[Senate Prints 108-40]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
108th Congress S. Prt.
COMMITTEE PRINT
2d Session 108-40
_______________________________________________________________________
NORTH KOREA: STATUS REPORT
ON NUCLEAR PROGRAM,
HUMANITARIAN ISSUES,
AND ECONOMIC REFORMS
__________
A STAFF TRIP REPORT
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Eighth Congress
Second Session
FEBRUARY 2004
92-278 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2003
____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
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C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Executive Summary................................................ vii
North Korea's Nuclear Program.................................... 1
Yongbyon Key Findings........................................ 2
Humanitarian Issues.............................................. 3
Japanese Abductees........................................... 4
U.S. Food Assistance to DPRK................................. 4
The Gulags................................................... 6
Economic Reforms................................................. 7
Background................................................... 7
Markets Sprout............................................... 8
Economic Prospects........................................... 9
Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo......................................... 10
Conclusions/Key Findings......................................... 10
Key Interlocutors................................................ 11
Prepared Statement of Dr. Siegfried S. Hecker, Senior Fellow, Los
Alamos National Laboratory, University of California (presented
to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 21,
2004).......................................................... 13
(iii)
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
February 23, 2004.
The Honorable Richard Lugar,
United States Senator,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden Jr.,
United States Senator,
Ranking Member, Committee on Foreign Relations.
Dear Senators Lugar and Biden:
In early January, we traveled to China, North Korea, South
Korea, and Japan, to assess the prospects for a peaceful
negotiated solution to the North Korean nuclear issue and to
follow-up on three earlier visits to North Korea focused on
gaining more transparency on food aid issues and encouraging
greater North Korean adherence to international norms in the
area of human rights. We met with foreign government officials
as well as with professors and think tank specialists concerned
with developments on the Korean Peninsula.
While in North Korea, we visited the Yongbyon nuclear
facility along with Dr. John Lewis of Stanford University, Jack
Pritchard of the Brookings Institution, and Sig Hecker, former
Director of Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratories. We also requested
of North Korean officials and were granted meetings to afford
us an opportunity to engage in detailed discussions on a number
of humanitarian issues, including food aid, prison conditions,
and the Japanese abduction cases. We also traveled to Seoul and
Tokyo to meet with key officials. We wish to acknowledge the
efforts of officials at the State Department in Washington and
abroad who helped to facilitate our travels.
A report on our major activities and key findings,
including some thoughts about the next steps on the Korean
Peninsula, follows below.
Sincerely,
Keith Luse,
Professional Staff Member, Majority Staff,
East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
Frank Jannuzi,
Professional Staff Member, Minority Staff,
East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
(v)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
----------
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) staff members
Keith Luse and Frank Jannuzi traveled to China, North Korea,
South Korea, and Japan January 3-15 to assess the prospects for
a peaceful negotiated solution to the North Korean nuclear
issue and to follow-up on earlier visits to North Korea
designed to encourage greater North Korean transparency on food
aid and greater adherence to international norms of behavior on
a broad array of human rights issues.
While in North Korea, our delegation interacted with a
group of three private citizens--Dr. John Lewis of Stanford
University, Jack Pritchard of the Brookings Institution, and
Sig Hecker, former Director of Los Alamos Nuclear
Laboratories--and accompanied them to the Yongbyon nuclear
facility. This marked the first time North Korea has allowed
foreigners to enter its key nuclear facilities since it
expelled IAEA monitors in December, 2002. We have relied on the
observations of Dr. Hecker to convey key findings from
Yongbyon. Dr. Hecker's testimony to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee is attached to this report. (See page 13.)
Over the course of five days in the North, we held a
variety of meetings with DPRK officials to discuss their
nuclear program and to encourage greater North Korean respect
for human rights. The delegation sought to clarify North
Korea's December 9 offer to ``freeze'' its nuclear program, and
urged North Korean officials to abandon their pursuit of
nuclear weapons and seek a peaceful, negotiated solution to the
crisis through multilateral dialogue.
While at Yongbyon, Dr. Hecker was able to confirm that the
5 MWe nuclear reactor is running normally and that the 8,000
spent fuel rods which had been stored under International
Atomic Energy Agency supervision under the terms of the 1994
Agreed Framework have been removed from their canisters and are
no longer in the spent fuel storage facility. Our tour of the
Radiochemical laboratory also convinced Dr. Hecker that North
Korea has the capability to reprocess spent fuel and produce
plutonium metal. North Korea did not make available any DPRK
personnel who may have expertise in nuclear weapons design and
manufacture, and Dr. Hecker reached no conclusions about the
North's ability to build a nuclear device.
During a discussion with Foreign Ministry officials on the
North's nuclear program following our time at Yongbyon, Vice
Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan claimed that unlike Iran and
Libya, North Korea actually has weapons of mass destruction.
Kim said that North Korea had provided us with evidence of
their ``nuclear deterrent.'' These were the most explicit
statements we received that North Korea has produced nuclear
weapons.
(vii)
As for U.S. allegations that North Korea has a clandestine
program to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU), Kim Gye-gwan
and other DPRK officials stated categorically that the DPRK has
no program for enriching uranium.
On the human rights front, Luse and Jannuzi had the
opportunity to engage in detailed discussions on a number of
issues, including food aid, prison conditions, and the
abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korean intelligence
agents. We emphasized that the United States' concern for the
human rights situation in North Korea reflects the deeply held
convictions of the American people. SFRC staff encouraged DPRK
officials to permit greater transparency for food aid
deliveries under the auspices of the World Food Program and
various non-governmental organizations, and we discussed ways
in which North Korea might reduce its dependence on foreign
food aid by adopting new methods of food production and moving
toward market-based distribution mechanisms. The delegation
pressed DPRK officials to allow outside access to its prison
facilities to assess food needs and humanitarian issues there.
We also met with Foreign Ministry officials to express our hope
that North Korea would take steps to fully resolve the issue of
the past abduction by the DPRK of more than a dozen Japanese
nationals. We explained that the prompt resolution of this
issue was a matter of international concern and of particular
interest to members of the Congress. The delegation requested
information on the abductees and their family members still in
North Korea and passed this information on to the Japanese
government.
Finally, the delegation had a chance to review the progress
of North Korea's economic reforms launched in July of 2002. We
found considerable evidence that North Korea is committed to
moving toward a market economy, but it is too soon to draw
conclusions about the ultimate success or failure of these
initiatives. North Korea suffers from critical resource
shortages and it may not yet fully grasp the institutional
changes that will be necessary if its fledgling economic
reforms are to yield a significant boost in DPRK production and
an improvement in living standards for the North Korean people.
Even if North Korea's economy begins to grow, it is not clear
how this will affect the nation's social and political
stability. Officials with whom we met recognized that the
North's ability to expand trade and attract foreign investment
and receive loans from international financial institutions
depends in large measure on the peaceful resolution of the
nuclear issue.
NORTH KOREA: STATUS REPORT
ON NUCLEAR PROGRAM,
HUMANITARIAN ISSUES,
AND ECONOMIC REFORMS
----------
North Korea's Nuclear Program
Prior to our visit to Yongbyon, Vice Foreign Minister Kim
Gye-gwan told us that North Korea had decided to permit our
visit to break through the ``stalemate'' at the six party talks
and to provide ``more transparency on our nuclear program that
has been shrouded in mystery.'' Kim also said North Korea hoped
to differentiate its nuclear program from those pursued by
Libya and Iran. ``They claim they do not have weapons of mass
destruction. We claim that we do have weapons of mass
destruction, and we leave the conclusions to your side.''
Kim said that North Korea had chosen to reprocess the 8,000
spent fuel rods from its nuclear reactor to ``strengthen our
deterrence'' in response to the ``intensifying hostile policy''
of the U.S. Government. He specifically cited the President's
reference to North Korea as a member of the ``Axis of Evil,''
as well as the inclusion of North Korea in a list of countries
subject to ``pre-emptive strike'' by the United States. Kim
told the delegation that he believes only the North's nuclear
deterrent has prevented the United States from launching a pre-
emptive attack. ``Once we lay down our gun, the United States
would attack immediately.''
Nonetheless, Kim repeatedly stated that North Korea remains
interested in the ``final goal'' of a nuclear free Korean
Peninsula, and said, ``If we are to reach the final goal, we
need to become serious about specific action steps, not just
talk. A freeze of current activities might be a first step. At
Yongbyon, you will see the importance of a freeze. We are
prepared to give up our nuclear activities, have no transfer to
other nations, and no testing of any kind. We truly believe
this is the right place to start.'' Kim later clarified that
the North's freeze proposal ``only makes sense as a starting
point to reach the objective of a non-nuclear peninsula. We
don't want to stop at a freeze.'' He also emphasized that ``how
to freeze'' and ``what comes next'' are issues the North hopes
can be discussed in detail at the next round of six party
talks, and that North Korea is ``. . . fully open to these kind
of talks.''
Our delegation raised the question of the North's alleged
program to develop highly enriched uranium (HEU). Kim Gye-gwan
stated categorically that the DPRK ``has nothing to do with any
HEU program.'' Kim said, ``We have no program, no facilities
you are talking about, or scientists trained for this purpose
[enriching uranium].''
Kim Gye-gwan continued, ``Our policy on nukes is based on
natural uranium, not highly enriched uranium . . . We don't
have any plans for HEU or facilities for that purpose.''
Moreover, Kim flatly denied that North Korea had ever admitted
to having an HEU program during the October, 2002 meeting with
Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly in Pyongyang.
Yongbyon Visit
On Thursday, January 8, we spent roughly six hours at the
Yongbyon nuclear facility. Yongbyon is about two hours by car
from Pyongyang, with much of the last hour spent on unpaved
roads. The Yongbyon nuclear complex is a city unto itself. DPRK
officials said that about 1,000 scientists and technicians work
and reside at the facility, and several thousand others provide
support services, grow food, etc. During our visit, we were at
all times escorted by senior officials at Yongbyon as well as
by Ambassador Li Gun, our Foreign Ministry host.
Of the five Americans who visited Yongbyon, only Dr. Hecker
possesses detailed understanding of the workings of a nuclear
power plant and the science connected with the extraction of
plutonium from spent reactor fuel and the production of
plutonium metal. Dr. Hecker's expertise allowed him to ask
probing questions and to engage in expert level discussions
with his counterparts. Accordingly, we have not tried to make
any independent assessments of the North's nuclear
capabilities. We are relying on Dr. Hecker's findings, and will
make only a few general observations about the tenor of our
visit.
North Korean officials at Yongbyon exhibited an easy
confidence during our tour, answering questions promptly and
with thoroughness. They seemed eager to showcase their
facilities and what they had accomplished. Yongbyon facility
director Ri Hong-sop told us that North Korea's nuclear program
was developed indigenously. In response to a question, Ri
denied that North Korea had provided any nuclear technology to
Burma or any other country.
The DPRK scientists confined their remarks and exchanges to
the science of running a nuclear reactor and fabricating
plutonium, generally avoiding political remarks or debate.
Their tone and demeanor were professional. The North's
officials appeared open to a repeat visit by Dr. Hecker to help
confirm what we had seen through additional observations and
scientific measurements.
Yongbyon Key Findings
Dr. Hecker's key findings based on our visit to Yongbyon
are these:
The 5 MWe reactor has been restarted. It appears to
be operating smoothly providing heat and electricity,
while also accumulating approximately 6 kg of plutonium
per year in its spent fuel rods.
The 50 MWe reactor construction site appears to have
seen no activity since the IAEA inspectors were
instructed to leave in 2002. The reactor and the
construction site look in a bad state of repair. It
would require a major construction program to finish
the reactor. North Korea reports the future of the 50
MWe reactor is still ``under evaluation.''
The spent fuel pond is empty; the approximately 8000
fuel rods have been moved.
The DPRK claimed to have reprocessed all 8,000 fuel
rods to extract plutonium metal during one continuous
campaign between mid-January 2003 and end of June 2003.
We could not definitively substantiate that claim.
However, the Radiochemical Laboratory staff
demonstrated that they had the requisite facility,
equipment and technical expertise, and they appear to
have the capacity to extract plutonium from the spent
fuel rods and fabricate plutonium metal. If all 8,000
fuel rods were reprocessed, the IAEA estimates they
would provide 25 to 30 kg of plutonium.
It is possible that they moved the 8,000 fuel rods
to a different storage location. However, such storage
would represent a serious health and safety hazard.
We were shown what was claimed to be a sample of
plutonium metal product produced last year. Dr. Hecker
was not able to definitively confirm that the sample
was actually plutonium metal, but all observations he
was able to make were consistent with the sample being
plutonium metal. However, Dr. Hecker was not able to
prove that the samples were from the most recent
reprocessing campaign. Such a determination requires
more sophisticated measurements.
In the foreseeable future, the DPRK can produce 6 kg
of plutonium per year in its 5 MWe reactor. It easily
has the capacity to reprocess the spent fuel at any
time to extract the plutonium. It also has the capacity
to reload the reactor with fresh fuel for a second and
subsequent reloading. Unless North Korea has a
clandestine nuclear reactor, it appears the DPRK is not
in a position to increase the rate of plutonium
production beyond 6 kg per year without a major
construction project at the 50 MWe or 200 MWe reactor
sites.
Officials of the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs
claimed that the DPRK had weapons of mass destruction.
They believe that they provided us with evidence of
their ``nuclear deterrent.'' At Yongbyon, they
demonstrated that they most likely had the capability
to make plutonium metal. However, Dr. Hecker saw
nothing and spoke to no one who could convince him that
they could build a nuclear device with that metal, and
that they could weaponize such a device into a delivery
vehicle. We were not able to arrange meetings with DPRK
staff who may have such expertise or visit related
facilities.
Humanitarian Issues
Upon arriving in Pyongyang, the staff delegation asked our
host, Ambassador Li Gun, to arrange meetings on the topics of
the Japanese abductee issue, prison camps in North Korea and
their conditions, and food aid to the DPRK. These on-the-spot
requests were all accommodated.
Japanese Abductees
In 2002, Kim Jong-il acknowledged to Japanese Prime
Minister Koizumi that North Korean agents had abducted 13
Japanese nationals during the 1970's and 1980's. Japanese
officials contend the number could go much higher. (South
Korean officials estimate that several hundred South Koreans
have been abducted by the North over the years, most never to
return). The Japanese were abducted reportedly to teach
Japanese language and culture to North Korean spies. At least
five of the Japanese abductees remain alive and were returned
to Japan last year following the Kim Jong-il-Koizumi summit.
North Korean and Japanese officials continue to negotiate as to
the fate of children and other relatives of these five, as well
as eight additional Japanese abductees reported dead by North
Korean authorities. North Korea has not provided evidence
convincing to the Japanese that the remaining eight are
deceased.
The North Korean official with whom we met on the abductee
issue was Song Il-ho, Deputy Director of the Foreign Affairs
Ministry for Japan. We emphasized that the United States'
concern for the human rights situation in North Korea--
including the fate of those abducted by North Korea and their
families--reflects the deeply held convictions of the American
people. We expressed our hope that North Korea would promptly
take steps to fully resolve the issue, and explained the
welfare of the abductees and their families was a matter of
international concern and of particular interest to members of
the Congress. We emphasized that we were not in North Korea to
negotiate, but only to exchange views.
Song gave his government's perspective on the abductee
issue, beginning with an overview of Japan-Korea relations from
the colonial period to the present. After this background, Song
acknowledged that North Korean secret agents did wrongly abduct
Japanese nationals. ``[They] did bring Japanese nationals to
the DPRK. Thirteen were brought to the DPRK, some of whom have
died of accidents or illness. Those responsible for bringing
them here were charged under state law and punished.''
After conveying his government's views, Song was
forthcoming in answering questions we asked about the abductees
and their relatives. He expressed his willingness to answer
additional questions in the future. Song reported that Japan
has been provided with videotapes and other information
pertaining to the children and other relatives of the abductees
remaining in North Korea. Song said that some of the abductees'
children only recently became aware of the truth regarding
their parents' origin, adding that the children have close
relationships in his country, (including fiancees for some),
have never been outside North Korea, and should be able to make
individual decisions on whether they remain in North Korea or
go to Japan. (Japanese officials counter that all abductees and
their immediate relatives should be able to travel to Japan to
live for a set amount of time before deciding on their own
whether they would remain in Japan or return to North Korea.)
U.S. Food Assistance to DPRK
As we did last August, we met again this year with Jong
Yun-hyong, Director of the Flood Damage Reconstruction
Committee, who is working with American and European non-
government organizations (NGO's) and universities to expand
efforts toward sustainable agriculture. During our meeting,
Jong for the first time made reference to the topic of ``rural
development,'' indicating that NGO's may be designated to take
charge of small to medium-sized rural development projects in
the areas of energy and agricultural production.
Poor farming practices are evident in DPRK. Soybeans, corn
and orchards planted vertically on mountainsides contribute to
erosion. Poorly-built levees break during heavy rains causing
fields to flood. There are often inadequate amounts of
fertilizer, and the soil is over-worked. Double-cropping is
practiced throughout the country. North Korea is interested in
adopting better agricultural practices.
Although anxious to achieve food production self-
sufficiency, Jong acknowledged emergency assistance will be
needed for quite some time given the North's shortage of arable
land. He expressed gratitude for the recent announcement from
the U.S. of additional food aid. When the staff delegation once
again questioned Jong on DPRK not allowing the World Food
Program (WFP) to fully monitor food distribution and the lack
of access to children, the elderly and pregnant women in 43
counties, he responded by advocating a shift away from food
assistance and toward agriculture development projects.
Jong outlined the North's food production and distribution
for 2003. He reported that the North produced 4.5 million
metric tons of grain (primarily rice, corn, wheat, and barley).
The DPRK calculates that after making allowances for food grain
consumption, seed grain, livestock consumption, restaurant
services, and spoilage, the North's production will fall
roughly one million tons short of its needs for 2004. The
Public Distribution System (PDS) largely broke down during the
famine years of the mid-1990's, and has never fully recovered.
Most North Koreans reportedly receive a meager allotment (300
grams/day) from the PDS, and must supplement their allotment
with purchases of food from markets. Jong expressed his hope
that the World Food Program and other donors would help close
the gap between the North's production (including imports) and
its actual food needs.
Kim Jong-il maintains a ``military-first'' policy in terms
of food produced in North Korea, and Jong acknowledged that the
military gets preferential access to the harvest. Once its
needs are met, remaining food production enters the PDS. Given
the minimal monitoring of bilateral South Korean and Chinese
food aid (largely rice), we believe it is possible that North
Korea may divert a portion of the rice from those two countries
to meet any unfulfilled needs in the military for 2004, as it
likely has in the past.
The United States provides food assistance to North Korea
through the World Food Program (WFP), which targets its aid to
the elderly, children up to the age of 10, and pregnant and
nursing women. In February, 2003, the U.S. Government announced
its intention to provide 100,000 tons of food assistance in
calendar year 2003, with 40,000 tons to be shipped immediately
and 60,000 tons to be shipped depending on circumstances inside
North Korea and on competing global demands for assistance. On
December 24, 2003, the administration announced it would ship
the last 60,000 metric tons. This assistance package will
reportedly include 38,000 metric tons of corn, 4,000 metric
tons of non-fat dry milk, 6000 metric tons of corn-soya blend,
6000 metric tons of vegetable oil, with the remaining products
including peas and beans. U.S. AID officials believe these food
items are more apt to reach the hungry target groups than U.S.
rice.
Most of the recipients of WFP aid live in urban areas
outside of Pyongyang. WFP staff now conduct about 500
monitoring visits in North Korea per month, although most
visits must be scheduled one week in advance and monitors are
usually accompanied by North Korean officials. WFP has five
field offices outside of Pyongyang. North Korea still does not
permit WFP to feed the hungry in 43 out of 206 counties, mostly
due to national security considerations. These off-limits
counties are estimated to contain 15% of North Korea's
population. WFP has no good information on the food needs of
these counties, most of which are in mountainous regions of
north-central DPRK or clustered along the border with South
Korea (adjacent to the DMZ).
Over time, the WFP's ability to monitor its food aid
deliveries has improved. WFP personnel are now able to obtain
Korean-language training inside North Korea, and WFP has
dramatically increased the number of monthly inspection visits
over the past three years. WFP has also chosen to curtail food
aid in Pyongyang. This is appropriate, as Pyongyang residents
are typically better off than residents of other parts of North
Korea. WFP has issued an appeal for 485,000 tons of commodities
for 2004, a decrease from 513,000 tons sought for 2003. Only
300,000 tons of the amount requested for 2003 was actually
received and distributed.
An extensive UN/DPRK nutrition survey conducted last year
showed significant reductions in malnutrition among young
children since 1998, a decrease due in large part to outside
food assistance. However, even with gains in nutrition
standards, more than 40% of North Korea's children under the
age of seven are markedly too short for their age--stunted--a
condition largely irreversible with an impact on mental growth
yet to be measured.
The Gulags
During our trip to North Korea last August, we raised the
issue of the prison system and the poor conditions and high
levels of malnutrition reported there with Vice Foreign
Minister Kim Gye-gwan. An estimated 150,000-200,000 North
Koreans reportedly are held under harsh conditions in hundreds
of political detention camps. Last year, Kim Gye-gwan said that
North Korean officials would allow non-government organizations
(NGO) access to prison camps on a ``case by case'' basis.
During our recent trip to Pyongyang, we once again raised
this issue with North Korean officials including Ambassador Li
Gun and Jong Yun-Hyong, Director of the Flood Damage
Rehabilitation Committee (FDRC). We advised North Korean
officials that the U.S. Senate would be considering legislation
later this year related to human rights conditions in North
Korea and that deep concern exists regarding human rights
abuses inside North Korea. The staff delegation also expressed
concern about the status of North Korean refugees in China and
the harsh treatment they sometimes receive upon returning to
North Korea. We noted China's unwillingness to establish a
formal structure of assistance for refugees, and urged North
Korean officials to cooperate with NGOs and other members of
the international community seeking to address the humanitarian
needs of this vulnerable population. Given Kim Gye-gwan's
initial willingness to engage in discussions on this sensitive
issue, the question of DPRK prisons and the conditions under
which prisoners are held should be a matter for future
discussions involving the United States and other countries.
Economic Reforms
North Korea launched a major economic reform initiative on
July 1, 2002. These reforms hold both promise and peril for the
North Korean people generally and for the regime of Kim Jong-
il. The government of North Korea has taken several steps to
implement the reforms. Moreover, officials with whom we met
recognize and acknowledge that North Korea's economic
performance is ultimately tied to the peaceful resolution of
the nuclear crisis.
Background
The main goals of the North's economic reform initiative
are to boost production and improve living standards by
introducing agricultural price incentives and stimulating the
production of light industrial goods. The first step of the
reform process emphasized raising wages and commodities prices
to increase food production and decrease dependence on foreign
aid. Subsequent reforms include new laws governing foreign
investment and trade and a renewed emphasis on the development
of three special economic zones--Sinuiju along the Chinese
border, Najin-Sonbong on the east coast, and Kaesong Industrial
Park, a joint venture with Hyundai located close to the DMZ and
Seoul.
The 2002 reforms built on earlier initiatives--notably the
1998 Constitutional revision which for the first time
recognized private ownership of ``income obtained through legal
economic activities''--while introducing several new concepts.
Farmer income is now linked more closely to production, and
small private plots are allowed to be planted alongside those
plots allocated to state-directed food production. The state
has taken steps to re-zone small plots into larger, more
efficient plots, and introduced a variety of new seed
technology and fertilizers. Similar initiatives in the
industrial sector allow factories to shift production of goods
once state quotas have been met--a kind of dual track system
similar to that tried by China 30 years ago. Although
ostensibly able to pursue new production, factories have no
obvious source of capital for inputs, and they must still
apparently maintain bloated work forces. In short, North
Korea's antiquated industrial base is not well positioned to
meet consumer demand for light industrial products.
It is not clear how much productive capacity will be freed
up by reforms, or indeed, if North Korea's industrial sector is
capable of producing items North Korean consumers want absent a
significant injection of capital and know-how. New small,
family-size business are beginning to provide services and
produce goods, but it remains unclear whether these grass-roots
initiatives can compensate for the lack of productivity from
large, state-owned factories that remain under utilized and
largely dormant.
For years, China has tried to encourage North Korea to
follow its model of market socialism, but Pyongyang has proven
reluctant, constrained by national pride and the juche (self
reliance, independence) political philosophy. Since the
launching of the July, 2002 economic reforms, however, DPRK
officials have begun to study China's success more closely. But
even as it begins to embrace market principles, the North's
economic prospects remain hampered by resource constraints. The
North suffers from chronic shortages of electricity, food,
material resources (especially timber and coal), capital,
technology, and trained administrative personnel. These
constraints serve as a break on the pace of economic growth.
The net result is a reform package that remains inchoate, but
nonetheless significant.
Markets Sprout
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the July 2002
economic reform package was the introduction of ``general
markets'' at which farmers could sell their produce and
craftsman could sell their wares. Until recently, these markets
have been rather rudimentary, consisting of large open-air
stalls enclosed by some kind of fencing, and they have been
strictly off limits to foreigners. That is changing. Farmers
markets are evolving into general markets. In recent months,
the North has taken the concept of the market to its next
logical evolution--a large, covered, regulated market, complete
with foreign exchange service, a cafe, and a wide variety of
both domestic and imported consumer goods. The ``fire wall''
that used to separate markets for food and markets for goods
has been breached.
We visited Pyongyang's ``flagship'' general market: the
Tong-il Street Market. It must be noted that the Tong-il Street
market is not typical, and that Pyongyang as a whole is not
representative of conditions elsewhere in North Korea.
Therefore, one cannot draw conclusions about market conditions
throughout North Korea based only on a visit to one market in
Pyongyang. That said, the Tong-il Street market, completed last
summer, appears to be in the vanguard of market reform in North
Korea, and was presented to the delegation as a clear
indication of where North Korea wants to go.
The Tong-il Street Market has more than 500 vendors, each
renting stall space from the Tong-il Street Market for 80 won a
day (about $3 month). Vendors sell a huge variety of food
imported from China, including pineapple, bananas, and melons.
They also sell Fuji apples from Japan--seven for one dollar--
and Russian vodka. In addition to food, shoppers can find
clothing, shoes, consumer electronics, major appliances,
furniture, artwork, etc.
Unlike the markets set aside for senior Korean Workers
Party officials, the Tong-il Street Market appears to be open
to the general public. There are no ID checks and no armed
security guards. The market was bustling when we visited.
Pyongyang residents typically tend to be a better off than
residents of other parts of the country, but given the prices
for most goods, there is no reason to believe that similar
markets would not attract shoppers elsewhere in urban North
Korea. We saw vendors accepting a variety of currencies--
Chinese Renminbi, Japanese Yen, American Dollar, Euros--and
gladly taking the opportunity to negotiate a favorable exchange
rate with an unwary shopper. Vendors appeared to have the
ability to provide change in several currencies. One dollar
traded for 1,000 DPRK Won at the stalls, slightly above the
official rate of 900 Won/dollar, but below the ``floating''
black market rate of roughly 1,200 Won/dollar. Vendors
bargained with enthusiasm and exhibited considerable
entrepreneurial spirit.
Are these kinds of markets the future for North Korea? It
is too soon to say. The Tong-il Street market was opened last
August, and plans call for similar markets to be constructed in
each of Pyongyang's 21 districts and then throughout the
country. These covered, climate-controlled markets are intended
gradually to replace the open-air markets that continue to
cater to buyers with more limited income. Large markets are
part of the story of North Korea's market reform initiative. In
Pyongyang, we also observed new small vendor stalls launched
since last summer. We saw similar stalls last summer in Nampo
and in Yongbyon city this year. These street stalls, selling a
variety of small snacks, cigarettes, and liquor, appear
popular, and have grown steadily in number over the past two
years. For the first time, we were able to make a purchase at
one of these street stalls--five Chinese chocolate bars for a
dollar. The vendor smiled as she took our one dollar bill, but
also seemed a bit wary of making a sale to a foreigner.
Economic Prospects
North Korea has a shortage of economic expertise at all
levels of government, but is beginning to take steps to remedy
that deficiency. Interestingly, China has begun training
programs for DPRK economic officials under the auspices of the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Chinese officials and think
tank specialists report a new willingness on the part of their
DPRK counterparts to learn from China's experiences with
economic reform and the privatization of state-owned
enterprises.
North Korea's economic reforms are not without risk. In the
short run, price adjustments could increase inequality and
exacerbate existing social differentiation. North Korea has
long maintained an elaborate system of preferences, and the
``haves'' are now even more distant from the ``have nots.''
Inflation has also become a major concern. Some initiatives--
such as a zero interest 10-year bond with lucky lottery winners
eligible for ``bonus interest''--at first blush seem ill-
considered or downright Orwellian. However, bonds could in the
long run provide a vehicle for privatizing state assets through
debt-equity swaps as occurred in the former Soviet Union.
If North Korea is able to stimulate agricultural production
and create functioning markets, it may not be enough to turn
around its ailing economy. North Korea is primarily an
industrial society, with roughly 70 percent of the population
residing in cities. Building a viable light industrial sector
in North Korea and making obsolete heavy industries productive
will require major restructuring and large infusions of capital
and technology.
In sum, reforms in North Korea may create as many
``losers'' as ``winners,'' at least in the short run, and this
could eventually undermine social stability. Reforms designed
to boost commodity prices may be good for farmers and those
with access to hard currency, but for urban dwellers on fixed
income, the price increases for food and the devaluation of the
North Korean Won against the dollar exact a heavy toll. The Won
has gone from 150 Won/dollar in 2002 to 900 Won/dollar in
October, 2003, with unofficial ``black market'' rates reaching
as high as 1200 Won/dollar. The state seems aware of this
problem, and has boosted salaries for miners and members of the
armed forces--presumably two sectors of the work force the
government must keep happy to avoid major unrest.
While it is too soon to judge whether North Korea's
economic reforms will kick-start its economy, there is no doubt
that the state is committed to the reforms and is pursuing them
with gusto. Success may depend in large measure on whether
North Korea can solve the nuclear crisis and gain access to
foreign capital, investment, and trade.
Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo
Upon departing Pyongyang, and en route back to the United
States, we met with U.S. and respective country officials in
China, South Korea, and Japan to answer questions regarding
details of our visit to the DPRK. While all the parties to the
six party talks share the goal of a non-nuclear Korean
Peninsula, each nation brings its own priorities to the talks.
Officials in Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo, each shared their
country's particular concerns with the staff delegation. We
gained a deeper appreciation for the special responsibility
China feels as host and facilitator of the talks, and were
reminded of the priority Seoul attaches to the maintenance of
peace and stability on the peninsula as this diplomatic process
moves forward. In Tokyo, we gained insights into the incredibly
important issue of the abductees, and how it informs Japanese
policy making as Tokyo participates in the talks.
Conclusions/Key Findings
1. DPRK officials believe the United States will launch a
pre-emptive attack on their country.
2. North Korea has restarted its Yongbyon nuclear reactor
which has the potential to produce 5-6 kilograms of
plutonium per year. The North could at any time
easily reprocess spent fuel from the reactor to
harvest plutonium for use in nuclear bombs.
3. North Korea is in the midst of a significant economic
reform movement, the full implications of which
remain to be seen. North Koreans intimately
involved with the reform initiatives appear to be
among those in the DPRK pushing the hardest for
resolution of the nuclear issue.
4. DPRK officials are interested in reducing the nation's
dependence on food aid and want outside help
developing a more productive agriculture sector.
5. Eliminating North Korea's gulags and addressing the
humanitarian needs of North Korea's prison
population should become a priority for the United
States government and the entire international
community.
6. Significant communications and coordination problems
continue to hamper the six party talks. The talks
are more likely to make progress if multi-party
working groups are established to define terms,
discuss verification protocols, and exchange views
on how any deal might be phased.
7. China and South Korea place a premium on maintaining
peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Both
seem prepared to go to great lengths to avoid
either a war on the peninsula or an abrupt collapse
of the Kim Jong-il regime.
8. China, on whom we rely as key facilitator in the six-
party talks, shares our goal of a non-nuclear
Korean Peninsula. Nonetheless, China will always
place its own interests first in this process, and
Beijing's interests are not identical to our own.
DPRK officials are not certain that China has
accurately transmitted messages between Washington
and Pyongyang.
----------
Key Interlocutors Include the Following:
People's Republic of China
John Aloisi, Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy
Donald Steel, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy
Wang Shenghong, Director, Foreign Affairs Bureau of the
National Committee of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference
Xia Jihui, Deputy Director, Foreign Affairs Bureau of the
National Committee of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference
Cao Huayin, Deputy Secretary-General, China Reform Forum
Ding Kuisong, Vice Chairman, China Reform Forum
Dai Fengning, Program Officer, China Reform Forum
Yu Meihua, Director of East Asia Studies, China Reform Forum
Maj. Gen. Pan Zhenqiang (Ret.), Professor, Institute for
Strategic Studies, National Defense University
Ning Fukui, Ambassador for Korean Peninsula Issue, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs
Li Yang, Deputy Director, Office for Korean Peninsula Issue,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tu Jingchang, Deputy Director, Office for Korean Peninsula
Issue, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Liu Xuecheng, Director of American Studies, China Institute
of International Studies
North Korea
The Honorable Paul Beijer, Ambassador, Embassy of Sweden
The Honorable Wojciech Katuza, Embassy of Poland
The Honorable Doris Hertrampf, Ambassador, Embassy of Germany
The Honorable David Slinn, Ambassador, Embassy of Great
Britain
Ri Hak-gwon, Vice President, Committee for the Promotion of
International Trade
Professor Doctor Ri Mun-ho, Head of Counsellors for Science,
Academy of Sciences DPRK
Dr. Jong Hun-il, Senior Officer, Bureau of International S &
T Cooperation, Academy of Sciences
Jong Yun-hyong, Director, Flood Damage Reconstruction
Committee
Kim Gye-gwan, Vice Foreign Minister, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Ambassador Li Gun, Deputy Director General, North America
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Ri Hong-sop, Director, Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific
Research Center
Choi Kil-man, Deputy Director, Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific
Research Center
Sung Il-ho, Deputy Director, Japan Division, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
Col. General Li Chol Bok, Korean People's Army
South Korea
The Honorable Thomas Hubbard, U.S. Ambassador
Sangmin ``Simon'' Lee, Control Officer, U.S. Embassy
Scott Snyder, Asia Foundation
Rhee Bong-Jo, Chief, Policy Coordination Bureau, National
Security Council
Park Sun-won, Ph.D., Senior Director, National Security
Council
Park Ro-byug, Senior Director, National Security Council
Park Chan-bong, Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Minister for
Unification Policy, Ministry of Unification
Wi Sung-lac, Director General, North American Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Yang Chang-seok, Director, International Cooperation Office,
Ministry of Unification
Jun Bong-geun, Policy Advisor, Ministry of Unification
Japan
The Honorable Howard Baker, U.S. Ambassador
Torkel Patterson, Minister-Counselor, Senior Advisor to the
Ambassador (U.S.)
Richard A. Christenson, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy
Tokyo
Daniel L. Shields, Political Section Deputy and Foreign
Policy Unit Chief, U.S. Embassy Tokyo
Ken Moskowitz, Director, Tokyo American Center
David Jonathan Wolff, Embassy Control Officer, Bilateral and
Foreign Policy Unit, Political Section, U.S. Embassy
Tokyo
Yasumasa Nagamine, Deputy Director General, North American
Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Kazuhiro Suzuki, Senior Policy Coordinator, Foreign Policy
Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Honorable Shinzo Abe, Secretary General, Liberal
Democratic Party
Mikio Mori, Director for Multilateral Nuclear Cooperation,
Foreign Policy Bureau
Naoki Ito, Director, Northeast Asia Division, Asian and
Oceania Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mitoji Yabunaka, Director General, Asian and Oceania Affairs
Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Akitaka Saiki, Deputy Director General, Asian and Oceania
Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Koji Tsuruoka, Deputy Director General, Foreign Policy Bureau
Nobuyuki Takakura, Director, Economic Affairs Division,
Health Policy Bureau, Ministry of Health, Labour and
Welfare
Kaoru Manabe, M.D., Deputy Director, Economic Affairs
Division, Health Policy Bureau, Ministry of Health,
Labour and Welfare
----------
Prepared Statement of Dr. Siegfried S. Hecker, Senior Fellow, Los
Alamos National Laboratory, University of California
[presented to the u.s. senate committee
on foreign relations, january 21, 2004]
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, I am
honored to share with you my report of a rather unexpected and
extraordinary visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research
Center in North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea). I will submit a written statement for the record and
summarize my observations this morning.
Background
I visited the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
and the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center as part of
an unofficial U.S. delegation led by Professor John W. Lewis of
Stanford University. Professor Lewis is an Asian scholar at
Stanford, specializing in China and North Korea. Professor
Lewis' visit was part of his ongoing dialog with officials of
the DPRK concerning the North's nuclear program. He has visited
the DPRK ten times since he began this dialog in 1987. He last
visited the DPRK just before the official six-party talks in
Beijing last August. DPRK officials invited him to return. When
they indicated that they may allow him to visit the nuclear
facilities at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center,
he contacted me to accompany him to provide scientific
expertise. Since I work for the Los Alamos National Laboratory,
which is operated by the University of California for the
Department of Energy, I requested and received the necessary
U.S. Government approvals for travel to China and the DPRK. I
have known Prof. Lewis for approximately 15 years. We have
collaborated on other global security issues.
Joining our delegation at Prof. Lewis' invitation was
Charles L. (Jack) Pritchard, Visiting Scholar at the Brookings
Institute and formerly the U.S. special envoy for DPRK
negotiations. In addition, two Senate Foreign Relations
Committee experts on Asian affairs, Mr. W. Keith Luse and Mr.
Frank S. Jannuzi, had separately planned a trip to the DPRK.
They joined our delegation in the DPRK and participated in our
visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center.
The host organization for our visit was the DPRK Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. Ambassador Li Gun accompanied us during the
entire visit. Vice Minister Kim Gye Gwan met with us on three
separate occasions. In addition to the visit to the Nuclear
Scientific Research Center, Prof. Lewis had arranged other
meetings with DPRK officials to cover economic, military, and
science issues. Mr. Luse and Mr. Jannuzi arranged some
additional meetings on their own. I will restrict my written
statement to the areas of my expertise, namely the nuclear
issues. More specifically, I will focus on what we learned
during the visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research
Center.
DPRK Statements and Motivation to Set the Context for the Visit
Vice Minister Kim [Gye Gwan] indicated that they were very
interested in resuming the six-party talks. The DPRK made a
proposal on Dec. 9, 2003 to freeze its nuclear activities and
received no response from the United States. Vice Minister Kim
indicated that they have just repeated this proposal, and this
time Secretary Powell responded positively. [The following
quote from Secretary Powell appeared in AFP, January 7, 2004:
``This is an interesting step on their part, a positive step,
and we hope that it will allow us to move more rapidly to six-
party framework talks. I am encouraged, I am encouraged by the
statement the North Koreans made.'']
Vice Minister Kim stated, ``The most reasonable way [to
proceed] is to have simultaneous action steps. . . . The U.S.
says it will give us a security assurance if we dismantle our
nuclear program. We say it differently. The first step would be
a freeze of the present [DPRK] nuclear activities. You will see
how important a freeze will be when you are at Yongbyon. This
means there will be no manufacturing, no testing, and no
transferring of nuclear weapons.''
Vice Minister Kim stated, ``We view the delegation's visit
to Yongbyon as a way to help contribute to breaking the
stalemate and opening up a bright future. We will not play
games with you. We have invited you to go to Yongbyon. The
primary reason for this is to ensure transparency. This will
reduce the assumptions and errors. . . . This visit can have
great symbolic significance.''
``We want you to take an objective look, and we will leave
the conclusions to your side. This is why the inclusion of Dr.
Sig Hecker is so significant.'' Mr. Pritchard stated that we
are unofficial and that we are not an inspection team. Kim
continued, ``Hecker's presence will allow us to tell you
everything. This is an extraordinary approval by us. . . . We,
too, emphasize that you are not making an inspection. But,
because we are allowing this visit, we will provide you enough
access to have good knowledge.''
Vice Minister Kim indicated that based on the U.S. actions
in November 2002, the DPRK decided that the Agreed Framework
was no longer in its interest, so it terminated the IAEA
[International Atomic Energy Agency] inspections and withdrew
from the NPT. The DPRK decided to operate the 5 MWe reactor and
resume reprocessing of plutonium for peaceful nuclear
activities. He stated, ``It is the only way to keep the spent
fuel rods safe.'' He added, ``At the same time, the hostile
U.S. policy had been intensified. So, we changed our purpose
and informed the U.S. that the plutonium that was to have been
used for peaceful purposes would now be used for weapons.
Originally, we had wanted to keep the reprocessed plutonium in
a way we could store it safely. Then, we changed the purpose in
order to strengthen our deterrent.''
Vice Minister Kim added that the DPRK wants a peaceful
resolution of the nuclear crisis. They want a denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula. He emphasized that the DPRK has been
very flexible and very patient, adding, ``I should note that
the time that has been lost [in dealing with us] has not been
beneficial to the U.S. side. With an additional lapse in time,
our nuclear arsenal could grow in quality and quantity. The
outcome has not been a success for the U.S.''
I provide this political background to set the context for
potential motivations for the DPRK decision to invite us to
visit the Nuclear Scientific Research Center. They have
publicly stated that they have reprocessed the fuel rods to
extract plutonium and strengthen their ``deterrent.'' It
appears they were concerned that the United States (and perhaps
others) did not believe them. So, they may have invited us to
provide independent confirmation of their claims.
However, Vice Minister Kim also expressed a concern about
their decision to invite us to Yongbyon. He stated: ``If you go
back to the United States and say that the North already has
nuclear weapons, this may cause the U.S. to act against us.''
At a later meeting, he returned to this concern by stating,
``We are concerned that the U.S. Government will use what you
conclude [as a pretext] to attack us. The U.S. might claim that
this visit proves that the DPRK has crossed a red line when it
restarted the reactor. Can we be sure that the U.S. will
refrain from action if it declares that we have gone beyond its
red line--such as finishing of the reprocessing and the change
in the purpose of the reprocessing [from peaceful safety-
related reasons to making weapons]?''
So, I believe the DPRK wanted to show us the Yongbyon
Nuclear Scientific Research Center to verify that they had
taken significant actions since December 2002 and to impress us
with their nuclear capabilities. The Center leadership and its
specialists were very cooperative within the boundaries of what
they were authorized to show us. Nevertheless, DPRK officials
had reservations about our visit and they recognized the risks
involved. They obviously decided the potential benefits of our
visit justified taking the risks.
My Motivations for Going to the DPRK
I explained to our DPRK hosts my decision to accept Prof.
Lewis' invitation to join him on this trip. I have been
concerned about the ambiguities associated with the DPRK
nuclear program. I realize that some of the ambiguities may be
deliberate. However, ambiguities often lead to miscalculations,
and in the case of nuclear weapons related matters, such
miscalculations could be disastrous. So, I had hoped that as a
scientist I could help to bring some clarity to the DPRK
nuclear situation by visiting the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific
Research Center.
I also stated that I believe the role of scientists (and I
should add engineers) is very important to the diplomatic
process. I see three important roles. First, to bring clarity
to the issues so as to facilitate a diplomatic solution to the
nuclear crisis. Second, if a diplomatic solution is found,
scientists must help to implement any solution such as a freeze
or eventual denuclearization. Third, scientists will be crucial
to help verify any such solution. So, it is my hope that my
visit might be a small step in this direction.
Logistics of the Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research
Center
On Thursday, January 8, 2004, all five members of our
delegation visited the Center, which is near the town of
Yongbyon, roughly 100 km north of the DPRK capital of
Pyongyang. We were accompanied by Ambassador Li Gun, an
official from the General Bureau of Atomic Energy and a
security escort. We were greeted by Professor Dr. Ri Hong Sop,
Director of the Nuclear Scientific Research Center. The Center
reports to the General Bureau of Atomic Energy. Also present at
our introductory briefing were Choi Ku Man, assistant director
of the center, Li Yong ho, safeguards section head, Kim Haik
Soon, senior center researcher, Pak Chang Su, center
researcher.
At the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center,
Director Ri [Hong Sop] toured us through the following
facilities:
The Experimental Nuclear Power Plant (the DPRK name
for what we call the 5 MWe [5 megawatt electric]
reactor). We were toured through the control room and
the observation area for the reactor hall. This
facility is inside the first security area of the
Yongbyon facility. Our guide was Chief Engineer of the
facility, Li Song Hwan.
The spent fuel storage pool building next to the 5
MWe reactor, also guided by Chief Engineer Li Song
Hwan.
Drive by (twice) of the 50 MWe reactor site. Inside
the second high-security area of the Yongbyon facility.
Radiochemical Laboratory--3rd floor corridor that
allowed for viewing of the hot cell operations through
shielded glass windows and a conference room. (This
facility is also inside the second high-security area).
Our guide was Chief Engineer of the Radiochemical
Laboratory, Li Yong Song.
Guest House for introductory and wrap-up discussions
with Center facility leadership.
Our hosts drove us from Pyongyang to the Yongbyon facility.
We left the hotel at 8:30 a.m. and returned shortly before 7:00
p.m. We spent from 10:30 a.m. to 5:15 p.m. at the facility,
Observations From the Visit: What We Were Told and What We Saw
I will present my observations for each facility. I will
first summarize what we were told by the Center leadership
(shown in italics) and then summarize my observations (in
regular font). The director and the two chief engineers each
stated that it was U.S. actions that forced the DPRK to take
steps to resume nuclear operations.
The 5 MWe Reactor. They stated that they have restarted
only the Experimental Nuclear Power Plant (the 5 MWe reactor).
The plant was restarted in February 2003. It now is operating
smoothly at 100% of its rated thermal power. They are producing
electricity and heat from the reactor now for their town. The
reactor is the main source of heat for the town now that the
10,000 metric tons (tonnes) of heavy fuel oil supplied annually
to their region (as part of the 500,000 tonnes agreed to in the
Agreed Framework) has been cutoff.
We confirmed that the 5 MWe reactor is operating now. We
were shown the control room and the reactor hall. All
indications from the display in the control room are that the
reactor is operating smoothly now. The steam plume emanating
from the cooling tower [visible both in the morning and
afternoon] confirmed operation. However, we have no way of
assessing independently how well the reactor has operated
during the past year.
The length of time the reactor is expected to operate with
the current load of fuel depends on how the situation with the
United States develops. They do not have safety concerns about
running the reactor for a long time [implying years]. They
stated that some of the operational problems experienced
previously have been corrected. However, they are prepared to
reprocess the current fuel at any time.
We commented to our hosts that in addition to producing
electricity and heat the reactor is also producing new
plutonium. Best estimates are that under current reactor
operations approximately 6 kg of plutonium is produced annually
in the spent fuel.\1\ The reactor may currently contain
approximately 6 kg of plutonium in the spent fuel rods, and it
will continue to produce an additional 6 kg each year assuming
the reactor operates efficiently.
They stated that have one more charge of fuel for the
reactor fabricated now. The fuel fabrication facility is
partially operational and partially under maintenance. They are
in no hurry to fabricate more fuel since the two bigger
reactors under construction are not close to operation.
We did not have the opportunity to visit the fuel
fabrication facility. However, these comments are consistent
with previous U.S. estimates. In previous years, the fuel
fabrication complex was reported to be making fuel elements
containing about 100 tonnes per year of uranium. The complex is
believed to have produced enough fuel for the initial loading
of the core for the 50 MWe reactor under construction.
Moreover, the nominal capacity was appreciably
larger.\1\
50 MWe Reactor. They told us that construction stopped in
1994. They stated that at that time it was within one year of
completion. Nothing has been done since. They are currently
evaluating what to do with the reactor.
We drove past the 50 MWe reactor site twice. We confirmed
that there is no construction activity at this site. There were
no construction cranes on site. The reactor building looks in a
terrible state of repair. The concrete building structure
showed cracks. The steel exhaust tower was heavily corroded, as
was other steel equipment on the site. The building was not
closed up and resembled a deserted structure. The NSC director
expressed his great dismay about the deterioration of the
facility because of the eight-year freeze. This reactor is much
more than one year from completion now. It is not clear how
much of the current structure can be salvaged.
200 MWe Reactor at Tacheon. (This reactor site is 20 km
from Yongbyon.) They stated that construction also stopped in
1994. They are also evaluating what to do with the reactor.
This reactor location is at a different site. We were not
able to assess the current situation.
Spent Fuel Storage Building. They stated that they removed
all 8,000 fuel rods from the spent fuel storage pool and
shipped them to the Radiochemical Laboratory (plutonium
reprocessing facility) and reprocessed them [to extract the
plutonium]. The fuel rods were taken out of the pool in Korean
containers (metal baskets) and placed in specially shielded
shipping casks. During the removal of the fuel rods they found
that about half of the U.S. canisters had leaked during
storage. But they claimed not to have experienced major
problems getting the spent fuel rods out of the pool and
transporting them in special casks by truck daily to the
Radiochemical Laboratory for reprocessing.
These are the spent fuel rods that the DPRK had removed
from the 5 MWe reactor after it ceased operation in 1994 as
part of the Agreed Framework. In 1995, a few months after the
Agreed Framework was signed, preparations for the canning
began. The process turned out to be quite involved and was not
finished until June 2000. During this time, the United States
Department of State and Department of Energy (supported by the
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and the Nuclear Assurance
Corporation) worked jointly with the DPRK to package these rods
in 400 U.S. supplied stainless steel canisters to store safely
(with dry inert gas inside the canisters) in a deep pool of
water (for radiation shielding) to allow the radioactivity
level of the rods to decrease with time. This facility was
fitted with various devices and seals by IAEA inspectors to
ensure that the fuel rods would not be tampered with. However,
the IAEA inspectors were dismissed by the DPRK in December
2002. Only DPRK personnel have had access to the Nuclear
Scientific Research Center since that time.
Our initial look into the spent fuel pool showed that the
locking plates and associated structures that the U.S. Spent
Fuel Team had put in place after the canisters (loaded with the
8,000 fuel rods) were inserted into the pool were gone. We
immediately confirmed the fact that all fuel rods were no
longer in the pool because many of the canisters were missing
and many were open. The building was not heated, and we found a
thin sheet of ice on the pool surface. When I expressed concern
that some of the canisters were still closed, they took the
extraordinary step of allowing me to pick one at random and
open it [all done under water in the pool] to demonstrate that
there are no fuel rods remaining, even in the closed canisters.
The randomly selected canister did not contain any fuel rods
(it initially contained 20). This and other observations
convinced me that the spent fuel pool is empty; the fuel rods
are gone. It is possible that they moved the 8,000 fuel rods to
a different storage location. However, such storage would
represent a serious health and safety hazard. [During the tour
of the Radiochemical Laboratory, I asked if we could visit the
Dry Storage Building, which serves as the port of entry for the
fuel rods into that laboratory; they said that it was not
available for a tour because their was no activity, and there
were no workers in the building.]
Radiochemical Laboratory. They stated that they reprocessed
all 8,000 spent fuel rods in the Radiochemical Laboratory in
one continuous campaign, starting in mid-January 2003 and
finishing by the end of June 2003. They stated that their
capacity in the Radiochemical Laboratory is 375 kg uranium per
day (they said they worked four 6-hr shifts around the clock).
They later added that the reprocessing capacity of the facility
under normal operating conditions is 110 tonnes of spent
uranium fuel per year. Therefore, they were able to finish the
current campaign of 50 tonnes of spent fuel rods in less than
six months. They told us that we would tour the corridor next
to the hot cells in which the reprocessing occurs. The campaign
is complete; the facility is not operating now. Everything has
been cleaned up, and there is no radiation hazard in the
corridor.
At the Radiochemical Laboratory we confirmed that they
possessed an industrial scale reprocessing facility. The
facility appeared in good repair. They demonstrated the
requisite facilities, equipment, and technical expertise
required for reprocessing plutonium at the scale in question.
They use the standard PUREX (plutonium uranium extraction)
process for separating plutonium from the fission products and
uranium fuel. They answered all our technical questions about
the reprocessing chemistry very competently. We were not able
to see the glove boxes used for the final plutonium
purification and production. They indicated that these were
downstairs and not part of today's tour. In his book, Albright
stated that five glove boxes were used during this process to
produce plutonium dioxide product. He also reported that one or
two glove boxes may have been removed before inspectors were
permitted on site.\1\ These boxes could presumably have been
used to process plutonium dioxide [the typical plutonium
product from the reprocessing operation] into metal and to cast
or shape plutonium metal. Based on our tour we are not able to
confirm or deny that the facility operated during the first
half of 2003.
They stated that the Radiochemical Laboratory was built
through their own efforts. They began construction in 1986 and
the main parts were completed by 1990. At that time they ran a
``hot test'' of the facility with 80 fuel rods and natural
uranium rods to extract 60 grams of plutonium.
Albright reported that the hot test involved 86 fuel rods
irradiated in the 5 MWe reactor combined with 172 fresh fuel
rods. He also reported that in 1992 the DPRK presented
plutonium oxide containing about 62 grams of plutonium to the
IAEA inspectors. However, the total amount of plutonium
actually processed by the DPRK before IAEA inspections began in
1992 is still strongly disputed.\1\
When asked about the disposition of the waste stream, they
stated that the waste from the most recent reprocessing
campaign was mixed in with the waste from the ``hot test'' of
the 80 fuel rods processed in spring of 1990.
We were not able to visit the waste facilities and, hence,
cannot confirm this statement. Even if we had toured the
facility, we could not make a judgment without sophisticated
sampling and measurements of the nuclear wastes. However, this
type of information is important for tracing the reprocessing
history of the facility.
They stated that they initially intended to run the fuel
cycle for civilian purposes (which means they would have stored
the plutonium product as plutonium dioxide) but because of the
hostile U.S. actions, they reprocessed the entire campaign to
plutonium metal. They stated that this processing was done in
the Radiochemical Laboratory by installing some glove boxes
that were not present during IAEA inspections. It took them
three months to install the equipment and prepare it for the
plutonium metal processing step.
We were not able to see the glove boxes for the final
plutonium operations. However, their comments indicated that
they had glove boxes for plutonium metal production ready to
go. This indicates that they had experience making plutonium
metal before the IAEA inspections began in 1992. Albright \1\
estimated that the 8,000 spent fuel rods in question could
yield between 25 and 30 kg of plutonium metal.
Although we could not see the plutonium glove box
operations, they took the extraordinary step of showing us the
``product'' from what they claimed to be their most recent
reprocessing campaign. In a conference room following the tour,
they brought a metal case that contained a wooden box with a
glass jar they said contained 150 grams of plutonium oxalate
powder and a glass jar they said contained 200 grams of
plutonium metal for us to inspect.
The glass jars were fitted with a screw-on metal lid and
were tightly taped with transparent tape. (The plutonium's
alpha-radiation is easily stopped by the glass jar). The green
color of the plutonium oxalate powder is consistent with
plutonium oxalate that has been stored in air for some time.
The plutonium metal was a thin-walled (approximately \1/8\-inch
thick) funnel (approximately 2-inch diameter at the base and 1-
inch diameter at the top, approximately 1\1/2\ inches high)
that they claimed to have been scrap from a casting from this
reprocessing campaign. When asked about its density, they
responded, ``between 15 and 16 g/cubic centimeter and that it
was alloyed [a practice common in plutonium metallurgy to
retain the d-phase of plutonium which makes it easier to cast
and shape]. The metal surface and color were consistent with
moderately oxidized plutonium metal from a casting (I believe
it could not have been in the jar for a period of many weeks
because it did not show any loose oxide powder). I tried to get
a feel for the density and heat content of the alleged
plutonium metal by holding the glass jar in a gloved hand. The
glass jar (very thick walled) was reasonably heavy and slightly
warm (importantly, however, it was definitely not cold as was
everything else in this building). The bottom line is that with
the rather primitive tools at hand I was not able to
definitively identify the purported metal and the powder as
plutonium. It was radioactive, however, because a radiation
probe (which appeared to be a Geiger counter [Geiger-Muller
detector]) registered a count when turned on near the wooden
box containing the glass jars. With a few relatively simple
tests, we would be able to positively identify the product as
plutonium metal, but that was not possible to do during this
visit.
Furthermore, even if we could confirm that the product we
were shown is plutonium, we would not have been able to confirm
that it came from the most recent campaign without additional,
more sophisticated isotopic measurements that would let us
identify the age of the plutonium. The director of the NSC
confirmed this by stating, ``you would have to measure the
americium to plutonium-241 ratio to determine its age.'' He was
correct.
When asked about the isotopic content of the plutonium,
specifically its Pu-240 content, they stated, ``the plutonium-
240 content from this campaign is low, but we are not
authorized to tell you. The IAEA knows, you can ask them.'' We
were in no position to assess the isotopic content of the
plutonium produced or that shown to us.
They also stated that the plutonium metal was alloyed, but
they were not authorized to tell us what alloying element was
used [they did add, you know what it is, and we do it the
same]. We were in no position to tell whether or not the
plutonium metal shown to us was alloyed. However, the fact that
it was not cracked and that their specialists claimed that the
plutonium had a density between 15 and 16 grams/cubic
centimeter is consistent with plutonium alloyed with
approximately 1 weight percent of gallium or aluminum. A
calculation of the rough dimensions and weight is also
consistent with these values. However, the uncertainty in my
observations is very large.
Mr. Luse asked about a concern of yours Mr. Chairman; that
is, the security of their nuclear materials. Director Ri
responded, ``Be at ease with this problem. I am not authorized
to give you an explanation on this, but we feel certain that
the protection and safety--the security--are good.''
We were also told that the effects of another freeze or
decision to denuclearize would have devastating effects on the
work force. Director Ri indicated that all of his people,
including he, would have to look for new jobs.
Other observations and comments related to the nuclear issues
The DPRK ``deterrent.'' During follow-up discussions with
Ambassador Li and Vice Minister Kim in Pyongyang, they stressed
that the DPRK now has a nuclear deterrent and that U.S. actions
have caused them to strengthen their deterrent--both in quality
and in quantity. Ambassador Li inquired if what I had seen at
Yongbyon convinced me that they had this deterrent.
I explained to both of them that there is nothing that we
saw at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center that
would allow me to assess whether or not the DPRK possessed a
nuclear deterrent if that meant a nuclear device or nuclear
weapon. We found that both in our visit and in previous
declarations by the government of the DPRK that the term
``deterrent'' was used in a very ambiguous manner.
I explained that I view a ``deterrent'' to have at least
three components: (1) The ability to make plutonium metal, (2)
the ability to design and build a nuclear device, and (3) the
ability to integrate the nuclear device into a delivery system.
What we saw at Yongbyon was that they apparently have the
capability to do the first. However, I saw nothing and talked
to no one that allowed me to assess whether or not they have
the ability to design a nuclear device. And, of course, we were
not able to assess the integration into a delivery vehicle.
Moreover, during additional discussions I cautioned that
``deterrence'' might have worked between the United States and
the Soviet Union, two equally armed nuclear superpowers under
rather predictable circumstances. The concept of nuclear
deterrence may have little meaning for the U.S.-DPRK situation.
I asked Ambassador Li in the late morning of the last day of
our visit if I could meet individuals who could talk to me in
some detail about their ``deterrent'' in the spirit that I had
just described. He said he would try, but that evening told me
that the time was insufficient to make such arrangements.
Highly-Enriched Uranium Issue. In the Foreign Ministry, we
discussed the contentious issue of DPRK's supposed admission on
October 4, 2002, to having a clandestine highly enriched
uranium (HEU) program in violation of the letter and spirit of
the 1994 Agreed Framework. There is a controversy about whether
the DPRK admitted to having such a program at a meeting with
U.S. officials. The disagreement concerns a difference between
what DPRK officials believe they said and what U.S. officials
believe they heard. DPRK officials provided us with a copy of
the Korean text of what Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju said
at the meeting. Regardless of how this issue is eventually
clarified, one will still have to deal with the facts.
During our meeting, Mr. Pritchard stated, ``The key issue
is the intelligence that makes the United States believe that
the DPRK has an HEU program. In the U.S., there is the
widespread view that the complete, verifiable resolution of
this HEU issue is now mandatory. This is a practical issue, and
there must be a multilateral discussion to resolve it.'' In
response, Vice Minister Kim Gye Gwan stated that the DPRK had
no HEU program. Upon further questioning he stated that the
DRPK had chosen the plutonium path to a deterrent. It had no
facilities, equipment or scientists dedicated to an HEU
program, adding, ``We can be very serious when we talk about
this. We are fully open to technical talks.''
Concluding Remarks
Mr. Chairman, I would like to summarize my observations
based on our visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research
Center and discussions in Pyongyang.
The 5 MWe reactor has been restarted. It appears to
be operating smoothly providing heat and electricity,
while also accumulating approximately 6 kg of plutonium
per year in its spent fuel rods.
The 50 MWe reactor construction site appears to have
seen no activity since the IAEA inspectors were
instructed to leave in 2002. The reactor and the
construction site look in a bad state of repair. It
would require a major construction program to finish
the reactor.
The spent fuel pond is empty; the approximately
8,000 fuel rods have been moved.
The DPRK claimed to have reprocessed all 8,000 fuel
rods to extract plutonium metal during one continuous
campaign between mid-January 2003 and end of June 2003.
The 8,000 fuel rods are estimated to contain up to 25
to 30 kg of plutonium metal. We could not definitively
substantiate that claim. However, the Radiochemical
Laboratory staff demonstrated that they had the
requisite facility, equipment and technical expertise,
and they appear to have the capacity to do so.
It is possible that they moved the 8,000 fuel rods
to a different storage location. However, such storage
would represent a serious health and safety hazard.
We were shown what was claimed to be a sample of
plutonium metal product. I was not able to definitively
confirm that what we saw was actually plutonium metal,
but all observations I was able to make are consistent
with the sample being plutonium metal. However, even if
the sample were plutonium metal, I would not have been
able to substantiate that it was plutonium from the
most recent reprocessing campaign. Such a determination
requires more sophisticated measurements.
In the foreseeable future, the DPRK can produce 6 kg
of plutonium per year in its 5 MWe reactor. It easily
has the capacity to reprocess the spent fuel at any
time to extract the plutonium. It also has the capacity
to reload the reactor with fresh fuel for a second and
subsequent reloading. It is not, however, in a position
to increase the rate of plutonium production much
beyond 6 kg per year without a major construction
project at the 50 MWe or 200 MWe reactor sites,
something that would be difficult to do clandestinely.
Officials of the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs
claimed that the DPRK had weapons of mass destruction.
They believe that they provided us with evidence of
their ``deterrent.'' At Yongbyon, they demonstrated
that they most likely had the capability to make
plutonium metal. However, I saw nothing and spoke to no
one who could convince me that they could build a
nuclear device with that metal and that they could
weaponize such a device into a delivery vehicle. We
were not able to arrange meetings with DPRK staff who
may have such expertise or visit related facilities.
Officials of the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs
also stated categorically that the DPRK has no program
for enriching uranium. Moreover, they claim to have no
equipment and no scientific expertise to do so. We were
not able to substantiate these claims.
Let me close by stating that I shared these conclusions
with our DPRK hosts before my departure. I told them that my
observations still have uncertainties. I may be able to reduce
some of the uncertainties through discussions with other U.S.
specialists, with additional analysis, and through peer review.
I intend to do so and write a more comprehensive technical
report in the future. The response of the DPRK officials was
quitc positive although they had hoped that my conclusions
would be more definitive. They asked me to report my
observations as I presented them.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I found the trip to be remarkable.
Our DPRK hosts were most courteous and cooperative. I would
like to acknowledge the Albright/O'Neil book, Solving The North
Korean Nuclear Puzzle, the Report from the Department of State/
Department of Energy Spent Fuel Canning Team, and discussions
with several of my colleagues at Los Alamos, all of which
helped me to prepare for this visit. I hope that our findings
will contribute at least in some small way to a resolution of
the current nuclear crisis and the eventual denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula. Thank you for giving me the opportunity
to share our findings with you.
Note:
\1\ David Albright, Kevin O'Neill, editors. ``Solving the North
Korean Nuclear Puzzle,'' ISIS Reports, The Institute for
Science and International Security, Washington, D.C., 2000.