[Senate Prints 107-61]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


107th Congress 
 2nd Session                COMMITTEE PRINT                     S. Prt.
                                                                 107-61
_______________________________________________________________________

 
                         TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

                        IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM

                         AND HOMELAND SECURITY:

                            THE ROLE OF OTA

                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                       PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF

                   HON. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, Chairman

                                FOR THE

                         COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,

                      SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                                     



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                               APRIL 2002

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           COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

              ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii               JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West           TED STEVENS, Alaska
Virginia                               CONRAD BURNS, Montana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts           TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana              KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota          OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
RON WYDEN, Oregon                      SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MAX CLELAND, Georgia                   GORDON SMITH, Oregon
BARBARA BOXER, California              PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina           JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri                GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida

               Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director

                  Moses Boyd, Democratic Chief Counsel

      Jeanne Bumpus, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel











                            C O N T E N T S

                               __________
                                                                   Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................     v
Letter of Submittal..............................................   vii
Preface..........................................................     1
Executive Summary................................................     2
    Findings.....................................................     2
    Conclusion...................................................     2
    Recommendation...............................................     2
    Rationale....................................................     3
        Terrorist Technology Threats.............................     3
        Precluding or Deterring Terrorist Acts...................     3
        Detecting Terrorist Acts When They Occur.................     4
        Coping with the Consequences of Terrorist Acts...........     4
        Technological Choice.....................................     5
        Technology Assessment....................................     6
        OTA's Structure and Pattern of Operations................     7
        OTA: 1993-1995...........................................     8
        Current Situation........................................     8
    Technology Assessment in the War on Terrorism and Homeland 
      Security: The Role of OTA..................................    10
        Terrorist Technology Threats.............................    10
        Precluding or Deterring Terrorist Acts...................    12
        Detecting Terrorist Acts When They Occur.................    15
        Coping with the Consequences of Terrorist Attacks........    17
        Technological Choice.....................................    20
        Technology Assessment....................................    23
        OTA's Unique Role and History............................    24
        OTA's Structure and Pattern of Operations................    26
        OTA's Credibility, Objectivity, and Relevance............    28
        The Relative Roles of OTA, CRS, and GAO..................    29
        OTA After Gibbons: 1993-1995.............................    30
        Findings.................................................    32
    Conclusion...................................................    33
    Recommendations..............................................    34
    Notes........................................................    36
                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                                       U.S. Senate,
        Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                    Washington, DC, April 11, 2002.
    Dear Colleague: Technology is crucial to our conduct of the 
War on Terrorism and to the success of our homeland security 
programs. The Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation is deeply engaged in evaluating policies and 
programs involving the role of technology in enhancing homeland 
security in the areas of communications, airlines and airports, 
seaports, railroads, trucking, transportation of hazardous 
materials, manufacturing facilities, and science and technology 
in general. In conducting these evaluations, the Committee is 
concerned not only with the effectiveness and costs of the 
technologies, but also with their impact on U.S. industries and 
consumers, and the privacy rights of individual citizens.
    To aid the Committee in its consideration of these matters, 
I have requested that a study conducted by Mr. Ellis R. Mottur, 
as a Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars, be made available to the Committee. Mr. 
Mottur earlier served as the first Assistant Director of the 
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and more recently 
as Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Transportation and Technology Industries.
    This document contains the report prepared by Mr. Mottur, 
entitled: ``Technology Assessment in the War on Terrorism and 
Homeland Security: The Role of OTA.'' Although the report has 
not been considered or endorsed by the Committee or any of its 
members, I believe it will be of interest to the Congress and 
many persons in the scientific, technical, academic, and 
professional communities, as well as the general public. To 
insure its general availability, I have directed that this 
document be published as a Committee print.
            Sincerely,
                                        Ernest F. Hollings,
                                                          Chairman.
                          LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

                              ----------                              

            Woodrow Wilson International Center for
                                                  Scholars,
                                  Washington, D.C., March 22, 2002.
Hon. Ernest F. Hollings, Chairman,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you very much for your kind letter 
expressing interest in my study at the Woodrow Wilson Center. 
In response to your request, I am pleased to provide the 
Commerce Committee with my report entitled: ``Technology 
Assessment in the War on Terrorism and Homeland Security: The 
Role of OTA.''
    The report focuses on the utilization of technologies in 
achieving homeland security, demonstrates the need for 
technology assessment to evaluate those technologies, traces 
the history of OTA, and concludes with a recommended course of 
action. I hope the report proves useful to the Committee.
    With best personal wishes.
            Sincerely,
                                           Ellis R. Mottur,
                                             Public Policy Scholar.
    Enclosure
                                PREFACE

                              ----------                              

    In the months since September 11, it has become abundantly 
clear that America's unparalleled superiority in technology is 
critical to achieving success in the War on Terrorism and 
ensuring homeland security. Accordingly, the choices the United 
States makes with respect to the implementation of particular 
technologies will continue to be of paramount importance to the 
course of that struggle for years to come.
    Those choices are exceedingly complex, involving 
assessments of effectiveness, costs, benefits, and impacts on 
the economy, environment, society, and human values, as well as 
comparisons with alternative technologies. Technology 
assessment is the methodology for making such choices.
    As one of the founders of the congressional Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA), and its first Assistant Director, 
I was well acquainted with that methodology and its application 
within the congressional context. Accordingly, in order to 
contribute to the national response to this unprecedented 
challenge, I joined the Woodrow Wilson Center as a Public 
Policy Scholar to conduct a study on technologies in the War on 
Terrorism and homeland security, with a focus on the potential 
role of OTA. The initial result is this report, which I hope 
proves useful in helping empower Congress to fulfill its 
legislative, appropriation, and oversight responsibilities in 
this overarching conflict.
    I want to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to 
the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and 
especially to Michael Van Dusen, Samuel F. Wells, Jr., Kent H. 
Hughes, and Robert S. Litwak for making this project possible, 
to all of the Scholars at the Center for their stimulating 
intellectual discussions, to my intern, Jonathan Radke, for his 
valuable assistance, and above all to Lee H. Hamilton whose 
far-sighted, inspired leadership of the Center makes it as 
great a pleasure as it is a privilege to be a part of it.
    Of course, the statements, views, and recommendations 
expressed in this report are solely the responsibility of the 
author and are not in any way intended to reflect those of the 
Woodrow Wilson Center, its management, staff, or other 
scholars.

                           EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

                              ----------                              

FINDINGS
   Technology is critical to U.S. success in the War on 
        Terrorism and ensuring homeland security.

   A wide variety of sophisticated technologies may be 
        involved in those efforts.

   Choosing among possible technologies and patterns of 
        implementation is a complex process, oftentimes 
        involving unintended consequences.

   Technology Assessment is the methodology for making 
        such choices.

   The leading exemplar of technology assessment was 
        the congressional Office of Technology Assessment 
        (OTA), founded in 1972.

   For almost a quarter of a century, OTA provided 
        Congress with valuable analyses of policy options on 
        important issues involving technology.

   During that period OTA achieved a world-wide 
        reputation for excellence, as a non-partisan, 
        objective, and credible conductor of technology 
        assessments.

   When OTA's funding was discontinued in 1995, there 
        was no dissatisfaction with its performance; indeed OTA 
        received accolades for its excellent work.

   Elimination of its funding was a cost-cutting 
        measure at a time of fiscal stringency and a symbol for 
        Executive Branch agencies to emulate.

   Congress now needs its own source of non-partisan, 
        objective technology assessment in order to fulfill its 
        legislative, appropriation, and oversight 
        responsibilities in the War on Terrorism and ensuring 
        homeland security.

   While OTA's funding was discontinued, its enabling 
        statute remains in effect, including its authorization 
        of ``such sums as may be necessary.''
CONCLUSION
    To fulfill its constitutional responsibilities in pursuing 
the War on Terrorism and ensuring homeland security, Congress 
urgently needs to reactivate OTA.
RECOMMENDATION
    In the first supplemental appropriation bill considered in 
this session, Congress should include $1 million for OTA to 
canvass and consult with congressional committees, and plan a 
series of technology assessments designed to meet the priority 
needs of those committees with respect to the War on Terrorism 
and homeland 
security.
RATIONALE
    In the War on Terrorism, America's principal advantage is 
its unparalleled technological superiority--measured not only 
in highly sophisticated hardware and software--but also in the 
competence and character of its citizens in controlling that 
technology. This is true not only in dealing with the war, but 
just as importantly, in ensuring homeland security.
Terrorist Technology Threats
    Each terrorist threat or act can be characterized by the 
specific technology utilized, by its means of delivery, and by 
its intended target. The diversity of technologies involved is 
enormous. There are 36 deadly biological agents, including 13 
viruses, 7 bacteria, 3 micro-organisms with traits common to 
both bacteria and viruses, 1 fungus, and 12 biological toxins. 
Cyber-terrorists can hack into information systems, deny 
service to others by overwhelming sites with bogus requests, 
and spread computer viruses or worms. Chemical agents encompass 
nerve gases, cyanides, phosgene, and vesicants. Explosives run 
the gamut from nuclear fission, fusion, or dirty nuclear bombs 
through plastic explosives, nitrogen-based varieties, to pipe 
bombs, or simple hand grenades.
    Similarly there are a great variety of means whereby 
terrorists can deliver their agents of destruction or 
disruption, including mail, modems, missiles, aircraft, ships, 
trains, trucks, autos, on foot, or by remote detonation. And 
their targets are equally varied, including: transportation and 
telecommunications systems; air, water and food supplies; 
energy sources and distribution channels; financial and 
computer networks; factories; key buildings; population groups; 
and prominent individuals.
    But surpassing the extensive array of technologies, 
transmissions, and targets available to terrorists is the wide 
range of countervailing technologies we can deploy to deal with 
their threats or attacks. These fall into 3 categories, those 
aimed at: (1) precluding or deterring the terrorist act; (2) 
detecting it when it occurs; and (3) coping with its 
consequences.
Precluding or Deterring Terrorist Acts
    The overarching campaign in this category consists of the 
current and projected military actions, along with the 
coordinated diplomatic, intelligence, public safety, and 
financial efforts to thwart terrorism wherever it lurks. On the 
homeland security front, there are a wide variety of 
technological systems under consideration. A number of these 
involve the enhanced coordination of more sophisticated, 
computerized information systems to track and apprehend 
terrorists before the deed is done. Most of the other 
technological systems directed at preventing terrorist acts are 
aimed at either or both of 2 goals: (a) to maintain boundaries 
which only authorized individuals can traverse; and (b) to 
ascertain whether the identities of specific individuals or 
entities meet the authorization criteria. The role of 
technology in maintaining boundaries lies essentially in 
electronic barriers, surveillance sensors, video cameras, 
alarms, and communications systems.
    Identification technologies to confirm authorization to 
traverse boundaries include those aimed at screening things and 
those designed to verify persons' identities. Since 
conventional x-ray screening of baggage is not very effective 
for moderately sophisticated explosive devices, a number of 
more advanced systems are being investigated, such as pulsed 
fast-neutron transmission spectroscopy. An example of a 
technology for screening things that may be carried by persons 
is a holographic imaging system that can see objects hidden 
under clothing. A host of new technologies are being studied 
for verifying individuals' identities, including sophisticated 
biometric identification techniques, such as facial pattern 
recognition and iris or retina scanning systems.
Detecting Terrorist Acts When They Occur
    If the terrorist act involves an explosion or shooting, 
witnesses are immediately aware that something terrible has 
transpired; but if the act involves cyber-terrorism or chemical 
or biological agents, there may be a considerable time lag 
before the act is discovered. If cyber-terrorists disrupt major 
electric power or communications systems, the act would be 
readily recognized; but when cyber-terrorists introduce 
computer worms or viruses into information systems, crucial 
time may elapse before the deed is discovered. Detection of 
chemical or biological agents is even more challenging. An 
example of a detection technology under development is a 
portable isotopic neutron spectroscopy chemical assay system 
that can identify nerve gases or explosives. Detection of 
biological agents is most difficult since the effect on the 
exposed individuals may not become apparent for a considerable 
period--by which time it may be too late to counteract the 
agent. An example of a technology being considered for 
detecting 8 different biohazards (including anthrax spores) is 
Polymerase Chain Reaction of PCR which uses specific enzymes to 
amplify tiny quantities of DNA to match them with DNA samples 
of the biological agent.
Coping with the Consequences of Terrorist Acts
    After a terrorist act has been detected, it is imperative 
that its nature and extent be rapidly comprehended so that 
appropriate countermeasures can be undertaken. But it is 
sometimes difficult quickly to ascertain the character of 
chemical agents utilized in an attack; and biological weapons 
are especially troublesome in confounding rapid comprehension 
of what has transpired, as was evidenced in last fall's anthrax 
attacks. To facilitate more rapid comprehension, there's a need 
for a greatly improved communications network. This is 
underscored by the fact that the Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC) were not aware of May 2001 Canadian studies that 
confirmed the threat of spreading anthrax through the mail, 
even though 6 other U.S. agencies were cognizant of the 
studies. CDC did not learn of the studies until early November 
when the anthrax outbreak was almost over. Examples of 
technologies for coping with chemical attacks are the Antidote-
Treatment-Nerve-Gas-Agent Auto-injector, a pen-like device to 
administer both types of anti-nerve-gas antidotes, and Sandia 
National Laboratory's development of a nontoxic, non-corrosive 
foam to neutralize chemical agents. Examples with respect to 
biological agents include an advanced, hand-held nucleic acid-
analyzer to identify biological agents in the field within a 
matter of minutes and the use of irradiation of mail to destroy 
bacteria or spores. The administration's budget includes $6 
billion for combating bioterrorism, including a substantial 
amount for research and development of such technologies.
Technological Choice
    Choosing among the vast array of technological options for 
homeland security is a complex process. Sometimes there are 
inadequate data; other times the underlying science is not 
fully understood. But even when the scientific basis and data 
are available, there remains the so-called `Law of Unintended 
Consequences,' which refers to the fact that many technologies 
engender ancillary, unexpected consequences that are difficult 
to foresee and sometimes detrimental in their impacts.
    The most obvious example from the past is the use of the 
internal combustion engine for vehicles. While this innovation 
served as one of the prime movers of 20th century economic 
expansion, its long-term effects on the environment have been 
deleterious because of air pollution and the possibility of 
global warming. Another example is the use of 
chlorofluorocarbons for refrigeration and air conditioning. 
Along with the very beneficial effects of this innovation has 
come the diminution of the ozone layer, which serves to block 
the sun's rays and prevent skin cancer.
    The point of these past examples is not that we should have 
refrained from utilizing the internal combustion engine for 
vehicles or Freon for cooling, both of which have bestowed 
substantial benefits on our standard of living. But if we had 
anticipated their ancillary, adverse consequences earlier, we 
might have been able to structure their implementation in such 
a way as to mitigate those unintended consequences and to 
design research and development programs aimed at alternative 
or supplemental means of achieving the same ends.
    Technologies considered for homeland security have already 
exhibited some unintended consequences. The irradiation of mail 
damages computer chips, film, food, pharmaceuticals, contact 
lens, etc. Moreover, the process appears to have caused illness 
in some mail handlers because the irradiation heats the plastic 
warp used to protect the mail, thereby releasing noxious fumes. 
A potential problem arises with retinal scanning for 
identification purposes because of possible adverse health 
effects from the infrared light used to scan the retina and the 
threat of infection because of contact with the equipment. With 
respect to on-flight security, it appears that Tasers, a kind 
of stun gun, might interfere with the plane's operational 
instruments. A broader case of unintended consequences involves 
the impact on personal privacy from the more intrusive use of 
surveillance cameras and the integration of data bases 
containing background information on individuals. Similarly the 
wider use of antibiotics, like Cipro, could trigger greater 
resistance as bacteria adapt to them. The planned computerized, 
surveillance system of foreign students has also engendered 
considerable opposition from the colleges and universities that 
fear the loss of their tuition--another unintended consequence.
    The lesson from all this is that technologies often have 
unintended, ancillary consequences which--to the extent 
feasible--should be anticipated and taken into account in 
selecting among alternative technological solutions and 
structuring their implementation. The point is not that any 
particular technology is inherently good or bad, but rather 
that its relative benefits and detriments depend partially on 
its ancillary consequences, as well as on the uses to which it 
is put and the way in which it is implemented.
Technology Assessment
    The analysis, comparison, and selection of technologies is 
a complex process, involving the following components:

   determining the technical capabilities of the 
        technology;

   evaluating its effectiveness in achieving its 
        primary objectives;

   ascertaining its costs;

   delineating the benefits it confers;

   anticipating its ancillary consequences, both 
        positive and negative;

   discerning its probable impact on the economy, 
        environment, society, and individual values;

   comparing the technology with alternatives in terms 
        of all the foregoing factors; and

   delineating the advantages and disadvantages--the 
        pros 
        and cons--for the various policy options confronting 
        decision 
        makers.

    Technology assessment is the methodology for conducting 
such analyses. Incorporating elements of operations research, 
systems analysis, cost-benefit studies, game theory, linear 
programming, simulation studies, and alternative-futures 
scenarios--along with pragmatic public policy considerations--
technology assessment emerged as a distinct field of academic 
research in the mid-1960s. After 5 years of extensive hearings 
before the House Science and Astronautics Committee, and 
subsequent consideration by the Senate Rules Committee, the 
Technology Assessment Act of 1972 was signed into law on 
October 13, 1972, thereby establishing OTA as only the third 
support agency of Congress in the history of the Republic. (The 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) was not created until 1974.)
    During the legislative consideration of creating OTA, a 
great deal of attention was focused on why Congress needed a 
new agency, rather than relying on CRS and GAO. It was the 
overwhelming judgment of the academic, scientific, technical, 
and public policy communities that neither CRS nor GAO was 
capable of carrying out the technology assessments required by 
Congress, a view in which the Director of CRS, the Librarian of 
Congress, and the Comptroller General all concurred.
    OTA went through its formative stages, guided by its 
Founding Director, former Congressman Emilio Q. Daddario. OTA 
later achieved maturity under the leadership of Director John 
Gibbons, who served about 15 years from 1979 to 1993. He built 
the credibility of the Office within Congress and throughout 
the nation's academic, scientific, technical, and professional 
communities. Indeed, OTA was recognized worldwide as the top 
institution of its kind, with many countries creating their own 
comparable organizations, modeled on OTA, including Austria, 
Denmark, the European Union, France, Germany, Great Britain, 
the Netherlands, and Sweden. While OTA products had a pervasive 
impact on congressional activities during the Gibbons Era, and 
the Office received many accolades and awards, its impact was 
best summed up by an article in the Federal Times, which 
stated: ``[I]n a town where unimpeachable sources are oh-so-
hard to come by, OTA has managed to secure a position near the 
top of the list.'' \1\
OTA's Structure and Pattern of Operations
    OTA consists of a congressional Technology Assessment Board 
(TAB), a Director and his staff, and an Advisory Council. TAB 
consists of 6 Senators and 6 House members, evenly split 
between the 2 parties. The 10 public members of the Advisory 
Council are appointed by TAB and are joined on the Council by 2 
ex officio members, the Comptroller General and the Director of 
CRS. TAB appoints the Director, who then appoints the office 
staff. The TAB Chairmanship rotates between Senate and House in 
different congresses. Traditionally the Chairman comes from the 
majority party in his House and the Vice Chairman from the 
opposite party in the other House. Assessments are undertaken 
at the request of congressional committees, not in response to 
individual members as is the case with CRS and GAO.
    For each assessment undertaken, OTA convenes an advisory 
panel made up of experts, stakeholders, and citizens relevant 
to the particular assessment. These advisory panels play a key 
role in the design of the assessment, in the analysis of the 
data that has been assembled, and in reviewing the final 
report, which is also examined by a number of other outside 
reviewers who bring special expertise and points of view to the 
assessment. Over time OTA came to draw upon a pool of about 
1,000 panelists and outside reviewers.
    The overall assessment process embodies a series of checks 
and balances that confer credibility, objectivity, and 
relevance on the final report. Some of the most important 
checks and balances are the:

   even balance between House and Senate and the 2 
        parties on TAB;

   tradition of the Chair and Vice Chair from opposite 
        parties;

   need for TAB approval to initiate assessments and 
        release 
        reports;

   Advisory Council's salutary influence on OTA's 
        standards of excellence;

   advisory panel's role in design, analysis, and 
        review of assessment;

   role of stakeholders and additional outside 
        reviewers;

   preparation of Review Memorandum which describes 
        reactions of panelists and reviewers to each portion of 
        report and shows how final version takes account of 
        those comments; and

   the pattern of continuing, informal communication 
        between OTA and committee staff before, during, and as 
        follow-up to the assessment.

    With this understanding of the OTA process, it becomes 
clear why neither CRS nor GAO could effectively carry it out. 
Neither one operates under the close control of a congressional 
board; neither one responds only to requests from committees; 
and neither one has the statutory authority or institutional 
capability to integrate the expertise and views of 1,000 
outside advisers into assessments.
    Examples of some OTA reports particularly relevant to the 
War on Terrorism and homeland security include:

   The Border War on Drugs
   Electronic Surveillance in a Digital Age
   High Level Radioactive Waste Site Characterization
   Impacts of Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria
   New Developments in Biotechnology
   Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing
   Taggants in Explosives
   Technology Transfer to China
   Technology and Counter Terrorism
   Transportation of Hazardous Materials
   Virtual Reality and Technologies for Combat 
        Simulation
   Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction 
OTA: 1993-1995
    After about 15 years of outstanding service, Gibbons 
resigned as OTA Director in early 1993 to join the new 
administration. He was succeeded by Dr. Roger C. Herdman who 
had been serving as Assistant OTA Director with responsibility 
for Health and Life Sciences.
    In 1995, however, there was a sea change in control of 
Congress. The new leadership was intent on eliminating a number 
of cabinet departments and on reducing the costs of government, 
including within the Legislative Branch. The likeliest target 
for reduction within Congress was one of the support agencies, 
CBO, CRS, GAO, and OTA. Of these, OTA was the smallest and most 
vulnerable. Accordingly, in order to save money, the House 
Appropriations Committee recommended elimination of all funding 
for OTA. This was strenuously opposed by many members--
including all TAB members in the House--but the leadership 
prevailed. In the Senate the committee proposed a small amount 
for OTA, but only enough to enable it to close down its 
operations in an orderly manner. Again there was a strong 
effort to provide adequate funding, led by all Senators who 
have served on TAB. But again the majority voted it down and 
OTA ceased operations at the end of FY 1995.
Current Situation
    As noted in the Findings, while OTA's funding was 
discontinued, its enabling statute remains in effect, including 
its authorization of ``such sums as may be necessary.'' 
Moreover, since the Senate is a continuing body and the act 
does not limit the tenure of its members, the Senators who were 
Board members in 1995--Senators Grassley, Hatch, Hollings, and 
Kennedy--are still Board members. Since the House is not a 
continuing body, it could be argued that the current House 
members who were on TAB in 1995--Representatives Dingell, 
Houghton, McDermott, and Oxley--would not still be members. But 
in any case, the act stipulates that: ``Vacancies in the 
membership of the Board shall not affect the power of the 
remaining members to execute the functions of the Board.'' In 
short, OTA has an ongoing authorization for appropriations, and 
TAB is empowered to submit a recommendation to the 
Appropriations Committees for such an appropriation.
    To underscore the urgent necessity for reactivating OTA, 
one example of OTA's potential impact on the War on Terrorism 
and homeland security should suffice. The anthrax attacks last 
fall engendered considerable confusion and consternation among 
public health authorities, public safety officials, and policy 
makers throughout federal, state, and local government. There 
was great uncertainty on many matters, including the number of 
spores necessary to trigger inhalation anthrax in humans; but 
it was widely believed that 8,000-10,000 spores would be needed 
to cause inhalation or pulmonary anthrax. If OTA had been 
operational at the time, it could have brought a highly 
relevant 1993 OTA report to the attention of the public health 
authorities. The report entitled Technologies Underlying 
Weapons of Mass Destruction stated: ``1,000 spores or less can 
produce fatal pulmonary anthrax in some members of an exposed 
population.'' \2\ If this information had been readily 
available, it's conceivable that it even could have saved a 
life or--at the very least--afforded much better guidance to 
the public health authorities in designing their response to 
the crisis.
    It is clear that Congress urgently needs to reactivate OTA, 
and that to do so, all that is required is inclusion of $1 
million in the next supplemental appropriation. Considering 
that this $1 million would reactivate an Office that could aid 
Congress in evaluating the $38 billion the President has 
recently requested for homeland security, the $1 million amount 
does not seem unreasonable.



           *         *         *         *         *
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY: 
        THE ROLE OF OTA
    In the War on Terrorism, America's principal advantage is 
its unparalleled technological superiority--measured not only 
in highly sophisticated hardware and software--but also in the 
competence and character of its citizens in controlling that 
technology. The military action in Afghanistan was a striking 
demonstration of those assets.
    Eight thousand mile bombing runs from the continental 
United States, tactical aircraft sorties from carriers in the 
Persian Gulf or Arabian Sea, targeting by satellites and 
Predator drone planes, real-time information displays, GPS-
guided smart bombs--along with night vision and special forces 
providing laser guidance on the ground--enabled precision 
bombing that could penetrate cave entrances horizontally and 
explode underground with greater devastation than hundreds of 
dumb bombs in World War II or Vietnam.
    In short, the awesome enhancement of our military 
capabilities through technology is apparent to all who tune in 
to CNN. But perhaps not as overtly obvious, yet promising to be 
as powerful and pervasive is the potential impact of technology 
on homeland security. This potential impact flows both from the 
technology utilized by the terrorists and from the technology 
we need to employ to deal with their threats.
Terrorist Technology Threats
    Each terrorist threat or act can be characterized by the 
specific technology utilized, by its means of delivery, and by 
its intended target. Thus the catastrophe of September 11 
utilized jet fuel as an explosive, delivered by means of fully-
fueled, Boeing-757 and -767 aircraft, and directed at the World 
Trade Center towers. The subsequent anthrax events utilized 
highly refined, aerosolizable anthrax powder, delivered through 
envelopes in the mail, and aimed at Senate and media personnel. 
The ongoing bombings in Israel utilize plastic explosives, 
delivered by suicidal individuals on foot or in vehicles, and 
targeted at groups of innocent bystanders.
    These current examples illustrate the diversity of 
technologies, means of delivery, and targets that terrorists 
may employ. The full range of possibilities is extremely wide. 
Thus biological agents could include--besides anthrax--small 
pox, plague, viral encephalitis, yellow fever, and Marburg 
virus. Examples of other agents that could be introduced 
through the food supply are botulism, salmonella, E. coli, and 
cholera. In fact, ``the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention lists 36 classes of . . . potential weapons . . . 
[including] 13 viruses, 7 bacteria, 3 rickettsiae (micro-
organisms that have traits common to both bacteria and 
viruses), 1 fungus and 12 biological toxins.'' \3\
    Cyber-terrorists utilize the internet, software, and their 
extensive computer skills to hack into purportedly inaccessible 
information systems, to deny service to others by overwhelming 
sites with bogus requests, and to spread deleterious computer 
viruses or worms. In contrast with weapons of mass destruction, 
``cyber threats are considered weapons of mass disruption . . . 
Computer security experts . . . have begun seeing evidence of 
increasingly potent attacks by hackers . . . denial of service 
attacks [are] becoming more common and more disruptive . . . 
Attackers have also employed `worms' . . . aimed at routers, 
which direct traffic throughout the internet . . . No computer 
on the internet is immune from denial of service attacks.'' \4\
    Chemical agents encompass: nerve agents like sarin, tabun, 
soman, and VX gas; cyanides; phosgene; and vesicants such as 
sulfur mustard gas. Explosives run the gamut from nuclear 
fission or fusion bombs to dirty nuclear bombs (which disperse 
radioactive materials without a chain reaction) to highly 
energetic plastic explosives to nitrogen-based (nitramine) 
varieties like nitroglycerine to pipe bombs or simple hand 
grenades. Arson can be committed merely with a container of 
gasoline and some matches. And of course, determined terrorists 
can rely on simple weapons like automatic rifles, hand guns 
or--as we saw on September 11--even small box cutters.
    While not as diverse as the wide range of technologies 
terrorists may employ, there are a number of means through 
which they can deliver their agents of destruction or 
disruption, including: mail; computer modems; missiles; 
aircraft (from crop dusters to Boeing 767s); ships (from huge 
tankers to small harbor craft); trains; trucks; automobiles; 
bicycles; on foot; by a hand hurling a grenade; or by remote 
detonation, which itself can be accomplished by a variety of 
methods.
    For example, in the ``early 1970s, IRA [bombs in the UK 
consisted of] . . . nails wrapped around a lump of plastic 
explosive and detonated simply by lighting a fuse. . . . 
[Their] time bombs . . . were . . . dynamite and commercial 
detonators . . . attached to ordinary battery-powered alarm 
clocks.'' Later on to avert danger to their agents, they began 
detonating remotely ``by using the radio controls for model 
aircraft. The British Ministry of Defense (MoD) thwarted this 
means of attack through electronic countermeasures and jamming 
techniques.'' The IRA then developed a ``network of 
sophisticated electronic switches [to] bypass the . . . 
countermeasures . . . [T]he MoD scientists . . . [then devised] 
a new system of electronic scanners able to detect radio 
emissions . . . before the bomber can actually transmit the 
detonation signal.'' But the IRA subsequently developed ``a 
photo-flash `slave' unit that can be triggered from a distance 
of up to 800 meters by a flash of light.'' \5\ So the various 
technologies for detonating and thwarting detonation continue 
to contend with each other.
    The targets terrorists may attack are equally varied, 
ranging from: telecommunication systems; computer networks; 
water systems; \6\ food supplies; energy sources and 
distribution systems (nuclear or coal power plants, 
hydroelectric dams, natural gas pipelines, oil refineries, 
etc.); transportation systems (roads, rail, subways, bridges, 
tunnels, seaports); financial institutions and networks; 
factories; key buildings; and concentrated populations or even 
prominent individuals.
    The vulnerability of the nation's electric power system, 
for example, was underscored at a recent conference of industry 
executives, at which it was revealed that: ``The computers that 
control the electric power system around the nation have been 
probed from the Middle East, and terrorists may have inspected 
the physical equipment . . . Government experts identified 
nuclear power plants as perhaps the most attractive targets, 
but said dams, gas pipelines and oil refineries were not far 
behind.'' \7\
    Surpassing the extensive array of technologies, 
transmissions, and targets available to terrorists is the wide 
range of countervailing technologies we can deploy to deal with 
their threats or attacks. These countervailing technologies 
fall into three categories, those aimed at: (1) precluding or 
deterring the terrorist act; (2) detecting it when it occurs; 
and (3) coping with its consequences. It is instructive to 
examine illustrative examples of technologies in each of these 
categories.
Precluding or Deterring Terrorist Acts
    The best example in this category, of course, is the 
current effort to root out and extirpate the Al Qaeda network, 
cells of which are reputed to be festering in about 60 
countries throughout the world. Accomplishing this goal would 
surely go a long way toward precluding many terrorist attacks. 
But as President Bush reiterated in his January 2002 State of 
the Union speech, the War on Terrorism extends far beyond the 
Al Qaeda network or the former Taliban government, as is 
evidenced by the recent incursion of American special forces 
into the Philippines and planned deployments into Yemen and the 
Republic of Georgia. Furthermore, underscoring his oft-stated 
warning that nations that harbor terrorists are equally 
culpable, he specifically cited Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as 
``seeking weapons of mass destruction,'' castigating them as 
constituting ``an axis of evil.'' \8\ Proceeding in parallel 
with the military actions in Afghanistan and the Philippines 
and the President's public exhortations, are the coordinated 
diplomatic, intelligence, public safety, and financial efforts 
to thwart terrorism wherever it lurks. Undoubtedly this 
concerted campaign has already impeded previously plotted 
terrorist events.
    But as President Bush also noted in his State of the Union 
address: ``Thousands of dangerous killers . . . are now spread 
throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off 
without warning.'' \9\ To intercept and prevent any of their 
attempted terrorist acts from implementation, homeland security 
measures may encompass a wide variety of technological systems. 
Many of these technologies involve ``the use of powerful 
computers . . . [which] can spot linkages among [innumerable] 
individual pieces of information . . . Germany pioneered the 
use of computers in this field . . . Two apparently unrelated 
individuals could be shown to be extremely likely to belong to 
the same terrorist group by showing an overlap in the 
information about them which was too complete to be 
coincidental . . . The FBI has now refined and expanded upon 
the capacities pioneered by the German police . . . [by 
developing a computer system] designed to draw investigative 
inferences from the organized examination of all the data that 
the Justice Department and its component agencies are 
collecting.'' \10\
    Most of the other technological systems directed at 
preventing terrorist acts are aimed at one or both of two 
goals: (a) to maintain some kind of boundaries which only 
authorized individuals or entities can traverse; and (b) to 
ascertain whether the identities of specific individuals or 
entities meet the authorization criteria.
    The boundaries can be as wide as the U.S. seacoasts and 
northern and southern border or as narrow as the walls of a 
particular facility, building, or secure room within a 
building. They can be the perimeters of nuclear, electrical, or 
telecommunications facilities or the confines of a particular 
airfield, airplane, seaport, ship, train station, train, 
bridge, or tunnel. They can be secured through appropriate 
configurations of powerful walls, fences, doors, electronic 
barriers, surveillance sensors, video cameras, communication 
systems, alarms, guards, and guard dogs. Current examples range 
from the projected increase of customs agents and immigration 
officials to be stationed at the Mexican and Canadian borders 
and various airports and seaports to the National Guard troops 
at nuclear power facilities to the reinforced cockpit doors on 
aircraft.
    With respect to border crossings, a number of technologies 
are being explored. The Director of Homeland Security, Governor 
Tom Ridge said: ``experimental high-tech `fast lanes' for 
frequent travelers, and inspecting cargo trucks and 
electronically sealing them at locations away from the border 
would . . . move the border into the 21st century . . . 
[although] scanners to read the 5 million `laser' 
identification cards issued to people who frequently cross the 
border [still need to be installed] . . . The new laser IDs 
include biometric features, such as fingerprints . . . The 
other new technology under discussion includes more mobile x-
ray units, which resemble a drive-through car wash. A vehicle 
crossing the border would drive through the apparatus and an 
inspector could, for instance, detect false compartments used 
to smuggle people or check sealed cargo.'' \11\
    The role of technology in maintaining boundaries lies 
essentially in electronic barriers, surveillance sensors, video 
cameras, communication systems, and alarms. Some examples will 
serve to illustrate the range of technologies involved. Thus 
alarm systems are generally based on hard-wire lines, 
microwave, radio frequency, or cellular transmission 
technologies.\12\ When available, fiber optics may replace 
copper hard-wire lines, since fiber optics provides longer 
distance transmission and freedom from electromagnetic or radio 
frequency interference.\13\ Because of the heightened emphasis 
on anti-terrorism activities since September 11th, many efforts 
are underway to develop more sophisticated surveillance 
systems. A good example is the software that has been developed 
by NetTalon Security Systems, Inc. of Fredericksburg, Virginia. 
This software enables real-time, simultaneous transmission to 
and from an aircraft and the ground for a host of video, sound, 
and sensor information (e.g., motion or vapor detection, 
changes in pressure or temperature, etc). As a result, the 
ground station could instantaneously trigger response 
mechanisms like aiming a Taser stun gun or releasing pepper 
spray at a precise target.\14\
    Identification technologies to confirm authorization to 
traverse boundaries fall into two classes: those aimed at 
screening things and those designed to verify persons' 
identities. In both cases there are a multitude of technologies 
entering into practice, under consideration, or still in 
research and development. Illustrative of these is the wide 
range of devices under consideration for baggage screening at 
airports. Conventional x-ray screening of baggage is not very 
effective at locating moderately sophisticated explosive 
devices.\15\ Other technologies that have been studied for this 
purpose include: thermal neutron activation (TNA); automated 
neutron-source accelerator; elastic neutron scattering; pulsed 
fast-neutron transmission spectroscopy (PFNTS); photon 
activation; nuclear resonant absorption (NRA); fast-neutron 
associated particle (FNAP); dual energy x-ray systems; 
backscatter x-ray; coherent x-ray scattering; and dual energy 
x-ray computed tomography (CT).\16\
    Numerous other technologies are being developed for 
screening things that may be carried by persons. For example, 
the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (pNNL) in Washington 
State has developed a hand-held ``device that uses ultrasonic 
waves to see inside of sealed containers, a holographic imaging 
system that can see objects hidden under clothing, and a 
polymer that detects nerve agents.'' \17\ The Federal Aviation 
Agency (FAA) is ``developing . . . electromagnetic devices for 
screening bottles and other containers . . . [for] detecting 
liquid explosives.'' Other devices, known as trace detectors, 
have been manufactured for ``detect[ing] the residue or vapor 
from explosives on the exterior of carry-on bags and on 
electronic items, such as computers or radios,'' or even on 
shoes. Other trace detectors under development screen items 
handled by persons to detect residue or vapor from explosives 
on the persons' hands. Also in development are walk-through 
screening portals that can: ``detect particles and vapor from 
explosives on passengers' clothing or in the air surrounding 
their bodies.'' \18\
    There is also a wide array of technologies being considered 
for verifying individuals' identities and authorization to 
traverse boundaries. Some of these are as simple as the use of 
wireless devices with software developed by Aether Systems, 
Inc. of Maryland whereby airport security personnel can 
instantaneously check electronic records to identify 
passengers, airport employees, and vehicles.\19\ Others include 
the more extensive use of photo IDs and smart cards (with 
embedded computer chips), encryption for electronic 
communications, and increasingly sophisticated biometric 
identification techniques. One biometric system utilizes 
passive and active imaging technologies, which ``can see 
through clothes and produce an image of the human body 
underneath . . . In passive screening, the natural radiation 
emitted by the human body is detected and analyzed . . . Active 
imaging entails irradiating the body with x-rays or millimeter 
waves and analyzing the radiation scattered from the body . . . 
[M]etallic weapons or explosive materials . . . will appear 
different from [the body].'' \20\
    Generally, biometrics refers to a set of technologies that 
utilize human characteristics or behavioral traits to identify 
particular individuals. These include: fingerprinting, finger 
patterns, palm prints, hand geometry, hand topography, hand and 
wrist vein patterns, facial pattern recognition, voice 
recognition, signature or handwriting analysis, key stroke 
dynamics, and iris or retina scanning. An example that employs 
facial pattern recognition is the FaceIT technology 
manufactured by a New Jersey company, Visionics. This system 
generates ID codes ``based on 80 unique aspects of 
[individuals] facial structures, like the width of the nose and 
the location of the temples. FaceIT can instantly compare an 
image of any individual's face with a database of the faces of 
suspected terrorists.'' \21\ Iris scanning systems are based on 
the fact that not only are everyone's irises--even those of 
identical twins--different, but also that each individual's two 
irises are different from each other. Software has been 
developed that enables scanning and database comparison of 
irises to take place within a few seconds.\22\
Detecting Terrorist Acts When They Occur
    When efforts to prevent or deter terrorism fail and a 
terrorist act occurs, it is not always immediately obvious what 
has happened. If the terrorist act involves an explosion or 
shooting, witnesses are immediately aware that something 
terrible has transpired; but if the act involves cyber-
terrorism or biological or chemical agents, there may be a 
considerable time lag before the act is discovered. Our 
increasingly interdependent, technologically complex society is 
highly vulnerable to the disruptive effects of cyber-terrorism. 
If such acts were to penetrate and disrupt the FAA flight 
control system, or power grids, or major communication systems, 
they would undoubtedly be readily recognized. It also would be 
obvious if the method of disruption consisted of, ``flooding 
[an information] system with false requests for service [so 
that it was] impossible to respond to legitimate requests''--as 
happened with Yahoo in the year 2000.\23\ But if the hackers or 
cyber-terrorists cleverly introduce computer worms or viruses 
into information systems--as is occurring with increasing 
frequency \24\--prompt detection of the act poses a constant 
challenge to the ingenuity of our software designers and the 
vigilance of our system operators.
    Detecting the introduction of chemical or biological agents 
is perhaps even more challenging. One of the most widely 
reported acts of chemical terrorism occurred on March 20, 1995, 
when ``the nerve gas sarin was released in commuter trains on 
three different Tokyo subway lines by a terrorist cult group. 
Sarin was concealed in lunch boxes and soft-drink containers 
and . . . released as terrorists punctured the containers with 
umbrellas before leaving the trains. Over 5,500 were injured,'' 
11 of whom died. Since there was no detection capability within 
the train system and since sarin is colorless and odorless, 
detection occurred only after sick patients flooded the area 
hospitals.\25\
    To provide rapid detection for such events in the future, 
U.S. scientists from Argonne, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore 
national laboratories ``have been developing and experimenting 
with chemical sensors in two downtown [Washington] Metro 
stations . . . [They have] studied how air moves through the 
subway and how trains, heat and humidity affect air flow . . . 
how chemicals spread . . . [and how they] can be released 
through air exhaust systems into the streets above . . . They 
can detect the presence of a harmful chemical, such as sarin 
gas, [but] cannot yet detect biological agents, such as 
anthrax.'' \26\ Other detection technologies under development 
at the national laboratories include: ``a cyanide microsensor, 
[a] portable isotopic neutron spectroscopy chemical assay 
system that can identify nerve agents, compressed gases, or 
explosives inside artillery shells or bombs [and] . . . a 
`laboratory on a chip' that can identify . . . all . . . known 
chemical warfare agents in under 30 seconds.'' \27\
    Detection of biological agents is generally more difficult 
because the effect of the biological agent on the exposed 
individuals frequently does not become obvious until quite some 
time has elapsed; and oftentimes it is then too late to 
counteract the harmful agent. So it's imperative that effective 
detection technologies are developed and made widely available 
throughout the U.S. public health system.
    Biological agents can be delivered through the air, the 
water, the food supply, or--as we recently witnessed--through 
the mail system. Since detecting biological agents in the mail 
poses extremely daunting problems, high security targets--like 
the Congress and key government agencies--are beginning to 
irradiate all such mail in an effort to kill any biological 
organisms that may be present.
    The U.S. Postal Service recently announced its exploration 
of an even more sophisticated technology that could ``detect 
eight biohazards, including anthrax spores.'' Termed PCR (for 
polymerase chain reaction)--although sometimes referred to as 
`molecular photo-
copying'--the technology would take air samples every half-hour 
from mail passing through high-speed postal sorters and test 
the samples for the specific signatures of particular bacteria 
like anthrax. ``PCR is a general term for a process that uses 
specific enzymes to amplify tiny quantities of DNA and make a 
DNA match.'' \28\
    With respect to food, the current system for detecting 
contaminants is similar to searching for a needle in a 
haystack. The paucity of resources that have been devoted to 
this effort is thinly spread among the Departments of 
Agriculture, Commerce, and Defense, the Food and Drug 
Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency. 
Inspections are infrequent and some items--e.g., fish that goes 
from the boat directly to a wholesaler or retailer--are not 
inspected at all. Moreover, ``the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention catches [sic] only a small percentage of food-
borne outbreaks because state reporting is voluntary and 
inconsistent.'' In 1984 when ``members of a religious commune 
in Oregon contaminated 10 salad bars with salmonella 
[sickening] 151 people . . . it took a year to link the 
outbreak to the commune.'' \29\
    With respect to biological agents in general, ``because the 
time lag between exposure to a pathogen and the onset of 
symptoms may be days or weeks, effective response to a covert 
terrorist action will be critically dependent upon (a) the 
ability of individual clinicians, perhaps widely scattered 
around a large metropolitan area, to identify and accurately 
diagnose an uncommon disease and (b) a surveillance system for 
collecting reports of such cases that is actively monitored to 
catch disease outbreaks as they arise.'' \30\
    One such surveillance system is the Pittsburgh ``Real Time 
Outbreak and Disease Surveillance System [which] tracks 
patients by zip code, looking for spikes that often signal an 
upcoming wave of illness. For example, a jump in fever and 
respiratory illness in one neighborhood could tip off medical 
detectives that an anthrax outbreak has occurred.'' \31\
    Unfortunately, the nation's public health system is 
woefully unprepared to deal effectively with bioterrorism. 
``Vast numbers of the nation's private doctors are uninformed 
about how to recognize, treat and report casualties of a 
biological attack.'' \32\ ``Half of all U.S. states [lack] even 
a single `disease detective' to investigate outbreaks . . . Ten 
percent of the nation's 120 largest city and county health 
departments [do] not have e-mail.'' \33\ While ``some 
serological, immunological, and nucleic acid assays are 
available for identifying . . . biological agents, . . . 
[since] laboratories do not perform these assays regularly . . 
. it therefore seems unlikely that many labs will be 
immediately prepared to conduct the specific analytical test 
needed . . . even when the attending physician is astute enough 
to ask for the appropriate test.'' \34\ To begin to remedy 
these deficiencies in the nation's public health system, the 
President's recent budget calls for an increase in overall 
funding for combating bioterrorism to $5.9 billion, including 
``$1.2 billion to improve the ability of state and local health 
systems to respond to bioterrorism attacks.'' \35\
Coping with the Consequences of Terrorist Attacks
    After a terrorist act has been detected, it is imperative 
that its nature and extent be rapidly comprehended so that 
appropriate countermeasures can be undertaken. Even with a 
simple explosive or shooting attack, one has to determine the 
number of fatalities and the nature and extent of the injuries. 
In the case of arson, one has to know the extent and nature of 
the fire to know where to deploy the firefighters and what type 
of extinguishers to employ. It is sometimes difficult quickly 
to ascertain the character of chemical agents utilized in an 
attack. But when dealing with a `dirty' radiological device or 
a nuclear bomb, the process of comprehension becomes even more 
complex. While acts of cyber-terrorism can usually be traced to 
their sources, the challenge comes in doing so fast enough to 
minimize the damage they have caused. And biological weapons 
are especially troublesome in confounding rapid comprehension 
of what has transpired.
    The recent anthrax attack illustrates the nation's lack of 
necessary knowledge and effective organization to deal with 
biological terrorism. First, there was widespread confusion 
within the public health system as to the nature of the anthrax 
involved and, indeed, the amount of anthrax needed to cause 
inhalation anthrax in humans. Moreover, while the mails were 
used to transmit the anthrax spores to Senator Daschle's office 
in October 2001, as of this writing in March 2002, there is 
still no resolution as to how anthrax was transmitted to the 
women who died in New York and Connecticut. Equally baffling is 
the case of the postal inspector who spent 45 days in a 
Baltimore hospital after inspecting a mail-sorting machine at 
the Brentwood facility in which the Daschle letter was 
processed. Although he evinced most of the symptoms of 
inhalation anthrax, there was no evidence of anthrax bacteria 
in his blood.\36\
    Clearly there are three paramount preconditions that must 
be met in order to promote the more rapid comprehension of the 
nature and extent of terrorist acts: Firstly, we need much more 
research and development, especially regarding all aspects of 
bioterrorism. Secondly, we need much more extensive and 
effective educational programs for the front-line responders to 
terrorism (police, firefighters, emergency rescue teams, hazmat 
squads, etc.), as well as the medical and scientific public 
health officials who must analyze the situation and prescribe 
treatment. And thirdly, we need a vastly expanded and enhanced 
communication network integrating the intelligence community 
with state and local government officials, front-line 
responders, police and other public safety officers, and public 
health diagnosticians and practitioners.
    The need for a greatly improved communication network is 
underscored by the fact that the Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC) were not aware of significant Canadian studies conducted 
in May 2001, ``which showed . . . that a real anthrax threat 
letter was a far more dangerous weapon than anyone had believed 
. . . [Although] bioterrorism and civil defense experts in a 
half-dozen [U.S.] agencies had the information . . . CDC 
epidemiologists . . . didn't learn of the Canadian studies 
until early November. By then, the anthrax outbreak was almost 
over.'' \37\
    Depending on the determination of the nature and extent of 
the terrorist act, there are a number of ways we can attempt to 
cope with its consequences. When cyber-terrorism has occurred, 
it is up to the experience, ingenuity, and software available 
to the cyber-security experts to structure the best approach to 
blocking further damage and restoring the system under attack 
to its normal functioning. When the terrorist employs small 
arms fire or simple explosives, the treatment for non-fatal 
victims is straightforward, requiring the standard medical 
technologies for dealing with accident injuries. In addition, 
newly developed technologies can ameliorate the situation. For 
example, there is the jackhammer developed at Brookhaven 
National Laboratory ``for rescue teams working in collapsed, 
unstable buildings. The jackhammer . . . creates fewer shocks 
and vibrations than a conventional device, reducing the risk of 
further collapse . . . [And Sandia National Laboratory is 
developing] the robot family, a group of intelligent, mobile 
machines that can swarm over a site . . . looking for victims . 
. . The robots . . . have demonstrated independent `swarm 
intelligence' in carrying out their tasks.'' \38\
    In cases when the terrorist has perpetrated arson, 
technology can be of great assistance in enhancing the 
effectiveness of the response. For example, the NetTalon system 
cited earlier with regard to internal aircraft surveillance 
could also be utilized in fighting fires. That system would 
enable the firefighters speeding to the scene to have real time 
pictures on their laptop screens of precisely where in the 
building the fire was located, its intensity, speed of 
spreading, associated vapors, and whether it required water or 
specialized foams.\39\
    A rudimentary response to a chemical gas attack, of course, 
is to don a gas mask before the gas takes effect. ``Although 
sarin [nerve] gas can seep through the skin, breathing it in 
delivers a lethal dose about 400 times faster--so the mask 
could give you enough time to escape from a noxious cloud.'' 
However, the mask has to be in good working order, and the fit 
has to be airtight for it to function effectively.\40\ A good 
example of a technology for responding to chemical attack, is 
the Antidote-Treatment-Nerve-Gas-Agent Auto-injector developed 
by Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc. of Columbia, Maryland. 
This pen-like device enables soldiers to self-administer 
precise doses of both types of required anti-nerve-gas 
antidotes (atropine and praladoxime chloride).\41\ Another 
excellent example is Sandia National Laboratory's ``development 
of a nontoxic, noncorrosive foam that neutralizes both chemical 
agents and biologic species such as anthrax . . . The foam . . 
. was used extensively to clean up anthrax-contaminated areas 
on Capitol Hill.'' \42\
    With respect to biological agents, Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory has developed a prototype of an advanced, 
hand-held nucleic-acid-analyzer, only slightly larger than a 
scientific calculator, that would enable emergency workers to 
identify biowarfare agents in the field in a matter of 
minutes.\43\ For use after a dangerous substance has been 
detected, the same national laboratory has developed a gel ``to 
kill biological agents and neutralize chemicals without harming 
people.'' \44\ Another approach, still in the research phase, 
is the attempt to find an antitoxin that would neutralize the 
toxins produced by the anthrax bacteria. A group at Harvard 
Medical School led by Dr. R. John Collier has developed two 
methods of neutralizing the anthrax toxins: one by combining 
with the toxin molecules and inactivating them; the other by 
adhering to the toxin molecules and blocking them from entering 
the host cells. Both methods have been tested on rats who have 
survived with no symptoms. Still another approach, in an early 
research stage, ``involves a new type of antibiotic against 
anthrax bacteria . . . discovered by Dr. Lucy Shapiro of 
Stanford University and Dr. Stephen J. Benkovic of Penn State. 
In early laboratory tests, this antibiotic worked not only 
against anthrax bacteria, but also against brucellosis and 
tularemia, both of which are ``potential germ warfare 
weapons.'' \45\
    An entirely different approach for counteracting biological 
agents is irradiation. But, of course, this cannot be used on 
infected individuals, but only on things that are carrying the 
bacteria or the spores that will produce the bacteria. 
Following the delivery of anthrax-laden letters to Capitol Hill 
in October, all mail for the White House and Congress and much 
of the mail for federal agencies is irradiated. All mail for 
Washington, D.C. is first machine sorted for zip codes. All 
mail with government-zip-code destinations is then sorted by 
hand. Mail for the White House, Congress, and much of the mail 
for other federal government entities is then ``wrapped in 
plastic, packed in boxes, and taken by tractor-trailer to 
irradiation centers in Bridgeport, New Jersey or Lima, Ohio.'' 
At those centers the boxes of mail move on a conveyor belt past 
a `gun' that subjects them to a high dose of ionizing 
radiation. Afterwards they are trucked back to Maryland where 
``they are opened and allowed to breathe for up to 48 hours to 
dispel gases created by irradiation.'' They are then ready for 
final sorting and delivery.\46\
    Regardless of which technology is used to respond to the 
effects of the terrorist act, critical to the success of any 
countermeasures are the resources, training, and organization 
that are brought to bear on the situation. For example, in 
dealing with a chemical attack: ``the removal of solid or 
liquid chemical agent from exposed individuals is the first 
step in preventing severe injury or death . . . Very few 
[hazmat] teams are staffed, equipped, or trained for mass 
decontamination . . . [F]ew hospitals have formal 
decontamination facilities; even fewer have dedicated outdoor 
facilities or an easy way of expanding their decontamination 
operations in an event involving mass casualties.'' \47\ The 
administration's budget submission for FY 2003 makes a start 
toward remedying these deficiencies. The $38 billion for 
Homeland Security includes nearly $6 billion for combating 
bioterrorism, encompassing a range of programs: research and 
development for vaccines, diagnostic tests, decontamination 
methods, and related technologies; expansion of the National 
Pharmaceutical Stockpile; development of rapid response 
networks; and training and technical assistance to states and 
local governments to strengthen their public health 
systems.\48\
Technological Choice
    It is clear from the preceding discussion that the menu of 
technological options available for homeland security is vast. 
However, choosing among alternative strategies and technologies 
is not a simple, straightforward matter; on the contrary, it is 
highly complex and fraught with difficulties. Sometimes there 
are inadequate data on which to base a sound decision; other 
times the underlying science on which the technology is founded 
is not fully known--as was the case with understanding the 
transmission of inhalation anthrax from anthrax spores.
    Even when the scientific basis and data are available, 
however, a significant difficulty remains: the so-called `Law 
of Unintended Consequences.' This refers to the historical fact 
that many technologies have engendered ancillary, unexpected 
consequences that are frequently difficult to foresee and 
sometimes somewhat detrimental in their impacts. In order to 
gain some perspective on this issue, it is useful to examine 
some examples from the past and some apparent instances that 
have already emerged in the application of technology to the 
War on Terrorism.
    The most obvious example from the past is the use of the 
internal combustion engine to power automobiles and other 
vehicles. There is no question that this innovation served as 
one of the prime movers of 20th century economic expansion. 
Moreover, it not only facilitated much more rapid 
transportation of people and goods, but also its initial impact 
on the environment was salutary; for it led to the elimination 
of foul-smelling horse manure from roads and city streets. Yet 
we now know that its long-term effect on the environment has 
been deleterious because of its substantial contribution to air 
pollution and the possibility of global warming. Furthermore, 
the use of motorized vehicles has had the unfortunate ancillary 
consequence of tens of thousands of traffic fatalities and 
injuries in the United States annually.
    Another past example of the `Law of Unintended 
Consequences' was the use of chlorofluorocarbons for 
refrigeration and air conditioning. This was an immensely 
important innovation that facilitated the comfortable use of 
many otherwise unsuitable facilities in the heat of summer and 
the longer-term distribution and preservation of food products, 
thereby transforming the role of homemakers who no longer had 
to shop for food each day. In referring to Freon, a trade name 
for these chemicals, the 1973 edition of the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica stated: ``The importance of the Freons lies in the 
fact that they are so stable that they are entirely harmless.'' 
\49\ As we now know, however, it is the very stability of these 
chemicals that enables them to rise up above the atmosphere and 
serve to deplete the ozone layer, thereby interfering with its 
blocking of sun rays that can cause skin cancer.
    The point of these past examples is not that we should have 
refrained from utilizing the internal combustion engine or 
making use of refrigeration and air conditioning; both 
innovations have bestowed substantial benefits on our standard 
of living. But if we had anticipated their ancillary, adverse 
consequences earlier, we might have been able to structure 
their implementation in such a way as to mitigate those 
unintended consequences and to design research and development 
programs aimed at alternative or supplemental means of 
achieving the same ends.
    As noted above, some apparent instances of the `Law of 
Unintended Consequences' have already emerged in the 
application of technology to the War on Terrorism. Most notable 
among them is the use of irradiation to sanitize mail from 
anthrax spores and other pernicious contaminants. This 
``process tends to destroy computer chips and to damage . . . 
delicate items including food, [photos], pharmaceuticals, 
clothing, contact lens--and even the paper mail itself.'' \50\
    Also the fact that the process entails wrapping the mail in 
plastic prior to irradiation has apparently caused varying 
forms of distress among some mail handlers. This may be due to 
the interaction of the electrons [in the irradiation] and the 
plastic wrap, thereby producing ozone and carbon monoxide.\51\ 
In any case, the mail room in the U.S. Department of Commerce 
had to be temporarily shut down because a number of the mail 
room employees complained of nausea and respiratory 
distress.\52\ Similarly ``seventy-three employees of the U.S. 
Senate have reported health problems including headaches, eye 
irritation and skin rash after handling irradiated mail, and 
the government has issued a cautionary advisory to 180,000 
federal workers in the District.\53\ In addition, ``87 . . . 
workers at the Gaithersburg [Maryland mail] facility . . . are 
experiencing nosebleeds, runny noses, runny eyes, extreme 
headaches, nausea.'' \54\
    Again these unanticipated consequences do not imply that 
sensitive mail should not be irradiated. Indeed, as a result of 
such concerns, ``engineers lowered radiation dosages by about 
40% after concluding that that was sufficient to kill anthrax 
spores and other biological contaminants.'' \55\ Also mail is 
now being ``removed from the boxes and plastic and allowed to 
air . . . for as long as 48 hours before re-entering the usual 
mail delivery system.'' \56\ The point is that the earlier one 
can anticipate the ancillary consequences, the better one can 
implement the technology in a manner designed to obviate or 
mitigate its adverse effects.
    An example of a potential problem with an identification 
technology occurs in the field of biometrics. ``Retinal scan . 
. . is perhaps the most secure biometric option. Users, 
however, fear health effects from the infrared light used to 
read the retina, as well as possible infections from contact 
with the equipment . . . [Moreover,] a person's retinal 
patterns change after he or she experiences a heart attack. 
Unions have fought the installation of retinal scan equipment 
on the theory that the scan could be used by companies to spot 
sick employees and terminate them.'' \57\ Iris scans may not be 
as reliable as retina scans, in terms of false acceptance or 
false rejection rates, but since they do not involve physical 
contact, they may prove more desirable in some instances.\58\ 
This example illustrates the importance of including 
examination of ancillary consequences in consideration of 
alternative technologies.
    Technologies for coping with terrorists who are onboard an 
aircraft in flight also pose a number of problems that need to 
be assessed, according to a draft report of the National 
Institute of Justice, a research resource of the Justice 
Department. The draft report stated that: ``Tasers--a type of 
stun gun . . . could interfere with the plane's operational 
instruments . . . `In the preliminary tests . . . an electrical 
discharge less-than-lethal device fired at cockpit instruments 
adversely affected a number of systems . . . [Furthermore,] in 
the confined space of a cockpit, crew members are likely to be 
incapacitated' . . . by other non-lethal weapons such as pepper 
spray or tear gas . . . [The draft report also raised serious 
questions on a number of other technologies, including,] . . . 
the Laser Dazzler, a light that temporarily blinds an attacker, 
. . . anesthetics or calmative chemicals that could 
incapacitate all passengers when released into the air, a 
`slippery foam' on the cabin floors that could make an attacker 
slip, and some kinds of ear-piercing acoustic weapon.'' \59\
    A broader problem of unintended consequences that permeates 
a number of the technologies that may be used in the War on 
Terrorism is their impact on the privacy of individuals. This 
impact can be readily perceived in the proliferation of video 
cameras and human scanning equipment for purposes of security. 
As indicated earlier, one biometric system utilizes imaging 
technologies that can penetrate clothing and produce an image 
of the body beneath them.\60\ The increasing use of closed 
circuit TV (CCTV) for security surveillance portends a 
pervasive impact on personal privacy. The proliferation of CCTV 
in the UK over the past decade may be a prognosticator of what 
lies ahead for the United States. In the early 1990s, after 
terrorist bombs exploded in the `City of London,' the 
government installed a network of CCTV cameras around that area 
and over the decade encouraged local governments to do the same 
in their areas. ``By 1998, 440 city centers were wired [with 
CCTV] . . . There are now [estimated to be] 2.5 million 
surveillance cameras in Britain.'' \61\ ``In Britain in the 
late 1990s it is unlikely that any urban dweller, in their 
[sic] role as shopper, worker, commuter, resident or school 
pupil can avoid being . . . monitored by camera surveillance 
systems.'' \62\
    A further instance of the potential invasion of privacy 
arises from the intended expansion and integration of data 
bases containing background information on individuals for use 
in security at airports, seaports, border crossings, etc. The 
more extensive and integrated such data bases are, the more 
susceptible they become to misuse of the information. A third 
example of the potential infringement of privacy comes from the 
pervasive expansion of the internet, with its manifold 
possibilities for mischief. As these technologies continue 
their diffusion, it is essential that every effort 
be made to ensure as much protection of individual privacy as 
possible.
    Another potentially adverse consequence from anti-terrorist 
technology is the much wider use of microwave and other forms 
of radiation to which persons may be exposed. While there is no 
conclusive evidence at this time as to such adverse impact, it 
is important that such technologies be designed, perfected, and 
operated so as to minimize the possibility of any such effects. 
The more widespread use of specific antibiotics, such as Cipro, 
also poses potential unintended consequences. This is evidenced 
by a recent study which ``found that a powerful strain of 
salmonella developed a resistance to the antibiotic Cipro in 
less than two years.'' \63\
    A different kind of unintended consequence has emerged from 
the current effort to establish a comprehensive computer 
network to track foreign students in the U.S. ``Officials 
concede they do not know . . . where [or whether] the 547,000 
people holding student visas are attending school . . . 
[H]igher education institutions . . . raised a raft of 
objections [to the planned system] . . . The issue is 
particularly pressing for community and technical colleges, 
which rely heavily on foreign students because they pay higher 
tuition . . . [C]olleges have also objected to a plan . . . 
that would prevent foreign students from receiving diplomas 
until they confirm that they have either returned home or have 
extended their visas.'' \64\ It is clear that this planned 
computerized, surveillance system of foreign students would 
pose major unintended consequences for the academic 
institutions involved.
    Perhaps the ultimate, tragic example of the `Law of 
Unintended Consequences' is the fact that without the Internet, 
cell phones, and modern telecommunications systems, the Al 
Queda network could never have evolved into the pervasive, 
pernicious web of evil it has become. So in that warped sense, 
the terrible tragedy of September 11 was--at least in some 
small part--an unintended consequence of the proliferation of 
those technologies.
    The lesson from all this is that technologies often have 
unintended, ancillary effects which--to the extent feasible--
should be anticipated and taken into account in selecting among 
alternative technological solutions and structuring their 
implementation. The point is not that any particular technology 
is inherently good or bad, but rather that its relative 
benefits and detriments depend partially on its ancillary 
consequences, as well as on the uses to which it is put and the 
way in which it is implemented.
Technology Assessment
    The analysis, comparison, and selection of technologies to 
be implemented is a complex, difficult process. Discerning 
unintended consequences is not the only hurdle that must be 
overcome. The process involves the following components:

   determining the technical capabilities of the 
        technology;

   evaluating its effectiveness in achieving its 
        primary objectives;

   ascertaining its costs;

   delineating the benefits it confers;

   anticipating its ancillary consequences and 
        estimating their positive and negative effects;

   discerning its probable impact on the economy, 
        environment, society, and individual values;

   comparing the technology with alternatives in terms 
        of all the foregoing factors; and

   delineating the advantages and disadvantages--the 
        pros 
        and cons--for the various policy options confronting 
        decision 
        makers.

    Technology assessment is the methodology for conducting 
such analyses. Focused on the future, ``it is the 
institutionalization of a methodology for previewing potential 
effects of technological developments so that the information 
generated may increase our ability to forestall the detrimental 
effects and encourage the beneficial effects of our 
inventions.'' \65\ Incorporating elements of operations 
research, systems analysis, cost-benefit studies, game theory, 
linear programming, simulation studies, and alternative-futures 
scenarios--along with pragmatic public policy considerations--
technology assessment emerged as a distinct field of academic 
research in the mid-1960s.
    Prompted by information on this field from the academic and 
scientific communities, along with congressional concern with 
comprehending the technological aspects of public policy 
issues, Representative Emilio Q. Daddario began a public 
dialogue in March 1967, when he ``introduced a bill proposing 
the creation of a `Technology Assessment Board' . . . to 
provide Congress with an `early warning signal' of the 
potential good and bad consequences of technological 
programs.'' As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Science, 
Research, and Development of the Committee on Science and 
Astronautics, Congressman Daddario followed up by launching 
several years of seminars, studies, and hearings with 
substantial input from reports by the Legislative Reference 
Service [now the Congressional Research Service] and by each of 
the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Public 
Administration.\66\
    Based on these extensive deliberations, a revised bill was 
introduced in the House in 1971, and followed by a companion 
bill in the Senate. With further amendments, the bill passed 
the House in February 1972; and, with some additional 
revisions, the bill to create an Office of Technology 
Assessment passed the Senate in September 1972. After 
consideration by a conference committee and final passage in 
both Houses, the Technology Assessment Act of 1972 was signed 
into law by President Nixon on October 13, 1972,\67\ thereby 
establishing OTA as only the third support agency of the 
Congress in the history of the Republic. (The first, the 
Legislative Reference Service, which later became the 
Congressional Research Service, was created in 1914; the 
second, the General Accounting Office (GAO) came in 1921; and 
the fourth, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), was not 
created until 1974.)
OTA's Unique Role and History
    Under the enabling statute, OTA consists of a Technology 
Assessment Board (TAB) and a Director. TAB consists of 6 
Senators and 6 House members, evenly split between the two 
parties (to ensure non-partisanship), along with the Director 
as an ex officio non-voting member. The Senate members are 
appointed by the President pro-tempore of the Senate; the House 
members by the Speaker of the House; and the Director is 
appointed by the Board. The Director appoints the office staff. 
In addition, there is a Technology Assessment Advisory Council 
(TAAC), whose 10 public members are appointed by the Board and 
which includes 2 ex officio members, the Comptroller General 
and the Director of the Congressional Research Service.\68\
    During the 5 years of extensive consideration before this 
measure was enacted into law, a great deal of attention was 
focused on the question of why a new Office of Technology 
Assessment (OTA) was needed, rather than relying on the 
existing congressional support agencies of the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) and the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS). The overwhelming judgment of the academic, scientific, 
technical, and public policy communities was that neither GAO 
nor CRS was capable of doing the job of technology assessment 
required by the Congress. Indeed, ``both the Comptroller 
General and the Director of the Congressional Research Service 
(and also the Librarian of Congress) support[ed] the 
establishment of an OTA.'' \69\
    In the first appropriations hearings on OTA, Representative 
John Davis, the ranking House Democrat on the newly created 
Technology Assessment Board (TAB) stated: ``[OTA] would perform 
a function far greater than could be performed by [CRS] . . . 
inasmuch as much of the information that would be desirable to 
have on the part of the committees of both the House and of the 
Senate would . . . require the generating of information rather 
than simply the retrieval of information.'' And the ranking 
House Republican on TAB, Representative Charles Mosher said: 
``GAO . . . investigations have been after the fact. The type 
of investigation they do is in retrospect . . . OTA . . . 
investigations are before the fact. They are . . . an early 
warning system for the Congress and I think that is a very 
important distinction . . . [Also] assessments . . . are 
assigned to OTA . . . by a request from congressional 
committees . . . The [Congressional] Research Service is 
responsive to any request of a Congressman and, therefore, gets 
a plethora of every variety, some very unimportant.'' \70\ The 
issue of whether OTA's functions could be adequately performed 
by either CRS or GAO was re-examined in 1976 by the Commission 
on the Operation of the Senate, which published the conclusion 
that: ``The functions OTA can perform represent important needs 
of the Senate, needs that cannot be met through the committee 
structure or by other support agencies.'' \71\
    In any case, this point of view had prevailed when, a 
little over a year after enactment of its enabling statute, OTA 
received its first appropriation in November 1973, appointed 
its first staff in December, and commenced operations in early 
1974, with then former Congressman Daddario as its first 
Director. Recognizing the challenge of creating a new 
institution within Congress, he gradually built his in-house 
staff, developed an extensive network of consultants and 
advisory panelists, and focused on establishing good working 
relationships with the various congressional committees. He 
structured OTA's initial assessments into seven program areas: 
energy, food, health, materials, national R&D policies and 
priorities, technology and international trade, and 
transportation.
    After guiding OTA through its formative first four years, 
he resigned in 1977, and was succeeded in 1978 by the former 
governor of Delaware, Russell Peterson. Unlike Daddario, 
Peterson did not manage to develop good relationships with the 
TAB Members who had appointed him. ``Several members of the 
board felt that . . . [his] priorities . . . strayed too far 
from what Congress considered to be the most important 
legislative concerns . . . One [TAB Member] complained that 
Peterson was trying to create a `sort of Brookings Institution 
in the Congress' . . . another accused the OTA of a `disturbing 
pattern of ignoring congressional oversight and service'.'' 
\72\ In any event, Peterson resigned in 1979 after serving only 
one year as Director.
    OTA achieved maturity with its next Director, Dr. John 
Gibbons who served close to 15 years, from 1979 to 1993. He 
developed very good relationships with TAB Members and 
congressional committees and, through astute management of OTA, 
built the Office's credibility within the Congress and 
throughout the nation's academic, scientific, technical, and 
professional communities. Indeed, OTA ``gradually became 
recognized worldwide as the top institution of its kind . . . 
Austria, Denmark, the European Community, France, Germany, 
Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden have copied or 
adapted the OTA style. Similar organizations are being 
discussed or formed in Hungary, Japan, Mexico, the People's 
Republic of China, Russia, Switzerland, and Taiwan.'' \73\
    From 1974 through 1995, ``OTA published nearly 750 full 
assessments, background papers, technical memoranda, case 
studies, and workshop proceedings. The quality of those 
products is attested to by the facts that from 1992 to 1994, 
twelve assessments won the National Association for Government 
Communicators' prestigious Blue Pencil Award . . . [and during] 
the same 3 years, 12 additional reports were named among the 60 
Notable Government Documents selected annually by the American 
Library Association's Government Documents Roundtable--
representing the best Federal, State, and local government 
documents from around the world . . . OTA's reports were often 
bestsellers at the Government Printing Office and the National 
Technical Information Service . . . [For example,] GPO sold 
48,000 OTA reports in [one year] alone.'' \74\
    The authoritative credibility achieved by OTA over the 
years is perhaps best articulated in a 1988 article entitled 
``Influential Office Guides Congress into Space Age,'' in which 
the author asserts: ``Without OTA's nod, leading scientific 
theories stand little chance of winning status as conventional 
wisdom on Capitol Hill . . . The Office is credited with having 
matured into the scientific heavyweight whose assessments can 
mean life or death for technical problems in the appropriations 
process . . . At least one thing is clear: in a town where 
unimpeachable sources are oh-so-hard to come by, OTA has 
managed to secure a position near the top of the list.'' \75\
OTA's Structure and Pattern of Operations
    OTA achieved this status as a consequence of the prescience 
embodied in its enabling statute and the implementing pattern 
of operations that subsequently evolved. Although the bill that 
originally passed the House called for the majority party to 
hold a majority of seats on TAB, the Senate bill stipulated a 
board evenly divided between the two parties, and the Senate 
version was accepted in conference.\76\ This assurance of TAB's 
non-partisanship--highly unusual at a time when both Houses of 
Congress had been controlled by the Democrats for a 
generation--was absolutely essential for enabling OTA to 
realize both the reality and public perception of objectivity 
and credibility.
    Along with a governing board, evenly split between House 
and Senate and between Democrats and Republicans, the Act 
called for the creation of an advisory council, including: 
``ten members from the public . . . eminent in one or more 
fields of the physical, biological, or social sciences or 
engineering or experienced in the administration of 
technological activities, or . . . qualified on the basis of 
contributions made to educational or public activities.'' \77\ 
Thus the Act provided TAB and the Director with the perspective 
of an eminent group of outside advisers. Since the assessments 
to be undertaken by OTA, however, spanned a multitude of 
scientific and technical disciplines and specialities, OTA also 
built a network of advisory panels and consultants who were 
versed in the specific issues involved in particular assessment 
projects. Over the years as the OTA in-house staff grew to 
number nearly 150, this outside network of advisers grew to 
about 1,000 individuals throughout the nation.
    The professional staff consisted of about half scientists 
and engineers and about half social scientists, lawyers, and 
health care professionals. From 1979 on, the OTA staff was 
organized in three divisions, each headed by an Assistant 
Director of OTA. These were the divisions of: (a) Energy, 
Materials, and International Security; (b) Science, 
Information, and Natural Resources; and (c) Health and Life 
Sciences. Each division in turn was organized in three 
programs, headed by a Program Director. The programs in 
division (a) were: Energy and Materials; Industry, Technology, 
and Employment; and International Security and Commerce. The 
programs in division (b) were: Communications and Information 
Technologies; Oceans and Environment; and Science, Education, 
and Transportation. And the programs in division (c) were: 
Biological Applications; Food and Renewable Resources; and 
Health.
    Each program in turn usually had several projects underway 
at any one time, each of which was headed by a project 
director. Some relevant examples of specific OTA assessments 
include:

   The Border War on Drugs
   Electronic Surveillance in a Digital Age
   High Level Radioactive Waste Site Characterization
   Impacts of Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria
   New Developments in Biotechnology
   Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing
   Taggants in Explosives
   Technology Transfer to China
   Technology and Counter Terrorism
   Transportation of Hazardous Materials
   Virtual Reality and Technologies for Combat 
        Simulation
   Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

    As noted above, in addition to the in-house staff and the 
congressional board and advisory council, OTA made extensive 
use of a national network of about 1,000 advisory panelists and 
consultants who addressed specific assessment projects. Thus 
for each full-fledged assessment an advisory panel of about 12-
20 individuals was appointed which included scientific and 
technical experts in the particular subject under 
consideration, as well as participants from industry, labor, 
academia, the professions, state and local government, and the 
public at large. And before an assessment report was finalized, 
it was critiqued by a wider array of experts and stakeholders 
throughout the nation.\78\
    ``The steps in the assessment process may be summarized as 
follows: (1) OTA staff engage in informal communication with 
congressional committee staff. (2) This leads to formal 
committee request letters to OTA, a proposal from the staff to 
TAB, and TAB approval to initiate an assessment. (3) An 
advisory panel is appointed which critiques the staff's 
preliminary assessment design at the panel's first meeting. (4) 
Months later, at the second panel meeting, OTA discusses its 
analysis of the data it has obtained and the way it is likely 
to be handled in the assessment report. (5) Some months later 
OTA presents a draft of its final report to the advisory panel 
and subsequently to additional outside reviewers. (6) About 
eighteen months after the start of the project, OTA presents a 
final report to TAB for approval to release it to the 
requesting committees and the public at large. (7) OTA then 
presents its results to the requesting committees, in the form 
of briefings and testimony at hearings, as well as in a written 
document, and disseminates its findings to appropriate 
Executive Branch agencies, other interested parties, and the 
general public.'' \79\
OTA's Credibility, Objectivity, and Relevance
    While this process may appear lengthy and laborious, it 
embodies an elaborate panoply of checks and balances that 
confer credibility, objectivity, and relevance on the final 
assessment report. These checks and balances are inherent in 
OTA's statute and pattern of operations. Some of the most 
important ones are:

   the even balance between House and Senate and the 
        two parties on TAB;

   the tradition of choosing the Vice Chair from the 
        opposite party to the Chair;

   the need for TAB approval both to initiate an 
        assessment and subsequently to release the final 
        report;

   the Technology Assessment Advisory Council's 
        salutary influence on OTA's standards of excellence;

   each advisory panel's role in the design of the 
        assessment, the analysis of the data, and the content 
        of the final report;

   the role of the stakeholders and additional expert 
        consultants in reviewing the draft report;

   the presentation of a Review Memorandum from the 
        Project Director to the OTA Director, which ``describes 
        the reactions of the panel and outside reviewers to 
        each portion of the report and shows how the final 
        version takes account of those comments;'' \80\ and

   the pattern of continuing, informal communication 
        between OTA and committee staff before, during, and as 
        follow-up to the assessment.

    The relevance of OTA's assessments is ensured by the close 
control the congressional board exercises over the initiation 
and final approval of OTA products, as well as by the 
continuing communication between OTA and congressional 
committee staff. While OTA reports have received widespread 
acclaim throughout the academic, scientific, technical, and 
professional communities, their primary purpose is not to edify 
scholars, but rather to serve congressional needs for the 
analysis of policy options involving technology. Because of the 
continuing oversight of TAB and interaction with congressional 
committees, adherence to this purpose is preserved.
    OTA's objectivity is ensured through a number of the checks 
and balances, the most fundamental one of which is that the 
Board is evenly split between the two parties and has 
traditionally included a range of conservatives, moderates, and 
liberals among its members. Moreover, the pattern of choosing 
the Chair and Vice Chair of TAB from opposite parties adds to 
OTA's non-partisanship, and hence its objectivity. This 
characteristic is further enhanced by the roles played by the 
advisory council, the specialized advisory panels, and the many 
outside reviewers involved in each assessment. They comprise 
not only a very wide range of technical experts, but 
stakeholders as well--representatives of industry, labor, 
public interest groups, and the public at large.
    This diversity of expertise and points of view ensures that 
the OTA staff is aware of virtually all relevant issues and 
interests involved in the particular assessment. The fact that 
the final Review Memorandum has to show specifically how each 
concern has been taken into account accords a high degree of 
objectivity to the final OTA report. Attesting to that 
objectivity is the fact that in debates on congressional 
proposals, OTA reports were oftentimes cited by both the 
proponents and opponents of the particular proposal. OTA's 
credibility consequently comes from the entire assessment 
process and the enviable reputation OTA achieved during the 
Gibbons directorship.
The Relative Roles of OTA, CRS, and GAO
    Having this understanding of the OTA process, it becomes 
clear that Congress made the right decision in establishing OTA 
in 1972, rather than attempting to rely on CRS and GAO for 
providing the necessary analysis of policy options involving 
complex technological issues. Congress needs technology 
assessment that is timely, targeted to the specific legislative 
priorities of congressional committees, and presented in a 
format that clarifies the consequences--both pro and con--of 
the various policy options related to the technologies under 
consideration.
    Neither CRS nor GAO has the capability to design and 
conduct such assessments. Both CRS and GAO must respond to the 
requests of individual members of Congress; whereas OTA 
responds only to requests from congressional committees. 
Accordingly, OTA assessments are inherently oriented toward the 
priority needs of congressional committees, thereby rendering 
them relevant to the committees' legislative agendas. This 
legislative relevance is further ensured by the requirement for 
TAB approvals both to initiate assessments and release final 
reports, as well as its continuing oversight of OTA activities 
throughout the process. While CRS research and GAO 
investigations certainly provide valuable information to 
individual members of the Senate and the House, they cannot 
possibly attain the same degree of conformance to committees' 
legislative requirements.
    Furthermore, as former Representative Davis noted, CRS 
essentially retrieves existent information, while OTA generates 
new information. And as former Representative Mosher stated: 
GAO does retrospective investigations; whereas OTA assessments 
are future oriented and serve as ``an early warning system for 
the Congress . . . a very important distinction.'' \81\
    Finally, neither CRS nor GAO has the statutory authority or 
institutional capability to make as extensive use of outside 
advisers drawn from all segments of the scientific, technical, 
professional, and public interest communities as OTA has. As 
indicated earlier, these advisers have played an integral, 
essential role in ensuring that OTA reports take account of 
virtually all relevant expertise and points of view. Without 
that involvement, OTA's products could not have been able to 
achieve so high a level of objectivity and credibility as they 
did. Neither CRS nor GAO is equipped to make that kind of use 
of 1,000 consultants.
    When one considers that OTA is controlled by a 
congressional board--similar to a joint committee--and has 
maintained continuing communication with congressional 
committees, along with the pattern whereby the office has drawn 
upon its pool of about 1,000 outside advisers, the essence of 
OTA's unique role becomes clear. In effect, OTA has served as a 
critical translation link between the widespread technical 
knowledge of the academic, scientific, and professional experts 
and the policy-oriented queries and concerns of congressional 
committees. OTA effects this translation in a thorough, in-
depth fashion that focuses on future-oriented policy options 
for Congress. In brief, OTA is the interface between Congress 
and the nation's science and technology community. For all of 
the reasons that have been cited, neither CRS nor GAO can 
fulfill that function.
OTA After Gibbons: 1993-1995
    After 15 years of high achievement as OTA Director, Gibbons 
resigned in early 1993 to join the new administration as 
Science and Technology Adviser to the President and Director of 
the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. He was 
succeeded by Dr. Roger C. Herdman who had been serving as an 
OTA assistant director, with responsibility for the Health and 
Life Sciences Division. In his new role, Dr. Herdman carried on 
in the tradition of excellence established by his predecessor.
    However, in 1995 there was a sea change in control of 
Congress. The new leadership was intent on eliminating a number 
of cabinet departments--Energy, Education, and Commerce--and 
also on reducing the costs of government, including within the 
Legislative Branch. The likeliest target for reduction within 
the Congress was one of the support agencies, CBO, CRS, GAO, 
and OTA. Of these, OTA was the smallest and most vulnerable.
    Accordingly, in order to save money--the FY 1995 
appropriation for OTA had been $22 million--the House 
Appropriations Committee on June 15, 1995 recommended 
elimination of funding for OTA. On June 22 following a failed 
effort by Representative Vic Fazio (D-CA) to restore OTA 
funding, the House passed the FY 1996 Legislative Branch 
Appropriations bill with no funding for OTA. The House also 
eliminated the Joint Committee on Printing, reduced the Joint 
Economic Committee budget by 25 percent, cut House committee 
budgets overall by a total of $40 million, and the GAO budget 
by $57 million. So the elimination of OTA's appropriation 
occurred within a context of extreme cost-cutting measures 
across the board. \82\
    On July 18 the Senate Appropriations Committee reported out 
its bill, including $3.6 million for OTA--but solely for the 
purpose of closing down the office. Senator Ernest F. Hollings, 
who had served on the OTA board for 23 years, had led an 
unsuccessful fight in committee to restore full funding. Again 
on the Senate floor on July 20, he offered an amendment to the 
committee bill to provide OTA with $15 million. Although his 
amendment was supported by then Minority Leader Daschle, 
Appropriations Committee ranking Democrat, Senator Byrd, as 
well as all other senators who had served on the OTA Board--
Senators Grassley, Hatch, Kennedy, and Stevens--it still went 
down to defeat.
    ``While lauding the past successes of the Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA), [opponents of the amendment] 
stated that Senators . . . should support efforts to conserve 
taxpayers' funds and streamline the bureaucracy surrounding 
Congress.'' \83\ Senator Hollings retorted: ``What you're doing 
is eliminating the most economical approach to this 
technological need.'' \84\ Senator Kennedy said: ``The Office 
of Technology Assessment . . . continues to serve an 
indispensable role . . . it should not be abolished.'' Senator 
Grassley noted: ``OTA is our source of objective counsel when 
it comes to science and technology and its interaction with 
public policy decision making . . . [I]f we do not have an 
unbiased source of information, then we have to rely on 
organizations with a stake in keeping alive programs that 
benefit their interests.'' Senator Hatch added: ``OTA . . . is 
the one arm of Congress that does give us . . . unbiased, 
scientific and technical expertise that we could not otherwise 
get where most everybody has confidence in what they do.'' And 
Senator Stevens stated: ``[W]e are about ready to do away with 
the one entity in the Congress that tries to . . . deliver to 
Members of Congress credible, timely reports on the development 
of technology. I believe . . . that we are changing the course 
of history in this Congress, but this is not one of the 
hallmarks of that change. This entity (OTA) ought to be out in 
the forefront of that change, and it will not be unless it is 
properly funded and maintained.'' \85\
    In the conference committee, Representative Fazio made 
another unsuccessful attempt to restore funding for OTA. In 
that debate Representative Ray Thornton (D-AK) made a 
rhetorical connection between the elimination of OTA's funds 
and the inclusion in the bill of funds to renovate the 
congressional Botanic Garden. He said: ``The arguments that 
there are alternatives to OTA apply equally to [the Botanic 
Garden, which] could be privatized. There are florists all over 
the country. If we're going to cancel the garden of the mind--
OTA--then we can't afford to keep a [Botanic] garden.'' \86\
    The House adopted the conference report on September 6, and 
the Senate followed suit on September 22, with a proponent of 
the bill stating: ``This bill sets the standard. If we in 
Congress can cut our own budget, every federal agency should be 
able to do the same.'' The President vetoed the bill on October 
3, because Congress submitted it to him prior to passing 
appropriations measures for various Executive Branch 
departments and agencies. After re-introducing the identical 
bill, the House passed it again on October 31, and the Senate 
on November 2. This time the bill was sent to the President, 
coupled with the appropriation for the Treasury Department and 
the White House, and he signed it into law on November 17.\87\ 
OTA had already ceased regular operations on September 29, the 
last work day of FY 1995. A skeleton staff was retained for a 
few months at the start of FY 1996, in order to archive OTA's 
records, arrange for internet access to its reports at various 
university sites, close out its personnel and financial 
commitments, dispose of its computers, furniture, and other 
equipment, and prepare its Annual Report to Congress for FY 
1995. \88\

           *         *         *         *         *

Findings
    The findings that emerge from the foregoing discussion are 
as follows:

   Technology is critical to U.S. success in the War on 
        Terrorism and ensuring homeland security.

   A wide variety of sophisticated technologies may be 
        involved in those efforts.

   Choosing among possible technologies and patterns of 
        implementation is a complex process, oftentimes 
        involving unintended consequences.

   Technology assessment is the methodology for making 
        such choices.

   The leading exemplar of technology assessment was 
        the congressional Office of Technology Assessment 
        (OTA).

   For almost a quarter of a century, OTA provided 
        Congress with valuable analyses of policy options on 
        important issues involving technology.

   During that period OTA achieved a world-wide 
        reputation for excellence, as a non-partisan, 
        objective, and credible conductor of technology 
        assessments.

   There was no dissatisfaction with its performance; 
        indeed OTA received accolades for its excellent work 
        while its funding was being eliminated.

   Elimination of its funding was a cost-cutting 
        measure at a time of fiscal stringency and a symbol for 
        Executive Branch agencies to emulate.

   Congress now needs its own source of non-partisan, 
        objective technology assessment in order to fulfill its 
        legislative, appropriation, and oversight 
        responsibilities in the War on Terrorism and ensuring 
        homeland security.
CONCLUSION
    Fortunately, in 1995 when OTA's funding was discontinued, 
its enabling statute remained in effect; no action was taken to 
rescind it. So the law establishing OTA is still on the books. 
OTA still technically exists. For practical purposes, what does 
this mean?
    To determine its import, it's necessary to examine the 
provisions of the enabling statute, the Technology Assessment 
Act of 1972. Section 3(b) of the act states that OTA ``shall 
consist of a Technology Assessment Board . . . and a 
Director.'' Discontinuing OTA's funding vacated the positions 
of the director and the staff, but the Board still technically 
exists. Moreover, since the Senate is a continuing body and the 
act does not limit the tenure of its members, the Senators who 
were Board members in 1995--Senators Grassley, Hatch, Hollings, 
and Kennedy--are still Board members. Since the House is not a 
continuing body, it could be argued that the current House 
members who were on TAB in 1995--Representatives Dingell, 
Houghton, McDermott, and Oxley--would not still be members. 
However, the facts that TAB is an independent board, rather 
than a congressional joint committee and that the OTA statute 
does not impose any time limit on board appointments provide a 
basis for arguing that they still are members of TAB. In any 
case, section 4(b) of the act stipulates that: ``Vacancies in 
the membership of the Board shall not affect the power of the 
remaining members to execute the functions of the Board.'' In 
addition, the appropriations section of the act, section 12(a) 
states that: ``To enable the Office to carry out its powers and 
duties, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the 
Office [following its first 2 fiscal years of existence] . . . 
``thereafter such sums as may be necessary.'' \89\
    In short, OTA has an ongoing authorization to receive 
appropriations, and the Technology Assessment Board (TAB) is 
empowered to submit a recommendation to the Appropriations 
Committee for such an appropriation. Given these facts and the 
finding that Congress needs its own source of technology 
assessment to fulfill its role in the War on Terrorism and 
ensuring homeland security, it is the conclusion of this author 
that OTA should be reactivated.
    But to underscore the urgent necessity for reactivating 
OTA, it is instructive to consider one final example of OTA's 
potential impact on the War on Terrorism and homeland security. 
As is well known, the anthrax attacks last fall engendered 
considerable confusion and consternation among public health 
authorities, public safety officials, and policy makers 
throughout federal, state, and local government. There was 
great uncertainty as to the source and extent of the attacks, 
the potency and persistence of the anthrax spores, the manner 
of transmission, and--not least--the number of spores necessary 
to trigger inhalation anthrax in human beings. In the course of 
reacting to the attacks, it was widely reported that it was 
believed that 8,000-10,000 spores would have to be inhaled for 
a person to contract inhalation or pulmonary anthrax. This 
belief undoubtedly played a role in shaping the public health 
response to the attacks.
    It's unfortunate that OTA was not operational at that time. 
If it had been, OTA staff could have ensured that a 1993 OTA 
report was promptly brought to the attention of the public 
health authorities. The report entitled Technologies Underlying 
Weapons of Mass Destruction contained the following finding: 
``1,000 spores or less can produce fatal pulmonary anthrax in 
some members of an exposed population.'' \90\ If this 
information had been readily available, it's conceivable that 
it even could have saved a life or--at the very least--afforded 
much better guidance to the public health authorities in 
designing their response to the crisis.

           *         *         *         *         *

RECOMMENDATIONS
    The War on Terrorism and the striving for homeland security 
are urgent national necessities. However, the reactivation of 
OTA is equally urgent, if Congress is to be empowered to 
partner with the President in pursuit of those objectives--in 
its role as a co-equal branch of government.
    The sooner Congress can reactivate OTA, the sooner it can 
effectively deal with those issues. Once OTA receives an 
appropriation, it still will take some months to build its 
staff and network of outside advisers, and to work with the 
congressional committees to delineate an assessment agenda that 
meets their priority needs. At this time of national challenge, 
waiting until the start of the next fiscal year, October 1, 
2002, is too long a period to remain without this resource. 
Accordingly, an appropriation for OTA should be included in the 
next supplemental appropriations bill to come before the 
Congress.
    A key question then becomes: How much should be provided 
for OTA in this bill? In the current situation of fiscal 
stringency, one should allocate only enough to reactivate the 
office effectively. This in turn hinges on what the office 
would be doing for the balance of this fiscal year.
    After a few essential staff members have been appointed, 
their primary function would be to canvass and consult with 
congressional committees in both the House and Senate in order 
to ascertain their priority needs for technology assessments 
with respect to the War on Terrorism and homeland security. The 
task would then be to plan a series of assessments designed to 
meet those priority needs. Concurrently with these activities, 
the office would be identifying potential outside advisers on 
whom OTA could rely, and under the guidance of the Technology 
Assessment Board, preparing a detailed budget submission for 
the following fiscal year that would provide OTA with the 
resources to proceed with a number of high priority 
assessments.
    It is believed that a supplemental appropriation of $1 
million would be sufficient for OTA to carry out these initial 
activities effectively. Considering that this $1 million would 
reactivate an Office that could aid Congress in evaluating the 
$38 billion the President has recently requested for homeland 
security, the $1 million amount does not seem unreasonable.
    Recommendation: In the first supplemental appropriation 
bill considered in this session, Congress should include $1 
million for OTA to canvass and consult with congressional 
committees, and plan a series of technology assessments 
designed to meet the priority needs of those committees with 
respect to the War on Terrorism and homeland security.



           *         *         *         *         *
                                 NOTES

    1. Sean Ford, ``Small Influential Office Guides Congress 
Into Space Age,'' Federal Times, 13 June 1988, 18.
    2. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 
Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 
1993, 78.
    3. William J. Broad, Stephen Engelberg, and James Glanz, 
``A Nation Challenged: The Threats; Assessing Risks, Chemical, 
Biological, Even Nuclear,'' New York Times, 1 Nov. 2001, AI.
    4. John Schwartz, ``A Nation Challenged: The Computer 
Networks; Cyberspace Seen as Potential Battleground,'' New York 
Times, 23 Nov. 2001, B5.
    5. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1998) 180-181.
    6. It should be noted that water systems are vulnerable not 
only to chemical or biological contamination, but also to 
cyber-terrorism: ``. . . essentially every component of the 
water supply system is highly automated. This includes 
electronic control of water pumping and storing, water 
treatment operations, and water transmission . . . [G]reat 
damage could be done if the control of these systems were lost 
for a period of time due to cyber attack.'' U.S. Congress, 
House Committee on Science. ``Safety of Our Nation's Water,'' 
testimony by Richard G. Luthy, Professor of Civil and 
Environmental Engineering, Stanford University and Chair, Water 
Science and Technology Board, National Research Council, 107th 
Cong., 1st sess., 14 Nov. 2001.
    7. Matthew L. Wald, ``Electric Power System Is Called 
`Vulnerable,' and Vigilance Is Sought,'' New York Times, 28 
Feb. 2002, A11.
    8. President George W. Bush, ``State of the Union,'' U.S. 
Capitol, Washington, D.C., 29 Jan. 2002.
    9. Ibid.
    10. Phillip B. Heymann, Terrorism and America: A Common 
Sense Strategy for a Democratic Society (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 1998) 134-136.
    11. Mary Jordan, ``Ridge Calls Security at Border 
`Outdated','' Washington Post, 6 March 2002, A11.
    12. Robert Montgomery, ``A Look at Cellular's Alarming 
Technology,'' Mastering Security (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1996) 
12.
    13. Robert De Lia, ``Seeing Into the World of Fiber Optics 
for Security,'' Mastering Security (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 
1996) 17.
    14. Donald R. Jones, Jr., Executive Vice President, 
NetTalon Security Systems, Inc., Personal Interview, 6 Dec. 
2001.
    15. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science. ``Aviation 
Security: Technology's Role in Addressing Vulnerabilities,'' 
testimony by Keith O. Fultz, Assistant Comptroller General, 
Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, 
General Accounting Office, 19 Sept. 1996, 7-12.
    16. National Research Council, Detection of Explosives for 
Commercial Aviation Security, Executive Summary (Washington, 
D.C.: National Academy Press, 1993), 
7-12.
    17. Jim Dawson, ``National Labs Focus on Tools Against 
Terrorism in Wake of Airliner and Anthrax Attacks,'' Physics 
Today, Jan. 2002, 19-22.
    18. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science. ``Aviation 
Security,'' 8-9.
    19. Cynthia L. Webb, ``A Handy Security Solution: Aether 
Software Gets Tryout on Handhelds at Boston Airport,'' 
Washington Post, 16 Jan. 2002, E5.
    20. National Research Council, Airline Passenger Security 
Screening: New Technologies and Implementation Issues, 
Executive Summary (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 
1996) 3.
    21. Jeffrey Rosen, ``A Watchful State,'' New York Times, 7 
Oct. 2001, 6-38.
    22. Donald R. Richards, ``ID Technology Faces the Future,'' 
Mastering Security (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1996) 78.
    23. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science, ``Cyber 
Security: Beyond the Maginot Line,'' testimony by Wm. A. Wulf, 
President, National Academy of Engineering and AT&T Professor 
of Engineering and Applied Science, University of Virginia, 
107th Cong., 1st sess., 10 Oct. 2001.
    24. Robert O'Harrow Jr., ``Key U.S. Computer Systems Called 
Vulnerable to Attack; Defense, FAA Among Agencies Lacking 
Security, Experts Say,'' Washington Post, 27 Sept. 2001, A6.
    25. Sada Yoshi Ohbu, et al., ``Sarin Poisoning on Tokyo 
Subway,'' Southern Medical Journal, 3 June 1997, 1.
    26. Lyndsey Layton, ``Drill Tests Response to Attack In 
Metro; Exercise Gauges Chemical Threats,'' Washington Post, 5 
Dec. 2001, B8.
    27. Dawson, ``National Labs Focus,'' 19-20.
    28. Ellen Nakashima, ``USPS Sees New Way to Spot 
Biohazards,'' Washington Post, 9 Mar. 2002, A13.
    29. Marian Burros, ``Eating Well; A Vulnerable Food Supply, 
A Call for More Safety,'' New York Times, 31 Oct. 2001, Fl.
    30. National Research Council, Improving Civilian Medical 
Response to Chemical or Biological Terrorist Incidents, 
Executive Summary (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 
1998) 3.
    31. Ceci Connolly, ``Bush Promotes Plans To Fight 
Bioterrorism,'' Washington Post, 6 Feb. 2002, A3+.
    32. Avram Goldstein, ``Anti-Terror Campaign Turns to 
Doctors; Physicians Scramble to Learn About Bio-Weapons; Some 
Urge Mandated Training,'' Washington Post, 14 Oct. 2001, A12.
    33. Joby Warrick and Steve Fainaru, ``Bioterrorism 
Preparations Lacking at Lowest Levels; Despite Warnings and 
Funds, Local Defenses Come Up Short,'' Washington Post, 22 Oct. 
2001, A7.
    34. National Research Council, Chemical and Biological 
Terrorism: Research and Development to Improve Civilian Medical 
Response, Executive Summary (Washington, D.C.: National Academy 
Press, 1999) 5-6.
    35. Eric Pianin and Bill Miller, ``Security Permeates 
Budget: Many Agencies Would Share $37.7 Billion in New Funds,'' 
Washington Post, 5 Feb. 2002, A7.
    36. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, ``A Nation Challenged: The 
Disease; Ill Postal Worker Has Symptoms That Stop Short of 
Anthrax,'' New York Times, 11 Jan. 2002, A11.
    37. David Brown, ``Agency With Most Need Didn't Get Anthrax 
Data,'' Washington Post, 11 Feb. 2002, A3.
    38. Dawson, ``National Labs Focus,'' 21.
    39. Jones, Personal Interview.
    40. George Musser, ``Better Killing Through Chemistry: 
Buying Chemical Weapons Material Through the Mail is Quick and 
Easy,'' Scientific American, Dec. 2001, 20-21.
    41. Terence Chea, ``Firm's Anti-Nerve Gas Device 
Approved,'' Washington Post, 30 Jan. 2002, E5.
    42. Dawson, ``National Labs Focus,'' 20.
    43. Ibid. 21.
    44. John Mesenbrink, ``Fighting the War on Bioterrorism,'' 
Security Magazine, 4 Jan. 2002, 3.
    45. Gina Kolata, ``Treatments; On Many Fronts, Experts Plan 
for the Unthinkable: Biowarfare,'' New York Times, 23 Oct. 
2001, F4.
    46. Steve Twomey, ``A Recipe for Safe Mail,'' Washington 
Post, 30 Jan. 2002, Al+.
    47. National Research Council, Chemical and Biological 
Terrorism, 8.
    48. Pianin, ``Security Permeates Budget.''
    49. ``Freon,'' Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 9, 1973 ed., 
924.
    50. John Schwartz, ``The Irradiation of Mail Can Also Zap 
the Contents,'' New York Times, 11 Feb. 2002, C2.
    51. Twomey, ``A Recipe For Safe Mail.''
    52. Andrew DeMillo and Allan Lengel, ``Fumes From Mail 
Sicken 11 at Commerce,'' Washington Post, 11 Jan. 2002, B9.
    53. Spencer S. Hsu, ``73 Senate Workers Report Illness,'' 
Washington Post, 7 Feb. 2002, B1+.
    54. Spencer S. Hsu, ``Workers Handling Government Mail 
Report Illness,'' Washington Post, 9 Feb. 2002, A6.
    55. Hsu, ``73 Senate Workers Report Illness.''
    56. Schwartz, ``The Irradiation of Mail.''
    57. Sherry L. Harowitz, ``More Than Meets the Eye,'' 
Mastering Security (Dubuque: Kendal1/Hunt, 1996) 73.
    58. Richards, ``ID Technology Faces the Future,'' 79.
    59. Sara Kehaulani Goo, ``Nonlethal Weapons Pose Own Risks 
in Air, Report Says,'' Washington Post, 6 March 2002, A11.
    60. National Research Council, Airline Passenger Security 
Screening, 3.
    61. Rosen, ``A Watchful State.''
    62. Clive Norris and Gary Armstrong, The Maximum 
Surveillance Society: The Rise of the CCTV (New York: Berg, 
1999) 42.
    63. AP, ``Resistance Builds to Cipro, Study Says,'' New 
York Times, 7 Feb. 2002, A18.
    64. Kate Zernike and Christopher Drew, ``Efforts to Track 
Foreign Students Are Said to Lag,'' New York Times, 28 Jan. 
2002, Al +.
    65. U.S. Congress, Senate, Office of Technology Assessment 
for the Congress, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Computer 
Services of the Committee on Rules and Administration, 92nd 
Cong., 2nd Sess., 2 March 1972, 72.
    66. Vary T. Coates, Technology and Public Policy: The 
Process of Technology Assessment in the Federal Government 
(Washington, D.C., Program of Policy Studies in Science and 
Technology, The George Washington University) July 1972, I:14-
36.
    67. U.S. Congress, House, Office of Technology Assessment: 
Background and Status, Report to the Committee on Science and 
Astronautics, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., Aug. 1973, 14-17.
    68. ``Technology Assessment Act of 1972,'' Public Law 92-
484 (2 U.S.C 471-481).
    69. U.S. Congress, Senate, Technology Assessment for the 
Congress, Staff Study of the Subcommittee on Computer Services 
of the Committee on Rules and Administration, 92nd Cong., 2nd 
Sess., 1 Nov. 1972, 41.
    70. U.S. Congress, Senate, Office of Technology Assessment, 
Excerpt of Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Fiscal Years 1973 and 1974, 93rd Cong., 1st 
Sess., 9 May & 20 June 1973, 11-14.
    71. U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Support Agencies, 
Prepared for the Commission on the Operation of the Senate, 
94th Cong., 2nd Sess., 55.
    72. David Dickson, The New Politics of Science (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998) 242.
    73. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Annual 
Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1995, 6.
    74. Ibid. 7-8.
    75. Ford, ``Small Influential Office Guides Congress Into 
Space Age,'' 18.
    76. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 
Office of Technology Assessment: Background and Status, Aug. 
1973, 13-17.
    77. ``Technology Assessment Act,'' sec. 7(a).
    78. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, What 
OTA Is--What QTA Does--How OTA Works, 1989, 8.
    79. Mottur, Alfred E., Institutional Innovation in the 
Congress: The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), 
``Sentinels of the Republic Scholar'' Honors Thesis, Williams 
College, Williamstown, MA, 1989, 37.
    80. Ibid. 108.
    81. U.S. Congress, Senate, Office of Technology Assessment, 
Excerpt of Hearings, 1973, 11-14.
    82. CQ Almanac, ``Congress Cuts Legislative Funds,'' 1995, 
11-61.
    83. U.S. Congress, Senate Democratic Policy Committee, 
Senate Voting Record, No. 316, ``Legislative Branch 
Appropriations, 1996, OTA,'' July 20, 1995.
    84. CQ Almanac, 11-64
    85. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Annual 
Report, 36-38.
    86. CQ Almanac, 11--64-65.
    87. Ibid. 11-65.
    88. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Annual 
Report, 40.
    89. ``Technology Assessment Act,'' sec. 3(b), sec. 4(b), 
and sec. 12(a).
    90. Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies 
Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, 78.

                                
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