[Senate Prints 109-39]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



109th Congress                                                  S. Prt.

 1st Session                COMMITTEE PRINT                      109-39
_______________________________________________________________________
 
 U.S.-INDIAN NUCLEAR ENERGY COOPERATION: SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION 
                              IMPLICATIONS

                               __________

                A COMPILATION OF STATEMENTS BY WITNESSES

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                       Richard G. Lugar, Chairman





       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations


                              _____


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                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                  RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska                JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island         PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia               CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota              JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio            RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee           BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire        BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska               BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
                 Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
              Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director

                                  (ii)


















                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Letter of Introduction...........................................     v
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, Minority 
  Leader, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.....................     4
Burns, Hon. R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political 
  Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC...................     6
Carter, Hon. Ashton B., Codirector, Preventive Defense Project, 
  Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA    31
Joseph, Hon. Robert G., Under Secretary for Arms Control and 
  International Security, State Department, Washington, DC.......    14
Krepon, Michael, Cofounder and President Emeritus, Henry L. 
  Stimson Center, Washington, DC.................................    62
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, Chairman, 
  Senate Foreign Relations Committee.............................     1
Lehman, Hon. Ronald F., II, Director, Center for Global Security 
  Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, Ca    23
Sokolski, Henry D., Executive Director, Nonproliferation Policy 
  Education Center, Washington, DC...............................    38
    Viewgraphs...................................................    43
    India's ICBM: On a ``Glide Path'' to Trouble.................    50
    Feeding the Nuclear Fire.....................................    57

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Einhorn, Hon. Robert J., Senior Adviser, International Security 
  Program, CSIS, Washington, DC:
    Letter to Senator Lugar......................................    67
    Recommended Modifications of U.S. Law and NSG Guidelines.....    70
    Prepared statement...........................................    71

                                 (iii)






                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                              United States Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                  Washington, DC, November 4, 2005.

    Dear Colleague: On November 2, the Foreign Relations 
Committee held a hearing titled ``U.S.-Indian Nuclear Energy 
Cooperation: Security and Nonproliferation Implications.''
    Because of the great importance we attach to the 
committee's consideration of this matter we wish to make 
available to you the statements and record inserts from our 
witnesses.
    The witnesses for this hearing were: Under Secretary of 
State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns; Under Secretary 
of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert G. 
Joseph; the Honorable Ronald F. Lehman, II, Director of the 
Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory and formerly Director of the U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency; the Honorable Ashton B. Carter, 
Co-Director of Preventive Defense Project and Professor at 
Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and 
International Security and formerly Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security Policy; Henry D. Sokolski, 
Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education 
Center; and, Michael Krepon, Co-Founder and President Emeritus 
of the Henry L. Stimson Center. This document also contains 
supplementary material from the Honorable Robert J. Einhorn, 
Senior Adviser, International Security Program, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, and formerly Assistant 
Secretary of State for Nonproliferation. Because the topic of 
this hearing is at the forefront of public debate, we wanted to 
make it available to you and your staff.
    Please let us know if you have any questions or comments 
regarding this hearing or the other hearings on this subject.
            Sincerely,
                                   Richard G. Lugar,
                                           Chairman.
                                   Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
                                         Ranking Democratic Member.
















                          Opening Statement of

                         HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR

                       U.S. Senator From Indiana,
              Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee


                            november 2, 2005


                              ----------                              


    The Foreign Relations Committee meets today to consider the 
Joint Statement issued by President Bush and the Prime Minister 
of India on July 18, 2005. This document stands as a milestone 
in the U.S.-Indian relationship. It covers the full range of 
economic, political, and security issues, as well as matters 
related to nuclear energy cooperation, and has the potential to 
bring our two countries closer together than ever before.
    India is an important emerging power on the world stage. It 
enjoys a vibrant democracy, a rapidly growing economy, and 
increasing influence in world affairs. Indians have come to the 
United States to study in our universities, to work in our 
industries, and to live here as citizens. It is clearly in the 
interests of the United States to develop a strong strategic 
relationship with India.
    At this point, let me pause for a moment to express the 
committee's condolences and sympathy for the people of India, 
who suffered a terrible terrorist attack over the weekend in 
New Delhi. We fully support India in its battle against 
terrorism.
    Although the Joint Statement covers many areas of policy, 
commentary has focused narrowly on the nuclear energy section, 
which states that India will be treated as ``a responsible 
state with advanced nuclear technology.'' Critics and advocates 
acknowledge that this represents a departure from previous U.S. 
policies and international practices.
    India has never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, the foundation of international efforts to stop the 
spread of nuclear weapons. India has developed a nuclear 
weapons arsenal, in conflict with the goals of the treaty. New 
Delhi in 1974 violated bilateral pledges it made to Washington 
not to use U.S.-supplied nuclear materials for weapons 
purposes. More recently, Indian scientists have faced United 
States sanctions for providing nuclear information to Iran.
    India's nuclear record with the international community 
also has been unsatisfying. It has not acknowledged or placed 
under effective international safeguards all of its facilities 
involved in nuclear work, and its nuclear tests in 1998 
triggered widespread condemnation and international sanctions.
    Prior to the July 18 Joint Statement, India had repeatedly 
sought, unsuccessfully, to be recognized as an official nuclear 
weapons state, a status the NPT reserves only for the United 
States, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom. 
Opponents argue that granting India such status will undermine 
the essential bargain that is at the core of the NPT--namely, 
that only by foregoing nuclear weapons can a country gain 
civilian nuclear assistance. They observe that permitting India 
to retain nuclear weapons while it receives the same civilian 
nuclear benefits as nations that have forsworn weapons programs 
would set a harmful precedent that would encourage other 
nations to take India's path. New Delhi has long claimed that 
the NPT is discriminatory, and that the international community 
has instituted what it calls a ``nuclear apartheid'' against 
it.
    Implementation of the July 18 Joint Statement requires 
congressional consent, as well as modifications to 
nonproliferation laws and an American commitment to work with 
allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil 
nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India. This 
committee, and ultimately the entire Congress, must determine 
what effect the Joint Statement will have on U.S. efforts to 
halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To date, 
no associated legislative proposals have been offered by the 
administration. Likewise, there does not appear to be a 
specific Indian timetable to fulfill its obligations under the 
Joint Statement.
    India has agreed, according to the Statement, to ``assume 
the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same 
benefits and advantages as other leading countries with 
advanced nuclear technology.'' These responsibilities include 
seven specific action steps:

          (1) Identifying and separating civilian and military 
        nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner and 
        declaring them to the IAEA;
          (2) Voluntarily placing its civilian nuclear 
        facilities under IAEA safeguards;
          (3) Signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol;
          (4) Continuing India's unilateral moratorium on 
        nuclear testing;
          (5) Working with the United States to conclude a 
        multilateral Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty;
          (6) Refraining from the transfer of enrichment and 
        reprocessing technologies to states that do not have 
        them and supporting international efforts to limit 
        their spread; and
          (7) Complying with the Missile Technology Control 
        Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 
        guidelines.

    There are four key questions that today's hearing seeks to 
answer. First, how does civil nuclear cooperation strengthen 
the United States-Indian strategic relationship and why is it 
so important? Second, how does the Joint Statement address 
United States concerns about India's nuclear programs and 
policies? Third, what effects will the Joint Statement have on 
other proliferation challenges such as Iran and North Korea and 
the export policies of Russia and China? Fourth, what impact 
will the Joint Statement have on the efficacy and future of the 
NPT and the international nonproliferation regime?
    Today's hearing will consist of two panels. On the first 
panel, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Nicholas 
Burns, and Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security, Robert Joseph, will lay out the 
administration's case for the July Joint Statement. They are 
both friends of this committee, and I want to express my 
personal appreciation for their efforts to meet with Senators 
on this and other important issues.
    On the second panel, we will hear from several outside 
experts. Ronald Lehman, formerly Director of the U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency and currently Director of the 
Center for Global Security Research at Livermore National 
Laboratory, and Ashton Carter, codirector of the Preventive 
Defense Project, will present their views to the committee. Dr. 
Lehman and Dr. Carter are cochairmen of the Non-Proliferation 
Policy Advisory Group, an informal panel of experts that I have 
convened to examine nonproliferation issues. They are joined by 
Mr. Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Non-Proliferation 
Policy Education Center, and Mr. Michael Krepon, cofounder and 
President Emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center.
    We appreciate the appearance of all our witnesses and look 
forward to their testimony.

                         PREPARED STATEMENT OF

                       HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

                      U.S. Senator from Delaware,
          Minority Leader, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

                            NOVEMBER 2, 2005

                              ----------                              


    Mr. Chairman, as you and I both know, there may be no more 
urgent issue for our country than nuclear nonproliferation. 
Today's hearing addresses some of the most difficult aspects of 
this issue, and I am grateful to you for assembling such 
excellent witnesses to help us.
    I hope that this is only the first of several hearings on 
nuclear trade between the United States and India. The matter 
is complex and Congress will be asked to legislate on it, so we 
need careful consultation with the executive branch. And I am 
sure you agree that any needed legislation on this matter 
should go through the Foreign Relations Committee.
    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty includes this basic 
bargain: Countries that renounce nuclear weapons gain the right 
to civil nuclear cooperation with the world's nuclear powers. 
The NPT and this bargain at its core have deterred many 
countries from pursuing nuclear weapons.
    Several countries did not sign the NPT--including India and 
Pakistan, which openly tested nuclear weapons, and Israel, 
which is presumed to have them.
    Past practice has been to ignore or reject the status of 
new entrants to the nuclear ``club,'' and to forswear nuclear 
commerce with them. This has not stopped those countries from 
developing nuclear weapons, but it may have slowed or limited 
their progress.
    We are left with the problem of how to assure that these 
countries do not become proliferators themselves or lead other 
countries to develop nuclear weapons, as well as the concern 
that a forthright nonproliferation policy might sour our 
relations with important and otherwise friendly countries.
    President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Singh propose to 
change the rules for India. The United States would seek 
changes in U.S. law and in NSG Guidelines to permit ``full 
civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India.''
    India, in return, would separate its civil nuclear 
facilities from its military ones, put its civil facilities 
under IAEA safeguards, and sign and implement an Additional 
Protocol with the IAEA. It would work with the United States on 
a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, continue its 
moratorium on nuclear testing, and improve its export control 
regime.
    I strongly support closer relations between the United 
States and India. India is not only the world's most populous 
democracy, but also a major power in the region and a long-
standing contributor to world progress in technology, 
philosophy and the arts. India and the United States are 
natural partners.
    At the same time, both countries must ensure that closer 
relations do not lead to further nuclear proliferation. If we 
were to undermine nuclear nonproliferation, even by accident, 
the cost to the world--in an increased risk of nuclear war or 
terrorism--would be a terrible legacy to leave.
    And I wonder how good the July 18 deal really is. Critics 
have charged that India's promises are unclear (regarding 
separation of civil from military facilities) or nothing new 
(on testing, a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, and export 
controls).
    So, it is up to the administration to demonstrate that in 
dealing with the dilemma of countries that have not signed the 
NPT, it will strengthen nonproliferation, rather than turning 
its back on over 50 years of U.S. policy. The July 18 Joint 
Statement raises several questions that I hope our witnesses 
will address today, among them:

          (1) Will this open the door to nuclear cooperation 
        with Pakistan, even if that is not our intent?
          (2) What implications would an India exemption have 
        for potential nuclear weapon states that have abided by 
        the bargain implicit in NPT? What concerns did other 
        countries raise at the recent Nuclear Suppliers Group 
        meeting?
          (3) Will an ``India exemption'' decrease our ability 
        to forge a common front against the nuclear ambitions 
        of Iran and North Korea? Could Russia use the India 
        precedent to justify technology transfers to Tehran? 
        Could China use it to justify sales to Tehran or even 
        Pyongyang?
          (4) Will India allow significant international 
        safeguards on its civilian nuclear entities? Will it 
        open as many facilities as possible to international 
        safeguards, as the United States does, or will it take 
        Russia or China as its model? Will it agree to 
        permanent safeguards on the civil nuclear facilities it 
        declares?
          (5) How confident are we that India shares our 
        nonproliferation concerns? Why were two of its senior 
        scientists sanctioned a few months ago?
          (6) How binding are the commitments that each side 
        made in the July 18 Joint Statement? If India were to 
        conduct a nuclear test or did not put many facilities 
        under safeguards, or if the U.S. Congress or the NSG 
        were to attach conditions to their ``India 
        exemptions,'' would the other country be released from 
        its promises?
          (7) How can we assure that what we do regarding India 
        will further nonproliferation? Is there a useful way to 
        address the broader dilemma of nonsigners of the NPT, 
        rather than just India? And,
          (8) How can we assure that what we do to preserve 
        nonproliferation equities will not undermine the 
        important United States-India relationship that we all 
        want to improve?

    These are tough questions, but that is in the nature of 
serious hearings. I look forward to the testimony of our 
witnesses.

                         PREPARED STATEMENT OF

                         HON. R. NICHOLAS BURNS

Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State, Washington, 
                                   DC

                               BEFORE THE

                   Senate Foreign Relations Committee

                            NOVEMBER 2, 2005

                              ----------                              


    Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for 
inviting Under Secretary Joseph and me to discuss the current 
state of our relations with India and, specifically the 
development of full civil nuclear energy cooperation between 
India and the United States. The July 18 visit of Indian Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh to Washington marked a watershed in our 
ties with the world's most populous democracy.
    President Bush's desire to transform relations with India 
is based on his conviction that, as he has said, ``This century 
will see democratic India's arrival as a force in the world.'' 
We believe it is in our national interest to develop a strong, 
forward-looking relationship with India as the political and 
economic focus of the global system shifts toward Asia. We know 
that many in Congress embrace this view. And the time is right. 
The cold war, when India was the ultimate nonaligned nation and 
the United States the ultimate aligned nation, is long past. It 
is time to shift our United States-India relationship to a new, 
strategic partnership for the decades ahead.
    India is a rising global power with a rapidly growing 
economy. Within the first quarter of this century, it is likely 
to be included among the world's five largest economies. It 
will soon be the world's most populous nation, and it has a 
demographic distribution that bequeaths it a huge, skilled, and 
youthful workforce. India's military forces will continue to be 
large, capable, and increasingly sophisticated. Just like our 
own, the Indian military remains strongly committed to the 
principle of civilian control. Above all else, we know what 
kind of country India will be decades from now. Like the United 
States, India will thrive as a multiethnic, multireligious and 
multilingual democracy, characterized by individual freedom, 
rule of law and a constitutional government that owes its power 
to free and fair elections.
    Under Secretary Joseph and I are here as part of a 
consultation process with both Houses of Congress to seek 
eventually the adjustment of United States laws to accommodate 
civil nuclear trade with India. We are at the very beginning of 
that process. We will work closely with Congress to determine 
the best way ahead.
    Since President Bush agreed with Prime Minister Singh on 
this nuclear initiative on July 18, we have discussed with many 
of you individually where best to begin the decisionmaking 
process with Congress. Both of us testified before the House 
International Relations Committee in September. Secretary Rice 
has briefed the Senate and House leadership on this initiative. 
She is eager to engage with you in more detailed discussions in 
the coming months. We have already had extensive briefings of 
House and Senate staff, and we even invited House staff to 
attend with us the meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 
Vienna, 2 weeks ago, dealing with the Indian civil nuclear 
issue. In short, we have shared with the Congress our rationale 
for the July 18 agreement and have consulted consistently and 
in detail on our discussions with the Indian Government since 
that time.
    Secretary Rice, Under Secretary Joseph, and I look forward 
to continuing this dialog. We recognize that the pace and scope 
of the initiative requires close consultation with Congress and 
we welcome your suggestions and advice as we move forward.
    Indeed, we cannot go forward on this initiative without the 
express consent of Congress. The advent of full United States 
civil nuclear cooperation with India requires adjustments in 
United States law. I had the privilege of negotiating the July 
18 agreement for the United States and remain the principal 
negotiator with the Indian Government. Based on my visit to New 
Delhi 2 weeks ago, it is clear that it will take some time for 
the Indian Government to fulfill all of the commitments it made 
in the July 18 agreement. The actions India committed to 
undertake are difficult, complex and time consuming. The 
administration thus believes it is better to wait before we ask 
Congress to consider any required legislative action until 
India is further along in taking the necessary steps to fulfill 
our agreement. I believe that will likely be in early 2006.
    Our judgment is that it would not be wise or fair to ask 
Congress to make such a consequential decision without evidence 
that the Indian Government was acting on what is arguably the 
most important of its commitments--the separation of its 
civilian and military nuclear facilities. I told the Indian 
leadership in Delhi, 2 weeks ago, that it must craft a credible 
and transparent plan and have begun to implement it before the 
administration would request congressional action.
    My counterpart, Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, assured me 
that the Indian Government will produce such a plan. He 
stressed last week to a domestic audience at the New Delhi-
based Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses, ``It makes no 
sense for India to deliberately keep some of its civilian 
facilities out of its declaration for safeguards purposes, if 
it is really interested in obtaining international cooperation 
on as wide a scale as possible. As India begins to meet its 
commitments under our agreement, we will propose appropriate 
language that would be India-specific and would demonstrate our 
dedication to a robust and permanent partnership.''
    I have invited Foreign Secretary Saran to Washington in 
December to continue our talks, and I intend to return to India 
in January to further our understanding of India's plans to 
separate its civil and military nuclear facilities. We will, of 
course, keep the Congress fully apprised of all these 
discussions. We hope very much that India can make the 
necessary progress to allow us to refer legislation to Congress 
by early 2006.

                THE CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION INITIATIVE

    Mr. Chairman, you requested that we answer three questions 
in this hearing: First, why is it necessary to draw closer to 
India; second, how would United States concerns about India's 
nonproliferation policies be addressed by this agreement; and, 
third, will our proposed policy change apply to countries other 
than India? Under Secretary Joseph and I will respond to each 
of your questions.
    When Secretary Rice set out last spring to develop the 
structure of such a partnership, we knew we would have to deal 
with the one issue that has bedeviled United States-India 
relations for the last 30 years--the nuclear issue.
    We determined from the start that we could not recognize 
India as a nuclear weapons state. Such a step would weaken 
fundamentally the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and 
would be logically inconsistent with U.S. policy under the last 
seven American Presidents. It was equally clear that India 
would not become a party to the NPT as a nonnuclear weapons 
state.
    We also knew that we would have to confront the more 
difficult and complex issue of whether to work with India on 
full civil nuclear cooperation. India had made this the central 
issue in the new partnership developing between our countries. 
As you know, past administrations had decided to forgo such 
civil cooperation with India due to India's nuclear weapons 
program and its status outside the nonproliferation regime. We 
had to decide whether this policy remained consistent with U.S. 
interests in building a strong nonproliferation regime and with 
our obvious priority of improving relations with the world's 
largest democracy.
    Because India developed nuclear weapons outside the regime, 
we had no existing cooperation between our civil nuclear energy 
industries and, as such, no real influence on India's adherence 
to the critical international nonproliferation standards that 
are the bedrock of our efforts to limit the spread of nuclear 
technology. While not formally part of the NPT regime, India 
has demonstrated a strong commitment to protect fissile 
materials and nuclear technology. Indeed, as other responsible 
countries with advanced nuclear technology, India has resisted 
proposals for nuclear cooperation with nuclear aspirants that 
could have had adverse implications for international security.
    We weighed the pros and cons of whether or not to seek 
changes to U.S. policy and ask Congress for authorization to 
begin full civil nuclear energy cooperation.
    We decided that it was in the American interest to bring 
India into compliance with the standards and practices of the 
international nonproliferation regime. And, we decided that the 
only way to reach that goal was to end India's isolation and 
begin to engage it. India will soon have the largest population 
in the world, and to consign it to a place outside that system 
did not appear to be strategically wise and has not proven 
effective.
    Without such an agreement, India, with its large and 
sophisticated nuclear capabilities, would continue to remain 
outside the international export control regimes governing 
commerce in sensitive nuclear and nuclear-related technologies. 
With this agreement, given India's solid record in stemming and 
preventing the proliferation of its nuclear technology over the 
past 30 years, the United States and the international 
community will benefit by asking India to open up its system, 
to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities, and to 
submit to international inspections and safeguards on its civil 
facilities, thus allowing it to bring its civil nuclear program 
into effective conformity with international standards.
    India will assume the same nonproliferation 
responsibilities as other responsible nations with civil 
nuclear energy and will protect against diversion of items 
either to India's weapons program or to other countries. United 
States-Indian cooperation on nuclear energy will therefore help 
strengthen the international order in a way that advances 
widespread international equities in nuclear nonproliferation. 
It also will allow India to develop much more quickly its own 
civilian nuclear power industry, thus reducing demands on the 
world energy market and in a way that provides clean energy for 
the future.
    This was not an easy choice. We do not live in an ideal 
world. We concluded we had a better chance to have India meet 
international nonproliferation standards if we engaged rather 
than isolated it. We believe the resulting agreement advances 
our strategic partnership and is a net gain for 
nonproliferation. We do not plan to offer such cooperation to 
any other country.
    In addition to aligning ourselves with a country that 
shares our democratic values and commitment to a multiethnic, 
multireligious society, developing civil nuclear cooperation 
with India will bring concrete benefits to the United States 
and to the international community more broadly. Under 
Secretary Joseph will address this initiative in detail, but 
let me outline here some of the key reasons why we believe this 
initiative makes excellent sense:

   Security Benefits: All the steps that India pledged 
        on July 18 strengthen the international 
        nonproliferation regime, and all align with our efforts 
        to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. 
        India's September vote in the International Atomic 
        Energy Agency (IAEA) that found Iran in noncompliance 
        with its nuclear obligations reflects India's coming of 
        age as a responsible state in the global 
        nonproliferation mainstream.
   Environmental Benefits: Nuclear energy is one of the 
        few proven sources of energy that does not emit 
        greenhouse gases, and thus can help India modernize in 
        an environmentally friendly manner that does not damage 
        our common atmosphere and contribute to global warming.
   Commercial Benefits: As a result of our involvement 
        in India's civil nuclear industry, United States 
        companies will be able to enter India's lucrative and 
        growing energy market, potentially providing jobs for 
        thousands of Americans.
   Energy Benefits: India's expertise in basic science 
        and applied engineering will add significant resources 
        and substantial talent in the development of fusion as 
        a cheap energy source if India can participate in the 
        International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) 
        program and help make the next generation of reactors 
        safer, more efficient and more proliferation-resistant 
        as a member of the Generation-IV Forum (GIF).

                        THE BROADER RELATIONSHIP

    Although our civil nuclear initiative has garnered the most 
attention, it is only part of a much broader and deeper 
strategic partnership with India, something that has not really 
been possible until now.
    In late June, Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee and 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld signed a New Defense 
Framework that will guide our defense relations for the next 
decade. We're planning to enlarge defense trade, improve 
cooperation between our Armed Forces, and coproduce military 
hardware. The brilliant cooperation of our two militaries 
during the response to the tsunami disaster last December was a 
remarkable testament to how far we have come, and the great 
potential we have for the future.
    A strong, democratic India is an important partner for the 
United States. We anticipate that India will play an 
increasingly important leadership role in 21st century Asia, 
working with us to promote democracy, respect for human rights, 
economic growth, stability and peace in that vital region. By 
cooperating with India now, we accelerate the arrival of the 
benefits that India's rise brings to the region and the world. 
By fostering ever-closer bilateral ties, we also eliminate the 
possibility that our two nations might overlook their natural 
affinities and enter into another period of unproductive 
estrangement as was so often the case during the cold war 
period. By challenging India today, with a full measure of 
respect for its ancient civilization, traditions, and 
accomplishments, we can help it realize its full potential as a 
natural partner in the struggle against the security challenges 
of the coming generation, and the global threats that are 
flowing over, under, and through our respective national 
borders.
    I visited New Delhi, 2 weeks ago, and held an extensive 
series of discussions with senior Indian officials on the range 
of our foreign policy interests. While there, I had broad-
ranging discussions on many issues, everything from HIV/AIDS to 
the situation in Nepal to our concerns about Iran. The July 18 
Joint Statement calls for government-to-government joint 
cooperation in many areas, including civil nuclear cooperation; 
a United States-India Global Democracy Initiative; an expanded 
United States-India Economic Dialogue focusing on trade, 
finance, the environment, and commerce; continued cooperation 
in science and technology; an Energy Dialogue to strengthen 
energy security and promote stable energy markets, an 
Agricultural Knowledge Initiative, an Information and 
Communications Technology Working Group; Space Cooperation; a 
United States-India Disaster Response Initiative; and the 
United States-India HIV/AIDS Partnership. Foreign Secretary 
Saran and I have already begun working on the joint ventures 
that the President and Prime Minister Singh had asked us to 
undertake and plan to further our cooperation in the fields of 
education, in agriculture, in science and technology, and in 
space. We very much would like to welcome an Indian astronaut 
to fly on the space shuttle. I think it is clear that our 
interests converge on all these issues. With this ambitious 
agenda, our two countries are becoming, in effect, global 
partners.
    Cooperation in several of these areas has already begun and 
is yielding results. Just last month, the United States-India 
Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters entered 
into force, providing for enhanced, streamlined and more 
effective law enforcement cooperation between our two 
countries. On October 17, Secretary Rice and Indian Science and 
Technology Minister Sibal signed an umbrella Science and 
Technology Agreement that will strengthen United States and 
Indian capabilities and expand relations between the extensive 
scientific and technological communities of both countries. 
This agreement includes a substantive Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR) provision--another indication of India's 
increasing recognition of the need to respect intellectual 
property.

                         THE CHALLENGES WE FACE

    We have accomplished much, but we have just scratched the 
surface of our partnership with India. Ambassador Mulford and 
his outstanding team in New Delhi, aided by frequent high-level 
visitors to the subcontinent over the next several months, will 
continue to pursue this expanding agenda.
    We want the United States and India to work together more 
effectively than we have in the past to become more effective 
global partners. Let me provide a few examples. On the 
political side of the ledger, we will be seeking early tangible 
progress with India toward:

   Creating a closer United States-India partnership to 
        help build democratic institutions in the region and 
        worldwide. During the Prime Minister's visit to 
        Washington, our two leaders agreed for the first time 
        to work together to promote democracy worldwide. Both 
        countries have contributed to the U.N.'s Democracy 
        Fund. We will seek ways to work together in 
        strengthening democratic institutions and practices in 
        specific countries. India's experiment in democracy has 
        been a success for over half a century, and its 2004 
        national polls were the largest exercise in electoral 
        democracy the world has ever seen. We share a belief 
        that democracy and development are linked, that 
        effective democratic governance is a precondition to 
        healthy economic development. In this regard, we hope 
        India will share its democratic experience with central 
        Asian nations, which are having a difficult time making 
        the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, and 
        assist them in building institutions necessary to the 
        success of democracy and the advancement of human 
        rights.
   Advancing our shared interest in reform at the 
        United Nations. Members of this committee know well the 
        President's deep desire to promote reform at the United 
        Nations. This is a top priority for this 
        administration, and India as well. We want a far more 
        vigorous Indian engagement with us in the ongoing 
        process of reforming the United Nations into an 
        organization that serves the interests of its members. 
        I think both our countries would agree that this 
        process should neither be politicized nor subjected to 
        the sort of country bloc calculations that prevailed 
        during the cold war. India has much to offer in moving 
        reform efforts ahead.
   Indian participation in the Proliferation Security 
        Initiative. India boasts one of the world's largest 
        commercial maritime fleets and a navy that demonstrated 
        its rapidly growing expeditionary capacity in 
        responding to the December tsunami. Indian support for 
        the multinational Proliferation Security Initiative 
        (PSI) would be a boon to the participating nations' 
        goal of tracking and interdicting dangerous terrorist 
        and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) cargoes 
        worldwide. We hope India will choose to join PSI.
   United States-India cooperation for regional peace 
        and stability. India is one of the largest 
        international donors to Afghanistan's reconstruction 
        and works closely with us in the areas of road 
        construction, public health, education, 
        telecommunications, and human resource development. 
        India and the United States share the goal of a return 
        to democracy in Nepal and a defeat of the Maoist 
        insurgency. In Sri Lanka, we both support the 
        government's efforts to recover from the tsunami and 
        return to the peace process. We should do more to 
        promote human rights and democracy in autocratic Burma. 
        Our two countries should work more closely to promote 
        peace and stability in Asia.
   Convincing Iran to return to negotiations. India and 
        the United States have found an increasingly positive 
        dialog on Iran. We are both dedicated to the goal of an 
        Iran that lives in harmony in its region, ends support 
        of terrorist groups and does not seek nuclear weapons. 
        We welcomed India's vote with us at the IAEA in 
        September to find Iran in noncompliance with its 
        international obligations. We appreciate India's belief 
        that Iran should not acquire a nuclear weapons 
        capability, and India's continuing cooperation with the 
        United States and Europe is essential to convince Iran 
        to return to negotiations.

    We and India also need to focus on a number of important 
economic challenges, both bilateral and global. Since the early 
1990s, India has progressed far in liberalizing its tariff 
regime and investment environment, and these major changes have 
fueled the growth and increased prosperity of recent years. Any 
quick survey of India's economic landscape provides thousands 
of examples of innovation and excellence. India is increasingly 
a global competitor in knowledge-based industries such as 
information and communications technology and biotechnology 
research and development.
    Despite its impressive record of economic growth during the 
last decade, India still struggles with many of the persistent 
challenges faced by developing countries: Insufficient and 
underdeveloped infrastructure, inefficient markets for goods 
and services, and minimal access of credit and capital among 
the urban and rural poor. In addition, India also suffers from 
a shortage of foreign capital and investment, which can bring 
in key, new technologies, create jobs, and modernize 
industries.
    In this new partnership, the United States and India have a 
great opportunity to work together to overcome these 
challenges, toward the continued prosperity of our peoples, and 
to play a positive role in shaping the world's economic future. 
The ongoing negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in the Doha Development Round offer the perfect opportunity to 
work on our shared goals of trade, development, and prosperity.
    Both India and the United States stand to gain from the 
increasing liberalization of trade in goods and services, and 
in convincing our trading partners to do the same. There is no 
reason why India and the United States should not be partners 
in this forum, whose success is so crucial to our common 
future. We plan to work closely with India on proposals that 
can translate the promise of the WTO's mission--and the new era 
of United States-India relations--into reality. This effort 
will take hard work on both sides, and we look forward to this 
opportunity to engage India seriously, to the economic 
betterment of both our people.
    As we build closer economic relations, we look forward to 
India's agreement to purchase American civil and military 
aircraft and to open its doors further to trade with our 
country.

BUILDING PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE AND PRIVATE SECTOR COOPERATION BETWEEN INDIA 
                         AND THE UNITED STATES

    The new United States-India partnership is not and cannot 
be just between governments. We have seen an equally powerful 
expansion of our people-to-people ties and business growth. The 
immense power of the India-United States people-to-people 
network goes deeper than anyone could have ever imagined. We 
find thousands of Americans in Delhi, in Mumbai and Bangalore, 
and even more Indians in New York, Washington, and Los Angeles. 
Over 85,000 Americans are living in India, lured by its growing 
economy and the richness of its culture. There are 2 million 
persons of Indian origin in the United States, citizens and 
legal permanent residents. They are operating businesses in our 
country, running for political office, and building bridges 
back to India. There are more Indian students in the United 
States today than from any other country in the world--80,000.
    We have, in essence, the development of a true, 
comprehensive, across-the-board engagement between India and 
the United States, our governments, our societies, and our 
peoples. This engagement by individuals and businesses will 
propel and sustain the formal ties between our governments.

                               CONCLUSION

    I am pleased to have had the opportunity to share with you 
the many elements of this strategic transformation that we are 
witnessing in the United States-India relationship. Both 
President Bush and Prime Minister Singh have shown the 
confidence and vision to pursue a common vision for the world 
together. We hope the Congress will help us make that vision a 
reality.

                         PREPARED STATEMENT OF

                         HON. ROBERT G. JOSEPH

  Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, State 
                       Department, Washington, DC

                               BEFORE THE

                   Senate Foreign Relations Committee

                            NOVEMBER 2, 2005

                              ----------                              


    Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, distinguished members of the 
committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to discuss 
the President's policy toward India with respect to civil 
nuclear cooperation. I look forward to working with you over 
the months ahead to bring this important objective to a timely 
and successful outcome.

          TOWARD UNITED STATES-INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

    We believe it is in our national security interest to 
establish a broad strategic partnership with India that 
encourages India's emergence as a positive force on the world 
scene. Our desire to transform relations with India is founded 
upon a contemporary and forward-looking strategic vision. India 
is a rising global power and an important democratic partner 
for the United States. Today, for the first time, the United 
States and India are bound together by a strong congruence of 
interests and values. We seek to work with India to win the 
global War on Terrorism, to prevent the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction and the missiles that could deliver them, to 
enhance peace and stability in Asia, and to advance the spread 
of democracy. India and the United States are on the same side 
of these critical strategic objectives. Our challenge is to 
translate our converging interests into shared goals and 
compatible strategies designed to achieve these aims.
    In the context of this growing partnership, the United 
States and India reached a landmark agreement in July to work 
toward full civil nuclear cooperation while at the same time 
strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The Joint 
Statement agreed to by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh 
is not--as some have argued--a triumph of power politics over 
nonproliferation principles. This is not a zero-sum trade-off, 
whereby improvement in our bilateral strategic relationship 
results in nonproliferation losses. Rather, as the broadly 
constituted Joint Statement is implemented, it will prove a win 
for our strategic relations, a win for energy security, and a 
win for nonproliferation.
    India believes, and our administration agrees, that it 
needs nuclear power to sustain dynamic economic growth and to 
address its growing energy requirements in an affordable and 
environmentally responsible manner. Our goal--in the context of 
the Joint Statement--is to provide India access to the 
technology it needs to build a safe, modern and efficient 
infrastructure that will provide clean, peaceful nuclear 
energy.
    At the same time, India has clearly demonstrated over the 
past several years its desire to work with the United States 
and the international community to fight the spread of 
sensitive nuclear technologies. As part of an effort launched 
with India during the administration's first term--the Next 
Steps in Strategic Partnership--India took a number of 
significant steps to strengthen export controls and to ensure 
that Indian companies would not be a source of future 
proliferation. Not only did India pledge to bring its export 
control laws, regulations, and enforcement practices in line 
with modern export control standards, but also passed an 
extensive export control law and issued an upgraded national 
control list that will help it achieve this goal. In addition, 
India has become a party to the Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material and has taken significant steps 
toward meeting its obligations under UNSCR 1540.
    The additional nonproliferation commitments India made as 
part of the Joint Statement go even further and, once 
implemented, will bring it into closer conformity with 
international nuclear nonproliferation standards and practices. 
This is a very important move for India and for the 
nonproliferation community. While we will continue to work with 
India and to encourage it to do more over time, India's 
implementation of its commitments will, on balance, enhance our 
global nonproliferation efforts. We expect the international 
nuclear nonproliferation regime will emerge stronger as a 
result.
    As evidence of this expectation, we note with satisfaction 
India's positive IAEA Board of Governors vote in September on 
Iranian noncompliance, and look forward to further cooperative 
action on this critical international security issue.

                         NONPROLIFERATION GAINS

    Through the Joint Statement, India has publicly committed 
to a number of important nonproliferation steps. It will now:

   Identify and separate civilian and military nuclear 
        facilities and programs and file a declaration with the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding its 
        civilian facilities;
   Place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities 
        under IAEA safeguards;
   Sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol with 
        respect to civilian nuclear facilities;
   Continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear 
        testing;
   Work with the United States for the conclusion of a 
        multilateral Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) to 
        halt production of fissile material for nuclear 
        weapons;
   Refrain from the transfer of enrichment and 
        reprocessing technologies to states that do not have 
        them and support efforts to limit their spread; and
   Secure nuclear and missile materials and 
        technologies through comprehensive export control 
        legislation and adherence to the Missile Technology 
        Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group 
        (NSG).

    India's commitment to separate its civil and military 
facilities and place its civil facilities and activities under 
IAEA safeguards demonstrates its willingness to assume full 
responsibility for preventing proliferation from its civil 
nuclear program. It will also help protect against diversion of 
nuclear material and technologies to India's weapons program.
    By adopting an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, India 
will commit to reporting to the IAEA on exports of all NSG 
Trigger List items. This will help the IAEA track potential 
proliferation elsewhere, and bolster our efforts to encourage 
all states to adopt an Additional Protocol as a condition of 
supply.
    By committing to adopt strong and effective export 
controls, including adherence to NSG and MTCR Guidelines, India 
will help ensure that its companies do not transfer sensitive 
weapons of mass destruction and missile-related technologies to 
countries of concern. In July, India took an important step by 
harmonizing its national control list with the NSG Guidelines 
and by adding many items that appear on the MTCR Annex.
    India has also committed to work with the United States 
toward the conclusion of a multilateral FMCT, which, if 
successfully negotiated and ratified, will ban the production 
of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices.
    India's pledge to maintain its nuclear testing moratorium 
contributes to nonproliferation efforts by making its ending of 
nuclear explosive tests one of the conditions of full civil 
nuclear cooperation. Since to date Pakistan has test-exploded 
nuclear weapons only in response to Indian nuclear tests, this 
commitment will help diminish the prospects for future nuclear 
testing in South Asia.
    By committing not to export enrichment and reprocessing 
technology to states that do not already have such fully 
functioning capabilities, India will help us achieve the goals 
laid out by President Bush in February 2004, designed to 
prevent the further spread of such proliferation sensitive 
equipment and technology. This will help close what is widely 
recognized as the most significant loophole in the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty regime--a loophole that has clearly been 
exploited by countries such as North Korea and Iran and could 
be manipulated by others in the future.
    Each of these activities is significant. Together, they 
constitute a substantial shift in moving India into closer 
conformity with international nonproliferation standards and 
practices. Their successful implementation will help to 
strengthen the global nonproliferation regime.
    As befits a major, responsible nation, and in keeping with 
its commitment to play a leading role in international efforts 
to prevent WMD proliferation, we hope that India will also take 
additional nonproliferation-related actions beyond those 
specifically outlined in the Joint Statement. We view this as a 
key component of the developing United States-India strategic 
partnership and look forward to working with the Indian 
Government, as well as the international community more 
broadly, to further strengthen nonproliferation efforts 
globally.
    Through our ongoing bilateral dialog we have already 
discussed with India such steps as endorsing the Proliferation 
Security Initiative Statement of Principles, bringing an early 
end to the production of fissile material for weapons, and 
harmonizing its control lists with those of the Australia Group 
and the Wassenaar Arrangement.

               U.S. COMMITMENTS UNDER THE JOINT STATEMENT

    On a reciprocal basis with India's commitments, the United 
States has committed to work to achieve full civil nuclear 
cooperation with India. In this context, President Bush told 
Prime Minister Singh that he would:

   Seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and 
        policies;
   Work with friends and allies to adjust international 
        regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation 
        and trade with India; and
   Consult with partners on India's participation in 
        the fusion energy International Thermonuclear 
        Experimental Reactor (ITER) consortium and the 
        Generation IV International Forum, the work of which 
        relates to advanced nuclear energy systems.

    To implement effectively the steps under the Joint 
Statement, we will need the active support of Congress and that 
of our international partners. We expect--and have told the 
Indian Government--that India's follow-through on its 
commitments is essential to success. We believe that the 
Government of India understands this completely and we expect 
them to begin taking concrete steps in the weeks ahead.

                    INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO DATE

    Mr. Chairman, since the July statement, we have actively 
engaged with our international partners--both bilaterally and 
in such multilateral fora as the G-8 and the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group. I have met directly with my counterparts from many 
different countries. Secretary Rice and other senior U.S. 
officials discussed the initiative with states at the recent 
U.N. General Assembly and at IAEA General Conference meetings. 
Assistant Secretaries Stephen Rademaker and Christina Rocca 
both traveled to Vienna to make presentations to the NSG 
Consultative Group. And, of course, many of our Embassies have 
been actively engaged on this front.
    While some countries, such as Sweden, have expressed 
substantial doubts about the initiative for fear of inadvertent 
damage to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, others have 
expressed strong support. For example, the United Kingdom has 
``warmly welcome(d)'' this initiative and indicated that on the 
basis of the Joint Statement it was ``ready to discuss with our 
international partners the basis for cooperation in civil 
nuclear matters with India.'' Similarly, France has underscored 
the ``need for full international civilian nuclear cooperation 
with India.'' The Director General of the IAEA has also 
welcomed India's decision to place its civil nuclear facilities 
under safeguards and to sign and implement the Additional 
Protocol as ``concrete and practical steps toward the universal 
application of IAEA safeguards.''
    To date, many other countries have adopted a ``wait-and-
see'' approach. Most recognize the need to come to terms with 
India and not to allow it to remain completely outside the 
international nonproliferation system. They welcome the 
nonproliferation steps India has committed to take in the 
context of the Joint Statement. At the same time, they have 
made clear that their ultimate support will depend on the scope 
and pace of India's actions.
    Some have understandably questioned how this complex 
initiative comports with the NPT and our efforts to combat WMD 
proliferation. Others have asked whether the provision of civil 
nuclear technology to India would be consistent with their 
obligations under the NPT not to contribute to India's nuclear 
weapons program. Still others have asked why a cap on India's 
production of fissile material for weapons was not part of the 
deal.
    We have sought to clarify that the United States does not, 
and will not, support India's nuclear weapons program. As it is 
for other states, this is a ``red line'' for us. We are 
obligated under the NPT not to assist India's nuclear weapons 
program. Our initiative with India does not recognize India as 
a nuclear weapon state, and we will not seek to renegotiate the 
NPT, whether to change the treaty definition of a nuclear 
weapon state or in any other way. We remain cognizant of, and 
will fully uphold, all of our obligations under the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, and we remain committed in principle 
to universal NPT adherence.
    But we also recognize that India is in a unique situation 
and has shown to be responsible in not proliferating its 
nuclear technologies and materials. With its decision to take 
the steps announced in the Joint Statement, India will now take 
on new nonproliferation responsibilities that will strengthen 
global nonproliferation efforts that serve the fundamental 
purpose of the NPT.
    India has informed us that it has no intention of 
relinquishing its nuclear weapons or of becoming a party to the 
NPT as a nonnuclear weapon state, the only way it could adhere 
under the current terms of the treaty. Despite this, it is 
important to seize this opportunity to assist India in becoming 
a more constructive partner in our global nonproliferation 
efforts. Indian commitments to be undertaken in the context of 
the Joint Statement will align Delhi more closely with the 
nuclear nonproliferation regime than at any time previously. 
India has said it wants to be a partner and is willing to take 
important steps to this end. We should encourage such steps.
    In this context, it is important to note that the NPT does 
not ban civil nuclear cooperation with safeguarded facilities 
in India, nor does it require full scope safeguards as a 
condition of supply. In fact, under the ``grandfather'' 
provision of the NSG Guidelines, Russia today is building two 
nuclear reactors in India.
    The NPT does preclude any cooperation that would ``in any 
way assist'' India's nuclear weapons program. For that reason, 
we have made clear that, under our proposal, supplier states 
will only be able to engage in cooperation with safeguarded 
facilities. Moreover, the more civil facilities India places 
under safeguards, the more confident we can be that any 
cooperative arrangements will not further any military 
purposes. We expect--and have indicated to the Government of 
India--that India's separation of its civil and military 
nuclear infrastructure must be conducted in a credible and 
transparent manner, and be defensible from a nonproliferation 
standpoint. In other words, the separation and the resultant 
safeguards must contribute to our nonproliferation goals. Many 
of our international partners have similarly indicated that 
they view this as a necessary precondition, and will not be 
able to support civil nuclear cooperation with India otherwise. 
We believe that the Indian Government understands this.
    With respect to the cessation of fissile material 
production, we continue to encourage India, as well as 
Pakistan, to move in this direction as part of our strategic 
dialogs with both governments. But we think it would be unwise 
to hold up the nonproliferation gains that can be obtained from 
the civil nuclear cooperation initiative for an Indian fissile 
material cap. Moreover, in the context of the Joint Statement, 
we jointly committed to work toward the completion of an 
effective Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. As we have indicated 
previously, the United States also stands willing to explore 
other intermediate options that also might serve this 
objective.
    As India completes the significant actions that it has 
committed to undertake in the Joint Statement, we are convinced 
that the nonproliferation regime will emerge stronger. 
Separately, we will continue to encourage additional steps, 
such as India's acceptance of a fissile material production 
moratorium or cap, but we will not insist on it for the 
purposes of the civil nuclear cooperation initiative announced 
by the President and Prime Minister. Even absent such a cap, 
the initiative represents a net gain for nonproliferation.

                             KEY CHALLENGES

    Five key challenges face the successful achievement of 
Joint Statement implementation. These include: Developing a 
meaningful civil/military separation; negotiating the 
appropriate safeguards arrangement; building support within the 
NSG; avoiding the temptation to renegotiate the deal; and 
securing domestic legal reform.
    Developing a meaningful civil/military separation: We have 
indicated that the separation of civil and military facilities 
must be both credible and transparent, as well as defensible 
from a nonproliferation standpoint. We have engaged in initial 
discussions with the Government of India, and look forward to 
further discussion of a mutually acceptable approach. While 
India has not yet presented a formal separation plan, we are 
encouraged by Foreign Secretary Saran's public acknowledgements 
both that ``it is legitimate for our partners to expect that 
such cooperation will not provide any advantage to our 
strategic programme,'' and that ``it makes no sense for India 
to deliberately keep some of its civilian facilities out of its 
declaration for safeguards purposes, if it really is interested 
in obtaining international cooperation on as wide a scale as 
possible.''
    In our discussions to date, and in particular during Under 
Secretary Burns' recent talks in Delhi, we have discussed some 
straightforward principles. I will not enumerate them fully 
here since the negotiations remain ongoing, but would like to 
underscore just a couple of these. For example, to ensure that 
the United States and other potential suppliers can confidently 
supply to India and meet our obligations under the NPT, 
safeguards must be applied in perpetuity. Further, the 
separation plan must ensure--and the safeguards must confirm--
that cooperation does not ``in any way assist'' in the 
development or production of nuclear weapons. In this context, 
nuclear materials in the civil sector should not be transferred 
out of the civil sector.
    Negotiating the appropriate safeguards arrangement: India's 
voluntary commitment to allow IAEA safeguards on its civil 
facilities is both a substantial nonproliferation gain and a 
key enabler for nuclear energy cooperation. A critical 
bellwether of Indian intentions will be how it handles the 
separation and safeguarding of its civil nuclear 
infrastructure. In our discussions with key international 
partners, both in the NSG context and otherwise, many have 
expressed strong views that India's separation plan be 
transparent and have noted the importance of IAEA safeguards 
being applied to its civil facilities.
    In this context, several countries have argued that it is 
integral to maintaining the integrity of the global regime that 
India not be granted de jure or de facto status as a nuclear 
weapon state under the NPT. For this reason, many have 
indicated that a ``voluntary offer'' arrangement of the type in 
place in the five internationally recognized nuclear weapon 
states would not be acceptable for India. We indicated at the 
recent G-8 and NSG meetings that we would not view a voluntary 
offer arrangement as defensible from a nonproliferation 
standpoint or consistent with the Joint Statement, and 
therefore do not believe that it would constitute an acceptable 
safeguards arrangement. Such a course of action would in all 
likelihood preclude NSG support. Conversely, should India put 
forward a credible and defensible plan, we anticipate that many 
states will become more steadfast in their support.
    Building support within the NSG: At the recent NSG 
Consultative Group meeting in Vienna, the United States 
discussed the initiative with regime members. We stressed our 
desire that the NSG maintain its effectiveness, and emphasized 
that we do not intend to undercut this important 
nonproliferation policy tool. For this reason, the U.S. 
proposal neither seeks to alter the decisionmaking procedures 
of the NSG nor amend the current full-scope safeguards 
requirement in the NSG Guidelines. Rather, the United States 
proposes that the NSG take a policy decision to treat India as 
an exceptional case, given its energy needs, its nuclear 
nonproliferation record, and the nonproliferation commitments 
it has now undertaken. We do not advocate similar treatment for 
others outside the NPT regime.
    In our view, once India makes demonstrable progress in 
implementing key Joint Statement commitments--with a credible, 
transparent, and defensible separation plan foremost on the 
list--we will be ready to engage with our NSG partners in 
developing a formal proposal to allow the shipment of Trigger 
List items and related technology to India. Obviously, the 
number of facilities and activities that India places under 
IAEA safeguards, and the method and speed with which it does 
so, will directly affect the degree to which we will be able to 
build support for full civil nuclear cooperation. We look 
forward to discussing this more fully with NSG members at the 
Consultative Group meeting in early 2006 and at the plenary 
session that follows.
    Avoiding the temptation to renegotiate the deal: Some 
observers--both in the United States and abroad--have argued 
that the United States-India arrangement as negotiated by the 
President and the Prime Minister does not constitute a net gain 
for nonproliferation, or at least does not reflect the maximum 
gain we might in theory have achieved. According to this view, 
the United States, presumably the United States Congress, 
should condition United States nuclear cooperation under the 
Joint Statement on additional Indian steps, such as 
implementing a moratorium on fissile material production, 
ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and/or joining the 
NPT as a nonnuclear weapon state. Based on our interactions 
with the Indian Government, we believe that such additional 
conditions would likely be deal-breakers.
    This is a case where the ``perfect'' is the enemy of the 
``good,'' and we must resist the temptation to pile on 
conditions that will prejudice our ability to realize the 
important and long-standing nonproliferation objectives 
embodied in the Joint Statement. We are better off with India 
undertaking the commitments it has now agreed to rather than 
allowing the status quo to prevail.
    The Joint Statement reached by President Bush and Prime 
Minister Singh is good both for India and for the United 
States, and offers a net gain for global nonproliferation 
efforts. Rather than layer on additional conditions or seek to 
renegotiate the Joint Statement, it would be better to lock-in 
this deal and then seek to achieve further results in 
subsequent nonproliferation discussions. We believe that this 
is a sound arrangement that should be supported because the 
commitments India has made will, when implemented, bring it 
into closer alignment with international nuclear 
nonproliferation standards and practices and, as such, 
strengthen the global nonproliferation regime.
    Securing domestic legal reform: The President promised in 
the Joint Statement that the administration would seek 
agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies. We 
recognize that the pace and scope of civil nuclear cooperation 
requires close consultations between the executive and 
legislative branches. In our own ongoing review, we have 
identified a number of options for modifying and/or waiving 
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act that currently prohibit the 
United States from engaging in such cooperation with India.
    As Under Secretary Burns noted, we do not intend to ask 
Congress to take legislative action until the Indian Government 
takes certain important steps. We welcome your partnership as 
we embark on this effort, and look forward to working with your 
committee, together with your House counterparts, as we jointly 
consider the best way forward in the legislative area.

                BOTTOM-LINE: ADVANCING NONPROLIFERATION

    We must recognize that there is today no viable cookie-
cutter approach to nonproliferation; we need tailored 
approaches that solve real-world problems. We need to be 
creative and adjust our approaches to take into account the 
conditions that exist, so that we can achieve our 
nonproliferation objectives. This has been a premise of 
administration policy since the outset of President Bush's 
first term, in which he established non- and 
counterproliferation as top national security priorities. He 
put in place the first comprehensive strategy at the national 
level for combating this preeminent threat to our security, and 
he embarked on changing how we as a nation, and how the 
international community more broadly, design and expand our 
collective efforts to defeat this complex and dangerous 
challenge.
    Indeed, recognizing that traditional nonproliferation 
measures were essential but no longer sufficient, the President 
has established new concepts and new capabilities for 
countering WMD proliferation by hostile states and terrorists.

   He sought increased national resources to prevent 
        proliferation through Nunn-Lugar type nonproliferation 
        assistance programs and, through the G-8 Global 
        Partnership, successfully enlarged the contributions 
        from other countries to this essential task.
   He launched the Proliferation Security Initiative to 
        disrupt the trade in proliferation-related materials. 
        This initiative has achieved the support of more than 
        70 other countries who are working together to share 
        information and develop operational capabilities to 
        interdict shipments at sea, in the air, and on land.
   He initiated the effort resulting in the unanimous 
        adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, 
        which requires all states to enact both legislation 
        criminalizing proliferation activities under their 
        jurisdiction and effective export controls to help 
        protect the sensitive materials and technologies on 
        their territories.

    These efforts in effective multilateralism, coupled with 
the strengthening of our own counterproliferation capabilities, 
have produced concrete successes such as the unraveling of the 
A.Q. Khan network and the decision by Libya to abandon its 
nuclear, chemical, and long-range missile programs.
    Similarly, we must pursue approaches with respect to India 
that recognize the reality that it is a growing 21st century 
power, shares our democratic values, has substantial and 
growing energy needs, and has long possessed nuclear weapons 
outside the NPT. Status quo approaches have not acknowledged 
these pragmatic considerations, nor have they achieved the 
positive outcome of progressively integrating India into the 
international nuclear nonproliferation mainstream.
    We have begun consultations with our international 
partners; have conducted a number of introductory discussions 
with you, your colleagues, and your staff; and look forward to 
working further with you on the steps necessary to realize the 
benefits of the July Joint Statement.
    Thank you.

                         PREPARED STATEMENT OF

                        HON. RONALD F. LEHMAN II

   Director, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore 
                   National Laboratory, Livermore, CA

                               BEFORE THE

                   Senate Foreign Relations Committee

                            NOVEMBER 2, 2005

                              ----------                              


    Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to 
accept your invitation to join with this distinguished 
committee--and with my good friends on this panel--to discuss 
the nonproliferation implications of the United States-India 
civilian nuclear cooperation called for in the July 18, 2005, 
Joint Statement of President George W. Bush and Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh. Over the years, I have appeared before this 
committee in various capacities, and, Mr. Chairman, I am 
pleased to cochair with Ash Carter your Policy Advisory Group 
on the future of the nonproliferation regime. Nevertheless, I 
would like to make clear that today I am speaking only for 
myself and the views I express here do not necessarily 
represent those of any administration, organization, or group 
with which I am or have been associated.
    The committee is well aware of the content of the United 
States-India Joint Statement: In the context of the broader 
global partnership on the economy, energy and the environment, 
democracy and development, and high-technology and space 
reflected in the Joint Statement, India will receive the 
benefits of civil nuclear cooperation in exchange for enhanced 
nonproliferation commitments. More specifically, India has 
agreed to separate civilian and military nuclear facilities, 
place those civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards, and 
implement an IAEA Additional Protocol. India will continue its 
moratorium on nuclear weapons testing and work toward a 
multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. India will help 
prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies 
to states that do not have them and adhere to the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG) and Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR) while legislating strong export controls.
    For its part, the United States Government will propose 
that Congress adjust United States law and that relevant 
international bodies adjust their regimes to permit full 
civilian nuclear energy cooperation with India. The United 
States will also consult with its partners on the inclusion of 
India in certain advanced nuclear energy research associated 
with both fission and fusion energy.
    Before I address the three specific questions the committee 
has asked about the Joint Statement, let me offer a short net 
assessment. The Joint Statement is an historic milestone for 
nonproliferation that creates both great opportunity and great 
risk. It creates an opportunity to strengthen a nuclear 
nonproliferation regime that is suffering from its own internal 
weaknesses such as inadequate enforcement, the threat of 
breakout once an advanced nuclear capability has been achieved, 
and an inability to engage effectively the nonparties to the 
NPT, Because the terms of the Joint Statement, however, also 
spotlight those weaknesses, mishandling of the implementation 
of its terms can have adverse consequences even when the best 
of intentions are involved. The elements of the package are not 
new, but the suddenness with which the particular mix of 
elements was put together has caught many key players at home 
and abroad by surprise. They need to take the time to think 
through their positions carefully as the governments of India 
and the United States flesh out their phased approach. The 
executive branch needs also to consult closely with the 
Congress, and within the executive branch, regional and 
functional experts need close, regular, and detailed 
coordination. All of this will serve to improve our ability to 
work with India and other governments to enhance our efforts 
against all weapons of mass destruction.
    Whether one could have negotiated a somewhat better deal is 
moot. The Joint Statement is in play, and we all have an 
obligation to ensure that our national security is enhanced as 
a result of the dynamic process now underway, especially our 
ability to prevent and counter the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction. If the basic approach contained in the Joint 
Statement collapses, we will not return to the status quo ante. 
United States-Indian cooperation will be set back, but also the 
weaknesses in the existing regime will be exposed to even 
greater pressure. Bringing India into a more comprehensive 
regime of nonproliferation and restraint, however, could 
significantly enhance our ability to reduce the dangers 
associated with weapons of mass destruction. Congress can help 
insure that this is a sufficiently ambitious agenda. India 
could do much to help within its borders, in South Asia, in 
other troubled regions, and globally.
    Yet India remains a symbol of a glaring challenge to the 
nonproliferation regime; namely reconciling universal 
principles with very different circumstances. Is the same 
verification system appropriate for both Sweden and Iran? Is a 
democratic India outside the NPT really to be considered more 
of a nuclear pariah than a despotic North Korea inside the 
treaty? Measures to deal with specific concerns are often 
inappropriate to apply universally. Yet rules that can be 
applied universally are often too general to address specific 
concerns, sometimes creating an inability to enforce compliance 
or even encourage restraint. In many ways, progress in the NPT 
centered nonproliferation regime has been measured by the 
success or failure in tailoring measures to different 
circumstances. One sees this in the dealings North Korea, Iran, 
Iraq, Pakistan, Israel, and others over the last decade or 
more. It will remain true with India.
    If the process set in place by the Joint Statement were to 
continue in a positive direction, it could create a more sound, 
broad-based nonproliferation community with the tools necessary 
to deal with the different circumstances of the real world. It 
could further integrate our nonproliferation goals into our 
national strategy and those of others, permitting us to more 
effectively deal with the increasing availability of 
destructive technology in the global economy and the 
persistence of dangerous actors, both state and nonstate.
    I would urge the Congress to focus on the dynamics of the 
process and the goals to be achieved as a result of the United 
States-India Joint Statement rather than attempting to 
rearrange the pieces of the initial package. Much that one 
might have detailed in the original package may be more 
successfully achieved by driving subsequent interactions in the 
right direction. This can only be done, I believe, if 
nonproliferation is a centerpiece of strategic engagement 
rather than a tradeoff. It is best achieved by retaining a 
viable Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the core of a 
broader nonproliferation regime that uses more targeted, 
embedded engagement to address the fundamental causes and 
conditions of proliferation. In short, widely shared goals 
should guide our actions, but implementation will fail if a 
``one-size-fits-all'' mentality is applied rigidly to different 
circumstances. Let me clarify what I mean by addressing the 
three questions you have asked.

    (1) If there is need to draw closer to India for strategic 
reasons, what are those reasons, and why does civil nuclear 
cooperation weigh so heavily among them?

    The NPT was designed to enhance the benefits for 
membership, but for India, a nonsignatory, restrictions on 
civilian nuclear cooperation are deeply resented in India 
because they are seen as punitive, discriminatory, and 
demeaning. The emotional quotient is high. Yes, India's nuclear 
power infrastructure has suffered from lack of access to 
outside technology and uranium shortages could become a major 
factor in India's nuclear power future, but that future still 
remains very uncertain. India's nuclear elite is divided on 
what it wants and why. One can imagine a major scale-up of 
India's nuclear power, but it is not clear private investment 
will be there. Even smaller public investment may be unwise if 
it continues the weaknesses of the current programs. Neuralgia 
over the nuclear issue is intense primarily because it triggers 
deeper seated resentments.
    Relations between the United States and India have long 
been far worse than the objective conditions warrant. The 
reasons are too numerous to list. Again, they are not primarily 
about nuclear cooperation. South Asia was a backwater of United 
States diplomacy during the cold war, and cooperation was made 
difficult by India's socialist orientation, nonaligned tactics 
that often tilted toward the Soviet Union, and a related 
testiness toward the West as a result of its colonial 
experience. In the United States, there were many ``Years of 
India,'' none of which seemed to last even that long. Indian 
nonproliferation policy was draped in grandiose disarmament 
rhetoric that provided moral top cover for the nuclear weapons 
program that gave its population much satisfaction. Thus, India 
has often been unwilling to take ``Yes'' for an answer. Long a 
leading advocate of a Comprehensive Test Ban, it backed away 
when rapid negotiations threatened options to demonstrate its 
nuclear prowess. One of the godfathers of the Fissile Material 
Cut-Off, India has been satisfied to see it buried in a 
moribund Conference on Disarmament. In short, India has serious 
security concerns, but its behavior is often driven by concerns 
about status.
    What has changed? Much. The end of the ``Permit Raj'' and 
the opening up of the Indian economy has emboldened a huge, 
highly educated middle class. The new demographics are also 
compelling. It is not just that India will have the world's 
largest population in 2030. It will be experiencing the so-
called ``demographic dividend,'' as the falling fertility rates 
and improved health increase the ratio of workers to dependents 
in ways that have historically driven economic growth. A 
global, high technology Indian diaspora is now networked and 
returning skills and investments to India. India is proud of 
its information technology and seeks to do the same in 
biotechnology. And if messy domestic politics is a signature of 
democracy, then India is clearly a democracy. This too can 
provide a basis for a new relationship with an India that may 
be more able to look more self-confidently to its real 
interests and leave the politics of resentment behind.
    As an economic, cultural, and strategic partner, India 
could offer much in the years ahead, especially if adverse 
geostrategic developments in the Islamic world or Eurasia 
create economic or security dangers, but a grand strategic 
partnership is not inevitable. It needs to be groomed. Indian 
domestic and regional politics are volatile because of 
economic, class, and ethnic divisions. For all of its tradition 
of business and trade, South Asia remains a region in which the 
win-win often seems alien. Spoilers abound domestically and 
around the region. As Indian power and influence grows, both 
its ability to help and its ability to do harm will grow. 
Positive steps will be accompanied by negative steps and vice 
versa. Most Indians are proud of having tested nuclear weapons, 
but having made this demonstration, many Indians are now more 
willing to reach out and to show restraint. We will not always 
have overlapping interests, but we can achieve a relationship 
that is at least as good as the common interests we develop, 
something we have often failed to achieve in the past.
    Strong bipartisan support exists for engaging the emerging 
India, much of it overly optimistic about near-term 
possibilities and long-term probabilities. Still, I believe it 
is the right approach, but we should not let our euphoria cause 
us to undermine our most effective nonproliferation tools. We 
should not assume that great economic and strategic gains that 
would not otherwise be possible would result simply from 
civilian nuclear cooperation. Rather we should fold our 
flexibility on civil nuclear cooperation into our efforts to 
work with India to strengthen the overall nonproliferation 
regime including improvements in strategic relationships and 
the international security architecture.

    (2) The July 18 Joint Statement addresses many long-
standing Indian concerns about the NPT, the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group (NSG) and United States law, but what United States 
concerns about India's past and current nonproliferation 
policies and laws are addressed by the Joint Statement? Please 
enumerate these concerns and indicate specifcally how they are 
addressed in the Joint Statement.

    Many United States and Indian concerns are addressed in the 
Joint Statement, but it is premature to suggest that they will 
be addressed successfully. What is underway is a phased 
process. Neither side will be certain of how much will be 
achieved for some time. Over the years, various Indian 
interlocutors have floated the idea of separating civilian from 
nuclear facilities and applying safeguards to them. We have 
never known the scale of the separation or the quality of the 
safeguards. If India is serious about nuclear power, then its 
infrastructure should be declared predominantly civilian with 
permanent IAEA safeguards. To clarify the separation may take 
some time, and full implementation of IAEA safeguards could 
take years. A major shift to safeguard civilian activity would 
be a positive step worthy of considerable movement on the part 
of the United States and the international community. A token 
step would be counterproductive.
    India has long had a formal position in favor of a Fissile 
Material Cut-Off. The Joint Statement reiterates that support 
and goes further in trying to align India's responsibilities 
and benefits with those of other ``responsible state[s] with 
advanced nuclear technology.'' The definition of responsible 
states with advanced nuclear technology is not clear, but 
examples might be those that are associated with the ITER 
fusion program and the GEN IV advanced nuclear reactor 
programs, countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, 
Switzerland, South Korea, South Africa, Japan, France, Canada, 
Brazil, Argentina, China, and Russia. Nearly all already have 
de facto or de jure fissile material cutoffs, and the rest are 
committed to such a cutoff. Because the prospects for a FMCT 
seem so poor in the Conference on Disarmament, perhaps an 
interim multilateral approach could be put forth with such 
states with advanced nuclear technology and other relevant 
states, in part to enhance nuclear security and in part as a 
``fly before buy'' experiment that might lead ultimately to 
progress on an FMCT in the CD. If India were to join the rest 
of the advanced nuclear community in this regard, it would be a 
major contribution.
    Perhaps the greatest contribution that India could make to 
nonproliferation outside its own borders would be to end its 
guerrilla war against the NPT and support the international 
community in its efforts to encourage and, as necessary, 
enforce compliance with obligations. India's stated long-term 
goals are compatible with those of the NPT, but India's 
insistence that the NPT is a discriminatory treaty that singles 
them out has resulted in a regular campaign to undermine 
support for the NPT. Certainly, it is not too much to expect of 
India that, in the context of renewed civil nuclear 
cooperation, the rhetoric against the treaty could be dispensed 
with. A polite agreement that we have some disagreements should 
be sufficient. For its part, the United States need not walk 
away from its view that ultimately we would like to see 
universal adherence to the NPT, but we have long ago stopped 
pressing India to join as if the conditions might be near at 
hand. Getting India to support adherence to treaties, including 
treaties they do not belong to, should also not be an issue of 
membership. The greater problem is that India has strategic and 
economic objectives in addition to whatever nonproliferation 
goals they may share with the United States. Whether it is NAM 
politics or its strategic engagement of Iran, these can create 
serious problems. India cannot be expected to alter its most 
fundamental interests, but in these areas, we may find a 
measure of New Delhi's actual commitment to nonproliferation 
and global partnership.
    Within its own borders, the growing concern over nonstate 
and quasi-state actors places a premium on modem physical 
security, export controls, counterterrorism, implementation of 
UNSC Resolution 1540, and support for measures such as the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). These are areas in 
which the United States and India can work together and gauge 
each other's commitment by our synergy. In recent years, 
official Indian policy has been increasingly positive in these 
areas, but the longer history has clouds. Confidence in 
effective implementation would be enhanced by more direct, 
bilateral engagement.

    (3) The policy adopted in the Joint Statement, if fully 
implemented, will require changes to international 
nonproliferation rules, rules that apply to nations other than 
India--in particular it is not clear how those changes would 
affect United States policy with respect to Iran and North 
Korea, as well as the nuclear export policies of Russia and 
China. How can the administration and Congress work to ensure 
that if rules are changed for India, those changes will not 
result in other proliferation challenges--and if such 
consequences are not avoidable, should these rules be changed?

    The nonproliferation rules have constantly been changing, 
becoming both more restrictive and less restrictive based upon 
changed circumstances. Perhaps I can illustrate this. In 
January 1992, at an historic summit of the United Nations 
Security Council, further proliferation was declared to be a 
threat to international security, strong words implying strong 
actions. These world leaders were encouraged in their strong 
statement by many historic developments. The cold war was over 
and United States-Russian cooperation was accelerating. 
Longstanding holdouts who had disparaged the NPT, such as 
France, China, Brazil, Argentina, and others, were now members. 
Historic arms control agreements were in place. The first gulf 
war had imposed on Saddam Hussein's regime an unprecedented, 
tailored UNSCOM inspection regime that ultimately revealed how 
badly we had underestimated the WMD capability in Iraq, both 
nuclear and biological. Just in time, we had learned how 
difficult it is to assess what really goes on in the global 
world of dual use technology. Enhanced nonproliferation 
initiatives were being expanded. On the Korean Peninsula, a 
North-South denuclearization agreement had been completed, and 
North Korea had finally concluded an IAEA safeguards agreement. 
The two Koreas were also negotiating a North-South bilateral 
inspection regime that would create a stronger NPT plus regime 
in that troubled region. Going beyond the Joint Verification 
Experiments and the laboratory-to-laboratory exchanges, the 
Nunn-Lugar programs were expanding the frontiers of engagement 
and transparency. Both the international norms and the means to 
engage concretely and in detail on their behalf were being 
enhanced with more hands-on flexibility.
    No sooner had the Security Council Summit spoken, than the 
remaining challenges became clear. Talks between the two Koreas 
on bilateral inspections stalled. Then implementation of the 
North-South denuclearization agreement under which both Koreas 
agreed to give up both reprocessing and enrichment finally 
collapsed when North Korea was revealed to have a covert 
reprocessing plant. When Pyongyang refused to permit an IAEA 
special inspection and announced it would withdraw from the 
NPT, the international community could not agree that this was 
a matter for the Security Council. Instead, the world turned to 
the United States to solve the problem, with great pressure 
applied on the United States to use carrots rather than sticks. 
However vital, nonproliferation began to loose its urgency. To 
buy time, an Agreed Framework was negotiated with North Korea 
under which new nuclear reactors would be provided Pyongyang as 
part of a process for resolving outstanding issues. Russians 
complained that the Agreed Framework subsidized a noncompliant 
North Korea even though the United States had opposed Russian 
sales of similar reactors when Pyongyang was thought to be 
compliant. Russia cited the Agreed Framework in rejecting 
United States opposition to reactor sales to Iran, which was 
then accepting IAEA inspections. And of course many Indians 
noted that reactors that were denied India, a democracy that 
was not party to the NPT, were being supplied to a North Korea 
in open violation of the NPT and still threatening to complete 
its withdrawal from the treaty. Whatever the merit of such 
protestations, they remind us that the difficult cases and 
changed circumstances have resulted in modifications to our 
basic approaches in the past, not always with good results. 
Sometimes, we bowed to the inevitable. We once had very tight 
limits on computer exports, but long ago we decontrolled far 
more capable machines because of foreign availability. 
Sometimes, we have been able to expand restraint. Because of 
the close association of enrichment and reprocessing with 
nuclear weapons potential, the United States and others have 
pressed for a further narrowing of the access of additional 
states to those technologies. Under the terms of the Joint 
Statement, India has agreed to join in this selective approach 
as it undertakes not to transfer enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies to those who don't have them and to support 
international efforts to limit their spread.
    Once again, we are faced with the challenges of achieving 
our basic goals under different circumstances. Common rules and 
criteria can be useful, but they can also be self limiting and 
counterproductive if they prevent us from developing different 
rules for different circumstances to promote the same goal. Of 
course, we need to keep in mind the real measures of merit. Too 
often we measure nonproliferation only by the number of benign 
and compliant states that have adhered to the treaty rather 
than by assessing the real state of proliferation capability 
and intent in a world in which much more potential is now 
latent.
    Mr. Chairman. In summary, the Joint Statement creates 
opportunities to strengthen nonproliferation by engaging India 
and reducing some of the stresses on the NPT that result from 
India's pariah status on civilian nuclear cooperation. A 
failure by India to step up to its side of the bargain fully 
and to continue to move in the direction of cooperation and 
restraint, however, could create dangers for an NPT-centric 
regime that is having difficulty because of noncompliance, weak 
enforcement, the spread of WMD capability into troubled 
regions, and the rise of dangerous nonstate or quasi-state 
actors. Ultimately, states will remain committed to 
nonproliferation, and members of the NPT will remain within the 
regime, only if it serves their interest. Many support the NPT 
because they get civilian nuclear cooperation, but most support 
the NPT because it enhances their security. So long as the NPT 
serves their interests, the emergence of asymmetric 
arrangements to deal with different circumstances is manageable 
and necessary. Unfortunately, such arrangements can serve as a 
pretext for withdrawal or nonsupport when the treaty itself no 
longer serves the interests of specific parties. To strengthen 
the NPT, we need to enforce compliance and concentrate on 
enhancing its value to its members rather than focusing on 
punishment of those who have not yet adhered, all of which are 
nations with which we have friendly, if sometimes difficult, 
relations.

                         PREPARED STATEMENT OF

                         HON. ASHTON B. CARTER

Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Kennedy School of Government, 
                   Harvard University, Cambridge, MA

                               BEFORE THE

                   Senate Foreign Relations Committee

                            NOVEMBER 2, 2005

                              ----------                              


    Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, thank you for inviting me to testify before you 
about the benefits and costs of the deal between India and the 
United States reflected in the July 18 Joint Statement between 
President Bush and Prime Minister Singh, which for brevity I 
will refer to simply as the India Deal.
    Chairman Lugar has charged his Policy Advisory Group (PAG), 
which I cochair, with assessing the India Deal and advising him 
on its pros and cons, and with recommending steps the Congress 
should take to ensure that the final version of the deal best 
serves U.S. interests. The PAG, like the committee itself, has 
not yet had the opportunity to hear all sides of the issue and 
make its recommendations. My statement today therefore reflects 
my own analysis and does not represent the views of the PAG.

         THE NEED TO LOOK AT THE INDIA DEAL THROUGH A WIDE LENS

    Much of the discussion--and controversy--around the India 
Deal focuses on its nuclear aspects. Since preventing nuclear 
war and nuclear terrorism is the single highest priority for 
American national security--now and as far into the future as I 
can see--I have some sympathy with this emphasis. But I believe 
the deal cannot be assessed within this narrow frame. In fact, 
when viewed as a nuclear-only deal, it is a bad deal for the 
United States. Washington recognized Delhi's nuclear status in 
return for little in the way of additional restraints on 
India's nuclear arsenal or help with combating nuclear 
proliferation and terrorism (that India was not already 
inclined or committed to give), and at appreciable likely cost 
to its nuclear nonproliferation objectives in other critical 
regions.
    But it seems clear that President Bush did not view the 
India Deal through a nuclear-only lens, and neither should we. 
The United States, in this view, gave the Indians what they 
have craved for 30 years--nuclear recognition--in return for a 
``strategic partnership'' between Washington and Delhi. 
Washington gave on the nuclear front to get something on the 
nonnuclear front. I agree strongly with the administration that 
a strategic partnership with India is in the deep and long-term 
United States security interest. A nuclear-recognition quid for 
a strategic-partnership quo is therefore a reasonable framework 
for an India Deal.
    However, as a diplomatic transaction the India Deal is 
quite uneven. First of all, a United States-Indian strategic 
partnership would seem to be in India's interest as well as 
ours. So why give them something for it? Second, the deal is 
uneven in its specifics--what the United States gives is 
spelled out quite clearly, but what India gives in return is 
vaguer. Third, the deal is uneven in timing--we gave something 
big up front, but what we stand to get lies further out in the 
future.
    Should Congress reject the India Deal as too uneven? I 
would recommend instead trying to improve the diplomacy to 
rebalance the deal. There are two ways this can be done: The 
United States can give less, or it can expect more. My 
statement takes the second approach--aiming to define a set of 
expectations for specific benefits to the United States from a 
``strategic partnership'' with India.
    My statement is divided into three parts: First, I describe 
what India got. Second, I describe what the United States 
should aim to get. Third, I assess the chances that U.S. 
expectations will actually be met.
    It is premature to judge whether the expectations of this 
partnership as apparently foreseen on the United States side 
are shared by India and will, in fact, materialize. The deal 
itself was premature. The problem with a poorly prepared 
diplomatic initiative is that disenchantment will set in on 
both sides. But with the deal now an accomplished fact, we and 
the Indians must do our best to build upon it.

                             WHAT DELHI GOT

    India obtained de-facto recognition of its nuclear weapons 
status: The United States will behave, and urge others to 
behave, as if India were a nuclear weapons state under the NPT. 
We will not deny it most civil nuclear technology or commerce. 
We will not require it to put all of its nuclear facilities 
under IAEA safeguards--only those it declares to be civil. It 
is worth noting that even if the administration wished to make 
India a formal Nuclear Weapons State under the NPT (which it in 
fact refused to do), it probably could not persuade all the 
other signatories of the NPT to agree to the formal change.
    Beyond these technicalities, nuclear recognition confers an 
enormous political benefit on India. In effect, it allows India 
to transcend the nuclear box that has for so long defined its 
place in the international order, jettison at last its outdated 
Non-Aligned Movement stances and rhetoric, and occupy a more 
normal and modern place in the diplomatic world. Proponents and 
critics of the deal alike agree that this is huge.
    The deal has accordingly been popular in India. Criticism 
from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has been narrow and 
technical and probably reflects regrets that a Prime Minister 
from the Congress Party and not the BJP secured the deal. The 
other source of criticism has been leftists in the Congress 
Party. They are wedded to the old politics of the Non-Aligned 
Movement which was overtaken by the end of the cold war, but 
they are unlikely to be able to block the deal.
    The Joint Statement contains a list of other items--
civilian space cooperation, agricultural exchanges, HIV/AIDS 
cooperation, ``promot[ing] modernization of India's 
infrastructure,'' and so on--that comprise Delhi's long-
standing list of desires. There is little in here for the 
United States.
    Other supposed benefits of the deal do not survive close 
scrutiny. Energy security, for example, is terribly important 
to both India and the United States. We want India's huge 
population to satisfy its energy needs without contributing 
further to the problems of dependence on Middle East oil, 
pollution, and global warming. But the arithmetic does not 
support the case that nuclear power will spell the difference 
for India, though it can and should play a role. For the 
foreseeable future, electricity generation in India will be 
dominated by coal burning. Burning coal more cheaply and more 
cleanly will do more than any conceivable expansion of nuclear 
power to aid India's economy and the environment. And nuclear 
power does nothing to address the principal Indian oil 
consuming sector--cars and trucks--since these don't run off 
the electrical grid and won't for a long time. Moreover, the 
type of nuclear assistance the United States is best positioned 
to provide (light water reactors operating on low-enriched 
uranium fuel) is at odds with India's vision of a civil nuclear 
power program built primarily around breeder reactors.
    It is also said that the deal will require India to improve 
its laws and procedures for controlling exports or diversions 
of sensitive nuclear technology--preventing an Indian A.Q. 
Khan. But to my knowledge India has a good record of 
controlling nuclear exports (though not always ballistic 
missile exports). India is already bound by the U.S.-sponsored 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 which requires such good 
conduct, so on paper at least Dehli has sold the same horse a 
second time in the deal. In any event, the United States 
intends to justify the deal's nuclear recognition to other 
nations around the world on the grounds that India's nuclear 
proliferation behavior is already exemplary. It will be 
difficult to argue this point both ways at the same time.
    Missile defense cooperation is also cited in the Joint 
Statement. The United States has had the world's largest and 
most technically proficient missile defense R&D program for 
many years; it is doubtful the United States can learn much 
from India in this field of military science, though India will 
benefit from United States knowledge. Basing United States 
missile defense radars or interceptors on Indian soil would not 
be of much benefit to the United States (in the way that such 
facilities in Japan, Great Britain, or Poland are useful), 
since with a few exotic exceptions the trajectories of 
ballistic missiles heading to targets of United States interest 
do not pass close to Indian airspace. Finally, it is possible 
that the administration expects India to purchase United States 
missile defense systems like THAAD to protect India from 
Pakistani and Chinese missile attack. Buying such defense 
systems would benefit United States industry and, through 
economies of scale, subsidize DOD's own purchases of missile 
defenses . . . but it is unlikely that India will make 
purchases of integrated BMD systems on that scale.

                       WHAT WASHINGTON SHOULD GET

    What is it then that the United States might expect from 
the ``strategic partnership'' in return for nuclear recognition 
and other items of interest to Delhi in the Joint Statement?
    I would suggest that over the long run the United States 
would be expecting the following strategic benefits from the 
India Deal:
    Immediate diplomatic support to curb Iran's nuclear 
program. India will need to abandon its long-standing policy of 
rhetorical support for the spread of nuclear fuel-cycle 
activities and compromise, to some extent, its friendly 
relations with Iran. India's September 24 vote with the United 
States and its European partners in the IAEA Board of 
Governors, finding Iran in noncompliance with its NPT 
obligations (and containing an implicit threat to refer the 
matter to the United National Security Council) was a welcome 
suggestion that India's support in the international struggle 
to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions will be firm. But India's 
continued firmness in this and other urgent 
counterproliferation efforts will be an early test of the value 
of strategic partnership and its new status.
    Potential counterweight to China. Though no one wants to 
see China and the United States fall into strategic 
competition, neither can anyone rule this out. The evolution of 
United States-China relations will depend on the attitudes of 
China's younger generation and new leaders, on Chinese and 
United States policies, and on unpredictable events like a 
crisis over Taiwan. It is reasonable for the United States to 
hedge against a downturn in relations with China by improving 
its relations with India, and for India to do the same. But for 
now India is intent on improving its relations and trade with 
China, not antagonizing China. Neither government will wish to 
talk publicly, let alone take actions now, pursuant to this 
shared--but hypothetical and future--common interest.
    Assistance in a Pakistan contingency. Avoiding and 
responding to dangers from Pakistan is another common interest 
that is awkward for either India or the United States to 
acknowledge. Pakistan, alongside Russia, belongs at the center 
of our urgent concern about nuclear terrorism--a concern 
Chairman Lugar has done so much to address. Terrorists cannot 
make nuclear bombs unless they obtain enriched uranium or 
plutonium from governments who have made these materials. The 
exposure of the A.Q. Khan network in Pakistan makes clear that 
Pakistan has to be regarded as a potential source of vital 
materials for nuclear terrorists--whether by theft, sale, 
diversion by internal radical elements with access to bombs or 
materials, change of government from Musharraf to a radical 
regime, or some sort of internal chaos. Which version of the 
A.Q. Khan story is more alarming--that the government and 
military of Pakistan was unaware of what he was doing, or that 
they were aware and permitted it? Either way it illustrates a 
serious danger. Were there to be a threat or incident of 
nuclear terrorism originating in Pakistan, the United States 
would want to act in concert with as many regional players as 
possible, including India.
    The Pakistan contingency is even more difficult for the 
newly minted ``strategic partners'' to acknowledge publicly, 
let alone to act upon. India seems intent on improving its 
relations with Pakistan--despite the recent bombings in Delhi 
and their impact on public opinion--and a rapprochement between 
these long-time antagonists is in the U.S. interest. The United 
States, for its part, has important interests at stake with the 
Musharraf government--among them supporting the search for 
Osama bin Laden and other terrorists on Pakistani territory, 
arresting the growth of radicalism in Pakistan's population, 
and stabilizing Afghanistan--and can ill afford the perception 
of a ``tilt toward India.'' For now, therefore, the Pakistan 
contingency, like the China counterweight, remains a 
hypothetical and future benefit of the India Deal.
    Joint action with the U.S. military in operations outside 
of a U.N. context. India has historically refused to join the 
U.S. military in operations outside of the context of a U.N. 
mandate and command. In the future, when the United States 
needs partners in disaster relief, humanitarian intervention, 
peacekeeping missions, or stability operations, the United 
States can reasonably expect India to cooperate. Judging from 
the evolution of United States security partnerships in Asia 
and Europe (especially NATO's Partnership for Peace), 
anticipation of joint action can lead first to joint military 
planning, then progressively to joint exercises, intelligence 
sharing and forging of a common threat assessment, and finally 
to joint capabilities. This is the path foreseen for a 
deepening United States-India strategic partnership in the 
defense field.
    Military access and basing. There could be occasions when 
access for and, if needed, basing of United States military 
forces on Indian territory would be desirable. At first this 
might be limited to port access for United States naval vessels 
transiting the Indian Ocean and overflight rights for United 
States military aircraft, but in time it could lead to such 
steps as use of Indian training facilities for United States 
forces deploying to locations with similar climate (the way 
German training areas were used for forces deploying to the 
Balkans).
    Preferential treatment for United States industry in 
India's civil nuclear expansion. The authors of the India Deal 
might have anticipated preferential treatment for United States 
industry in construction of Indian nuclear reactors and other 
civil power infrastructure made possible by the deal. But there 
are two barriers to realization of this U.S. benefit. First, 
the United States must secure preferential access for its 
nuclear industry at the expense of Russian and European 
suppliers who are also seeking access to the Indian market. 
Second, the United States will also need to persuade India to 
focus its nuclear power expansion on light water reactors, not 
the exotic and uneconomical technologies (e.g., fast breeders), 
that the Indian nuclear scientific community favors. This 
benefit should therefore not be exaggerated.
    Preferential access for United States defense industry to 
the Indian market. India is expected to increase the scale and 
sophistication of its military, in part by purchasing weapons 
systems abroad. In view of its concessions in the India Deal, 
the United States can reasonably expect preferential treatment 
for United States vendors relative to Russian or European 
vendors. Early discussions have included the F-16 and F-18 
tactical aircraft and the P-3C Orion maritime surveillance 
aircraft.
    Additional contributions to nuclear nonproliferation from 
India's nuclear program. Finally, many commentators and 
nonproliferation experts have recommended that Congress urge 
the administration to pursue Indian agreement to certain 
additional steps, not spelled out in the Bush-Singh Joint 
Statement, to ``even up'' the nuclear portion of the deal. 
These proposed additional steps by India include: Agreeing to 
cease production of new fissile material for weapons (as the 
Nuclear Weapons States have done); agreeing to forego 
indigenous enrichment and reprocessing for its civil nuclear 
power program in favor of the international fuel cycle 
initiative proposed by President Bush in February 2004; 
separating its civil and military nuclear facilities 
permanently and in such a manner that all reactors producing 
electricity are declared ``civil,'' and so forth.

       WILL THE UNITED STATES GET THE BENEFITS OF THE INDIA DEAL?

    The list above is a very substantial--even breathtaking--
set of potential benefits to the United States of a strategic 
partnership with India. How realistic is it?
    Some of the items on this list reflect joint, common 
interests of India as well as the United States. The United 
States might therefore have had many of these benefits without 
having to pay the nonproliferation costs associated with 
nuclear recognition for India.
    Most of the items on the list are also hypothetical and lie 
in a future that neither side can predict--this is certainly 
the case with regard to the China counterweight and Pakistan 
contingency items. Other items on the list, like Iran's nuclear 
program, will unfold sooner. The United States can certainly 
hope that India will behave as a true ``strategic partner'' in 
the future across all the items on this list. But I believe we 
may also find, when we ask India to do something they are 
reluctant to do, that we come to regret having played our big 
diplomatic card--nuclear recognition--so early in the process.
    India, as befits a great nation on its way to global 
leadership, will have its own opinions about this list. Some 
American proponents of the India Deal have compared it to 
Nixon's opening to China--a bold move based on a firm 
foundation of mutual interest, but more a leap of trust than a 
shrewd bargain. Mao and Nixon, however, had a clear and present 
common enemy--the Soviet Union--not a hypothetical set of 
possible future opponents. But the real difference between the 
Nixon/Kissinger deal and the India Deal is that India, unlike 
Mao's China, is a democracy. No government in Delhi can turn 
decades of Indian policy on a dime or commit it to a broad set 
of actions in support of United States interests--only a 
profound and probably slow change in the views of India's 
elites can do this. India's bureaucracies and diplomats are 
fabled for their stubborn adherence to independent positions 
regarding the world order, economic development, and nuclear 
security. Proponents of the India Deal suggest that these 
positions will yield to the grand gesture of nuclear 
recognition by the United States. I believe this expectation is 
naive. Americans view the change of long-standing and 
principled nonproliferation policy to accommodate India as a 
concession. India views it as acknowledgement of something to 
which they have long been entitled. This is not a durable basis 
for a diplomatic transaction.
    Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is therefore 
premature to tell whether the United States will achieve 
security benefits from the India Deal that outweigh the costs. 
That means the deal itself was premature. At this point, the 
United States, including the Congress, can only do its best to 
ensure that its benefits are fully realized--by both parties.

                         PREPARED STATEMENT OF

                           HENRY D. SOKOLSKI

     Executive Director, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 
                             Washington, DC

                               BEFORE THE

                   Senate Foreign Relations Committee

                            NOVEMBER 2, 2005

                              ----------                              


    Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I want to thank you 
for asking me to testify on the nonproliferation impact of the 
U.S.-India nuclear and space cooperation deals announced July 
18, 2005. Unlike the many other mutually favorable deals 
announced July 18, 2005, these two, if not properly clarified 
by Congress, are fraught with danger. Improperly implementing 
them in their current form could not only encourage India to 
make intercontinental-range ballistic missiles and more nuclear 
weapons, it could devastate any firm reading of the current 
nuclear rules, whether they be the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) or America's 
own Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
    My general recommendation to you today is that Congress 
should authorize implementing these agreements only after India 
commits to the limits other responsible, advanced nuclear 
states have. This should be done in a country-neutral fashion 
by amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to allow U.S. nuclear 
cooperation with advanced, responsible nuclear states that are 
not members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) if, 
and only if, they meet five minimal conditions.
    First, they must forswear producing fissile materials for 
military purposes and, if they have a nuclear arsenal, forswear 
increasing the net number of nuclear weapons in their arsenal. 
Such states would also have to pledge eventually to dismantle 
their nuclear arsenals as have all other NPT weapons states.
    Second, they must identify all reactors supplying 
electricity, all research reactors claimed to be for peaceful 
purposes, all spent fuel these reactors have produced, and all 
fuel making plants supplying these reactors as being civilian 
and, therefore, subject to routine, compulsory international 
inspections.
    Third, they must uphold all previous bilateral nuclear 
nonproliferation obligations they might have had with the 
United States and other countries.
    Fourth, they must publicly adopt the principles of the 
Proliferation Security Initiative.
    Fifth, they must be free of any U.S. nuclear or nuclear-
capable missile sanctions for at least 2 years and have cleared 
up any outstanding sanctionable actions before U.S. cooperation 
is formalized.
    To be sure, insisting on these requirements will displease 
those in a hurry to seal the nuclear and space deals with 
India. Yet, insisting on such conditions in no way moves the 
goal posts or raises the bar on the U.S.-India Joint Statement 
announced July 18, 2005. At the time, both the United States 
insisted that it does not regard India as a nuclear weapons 
state under the NPT. As such, it should have been understood 
that IAEA inspections of India's civilian nuclear facilities 
might well be tighter than the unique, voluntary spot 
inspections, that NPT weapons states' facilities are given.
    Also, at the time, both United States and Indian officials 
agreed that India would assume all those restraints that 
``advanced, responsible nuclear states'' had assumed. Among the 
most important of these is forswearing the expansion of one's 
nuclear arsenal by renouncing the further production of fissile 
material for military purposes and capping the net number of 
nuclear weapons one has. Under these conditions, one could 
possess nuclear weapons, modernize them, or (as the United 
States, Russia, United Kingdom, and France, have done) 
dismantle them, but that would be it.
    It should be noted that demanding that these conditions is 
more than merely desirable. They must be met if, as the deal's 
backers have claimed repeatedly, the nuclear and space deals 
are to enhance the cause of global nonproliferation and U.S. 
security. Certainly, the credibility and success of United 
States and allied efforts to curb proliferation in Iraq, Iran, 
and North Korea has depended heavily on a firm reading of the 
nuclear rules. The NPT bargain of giving up nuclear weapons to 
secure international civilian nuclear cooperation also was 
critical to securing Libya's agreement to give up its nuclear 
activities, and to South Africa's and the Ukraine's surrender 
of their nuclear arms. Finally, the United States has an 
interest in making India behave as the United Kingdom and Japan 
do, not merely as China or Iran. Indeed, only by insisting on 
better behavior here will the United States, India, and other 
responsible nuclear nations have the moral authority required 
to pressure Iran to limit its unnecessary and dangerous nuclear 
fuel making and China to stop its expansion of its nuclear 
weapons arsenal.
    Unfortunately, India has yet to express interest in meeting 
these conditions. Nor has the Bush administration pushed very 
hard to secure them. This all might be acceptable to Congress. 
If so, Congress need only endorse the loose nuclear inspections 
arrangements India and the executive branch are currently 
negotiating and approve legislation to relax U.S. Atomic Energy 
Act and missile technology controls in the sole case of India. 
But Congress should understand that if it does this, it will 
put the United States in the dubious position of:

    1. Helping India expand its nuclear weapons arsenal by 
freeing up a nuclear fuel making capacity that otherwise would 
be needed to supply civilian reactors, such as those at 
Tarapur, with lightly enriched uranium (see viewgraph 1).
    2. Lending technical support to India's intercontinental 
ballistic missile (ICBM) project, the Surya, an incredibly 
massive, inherently vulnerable, first-strike missile derived 
directly from its civilian satellite launch system (the Polar 
Space Launch Vehicle). India already has a medium-range 
missile, the Agni, which it is upgrading to reach all of China 
and can be made road and rail-mobile. Indian officials, 
meanwhile, claim India's ICBM is intended to deter Europe and 
the United States (see attached viewgraphs 2 and 3 and NPEC's 
newly released study, ``India's ICBM: On a Glide Path to 
Trouble?'' by Dr. Richard Speier).
    3. Undermining United States and international efforts to 
restrict nuclear and missile technology exports to states such 
as North Korea and Iran by giving such help to a state that has 
not yet signed the NPT, capped its nuclear weapons program, 
rectified proliferation transactions that are sanctionable 
under United States law, endorsed the Proliferation Security 
Initiative's principles, or placed all of its nuclear 
activities under compulsory IAEA nuclear inspections as all 
responsible, advanced nuclear states have.

    For most people, avoiding these pitfalls would be worth 
considerable effort. Yet, more than a few of the deals' backers 
cynically believe that encouraging these developments is 
necessary to enhance United States security against a hostile 
China or Iran. This, however, reflects an unwarranted, 
defeatism that is unworthy of the United States. More 
important, it is strategically misguided on at least three 
critical counts:

    1. India's Foreign Secretary and Prime Ministers insist 
India's July 18 understandings with the United States are not 
``directed against any third country.'' In fact, India struck a 
strategic agreement with Iran in January 2003 known as the New 
Delhi Declaration, not only to help develop Iranian oil and gas 
fields, but to assure continued cooperation with Iran against 
the Taliban in Afghanistan, many of whom threaten the peace in 
Kashmir. Indian officials also are insistent that India's vote 
on Iranian IAEA noncompliance was cast primarily to help 
prevent referral to the United Nations and did not mean that 
India thought Iran was actually in noncompliance. As for China, 
the current Indian Government sees economic cooperation with 
Beijing as a key to India's future development.
    2. The last thing in anyone's security interest is to help 
India compete against China with nuclear arms. China has 5 to 
10 times the number of deployed nuclear weapons as India and 
hundreds more advanced long-range ballistic missiles. Although 
it no longer makes fissile materials for weapons, it has 
stockpiled thousands of additional weapons' worth of highly 
enriched uranium and separated plutonium. It has shied from 
converting all of this material into bombs for fear of sparking 
an arms rivalry with Japan, who could go nuclear by bolting the 
NPT and militarizing its own massive, growing stockpile of 
separated civilian plutonium. To be sure, the current Indian 
Government is not interested in dramatically ramping up Indian 
nuclear weapons production. Its main opponents, the BJP, 
however, clearly are. If they were to return to power and no 
cap had been placed on India's nuclear weapons efforts, more 
Indian weapons would likely be built, which, in turn, could 
provoke China--prompting a nuclear arms rivalry, not only 
between it and India (and, consequently, revving up even more 
nuclear competition between India and Pakistan), but with Japan 
and the United States.
    3. Every rupee India invests in developing nuclear weapons, 
ICBMs, and missile defense is one less that will otherwise be 
available to enhance security cooperation with the United 
States in the imperative areas of antiterrorism, intelligence 
sharing, and maritime cooperation in and near the Indian Ocean. 
India's entire annual military budget of about $20 billion 
(which supports a military of over 1.3 million active duty 
soldiers) is roughly what the United States spends on its 
nuclear arsenal and missile defenses alone. Encouraging India 
to spend in these areas could easily hollow out its 
conventional military and undermine the very areas most 
promising for United States-Indian cooperation.

    This then brings us to the weakest and least credible 
arguments for pushing nuclear and space cooperation on an 
urgent basis; that is that India must have substantial United 
States cooperation in these fields immediately to sustain its 
economic growth. In fact, for the near term just the reverse is 
the case: Investing in the expansion of nuclear power in India 
for the next decade is the very least leveraged way to address 
India's growing need for more and cleaner energy. Instead, one 
should focus first on increasing efficiencies in India's 
consumption, distribution, and generation of energy (including 
but not limited to its electrical sector). This would entail 
transitioning to cleaner uses of coal and restructuring India's 
coal industry to meet demand; introducing market mechanisms and 
curbing massive energy theft and subsidies; and expanding the 
use of renewable energy, e.g., biomass, small hydro, wind, etc. 
(both connected and unconnected to the grid). So long as the 
Indian nuclear sector continues to be preoccupied with 
extremely complicated thorium-fuel cycle systems and breeder 
reactors and relies on dysfunctional state secrecy and 
monopoly-style management, investing in this energy sector will 
be self-defeating. Instead, the United States and others should 
encourage India's nuclear sector to acquire a more reasonable 
set of goals and open itself up to foreign ownership and 
management. This will take time (for more details, see attached 
viewgraphs, 4 through 7).
    As for space cooperation in the space launch area, by far 
the safest, most cost-effective form of cooperation would be to 
make affordable United States launch capabilities more 
accessible to India. Certainly, the recent announcement that 
the United States intends to include Indian astronauts in 
upcoming United States space shuttle missions is the proper 
path to take. Transferring satellite integration and space 
launch technology to India, on the other hand, is a sure-fire 
way to repeat the frightening development that Loral and Hughes 
produced in the 1990s with China when their satellite launch 
integration assistance literally boosted China's ICBM 
modernization efforts.
    For this and all the other reasons noted above, Congress 
should exercise due diligence in sorting out the specifics of 
United States-Indian nuclear and space cooperation. Your 
committee is to be commended for taking the initiative in 
requesting that any enabling legislation to implement United 
States-India space and nuclear cooperation be referred to the 
appropriate committees rather than on any legislative spending 
vehicle. Congress and the appropriate committees also should 
make their own views known on what legislative conditions they 
believe the proper implementation of nuclear and space 
cooperation with India and similar non-NPT states require. 
Under no circumstances, should Congress allow itself to be 
rushed.
    [Viewgraphs and other material submitted by Mr. Sokolski 
follow:]





             India's ICBM--On A ``Glide Path'' to Trouble?

   (A Policy Research Paper by Dr. Richard Speier, October 26, 2005)

                              introduction
    A glide path is the gentle course that an airplane follows as it 
descends to a safe landing. If the plane encounters an unexpected 
development, it can divert, regain altitude, and change its course.
    Because India has been developing nuclear weapons and missiles to 
deliver them, United States-Indian technology relations have for many 
years remained up in the air, not heading for a safe landing. After 4 
years of Bush administration negotiations the United States now 
describes its technology relations with India as being on a ``glide 
path.''
    This paper addresses the question whether, in view of India's 
abundantly reported intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) 
development, we should divert from our present ``glide path'' approach 
to space cooperation.
    On October 3, 2003, the Washington Post questioned Secretary of 
State Powell about the latest diplomatic developments with India.

          QUESTION: . . . last week, President Bush presented [Prime 
        Minister Atal Bihari] Vajpayee with what was called, like, a 
        ``glide path'' toward better relations. .  . .
          SECRETARY POWELL: . . . there was a basket of issues that 
        they were always asking us about called, well, we called it--we 
        nicknamed it, ``The Trinity.'' How could you help us? How can 
        we expand our trade in high tech areas, in areas having to do 
        with space launch activities, and with our nuclear industry? . 
        . . we also have to protect certain red lines that we have with 
        respect to proliferation, because it's sometimes hard to 
        separate within space launch activities and industries and 
        nuclear programs, that which could go to weapons, and that 
        which could be solely for peaceful purposes. . . . And the 
        ``glide path'' was a way of bringing closure to this debate.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A41977-
2003Oct3.html. Italics added for emphasis.

    Nearly 2 years later, President Bush and the Indian Prime Minister 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
confirmed this cooperation in a joint statement.

          . . . the two leaders resolve . . . Build closer ties in 
        space exploration, satellite navigation and launch, and in the 
        commercial space arena. . . .\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, July 18, 2005, 
``Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh,'' available at http://usinfo.state.gov. Italics added 
for emphasis.

    As this cooperation was being negotiated and agreed, reports 
persisted that India was preparing to produce an ICBM. These reports 
had been accumulating for over two decades.\3\ The latest public report 
appeared less than 6 weeks after the Presidents' joint statement.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ For early reports see Islamic Defence Review Vol. 6/No. 4, 
1981; Maurice Eisenstein, ``Third World Missiles and Nuclear 
Proliferation,'' The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1982; ``Liquid Fuel 
Engine Tested for PSLV,'' Hindustan Times, New Delhi, December 13, 
1985, p.1; ``Growing Local Opposition to India's Proposed National Test 
Range at Baliapal, Orissa,'' English Language Press, October 1986; and 
``India Faces Rising Pressure for Arms Race With Pakistan,'' Christian 
Science Monitor, March 9, 1987, p.1.
    \4\ Madhuprasad, ``Boost to Indian Armed Forces' Deterrence 
Arsenal; India to Develop Intercontinental Ballistic Missile,'' 
Bangalore Deccan Herald in English, August 25, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Over the last decade the reports have been consistent in avering 
that the ICBM will be called ``Surya'' and that hardware and technology 
for the ICBM will come from India's gigantic Polar Space Launch Vehicle 
(PSLV).
    What are the capabilities of the ICBM, and why does India want it? 
How did India acquire the space launch vehicle technology for the 
weapon? And how did the United States come to ride a ``glide path'' to 
space launch cooperation with India? These topics will be covered in 
turn.
India's ICBM--what and why
    In 1980s India adapted a space launch vehicle, the SLV-3, to become 
the Agni medium-range ballistic missile. In keeping with India's 
practice of describing nuclear and missile programs as civilian until 
their military character could not be denied, India originally claimed 
that the Agni was a ``technology demonstrator.'' The Agni program now 
consists of three missiles with ranges, respectively, of upwards of 
700, 2,000, and 3,000 kilometers.
    India may have officially begun the Surya project (also sometimes 
known as Agni IV) in 1994.\5\ Reports cite various dates perhaps 
because the project has several decision points. Reports generally 
agree that the Surya program, like the Agni program, will result in 
missiles with various ranges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Vivek Raghuvanshi, ``Indian Scientists Poised To Test-Launch 
Country's First ICBM,'' Defense News, April 30, 2001, p. 26.

   Surya-1 will have a range of about 5,000 kilometers.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ International missile nomenclature defines an ICBM as a 
ballistic missile with a range of 5,500 or greater. However, Indian 
commentators have tended to exaggerate their missiles' capabilities by 
bumping missiles into the next higher range classes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Surya-2 from 8,000 to 12,000 kilometers.
   Surya-3 up to 20,000 kilometers.

    Table 1 compares the Agni and Surya families of missiles.

                                TABLE 1.--THE AGNI AND SURYA MISSILE FAMILIES \7\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Missile                      Size                Range               Mobile?        Probable Target
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
lxd.............................  (km) (m)
Agni-1..........................  15xl...............  700-1000+..........  yes...............  Pakistan
Agni-2..........................  20x1...............  2000-3000+.........  yes...............  China
Agni-3..........................  20x1 or 13x1.8.....  3000-5000+.........  yes...............  China
Surya-1.........................  35x2.8............  5000..............  no................  China
Surya-2.........................  40x2.8............  8000-12000.........  no................  United States
Surya-3.........................  40+x2.8............  20000..............  no................  Global
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Reports agree that the Surya will have the option of a nuclear 
payload--and sometimes the claim is made that the payload will consist 
of multiple nuclear warheads.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ The low-end figures for the Agni family are commonly reported. 
The high-end figures are more uncertain. In the case of Agni-3, the 
high-end figures may relate to later Agni models or even to the Surya. 
Surya lengths are approximations based on the lengths of the PSLV and 
GSLV missile stages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Reports generally agree that the Surya will be a three-stage 
missile with the first two Surya stages derived from PSLV's solid-fuel 
rockets. India obtained the solid-fuel technology for the SLV-3 and the 
PSLV from the United States in the 1960s.\8\ The third Surya stage is 
to use liquid fuel and will be derived either from the Viking rocket 
technology supplied by France in the 1980s (called Vikas when India 
manufactured PSLV stages with the technology) or from a more powerful 
Russian-supplied cryogenic upper stage for the Geosynchronous Space 
Launch Vehicle (GSLV), which is an adaptation of the PSLV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Gary Milhollin, ``India's Missiles--With a Little Help from Our 
Friends,'' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1989, available 
at http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/india/misshelp.html and 
Sundara Vadlamudi, ``Indo-U.S. Space Cooperation: Poised for Take-
Off?'', The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, March 2005, p. 
203.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    If--as reported--the Surya uses PSLV rocket motors, it will be an 
enormous rocket with solid-fuel stages 2.8 meters (about 9 feet) in 
diameter and a total weight of up to 275 metric tons. This will make it 
by far the largest ICBM in the world--with a launch weight about three 
times that of the largest U.S. or Russian ICBMs.
    There appears to be no literature on Indian plans to harden or 
conceal the Surya launch site or to make the missile mobile, any of 
which would be difficult to do because of the missile's size and 
weight. If a cryogenic third stage is used, the launch process will be 
lengthy. This means that the Surya is likely to be vulnerable to attack 
before launch, making it a ``first-strike'' weapon that could not 
survive in a conflict. Indeed, the Surya's threatening nature and its 
prelaunch vulnerability would make it a classic candidate for 
preemptive attack in a crisis. In strategic theory this leads to 
``crisis instability,'' the increased incentive for a crisis to lead to 
strategic attacks because of each side's premium on striking first.
    Why would India want such a weapon? The reported ranges of the 
Surya variants suggest the answer.

   5,000-kilometer Surya-1 might overlap the range of a 
        reported 5,000-kilometer upgrade of the Agni missile.\9\ Surya-
        1 would have only one advantage over such an upgraded Agni. 
        That advantage would be a far larger payload--to carry a large 
        (perhaps thermonuclear) warhead or multiple nuclear warheads. 
        India has no reason to need a missile of ``ICBM'' range for use 
        against Pakistan. 5,000 kilometers is arguably an appropriate 
        missile range for military operations against distant targets 
        in China. As illustrations of the relevant distances, the range 
        from New Delhi to Beijing is 3,900 kilometers, from New Delhi 
        to Shanghai 4,400 kilometers, and from Mumbai to Shanghai 5,100 
        kilometers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Moscow Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey internet news service in 
English, 1252 GMT November 1, 2004; and a publication of more uncertain 
quality, Arun Vishwakarma, ``Agni--Strategic Ballistic Missile,'' April 
15, 2005, available at http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MISSILES/
Agni.html. It is possible that either or both of these references have 
conflated the Surya-1 the Agri program.

   An 8,000-to-12,000-kilometer Surya-2 would be excessive for 
        use against China. However, the distance from New Delhi to 
        London is 6,800 kilometers, to Madrid 7,400 kilometers, to 
        Seattle 11,500 kilometers, and to Washington, D.C., 12,000 
        kilometers. An Indian Defence Research and Development 
        Organisation (DRDO) official wrote in 1997, ``Surya's targets 
        will be Europe and the United States.'' \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Wilson John, ``India's Missile Might,'' The Pioneer in 
English, New Delhi, July 13, 1997, p. l, available as FBIS-TAC-97-195 
BK1407155097, July 14, 1997
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   A 20,000-kilometer range Surya-3 could strike any point on 
        the surface of the Earth.

    Indian commentators generally site two reasons for acquiring an 
ICBM: To establish India as a global power and to enable India to deal 
with ``high-tech aggression'' of the type demonstrated in the wars with 
Iraq.\11\ Because there is no obvious reason for India to want a 
military capability against Europe, there is only one target that 
stands out as the bulls-eye for an Indian ICBM--the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ For example, Brahma Chellaney, ``Value of Power,'' The 
Hindustan Times in English, May 19, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
How India got here
    The established path to a space launch capability for the United 
States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China was to 
adapt a ballistic missile as a space launch vehicle. India turned the 
process around, adapting a space launch vehicle as a ballistic missile. 
If Brazil, Japan, or South Korea were to develop long-range ballistic 
missiles, they would probably follow India's example.
    President Kennedy was once asked the difference between the Atlas 
space launch vehicle that put John Glenn into orbit and an Atlas 
missile aimed at the Soviet Union. He answered with a one-word pun, 
``Attitude.'' Paul Wolfowitz is said to have compared space launch 
vehicles to ``peaceful nuclear explosives'' (PNEs); both have civilian 
uses but embody hardware and technology that are interchangeable with 
military applications. India has demonstrated this interchangeability 
with both space launch vehicles and PNEs.
    The path to India's ICBM capability took more than four decades.

   Early 1960s: NASA trains Indian scientists at Wallops 
        Island, Virginia, in sounding rockets and provided Nike-Apache 
        sounding rockets to India.\12\ France, the UK, and the Soviet 
        Union also supply sounding rockets.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Vadlamudi, op cit.
    \13\ Milhollin, op cit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   1963-64: A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, an Indian engineer, works at 
        Wallops Island where the Scout space launch vehicle (an 
        adaptation of Minuteman ICBM solid-fuel rocket technology) is 
        flown.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   1965: Upon Kalam's return to India the Indian Atomic Energy 
        Commission requests U.S. assistance with the Scout, and NASA 
        provides unclassified reports.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   1969-70: U.S. firms supply equipment for the Solid 
        Propellant Space Booster Plant at Sriharokota.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Vadlamudi, op cit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   1973: India tests a ``peaceful nuclear explosion.''
   1970s: A.P.J. Abdul Kalam becomes head of the Indian Space 
        Research Organisation (ISRO), in charge of developing space 
        launch vehicles.
   1980: India launches its first satellite with the SLV-3 
        rocket, a close copy of the NASA scout.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Alexander Pikayev, Leonard Spector, et al., Russia, the U.S. 
and the Missile Technology Control Regime, Adelphi Paper 317, 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   February 1982: Kalam becomes head of DRDO, in charge of 
        adapting space launch vehicle technology to ballistic missiles.
   1989: India launches its first Agni ``technology 
        demonstrator'' surface-to-surface missile. The Agni's first 
        stage is essentially the first stage of the SLV-3. Later, the 
        Agni becomes a family of three short-to-intermediate-range 
        ballistic missiles.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, ``India's Nuclear Forces, 
2005,'' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 61, No. 05, September/
October 2005, available at http://www.thebulletin.org/
article_nn.php?art_ofn=so05norris.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   1990: Russia agrees to supply India with cryogenic upper 
        stage rockets and technology. The United States imposes 
        sanctions on Russia until, in 1993, Russia agrees to limit the 
        transfer to hardware and not technology. However, India claims 
        it has acquired the technology to produce the rockets on its 
        own.
   1994: India launches the PSLV. Stages 1 and 3 are 2.8 meter-
        diameter solid-fuel rockets. Stages 2 and 4 are liquid-fuel 
        Vikas engines derived from French technology transfers in the 
        1980s.
   1994: This is the earliest date for which the Surya ICBM 
        program, using PSLV technology, is reported to have been 
        officially authorized. However, India's space and missile 
        engineers--if not the ``official'' Indian Government--had 
        opened the option much earlier.
   1998: India tests nuclear weapons after decades of 
        protesting that its nuclear program was exclusively peaceful.
   1999: India flies the Agni II, an extended range missile 
        that tests reentry vehicle ``technology [that] can be 
        integrated with the PSLV programme to creat an ICBM'' according 
        to a defence ministry official.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ V.G. Jaideep, ``India Building ICBM with 8,000-Plus Km 
Range,'' The Asian Age in English, February 8, 1999, pp. 1-2 and 
Barbara Opall-Rome, ``Agni Test Undercuts U.S., Angers China,'' Defense 
News, April 26, 1999, p. 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   1999: Defense News cites Indian Defence Research and 
        Development Organisation (DRDO) officials as stating that the 
        Surya is under development.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Vivek Raghuvanshi, ``India To Develop Extensive Nuclear 
Missile Arsenal,'' Defense News, May 24, 1999, p. 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   November 6, 1999: India's Minister of State for Defence (and 
        former head of DRDO) Bachi Singh Rawat says India is developing 
        an ICBM known as Surya that would ``have a range of up to 5,000 
        km.'' \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, ``Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation,'' Report # 2000/09, March 23, 2001, available at http://
www.cisiscrs.gc.ca/eng/misdocs/200009_e.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   November 23, 1999: Rawat is reported to have been stripped 
        of his portfolio after his ICBM disclosure.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Iftikhar Gilani, ``Premature Disclosure of ICBM Project, Rawat 
Stripped of Defence Portfolio,'' New Delhi, November 23, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   2001: Khrunichev State Space Science and Production Center 
        announces that it will supply five more cryogenic upper stages 
        to India within the next 3 years.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Moscow (Interfax), ``Khrunichev Space Center To Supply Rocket 
Boosters To India,'' April 16, 2001, available at http:/spacer.com/
news/india-01d.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   2001: The cryogenic engine is reported to be ``the Surya's 
        test-bed.'' \24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Cf. footnote 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   2001: A U.S. National Intelligence Estimate states, ``India 
        could convert its polar space launch vehicle into an ICBM 
        within a year or two of a decision to do so.'' \25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ National Intelligence Estimate, ``Foreign Missile Developments 
and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015,'' December 2001, 
available at http://www.cia.gov/nic/special_missilethreat2001.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   2004: A Russian Academy of Sciences Deputy Director states 
        that India is planning to increase the range of the Agni 
        missile to 5,000 kilometers and to design the Surya ICBM with a 
        range of 8,000 to 12,000 kilometers.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Cf. footnote 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   2005: According to Indian Ministry of Defence sources, there 
        are plans to use the non-cryogenic Vikas stage for the Surya 
        and to have the missile deliver a 2\1/2\ to 3\1/2\ metric ton 
        payload with two or three warheads with explosive yields of 15 
        to 20 kilotons.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ Madhuprasad, op cit.

    The common threads in all these reports are that space launch 
vehicle technology is the basis for the Indian ICBM, and that India 
obtained the technology with foreign help.
How the United States got here
    The United States has a policy against missile proliferation, but 
the policy has not been in place as long as the Indian missile program. 
Nor has the policy been consistently applied. Some markers:

   1970s: The United States begins to consider a broad policy 
        against missile proliferation.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ Richard Speier, ``The Missile Technology Control Regime: Case 
Study of a Multilateral Negotiation,'' manuscript funded by the United 
States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., November 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   1980s: The United States and its six economic summit 
        partners secretly negotiate the Missile Technology Control 
        Regime (MTCR). After 1\1/2\ years of difficult negotiations on 
        the question of space launch vehicles, all partners agree that 
        they must be treated as restrictively as ballistic missiles 
        because their hardware, technology, and production facilities 
        are interchangeable. The MTCR is informally implemented in 1985 
        and is publicly announced in 1987.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Speier, ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   1990: Two weeks after the United States enacts a sanctions 
        law against missile proliferation, the Soviet Union announces 
        its cryogenic rocket deal with India. The two parties are the 
        first to have sanctions imposed on them under the new law.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Pikayev, et al, op cit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   1993: The United States and Russia agree that Russia may 
        transfer a limited number of cryogenic rocket engines to India, 
        but not their production technology. \31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   1998: India tests nuclear weapons. United States imposes 
        broad sanctions on nuclear and missile/space-related transfers.
   1999: Kalam says he wants to ``neutralise'' the 
        ``stranglehold'' some nations had over the MTCR that had tried, 
        but failed, to ``throttle'' India's missile program. ``I would 
        like to devalue missiles by selling the technology to many 
        nations and break their stranglehold.'' \32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ ``Agni IRBM Built to Carry Nuclear Warhead,'' Jane's Defence 
Weekly, April 28, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   September 22, 2001: United States lifts many of the 
        technology sanctions imposed in 1998. Subsequently, India's 
        Prime Minister visits the United States amid agreement to 
        broaden the technology dialogue.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ Vadlamudi, op cit., is an excellent source for recent 
developments in the U.S.-Indian space dialogue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   2002: Kalam becomes President of India.
   2002: The United States tells India it will not object to 
        India launching foreign satellites, as long as they do not 
        contain U.S.-origin components.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ C. Raja Mohan, ``U.S. Gives Space to ISRO,'' The Hindu in 
English, September 30, 2002, p. 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   April 2003: The last mention of India is made in the 
        Director of Central Intelligence's unclassified semi-annual 
        report to Congress on the acquisition weapons of mass 
        destruction. Future reports deletes descriptions of India's 
        activities.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ Director of Central Intelligence, ``Unclassified Report to 
Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass 
Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 
June 2002,'' posted April 2003, available at http://www.cia.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   October 2003: Secretary of State Powell speaks to the 
        Washington Post about the ``Trinity'' and the ``glide path.'' 
        \36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ Cf. footnote 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   January 2004: President Bush agrees to expand cooperation 
        with India in ``civilian space programs'' but not explicitly to 
        cooperate with space launches. This measure is part of a 
        bilateral initiative dubbed ``Next Steps in Strategic 
        Partnership.'' \37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by 
the President on India, ``Next Steps in Strategic Partnership with 
India,'' January 12, 2004, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2004/01/20040112-1.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   July 2005: President Bush agrees to cooperate with India on 
        ``satellite navigation and launch.'' The Prime Minister of 
        India agrees to ``adherence to Missile Technology Control 
        Regime . . . guidelines.'' \38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ Cf. footnote 3.

    The common thread in these developments is that the U.S. clarity 
about the relationship between space launch vehicles and missile 
proliferation appears close to being obscured in the case of India. 
India's agreement to adhere to the MTCR's export control guidelines is 
a welcome development but does not entitle India to missile (or space 
launch vehicle) technology. Without India's adherence, if India were to 
export missile technology restricted by the MTCR, it would be a 
candidate for the imposition of sanctions under U.S. law.
Analysis
    The story of India's ICBM illustrates short-sightedness on the 
parts of both India and the United States. If India completes the 
development of an ICBM, the following consequences can be expected:

   An incentive to preempt against India in times of crisis,
   A diversion of India's military funds away from applications 
        that would more readily complement ``strategic partnership'' 
        with the United States,
   Increased tensions and dangers with China,
   Confusion and anger on the part of India's friends in Europe 
        and the United States,
   A backlash against India that will hinder further 
        cooperation in a number of areas, and
   A goad to other potential missile proliferators and their 
        potential suppliers to becoming more unrestrained.

    The governments of India and the United States have nothing to be 
proud of in this business. In seeking to become a global power by 
acquiring a first-strike weapon of mass destruction the Indian 
Government is succumbing to its most immature and irresponsible 
instincts. The U.S. Government, by offering India the ``Trinity'' of 
cooperation, is flirting with counterproductive activities that could 
lead to more proliferation.
    There are, of course, arguments in favor of such cooperation:

   Strategic cooperation with India is of greater value than 
        theological concerns about proliferation.
   India has already developed nuclear weapons and long-range 
        missiles, so resistance to such proliferation is futile.
   And India is our friend, so we need not worry about its 
        strategic programs.

    It is true that there is considerable value to strategic 
cooperation with India. But nuclear and space launch cooperation are 
not the only kinds of assistance that India can use. It has a greater 
use for conventional military assistance, development aid, and access 
to economic markets. Moreover, nonproliferation has a strategic value 
at least as great as that of an Indian partnership. A little 
proliferation goes a long way. It encourages other nations (such as 
Pakistan, Brazil, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) to consider similar 
programs. And the example of U.S. cooperation encourages other 
suppliers to relax their restraint.
    It is true that India has already developed nuclear weapons and 
long-range missiles. But India has a long way to go to improve their 
performance, and it has a history of using nuclear and space launch 
assistance to do just that. Some areas in which India can still improve 
its missiles are:

   Accuracy. For a ballistic missile, accuracy deteriorates 
        with range. India's ICBM could make use of better guidance 
        technology, and it might obtain such technology with ``high-
        tech'' cooperation with the United States.
   Weight. Unnecessary weight in a missile reduces payload and 
        range. Or it forces the development of gigantic missiles such 
        as India's PSLV-derived ICBM. India is striving to obtain 
        better materials and master their use to reduce unnecessary 
        missile weight.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ Mir Ayoob Ali Khan, ``Agni-Ill to get light motor for bigger 
bombs,'' The Asian Age in English, New Delhi, October 14, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Reliability. India's space launch vehicles and medium range 
        missiles have suffered their share of flight failures. 
        Engineering assistance in space launches could improve India's 
        missile reliability--as was demonstrated with unapproved 
        technology transfers incident to launches of U.S. satellites by 
        China.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ The ``Cox Commission'' Report, House of Representatives Report 
105-851, ``Report of the Select Committee on US National Security and 
Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China,'' 
June 14, 1999, available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/
hr105851/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Multiple warheads. India's reported interest in missile 
        payloads with multiple nuclear warheads means that certain 
        elements of satellite technology may get diverted to military 
        use. Deliberate or inadvertent transfers of technology 
        associated with dispensing and orienting satellites could, as 
        in the Chinese case, make it easier to develop multiple re-
        entry vehicles.
   Countermeasures against missile defenses. Assistance to 
        India in certain types of satellite technology, such as the 
        automated deployment of structures in space, could aid the 
        development of penetration aids for India's long-range 
        missiles. Given that the United States is the obvious target 
        for an Indian ICBM, such countermeasures could stress U.S. 
        missile defenses.

    Supplier restraint can slow down India's missile progress and make 
such missiles more expensive and unreliable--perhaps delaying programs 
until a new regime takes a fresh look at them and considers 
deemphasizing them. Apart from the technical assistance that the United 
States is considering supplying, the relaxation of U.S. objections to 
foreign use of India launch services will augment the ISRO budget for 
rocket development. Even if India were not materially aided by U.S. 
space launch cooperation, the example is certain to kindle hopes in 
such nations as Brazil that they can get away with the same tactics. 
And France and Russia, India's traditional and less-restrained rocket 
technology suppliers, are certain to want a piece of the action.
    It is true that India is our friend and ``strategic partner,'' at 
least at the present time. History raises questions whether such 
friendship would continue through a conflict with Pakistan. And India's 
interest in an ICBM, which only makes sense as a weapon against the 
United States, raises questions whether the friendship is mutual. 
Moreover, nonproliferation policy is often directed against programs in 
friendly nations. Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, 
South Korea, Taiwan, and Ukraine are all friendly nations for which the 
United States has attempted to hinder WMD and missile programs without 
undermining broader relations. An exception for India is certain to be 
followed by more strident demands for exceptions elsewhere. Is the 
space-launch component of ``friendship'' worth a world filled with 
nations with nuclear-armed missiles?
    India's missile program has evolved over more than four decades. 
The history of proliferation demonstrates the difficulty of holding to 
a strong nonproliferation policy over years, let alone decades.\41\ 
There will always be temptations to trade nonproliferation for some 
bilateral or strategic advantage of the moment. In the current 
situation, India may have out-negotiated the United States. After 
India's 1998 nuclear weapon tests, the United States imposed sanctions 
and then gradually lifted them. In nuclear and rocket matters, this was 
not enough for India. And once the United States began easing up on 
India, the United States kept easing up.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ Richard Speier, ``United States Strategies Against the 
Proliferation of Mass Destruction Weapons,'' doctoral dissertation, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1968.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The United States professes to be holding to its ``red lines''--in 
Secretary of State Powell's words--in whatever kind of cooperation it 
is considering. But the world needs to know where these lines are when 
it comes to ``space launch'' cooperation. It is one thing for the 
United States to provide launch services for Indian satellites. It is 
another thing for the United States to use or help improve India's 
ICBM-capable rockets. Are the ``red lines'' firm or flexible? Is the 
``glide path'' a slippery slope? This brings us to this paper's 
recommendations.
Recommendations
    Under the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, the United States and 
India committed themselves to ``build closer ties in space exploration, 
satellite navigation and launch, and in the commercial space arena.'' 
This does not require nor should it encourage U.S. cooperation on 
India's ICBM program directly or indirectly. In fact, the United States 
has already taken a step in the right direction by offering to launch 
Indian astronauts in upcoming space shuttle missions and to involve 
them to the fullest extent in the International Space Station
    The United States should do more to encourage India to launch its 
satellites and science packages on U.S. and foreign launchers by making 
these launches more affordable. The United States also should be 
forthcoming in offering India access, as appropriate, to the benefits 
of U.S. satellite programs--including communications, earth resource 
observation, and exploration of the cosmos. India, in fact, has some of 
the world's best astrophysicists and cosmologists. It is in our 
interest, as well as the world's, that we make all of the data from our 
space observation programs involving the Hubble telescope and similar 
systems available to Indian scientists to analyze.
            (1) Do not be naive about the nature of India's program
    After more than two decades of reports about India's interest in an 
ICBM--including reports from Russia, statements on India's ICBM 
capability by the U.S. intelligence community, and the firing of an 
Indian official after he publicly described the Surya program--there 
should be no illusions. All of the reports state that India's ICBM will 
be derived from its space launch vehicle. The United States should not 
believe that it is possible to separate India's ``civilian'' space 
launch program--the incubator of its long-range missiles--from India's 
military program. There should be no illusions about the target of the 
ICBM. It is the United States--to protect India from the theoretical 
possibility of ``high-tech aggression.'' The U.S. intelligence 
community's semi-annual unclassified reporting to Congress on India's 
nuclear and missile programs was discontinued after April 2003. This 
reporting should be resumed.
            (2) Do not assist India's space launch programs
    The United States should not cooperate either with India's space 
launches or with satellites that India will launch. India hopes that 
satellite launches will earn revenues that will accelerate its space 
program--including rocket development. U.S. payloads for Indian 
launches--such as the envisioned cooperative lunar project--risk 
technology transfer (see recommendation No. 3) and invite other nations 
to be less restrained in their use of Indian launches. Because there is 
no meaningful distinction between India's civilian and military rocket 
programs, the United States should explicitly or de facto place ISRO 
back on the ``entities'' list of destinations that require export 
licenses.\42\ Certainly, Congress should insist that the United States 
explain it's ``red lines'' regarding space cooperation with India. If 
these lines are not drawn tightly enough, Congress should intervene.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ U.S. Department of Commerce, ``Control Policy: End-User and 
End-Use Based,'' Export Administration Regulations, Part 744, available 
at http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/744.pdf. ISRO was removed from 
the ``entities'' list under a U.S-Indian agreement signed on September 
17, 2004. See Vadlamudi, op cit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            (3) Review carefully any cooperation with India's satellite 
                    programs
    India is reportedly developing multiple nuclear warheads for its 
long-range missiles. If India develops an ICBM, the next step will be 
to develop countermeasures to penetrate U.S. missile defenses. Certain 
satellite technologies can help India with both of these developments. 
The United States should review its satellite cooperation to ensure 
that it does not aid India inappropriately in the technologies of 
dispensing or orienting spacecraft, of automated deployment of 
structures in space, or of other operations that would materially 
contribute to multiple warheads or countermeasures against missile 
defenses.
                               conclusion
    The target of an Indian ICBM would be the United States. The 
technology of an Indian ICBM would be that of a space launch vehicle. 
The United States should not facilitate the acquisition or improvement 
of that technology directly or indirectly In this matter, U.S. clarity 
and restraint are what the world--and India--need.
                                 ______
                                 

                        Feeding the Nuclear Fire

           (By Zia Mian and M.V. Ramona, September 20, 2005)

    The July 18 Joint Statement by U.S. President George Bush and Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh has attracted a great deal of comment. The 
focus has been on the possible consequences of United States promises 
to support India's nuclear energy program in exchange for India clearly 
separating its military and civilian nuclear facilities and programs 
and opening the latter to international inspection.
    Much of the debate on the deal has arisen between what can be 
broadly called nuclear hawks and nuclear nationalists. The hawks 
believe that New Delhi's nuclear program is a great success and that 
India is more than able to take care of itself. They see the deal as 
imposing unnecessary constraints on India's nuclear program and 
impeding the creation of a large nuclear arsenal--including 
thermonuclear weapons (hydrogen bombs)--which they believe to be 
essential for India to achieve ``great power'' status.
    The clearest expression of this perspective comes from former Prime 
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), who 
seek the largest possible nuclear weapons capability. Vajpayee argues 
that: ``Separating the civilian from the military would be very 
difficult, if not impossible . . . It will also deny us any flexibility 
in determining the size of our nuclear deterrent.'' When he refers to 
``flexibility'' in determining the size of the Indian nuclear arsenal, 
he does not include reducing or eliminating it. Rather, his term 
expresses the fear that separating civil and military facilities may 
curb the arsenal's size.
    Nuclear nationalists have a less ambitious, more traditional 
perspective that considers Indias nuclear program a great national 
technological achievement and necessary for India's economic and social 
development. They see the deal as offering a way to sustain and expand 
the nuclear energy program without unduly restricting a ``minimum'' 
nuclear weapons arsenal.
    The current government has embraced this nationalist view, as have 
many defenders of the deal. The Prime Minister laid it out most clearly 
to Parliament on July 29, saying: ``Our nuclear program . . . is 
unique. It encompasses the complete range of activities that 
characterize an advanced nuclear power . . . our scientists have done 
excellent work, and we are progressing well on this program as per the 
original vision outlined by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Dr. Homi 
Bhabha.'' Singh went on to argue that ``nuclear power has to play an 
increasing role in our electricity generation plans,'' and he noted 
that the deal is flexible because ``our indigenous nuclear power 
program based on domestic resources and national technological 
capabilities would continue to grow.'' The expected international 
support, both in nuclear fuel and nuclear reactors, will help ``enhance 
nuclear power production rapidly,'' he added. At the same time, he made 
it clear that ``there is nothing in the Joint Statement that amounts to 
limiting or inhibiting our strategic nuclear weapons program.''
    These two positions have by and large dominated the debate so far. 
There are many problems with both views. The first is their shared 
belief in the success of India's nuclear energy program and the need to 
continue with and expand this effort. They fail to recognize that the 
deal is actually a testament to the long-standing, expensive, and 
large-scale failure of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) to 
safeguard health, safety, the environment, and local democracy.
    Both camps also contend that nuclear weapons are a source of 
security, though this conviction has been extensively debunked. Those 
who persist in this belief also ignore the essential moral, legal, and 
criminal questions of what it means to have--and be prepared to use--
nuclear weapons. The only differences between the two camps are in the 
character and size of the genocidal weapons they desire and in the 
number of people they are prepared to threaten to kill.
                          a history of failure
    The establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in 1948 was 
framed by the rhetoric of indigenous national development. Led by Homi 
Bhabha, the AEC portrayed India as forging its own path in the new 
nuclear age. That was not to be. There was no progress until the United 
Kingdom offered the design details and enriched uranium fuel for the 
first Indian nuclear reactor, Apsara. In what was to become a pattern, 
the official announcement when the Apsara reactor went critical 
declared the landmark a ``purely indigenous affair.''
    Similarly, the CIRUS reactor, which provided the plutonium used in 
the 1974 nuclear test (and quite likely some used in the 1998 tests as 
well), was supplied by Canada, and the heavy water used in it came from 
the United States. An American firm, Vitro International, was awarded 
the contract to prepare blueprints for the first reprocessing plant at 
Trombay. The first power reactors at Tarapur and Rawatbhata were 
supplied by the United States and Canada respectively. And foreign 
collaboration did not just extend to reactors. Many of India's nuclear 
scientists were schooled in America and elsewhere. Between 1955 and 
1974, over 1,100 Indian scientists were sent to train at various United 
States facilities.
    Extensive foreign support of the nuclear program ended only after 
the 1974 nuclear test. The international community led by Canada and 
the United States--both of whom were incensed by India's use of 
plutonium from the CIRUS reactor, which had been given purely for 
peaceful purposes--cut off most material transfers relating to New 
Delhi's nuclear program. However, India's nuclear facilities 
surreptitiously procured components from abroad, and foreign 
consultants continued to be hired for projects. Moreover, DAE personnel 
still had access to nuclear literature and participated in 
international conferences where technical details were freely 
discussed.
    Even with all this help, DAE's failures were many and stark. In 
1962, Homi Bhabha predicted that by 1987 nuclear energy would 
constitute 20,000 to 25,000 megawatts (MW) of installed electricity 
generation capacity. His successor as head of the DAE, Vikram Sarabhai, 
predicted that by 2000 there would be 43,500 MW of nuclear power. In 
1984, the ``Nuclear Power Profile'' drawn up by the DAE suggested the 
more modest goal of 10,000 MW by 2000, India never came close to 
meeting any of these goals.
    After over 50 years of generous government funding, nuclear power 
amounts to only 3,400 MW, barely 3 percent of India's installed 
electricity capacity. This capacity is expected to rise by nearly 50 
percent over the next few years but not because of the DAE. The largest 
component of the expansion will be two 1,000 MW reactors purchased from 
and being built by Russia.
    This history of failure explains the escalating demands from the 
DAE and other nuclear advocates to gain access to international nuclear 
markets. Only with international help can the DAE ever hope to achieve 
its latest promised goal of 20,000 MW by the year 2020.
    Another pressure driving the deal with Washington has been the 
DAE's failure to manage its existing nuclear program. In its 
determination to build more and more reactors--something to show for 
all the money that it gets--the DAE has failed to provide reactor fuel. 
Soon after the United States-India deal was announced, this oversight 
became apparent in a statement from an unnamed official to the British 
Broadcasting Corporation who admitted: ``The truth is we were 
desperate. We have nuclear fuel to last only till [sic] the end of 
2006. If this agreement had not come through we might have as well 
closed down our nuclear reactors and by extension our nuclear 
program.'' The former head of the atomic energy regulatory board has 
reported that this is not a new problem, he notes that ``uranium 
shortage'' has been ``a major problem for the officials of NPCIL and 
the Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) for some time.''
    The issue is simple. Apart from Tarapur I and II, all DAE reactors 
are fueled using uranium from the Jaduguda region of Jharkand. The 
total electric capacity of the heavy water-based power reactors is 
2,450 MW. At 75 percent operating capacity, they require nearly 330 
tons of uranium every year. The reactors that are supposedly dedicated 
to making plutonium for nuclear weapons, CIRUS and Dhruva, consume 
perhaps another 30-35 tons. When mining started in Jaduguda, the 
average ore grade was about 0.O67 percent. Now it is reportedly less 
than half that. The current mining capacity is around 2,800 tons of 
uranium ore per day. This means the DAE may only be producing about 300 
tons of uranium a year, which falls well short of the fueling 
requirements. The DAE has been able to continue to operate its reactors 
only by using stockpiled uranium from earlier days when nuclear 
capacity was much smaller. This stockpile should be exhausted by 2007.
    The DAE has been desperately trying to open new uranium mines in 
India, but it has been met with stiff public resistance everywhere. 
This local resistance stems from the widely documented negative impacts 
of uranium mining and milling on public and occupational health.
    The limits on domestic uranium reserves have been known since the 
nuclear program was started. This concern was the justification for the 
three-phase nuclear power program that Bhabha originally proposed and 
that continues to be pursued. This program involves separating 
plutonium from the spent fuel produced in natural uranium reactors and 
setting up breeder reactors, which in turn could theoretically be used 
to utilize India's thorium resources for energy production. But the 
three phases are far from being realized. The DAE has failed to build 
and sustain enough natural uranium-fueled reactors for the first phase. 
The second phase is still experimental, and the first plutonium-fueled 
power reactor has yet to be completed. Even if it becomes fully 
functional, breeder reactors are unlikely to be a significant source of 
electricity for several decades. The thorium fuel cycle, the third 
phase, is still far in the future.
       implications of the agreement for nuclear energy in india
    If the deal with Washington goes through, the DAE will be free to 
purchase uranium from the international market for its safeguarded 
reactors. This has some important consequences. For starters, it will 
reduce pressure on domestic uranium reserves. Since imported uranium 
will be much cheaper than Indian uranium, it may also marginally reduce 
the operating costs of Indian nuclear plants. Although the DAE hides 
its actual costs, there is little doubt that nuclear electricity is 
more expensive than other major sources of power in India.
    At the same time, access to cheap, imported uranium will remove 
what has been the DAE's primary justification for much of its long-term 
nuclear plan. For decades, the DAE has cited a shortage of domestic 
uranium as justification for India's breeder program, even though poor 
economics and countless engineering problems have effectively killed 
similar breeder reactor programs in the United States, France, and 
Germany. The high cost of breeder reactors stems from their need for 
plutonium fuel produced at reprocessing plants by chemically treating 
spent (i.e., used) nuclear fuel from ordinary reactors. The separated 
plutonium is then fashioned into breeder fuel at special and costly 
fabrication plants. There are enormous economic costs, environmental 
repercussions, and public health risks associated with this whole 
scheme.
    If cheap uranium becomes available to India, there will be no need 
for any of this. Even so, the DAE may balk at giving up its breeder 
reactor program. It may instead choose to emulate Japan, which imports 
uranium to power its nuclear reactors and, ignoring the costs and 
risks, continues to pursue its breeder reactor program. If so, the 
DAE's institutional interests will have once again triumphed over 
economic good sense and concerns about health and the environment.
    India's existing nuclear capacity--and any increases in it, 
domestic or foreign, that the United States deal facilitates--should 
not to be considered a benefit. Nuclear electricity is expensive, and 
it would be far better to invest in other, cheaper sources of power as 
well as energy conservation measures. There are also important safety 
concerns associated with nuclear power. At least one of the DAE's 
nuclear reactors has come close to a major accident. One can barely 
imagine the consequences of a Chernobyl-like meltdown involving the 
release of large quantities of radioactive materials at a reactor in a 
densely populated country like India. Other facilities associated with 
the nuclear fuel cycle have also experienced accidents, though these 
have primarily affected workers within the plant.
    Apart from extreme accidents, there are many environmental and 
public health consequences associated with the many facilities that 
make up India's nuclear complex. A scientific study of the health 
consequences on the local population around the Rajasthan Atomic Power 
Station (RAPS) located at Rawatbhata near Kota observed statistically 
significant increases in the rates of congenital deformities, 
spontaneous abortions, stillbirths and 1-day deaths of newborn babies, 
and solid tumors.
    And, to cap it all, there is the unsolved problem of managing large 
amounts of radioactive waste for many tens of thousands of years. The 
question that really needs to be discussed (but has hardly figured in 
the debate) is whether India needs any nuclear power plants at all. 
There are many who believe India would be better off giving up this 
costly and dangerous technology and finding ways to meet the needs of 
its people without threatening their future or their environment.
                       how many bombs are enough?
    Nuclear energy and nuclear weapons have been linked from the 
beginning, and this will continue under the deal with Washington. 
Access to the international uranium market for fueling reactors will 
free up domestic uranium for India's weapons program and will likely 
boost New Delhi's nuclear clout.
    There are several ways in which India could use its freed-up 
domestic uranium. It could choose to build a third reactor dedicated to 
making plutonium for nuclear weapons. There have been proposals for a 
larger reactor to add to CIRUS and Dhruva at the Bhabha Atomic Research 
center in Mumbai. India could also start to make highly enriched 
uranium for nuclear weapons. Pakistan has used such highly enriched 
uranium, produced at Kahuta, for its weapons. Both paths, which need 
not be exclusive, would allow India to increase its fissile materials 
stockpile at a much faster rate. A third use for domestic uranium would 
be in supplying the fuel for a nuclear submarine that has been under 
development since the 1970s. Modest uranium availability and the more-
pressing need to keep the power reactors running have restricted all 
such plans in the past.
    If the proposed agreement is solidified, India could use both its 
current stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium and all future production 
to make nuclear weapons. The current stockpile is estimated to be 
perhaps 400-500 kg, sufficient for about 100 simple fission weapons. 
(It is usually assumed that 5 kg is needed for a simple weapon. More 
sophisticated designs typically require less plutonium.) CIRUS and 
Dhruva produce about 25-35 kg of plutonium a year. This means that by 
2010 India's potential arsenal size could be about 130 warheads using 
only existing facilities.
    But there are other sources of weapons-grade fissile material. 
Power reactors can be used to make weapons-grade plutonium by limiting 
the time the fuel is irradiated. Run this way, a typical 220 MW power 
reactor could produce between 150-200 kg/year of weapons-grade 
plutonium when operated at 60-80 percent capacity.
    Another source of fissile material is the stockpile of plutonium in 
the spent fuel of power reactors. Though it has a slightly different 
mix of isotopes from weapons-grade plutonium, it can be used to make a 
nuclear explosive. The United States conducted a nuclear test in 1962 
using plutonium that was not weapons-grade. One of India's May 1998 
nuclear tests is also reported to have involved such material.
    Over the years, some 8,000 kg of reactor-grade plutonium may have 
been produced in the power reactors not under safeguards. Only about 8 
kg of such plutonium are needed to make a simple nuclear weapon. Unless 
this spent fuel is not put under safeguards-i.e., declared to be off-
limits for military purposes, as part of the deal--India would have 
enough plutonium from this source alone for an arsenal of about 1,000 
weapons, larger than that of all the nuclear weapons states except the 
United States and Russia.
    Lastly, there is the plutonium produced in Kalpakkam in India's 
small, fast-breeder test reactor (FBTR). Even more plutonium will be 
produced by the 500 MW prototype FBTR now under construction. It is 
curious that ever since the 1960s, the DAE has resisted placing India's 
breeder program under international safeguards, even though both 
Germany and Japan, neither of them nuclear weapon states, subjected 
their breeder reactor programs to such safeguards. In theory, 
international scrutiny prevents plutonium or uranium from civil nuclear 
facilities from being used to make nuclear weapons. The DAE's 
resistance to safeguards begs the question as to whether the breeder 
program is, or ever was, only for civilian purposes.
    A.N. Prasad, former director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre 
(BARC), has argued that these large stocks of weapons-usable material 
are beside the point. Prasad asserts that the deal with Washington 
should be rejected because ``our military activities are not aimed at 
stockpiling nuclear weapons,'' since the weapons become old, their 
materials degrade, [and] they have to be dismantled and replaced.
    But Prasad is disingenuous. It is estimated that the plutonium used 
in U.S. nuclear weapons may not need to be replaced for 45-60 years. 
The material can then be recycled into new nuclear weapons. Moreover, 
many of the aging effects that plutonium experiences can be avoided 
with proper storage, allowing existing stocks of plutonium to last 
indefinitely. All other nuclear weapons states have stopped producing 
new material for their nuclear weapons programs-only India, Pakistan, 
and Israel appear to be producing new weapons ingredients.
    Another nuclear weapons resource is tritium, a gas used to boost 
the yield of fission weapons. The DAE claims to have tested a tritium-
boosted weapon in 1998. However, tritium decays relatively quickly (its 
half-life is just over 12 years). Thus, to maintain a stockpile of 
tritium for a long time requires either a very large initial amount or 
production at a rate that balances decay. Tritium is a byproduct in 
nuclear reactors dedicated to producing plutonium for weapons. These 
reactors can also be used specifically to generate more tritium.
    In short, the deal with Washington promises not only to leave New 
Delhi's weapons capability intact but to allow for a rapid and large 
expansion of India's nuclear arsenal. And both parties to the pact 
accept this as a good thing.
    The effects of the use of both the smaller yield fission weapons 
and the more destructive thermonuclear weapons in India's arsenal are 
well-known. Put simply, the smaller weapons will kill almost everyone 
within 1.5 km of the explosion, and the larger weapons will kill most 
people out to distances of 3.5 km. The effects of radioactive fallout 
would spread tens of kilometers further. Either kind of bomb would be 
enough to destroy a modern city. The question that needs to be asked 
is, ``How many cities do India's leaders wish to be able to destroy?''
    There are many who believe that no country should have nuclear 
weapons, since such weapons engender fear through the threat of 
genocide. In the 60 years since Hiroshima, we all should have learned 
that there is no security to be found in the threat to kill millions.
                               conclusion
    The nuclear agreement between the United States and India has many 
problems and raises two fundamental questions. The first is whether 
India needs nuclear energy for its development and the well-being of 
its people. A good case can be made that it does not.
    The second question is whether India needs nuclear weapons if it 
truly wants to live in peace with its neighbors and with the world. 
Many believe, with good reason, that it does not.
    The outcome of the proposed nuclear agreement, therefore, is a 
future in which a nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed India swaggers 
along in Washington's shadow. Such a choice could not be more stark.

                         PREPARED STATEMENT OF

                             MICHAEL KREPON

Cofounder and President Emeritus, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, 
                                   DC

                               BEFORE THE

                   Senate Foreign Relations Committee

                            NOVEMBER 2, 2005

                              ----------                              


    The debate now unfolding on the Bush administration's 
nuclear cooperation initiative is not about isolating and 
penalizing India. India is already the beneficiary of 
significant changes in U.S. Government policy. The real issue 
at hand is how to greatly improve bilateral ties without 
greatly weakening rules against proliferation.
    Many ardent admirers of India and staunch defenders of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty are conscientiously struggling with 
this dilemma. The NPT faces a number of problems more severe 
than India's nuclear program. But these problems can be 
compounded by how we handle India. The rules we change on 
India's behalf can also weaken the rules we want other nations 
to abide by.
    We can't sidestep this dilemma by distinguishing, as 
advocates within the administration do, between friendly states 
and problem states. Such distinctions are rarely permanent or 
clear cut. We all know that friendly states can also be problem 
states, that yesterday's friend can become tomorrow's 
adversary, and vice versa.
    Another significant problem with making U.S. 
nonproliferation policy dependent on country-specific 
distinctions between good and bad states is that this approach 
will seriously damage domestic laws and international treaties 
that set norms against proliferation. Domestic traffic laws 
don't allow some people to speed, but not others. Nor do 
international treaties distinguish between friends and foes, 
since one nation's friend can be another's foe. Instead, the 
rule of law applies to all. It allows us to distinguish between 
those who abide by the law and those who break it. Laws still 
get broken, but that doesn't diminish the importance of rules. 
Having rules, laws, and international norms provides the basis 
for prosecution, coalition building, and enforcement.
    I will describe below four fundamental principles that I 
hope will serve as guideposts for your deliberations:

   Strengthen nonproliferation norms more than you 
        widen loopholes. Country-specific exemptions are bad 
        for norms;
   The net effect of any changes in public law should 
        make proliferation harder, not easier;
   Follow the guideline of proportionally: Link 
        conditions to changes in public law. The greater the 
        exemption sought, the greater the need for compensatory 
        steps against proliferation; and
   No exemption should assist the recipient to enhance 
        or enlarge its nuclear arsenal.

    My first principle is that country-specific exemptions are 
corrosive to nonproliferation norms. If the United States were 
to champion a country-specific exemption, there is a strong 
likelihood that other nuclear suppliers would seek other 
exemptions, and that the United States would lose leverage to 
prevent such transactions.
    Thus, if after thoughtful deliberation, you conclude that 
some relaxation of our laws is advisable, I strongly urge you 
not to do this on a country-specific basis. Instead, I urge you 
to establish conditions under which the relaxation of public 
law would apply to any state seeking an exemption that meets 
congressional conditions. In this way, exemptions would be 
granted on the basis of performance, not on the basis of a 
particular country.
    A second general principle that I would propose for your 
consideration is that the net effect of changing public law 
should be to make proliferation harder, not easier. Put another 
way, the strengthening effects of the conditions established by 
the Congress should outweigh the weakening effects of the 
exemptions granted.
    Not all proposed relaxations of public law are equal. Since 
some kinds of U.S. nuclear assistance would have minimal 
negative impact on global nonproliferation norms, the 
conditions set by the Congress to allow for such transactions 
might also be modest. Conversely, other types of U.S. nuclear 
assistance could potentially have larger adverse impacts on 
nonproliferation norms and treaties. In such instances, the 
Congress might set very stringent conditions--or prohibit such 
transactions altogether.
    To address the fact that there are widely disparate 
gradations of nuclear commerce, I would propose that the 
Congress consider a third principle when considering changes to 
public law--the principle of proportionality. If the Congress 
deems it advisable to establish conditions associated with U.S. 
nuclear assistance, different types of assistance might be 
conditioned on different strengthening measures against 
proliferation. Minor adjustments in existing law would 
therefore be possible when modest conditions are met; major 
adjustments would be possible when significant conditions are 
met.
    The first two principles would mesh with the third: When 
applying the principle of proportionality, a relaxation of 
public law should be accompanied by conditions that, in all 
cases, result in a net strengthening of the global norm of 
nonproliferation. Moreover, these conditions should not be 
country specific. Instead, these considerations should apply to 
every applicant meeting congressional standards.
    The fourth fundamental principle that I would urge for your 
consideration is that the relaxation of U.S. nuclear assistance 
must not assist the recipient to enhance or enlarge its arsenal 
of nuclear weapons. If U.S. nuclear commerce were to result in 
more and more capable nuclear weapons on the part of any 
recipient, global nonproliferation norms would be dealt a 
severe blow. The reassertion by Congress of this fundamental 
objective and purpose of public law is essential because the 
July 18 Joint Statement by President Bush and Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh could lead to this negative result, depending on 
how it is implemented.
    How might these four general principles be applied in the 
proposed U.S.-India agreement? Let's take a look at both ends 
of the spectrum reflected in this initiative, and at two cases 
in between.
    The most troubling kinds of nuclear commerce--aside from 
the outright sale of bombmaking material and bombs--have to do 
with enrichment and reprocessing. This kind of nuclear commerce 
offers nations very costly ways to produce electricity, but 
essential means to produce nuclear weapons, regardless of cost. 
Given the negative proliferation consequences of commercial 
trafficking in enrichment and reprocessing technologies, 
President Bush spelled out his administration's opposition to 
this practice in a speech delivered at the National Defense 
University on February 11, 2004:

          The world must create a safe, orderly system to field 
        civilian nuclear plants without adding to the danger of 
        weapons proliferation. The world's leading nuclear 
        exporters should ensure that states have reliable 
        access at reasonable cost to fuel for civilian 
        reactors, so long as those states renounce enrichment 
        and reprocessing. Enrichment and reprocessing are not 
        necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy 
        for peaceful purposes.

    In the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, President Bush 
endorsed a very different formulation. He promised to ``work to 
achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India'' and 
to ``seek agreement from Congress [and to] work with friends 
and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil 
nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India.''
    President Bush's February 2004 statement is consistent with 
a principled position to strengthen nonproliferation norms, 
much like the one I am asking you to consider. His July 2005 
promise appears to carve out an exception to this principled 
position. A rules- and norms-based system would seek to set the 
highest barriers against transfers that could do the most 
proliferation damage--without exception.
    On the other end of the spectrum, the July 18 Joint 
Statement discusses bringing India into international research 
efforts related to advanced development concepts for civil 
nuclear power generation. While the particulars of such 
engagement matter--since some research and development 
initiatives could have more utility for nuclear weapon programs 
than others--in general this type of engagement would be 
consistent with the general principles advocated here.
    Two cases in between these poles are not so easy. One is 
providing fuel for safeguarded facilities at Tarapur. The other 
is selling new nuclear power plants to India. Providing 
commercial assistance to Tarapur, which the Government of India 
seeks in the near term, would be of far narrower scope than 
signing contracts for new nuclear power plants, but both steps 
would be contrary to the ``full-scope safeguards'' standard 
that the United States has long insisted that other nuclear 
suppliers live up to.
    In these intermediate cases, the fundamental principles 
enumerated above ought to apply: Norms should be strengthened, 
rather than exceptions; the net effect of any changes in public 
law linked to conditions should strengthen, not weaken, these 
norms; the principle of proportionality should apply; and no 
assistance should be given with respect to the military nuclear 
capabilities of the recipient state. The last of these 
fundamental principles would mandate that any relaxation of 
nuclear commerce for particular facilities be linked to the 
requirement that such facilities be safeguarded in perpetuity. 
But this still begs the question of what to do about the full 
scope safeguards requirement that U.S. administrations have 
finally succeeded in establishing as an international norm.
    A key formulation embedded in the July 2004 Joint Statement 
suggests one way to proceed. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has 
stated that his government is ``ready to assume the same 
responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits 
and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear 
technologies.'' This passage suggests that India would be 
treated in the same way--and would behave in the same way--as 
the nuclear weapon states recognized under the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
    The ``equal benefits for equal responsibilities'' 
formulation has some merit. But what would it mean in actual 
practice? In actual practice, the five nuclear weapon states 
recognized under the NPT have stopped producing fissile 
material for nuclear weapons. India has not. In actual 
practice, the five nuclear weapon states recognized under the 
NPT have signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Three of the 
five have ratified the treaty. The Senate of the United States 
has not consented to ratification. But under international law, 
all five are equally obligated not to undermine the objectives 
and purposes of this treaty, pending its entry into force. 
India has not signed the CTBT. Government officials have 
affirmed, using the present tense, the absence of current plans 
to test. These statements do not carry equal weight, nor do 
they impose equal responsibility, to the obligations accepted 
by the 176 states that have signed the CTBT.
    If India were serious about the ``equal benefits for equal 
responsibilities'' formulation, then New Delhi would be well 
advised to favorably consider a moratorium on the production of 
fissile material for nuclear weapons, and to sign the CTBT. 
Such steps would clarify that India seeks commercial nuclear 
transfers to fuel its economic growth and not to increase or 
enhance its nuclear arsenal. These steps would also clarify 
that the net effect of the changes Congress is being asked to 
consider would strengthen, not weaken, global nonproliferation 
norms. Under the principle of proportionality proposed above, 
such steps by the Government of India would open up a much 
wider range of cooperative nuclear endeavors.
    While I endorse this structure for handling the dilemmas 
posed by the Bush administration's nuclear cooperation 
initiative with India, I most emphatically do not recommend 
that the Congress direct the Government of India to take such 
steps. Any such directive would be counterproductive and deeply 
offensive to most Indian citizens. India is a proud, sovereign 
state facing vexing security problems. It will not take 
dictation from a nation with many thousands of nuclear weapons 
and large stocks of fissile material that has tested nuclear 
weapons over 1,000 times.
    Decisions regarding a moratorium on fissile material 
production and nuclear testing are India's to make. India will 
make these decisions in light of its perceived security 
requirements, and not as a result of foreign pressure. We must 
respect New Delhi's decisions, which could facilitate or impede 
nuclear cooperation. Either way, these are New Delhi's 
decisions to make. My preferred approach respects New Delhi's 
powers of decision, while reinforcing a principled stance by 
the United States against proliferation.
    By laying out a set of fundamental principles associated 
with changes in public law, and by establishing conditions for 
different levels of relaxation, the Congress could provide 
consistency and clarity that are lacking in the July 2005 Joint 
Statement, while strengthening global norms against 
proliferation. Improved bilateral ties with India will continue 
to proceed on many fronts, including trade, investment, non-
nuclear energy, agriculture, defense cooperation, and public 
health issues. There is no compelling reason why improved 
relations should come at a great cost to the nonproliferation 
norms that have buttressed national and international security. 
Working out the particulars associated with a statement of 
principles and conditions will not be easy. But, in my 
judgment, this approach could substantially strengthen 
bilateral relations and nonproliferation norms, rather than 
pitting one against the other.

  Additional Prepared Statement and Material Submitted for the Record

                              ----------                              

                                                  October 28, 2005.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Senator Lugar: I'm sorry that, because of a long-
standing commitment to be in Moscow next week, I will not be 
able to attend the Nonproliferation PAG meeting or appear as a 
witness at the SFRC's hearing. I would nonetheless like to 
convey to you and members of the PAG my thoughts on the issues 
you will be discussing.
    Please find below answers to the questions posed to us by 
Tom Moore. I am also attaching a one-page summary of my 
recommendations for modifying U.S. law and the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group guidelines as well as my prepared statement for 
a hearing held by the House International Relations Committee 
this past Wednesday, October 26. I would appreciate it if these 
papers could be circulated to PAG members.
1. Why does civil nuclear cooperation weigh so heavily in U.S.-Indian 
        relations?
    A key reason is the huge expansion of Indian energy needs 
in coming decades. Although the role that nuclear power can 
realistically play in meeting those needs is exaggerated by 
India's influential nuclear lobby, it is clear that nuclear 
will be an increasing share of India's future energy mix. 
Moreover, given India's limited domestic supplies of natural 
uranium, its ability to import yellowcake--which it cannot do 
under current Nuclear Suppliers Group restrictions--has become 
a critical requirement if India's nuclear energy program is to 
expand.
    But there is also a political reason why the nuclear issue 
weighs so heavily. Civilian nuclear cooperation with the United 
States and other NSG members has been the forbidden fruit that 
Indian political elites crave. More than anything else, U.S. 
willingness to set aside NPT-related rules to engage in nuclear 
cooperation with India has been sought by Indians as both a 
validation of their status as a nuclear weapon state and as a 
litmus test of the U.S. desire to transform the bilateral 
relationship.
2. How does the Joint Statement address U.S. nonproliferation concerns?
    The United States has long urged India to align its 
policies and practices more closely with the international 
nonproliferation regime and, in general, to make its own 
contribution toward strengthening that regime. The Joint 
Statement brings India a few steps closer to the 
nonproliferation mainstream, but the benefits are limited.
    Most of India's pledges in the Joint Statement are either 
reaffirmations of existing positions (to continue its 
unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, strengthen its export 
control system, and work toward a fissile material cutoff 
treaty), codifications of current Indian practices (no 
transfers of enrichment or reprocessing technology to states 
without fuel-cycle facilities), or announcements of steps India 
had already agreed to take in the context of an earlier 
bilateral dialog on technology transfer and export control 
(adherence to the NSG and MTCR guidelines).
    The genuinely new Indian commitment is the pledge to 
separate civilian and military nuclear facilities and to place 
civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards and the Additional 
Protocol. This has the symbolic value of helping reduce the 
perceived discrimination between countries that are obliged to 
accept safeguards on all their facilities and those that are 
not. But at this stage we don't know how complete will be the 
list of facilities India designates as civilian. And regardless 
of how inclusive or selective the list turns out to be, the 
pledge will not affect India's ability to continue producing 
fissile material for nuclear weapons at facilities not 
designated as eligible for safeguards. Without a halt to such 
production, the U.S.-India deal could facilitate an increase in 
India's stock of bomb-usable nuclear material (see my HIRC 
testimony).
    In a serious omission, the July 18 agreement doesn't call 
on India to play a more active role in helping address today's 
most acute proliferation challenges, especially Iran. India's 
``yes'' vote on the recent IAEA Board resolution that found 
Iran in noncompliance with its nonproliferation obligations was 
a welcome step. But since then, the Indians have tried to 
mollify the Iranians, saying that they actually oppose the 
finding of noncompliance and that they had voted for the 
resolution only because that was necessary to get the Europeans 
to back down from pursuing referral to the U.N. Security 
Council. The key test will be whether India makes a sustained 
and determined effort in the months ahead to persuade Iran to 
forgo its own enrichment capability and whether, if it becomes 
necessary, India votes yes to refer the question to the 
Security Council.
3. What are the risks of the deal and how can they be minimized?
    Following are among the risks if the deal goes forward as 
it currently stands:

   By seeking an exception to the rules for India, the 
        deal will make others less inhibited about engaging in 
        risky nuclear cooperation with friends of their own--
        Iran in the case of Russia, Pakistan in the case of 
        China.
   Bush administration initiatives in the NSG to 
        tighten export controls will be harder to achieve if at 
        the same time we're asking the Group to relax the rules 
        for India.
   By sending the signal that the United States will 
        eventually accommodate a decision to acquire nuclear 
        weapons, the deal will reduce the perceived costs to 
        states that might in the future consider going nuclear.
   It will make it more difficult to address 
        proliferation challenges such as Iran. The Iranians 
        have won some support internationally by asking 
        publicly why they, as an NPT party, should give up 
        their right to an enrichment capability while India, 
        which rejected the NPT and acquired nuclear weapons, is 
        being offered nuclear cooperation.
   In general, the deal conveys the message that the 
        United States now gives nonproliferation a back seat to 
        other foreign policy goals--which will give others a 
        green light to assign a higher priority to commercial 
        and political interests relative to nonproliferation.

    Among the ways of minimizing these risks are the following 
recommendations:

   Require that India stop producing fissile materials 
        for nuclear weapons, perhaps as part of a multilateral 
        moratorium. This would bring India in line with the 
        practices of the five original nuclear powers, all of 
        whom have already stopped. A multilateral moratorium 
        would help fight nuclear terrorism by capping stocks of 
        bomb-grade material worldwide and thereby making those 
        stocks easier to secure.
   Urge India to use its standing with Iran and the NAM 
        to press Iran to give up its enrichment and other fuel-
        cycle capabilities.
   Preserve a semblance of the long-standing ``NPT 
        preference policy'' by maintaining a distinction 
        between India and NPT parties in terms of the nuclear 
        exports they would be eligible to receive. Accordingly, 
        U.S. law and NSG guidelines should be modified to 
        permit nuclear exports to India except equipment, 
        materials, or technology related to enrichment, 
        reprocessing, and heavy water production. This would 
        permit India to acquire uranium, enriched fuel, and 
        nuclear reactors, but not items most closely related to 
        a nuclear weapons program. Moreover, in keeping with 
        U.S. NPT obligations and existing U.S. law, we should 
        allow nuclear exports to India only to facilities that 
        are under IAEA safeguards in perpetuity--not to 
        facilities under voluntary safeguards arrangements that 
        allow countries to withdraw materials or facilities 
        from safeguards for national security reasons.
   Pursue changes to U.S. law and NSG guidelines in a 
        country-neutral manner--not as a special exception to 
        the rules for India alone. An India-specific approach 
        heightens concerns that the United States is acting 
        selectively and self-servingly on the basis of its own 
        foreign policy interests rather than on the basis of 
        nonproliferation performance. Modified U.S. law and NSG 
        guidelines should therefore permit nuclear cooperation 
        with any state not party to the NPT that meets certain 
        criteria of responsible nuclear behavior. Such criteria 
        can avoid the pitfalls of making a country-specific 
        exception without opening the door to nuclear 
        cooperation in cases where it is clearly not yet 
        merited. (Suggested criteria are contained in the 
        attached one-page paper.)

    I hope these responses to Tom Moore's questions and the 
attached papers can be of some assistance to you next week in 
your meetings on the U.S.-India nuclear deal.
            Yours truly,
                                                    Robert Einhorn.
                                ------                                


        Recommended Modifications of U.S. Law and NSG Guidelines

    Nuclear cooperation--except in the areas of enrichment, 
reprocessing, or heavy water production or with facilities not under 
IAEA safeguards in perpetuity--would be permitted with any state not 
party to the NPT as of January 2002 * that has demonstrated a strong 
commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and has a sustained, consistent 
record as a responsible nuclear power. Such a state will be considered 
a responsible nuclear power if it:

   Has provided public assurances that it will not test nuclear 
        weapons;
   Is not producing fissile materials for nuclear weapons;
   Has placed under IAEA safeguards its civil nuclear 
        facilities, including all nuclear power reactors and R&D 
        facilities related to electricity generation;
   Is playing an active and constructive role in helping 
        address acute nuclear proliferation challenges posed by states 
        of proliferation concern;
   Has established, and is rigorously implementing, a national 
        export control system that meets the highest international 
        standards, including stringent rules and procedures banning 
        unauthorized contacts and cooperation by personnel with nuclear 
        expertise;
   Has provided public assurances that it will not export 
        enrichment or reprocessing equipment or technologies;
   Is working actively on its own and in cooperation with other 
        countries in stopping illicit nuclear transactions and 
        eliminating illicit nuclear commercial networks, including by 
        fully sharing the results of any investigations of illicit 
        nuclear activities; and
   Is applying physical protection, control, and accountancy 
        measures meeting the highest international standards to any 
        nuclear weapons and to all sensitive nuclear materials and 
        installations, both military and civilian, on its territory.

    Under modified U.S. law, in order to make a nonparty to the NPT 
eligible to receive U.S. nuclear exports, the President would be 
required to certify that the prospective recipient had met these 
criteria. The criteria could also be adopted by the NSG as criteria for 
deciding, by consensus, whether a particular nonparty to the NPT should 
be eligible for nuclear transfers from NSG member states.

    * To avoid creating an incentive for countries to withdraw from the 
NPT, the modified rules should apply only to countries that were 
outside the NPT as of a specified date, which would be chosen to 
exclude North Korea and include only India, Pakistan, and Israel.

                         PREPARED STATEMENT OF

                         HON. ROBERT J. EINHORN

 Senior Adviser, International Security Program, Center for Strategic 
               and International Studies, Washington, DC

                               BEFORE THE

                House International Relations Committee

                            OCTOBER 26, 2005

                              ----------                              


    Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify 
before the committee on the nonproliferation implications of 
the recent agreement between the United States and India on 
civil nuclear cooperation.
    The United States has an important national interest in 
strengthening relations with India and making it a strategic 
partner in the 21st century. But efforts to strengthen the 
United States-Indian relationship should not be pursued in a 
way that undermines a United States national interest of equal 
and arguably greater importance--preventing the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. That is precisely what the Bush 
administration has done in the nuclear deal reached this past 
summer during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to 
Washington.
    In the Joint Statement released on July 18, India agreed to 
take several steps to demonstrate its commitment to being a 
responsible nuclear power and a supporter of nonproliferation 
goals. In exchange, the United States administration agreed to 
seek changes in United States law and multilateral commitments 
to permit exports of nuclear equipment and technology to 
India--a radical departure from longstanding legal obligations 
and policies that precluded nuclear cooperation with states not 
party to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
    Administration officials have claimed that the deal, by 
aligning India more closely with the policies and practices of 
the international nonproliferation regime, is a net gain for 
nonproliferation. In his testimony before this committee on 
September 8, Under Secretary of State Robert Joseph maintained 
that ``India's implementation of its agreed commitments will, 
on balance, enhance our global nonproliferation efforts, and we 
believe the international nuclear nonproliferation regime will 
emerge stronger as a result.'' Upon close scrutiny, however, it 
appears that the nonproliferation benefits of the July 18 Joint 
Statement are rather limited.

                   NONPROLIFERATION GAINS ARE MODEST

    Several of the steps pledged by India are simply 
reaffirmations of existing positions, including India's 
commitments to continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear 
weapons testing, strengthen its national system of export 
controls, and work toward the conclusion of a multilateral 
fissile material cutoff treaty. In view of unsuccessful efforts 
for over a decade to get negotiations underway on a fissile 
material cut-off treaty and no near-term prospect of removing 
obstacles to beginning negotiations, this last pledge is 
unlikely in the foreseeable future to have any effect on 
India's ongoing program to produce more fissile materials for 
nuclear weapons.
    Other Indian commitments in the Joint Statement break new 
ground, but their actual nonproliferation gain is modest. For 
example, the pledge to refrain from transferring enrichment and 
reprocessing technologies to countries that do not already 
possess them is welcome. But since India--to its credit--has 
never transferred those technologies and has no plans to do so, 
it will have little practical consequence. Moreover, adherence 
to the guidelines of the Missile Technical Control Regime and 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is also positive; but it is a 
step New Delhi was already planning to take before the July 18 
Joint Statement as part of a United States-Indian dialog on 
technology transfer and export control called ``Next Steps in 
the Strategic Partnership.''
    The commitment that has drawn the most criticism within 
India is the pledge to separate civilian and military nuclear 
facilities and place civilian facilities voluntarily under IAEA 
safeguards and the Additional Protocol. Indian critics claim 
that, because of the colocation of civilian and military 
activities at a number of Indian nuclear facilities, 
implementation of the commitment could be expensive and time 
consuming and could impose unwarranted constraints on military 
programs. In response to these concerns, Indian officials have 
stressed that India alone will decide which facilities are 
subject to safeguards and have suggested that only a relatively 
small number will be put on the civilian list. While 
recognizing that the designation of civilian facilities (i.e., 
those eligible for safeguards) is an Indian prerogative, United 
States officials have made clear that, to be credible, any list 
should be complete.
    However, regardless of how inclusive or selective the list 
turns out to be, the nonproliferation value of India's 
commitment to place certain nuclear facilities under IAEA 
safeguards will be rather limited. The purpose of IAEA 
safeguards for non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT is to 
verify that no nuclear materials are diverted to a nuclear 
weapons progam. But as long as India continues to produce 
fissile materials for nuclear weapons (at facilities not 
included on the safeguards list), its willingness to apply 
safeguards to facilities designated as civilian serves 
primarily a symbolic function--to reduce the perceived 
discrimination between countries that are obliged to accept 
safeguards on all their facilities and those that are not.
    Beyond this symbolic value, willingness to put civilian 
facilities under safeguards also serves a more practical 
function. If members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group change 
their rules and permit nuclear cooperation with India, they 
will presumably confine such cooperation to safeguarded 
facilities in India. (NPT Article III(2) obliges them to engage 
in nuclear cooperation only with safeguarded facilities in 
nonweapon states. Since the Bush administration is not seeking 
to give India nuclear weapon state status under the NPT, III(2) 
will continue to apply to India.) The list of safeguarded 
Indian facilities will therefore serve to define the scope of 
permissible nuclear cooperation. For India, the trade-off will 
be between broadening the list (to expand opportunities for 
cooperation) and narrowing the list (to shield facilities from 
international scrutiny). However it chooses, the fundamental 
shortcoming of India's July 18 safeguards commitment remains--
it has no effect on India's ability to continue producing 
fissile material for nuclear weapons at facilities not 
designated as eligible for safeguards.

                         DOWNSIDES OF THE DEAL

    Administration officials are right that the various pledges 
contained in the Joint Statement move India closer, both in 
rhetorical and practical terms, to the international 
nonproliferation mainstream it has shunned for over 30 years. 
Still, the nonproliferation gains of the United States-India 
nuclear deal are meager compared to the major damage to 
nonproliferation goals that would result if the deal goes 
forward as it currently stands.
    The United States-India deal would make it harder to 
achieve key Bush administration nonproliferation initiatives. 
The United States is now asking the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers 
Group to permit nuclear cooperation only with countries that 
adhere to the IAEA's Additional Protocol and to ban transfers 
of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do 
not already possess fuel-cycle facilities. But getting NSG 
partners to tighten the rules in ways favored by the United 
States will be an uphill battle if they are also being asked to 
bend one of their cardinal rules (i.e., no nuclear trade with 
nonparties to the NPT) because it no longer suits the United 
States.
    By seeking an exception to the rules to accommodate 
America's new special friendship with India, the deal would 
reinforce the impression internationally that the U.S. approach 
to nonproliferation has become selective and self serving, not 
consistent and principled. Rules the United States initiated 
and championed would be perceived as less binding, more 
optional. Russia and China would feel less inhibited about 
engaging in nuclear cooperation that the United States might 
find risky and objectionable with special friends of their 
own--Iran and Pakistan, respectively.
    The nuclear deal in its present form has produced 
resentment on the part of close United States friends like 
Japan, Germany, and Brazil who were forced to choose between 
nuclear weapons and civil nuclear cooperation. They chose the 
latter, giving up the weapons option and joining the NPT to 
realize the benefits of nuclear cooperation. Now that India has 
been offered the opportunity to have its cake and eat it too, 
many non-nuclear NPT parties feel let down. Not wishing to harm 
relations with either India or the United States, they are 
unlikely to make a public fuss over the sudden reversal of U.S. 
policy (on which they were not consulted). But they will be 
less inclined in the future to make additional sacrifices in 
the name of nonproliferation.
    The United States-India deal could also reduce the 
perceived costs to states that might consider ``going nuclear'' 
in the future. In calculating whether to pursue nuclear 
weapons, a major factor for most countries will be how the 
United States is likely to react. Implementation of the deal 
would inevitably send the signal, especially to countries with 
good relations with Washington, that the United States will 
tolerate and eventually accommodate to a decision to acquire 
nuclear weapons.
    In the near term, United States plans to engage in nuclear 
cooperation with India will make it more difficult to address 
proliferation challenges such as Iran. Of course, Iran's 
interest in nuclear weapons long predated the India deal. But 
the deal has strengthened the case Iran can make--and is 
already making--internationally. Why, Iranian officials ask 
publicly, should Iran give up its right as an NPT party to an 
enrichment capability when India, a nonparty to the NPT, can 
keep even its nuclear weapons and still benefit from nuclear 
cooperation? It is an argument that resonates well with many 
countries and weakens the pressures that can be brought to bear 
on Tehran.
    In general, the Bush administration's policy shift conveys 
the message that the United States--the country the world has 
always looked to as the leader in the global fight against 
proliferation--is now de-emphasizing nonproliferation and 
giving it a back seat to other foreign policy goals. Other 
countries can be expected to follow suit in assigning 
nonproliferation a lower priority relative to political and 
commercial considerations in their international dealings, and 
this would have negative, long-term consequences for the global 
nonproliferation regime.

                MAKING THE DEAL A NONPROLIFERATION GAIN

    The damage can be minimized--and the deal transformed from 
a net nonproliferation loss to a net nonproliferation gain--if 
several improvements are made in the course of implementing the 
July 18 Joint Statement, either by the Governments of India and 
the United States themselves, by the U.S. Congress in adopting 
new legislation, by the Nuclear Suppliers Group in modifying 
its guidelines, or by a combination of these.
    The most important improvement would be an Indian decision 
to stop producing fissile materials for nuclear weapons. India 
need not stop such production unilaterally, but as part of a 
multilateral moratorium pending completion of an international 
fissile material cutoff treaty. A multilateral production halt 
would make a major contribution to fighting nuclear 
proliferation and nuclear terrorism by capping stocks of bomb-
making materials worldwide and thereby making those stocks 
easier to secure against theft or seizure--in India, Pakistan, 
or elsewhere.
    Without a moratorium on fissile material production, the 
United States-India deal could actually facilitate the growth 
of India's nuclear weapons capability. India's indigenous 
uranium supplies are quite limited. Under current 
nonproliferation rules--with India unable to buy natural 
uranium on the world market--India must use those limited 
supplies for both civil power generation and nuclear weapons, 
and the trade-off will become increasingly painful. Under new 
rules, India could satisfy the needs of the civil program 
through imports, freeing up domestic uranium supplies for the 
weapons program and permitting, if the Indian Government so 
decided, a continuing and even major increase in bomb-making 
material. A production moratorium would preclude such an 
increase.
    Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran said in July that 
India ``is willing to assume the same responsibilities and 
practices--no more and no less--as other nuclear states.'' It 
so happens that the five original nuclear weapon states (United 
States, Russia, France, United Kingdom, China) have all stopped 
producing fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Applying the 
``no more, no less'' standard, it would be reasonable to ask 
India to join the others. India claims that it does not have a 
strategic requirement for parity with the other nuclear powers 
(including China) and that it seeks only a ``credible minimum 
deterrent capability.'' If that is the case, then perhaps it 
can soon decide that it has sufficient plutonium for its 
deterrence needs and can afford to forgo further production.
    Another way to strengthen the July 18 agreement would be 
for India to assume a more active and constructive role in 
helping the United States address today's most acute 
proliferation challenges, especially the challenge posed by 
Iran. Given its desire to make Iran a long-term source of 
energy supplies, India has been reluctant to press Iran on its 
nuclear program. During a September visit to Tehran, Indian 
Foreign Minister Natwar Singh made public remarks supportive of 
Iran's position on the nuclear issue and critical of the 
approach taken by the United States. The remarks produced a 
sharp backlash by Members of Congress across the political 
spectrum, including several strong supporters of India, who 
made clear that India's failure to side with the United States 
on the Iran nuclear issue would jeopardize congressional 
support for the legislative changes needed to implement the 
United States-India nuclear deal.
    In response to these congressional warnings and tough 
messages conveyed in person by President Bush and Secretary 
Rice to their Indian counterparts, the Indians on September 24 
joined the United States and Europeans in voting ``yes'' on an 
International Atomic Energy Agency Board resolution finding 
Iran in noncompliance with its nonproliferation obligations but 
deferring the matter of when and how the Iran question would be 
referred to the United Nations Security Council. This was a 
positive step but not yet an indication that India is prepared 
to use its influence in a sustained and determined way to get 
Iran to abandon its plans for an enrichment facility capable of 
producing both fuel for civil nuclear reactors and fissile 
material for nuclear bombs. Indeed, since the IAEA vote, the 
Indians have sought to mollify the Iranians, stating that they 
had acted in Iran's interest by persuading the Europeans to 
back down from seeking an immediate referral to the UNSC. The 
key test in the months ahead will be whether India makes a real 
effort to persuade Iran to forgo an enrichment capability and 
whether it eventually supports referral to the Council, which 
is required by the IAEA Statute after a Board finding of 
noncompliance.
    The risks of the nuclear deal could also be reduced by 
preserving some distinction between NPT parties and nonparties 
in terms of the nuclear exports they would be permitted to 
receive. A long-standing element of the nonproliferation regime 
has been the ``NPT preference policy''--giving NPT parties 
benefits in the civil nuclear energy area not available to 
those outside the NPT. The Joint Statement undermines that 
policy by calling for ``full'' nuclear cooperation with India. 
A way of maintaining some preferential treatment for NPT 
parties would be to modify U.S. law and the NSG guidelines to 
permit nuclear-related exports to nonparties except equipment, 
materials, or technologies related to sensitive fuel-cycle 
facilities, including enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water 
production. Such a distinction would permit India to acquire 
natural uranium, enriched fuel, nuclear reactors, and a wide 
range of other nuclear items, but would retain the ban on 
transfers of those items that are most closely related to a 
nuclear weapons program.
    In addition to precluding any cooperation with India in the 
area of sensitive fuel-cycle capabilities (even under IAEA 
safeguards), the United States should permit cooperation in 
less sensitive nuclear areas only under safeguards. As noted 
earlier, India will remain a non-nuclear weapons state (NNWS) 
as defined by the NPT, and Article III(2) allows nuclear 
exports to NNWSs only under IAEA safeguards. Moreover, 
consistent with existing U.S. law, such exports should only be 
permitted to facilities that are under safeguards in perpetuity 
(under facility-specific, or INFCIRC/Rev.2, safeguards 
agreements with the IAEA)--not to facilities under voluntary 
safeguards arrangements that allow countries to withdraw 
materials or facilities from safeguards for national security 
reasons. The choice would be up to India. If it wished to 
benefit from nuclear cooperation at a particular facility, it 
would have to put in place a facility specific safeguards 
agreement at that facility.
    Nonproliferation risks could also be reduced by 
implementing the nuclear deal in a country-neutral manner--not 
as a special exception to the rules for India alone. Although 
the administration has been slow to indicate how specifically 
it would seek to adjust United States law and NSG guidelines, 
it has suggested that one option would be to leave the general 
rules in place but waive their application in the special case 
of India because of its qualifications as ``a responsible state 
with advanced nuclear technology.'' A problem with that option 
is that it would accentuate concerns that the United States is 
acting selectively on the basis of foreign policy 
considerations rather than on the basis of objective factors 
related to nonproliferation performance. Moreover, in the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group, where changing the guidelines requires 
a consensus, some countries--notably China--might well resist a 
country-specific approach and press for permitting nuclear 
cooperation with other nonparties to the NPT with whom they are 
friendly (e.g., Pakistan).
    To avoid the pitfalls of making a country-specific 
exception without opening the door to nuclear cooperation in 
cases where it is clearly not yet merited, the administration 
should propose modifications of U.S. law and the NSG guidelines 
that would permit nuclear cooperation (except in sensitive 
parts of the fuel cycle or in unsafeguarded facilities) with 
any state not party to the NPT that meets certain criteria of 
responsible nuclear behavior. To avoid creating an incentive 
for countries to withdraw from the NPT, the modified rules 
should apply only to countries that were outside the NPT as of 
a specified date, which should be chosen to exclude North Korea 
and include only India, Pakistan, and Israel. For such non-NPT 
states to be eligible to receive U.S. nuclear exports under a 
revised U.S. law, the President should be required to certify 
that the state:

   Has provided public assurances that it will not test 
        nuclear weapons;
   Has provided public assurances that it will not 
        produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons and is 
        fulfilling that assurance;
   Has placed under IAEA safeguards its civil nuclear 
        facilities, including all nuclear power reactors and 
        R&D facilities related to electricity generation;
   Is playing an active and constructive role in 
        helping address acute nuclear proliferation challenges 
        posed by states of proliferation concern;
   Has established, and is rigorously implementing, a 
        national export control system that meets the highest 
        international standards, including stringent rules and 
        procedures banning unauthorized contacts and 
        cooperation by personnel with nuclear expertise;
   Has provided public assurances that it will not 
        export enrichment or reprocessing equipment or 
        technologies and is fulfilling that assurance;
   Is working actively on its own and in cooperation 
        with other countries in stopping illicit nuclear 
        transactions and eliminating illicit nuclear commercial 
        networks, including by fully sharing the results of any 
        investigations of illicit nuclear activities; and
   Is applying physical protection, control, and 
        accountancy measures meeting the highest international 
        standards to any nuclear weapons and to all sensitive 
        nuclear materials and installations, both military and 
        civilian, on its territory.

    These criteria could be written into U.S. law. They could 
also be adopted by the NSG as criteria for deciding, by 
consensus, whether a particular nonparty to the NPT should be 
eligible for nuclear transfers from NSG member states. While 
such an approach would be country-neutral, it would enable both 
the U.S. Government and NSG members to distinguish among the 
nonparties to the NPT in terms of whether--and how soon--they 
would be eligible for nuclear cooperation.
    Staunch supporters of the NPT can be expected to argue that 
these criteria do not go far enough--and that only NPT 
adherence should make a country eligible for nuclear 
cooperation. But it is unrealistic to expect India or the other 
nonparties ever to join the NPT, and continuing to insist on 
adherence as a condition for nuclear cooperation could forfeit 
the contribution to nonproliferation that steps short of NPT 
adherence could make.
    Those who strongly favor the July 18 Joint Statement can be 
expected to argue that the criteria are too demanding and could 
result in India's walking away from the nuclear deal. But even 
the most demanding criterion--ending fissile material 
production--is a step India, in principle, supports and says it 
is willing to take when its minimum deterrence needs are 
satisfied. If India is prepared now to stop production, it 
could readily meet the remaining criteria. If not, the door 
would be open for India to walk through at a time of its own 
choosing.
    The approach suggested here would clearly be less 
attractive to the Indians than the less demanding one that Bush 
administration was prepared to settle for on July 18. But it 
would be a major change from the status quo that has prevailed 
for decades, in which the door to nuclear cooperation for India 
and the other nonparties has been locked as a matter of law and 
policy.
    In its ardent desire to transform United States-Indian 
relations, the Bush administration has given too little weight 
to the damaging implications of its actions for the 
nonproliferation regime. The remedy should not be to reject the 
deal struck in July but to require that it be pursued in a way 
that enables the United States to advance its strategic goals 
with India as well as its nonproliferation interests--not serve 
one at the expense of the other.

                                  
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