[Senate Prints 108-33]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


108th Congress                                                  S. Prt.
                            COMMITTEE PRINT                     
 1st Session                                                     108-33
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     




                       STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS:

                         STILL KEPT IN THE DARK

                        ABOUT HOMELAND SECURITY

                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                            prepared by the

                             MINORITY STAFF

                                 of the

         COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE


                                 -------
88-843              U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
                            WASHINGTON : 2003
____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpr.gov  Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512ï¿½091800  
Fax: (202) 512ï¿½092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402ï¿½090001


[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13


                            August 13, 2003

                   COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                   SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska                  JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio            CARL LEVIN, Michigan
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota              DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania          RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah              THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois        MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire        FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama           MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

           Michael D. Bopp, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
        Joyce Rechtschaffen, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
        Michael L. Alexander, Minority Professional Staff Member
                   Beth M. Grossman, Minority Counsel
                      Amy B. Newhouse, Chief Clerk

                            C O N T E N T S

                                 ------                                

                                                                   Page

Executive Summary................................................     1

    Background...................................................     1

    Recommendations..............................................     2

Introduction.....................................................     5

Defining the Challenge...........................................     6

The Role of the Department of Homeland Security..................     8

An Urgent Agenda For Reform: State and Local Information Needs 
  and How to Meet Them...........................................    11

    A Place at the Table.........................................    11

    Timely Threat and Watch List Information.....................    11

    Two-Way Flow.................................................    13

    Security Clearances..........................................    15

    Special Case of Special Needs: Fire Fighters.................    18

    Threat Advisory System.......................................    19

Recommendations: Repairing the Federal-Local Information Breach..    20


 
   STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS: STILL KEPT IN THE DARK ABOUT HOMELAND 
                                SECURITY

                              ----------                              


                           EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

    America's safety demands that state and local officials, 
especially law enforcement and public safety professionals--our 
front line defenders--are fully engaged in the war against 
terrorism. Yet almost 2 years after the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks, Governmental Affairs Committee (GAC) 
Minority staff found that these officials are being asked to 
fight the war against terrorism with incomplete and unreliable 
access to one of the most potent weapons in the homeland 
security arsenal: information.
    State and local first responders and first preventers still 
do not systematically receive from the Bush Administration the 
information they need to prevent or respond to another 
catastrophic terrorist attack, nor does vital information flow 
effectively from them to the federal government. These 
information gaps pose a significant challenge for the federal 
government and leaves the American people at unacceptable risk.
    This report contains the results of a staff investigation 
conducted at the request of Senator Joe Lieberman, Ranking 
Member of the Governmental Affairs Committee. Senator Lieberman 
asked GAC Minority staff to review the information needs of 
state and local officials and assess the progress of the Bush 
Administration in meeting those needs. Staff interviewed 
officials on the front lines in the fight against terrorism, 
while also reviewing reports, hearings, and other public 
information.
    State and local officials told staff that what they want 
most is to have a seat at the table as the administration 
grapples with homeland security protection. They need reliable 
and timely information about terrorist threats, individuals on 
federal terrorist watch lists, and investigations of suspected 
terrorists in their jurisdictions. Several officials told staff 
there is currently no effective mechanism for allowing hundreds 
of thousands of local law enforcement officials to 
systematically provide information to, or receive information 
from, the federal government. And, the federal government has 
barely even acknowledged the information needs of our nation's 
local fire fighters. This is extremely troublesome, especially 
because fire fighters nationwide are most communities first 
line of defense against conventional, chemical, radiological, 
and biological attacks.
    State and local officials also expressed frustration with 
the time it takes for them to receive security clearances 
necessary for access to classified information. And they 
believe that changes are needed in the color-coded Homeland 
Security Advisory System--a key piece of the federal 
government's strategy to communicate with state and local 
officials, as well as the public, about terrorist threats.
    Information that allows state and local officials to deter, 
prevent, mitigate, prepare, and if necessary respond to acts of 
terrorism--homeland security information--is difficult to 
quantify or define because it includes many different 
categories of information that is of varying interest to a host 
of different state and local officials. It ranges from publicly 
available information--for example about available federal 
resources to bolster homeland defenses--to highly classified 
intelligence information about terrorists available only to 
those with appropriate security clearances. Yet, understanding 
and systematically fulfilling these varying information needs--
while also ensuring that state and local officials can provide 
information to the federal government--is crucial to our 
homeland defense.
    The commitment has been made on paper. The administration's 
``National Strategy on Homeland Security'' released in July 
2002 included information sharing and systems as one of ``four 
foundations'' of homeland security success. And several 
provisions in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 establish 
Congress' intent to create a new paradigm of information 
sharing between the federal government and state and local 
agencies and officials.
    But the Bush Administration's rhetoric about making 
information sharing and systems a key to homeland security 
success has not translated into the kind of aggressive actions 
necessary to fundamentally change the status quo and protect 
the American people. The result of this lack of leadership is 
that many state and local officials--who also often lack the 
funding, training, and technology to counter terrorism--are 
left, if not entirely blind, straining to see the terrorist 
threat and how to respond to it.

RECOMMENDATIONS

    The Bush Administration must act now and forge an effective 
partnership with state and local officials. It must provide the 
aggressive leadership necessary to replace state and local 
officials' blindfolds with binoculars and to provide them with 
a seat at the homeland security table. Implementing the 
following recommendations will facilitate the information 
sharing necessary to create such a partnership:

1. Make Consolidated Federal Watch Lists Available to State and Local 
                    Law Enforcement Agencies

    The President should immediately issue an Executive Order 
to consolidate terrorism watch lists; the Department of 
Homeland Security should oversee the consolidation of all 
federal terrorism watch lists and provide state and local law 
enforcement officials the ability to check names against a 
consolidated list by the end of this year. Sufficient resources 
must be made available, and senior officials held accountable 
for getting the job done.

2. Build Information Bridges Between States and Localities

    DHS should encourage the creation of national and regional 
task forces (including multi-state task forces) as necessary 
(over the next year) to coordinate information sharing needs, 
bringing together state and local officials, including fire 
fighters, emergency management professionals, and police 
officers, as well as federal officials. These Task Forces 
should provide state and local officials a permanent ``seat at 
the table'' to ensure that information needs are addressed at 
all levels. DHS's Office of State and Local Government 
Coordination should also create a best practice database 
allowing localities to share and compare solutions to homeland 
security problems.

3. Overhaul the Security Clearance Process

    Provide the resources necessary to expedite security 
clearances for designated state and local officials--including 
appropriate fire officials--as nominated by governors and 
approved by DHS. Immediately assess the feasibility of 
requiring agencies to proactively recognize clearances issued 
by others for state and local officials, unless there are 
compelling security or law enforcement reasons not to do so. 
Establish a task force to review the security clearance process 
for state and local officials and report back in 6 months on 
ways to modernize it so that it meets the nation's needs in the 
war against terrorism.

4. Create In-State 24-Hour Command Centers

    Expedite the establishment of 24-hour operations centers in 
each state to provide connectivity and information sharing 
between the nation's 650,000 local law enforcement officers and 
federal agencies.

5. Refine the Homeland Security Threat Advisory System

    Immediately refine the Threat Advisory System to provide 
state and local officials specific information about terrorist 
threats and detailed guidance on how to respond to those 
threats. Put in place secure communications systems to inform 
key homeland security officials across the country of changes 
in the alert level and other information so they can start 
putting in place heightened protective measures.

6. Sharpen the DHS Office of State and Local Government Coordination 
                    (OSLGC)

    Immediately equip OSLGC adequately and task it with 
overseeing state and local information sharing issues. The 
OSLGC must make it a priority to ensure that DHS and other 
federal agencies meet the information needs of state and local 
officials.

7. Judge Federal Officials Based on How Well They Share Information

    Immediately revise federal agencies' performance management 
systems to reward information sharing. Senior officials should 
be evaluated, in part, on their success or failure in breaking 
down barriers to sharing information. Bonuses should be 
dependent, in part, upon making measurable progress in 
improving information sharing systems and processes, and 
special awards should be given to employees who demonstrate 
exemplary leadership and results in overcoming obstacles to 
sharing homeland security information.

8. Make Sharing Homeland Security Information a Top Priority

    Immediately make sharing homeland security information with 
state and local officials a high priority for DHS and other key 
agencies; assign the Deputy Secretaries or Chief Operating 
Officers responsibility for overseeing implementation, 
monitoring, and reporting on agency progress.

                              INTRODUCTION

    Since September 11, 2001, a consensus has emerged that to 
successfully defend against terrorism, federal agencies and 
officials must much more effectively share homeland security 
information with their state and local counterparts and receive 
from the ``front lines'' the vital information only those state 
and local officials can provide.
    Numbers alone illustrate the need for successful 
collaboration. Some 11 million law enforcement officials and 
first responders--police officers, firefighters, public health 
professionals, emergency medical technicians, and others--are 
spread throughout America, with advanced training, intimate 
knowledge of their communities, and their ears always to the 
ground. In contrast, far fewer federal personnel are involved 
in homeland security. Many of these federal personnel--some 
170,000--now work for the new Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS); approximately 11,500 work as FBI agents. But relatively 
few federal employees are ``on the beat,'' day after day, and 
in a nation this size, they constitute nowhere near the army 
needed to defend against the enemy in this unprecedented war on 
our home front. To the extent that we have a homeland security 
army, the overwhelming majority of foot soldiers on the front 
lines are from state and local governments.
    The homeland security information they need is difficult to 
define precisely, or to quantify, because it includes many 
different categories of information that is of varying interest 
to a host of different state and local officials. It ranges 
from publicly available information--for example about 
available federal resources--to highly classified intelligence 
information available only to those with appropriate security 
clearances. It could be information about ``best practices'' in 
a given homeland security area that should be widely shared 
among elected officials, or sensitive, yet unclassified 
information of primary interest to law enforcement officials. 
Understanding and systematically fulfilling these varying 
information needs is crucial to homeland defense.
    The Bush Administration does appear to be aware of the 
problem. In his letter accompanying the release of The National 
Strategy for Homeland Security in July 2002, President Bush 
states: ``This is a national strategy, not a federal 
strategy.''\1\ The strategy identifies ``information sharing 
and systems'' as one of four foundations essential to its 
success.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ George W. Bush, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 
introductory letter, July 2002. (http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/
book/nat-strat-hls.pdf)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite this recognition, however, real progress has been 
slow. In October 2002, a non-partisan task force on homeland 
security sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and led 
by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman released its 
final report, ``America Still Unprepared, Still in Danger.'' It 
warned that 650,000 state and local law enforcement officers 
``continue to operate in a virtual intelligence vacuum, without 
access to terrorist watch lists provided by the U.S. Department 
of State to immigration and consular officials.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Council on Foreign Relations, America--Still Unprepared, Still 
in Danger, October 2002, at 2. (http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Homeland--
TF.pdf)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Because America's safety demands that state and local 
officials are fully engaged as quickly as possible in the fight 
against terrorism, Senator Lieberman asked staff for the GAC 
Minority to review the information needs of state and local 
officials and the progress the Bush Administration was making 
in meeting those needs. GAC staff subsequently interviewed 
officials who are on the front lines in the fight against 
terrorism, and reviewed reports, hearings, and other public 
information.
    It quickly became clear that most police officers, fire 
fighters, and other first responders and first preventers 
continue to operate without the information they need from the 
federal government and have yet to be fully integrated into the 
President's recommended ``national strategy'' for homeland 
security. Though some progress has been made, the Bush 
Administration's stated commitment to making information 
sharing and systems one of its four foundations of homeland 
security success has thus far not been matched by the kind of 
action necessary to fundamentally change the status quo.
    A considerable amount of attention is necessarily focused, 
at the moment, on establishing information sharing systems 
within DHS. The administration faces a tremendous challenge 
integrating information systems and sharing information just 
among the agencies being merged into the Department. However, 
this is not an ``either/or'' challenge. Federal agencies, led 
by DHS, must simultaneously and aggressively forge a new 
culture, along with effective processes and systems, for 
sharing information with state and local officials. But thus 
far, the leadership necessary to fully bridge some crucial 
information gaps has not been forthcoming.
    The result of this lack of leadership by senior officials 
in the administration is that many state and local officials--
who also all too often lack the funding, training, and 
technology to counter terrorism--are left, if not entirely 
blind, straining to see the terrorist threat and how best to 
respond to it.

                         DEFINING THE CHALLENGE

    To defeat an enemy that operates on and targets our home 
soil, information must swiftly and reliably flow downstream 
from federal agencies to those officials in states and local 
communities who can act upon it. It must flow up--from states 
and localities to federal officials. It must move sideways--
from states and localities to other states and localities that 
need vital information. And, at the same time, it must flow 
horizontally among the numerous federal agencies with homeland 
security responsibilities.
    The reluctance of the federal intelligence community to 
allow information specific to the attacks of September 11, 2001 
to flow downstream has been well documented. In December 2002, 
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry (Joint 
Inquiry), stated:

        Serious problems in information sharing . . . 
        persisted, prior to September 11, between the 
        Intelligence Community and relevant non-Intelligence 
        Community agencies. This included other federal 
        agencies as well as state and local authorities. This 
        lack of communication and collaboration deprived those 
        other entities, as well as the Intelligence Community, 
        of access to potentially valuable information in the 
        ``war'' against Bin Ladin.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist 
Attacks of September 11, 2001, Final Report--Part 1, December 10, 2002, 
at 8.

    An October 2002 report, ``Protecting America's Freedom in 
the Information Age,'' prepared by a task force organized by 
the Markle Foundation, made clear that many months after the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
September 11 attacks, such problems still persisted:

        Several federal agencies have relationships with state 
        and local actors: the FBI and other federal law 
        enforcement agencies communicate regularly with law 
        enforcement personnel; FEMA has ties to state and local 
        first responders; the Department of Health and Human 
        Services interacts with the public health community. 
        But sharing is ad hoc and inconsistent. The local 
        entities often do not know what to share or with what 
        federal agency they should share it. federal agencies 
        often resist sharing information with state and local 
        entities because of concerns about operational security 
        and the potential for leaks.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Markle Foundation, Protecting America's Freedom in the 
Information Age, A Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force, October 
2002, at 70. (Http://www.markletaskforce.org/documents/Markle--Full--
Report.pdf) (Hereinafter ``A Report of the Markle Foundation Task 
Force.'')

    Cultural obstacles reinforce structural ones. At a GAC 
hearing on February 14, 2003, former Virginia Governor James 
Gilmore, who chairs the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic 
Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, cited a ``supreme and total distrust by the 
federal government authorities of the states and locals. The 
idea of sharing sensitive information with a police chief of a 
major jurisdiction or the governor of a state is anathema,'' 
said Gilmore. ``Progress is being made, but they are trying to 
break a cultural barrier and it is going to require dramatic 
leadership at the executive and congressional level to make 
that happen.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Governor James Gilmore, Testimony, Consolidating Intelligence 
Analysis: A Review of the President's Proposal to Create a Terrorist 
Threat Integration Center, Hearing Before the Governmental Affairs 
Committee, (S. Hrg. 108-54), February 14, 2003, at 20 (Printed Hearing 
Record Pending). (Hereinafter ``Gilmore testimony, GAC Hearing, 
February 14, 2003.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) 
has also called attention to the anti-sharing cultures in 
federal agencies, and reports more specifically:

        In some cases real, and in others only perceived, the 
        hierarchical organization of law enforcement and 
        intelligence agencies . . . leads to organizational 
        incentives against intelligence sharing and even anti-
        sharing cultures. At best, the disaggregation of 
        activity means that managers in one agency might not 
        imagine that others would find their intelligence data 
        useful. At worst, the structure creates an ``us'' 
        versus ``them'' mentality that stands in the way of 
        productive collaboration.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ International Association of Chiefs of Police Criminal 
Intelligence Sharing Summit, Report Draft, March 2002, at 5.

    Clearly, the Bush Administration must provide the 
aggressive leadership necessary for federal, state, and local 
governments to meet the challenge of sharing homeland security 
information with those who need it to secure our nation. As the 
Markle report noted, the intelligence and other information 
critical to homeland security ``will come from across the 
country and around the world,'' and while Washington, D.C. is a 
``critical node in that network,'' it is ``only one of many.'' 
The report states: ``To bring together this far-flung community 
of analysts and operators working directly on the problem is 
the real challenge.'' \7\ It is a challenge from which we must 
not shrink.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ A Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force, at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    In passing the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) 
(HSA or Act), Congress recognized the need for focused, 
sustained, and committed leadership to build better bridges 
between the federal government and state and local officials. 
The Act charges the Secretary of Homeland Security with 
facilitating the sharing of information between the federal 
government, state and local government personnel, and the 
private sector.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Homeland Security Act, Sec. 102(c). In addition to this 
requirement, Executive Order 13228 which established the Office of 
Homeland Security in October 2001 requires the Office to ``coordinate 
the strategy of the executive branch for communicating with the public 
in the event of a terrorist threat or attack within the United States. 
The Office also shall coordinate the development of programs for 
educating the public about the nature of terrorist threats and 
appropriate precautions and responses.'' (Executive Order 13228, Sec. 
3(i) (October 8, 2001), 66 Fed. Reg. 51812 (October 10, 2001)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Three specific mandates in the Act are particularly 
relevant. First, the HSA establishes an Office of State and 
Local Government Coordination (OSLGC) in the Office of the 
Secretary and makes it responsible for: coordinating the 
activities of the Department relating to state and local 
government; assessing and advocating for the resources needed 
by state and local government to implement the national 
strategy; providing state and local government with regular 
information, research, and technical support; and developing a 
process for receiving meaningful input from state and local 
government to assist the development of the national 
strategy.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \9\ Homeland Security Act, Sec. 801.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, the HSA requires the President to prescribe and 
implement procedures for federal agencies to share homeland 
security information with other agencies--including DHS--and 
with appropriate state and local personnel. These procedures 
are to address both classified and unclassified information. 
Each federal agency is required to designate one official to 
administer these provisions. The President is required to 
report to Congress on the implementation of these procedures, 
with recommendations to increase the effectiveness of sharing 
information between federal, state, and local entities, not 
later than November 25, 2003.\10\ The Bush Administration first 
issued an Executive Order delegating responsibility for 
prescribing the required procedures on July 29, 2003--9 months 
after the Act was passed, and 3 months before it is to report 
on its progress to the Congress.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Homeland Security Act, Sec. 892. The Homeland Security Act 
recognizes the disparate and complex requirements for information in 
the fight against terrorism. Sec. 892(b)(1) states: ``Under procedures 
prescribed by the President, all appropriate agencies, including the 
intelligence community, shall, through information sharing systems, 
share homeland security information with Federal agencies and 
appropriate State and local personnel to the extent such information 
may be shared, as determined in accordance with subsection (a), 
together with assessments of the credibility of such information.'' 
Sec. 892(b)(2) further provides that each information system shall 
``(A) have the capability to transmit unclassified or classified 
information, though the procedures and recipients for each capability 
may differ; (B) have the capability to restrict delivery of information 
to specified subgroups by geographic location, type of organization, 
position of a recipient within an organization, or a recipient's need 
to know such information; (C) be configured to allow the efficient and 
effective sharing of information; and (D) be accessible to appropriate 
State and local personnel.''
    \11\ Executive Order 13311, ``Homeland Security Information 
Sharing,'' (July 29, 2003) assigns to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security most of the President's responsibilities under Section 892 of 
the Act. Other functions are delegated to the Attorney General and the 
Director of Central Intelligence. 68 Fed. Reg. 45149 (July 31, 2003); 
see also http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030729-
10.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, the HSA also charges the intelligence unit within 
DHS with broad responsibilities for sharing homeland security 
information. These include: making recommendations to improve 
information sharing; administering the Homeland Security 
Advisory System; exercising primary responsibility for public 
advisories related to threats to homeland security; and 
providing advice about appropriate protective measures and 
counter measures to state and local government agencies and 
authorities, the private sector, other entities, and the 
public.
    The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
Directorate (IAIP) of the new Department was created 
specifically to establish a central location to integrate, 
analyze, and disseminate intelligence information related to 
terrorist threats across all levels of government, especially 
including state and local governments.\12\ The HSA also makes 
the IAIP responsible for ``coordinating training and other 
support to the elements and personnel of the Department, other 
agencies of the federal government, state and local governments 
that provide information to the Department, or are consumers of 
information provided by the Department, in order to facilitate 
the identification and sharing of information revealed in their 
ordinary duties and the optimal utilization of information 
received from the Department.'' \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Homeland Security Act, Sec. 201(d)(8) and (9). The Act makes 
the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection responsible, among other things, for reviewing, analyzing, 
and making ``recommendations for improvements in the policies and 
procedures governing the sharing of law enforcement information, 
intelligence information, intelligence-related information, and other 
information relating to homeland security within the federal government 
and between the federal government and state and local government 
agencies and authorities.'' The Under Secretary is also responsible for 
disseminating, ``as appropriate, information analyzed by the Department 
within the Department to other agencies of the federal government with 
responsibilities relating to homeland security, and to agencies of 
state and local governments and private sector entities with such 
responsibilities in order to assist in the deterrence, prevention, 
preemption of, or response to, terrorist attacks against the United 
States.''
    \13\ Homeland Security Act, Sec. 201(d)(16).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Rather than follow the mandate of the HSA and the 
recommendation of the Joint Inquiry to create an all-sources 
intelligence center within DHS,\14\ the administration has 
created a Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) that 
reports to the Director of Central Intelligence. Senator 
Lieberman, among others, has strongly criticized this decision 
for yielding to current cultural barriers rather than 
challenging them--and expressed concern that this arrangement 
may reinforce, rather than break down, information sharing 
walls with state and local officials. In a letter to President 
Bush on April 29, 2003, Lieberman wrote: ``The fundamental 
problem is that by placing the TTIC under the command of the 
Central Intelligence Agency and not the Department of Homeland 
Security, it will be removed from our government's daily 
efforts to improve domestic defenses, constrained by cultural 
and institutional rivalries between the CIA and the FBI, 
isolated from state and local governments, and unaccountable to 
the nation's top homeland security official.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist 
Attacks of September 11, 2001, Final Report--Recommendations, December 
10, 2002, at 4. The Joint Inquiry recommended that Congress and the 
Administration ``ensure the full development within the Department of 
Homeland Security of an effective all-source terrorism fusion center 
that will dramatically improve the focus and quality of counter 
terrorism analysis and facilitate the timely dissemination of relevant 
intelligence information, both within and beyond the boundaries of the 
Intelligence Community.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Secretary Ridge defended the administration's decisions 
relative to TTIC in a letter dated June 17, 2003--but, among 
other issues, he failed to adequately address one of Senator 
Lieberman's key concerns: as constituted, the TTIC, under the 
Director of Central Intelligence, would not effectively 
incorporate state and local law enforcement into anti-terror 
intelligence activities. In a response, Senator Lieberman noted 
that one of the primary lessons from the September 11, 2001 
attacks is that individuals outside the intelligence community, 
and even outside the federal government, might hold crucial 
pieces to the terrorist puzzle. He added, ``we will have a much 
better chance of stopping attacks if the threat analysis center 
effectively integrates and utilizes the knowledge, skills, and 
information of those [including state and local law 
enforcement] outside the intelligence community.'' \15\ The 
provisions in the HSA demonstrate Congress' intent to create a 
new paradigm of information sharing between the federal 
government, state, local agencies, and officials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Joseph I. Lieberman, letter to Secretary Tom Ridge, July 1, 
2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to the HSA, the President's National Strategy 
for Homeland Security, the National Strategy to Secure Cyber 
Space, and the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of 
Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets also acknowledge the 
importance of information sharing and identify key 
responsibilities for DHS. For example, the National Strategy 
for Homeland Security cites the need for DHS to ``integrate 
information sharing across state and local governments, private 
industry, and citizens.'' \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, July 2002, at 57. See also General Accounting Office, GAO-03-
715T, Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, 
Challenges, and Key Management Issues, testimony of Robert F. Dacey and 
Randolph C. Hite Before the Committee on Government Reform, House of 
Representatives, May 8, 2003, at 25-26 (discussing the information-
sharing responsibilities for DHS identified by each of the national 
strategy documents).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To solve these information challenges, federal officials 
must be held accountable for overcoming traditional thinking 
that places federal agencies at the top of the hierarchal 
organizational pyramid with non-federal agencies viewed as 
untrustworthy or otherwise not suited to be full partners in 
the effort to secure the nation. Organizational incentives 
against intelligence sharing must be swiftly identified and 
discarded. Perhaps most important, as Congress clearly 
intended, the President, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
and other senior administration officials must provide the 
leadership necessary to ensure that barriers to sharing 
information are systematically overcome.

AN URGENT AGENDA FOR REFORM: STATE AND LOCAL INFORMATION NEEDS AND HOW 
                              TO MEET THEM

A Place at the Table

    Governors, mayors, county officials, law enforcement 
officers, fire officials, medical, emergency management 
officials, and public health officials have general information 
needs in common, but also many demands that diverge 
significantly. For this reason, the Secretary must first and 
foremost ensure that state and local officials are fully 
included in the Department's decisionmaking process. Indeed, 
state and local officials told us that what they want most is 
to have a seat at the table as the administration grapples with 
homeland security protection.
    For example, Major General Timothy Lowenberg, the Adjutant 
General of the State of Washington and the state's homeland 
security director, said that while he was included in 
discussions that helped shape the initial, broad national 
homeland security strategy (which the administration released 
in July 2002), he had not been consulted in the development of 
subsequent strategies on physical infrastructure security and 
cyber security, which were released in February 2003. 
Expressing a common refrain among those interviewed by 
Committee staff, Lowenberg said, ``The only way the procedures 
[for information sharing] will be meaningful is if they bring 
us in.'' \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Staff Interview with Timothy Lowenberg, Adjutant General State 
of Washington, February 25, 2003 (``Lowenberg February 2003 
Interview'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``Bringing them in'' means more than occasional conference 
calls or interaction with federal officials based on personal 
relationships. State and local homeland security professionals 
interviewed by GAC staff emphasized the need for systematic and 
institutionalized communication and cooperation with federal 
officials. Yet these officials--especially law enforcement 
officers--more often credited personal relationships with 
federal officials (where they existed) rather than any well-
developed system for sharing information with facilitating 
their exchange of information with the federal government to 
date.\18\ This is consistent with the findings of a November 
2002 forum of federal and state law enforcement officials 
convened by the Police Executive Research Forum, a non-profit 
organization of law enforcement professionals. Participants in 
the forum ``acknowledged that barriers to information exchange 
exist in all law enforcement agencies, and at every level,'' 
and emphasized the importance of making information sharing 
strategies intrinsic to organizations, not based on personal 
relationships.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Staff Interview with John Skinner, Director, Intelligence 
Section, Baltimore Police Department, February 12, 2003 (``Skinner 
Interview''); Staff Interview with Karen Walton, Chief Operating 
Officer and other officials, New Haven, CT, March 5, 2003 (``Walton 
Interview''); Staff Interview with Benjamin Barnes, Director, Office of 
Public Safety, Health and Welfare, Stamford, CT, March 7, 2003.
    \19\ Gerald R. Murphy and Martha R. Plotkin, Police Executive 
Research Forum, Protecting Your Community From Terrorism: The 
Strategies for Local Law Enforcement Series, March 2003, at 7.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Timely Threat and Watch List Information

    Localities and states need reliable and timely information 
about terrorist threats, about individuals on federal terrorist 
watch lists, as well as about the investigations of suspected 
terrorists within their jurisdictions.
    Local law enforcement officials with whom GAC staff spoke 
described examples of being left out of the intelligence and 
information loop. Sheriff Ralph Ogden of Yuma County, Arizona, 
said he receives far too little information from federal 
intelligence on threats to specific targets or facilities in 
his jurisdiction.\20\ Sheriff David Huffman of Catawba County, 
North Carolina told staff: ``We need the details of the 
particular incident that caused the [terrorist threat] alert to 
be given in the first place.'' \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Staff Interview with Ralph Ogden, Sheriff, Yuma County, 
Arizona, February 24, 2003 (``Ogden Interview'').
    \21\ Staff Interview with David Huffman, Sheriff, Catawba County, 
North Carolina, February 25, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Major General Lowenberg of Washington State told GAC staff 
that he too lacked sufficient intelligence and threat 
information from the federal government.\22\ Just as 
importantly, Lowenberg explained that state public health 
officials especially lack secure methods to communicate with 
the federal government. For example, he explained that, were 
the Centers for Disease Control or the Plum Island Animal 
Disease Center to confirm the presence of a plague, there would 
be no way to communicate that information to states except 
through open source, unsecured transmission methods. He said 
that, to date, there simply has been ``no provision''--in terms 
of prioritization or resource allocation--for a secure 
communications infrastructure to share information about such 
biothreats with public health officials.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Lowenberg February 2003 Interview, note 17 above.
    \23\ Staff Interview with Timothy Lowenberg, Adjutant General State 
of Washington, May 20, 2003 (``Lowenberg May 2003 Interview'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Some of the most vital streams of information to which 
state and local officials are not now privy are the 12 
terrorism watch lists separately maintained by the State 
Department and 8 other federal agencies. Watch lists are 
basically automated databases--supported by analytical 
capabilities--that contain a wide variety of identifying data 
such as name, date of birth, and biographical data about 
suspected terrorists.\24\ When utilized effectively, watch 
lists can be effective tools to keep terrorists out of our 
country or find them once they are inside our borders. In fact, 
we know today that 2 of the 19 September 11 hijackers should 
have been placed on the watch list as long as 20 months before 
the attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ General Accounting Office, GAO-03-322, Information Technology: 
Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated to Promote Better 
Integration and Sharing, April 2003, at 3. (Hereinafter ``GAO Report, 
Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated to 
Promote Better Integration and Sharing'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, as these databases are currently constituted, 
local officials cannot efficiently access them to detect 
potential terrorists once they may be within America's borders. 
The reason is simple: nearly 2 years after September 11, the 
Bush Administration has yet to consolidate and integrate the 
watch lists maintained by different agencies, much less 
systematically share the information on them with appropriate 
state and local officials. Consequently, when making routine 
stops, police officers cannot search a consolidated federal 
watch list to determine whether an individual is suspected of 
terrorism.
    In an April 2003 briefing on the efforts to consolidate the 
information on these lists and make them available to local law 
enforcement agencies, GAC staff was informed that the 
administration has yet to even make a formal policy decision to 
consolidate the lists--despite the fact that CIA Director 
George Tenet testified to Congress twice, in June and October 
of last year, that a national watch list center was being 
created that would correct the failures and lapses of the 
past.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ George Tenet, written testimony, Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence and House Permanent Committee on Intelligence Joint 
Inquiry into the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks, June 18, 2002, 
at 19, and October 17, 2002, at 18. (Testimony available in the 
Governmental Affairs Committee files.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    An April 30, 2003 report by the General Accounting Office 
(GAO) confirmed the lack of progress. GAO said that much of the 
data contained in the watch lists is still not being shared 
among federal agencies, much less with state and local law 
enforcement agencies. GAO found that terrorist watch lists 
compiled by nine federal agencies are frequently incompatible 
with one another and cannot be merged or compared easily. In 
addition, GAO stated that the agencies reported that they 
received no direction from the White House Office of Homeland 
Security identifying the needs of the government as a whole in 
this area. As a result, ``Federal agencies do not have a 
consistent and uniform approach to sharing watch list 
information.'' \26\ In July 2003, a senior administration 
official reported to GAC Minority staff that there had been no 
progress towards consolidating the watch lists.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ GAO Report, Information Technology, Terrorist Watch Lists 
Should Be Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and Sharing, note 
24 above, at 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To protect the American people, state and local officials 
need access to this information--and from a single source. For 
example, Sheriff Ogden said he needs a ``clearinghouse for 
federal databases, a one-stop-shop'' where he can get 
information about deportations, prosecutions, and apprehensions 
by the Border Patrol. Now, he and other local law enforcement 
officials around the country have to try and access many 
different databases. However, they need the ability to find out 
immediately if someone who has been stopped in their 
jurisdiction is of interest to other agencies.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ Ogden Interview, note 20 above.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two-Way Flow

    Local officials can and must be much more than recipients 
of information. Our 650,000 law enforcement officers nationwide 
should be leveraged by the federal intelligence and law 
enforcement authorities as hunters and gatherers of 
intelligence--as ``force-multipliers.'' After all, these local 
officials know the people and vulnerabilities within their 
communities; they know the norms and consequently understand 
what is not normal; and they encounter individuals during 
routine activities that may also be of legitimate interest to 
federal agencies. Any successful information sharing strategy, 
therefore, must focus both on pushing vital counter terrorism 
intelligence and information quickly and effectively upstream 
from the thousands of state and local officials to the feds, as 
it does sending data downstream.
    Yet, several officials told us there is currently no 
effective mechanism allowing hundreds of thousands of local law 
enforcement officials to systematically provide information to 
or receive information from the federal government. To fix this 
serious flaw, in February Senator Lieberman called for the 
establishment of a 24-hour operations center in each state that 
would serve as a conduit for sending information from local 
officials to the federal government and back--a suggestion made 
by James Kallstrom, formerly a 28-year veteran of the FBI and 
currently Senior Executive Vice President at MBNA Bank America 
and Senior Advisor for Counter Terrorism to the Governor of New 
York. Kallstrom contends that the vast majority of the nation's 
local law enforcement officers ``are virtually not a part of 
the war against terrorism.'' \28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ Staff Interview with James Kallstrom, Senior Advisor for 
Counter Terrorism to the Governor of New York, February 27, 2003 
(``Kallstrom Interview'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To facilitate communication with local law enforcement, the 
FBI has established some 66 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) 
around the country, which typically consist of representatives 
of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies working 
together to deter, counter, or respond to acts of terrorism. 
The JTTFs play an important role in allowing law enforcement 
information to be exchanged and investigations to be 
coordinated across different jurisdictions and levels of 
government. However, GAC staff was informed by some officials 
that while JTTFs are useful, they do not provide information to 
many state and local law enforcement officials who are critical 
in the war against terrorism. JTTFs are not helpful to many of 
the police officers who must be engaged in combating terrorism 
because the classified information JTTFs handle cannot be 
shared with those who lack security clearances; and systems to 
declassify, where appropriate, and share the information are 
not in place.
    For example, in New York State, JTTFs include about 250 
police officers. However, approximately 69,000 others are not 
part of the task forces. Kallstrom believes that we need to 
``train and provide relevant information to the rest of the 
cops.'' He said that nationally, ``we're not asking or tasking 
or allowing 99.9% of police to have any impact in counter 
terrorism.'' \29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The federal government must also take steps to facilitate 
the flow of homeland security information among other 
jurisdictions. Terrorist attacks pay no heed to distinctions or 
boundaries between state and local jurisdictions. However, to 
protect the public, state and local governments must overcome 
walls of separation among themselves. For example, Major 
General William Cugno, the Adjutant General of Connecticut who 
has lead agency responsibility for developing and coordinating 
counter terrorism and domestic preparedness for the state, said 
that even though Connecticut is next to New York, there is 
currently no forum where officials of the two states can 
systematically share emergency operations and management 
information. Although both states participate in and share 
information through national organizations, such as the 
National Emergency Management Association and the Adjutant 
General's Association, Cugno said more direct participation and 
interaction is lacking. He noted, for example, that while 
Connecticut would be greatly affected by an evacuation of New 
York City, there are no coordinated efforts, resources, or 
requirements that would include Connecticut in New York's 
evacuation planning.\30\ With over 50,000 state and local 
jurisdictions in America, the task of coordinating various 
domestic defense information requirements demands strong 
federal leadership.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Staff Interview with William Cugno, Adjutant General State of 
Connecticut, May 29, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Markle Foundation recommends establishing task forces 
that include ``all key actors from the federal, state and local 
governments and the private sector to facilitate local, real 
and virtual communities'' and a central leadership role for the 
DHS.\31\ The report states:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ A Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force, note 4 above, at 
51.

        First, states must begin organizing themselves to 
        gather and share information more effectively. Second, 
        the federal government needs one entity responsible for 
        coordinating its role in this effort. . . . There 
        currently is no coordinated strategy in the federal 
        government for interaction with state and local 
        entities.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ Id., at 75.

    A critical need is for mechanisms to ensure that state and 
local jurisdictions do not waste precious time and resources by 
unnecessarily reinventing the wheel. For example, Jack Weiss, a 
Los Angeles City Councilman, told GAC staff that local 
officials are often left to figure out complex homeland 
security challenges without the benefit of knowing what is 
happening in other areas. He believes OSLGC at DHS should help 
overcome this challenge by actively facilitating the sharing of 
best practices.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ Staff Interview with Jack Weiss, Los Angeles City Councilman, 
February 5, 2003. Some of the other officials with whom GAC staff spoke 
noted that some best practices information was already being collected 
by disparate organizations, including police and firefighters' 
associations and the National Governors Association's Center for Best 
Practices. OSLGC could play an important role in pulling this 
information together in one place.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security Clearances

    The challenge of sharing homeland security information with 
state and local officials cannot be met without dramatic 
changes in the procedures the government now uses to grant 
security clearances. The security clearance process--designed 
to determine access on a need-to-know basis to classified 
national security information--has been focused mostly on 
federal employees, applicants, and contractors. Until now, 
state and local officials haven't had a significant place in 
the process. But the war on terrorism has changed the 
landscape. According to the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS), addressing this new situation means providing official 
security clearances for non-federal officials and elected 
public officials at any level as standard policy, requirements 
that are ``unprecedented in their scope.'' \34\ A report by CRS 
explains:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ Frederick M. Kaiser, Congressional Research Service, Access to 
Classified Information: Seeking Security Clearances for State and Local 
Officials and Personnel, Government Information Quarterly, forthcoming 
Summer 2003. (Hereinafter ``Frederick M. Kaiser, CRS, Access to 
Classified Information'').

        Because of the absence of standardized security 
        clearance requirements, high-ranking state and local 
        public officials--mayors, municipal chiefs of police, 
        county executives, sheriffs, and even governors, in 
        some instances--have been denied certain information; 
        and those who have received it may not have been able 
        to share it with their colleagues, even officials who 
        otherwise outranked or supervise them. This condition 
        has existed, in large part, because their need for 
        classified national security information has been 
        narrow and circumscribed--confined, for instance, to 
        nuclear weapons facilities or certain defense 
        establishments within their jurisdictions. The 
        heightened priority to combat terrorism, by contrast, 
        has broadened the boundaries.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ Id.

    The National Governors Association's Center for Best 
Practices has also cited the need for expanded access to 
information, stating: ``Governors and other high-ranking 
officials must receive timely and critical intelligence related 
to terrorist threats. Granting security clearances to certain 
state and local personnel using a compartmented, need-to-know 
system would facilitate securing sharing of critical 
intelligence.''\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ National Governors Association, NGA Center for Best Practices, 
States Homeland Security Priorities, Issue Brief, August 9, 2002, at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congress recognized this necessity in the HSA, which 
states, ``The needs of state and local personnel to have access 
to relevant homeland security information to combat terrorism 
must be reconciled with the need to preserve the protected 
status of such information and to protect the source and 
methods used to acquire such information.'' The HSA notes that 
granting security clearances to certain state and local 
personnel is one way to facilitate the sharing of information 
regarding specific terrorist threats among federal, state, and 
local levels of government.\37\ The Act requires the President 
to prescribe procedures under which federal agencies may share 
classified homeland security information with appropriate state 
and local personnel, and expresses the sense of the Congress 
that such procedures may include ``carrying out security 
clearance investigations with respect to appropriate State and 
local personnel.'' \38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ Homeland Security Act, Sec. 891(a)(5) and (6).
    \38\ Homeland Security Act, Sec. 892(c)(1) and (2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    GAC staff interviews with state and local officials 
revealed their continuing frustration over the lack of security 
clearances and therefore, their limited access to classified 
information.
    The problem has reached as high as governors' mansions. 
Former Virginia Governor Gilmore testified at a Joint Inquiry 
hearing on October 1, 2002 that, in his 4 years as Governor 
(1998-2002), he never received any intelligence or law 
enforcement information regarding terrorists and never received 
a security clearance that would have allowed him to be briefed 
on possible terrorist plots.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ Governor James Gilmore, Testimony, Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence and House Permanent Committee on Intelligence Joint 
Inquiry, October 1, 2002, unpublished transcript at 135. (Testimony 
available in the Governmental Affairs Committee files.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A leading emergency management official in one state 
provided a stark example of why urgent change is needed: a 
critical private sector asset whose disruption by terrorists 
would cause tremendous damage to the nation is located in his 
state. He is aware of this because he has the appropriate 
security clearances. Yet, the official was not able to inform 
the governor of the vulnerability because more than a year and 
a half after being elected to office, the governor was still 
awaiting appropriate clearances.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ Staff Interview with Emergency Management Official, February 
2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The security clearance gaps frustrate common-sense efforts 
to safeguard significant vulnerabilities. According to Major 
General Timothy Lowenberg, the Adjutant General of Washington 
State, even if he were to receive classified information about 
a bio-threat, he would not be allowed to share it with the top 
public health official in his state because that official does 
not have the required security clearances. He also noted the 
irony that, while the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) has funded equipment for secure audio, video, and data 
communications in state emergency operations centers, as well 
as installed secure equipment for governors, in many cases the 
equipment cannot be used because too few state emergency 
management officials have clearances.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ Lowenberg May 2003 Interview, note 23 above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As noted earlier, an important link between state and local 
law enforcement is the FBI's JTTFs. But their usefulness is 
limited because governors, mayors, attorneys general, many 
other law enforcement officers, fire fighters, and others who 
sometimes need access to classified information are typically 
not included in JTTFs.
    Another problem is how quickly and efficiently the 
clearances are approved. For years, the security clearance 
approval process has been beset by bureaucratic complexity and 
delays which now frustrate the ability of federal officials to 
leverage the strengths of state and local law enforcement, and 
vice versa. Reports by CRS, the GAO, the Department of Defense 
Inspector General, and others have documented a host of 
concerns, including: a sizeable and growing backlog in 
background investigations; substantial and rising costs in time 
and resources associated with such investigations; failure to 
comply with investigative standards; duplications and delay in 
adjudications; and continued outdated and disjointed governing 
authorities and the resulting confusion for both administrators 
and applicants.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ Frederick M. Kaiser, Congressional Research Service 
Memorandum, Security Clearance Program: An Overview, February 27, 2003, 
at 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Bush Administration asserts that it is making progress 
in clearing up the backlog of security clearance applications. 
For example, at a February 26, 2003 GAC hearing, Pasquale J. 
D'Amuro, Executive Assistant Director of the FBI for 
Counterterrorism, said that the Bureau had received over 1,200 
requests for Top Secret level security clearances from state 
and local law enforcement officers and approved 936 of them for 
officers working in the Bureau's JTTFs.\43\ Governors have also 
now signed non-disclosure agreements with DHS, allowing them to 
receive certain classified information over secure equipment 
that has been installed using grants from FEMA. FEMA is also 
working on clearances for state homeland security advisors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ Pasquale J. D'Amuro, Testimony, Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee Hearing, Consolidating Intelligence Analysis: A Review of the 
President's Proposal to Create a Terrorist Threat Integration Center, 
(S. Hrg. 108-54) February 26, 2003, at 58 (Printed Hearing Record 
Pending).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, much more remains to be done. For example, many 
state and local officials do not realize--until learning it 
through difficult experience--that a high-level clearance 
issued by one federal agency does not mean that the individual 
is cleared for all agencies. A March 2003 report by the Police 
Executive Research Forum cited the example of one local 
official who had two federal security clearances, but not one 
from the FBI. As a result, the FBI would not share classified 
information with him. Another executive had a Top Secret 
clearance from the National Guard, but only a Secret clearance 
from the FBI. The report did note that, as a result of the 
session, participants learned ``that is it possible to have one 
federal agency transfer its security clearance to another 
federal agency immediately if the applicant makes a request.'' 
\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ Murphy and Plotkin, Police Executive Research Forum Report, 
March 2003, at 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At a May 15, 2003 GAC hearing, Governor Mitt Romney of 
Massachusetts recommended that security clearances be 
standardized--perhaps within DHS--and made reciprocal between 
agencies and levels of government. Romney also recommended that 
the process for federal security clearances should be 
expedited.\45\ Clearly far too little, if any, progress has 
been made on these recommendations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\ Mitt Romney, written testimony, Governmental Affairs Committee 
Hearing, Investing in Homeland Security: Challenges Facing State and 
Local Governments, (S. Hrg. 108-83), May 15, 2003, at 9. (Printed 
Hearing Record Pending)

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Special Case of Special Needs: Fire Fighters

    GAC staff found that the federal government has barely even 
acknowledged the information needs of our nation's local fire 
fighters. This is extremely troubling, especially because fire 
departments nationwide are most communities' first line of 
defense against conventional, chemical, radiological, and 
biological attacks; many of their needs for advanced equipment 
and training also have not been met; and budgetary strains are 
stretching the personnel and resources of these departments 
thinner than ever.
    Peter Gorman, a captain in the Fire Department of New York, 
pointed out that while fire fighters are often the first of the 
first responders to arrive after an incident, they are 
typically not brought into the information loop until after 
they are called upon to respond. Gorman used the example of a 
potential attack with a ``dirty bomb'' or the release of poison 
gas in a subway: if intelligence agencies have reason to 
believe that such an attack could occur, fire fighters need to 
know in advance to effectively prepare and deploy resources for 
the eventuality. He believes that senior fire officials--not 
just those who have law enforcement powers--should also have 
top-level security clearances and participate in JTTFs.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ Staff Interview with Peter Gorman, Captain, Fire Department of 
New York, February 26, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Major Marc Bashoor, Commander of the Prince George's 
County, Maryland Fire Department's Special Operations Division, 
expressed similar sentiments. He agreed that many fire fighters 
with a need to know are ``not in the loop.'' Bashoor explained 
that even though he is head of the County's hazardous materials 
and bomb squad, he cannot receive classified intelligence 
information: for example, he is not eligible to receive 
classified information about the latest mechanisms terrorists 
may be using to deliver explosives. He said a fire detective 
with law enforcement powers represents the department on the 
JTTF, but that the representative typically cannot share what 
he learns. Bashoor does not believe fire fighters need 
information about terrorism investigations (the primary 
information shared in JTTFs), nor does every fire fighter 
necessarily need certain intelligence information. But current 
obstacles, especially lack of security clearances, leave many 
that do have a need to know out of touch. Bashoor noted that 
knowledge about the weapons that terrorists plan to use 
eventually may be shared in training sessions--but it may take 
``a year or two'' before the information is included. Right 
now, he said, information that would be very useful to bomb 
squads and hazardous materials teams ``just doesn't get to 
us.'' Bashoor is not aware of any federal initiatives to 
understand, much less address, these information needs.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ Staff Interview with Marc Bashoor, Commander Special 
Operations Division, Prince George's County, Maryland Fire Department, 
May 19, 2003.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Threat Advisory System

    The color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System is a key 
piece of the federal government's strategy to communicate with 
state and local officials, as well as the public, about 
terrorist threats. Yet GAC staff interviews with these 
officials made clear that, as currently implemented, the 
present system operates more like a blunt instrument than a 
sharp information tool. A change in the alert level may now 
raise officials' general ``level of vigilance,'' but without 
more pointed information on what prompted the change or more 
specific federal instructions on precise steps that might be 
taken to protect people from the threat, state and local 
officials are limited in knowing where to focus their efforts.
    Officials in New Haven, Connecticut stressed that they 
needed a description of the reason the alert level has been 
elevated and that officials at the local level needed to know 
what a change in alert status means to them.\48\ As John 
Skinner, Director of the Intelligence Section of the Baltimore 
Police Department summed it up, the limited information 
currently provided by the alert is simply ``not actionable.'' 
\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ Walton Interview, note 18 above.
    \49\ Skinner Interview, note 18 above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another troubling aspect of the current alert system is how 
word of it travels--or fails to travel. At an April 9, 2003 GAC 
hearing on homeland security challenges facing first 
responders, witnesses--including the Police Chief of Dover 
Delaware, Fire Chief of Arlington, VA, and a Prince Georges 
County, MD Fire Captain--all indicated that they first heard 
the alert level was being raised in March through the news 
media, rather than through official channels.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ Jeffrey Horvath, Ed Plaugher, Chauncey Bowers, Testimony, 
Governmental Affairs Committee Hearing, Investing in Homeland Security, 
Challenges on the Front Lines, (S. Hrg. 108-82), April 9, 2003, at 31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After terrorist attacks killed over 75 people in Saudi 
Arabia and Morocco, the alert level was raised from Code Yellow 
to Orange, for the fourth time, on May 20, 2003. As CNN 
reported the news, it noted that officials were at that very 
moment contacting state and local officials to inform them of 
the decision. Clearly, the internal distribution channels 
necessary to fully and timely inform those officials with key 
homeland security responsibilities about heightened terrorist 
threats still have not been established. This leaves local 
officials in a reactive, not proactive, mode from the very 
start.

    RECOMMENDATIONS: REPAIRING THE FEDERAL-LOCAL INFORMATION BREACH

    The Bush Administration must act now and provide the 
aggressive leadership necessary to replace state and local 
officials' blindfolds with binoculars and to provide them with 
a seat at the homeland security table. America needs a 
proactive, energized, and well-informed front line of defense 
that works in seamless partnership with the federal government 
in order to protect its people from terrorism. Implementing the 
following recommendations will facilitate the information 
sharing necessary to create such a partnership:

1. Make Federal Watch Lists Available to All State and Local Law 
                    Enforcement Agencies.

        CHALLENGE: The frontline ``first preventers'' in the 
        war against terrorism lack simple, streamlined access 
        to the federal databases that are most valuable in the 
        effort to identify and apprehend terrorists.

    All units in post-war Iraq were given a pack of playing 
cards with the names and faces of top officials from Saddam 
Hussein's regime and the Ba'ath party. Yet, with a constantly 
changing roster of suspects to potentially apprehend, the 
frontline soldiers in the war against terrorism here at home 
are not provided with clear and simple access to federal 
terrorism watch lists. Twenty-one months after the September 
11, 2001 attacks, the administration still has yet to 
consolidate the 12 watch lists maintained at 9 different 
agencies, frustrating the efforts of state and local law 
enforcement, and federal officials, to readily access the 
information they contain. It is imperative that the 
administration makes these issues a priority, set a timetable 
for completion, and ensure accountability.

        RECOMMENDATION: The President should immediately issue 
        an Executive Order to consolidate terrorism watch 
        lists; the Department of Homeland Security should 
        oversee the immediate consolidation of all federal 
        terrorism watch lists and provide state and local law 
        enforcement officials the ability to check names 
        against a consolidated watch list by the end of this 
        year. Specific goals and timetables must be set, 
        resources made available, and senior officials held 
        accountable for getting the job done.

2. Build Information Bridges Between States and Localities.

        CHALLENGE: States and localities still operate far too 
        much as information islands, in relative isolation from 
        their neighbors. Cities, counties, and states also have 
        few resources to learn what their counterparts around 
        the country are doing to effectively protect their 
        localities.

    To ensure that homeland security information is shared 
effectively, the federal government must also help to establish 
mechanisms to build information bridges among states, and among 
states and localities. This includes ensuring that best 
practices are documented and shared, facilitating the 
establishment of mutual aid agreements which cross states and 
jurisdictions, and providing fora where state and local 
officials can work closely with each other, and with federal 
officials, to identify and systematically address all homeland 
security information sharing needs.

        RECOMMENDATION: Charge DHS with encouraging, over the 
        next year, the creation of national and regional task 
        forces (including multi-state task forces) as 
        necessary. These task forces should bring state and 
        local officials, including fire fighters, emergency 
        management professionals, and police officers, as well 
        as federal officials, together to coordinate their 
        information sharing needs and provide state and local 
        officials a permanent seat at the table to ensure that 
        information needs are addressed at all levels. DHS's 
        Office of State and Local Government Coordination 
        should also create a best practices database allowing 
        localities to share and compare solutions to homeland 
        security problems.

3. Overhaul the Security Clearance Process

        CHALLENGE: Many state and local officials who need 
        high-level information access lack the necessary 
        federal security clearances to do what their job--and 
        our safety--demands.

    The current processes for providing security clearances are 
burdened by backlogs; various agencies do not routinely 
recognize clearances issued by others; and key state and local 
officials must often wait months before a clearance is granted. 
In essence, the security clearance process that served our 
nation when the primary threats were abroad must be reoriented 
to address information sharing challenges in the war against 
terrorism.

        RECOMMENDATIONS: Provide the resources necessary to 
        expedite clearances for designated state and local 
        officials--including appropriate fire officials--as 
        nominated by governors and approved by DHS. Immediately 
        assess the feasibility of requiring agencies to 
        proactively recognize clearances issued by others for 
        state and local officials, unless there are compelling 
        security or law enforcement reasons not to. Establish a 
        task force to review the security clearance process for 
        state and local officials and report back in 6 months 
        on ways to modernize it so that it meets the nation's 
        needs in the war against terrorism.

4. Create In-State 24-Hour Command Centers

        CHALLENGE: States lack a single point of contact for 
        both receiving ``downstream'' information needs and 
        pushing intelligence and other information 
        ``upstream.''

    New York's Counter Terrorism Advisor, James Kallstrom, has 
urged creation of 24-hour command centers in each state to 
serve as hubs merging police on the front lines with state and 
federal agencies, especially DHS. Construction of such a center 
is now underway in New York. Similarly, the State of Georgia, 
with some federal funds from the Justice Department, has 
created the Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center. 
Its priority is to organize existing state and local law 
enforcement resources into a statewide intelligence gathering 
and sharing network.\51\ As Kallstrom points out, to be 
effective, these centers must be closely coordinated with 
federal agencies through DHS.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\ State of Georgia, Department of Public Safety, October 9, 
2002. (http://www.gahomeland-security.com)
    \52\ Kallstrom Interview, note 28 above.

        RECOMMENDATION: Expedite the establishment of 24-hour 
        operations centers in each state to provide 
        connectivity and information sharing between the 
        nation's 650,000 local law enforcement officers and 
        federal agencies.

5. Refine the Homeland Security Threat Advisory System

        CHALLENGE: The current advisory system offers little 
        guidance to local officials on what specific steps they 
        should take to guard against specific threats.

    The Homeland Security Advisory System, which the 
administration itself admits is still a work in progress, may 
raise and lower officials' general level of vigilance, but 
without more specific information or instructions from the 
federal government on precise steps that might be taken to 
protect people from the threat, state and local officials do 
not know where to focus their efforts. The system should be 
revamped so that officials are provided with actionable 
intelligence. DHS also needs to ensure that officials at the 
state and local level with a need to know have a swift and 
reliable channel to receive information so that they can start 
putting in place heightened protective measures.

        RECOMMENDATIONS: Immediately refine the Threat Advisory 
        System to provide state and local officials specific 
        information about terrorist threats and detailed 
        guidance on how to respond to those threats. Put in 
        place secure communications systems to inform key 
        homeland security officials across the country of 
        changes in the alert level.

6. Sharpen the DHS Office of State and Local Government Coordination

        CHALLENGE: Strong and consistent leadership is 
        necessary to overcome cultural barriers to sharing 
        information with state and local officials. DHS must 
        make this an explicit priority, especially for the 
        Office of State and Local Government Coordination.

    While the office is now functioning, its overall budget, 
staff resources, plans, and priorities are as yet unclear. The 
office has not yet demonstrated a clear capacity to foster the 
kind of fundamental changes necessary to create a new 
information-sharing paradigm. The administration must act to 
ensure that OSLGC receives sufficient staff and budgetary 
resources, and bureaucratic clout, to vastly improve the 
sharing of information with state and local governments. The 
office must work closely with the Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection Directorate--which is responsible for 
disseminating intelligence analysis to state and local 
officials, and coordinating training and other support to these 
officials to assist them as information sharers and consumers--
to ensure that this vital national priority is addressed.

        RECOMMENDATION: Immediately equip OSLGC for, and task 
        it with, overseeing state and local information sharing 
        issues. The OSLGC must make it a priority to ensure 
        that DHS and other federal agencies meet the 
        information needs of state and local officials.

7. Judge Federal Officials Based on How Well They Share Information

        CHALLENGE: To overcome cultural and other barriers to 
        effectively sharing information with states and 
        localities, DHS and other agencies must hold senior 
        officials accountable for achieving results while 
        providing positive incentives to motivate change.

    Without changing the system of accountability--so that 
agency officials' performance is graded, in part, based on how 
well they share--it will be impossible to fundamentally change 
the status quo. When Governor Gilmore testified before GAC 
about the proposed Terrorist Threat Integration Center, he 
stated: ``There is going to have to be an understanding that 
information of this type of sensitive nature is going to have 
to be shared. If it is not shared, then there should be 
penalties connected with the non-sharing.'' \53\ Agencies 
seeking to improve the sharing of information have also learned 
that employees must be positively motivated and are 
establishing incentives to achieve results--including employee 
recognition programs.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \53\ Gilmore testimony, GAC Hearing, February 14, 2003, note 5 
above.
    \54\ Sara Michael, ``Knowledge Hoarding: Agencies find incentives 
can encourage the reluctant to share what they know.'' Federal Computer 
Week, April 28, 2003.

        RECOMMENDATION: Immediately revise federal agencies' 
        performance management systems to reward information 
        sharing. Senior officials should be evaluated, in part, 
        on their success or failure in breaking down barriers 
        to sharing information. Bonuses should be dependent 
        upon making measurable progress in improving 
        information sharing systems and processes and special 
        awards should be given to employees who demonstrate 
        exemplary leadership and results in overcoming 
        obstacles to sharing homeland security information.

8. Make Information Sharing a Priority, Track and Monitor Progress

        CHALLENGE: Meeting the complex challenge of sharing 
        homeland security information with state and local 
        officials requires sustained and focused leadership by 
        the Secretary of Homeland Security and other top 
        administration officials.

    The Bush Administration has cited five government-wide 
goals, and several agency-specific goals, in its so-called 
``management agenda'' that identifies its top priorities for 
federal agencies. These agenda items--including 
counterproductive ideas like establishing mandatory quotas for 
systematically privatizing federal employees' jobs--receive 
high-level attention from senior administration officials. The 
chief operating officers in each agency, typically the Deputy 
Secretaries, have been delegated responsibility for the agenda, 
and progress is tracked by periodically grading agencies' 
performance as green (indicating successful progress is being 
made); yellow (indicating mixed results); and red (for 
unsatisfactory performance). The challenge of sharing homeland 
security information, which the Bush Administration has 
identified in its national strategy and is vital to 
governments' ability to protect the American people, must be 
elevated to the highest priority status within the 
administration. Progress must be systematically monitored and 
tracked--and agencies should be graded on their performance.

        RECOMMENDATION: Make sharing homeland security 
        information with state and local officials a high 
        priority for DHS and other key agencies; assign the 
        Deputy Secretaries or Chief Operating Officers 
        responsibility for overseeing implementation, 
        monitoring and reporting on agency progress.
      
                                   - 
