[Senate Prints 109-54]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



109th Congress                                                  S. Prt.
 2d Session                 COMMITTEE PRINT                      109-54
_______________________________________________________________________
 
                      HAITIAN ELECTIONS: SETTING THE 

                         FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY

                               __________

                           STAFF TRIP REPORT

                                 TO THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                       One Hundred Ninth Congress

                             Second Session

                             February 2006

                                     





      Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations



Available via World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate


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                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                  RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska                JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island         PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia               CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota              JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio            RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee           BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire        BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska               BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
                 Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
              Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director

                                  (ii)










                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................     v

Primary Conclusion...............................................     1

Election Observations............................................     1

    Voting Conditions............................................     2

    Political Attitudes and Implications.........................     2

Recommendations..................................................     2

    Country Conditions...........................................     2

    Security and Economic Growth.................................     3

    Building Democracy...........................................     4

Haitian Election Preparations....................................     5

    Electoral Aid and Observation................................     5

    Voter Registration and National ID Card Distribution.........     6

    Candidate and Party Registration.............................     6

Appendix I--Staff Discussions in Haiti...........................     7

Appendix II--List of Voting Centers Visited by Congressional 
  Delegation.....................................................     8

Appendix III--Scenes From Haiti's Election Day...................     9

Appendix IV--Haiti: Election Day Procedures......................    14

                                 (iii)




                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                                                  February 10 2006.
Dear Colleagues:

    The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recently sent Mr. 
Carl Meacham of the senior professional staff and Ms. Caroline 
Tess, Foreign Policy Advisor to Senator Bill Nelson to Port-au-
Prince, Haiti to observe the first round of Haitian elections 
on February 7, 2006. They were joined in Haiti by Mr. Ted 
Brennan of the House Committee on International Relations, 
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere and Mr. Paul Oostburg-
Sanz, Democratic Chief Counsel, House Committee on 
International Relations. This report reflects the views of the 
Senate delegation.
    The delegation's priority was to observe Haiti's electoral 
process and to assess whether a free, fair, and inclusive 
election took place. The presence of a bipartisan and bicameral 
delegation from the U.S. Congress helped emphasize the 
importance of transparent elections and demonstrate our 
enduring commitment to the process, as well as provided the 
U.S. Congress' moral support to the people of Haiti.
    I hope you find this report helpful as the U.S. Congress 
considers how to support the building of a strong and long-
lasting democracy in Haiti.
    We look forward to continuing to work with you on these 
issues and welcome any comments you may have on this report.
            Sincerely,

                                          Richard G. Lugar,
                                                          Chairman.

                                               Bill Nelson,
                                                           Senator.

                                  (v)



        HAITIAN ELECTIONS: SETTING THE FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY

                              ----------                              

    From February 5-8, 2006, a staff delegation from the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) traveled to Port au Prince, 
Haiti to observe the first round of Haitian elections. Haitians 
voted for a new President as well as Senators and Deputies who 
will form Haiti's new Parliament. On February 7th, Election 
Day, the delegation deployed to approximately 6 voting centers 
in Port-au-Prince. The delegation also visited the Vote 
Tabulation Center on February 6th and 8th. (See Appendix I for 
detailed list of election centers visited.)
    During this trip, the delegation visited with Haiti's 
interim Prime Minister, Gerard LaTortue, and with the Special 
Representative of the United Nations Secretary General, Juan 
Gabriel Valdes. Staff also met with Organization of American 
States (OAS) Secretary General, Jose Miguel Insulza. (See 
Appendix II for complete list of meetings.)

                           Primary Conclusion

    The delegation finds the voting process of the Haitian 
elections observed on February 7, to be satisfactory as the 
majority of registered Haitians were able to vote in a 
relatively orderly and secure fashion. However, the election 
was marked by serious challenges including: Haitians voting by 
candlelight, spending hours in long lines at some polling 
stations just to find that their names did not appear on the 
electoral rolls, and many polling centers opening hours late 
because they lacked the necessary workers, security, ballots, 
and organization. As of this writing, the count is not yet 
complete; this report in no way reflects on the Haitian 
electoral process beyond Election Day. (See Appendix III for 
scenes from Haiti's Election Day.)

                         Election Observations

    The willingness, enthusiasm and overwhelming interest of 
the Haitian electorate was evident during the elections. It is 
estimated that over 60 per cent of the Haitian electorate came 
out to vote.\1\ However, sufficient preparation and 
organization at the polling centers was lacking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 2.2 million Registered voters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
    These elections will not be the solution to Haiti's 
problems, but they are an obligatory passage to lay the 
foundation for democracy.
Voting Conditions
    In general, voting was characterized by delayed openings, 
early and eager voters, shorter lines and waiting times in the 
afternoon, the presence of many other national and 
international election observers, and protracted closing 
procedures and ballot counting. Haiti's Provisional Electoral 
Council's (CEP) efforts to inform the public regarding changes 
in the locations of voting centers seemed to have limited 
impact: sizable numbers of voters were frustrated to learn the 
locations indicated on the back of their ID cards were 
incorrect. As a result, later in the day, the CEP opened voting 
bureaus to all voters, regardless of where one's name appeared 
on the official registration lists. The most prominent 
irregularity was that poll workers selectively checked names 
against the official registration lists after voters were 
allowed to vote at any voting bureau.
    Each voting bureau was run by four Haitian poll workers who 
were then ``observed'' by multiple political party observers, 
national observers, and international observers. Because of the 
large number of parties (over 40), the presence of up to 10 
political party observers at each individual voting bureau 
slowed the process and also constrained the voter's ability to 
cast their vote in secret. In other cases, the political party 
monitors provided assistance to those in line, explaining the 
voting procedure or helping voters to find the correct voting 
bureau.
    It was also evident that tabulating the results of the 
election would take longer than the original 48 hours 
anticipated by the CEP and the OAS. Tally sheets were hand 
written--making them difficult to read, inconsistent, and in 
some cases calling into question their validity. The need to 
re-open ballot boxes or verify tallies could lead to even more 
significant delays.
Political Attitudes and Their Implications
    Unfortunately, supporters of the various political parties 
made statements that sought to claim victory for their party 
and candidate. There were also isolated acts of violence and 
impatience which led to approximately four deaths, including 
two by natural causes, and multiple injuries.
    Inside polling centers, some voters engaged in campaign 
activities directed at other individuals waiting to vote. Some 
voters expressed an aggressive and discourteous public 
discourse about the political parties.
    In terms of the Haitian attitudes, political polarization 
constituted a central element of the electoral contest. This 
attitude may lead to violence, instability, and claims of fraud 
from the election's losers once the official results are known. 
Instability, in the long term could lead to disruptive 
intrusions into Haitian politics by other countries in the 
region, including Cuba and Venezuela. This could negatively 
impact Haitians, the neighboring Dominican Republic, and United 
States interests in the region.

                            Recommendations

Country Conditions
    Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere and 
one of the poorest countries in the developing world. Its 
annual per capita income--US$390--is considerably less the 
Latin American average.\2\ Approximately 80 per cent of the 
Haitian population lives in abject poverty.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ World Bank Operational Manual, July 2005.

   In its fiscal year 2007 budget the administration 
        slashed Child Survival and Health Programs Funds for 
        Haiti by approximately 20 per cent, and Development 
        Assistance by approximately 22 per cent. We strongly 
        encourage increases in these accounts.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Child Survival and Health Programs Fund: actual fiscal year 
2005 = $19,969; fiscal year 2006 estimate = $19,801; fiscal year 2007 
administration request = $15,812. Development Assistance: actual fiscal 
year 2005 = $24,281; fiscal year 2006 estimate = $29,700; fiscal year 
2007 administration request = $23,143 (all amounts, thousands of 
dollars).

   We particularly support and encourage the 
        continuation of the Inter-American Development Bank's 
        (IDB) projects which focus on the improvement of access 
        to basic services, particularly regarding water and 
        sanitation, health and nutrition, and education, youth 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
        and sports, and local development.

    Narco-trafficking is an ongoing problem in Haiti, primarily 
in marijuana and cocaine but also some heroin, from Venezuela, 
Colombia and to a lesser extent Jamaica. Drugs are brought by 
fast boats or planes to the southern area of the island then 
transported by truck and plane to the northern part (Port-de-
Paix), then through the Bahamas by sail freighter or straight 
to Miami by fast boat. At varying times, anywhere from 5-10 
percent to 15-20 percent of cocaine destined for the United 
States passes through Haiti. \4\
----------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ U.S. Embassy, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

   The United States Government (USG) should expand 
        engagement with Haiti, in areas where feasible, 
        focusing on cooperation with U.S law enforcement 
        officials and the Drug Enforcement Administration 
        (DEA).
Security and Economic Growth
    The success of Haitian democracy and government ultimately 
lies with its government and the international community's 
ability to work together to provide long term security and 
development for the Haitian people. The long-term solution to 
insecurity, particularly in Port-au-Prince, is by providing 
Haitians with jobs--either in agriculture, tourism or light 
manufacturing.

   We urge the administration to support the passage of 
        the Haitian Economic Recovery Opportunity Act (HERO) 
        (S. 1937/H.R. 4211) to foster job creation.\5\
----------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ HERO would:
    Provide duty free entry to apparel articles assembled in Haiti 
contingent upon Presidential certification that the new government is 
making significant reforms; and
    Cap the duty free treatment to ensure that Haiti's current apparel 
exports, which amount to less than one half of one percent of total 
U.S. apparel imports, cannot increase to a level that could cause 
injury.

    On February 29, 2004, shortly after former President 
Aristide departed Haiti, the United Nations Security Council 
adopted UNSCR 1529, authorizing the deployment of a 
Multinational Interim Force (MIF) to restore order and to 
prevent civil unrest. The Security Council established the 
``Maintenance of the Expanded United Nations Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti'' (MINUSTAH) by resolution 1542 on April 30, 
2004, to replace the U.S.-led MIF. By resolution 1576 of 
November 29, 2004, the Council extended MINUSTAH's Chapter VII 
mandate for an additional period of six months until June 1, 
2005, to maintain peace and security and to continue to ensure 
a stable environment to facilitate the constitutional and 
political process in Haiti. On June 22, 2005, the UN Security 
Council adopted resolution 1609 extending MINUSTAH's mandate 
and approving temporary force increases for approximately eight 
months, through February 14, 2006.\6\
----------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ At the time this report was written, the United Nations 
Security Council had scheduled a vote to renew MINUSTAH's mandate and 
extend increased personnel levels on the 14th of February 2006 (with a 
ceiling of 9,397 for troops and police).
----------------------------------------------------------------------
    The interim Haitian Government has come under increasing 
pressure to improve security, protect human rights, and to 
build the economy. The main security threat continues to come 
from various criminal armed groups, some of which in recent 
months have displayed an increasing willingness to defy 
MINUSTAH. Despite some improvement, the security situation 
remains a daunting challenge, particularly in the slum 
districts of Port-au-Prince, as armed criminal elements torment 
the population with violence and use the slums as a base for 
kidnapping.
    The interim Haitian Government's authority remains weak in 
many parts of Haiti. Although the interim Haitian Government 
has appointed all 140 municipal commissions and taken steps to 
reorganize central structures, local state institutions remain 
weak, in part due to lack of resources, particularly in rural 
areas, and also because of a lack of communication in Port-au-
Prince. Poor command and control in the Haitian National Police 
(HNP) and the lack of adequately trained and vetted HNP 
officers have also contributed to the violence. \7\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ January 30, 2006 background paper from the U.S. Department of 
State notifying the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations that 
the United States intends to support a resolution in the United Nations 
Security Council to extend for an additional six months previously 
approved temporary increases in the authorized force strength of the 
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MUNSTAH).
----------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, the lack of economic opportunity, poor 
infrastructure, and deficient education and health care systems 
also contribute to the cycle of instability in Haiti.

   We support the administration's vote in favor of a 
        resolution renewing the mandate of the ``Maintenance of 
        the Expanded United Nations Stabilization Mission in 
        Haiti'' (MINUSTAH), extending personnel levels for a 
        further six-month period covering the electoral period 
        and subsequent political transition.

   We strongly support the continued participation of 
        troop contributing countries with particular 
        recognition of the Brazilians, Canadians, and Chileans. 
        And, we strongly encourage the USG to ensure they 
        remain in Haiti.
Building Democracy
    Democratic political coexistence will be possible only 
through explicit efforts by the winning candidates to reach 
across party lines to accommodate concerns of losing parties 
into the political agenda.
    It would be highly beneficial for Haitian democracy if 
government authorities, political parties, citizens and non-
governmental officials could, in the near future, reach a new 
democratic consensus. The agenda for this dialogue could 
include such items as: the development of a political party 
system with transparent financing formulas, the maturing of the 
parliamentary election system to ensure that the interests of 
minorities are respected, and the strengthening of the 
principle of separation, independence and balance of powers.

   We strongly encourage the winners of these elections 
        to build respect and mutual recognition through a 
        frank, inclusive and good-faith dialogue, and the 
        empowerment of a political opposition in conjunction 
        with the new government. The role of the International 
        Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic 
        Institute (NDI) can facilitate this process. We 
        encourage both NDI and IRI to work with all political 
        parties in an open and transparent manner.

   In the short term the USG should encourage the new 
        Haitian Government to work with other Caribbean 
        Community (Caricom) member nations to learn from their 
        experiences, with special attention to Jamaica. We also 
        encourage the OAS to foster excursions and exchanges 
        among Caribbean legislators and government officials to 
        facilitate the consolidation of democracy in Haiti.

                     Haitian Election Preparations

    The Haitian presidential elections were delayed four times; 
they finally occurred on February 7th, 2006 together with 
parliamentary elections. If none of the candidates running for 
president receives 50 per cent or more of the electorate; there 
will be a second round for the two top vote getters. The second 
round would take place on March 19, 2006.\8\ The presidential 
inauguration is scheduled to take place on March 29, 2006.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ At the time this report was written ballot counting for the 
presidential contest was not conclusive.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Electoral Aid and Observation
    United States Government electoral assistance was $30 
million.\9\ In addition, IFES \10\ was awarded $2 million for 
election observation with U.S. observers. IFES fielded 12 long-
term observers, 30 short-term observers (STOs) for the first 
round and will field 30 STOs during the second round. The 
National Democratic Institute (NDI) trained and supported 
political party observers and domestic civil society observers. 
The United States Embassy in Port-au-Prince separately fielded 
30 observers including Creole-speaking staff.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ The European Union provided approximately $22 million and the 
Government of Canada provided approximately $22.75. Total electoral aid 
was approximately $70 million.
    \10\ ``IFES'' used to stand for the International Foundation for 
Election Systems when it was dedicated exclusively to elections. In the 
two decades since their founding, they have come to deliver 
comprehensive solutions in democracy building and their name is simply 
IFES.
    \11\ The European Community (EC) and Election Canada (150) fielded 
international observation missions. The Caribbean Community of Nations 
(Caricom) also sent observers.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Voter Registration and National ID Card Distribution
    The OAS reports that over 3.5 million (3,535,025) potential 
voters registered to receive new National Identity Cards. Wide 
OAS distribution of the identity cards began on November 23, 
2005. OAS reported that over 3.1 million cards (88 per cent) 
were distributed by January 30, 2006. On Election Day, there 
were 808 secure election polling centers; with approximately 50 
per cent in communal sections and 50 per cent in urban centers.
Candidate and Party Registration
    According to the U.S. Department of State, 35 Presidential 
candidates were approved to contest the election; 45 political 
parties were approved by the CEP. According to the CEP, 
accommodations in the party registration process resulted in 
all major parties participating. (See Appendix IV for Election 
Day Procedures)
                               APPENDIX I

                              ----------                              


                       Staff Discussions in Haiti

    Staff held discussions with the following individuals in 
Haiti:

    Charge d'Affaires Timothy M. Carney (Amb. ret.)

    Interim Prime Minister of Haiti, Gerard Latortue

    Special Representative of the Secretary General of the 
United Nations,  Juan Gabriel Valdes

    Organization of American States (OAS) Secretary General, 
Jose Miguel Insulza

                              APPENDIX II

                              ----------                              


   List of Voting Centers in Port-au-Prince Visited by Congressional 
                     Delegation, February 7-9, 2006

Tuesday, February 7, 2006 \1\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Many of these centers were visited more that once during the 
course of the day. Movement around Port-au-Prince was restricted due to 
security concerns.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Ecole Freres de l'Instruction Chretienne, Petion-Ville

2. Ecole Nationale Thomas Madio

3. Ecole Nationale de Guatamala, Lycee Petion-Ville

4. Delmas 75--Institut Mixte Evens Dorleans

5. Fermathe--College Mission Baptiste de Fermathe

6. Thomassin--Eglise Saint Vincent de Paul

Wednesday, February 8, 2006
    The delegation visited the Vote Tabulation Center.

                              APPENDIX III

                              ----------                              


           Scenes From Haiti's Election Day, February 7, 2006




   Haitians waiting to vote at Tomassin--Eglise Saint Vincent de Paul



       Haitians waiting to vote at an unidentified voting center



        Haitians waiting to vote at Ecole Nationale Thomas Madio



   Haitians examining a voter list at Ecole Freres de l'Instruction 
                        Chretienne, Petion-Ville



                         A Presidential ballot



      Ballot boxes for Deputy, Senate, and Presidential elections



  A Haitian woman has her thumb marked to indicate that she has voted



                         Vote Tabulation Center



     Chinese MINUSTAH soldiers guarding the Vote Tabulation Center



              A UN tank guards the Vote Tabulation Center

                              APPENDIX IV

                     Haiti: Election Day Procedures

Schedule for Voting Centers
   5:00 a.m.: 38,000 voting center personnel arrive at 
        voting centers.

   5:00 a.m.-6:00 a.m.: Personnel set up voting

   6:00 a.m.: Voting opens

   4:00 p.m.: Voting closes (any voters already in line 
        at 1600 will be allowed to vote)
Transportation
    The Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) and IGOH plan to 
allow public transportation on Election Day.
Steps to Casting a Vote
          Voting site (BV) First Secretary checks voter IDs at 
        the door to the BV and directs them to the president of 
        the BV.

          BV President examines both of the voter's hands to 
        make sure there is no mark indicating they have already 
        voted.

          BV President finds voter's name, photo (identical to 
        the ID card photo) and ID number on j the partial 
        electoral list (LEP).

          Voter signs next to their name on the LEP.

          BV Vice President (VP) gives the voter a ballot for 
        presidential, senatorial and deputy races.

          BV VP explains that the voter can choose one 
        president, three senators, and one deputy.

          BV VP explains that voter should fold ballot as soon 
        as he votes to keep his decision private.

          Voter casts vote at table divided in four by a 
        cardboard divider.

          BV Second Secretary helps voter place ballots in 
        correct box, but does not touch ballots.

          BV Second Secretary marks voter's thumb nail with 
        indelible marker.
Counting the Votes
          Vote count begins at 4 p.m. or after all voters in 
        line at 4 p.m. have voted.

          Candidate, party, national, and international 
        observers monitor counting. They will keep a separate 
        count to verify the official count before the BV 
        president records the official results.

          Beginning with the presidential race, the BV 
        president will remove ballots from the ballot box one 
        by one, calling out who the vote is for, if the ballot 
        is blank, or if the ballot is undecipherable.

          BV President will show the ballot to all observers so 
        they can confirm his assessment.

          BV Secretaries will sort the ballots by candidate.

          Once all the ballots are removed from the box and 
        sorted, the BV secretaries will count the votes for 
        each candidate.

          The votes will be counted again if any of the 
        observers in the room disagree with the count.

          Once, all the observers agree on the results, the BV 
        president will fill out the tally sheet and place clear 
        tape over the results on every carbon copy of the tally 
        sheet.

          BV Secretaries will seal all of the ballots in one of 
        the ballot boxes.

          BV President seals three tally sheets in envelopes, 
        one for the communal electoral bureau (BEC), one for 
        the departmental electoral bureau (BED), and one for 
        the CEP as required by the electoral law.

          BV President seals the tally sheet for the CEP as 
        well as the time and attendance sheets for the poll 
        workers in a tamper-proof plastic bag for delivery to 
        Port-au-Prince,

          A tally sheet is given to each of the two political 
        parties with the most votes, and one is displayed 
        publicly on the wall of the BV.

          CEP staff accompanies the results throughout the 
        process; only Haitian elections workers are allowed to 
        handle the results.

          UN vehicles and in some cases rented animals carry 
        the sealed results to UN departmental bases co-located 
        with or close to the BEDs.

          The UN will provide space in all vehicles carrying 
        results (trucks and helicopters) for observers.
Ballots Stored, Tally Sheets Transferred
          CEP staff unloads the ballots and tally sheets at 
        MINUSTAH departmental bases.

          Ballots are locked in secure storage.

          One copy of each tally sheet is sent to the relevant 
        BEC, the BED, and the tabulation center in Port-au-
        Prince

          Elections officials hope to transport tally sheets to 
        the tabulation center in Port-au-Prince quickly. 
        However, results transportation from some remote areas 
        may be slow--some roads are nearly impassable in foul 
        weather. It could take 3 - 5 days to finalize the count 
        from outlying areas.
Tabulating and Releasing the Results

          CEP workers log in each tally sheet by their unique 
        identification number as they arrive at the tabulation 
        center.

          Each tally sheet is randomly assigned to an OAS/CEP-
        trained operator who enters the results into a 
        computer.

          The sheet is then passed to another randomly selected 
        operator who enters the results a second time.

          If the two entries do not match, the sheet is sent to 
        a committee that examines the entered results and the 
        tally sheet to verify the results.

          The CEP will release results from the USAID-funded 
        media center, but has not yet decided when they will 
        begin to release results.
          Members of the press, elections observers, and 
        members of the diplomatic community will have access to 
        the tabulation center throughout the counting process. 
        However, the tabulation center is divided into sections 
        to prevent results from leaking before they are 
        officially release by the CEP.
          The technical process for voting and tabulation is 
        complete. This year's Election Day process will make 
        fraud significantly more difficult than in past 
        elections and should lead to a more credible result.

Source: U.S. Department of State.

                                    

      
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