., there was only one women on the ballot in
Hebron, and reportedly she unofficially withdrew from the
election). The generally high level of women's participation in
other aspects of the process was nonetheless a positive feature
of these elections.
NDI and the Carter Center are independent, nongovernmental
organizations that have conducted more than 100 impartial
preelection, election-day and post-election observation
missions around the world. Both organizations recognize that
elections cannot be separated from the broader political
process of which they are part. NDI's and The Carter Center's
methodologies for assessing elections are based on the premise
that all aspects of the election process must be considered to
accurately understand the nature of an election. Considerable
weight must be given to the preelection period as well the
resolution of complaints and disputes following the initial
proclamation of results.
The delegation held meetings with Palestinian Authority
President Mahmoud Abbas; the Chairman and officials of the
Central Election Commission (CEC); representatives of the major
competing political parties/candidate lists that have renounced
violence; civic leaders; news media; political analysts; the
heads of the European Union, European Parliament and Canadian
Observation Missions; other representatives of the
international community who are concerned with supporting a
democratic Palestinian election process; and senior Israeli
Government officials and analysts. The delegation worked in
close cooperation with Palestinian nonpartisan election
monitoring organizations and with the European Union's
International Observation Mission.
Delegates divided into teams and deployed to 14 electoral
districts in the Palestinian Territories for meetings with
governmental, electoral, political, and civic leaders in their
respective localities. On election day, the teams observed the
voting, counting and tabulation processes in over 300 polling
centers selected on the basis of a scientific statistical
sample and at District Election Commissions. Delegates then
reconvened in Jerusalem to debrief and develop this statement.
The delegation expresses its gratitude to all with whom it met.