[Senate Prints 109-36]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
109th Congress S. Prt.
COMMITTEE PRINT
1st Session 109-36
_______________________________________________________________________
ISRAEL'S DISENGAGEMENT FROM
GAZA AND SEVERAL
WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS
__________
STAFF TRIP REPORTS
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Nineth Congress
First Session
October 2005
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
23-820 WASHINGTON : 2005
_____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
I. Report of Kim Savit--Senior Professional Staff Member (Majority
Staff)...........................................................1
II. Report of Puneet Talwar--Senior Professional Staff Member
(Minority Staff).................................................8
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
Dear Colleague:
The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and several West Bank
settlements will shape the future of the peace process and the
region for years to come. The committee recently sent two
senior professional staff members, Ms. Kim Savit and Mr. Puneet
Talwar, to the Middle East to assess U.S. assistance to
Israel's disengagement from Gaza and several West Bank
settlements.
We are pleased to share with you their trip reports, which
highlight concerns about the critical issues that will face all
parties on the ``day after'' disengagement. The reports also
provide a number of recommendations that may be helpful as the
Committee on Foreign Relations considers these issues. As both
authors indicate, there is much at stake in getting the ``day
after'' Gaza disengagement right.
We look forward to continuing to work with you on these
issues and to any comments you might have on these reports.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman.
Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Ranking Minority Member.
(v)
ISRAEL'S DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA AND SEVERAL WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS:
----------
I. Report of Kim Savit--Senior Professional Staff Member (Majority
Staff)
Israel's disengagement from Gaza and several West Bank
settlements proceeded over the past two weeks without the
anticipated Israeli-Palestinian violent clashes or deadly
attacks by extremist Israeli settlers. Successful completion of
this historic withdrawal of Israeli troops and settlers from 21
Gaza and 4 West Bank settlements will shape the future of the
Middle East region and the global war on terrorism. In meetings
with U.S., Israeli, Palestinian and international community
officials from July 24-31, 2005, I found that there was
consensus on the short-term agenda to facilitate Israel's
disengagement. Leadership provided by the U.S. under Lieutenant
General William Ward as the U.S. Security Coordinator and Mr.
James Wolfensohn for the Quartet has energized Israeli and
Palestinian Authority coordination efforts. But, there are
major differences and uncertainties over how to address
critical issues that will face all parties on the ``day after''
disengagement. To sustain the positive momentum engendered from
the disengagement effort thus far, the U.S. will need to
intensify its support for efforts on the ground, in terms of
both tangible material assistance and engagement with the two
parties on issues that could derail progress.
key findings:
1. U.S. leadership to support Gaza disengagement is critical, but
must be followed-up by delivering tough messages to both sides
and actions demonstrating the U.S. long-term commitment to the
peace process.
The Israelis, Palestinians and the international community
are skeptical that the U.S. will continue to be engaged in
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the long-term.
U.S. personnel and resources dedicated to the peace process
appear as ad hoc, short-term and temporary measures. Despite
the appointment of General Ward as Security Coordinator, there
is no single U.S. voice for all aspects of engagement in the
peace process and U.S. policy appears fragmented. This
intensifies Palestinian fears of ``Gaza first and Gaza last,''
and could undermine those in Israel who support the two state
solution.
Progress is being made on Wolfensohn's short-term
shared agenda of six issues and steps are being taken
at the Ministerial and agency levels to move forward on
each to ensure success of the withdrawal. These include
detailed plans to resolve questions on border crossings
and trade corridors; ensuring access between Gaza and
the West Bank; addressing internal mobility and
closures; opening of the airport/seaport; disposition
of the greenhouses and related jobs and income; and
dismantling settler houses and disposing of the rubble.
There are problems in implementation, however, at the
field level. Access and mobility issues, particularly
in Gaza, reportedly slow or prevent provision of U.S.
assistance to the Palestinians from U.S. aid providers.
General Ward has minimal staff to facilitate reform
of the Palestinian security forces (16 in all,
including security personnel and detailees from other
countries) and only a few have Arabic language skills.
Given security concerns, General Ward and his staff
also have limited access to, and mobility in, Gaza and
the West Bank. U.S. Security Coordination personnel
interaction with the Palestinian Authority security
forces is occurring at the Ministerial level, but
again, is minimal in the field. Without U.S. personnel
presence in field activities, progress reported to have
been made on consolidation and reorganization of
Palestinian Authority security forces cannot be
confirmed on the ground.
Moreover, there appeared to be no specific mechanism
for Israeli and Palestinian Authority security forces
to interact or communicate at the ground level to
ensure that acts by extremists and terrorists of either
side can be differentiated from actions sanctioned by
the Israeli Government or Palestinian Authority. Issues
of control of the border crossings at points such as
Rafah, for example, have been particularly contentious,
exposing severe gaps in coordination among the parties
and raising Israeli fears of increased weapons
smuggling and terrorist infiltration.
There is a very real risk that unless there are concrete
benefits that meet rising Palestinian expectations from Gaza
disengagement in the short-term, and either an agreed, more
formal negotiating framework or plan to move forward on the
Road Map in the longer-term, a ``third intifada'' could be
launched after Gaza disengagement to try to drive the Israelis
out of the West Bank. The U.S. must work to forestall this.
Israel must be persuaded to demonstrate in words and deeds that
they will return to the Road Map and to the negotiating table
in the near future. The Palestinians must be persuaded that the
path of peace will produce dividends; that their economic
future will be brighter; and that discussions of final status
issues will only occur if there is continued calm.
The U.S. must deliver strong, tough messages to both sides
while recognizing the historic burdens each carries. The
Israelis and Palestinians are each facing intense internal
political conflicts with factions positioning themselves for
the ``day after'' disengagement. Both Prime Minister Sharon and
Palestinian Authority President Abbas have taken enormous
political risks to move the disengagement forward. Over the
past few months, however, when the U.S. has taken tough
positions with each side, despite delays, it has achieved
results. Israel apparently has been more cooperative and
flexible on disengagement issues such as removal of barriers
and checkpoints. The Palestinian Authority reportedly has taken
steps to arrest terrorists identified as perpetrators of
violence. Continued direct, forceful U.S. engagement, reflected
by more permanent mechanisms for coordination and
implementation, will be critical to maintaining momentum on the
``day after.'' The continuing expansion of West Bank
settlements, particularly E-1 and Maale Adumin, and the
construction of the security fence or barrier must be at the
top of the agenda with the Israelis. Stopping terrorism must
remain at the top of the list with the Palestinians. We should
be insistent in our message to both Israelis and Palestinians
that they live up to their commitments.
2. There is an urgent need for the U.S. to develop a strategy and a
policy for dealing with the growing popular support for Hamas.
For the Palestinian Authority to do well in the January
2006 municipal and parliamentary elections, it needs to be
credited with delivering tangible benefits to the Palestinian
people. Specifically, it needs to compete with Hamas' social
services network in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and
transparency. Some aid providers complained that U.S. laws
intended to prevent U.S. funding from going to Hamas,
unintentionally leave critical areas vulnerable to Hamas
influence and weaken moderate voices in the Palestinian
Authority.
Currently, U.S. laws prohibit aid to Palestinians who are
known to be, claim to be, or are suspected of being members of
Hamas, a U.S. designated foreign terrorist organization. Aid is
prohibited, specifically, from going to ``groups or individuals
who are or have been involved in terror.'' These laws and our
policies to implement them place the onus on U.S. aid providers
to judge which Palestinian aid recipients are terrorists or
suspected members of terrorist organizations and which are not.
Fearing they might break the law, aid providers reported that
few non governmental organizations (NGOs) will work with
Palestinian recipients and contractors unless they agree to
sign an anti-terrorism certification (ATC) as required by
USAID. Many bona fide Palestinian grass roots organizations--
particularly educational and humanitarian organizations--
reportedly refuse to sign such certifications based on
principles and/or politics. Thus, aid goes primarily where it
is legally uncontroversial rather than where it may be most
needed and effective. Even worse, in towns and villages in
which Hamas controls the local municipal councils, U.S. aid
providers stay away, ceding such areas to Hamas dominance
without a fight, and thus indirectly bolstering Hamas'
legitimacy and credibility.
In a roundtable held with Senate Foreign Relations
Committee staff at the Consulate in Jerusalem, several
of the six NGO representatives participating argued
that the U.S. policy of isolating Hamas and similar
groups is counterproductive. They argued that Hamas
members or terrorists would be more likely to sign the
anti-terrorism certificates to get U.S. aid than decent
people from organizations that refused to sign on
principle. The NGO representatives also argued that
Hamas could not be eliminated, and U.S. policy should
be either to co-opt the organization or to force a
split between its military and political arms.
Palestinian Authority officials echoed many of these
arguments.
Israeli officials expressed concern that Palestinian
Authority President Abbas lacks the leadership abilities to
organize Palestinian security forces against Hamas. The
Israelis fear Hamas is seeking to replace the Palestinian
Authority and is following a concerted strategy to do so. One
aspect of that strategy is undertaking terrorist acts to
demonstrate that Hamas, and not the Palestinian Authority,
controls Gaza. One Israeli official stated Hamas wants to
paralyze and destroy the Palestinian Authority so it can
replace the current government and establish ``Hamasastan'' in
Gaza.
3. Additional U.S. aid and flexibility in delivering it quickly and
visibly are needed for both the Israelis and Palestinians:
U.S. Aid to Israel. Israel has requested $2.1
billion ($.8 billion for security and $1.3 billion for
economic aid) to cover part of the estimated $8 billion
total cost of Israeli security forces redeployment and
disengagement from Gaza and development of the Negev
and Galilee (Israel estimates it will spend $3 billion
on security and redeployment of security forces and $5
billion on economic reintegration and development). The
administration and Congress will need to review this
request carefully, particularly in light of new demands
on U.S. resources with Hurricane Katrina. The initial
Israeli request was timed and designed politically to
help counter those within Israel who argue Israel gains
nothing for its painful withdrawal from Gaza and West
Bank settlements. Additional U.S. aid to Israel would
facilitate the completion of the disengagement from
Gaza and the four West Bank settlements and reflect our
strong commitment to Israel's security and future. The
high level of aid requested, however, sets a precedent
which may become an obstacle to future West Bank
disengagement. Additionally, how providing additional
economic aid to the Negev and Galilee is linked to the
peace process needs to be clarified. The U.S. might
consider how to construct any Israeli aid package to
ensure it facilitates specific steps related to
progress on the Road Map.
U.S. Aid to the Palestinians. U.S. aid to the
Palestinians, totaling an estimated $350 million in FY
2005 Supplemental and FY 2006 funds requested, is
focused on economic improvements and quality of life
issues to build confidence that there will be a better
future on the ``day after'' for the Palestinians. Yet,
while one of the highest priorities on the ``day
after'' disengagement will be to establish security and
rule of law in the newly controlled Palestinian
territory, currently there are no U.S. aid funds for
equipping and training Palestinian Authority security
forces to undertake this responsibility. General Ward
indicated that it would take 3-5 years to facilitate
the transition and restructuring of the Palestinian
security forces, but he had no authority or funding
flexibility to begin the process. The State Department
recently has tapped an estimated $3 million in
community policing funds to help build Palestinian
Authority police capabilities, but this may be ``too
little too late.'' The U.S. and other Quartet members
urgently need to develop and implement a concrete plan
to help reform the Palestinian Authority security
forces. Such reform will be key to the Palestinian
Authority's ability to govern on the ``day after''
disengagement.
Several Israeli officials argued that we should not
supply arms and ammunition to the Palestinians to
enhance their security forces as they have sufficient
arms to equip their estimated 58,000 security force
personnel. The issue, they argued, is not how much
lethal military equipment is available to these
Palestinian Authority security forces, but the
political will to use these arms to dismantle the
terrorist capabilities. While sympathetic to Israeli
security fears, one expert indicated that the equipment
issue is of concern as the Palestinian Authority
reportedly was paying $3 per bullet on the black market
for ammunition. Given that Palestinian Authority
security forces are critical to success of the
disengagement and long-term stability, U.S. aid
policies should seek to help Israel find a balanced
trade-off between its fears of arming the terrorists
and shoring up legitimate Palestinian Authority
security capabilities. Consideration also should be
given to how to condition any U.S. aid to the
Palestinian Authority on its efforts to consolidate and
reform its security forces and achieve progress on the
Road Map.
Bureaucratic Delays. Current FY 2005 Economic
Support Funds (ESF) for USAID Palestinian assistance
programs have been slowed by bureaucratic processes.
These funds were not cleared for release by the Deputy
Secretary of State's office at the time of the visit
and such delays could complicate any return to the Road
Map further. USAID also is running into another
potential road block as once funds are released at the
end of the fiscal year, September 30, 2005, all funds
must be obligated within a few weeks or they may have
to be returned as unobligated balances, leaving a
funding gap until almost January 2006. Such
bureaucratic delays may be devastating to U.S.
interests. As one official stated: ``Whatever is not
done before the Palestinian elections in January 2006
will be too late.''
4. Greater focus is needed on public diplomacy to demonstrate the
magnitude of U.S. aid (and thus commitment) to the
Palestinians; and to reflect the benefits of such aid provided
under the Palestinian Authority.
While the Palestinian Authority's commitment to non-
violence has been of enormous benefit to the Palestinian
people, there is very little appreciation of this on the
streets of Gaza and the West Bank. The Palestinian Authority
continues to be viewed as corrupt, despite a range of current
efforts to clean up and get rid of Arafat's old guard cronyism.
Successes are not made public and much more needs to be done to
help the Palestinian Authority get its message of reform to the
people. During one meeting, the Palestinian Authority Minister
of Social Welfare requested that the U.S. provide the
Palestinian Authority with an ``events coordinator'' to help
get the Palestinian Authority message out. The Consulate took
this request for consideration.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
A. Next Steps:
The U.S. must find new ways to prove its long term
commitment to the Road Map and to the peace process. One
possibility would be to establish a more permanent
organizational support structure for Mr. Wolfensohn and General
Ward, not only increasing the number of personnel, but finding
the ``right'' personnel to staff these missions. Military
staffing from the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) with 90 day
rotations has been at the expense of existing EUCOM missions.
Moreover, while military civil affairs personnel are very
capable, the needs to be met in assisting the Palestinian
Authority often go beyond their military training.
The new State Department office of the Coordinator
for Reconstruction and Stabilization (CRS) with its
interagency capabilities might be a useful source of
the ``right'' personnel and experts to support post-
conflict transition in Gaza and the West Bank and to
integrate the U.S. aid process. CRS could be designated
to support General Ward and the Quartet under Mr.
Wolfensohn to develop a USG strategy and plan to return
both parties to the Road Map, including benchmarks,
timetables, and actions that the USG would undertake to
advance the process. Tapping into the CRS now also may
avoid continuity problems for assisting the Palestinian
Authority after the disengagement.
Another possibility would be to facilitate an
exchange of letters or hold a bilateral or multi-
lateral summit meeting among the parties to build
confidence that there is consensus on a process for
returning to the Road Map on the ``day after''
disengagement.
B. Law and Policy on Hamas:
The U.S needs to reassess our laws and policies intended to
prevent terrorism, promote political development and rule of
law and to strengthen reformers (both inside and outside of the
Palestinian Authority) to ensure they are doing exactly that.
In the near term, the administration might consider if
providing U.S. assistance to local and municipal Palestinian
governing institutions, regardless of the political coloration
of any democratically elected officials heading them at the
time, would serve U.S. long-term interests. This approach might
take some of the onus of judging who can receive aid off of the
U.S. aid providers and while not endorsing Hamas' terror
activities, it, would recognize realities in Palestinian
politics and steer those politics towards moderation.
Elections Issue. Israeli Prime Minister Sharon
recently indicated that Hamas members should not be
allowed to participate in Palestinian elections and
Israel would withhold cooperation facilitating the
elections process if Hamas candidates are allowed to
take part. Others too have stated that the Palestinian
Authority should prevent Hamas or other terrorist group
members from running for elective office as under the
Oslo accords, if ``such candidates, parties or
coalitions (1) commit or advocate racism, or (2) pursue
the implementation of their aims by unlawful non-
democratic means.'' This may meet U.S. and Israeli
counter terrorism concerns, but would be viewed as
interference in a democratic process which could weaken
the Palestinian Authority among the Palestinian people.
The Palestinian Authority might help resolve this issue
by establishing clear benchmarks or conditions for any
candidate's eligibility to participate in Palestinian
elections, including renunciation of violence.
By advocating for strong, transparent democratic
Palestinian elections, the U.S. would be consistent
with its broader policies to promote democracy, freedom
and reform in the Middle East. Support for transparent,
democratic elections by the Palestinian Authority also
could help it take the high ground and raise its
credibility in the Palestinian street. Moreover, as the
majority of Palestinians do not support Hamas'
militancy and want an end to the continued violence, a
transparent, democratic legislative election could
actually tie any elected members of Hamas' hands,
requiring them, as part of joining the political
process, to meet the demands for non-violence of their
Palestinian constituents.
Long-Term Policy. It is also worth exploring for the
longer term, whether some of the successes of the
Northern Ireland peace process, including nurturing a
political wing on the way toward an unequivocal
renunciation of violence, hold lessons for the
Palestinian case. While controversial, debate on this
issue is clearly needed to develop a coherent,
consistent strategy and policy for dealing with Hamas
and other terrorist organizations.
C. Additional U.S. Assistance:
The administration should seek additional U.S. assistance
resources for the Israelis and Palestinians with sufficient
flexibility to meet urgent needs on both sides. High priority
should be placed on aid to reform the Palestinian Authority
security forces as such aid holds potential long term stability
benefits for both Israelis and Palestinians. The administration
might consider using Peacekeeping Operations Funds (PKO) to
support aid to Palestinian security forces on an emergency
basis; or seek approval for NATO to provide urgently needed
equipment and training to facilitate the Palestinian Authority
security forces transformation and consolidation. NATO may be
an acceptable third party for both Israelis and Palestinians
and could act as a military equivalent of the Quartet.
D. Coordination with Other Donors:
Finally, the U.S. should continue to encourage other donors
to provide greater support to the Israelis and Palestinians and
should ensure U.S. assistance resources are coordinated with
aid committed by members of the G-8 and other nations to
prevent duplication. Any international aid coordination
mechanism should encompass economic and technical aid as well
as security-related assistance.
These recommendations are not exhaustive, but may be useful
for Committee members to explore in the coming months. There is
much at stake in getting the ``day after'' Gaza disengagement
right.
----------
II. Report of Puneet Talwar--Senior Professional Staff Member (Minority
Staff)
DISENGAGEMENT AND BEYOND
This report summarizes key findings and recommendations
from a recent trip (July 5-12) to Israel and the Palestinian
areas. It also reflects subsequent developments in order to
provide an account of the current situation as of early
September.
Introduction
There are two main pillars of a successful peace process.
First, Israel must have confidence that the Palestinian
Authority is a reliable partner that is capable of exercising
control, especially on security-related matters. Second,
Palestinians must have improved economic prospects and believe
that they will soon have a viable state.
Israel's disengagement from the Gaza Strip and Northern
West Bank is a politically courageous decision on the part of
Prime Minister Sharon and can play a critical role in building
both of these pillars. However, significant gaps in
expectations separating the two sides require continuous active
international involvement to ensure that disengagement does not
become a lost opportunity to breathe new life into the peace
process.
This report focuses on five key issues that will determine
the success of disengagement and the future of the peace
process: (1) The gaps in perspective and expectations between
Israelis and Palestinians; (2) The progress that has been made
on the coordination of disengagement; (3) The obstacles and
difficulties in improving security in Palestinian areas; (4)
The impact of settlement activity and the construction of the
security barrier; (5) The potential of Israeli and Palestinian
political developments to slow progress on the peace process.
The final section will make specific recommendations on a way
forward after disengagement.
A Gap in Palestinian and Israeli Perspectives
Prime Minister Sharon and President Abbas have an
overwhelming common interest in a successful disengagement.
Sharon must demonstrate that disengagement has enhanced, not
harmed, Israel's security. Abbas must demonstrate to
Palestinians that disengagement is accompanied by an
improvement in daily life and a credible path to a final-status
solution. Neither Sharon nor Abbas can succeed in achieving his
objective without the other succeeding as well. While this
logic would appear to be self-evident and compelling, it has
not necessarily been reflected in actions on the ground.
Israeli Perspective. The Israeli political and
military establishment has been focused on the
requirements for a peaceful evacuation of the
settlements in Gaza and the Northern West Bank. Prime
Minister Sharon has been highly critical of the
Palestinian Authority's efforts on security, describing
Abbas and Interior Minister Youssef as well
intentioned, but indecisive. As long as Israel is
dissatisfied with Palestinian security performance, it
will not begin implementation of the Road Map. While
Israel has not yet made clear its intentions after
disengagement, a key Sharon advisor said that the Prime
Minister believes Israel must have time to ``heal the
wounds.''
Palestinian Perspective. As the date for
disengagement nears, Palestinians have a keen interest
in ensuring that Gaza is not cut off from the outside
world. They also are seeking assurances that ``Gaza
first'' does not become ``Gaza last,'' but is instead a
path to renewed negotiations for a final-status
solution. However, close advisors to President Abbas
believe that Prime Minister Sharon does not want a
viable Palestinian partner and is deliberately trying
to weaken Abbas. Their fear is that disengagement and
the construction of the West Bank barrier suggest that
Israel is interested in a long-term interim arrangement
and further unilateral steps, not a negotiated final
agreement.
An Acrimonious Meeting. These differing perspectives
and the overall lack of trust were on display during a
June 21 meeting between Prime Minister Sharon and
President Abbas. While the meeting did produce some
tangible results, it did not build a foundation
conducive to future interaction. Israeli officials
described Palestinians as being unresponsive on
security-related matters, while Palestinian officials
felt that they were being lectured. Unfortunately, the
short-term effect appears to have been a deepening of
suspicions on both sides.
Progress on Coordination
The Quartet Special Envoy, James D. Wolfensohn, has deftly
used the convergence of both side's core interests in making
progress toward agreements that they could not have otherwise
achieved on their own.
The Importance of Coordination. Successful
coordination of disengagement is important for two
reasons. First, maximizing security for Israelis as
they evacuate settlements can help to rebuild trust
between Israelis and Palestinians which is essential to
future negotiations. Second, it can improve the quality
of life for Palestinians and bolster the position of
President Abbas and the Palestinian Authority relative
to Hamas.
``Ownership'' of Disengagement. Nearly 75% of
Palestinians believe Israel's withdrawal from Gaza is a
victory for violence. To prevent this logic from taking
hold in the West Bank, President Abbas must have
``ownership'' of disengagement. Hamas gains if
disengagement is perceived as more of a unilateral
move, while Abbas gets credit if diplomacy succeeds in
delivering results.
Wolfensohn's Role. This is why the role of
Wolfensohn is so critical. Thus far, the Special Envoy
has made progress on a six-part work program: (1)
Border Crossings and Trade Corridors; (2) A connection
between the West Bank and Gaza; (3) Easing movement in
the West Bank; (4) Air and Sea Ports; (5) The
disposition of houses in the settlements; and (6)
Greenhouses in the settlements.
Of these six issues, two--greenhouses and the removal of
rubble from demolished structures--have been resolved.
In the case of the greenhouses, Wolfensohn creatively
mobilized resources from the private sector to avert
their dismantlement, thereby saving thousands of
Palestinian jobs. Palestinians and Israelis also have
reached an agreement to dispose of the large quantities
of rubble from demolished settlements.
The other four areas relate to the movement of goods and
people within the Palestinian territories and unimpeded
access to the outside world. Progress on these is
essential to improving Palestinian economic prospects.
On border crossings and trade corridors, technological
improvements and new terminals under construction
should satisfy Israeli security concerns while
permitting significant reductions in costly delays
which often prevent Palestinian goods from reaching
markets. Both sides have agreed on the goal of this
exercise: speedy and efficient transit of goods from
door to door.
The two sides also have made progress in creating a
reliable linkage between the West Bank and Gaza, with
Israel agreeing to convoys between the two territories
as an interim measure while discussions continue on
more permanent arrangements. In addition, the UN is
working with the parties to identify major bottlenecks
in the West Bank which could be removed to improve the
flow of goods and boost economic activity. Moreover,
Israel has agreed to the construction of a Palestinian
seaport which will take two to three years, and it has
given the go-ahead for planning to reopen the airport
in Gaza.
While progress is being made, some are concerned that if
the outstanding issues are not resolved they
effectively could become ``Sheba Farms'' in Gaza that
are a focal point for disputes, thus preventing the
focus from shifting to next steps in the peace process.
The Rafah Border Crossing. One issue deserving
special mention is the Rafah crossing point between
Egypt and Gaza. The two sides have been discussing an
arrangement which would have a third-party--possibly an
EU member state--be involved to provide expertise in
customs and border-regime management. It appears,
however, that Israel is wary that a technical mission
focused on border management would not hinder arms
smuggling, and has instead proposed that a border
crossing at the meeting point of Gaza, Egypt, and
Israel be used so that Israel can continue to regulate
access to and from Gaza. The United States should focus
on supporting an agreement which meets both sides'
objectives--security for Israel and ease of movement
for Palestinians. This would not only be a huge leap
forward for the Gaza economy, but it also could serve
as a model for arrangements at the airport and seaport.
Obstacles to Establishing Security
Although there is a recognition on both sides of the
central importance of security, Israel and the PA have strongly
differing views on the performance of Palestinian security
services and the nature of support they require. Without a
sustained effort to improve coordination and close the gaps
between the two sides, the security sector could impede further
steps in the peace process. General William Ward has made
significant strides in assisting Palestinians rebuild their
security forces, but the challenges are daunting and time is
short.
Israeli Perceptions. Israel maintains that Abbas and
Interior Minister Youssef are doing little to fight
terror. They argue that Hamas is taking advantage of
the ``quiet'' to rearm and gain strength. They say that
Abbas, during his meeting with Sharon, refused to move
against Palestinian Islamic Jihad--even when presented
with specific evidence of its intent to carry out
operations--arguing that he was too weak to do so. They
dismiss such claims and believe that the PA can disarm
terrorist groups--``we don't care how he does it, as
long as he does it.''
Palestinian Efforts. Interior Minister Nasser
Youssef has taken steps to consolidate the many
competing branches of Palestinian security forces. This
has included the establishment of joint operations
centers to facilitate coordination among the previously
disparate services. He has developed a 5,000 person
force to secure settlement areas in Gaza after
disengagement. In addition to these specific steps,
Youssef and others emphasize the significance of the
cease-fire, which they maintain effectively ended the
second intifada.
A Shortage of Arms? Youssef says that his top
requirements are arms and ammunition and is deeply
frustrated at Israel's refusal to permit their
acquisition. He claims that his weapons and ammunition
supplies are so low that if Israel does not permit
deliveries, he will soon turn to the black market for
smuggled weapons. General William Ward has endorsed
Youssef's judgment that the Palestinian security
services are in need of additional arms and ammunition.
Secretary Rice pressed the issue on her recent visit,
but Israel has not changed its position. It should be
noted that several knowledgeable Palestinians--inside
and outside the government--do not believe that a
shortage of arms and ammunition are the chief obstacles
to better performance by Palestinian security services.
Instead, they believe the main impediment is the
hesitancy of Palestinian leaders to act decisively
against corrupt and renegade elements within Fatah and
the PA.
A Desire for Closer Coordination. Youssef also
indicated a keen interest in improving the level of
coordination between Israeli and Palestinian security
services at the field level. This message was conveyed
to Israeli officials. The absence of closer
coordination may be one of the legacies of the
intifada, which left an enormous gulf in trust between
Israeli and Palestinian security services.
Law and Order in Palestinian Areas. Closely related
to the issue of security for Israel is law and order in
Palestinians areas. Palestinians, including cabinet
ministers, are highly critical of the security services
for their unwillingness or inability to confront common
criminals and thugs. The law and order problem is
another legacy of the intifada which empowered local
leaders at the same time that Palestinian security
services were rendered ineffective. Those who acquired
weapons and a measure of local power are loath to
surrender them now. Palestinians say that these local
thugs--many of whom are members of Fatah-related
organizations and some of whom serve in the security
forces--have connections to powerful players in the PA
and Palestinian Legislative Council.
A Need for Decisive Action. The standing of the PA
is suffering because of the perception among
Palestinians that it is not doing all that it can to
restore law and order. Many Palestinians believe that
President Abbas has to take dramatic steps to impose
his authority. Suggestions heard include replacing the
Police Chief and Attorney General, declaring a State of
Emergency (Abbas did so in response to armed clashes
between Hamas and the PA in mid-July), and the
formation of a slimmed-down national security cabinet
to serve through the period of disengagement.
The Importance of the Ward Mission. General William
Ward has been playing a crucial role in rebuilding the
Palestinian security services and enhancing the chain
of command to the Interior Minister. The European Union
is also serving an important function through its
efforts to develop Palestinian police capability. Ward
has developed a detailed analysis of requirements for
international assistance to the security forces in four
sectors: (1) Communications, command, and control; (2)
Mobility and transport; (3) Logistics and medical; (4)
Force protection. Recently, supplies have begun to
arrive from international donors in response to Ward's
list of requirements, and Israel has been forthcoming
in facilitating their delivery.
While Ward has made significant progress, he also has
faced serious challenges in his mission. Until very
recently, he lacked the funds to direct immediate
assistance to priority areas within the four sectors;
personalities in the PA have the loyalty of various
branches of the security services which impairs a
unified chain of command; and his mandate does not
formally include a coordination role between the two
sides even though his position has inevitably required
him to increasingly act in such a capacity.
The Impact of Settlements and the Security Barrier
Continuing Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank and
the construction of the security barrier is leading some
Palestinians and Israelis to believe that disengagement will
foreclose the option of a two-state solution at some point in
the near future.
Settlements and Security. According to knowledgeable
Palestinians, there is a direct correlation between
Abbas's ability to improve security and construction
and expansion of the settlements. One respected
pollster suggests that a settlement freeze would
strengthen Abbas's ability to maintain strong public
support for disarming terrorist and militants groups.
Status and Plans for Israeli Settlements. The U.S.
Consulate in Jerusalem has reported continuing
construction in at least 40 West Bank settlements.
Israeli Housing Minister Herzog says that all
construction has been halted in 50 unauthorized
outposts in the West Bank. Plans are to authorize
construction in two settlements--Maale Adumim and Betar
Ilit. Recently, Israel announced plans to build an
additional 117 housing units in the Ariel settlement
which lies deep inside the West Bank.
The planned E-1 settlement could affect the prospects for
a two-state solution by essentially dividing the West
Bank in two. Israel says no decision has been made on
E-1, which is undergoing zoning at present. One Israeli
official envisages an eventual compromise with the
Palestinians in which part of E-1 will be built, but
with enough land returned to permit a contiguous
Palestinian state.
The Implications of the Security Barrier. The route
of the security barrier will have significant
implications for future peace talks. The greater the
percentage of West Bank territory incorporated on the
Western side, the more difficult it becomes to create a
viable and contiguous Palestinian state. According to
the Israeli Defense Ministry, the route of the security
barrier will cut into somewhere between 6.4% and 10% of
the West Bank. The two undetermined portions of the
route involve the ``Ariel finger'' in the north-central
West Bank and the ``Jerusalem bubble,'' which would
incorporate Maale Adumim.
Israeli Perspectives on the Barrier. Israel argues
that the barrier is purely a security measure and can
be moved based on a final peace agreement. It notes the
drop in the number of suicide bombings as proof that
the barrier has served its intended purpose of reducing
terrorism. The Israeli Defense Ministry maintains that
once the barrier is complete in 2006, Israeli soldiers
will be able to redeploy in large numbers to the ``seam
zone'' along the barrier. This, they argue, will
greatly improve the freedom of movement for
Palestinians within the West Bank. In addition, roughly
34 to 38 crossing points are expected to be built along
the barrier to facilitate the flow of people and goods.
It should be noted that Israel has modified the route
of the barrier in response to Israeli Supreme Court
decisions which require that the route minimize
hardships on Palestinians.
Palestinian Perspectives on the Barrier.
Palestinians say that the route of the barrier is
causing significant disruptions in their daily lives,
especially in the greater Jerusalem area. The barrier--
a system of fences, roads, and other obstacles for most
of its length, but in the form of a wall in Jerusalem
and other built-up areas--slices into the expanded
municipal boundaries of East Jerusalem, leaving some
55,000 Palestinian residents of Jerusalem cut off from
the rest of the city (Israel says that topography, not
demography, determined the route of the barrier and
that it plans to build new facilities such as schools
and post offices to serve residents ``outside'' the
barrier). Palestinians say that the barrier disrupts
long-standing ties between East Jerusalem and nearby
cities. Politically, it leads many Palestinians to
believe that Israel is trying to foreclose the
establishment of a capital in East Jerusalem as part of
a final-status agreement.
The Impact of Palestinian and Israeli Politics
Internal Palestinian and Israeli political dynamics could
impede the prospects for peace negotiations after
disengagement. There is unlikely to be overwhelming pressure
generated from within the Israeli body politic for bold steps
on the peace process. Political jockeying and internecine
battles among Palestinian factions could also preoccupy
Palestinian leaders. An absence of progress would exacerbate
frustration among ordinary Palestinians. Both Israeli and
Palestinian leaders and key players in the international
community must be prepared to take risks to push the process
forward.
Israeli Political Dynamics
Israeli politics are in a state of flux. Prime
Minister Sharon took a courageous decision to pursue
disengagement against the wishes of many within Likud,
which historically embraced the concept of ``Greater
Israel.'' Few in Israel have a sense of what the
political landscape will look like the day after
disengagement. While Israel is due to have elections no
later than the Fall of 2006, many believe that Sharon
will call early elections.
One scenario involves an idea gaining ground in
Israel for a reorientation of the political map and the
creation of a centrist coalition drawn from Labor,
Shinui, and a section of Likud. Such a coalition would
have a majority in favor of moving ahead with the peace
process.
Another scenario would have Sharon moving to the
Right in order to win a Likud primary against
challenger Benyamin Netanyahu, who recently resigned
from the cabinet. This could create a situation where
further peace moves may be suspended at the very moment
that Abbas would want them most in advance of
Palestinian legislative elections.
While there is a consensus emerging in Israel on
territorial issues, there is not yet a similar
consensus on whether there is a reliable Palestinian
partner. Some believe that that Israel should define
its borders without a negotiated solution with the
Palestinians. Others believe that Israel has a
political interest in seeing Abbas succeed, because
failure would likely lead to more terrorism and chaos.
Palestinian Political Dynamics
The post-Arafat transition in Palestinian politics
is still underway, and the result is a somewhat chaotic
political picture. The political battles being waged
are more than simply a question of ``who's up and who's
down''--their outcome will have a direct bearing on the
future of peacemaking efforts.
Palestinians have been disappointed by the lack of
performance in key areas of governance by the PA. The
main complaints are corruption, a weak economy, a lack
of diplomatic progress, and the absence of law and
order. The main beneficiary of the public's displeasure
has been Hamas. Advisors to Abbas acknowledge these
popular perceptions, but blame Israeli actions,
jockeying among rival personalities, and the difficult
task of reforming broken institutions as being
responsible for preventing the PA from performing as
well as it could.
Another feature of Palestinian politics is the
deepening rift between the ``old guard'' and ``young
guard'' within Fatah. This rift was exacerbated by the
generally poor showing by Fatah in local and municipal
elections earlier this year. The ``young guard'' blamed
the poor results on the decision to place discredited
figures from the ``old guard'' on the ballot. A recent
Fatah meeting in Amman apparently further hardened
positions in the two camps.
The ``young guard,'' who take their cue from the
jailed Marwan Bargouti, may run on a separate list in
legislative council elections set for January 25, 2006
if they are not given a greater role. This could split
the Fatah vote and have a dramatic impact on the
outcome. Under a compromise formula, 50% of the seats
in legislative elections will be district-based, while
the other 50% will be allocated through proportional
representation. If elections were held today, polls
show Hamas--if it is permitted to participate--would
win 33-40% of the vote, with Fatah receiving roughly
45-50%. Should the Fatah vote split, then Hamas could
conceivably emerge with a majority in the Legislative
Council, winning 50 out of 66 district-based seats
alone. While this scenario is unlikely, an outright
Hamas victory would raise significant questions about
the future of the peace process.
Recommendations for a Way Forward
It is vitally important to develop a coherent plan for
international involvement after disengagement so that the peace
process does not stagnate. Standing back from the process would
be irresponsible and could set the stage for a deteriorating
situation and a costly new round of violence.
Five Key Steps. Once disengagement is complete, the
Quartet and other key parties should concentrate their
efforts on five areas: (1) Demonstrating clearly that
``Gaza first'' will not be ``Gaza last'' by enunciating
broad parameters and/or principles for the way ahead;
(2) Outlining next steps including a return to the Road
Map, revising it with new dates for each of the phases,
and establishing a mechanism to monitor compliance; (3)
Endorsing the medium-term plan being developed in
cooperation with Quartet Special Envoy Wolfensohn and
solidifying pledges for it; (4) Extending Wolfensohn's
mandate to continue to assist the parties; (5) Creating
a follow-on to the Ward mission to continue to rebuild
Palestinian security forces and coordinate between the
two sides.
The Quartet could consider endorsing these five steps
through an international summit or through a scheduled
meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. It
can calibrate them according to political realities on
the ground in the coming months.
Arab Involvement. It will be important to ensure the
sustained involvement of key Arab states in the peace
process after disengagement. Wolfensohn is likely to
succeed in gaining new financial commitments for the
medium-term plan from the oil-rich Arab states as a
follow-on to the successful G-8 meeting in Gleneagles.
Convincing them to invest political capital as well
will be challenging, but it is critical to the success
of the peace process.
Israel has sought genuine signs of normalization from the
Arab world as a demonstration that the Arabs accept its
existence. The Saudis and others, while offering full
normalization after a peace agreement, have resisted
taking steps beforehand because they are unwilling to
expose themselves to that level of political risk. The
United States should press them to take such steps now,
especially after a successful disengagement. The recent
meeting between Pakistani and Israeli foreign ministers
is evidence that there may be greater willingness on
the part of Islamic countries to engage with Israel.
No Excuses/Insist on Security. Even as assistance is
provided to the PA to rebuild effective security
forces, the international community must demand that
the Palestinians act decisively to thwart terror and to
restore law and order. The PA will not be viewed as a
reliable partner by Israel if it is not seen as making
a full effort on security. The PA's credibility in the
eyes of its own people is also at stake. The PA must be
seen as capable of exercising control and enforcing law
and order, if it is to maintain the support of the
Palestinian public. President Abbas must show a
willingness to take the same sort of risk as Prime
Minister Sharon, who proceeded with disengagement
despite fierce internal opposition.
Settlements. There is no moral equivalence between
terrorism and the expansion of settlements. However,
given the detrimental impact that settlement activity
has on the peace process, it is important to continue
to urge the Israeli government to halt that activity.
Israel has committed to the United States to dismantle
unauthorized outposts in the West Bank. While Israel's
hesitation to fulfill this commitment was
understandable during the difficult period surrounding
the disengagement from Gaza, that impediment has been
removed. Furthermore, by meeting its road map
obligation to freeze settlement expansion, Israel could
significantly improve the standing of President Abbas
to simultaneously meet his road map obligations.
Ensuring Flexibility on the Barrier. The barrier has
improved Israelis' security by preventing suicide
bombings. Nonetheless, it is important to continue to
urge the Israeli government to minimize the intrusion
of the barrier into the West Bank. The barrier provokes
deep suspicions among Palestinians that Israel has no
interest in a negotiated solution and wants to define
its borders unilaterally. Construction in particularly
sensitive areas such as Jerusalem and Ariel should not
undermine prospects for a two-state solution.
NATO Involvement. The member states of NATO should
seriously consider endorsing two new missions to
support the peace process. The first would be to offer
an outside monitoring presence at the Rafah crossing
point or another location pursuant to an agreement
between Israelis and Palestinians. This could
complement the technical management of the crossing by
an EU member state. A NATO commitment could satisfy
Israeli security concerns.
The second mission would be to take over the work of
General Ward, who is due to rotate out of his current
assignment after disengagement. It is vitally important
to ensure continued international involvement in the
development of capable Palestinian security forces.
These missions would not be risk free, and NATO member
states would have to seriously consider the possibility
that their forces could become a target for terrorists.
Moreover, NATO could only take on this role if both
Israelis and Palestinians are supportive.
Traditionally, Israel has been reluctant to transfer
responsibility for security functions to third parties.
Nonetheless, if NATO were to get the go-ahead for one
or both of these missions, it would send a powerful
signal of support for the peace process.
Assisting Israel. Israel has taken a considerable
risk with disengagement. It should receive the
continued backing of the United States so that this
step is seen as benefiting Israel's security. The
United States should respond favorably to Israel's
request for assistance to partially offset the costs of
redeployment from Gaza and to develop the Galilee and
Negev regions as it refocuses its priorities away from
settlements in the West Bank to areas within Israel
proper.
Assisting and Reforming the Palestinian Authority.
The international community, including the United
States, must make substantial financial commitments to
the Palestinian Authority. Funds which are directed
through NGOs, as important as they are, do not have the
same impact in boosting the standing of President
Abbas. At Gleneagles, G8 leaders endorsed up to $3
billion in assistance per year over three years for the
Palestinians. Three Palestinian ministries are
developing a medium-term plan in cooperation with the
Quartet's Special Envoy to give confidence to all
donors that aid provided to the PA will be used for its
intended purpose.
In addition to financial contributions, it is important
to urge the PA to proceed with far-reaching
institutional reforms, especially in areas that promote
the rule of law. Senior members of the PA who are in
favor of deep reforms appreciate the role of
international scrutiny and skillfully use it as
leverage to effect change.
Resources for General Ward. It is critical for
General Ward to have immediate access to approximately
$10 million which he can direct quickly to four
sectors: (1) Communications, command, and control; (2)
Mobility and transport; (3) Logistics and medical; (4)
Force protection. It is unfortunate that he was not
given control of such resources early in his tenure.
Additional funds should be made available to the Ward
mission and its successor as needs are identified.
Conclusion
This is a pivotal moment in the peace process. There has
been progress in certain areas in recent months, but many of
the gains are fragile. Continuing disputes between the two
sides, electoral issues in Israel, and internecine battles
among Palestinians could pose significant challenges in the
months ahead.
The entire process could unravel without international
involvement. That involvement may or may not include all of the
elements outlined above, but the core guiding principle is to
identify the areas that are showing promise and to build from
them in a resolute manner.
Strategically, the stakes could not be higher. They extend
well beyond the geographic confines of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. The peace process represents the best opportunity for
progress in the Middle East region. Iraq will not be stabilized
for a considerable period of time. Democratization will be
drawn-out and uneven. Iran and the West appear headed for a
protracted crisis over Tehran's nuclear program. However, the
basic elements for progress between Israelis and Palestinians
are in place and can be brought together with persistence and
determination. Not only is the peace process the best path to
ensure Israel's security and to achieve statehood for
Palestinians, it also will have a positive spillover effect on
the other vexing challenges in the region.