[Senate Prints 107-59]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]

107th Congress                                                  S. Prt.
                              COMMITTEE PRINT                     
 2d Session                                                      107-59

                ``WHAT'S NEXT IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM?''


                      A COMPILATION OF STATEMENTS

                               BEFORE THE


                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman


                           FEBRUARY 14, 2002

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations


77-688 DTP                 WASHINGTON : 2002
             For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, 
                   U.S. Government Printing Office
    Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; 
             DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 
             Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001


                JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland           JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut     RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts         CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin       GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota         BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California            LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
BILL NELSON, Florida                 SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

                     Edwin K. Hall, Staff Director
            Patricia A. McNerney, Republican Staff Director

                            C O N T E N T S


Letter of Introduction...........................................     v

Berger, Samuel R., former National Security Advisor, statement 
  before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 7, 
  2002...........................................................     1

Joulwan, Gen. George A., former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, 
  statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
  February 7, 2002...............................................     5

Kristol, William, Editor, The Weekly Standard; Chairman, Project 
  for the New American Century, statement before the Senate 
  Committee on Foreign Relations, February 7, 2002...............     9

                         LETTER OF INTRODUCTION


                              United States Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                 Washington, DC, February 14, 2002.

    Dear Colleague,

    As part of our series of hearings on the role of foreign 
policy in securing America's future, the Foreign Relations 
Committee held a hearing on February 7, entitled ``What's Next 
in the War on Terrorism?'' The witnesses for this hearing were 
former National Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger, former NATO 
Supreme Allied Commander Gen. George A. Joulwan (Ret), and 
William Kristol, head of the Project for the New American 
Century. Because the topic of this hearing is at the forefront 
of public debate, we wanted to make it available to you and 
your staff.
    Please let us know if you have any questions or comments 
regarding this hearing or the other hearings in this series.

                            Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman.

                    Jesse Helms, Ranking Republican Member.
                              testimony of

                            SAMUEL R. BERGER

                    Former National Security Advisor

                               before the

                   Senate Foreign Relations Committee

                            february 7, 2002


                ``What's Next in the War on Terrorism?''

    Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
    I welcome your invitation to participate in this important 
and timely series of hearings and to address, in particular, 
the next stages in the war against terrorism.
    Let me begin with what we already have accomplished with 
decisive and courageous leadership from President Bush, 
skillful diplomacy and a military that has demonstrated 
superbly the strength it has gained and the lessons learned 
over the past decade. The Taliban regime is gone, its demise 
unlamented by the Afghan people, its first victims. An interim 
coalition, fragile but representative, has taken over in Kabul. 
Al Qaeda has been shaken and dispersed, for now disrupted as a 
functioning network.
    September 11th was a watershed for our country and the 
world. It breached the boundaries of the unimaginable. A 
horrified world stood with us. The response by the United 
States was fierce and focused--directed at those who 
perpetrated the crimes and those who support them. This 
response thwarted bin Laden's fundamental objective: to provoke 
indiscriminate actions by the U.S. that would have further 
polarized the West and the Islamic world, collapsing not just 
the Twin Towers but governments linked to us from Pakistan to 
Saudi Arabia. We were not just the object of these attacks but 
also the potential instrument of the terrorists' purpose: to 
advance the vision of a radical pan-Islamic region from central 
Asia to the Gulf and beyond.
    Americans, led by the President, have responded with 
unified purpose. We have known that our cause is both right and 
necessary, and so has the world.
    So where do we go from here? We have an historic 
opportunity--if we show as much staying power as fire power . . 
. if we are unrelenting but not overreaching . . . if we 
exercise not only the military power necessary to protect our 
people but also the moral authority necessary to demonstrate 
that our strength serves a purpose broader than self-
protection--to build a safer world of shared well-being.
    Our first task, as the President has said, is to finish the 
job of destroying al Qaeda. That job necessarily involves 
getting bin Laden. We must not define him out of existence; we 
must dictate his destiny. After all, he is the man most 
responsible for the crime against humanity nearly five months 
ago. We cannot permit him to reemerge--in a month, or a year. 
We do not want the legend of bin Laden--a symbol of defiance. 
We want the lesson of bin Laden--a symbol of defeat.
    It may take months or years. But the victims cannot rest in 
peace until that justice is done.
    And we must continue to take down al Qaeda cells, and hunt 
down al Qaeda operatives elsewhere--in Asia, Europe, Africa, 
here and elsewhere in this Hemisphere. Disruption will be an 
ongoing enterprise--a priority that will require international 
intelligence, law enforcement and military cooperation for the 
foreseeable future. These cells of fanatics will reconstitute 
themselves. We must treat this as a chronic illness that must 
be aggressively managed, while never assuming it has been 
completely cured.
    Where we can help our friends suppress terrorist threats, 
we should do so, as we are in the Philippines, Bosnia and 
elsewhere. We must be careful to distinguish that from 
suppressing their legitimate opposition. And where we see 
remnants of al Qaeda and its allies regroup in countries with 
virtually no governments, it may be necessary to act 
militarily, balancing the genuine security gains against 
potential allegations that we are assuming the role of world 
    As we move beyond al Qaeda and its allies, we need to be 
clear about our purposes, strategies, standing and capacities. 
In the State of the Union, the President dramatically expanded 
the battlefield. He redefined and expanded the war to embrace 
an ``axis of evil.'' Implicit in the ultimatum, I believe, is 
the conviction that the threat of American power against 
radical regimes--and presumably its exercise--will create a new 
dynamic that causes these regimes to abandon activities that 
threaten us. It assumes that others will follow our clearly 
defined leadership and, if not, we will act alone if necessary.
    These are profoundly important premises, which promise a 
far more interventionist global American posture. They deserve 
serious and open-minded discussion. I do not believe the 
President is engaged in empty threats or rhetorical bluff.
    Each of the governments singled out by the President pose 
unmistakable dangers. Saddam Hussein was, is and continues to 
be a menace to his people, to the region and to us. He cannot 
be accommodated. Our goal should be regime change. The question 
is not whether but how and when.
    Iran continues to pursue nuclear weapons and advanced 
missile systems and to support terrorist and rejectionist 
groups like Hezballah, Hamas and PiJ. Its involvement in arms 
shipments to the Palestinians is unacceptable.
    North Korea's regime, a relic of the Cold War, is 
repressive toward its people and promiscuous in peddling its 
missile technology.
    We ignore the risks these governments pose at our peril. 
But each of them, and their context, is very different. Merely 
labeling them as ``evil'' does not answer hard questions about 
the best way to deal with them to effect needed change.

   How do we build support, in the region and among our 
        allies, to intensify pressure on Saddam Hussein? Can 
        the Afghan template be applied in Iraq, where Saddam's 
        power is more entrenched and the opposition is weaker? 
        Are we prepared to go-it-alone militarily? Is that 
        feasible and what would it take?

   How does our role in the deteriorating Middle East 
        conflict relate to a more aggressive posture toward 
        Saddam? Do flames in Baghdad inflame the Middle East, 
        or quiet it?

   Have we given up on the internal struggle in Iran, 
        where majorities of over 70% have expressed their 
        desire for change? Does branding Iran part of an evil 
        axis strengthen those who want to engage the U.S. or 
        those who seek to demonize us?

   Does disengaging from negotiations with North Korea, 
        which produced a missile moratorium that has held since 
        1998 and a freeze on nuclear fuel production that has 
        been continuously verified by outside monitors, make it 
        more or less likely that we will gain restraint? Does 
        it make war on the Korea Peninsula more or less likely? 
        Does it matter that our ally, South Korea, believes 
        that the policy of cautious engagement with the North 
        has reduced tensions on the Peninsula to an all-time 

   Do we lose focus in our war against terrorism, and 
        the support of our allies for fighting it, when we 
        redefine the conflict as a war against rogue states? 
        From the beginning, the President described war against 
        terrorism as a ``monumental struggle between good and 
        evil.'' But as our definition of evil becomes more 
        expansive--from Baghdad to Tehran to Pyongyang--will 
        our support in the world for the fight against 
        terrorism become more diffuse?

    I think the President is absolutely right to sound the 
alarm against the nexus between biological, chemical and 
nuclear states and terrorism. The discussion we should have, in 
a bipartisan and respectful way, is not whether we deal with 
these risks, but how. It must also include reducing the threat 
of loose nukes and inadequately secured nuclear material in 
Russia. It should include putting teeth in the Biological 
Weapons Convention, and, I would argue, ratifying the CTBT. And 
it must include stopping friends and allies from selling 
dangerous technology to hostile governments. The struggle 
against global terrorism is not a fight we can win alone; we 
need partners--coalitions built around us not against us.
    The President was also right when he said we are usually 
better off in the world when we say less and do more. A great 
power threatens only if it is prepared to act if intimidation 
fails. In an effort to impose new world order, we must be 
careful not to contribute to new world disorder.
    Let me make one other principal point about what is next in 
the war against terrorism. We have been focused since September 
11th on the military dimension of this struggle. It is a 
necessary part, now and perhaps in the future. But this is not 
a war we can fight with military power alone. Our objective 
must be not only to destroy the terrorist networks that have 
attacked and threaten us; we must do so in a way that makes the 
world more stable, not less--that isolates the extremists, not 

   That means, as Secretary Powell has said, we must 
        commit our resources to stabilizing and rebuilding 
        Afghanistan, including the possibility of participating 
        in an international security force.

   It means we must make sure President Musharraf 
        succeeds. He has ``bought the program''--that he must 
        take on the terrorists within, or lose his country. If 
        he fails, no one else in the Islamic world will try 
        again. And it would be more than ironic if we defeated 
        the militant extremists in Afghanistan only to see them 
        prevail in Pakistan, and seize control of nuclear 

   It means supporting the Administration's active role 
        in defusing the crisis between Pakistan and India--
        where confrontation can easily lead to miscalculation 
        and, with nuclear weapons on both sides, miscalculation 
        can lead to disaster.

   It means that we must fight the terror, and seek to 
        break the death grip, in the Middle East. Pessimism 
        about the Middle East is an honest reflection of 
        reality, but it cannot lead us to fatalism--the view 
        that we are unable to make a difference. The situation 
        will only get worse without concerted and sustained 
        engagement led by the U.S.--on Arafat to defeat the 
        killers and on the Israelis to respond as he does. The 
        alternative is a destructive war of attrition and a 
        radicalization of the entire region.

   It means that we must put as much energy into the 
        Arab world as we take out--but of the diplomatic, 
        political, economic and intellectual variety. We must 
        act more purposefully to convince our friends in the 
        region that pluralism and reform are not the enemies of 
        Islam; they are the enemies of the extremists.

   Finally, we must put at the heart of the U.S. agenda 
        efforts to enable the poor to reap the advantages of 
        globalization and opportunity. This too is part of the 
        war against terrorism--for unless we do so, the world 
        will become a more divided and bitter place, and our 
        power--unrivaled as it is--will produce as much 
        resentment as respect.

    In short, Mr. Chairman, ``phase two'' in the war against 
terrorism--a long-term struggle as the President honestly has 
told us--must be defined not only by what we destroy, but by 
what we build, not only by what we stand against but what we 
stand for.
    Thank you.
                              Testimony of

                      GEN. GEORGE A. JOULWAN (Ret)

                  Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander

                               Before the

                   Senate Foreign Relations Committee

                            February 7, 2002


                ``What's Next in the War on Terrorism?''

    Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting me to testify here 
today. At the outset I want to thank you Mr. Chairman and this 
Committee for your support during my time on active duty and 
for the important role you have played in the development and 
implementation of American foreign policy.
    You have asked me to look at several questions as part of 
your effort to better understand what we are confronting in 
this war to defeat terrorism. Specifically, what are our next 
steps in Afghanistan, how do we ``drain the swamp'' of 
terrorism, and how do we foster better civilian and military 
    Let me make some brief points then respond to your 

   First we are at war. But it is a different war than 
        those we fought in the past. There are no front lines. 
        The enemy is dispersed and operates in small cells. The 
        underpinnings of this threat are in its religious 
        radicalism and its hatred of the United States and the 
        civilization that embraces freedom, tolerance and human 
        dignity. It is an enemy willing to commit suicide of 
        its young to achieve its aims and with little regard 
        for human life. While the enemy may be small in number 
        it would be wrong to underestimate the threat--or the 
        depth of their convictions.

   Second, the al Qaeda Network has been in place for 
        years if not decades. We as a Nation have been 
        surprised at the number of countries from which al 
        Qaeda operates and the ``sleepers'' who provide 
        assistance and comfort to terrorist in many democratic 
        countries including our own. Such is the pervasiveness 
        of this threat. While it would be wrong to paint al 
        Qaeda 10 feet tall, it would equally be wrong to 
        dismiss the pervasiveness of the threat. I adhere to a 
        very basic principle--never underestimate your enemy.

   Third, let me underscore what President Bush and his 
        advisors have been saying--this will be a lengthy 
        campaign not of months but years. We have bought some 
        time in the disruption we have caused the al Qaeda 
        terrorists but do not for a minute believe we have 
        eliminated nor greatly diminished the threat to our 
        homeland and to our allies and friends. We have not. 
        While we Americans are used to quick action and return 
        to normalcy, the Congress, the media and our elected 
        leaders must prepare our Country for a long struggle. 
        During the Cold War we demonstrated a commitment and 
        resolve for over 40 years. That commitment and resolve 
        transcended political party and labels such as liberal 
        and conservative. And we prevailed. In this fight we 
        need that same resolve and commitment for however long 
        it takes--and Mr. Chairman, we will prevail.

   Fourth point. The war on terror is being conducted 
        on three fronts. One front is Afghanistan and the 
        surrounding region. Another is here in our homeland. 
        And the third is global in scope.

   In Afghanistan we acted swiftly to punish those who 
        killed so many innocent people in New York, Washington 
        and Pennsylvania. Indeed our military actions were out 
        in front, at times, of the political decisions needed 
        to provide clarity and direction for the campaign plan. 
        We surprised al Qaeda, Bin Ladin and their supporters 
        with the swiftness of our action and the resolve of the 
        American people. The surprise attack on the United 
        States was answered in weeks not months or years. The 
        resolve of the American people to take the fight to 
        this new enemy has been resolute and unwavering.

   When the Taliban and al Qaeda chose to stand and 
        fight they were defeated. The union of Northern 
        Alliance fighters and U.S. and British Special Forces 
        has been extremely effective in bringing accurate, 
        deadly air strikes on the enemy.

   But the war in Afghanistan is not over. The 
        leadership of al Qaeda has still not been killed or 
        captured. We have disrupted the enemy's activities but 
        not rendered him ineffective. Without constant pressure 
        the enemy can reconstitute and pose a threat to the new 
        interim government and to our troops on the ground. 
        Intelligence collection and sufficient U.S. ground 
        troops are needed to ensure the al Qaeda and Taliban 
        are not just disrupted but defeated.

    This means staying in South Asia. It means developing a 
stronger relationship with Pakistan that is economic and 
political, as well as military. It means involvement in 
resolving the potentially dangerous dispute between India and 
    Mr. Chairman, it was clear from the outset that the only 
way we were going to be successful in Afghanistan and beyond 
was to enlist global support. That support has been there from 
the beginning. The stand up attitude of the British confirms 
the special nature of our relationship and NATO's invoking of 
Article 5 for the first time in its history are two best 
examples. There are others as well. Australia has troops on the 
ground and Japan is supplying ships and aid for the war effort, 
which is unprecedented.
    In addition, Russia, despite the ups and downs in our 
relations has been supportive. President Putin, to his credit, 
has decided to use this opportunity to seek common ground with 
the United States and broaden our relationship. As you know, 
Mr. Chairman, I had a Russian Three Star General as my deputy 
for Russian forces in Bosnia. We do have common interests and 
can build a foundation for better relations in the future.
    Also, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are providing bases for 
U.S. and Coalition forces. Part of the reason we have had such 
immediate access to bases in both these countries is because 
Americans have been training there since 1995 as part of the 
Partnership for Peace developed between NATO and the states of 
the former Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Engagement works, 
Mr. Chairman, and our allies and partners are important in this 
global fight against terror.
    As I said before, Mr. Chairman, we should not be lulled 
into thinking we have ``drained the swamp'' of terrorism in 
Afghanistan or anywhere else quite yet. Afghanistan is still a 
dangerous place. The two priorities in the near term are clear. 
One is a combat mission to disrupt and defeat al Qaeda and the 
terrorists. The second is an international security force in 
Afghanistan to provide security for the interim government and 
the multitude of agencies committed to rebuilding Afghanistan 
after the devastating years of Taliban rule.
    Both efforts are important. Both efforts need to compliment 
each other. And both efforts require U.S. leadership and 
direction. I believe there are some lessons from Bosnia that we 
can apply to Afghanistan.
    We went into Bosnia in the winter of 1995 in the worst 
terrain in Europe and in six months accomplished all military 
tasks--separating 200,000 armed insurgents in 30 days, 
transferring land in 45 days and demobilizing all warring 
factions in 180 days. NATO did so with a coalition of forces 
from 36 nations including, for the first time, a brigade of 
Russian troops. Unlike the UNPROFOR--the UN protection force--
we had clarity of mission, unity of command, and clear robust 
rules of engagement. The civilian side was not well organized 
or as successful. Six years later U.S. and NATO troops are 
still in Bosnia and the unemployment rate is higher than it was 
in 1995. We are better than that as a Nation and as an 
Alliance. Clearly the military can bring about an absence of 
war; but it is the civilian follow-on agencies that will bring 
true peace.
    Therefore my fifth point is that we must have an effective 
integrated disciplined multinational team with clear objectives 
and milestones as the follow-on force in Afghanistan. This is 
not nation building but security building. We did not do so 10 
years ago in Afghanistan. We must not make that same mistake 
    As we know, al Qaeda is not confined to Afghanistan. I 
uncovered an al Qaeda cell in Bosnia in 1996. It has a global 
reach. And President Bush is right; we cannot wait for the next 
attack in order to take the next step. We must anticipate. We 
must be proactive not reactive. We must take on those who 
support terrorist organizations with a global reach. But while 
doing this, we must take into consideration several criteria. 
What is the best allocation of our resources, what will it take 
to succeed, and what impact will this have on the international 
support we will need over the long term to defeat terrorism. We 
should not make threats we are not prepared to carry out. We 
must match requirements with resources. And, while we cannot be 
tied to the wishes or judgement of the international community, 
we cannot ignore the very important support it has to offer.
    Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me say that, the most difficult 
challenge will be that of Governor Ridge and Homeland Security. 
My prior experience as the Commander of U.S. Forces in Latin 
America reinforces how vulnerable we are to asymmetrical 
threats. While missile defense is important and should be 
pursued, a more daunting challenge is to develop a long-range 
strategy for the protection of our people here at home. We are 
vulnerable. We need to better organize the 40 agencies involved 
in homeland defense--particularly along our borders, which are 
extremely porous. If the narco traffickers can smuggle 200 
metric tons of a chemical called cocaine through our borders 
every year, what other chemicals can be brought into our 
country? And make no mistake about it; there is a direct link 
between the narco traffickers and al Qaeda--not just in 
Afghanistan but also in South America.
    I would also urge that the U.S. military play a key role in 
homeland defense. I support the idea of a homeland defense 
CINC. Intelligence collection and sharing is the key to 
success. We need to ensure that there is effective coordination 
between our military, intelligence, law enforcement, customs 
and immigration agencies. The military can help in this effort. 
In my view, law enforcement is in the lead, the military is in 
support. The military should serve as the operations 
coordinator, not the operational commander.
    Mr. Chairman, those are the points I wanted to make. In 
conclusion, let me say the terrorists who carried out the 
attacks of 11 September greatly miscalculated the resolve and 
resourcefulness of the American people. I can attest to the 
quality of our troops and their ability to carry out any 
mission assigned. And I can assure you those who died on 11 
September did not die in vain. I truly believe it is a time for 
hope not despair. Optimism not pessimism. With the help of this 
committee and the continued resolve of the American people, we 
will prevail. Failure is not an option.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you again for inviting me here today. I 
look forward to your questions.
                              Testimony of

                            WILLIAM KRISTOL

  Editor, The Weekly Standard; Chairman, Project for the New American 

                               Before the

                   Senate Foreign Relations Committee

                            February 7, 2002


                ``What's Next in the War on Terrorism?''

    Thank you, Chairman Biden, Senator Helms, and members of 
the committee, for inviting me to testify before you today. You 
have asked me to address the question, ``What's next in the war 
on terrorism?''
    The short answer is that Iraq is next. I am not simply 
saying that Iraq should be next--although I think it should be. 
I am rather drawing a straightforward conclusion from President 
Bush's State of the Union speech, and from the logic of the war 
itself. The president sees this war differently from our 
European allies and differently, I think, from the way his 
predecessor or even his father might have seen it. The 
president has chosen to build a new world, not to rebuild the 
old one that existed before September 11, 2001. And after 
uprooting al Qaeda from Afghanistan, removing Saddam Hussein 
from power is the key step to building a freer, safer, more 
peaceful future.
    To explain my answer, let me address the basic questions 
about the nature of the war. Have the events of September 11 
fundamentally changed the world? Is our aim to restore the 
status quo through limited actions or is it a broader attempt 
to reshape the Middle East and the other breeding grounds of 
terror? And how and when should we deal with our enemies who 
possess or will soon possess weapons of mass destruction?
    Reviving the status quo would mean that we would be 
satisfied at having deposed the Taliban, and at having dealt 
with Osama bin Laden--presuming we eventually find him--and 
having crippled his al Qaeda network. We would not overly 
concern ourselves with who's in power in Afghanistan, or 
Pakistan, or in Central and South Asia. We would continue to 
try to keep Saddam Hussein ``in his box'' and similarly to 
contain Iran. We would return to the old Israeli-Palestinian 
``peace process.'' We would regard North Korea not as a 
Stalinist state organized for war but as an arms control 
problem amenable to an ``agreed framework.''
    This has been the ``post-Cold War status quo.'' It has been 
a period of unprecedented great-power peace. The great 
international questions of the 19th and 20th centuries, of 
Napoleonic France, imperial Britain and Japan, the Kaiser and 
Hitler's Germany, of Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, have 
all been largely settled. Indeed, the only real unresolved 
great-power issue is that of China.
    Yet this has also been a violent time, especially in the 
region from the Balkans through the Middle East to Southwest 
and Central Asia. Even before the final collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Though his army was 
defeated and driven back to Baghdad, the failure to remove the 
Iraqi tyrant left a problematic legacy.
    Since then, the pace of major terrorist attacks--now 
directly aimed at America--has increased, as Norman Podhoretz 
has chronicled in the most recent issue of ``Commentary'' 
magazine. The initial attempt to bring down the World Trade 
Center was in February 1993; two months later, Saddam tried to 
assassinate President Bush when he visited Kuwait. In June 
1996, nineteen U.S. airmen were killed and 240 wounded in the 
Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia. On August 7, 1998, the 
U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were simultaneously 
attacked, killing 12 Americans and more than 200 Africans. On 
October 12, 2000, the USS Cole was struck while docked for 
refueling in Yemen, killing 17 sailors and wounding 39. And 
during the past decade, there have been dozens, if not 
hundreds, of smaller attacks--as well as untold numbers of 
foiled, failed or postponed assaults.
    Despite these escalating costs, American policy has 
implicitly considered the costs of significant U.S. action 
against terrorists as higher still. As Podhoretz points out, 
this is a tradition that began during the Cold War. But it has 
persisted through the Soviet Union's final days and through the 
Clinton Administration. Even as terrorists and rogue regimes 
lost their superpower sponsor, they learned there would be few 
consequences from attacking America. President Clinton's policy 
was, as his first CIA director James Woolsey has said, ``Do 
something to show you're concerned. Launch a few missiles into 
the desert, bop them on the head, arrest a few people. But just 
keep kicking the ball down the field.'' Maintain the status 
    Is that the goal of this war?
    No. Since September 11, President Bush has been clear--and 
increasingly detailed and articulate--that there has been a 
fundamental shift in U.S. policy and strategy. On the evening 
of the attacks, he vowed to bring to justice ``those who are 
behind these evil acts.'' Yet by September 20, when he 
addressed a joint session of Congress, he had determined that 
we were at war not only with a group of terrorists directly 
responsible for the attacks but with ``every terrorist group of 
global reach'' and with the ``nations that provide safe haven 
to terrorism,'' as well.
    Over the past few months, the president's views of ``our 
mission and our moment'' have progressed further still. On 
November 6, he assured the Warsaw Conference on Combating 
Terrorism that the United States would wage war on terror 
``until we're rid of it.'' He also saw the potential threat of 
terrorists armed with chemical, biological, radiological or 
even nuclear weapons: ``We will not wait for the authors of 
mass murder to gain the weapons of mass destruction.'' And 
shortly afterward, the president shifted his emphasis from 
terrorist groups to terror-loving states: ``If you develop 
weapons of mass destruction [with which] you want to terrorize 
the world, you'll be held accountable.''
    The State of the Union address marked the maturation of the 
Bush Doctrine. This war, according to the president, has ``two 
great objectives.'' The first is defeating terrorism. The 
second objective, marking the most significant declaration by 
an American president in almost 20 years, is an unequivocal 
rejection of the international status quo. ``The United States 
of America,'' said President Bush, ``will not permit the 
world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's 
most destructive weapons.''
    And President Bush singled out three regimes, North Korea, 
Iran and Iraq, as enemies; they constitute an ``axis of evil'' 
that poses ``a grave and growing danger.'' Nor will he ``stand 
by, as peril draws closer and closer.'' Time, he said, ``is not 
on our side.'' The president is thus willing to act 
preemptively and, if need be, unilaterally. This is a matter of 
American self-defense.
    The Bush Doctrine seeks to eliminate these weapons and the 
dictatorial regimes that would use them. The president also 
seeks to challenge tyranny in general. ``No nation is exempt,'' 
the president said, from the ``true and unchanging'' American 
principles of liberty and justice. Moreover, our role with 
respect to those principles will not be passive. According to 
the president, ``America will take the side of brave men and 
women who advocate these values around the world, including the 
Islamic world,'' and will do so because it is the only lasting 
way to build ``a just and peaceful world beyond the war on 
terror.'' This is now a strategic imperative as much as a moral 
    The president's words augur a fundamental departure from 
the U.S. policies of the past decade, from the pseudo-
sophisticated ``realism'' of the first Bush Administration or 
the evasive ``multilateralism'' of the Clinton years. The Bush 
Doctrine rests on a revived commitment to the principles of 
liberal democracy and the restoration of American military 
    If the president has defined a new goal--or reminded us of 
what Americans have always regarded as our true purpose in the 
world--how do we get there? The president and his lieutenants 
have suggested answers to what the next steps should be.
    Since September 11, we have all understood that this will 
be a large and long war. Already it is being waged on a variety 
of fronts. The campaign in Afghanistan is far from complete. 
The Taliban has been routed, al Qaeda's safe haven destroyed. 
But while bin Laden is on the run, he is still on the loose. 
The initial battles have been successful, but true victory in 
Afghanistan will be measured in the long-term effort to create 
a viable and stable state that protects individual liberties 
and promotes justice. Nor can victory in Afghanistan be ensured 
without securing Pakistan.
    The campaign against al Qaeda now is taking American 
soldiers into Southeast Asia. More than 600 troops have been 
deployed to the Philippines to help the government of Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo in its war against the Abu Sayyaf group of 
Muslim extremists. Singapore and Malaysia both have arrested 
terrorists with al Qaeda connections and the Bush 
Administration is stepping up pressure on the Indonesian 
government to do the same. The trail is also likely to lead 
into Somalia and elsewhere in Africa.
    The presence of North Korea in President Bush's ``axis of 
evil'' underscores his larger view of this war. The 
administration previously has taken somewhat contradictory 
stands on North Korea, first suggesting it would overturn the 
Clinton Administration's policy and then to maintain it. North 
Korea may be impoverished and isolated, but it is extremely 
dangerous. American policy must be to change the North Korean 
regime, not simply to contain it and coexist with it.
    The president also makes it clear that he regards the 
Middle East as occupying the central front in this war, and 
that the problem is political, not religious. What links Osama 
bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, and the mullahs in Tehran is a 
common hatred of America and a desire to drive America out of 
the region. President Bush wishes to promote the principles of 
liberty and justice especially in the Islamic world.
    The principal obstacles to that goal are the regimes in 
Iran and Iraq. Ever since the revolt against the shah, experts 
have been arguing that eventually shared interests would create 
a rapprochement between Washington and Tehran. ``Openings'' to 
Iran are like the first blooms of spring. But they are just as 
ephemeral. Iran's offer to rescue American aviators hit in 
Afghanistan has been more than offset by the discovery of its 
arms shipments to the Palestinian Authority. The character of 
this Iranian regime is obvious, and implacable.
    But, as Charles Krauthammer wrote in the ``Washington 
Post'' last Friday, the good news is that Iran ``is in the 
grips of a revolution from below. We can best accelerate that 
revolution be the power of example and success. Overthrowing 
neighboring radical regimes shows the fragility of 
dictatorship, challenges the mullahs' mandate from heaven and 
thus encourages disaffected Iranians to the rise. First, 
Afghanistan to the east. Next, Iraq to the west.''
    This summarizes the strategic implication of President 
Bush's war aims. We may never definitely know, for example, 
whether Saddam had a hand in the events of September 11; the 
relationship between Mohamed Atta and Iraqi intelligence may be 
lost in the mists of Prague. But Iraqi involvement would come 
as no surprise. After all, Saddam Hussein has remained at war 
with the United States since 1991. Every day, his air defenses 
target U.S. and British aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones 
over northern and southern Iraq. He flouts the UN resolutions 
agreed to following the Gulf War. And we know that Iraqi-
sponsored terrorists have tried to kill an American president 
and Saddam's agents were likely involved in the effort to bring 
down the World Trade Center in 1993.
    And Saddam's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction 
have ruled out a return to the status quo strategy of 
containment. President Bush has asked himself how this man will 
behave once he acquires these weapons. The delicate game of 
nuclear deterrence, played with Saddam Hussein, is an 
unacceptable risk.
    A military campaign against Iraq is also something we know 
how to do. Other than the Euphrates River and Saddam's palace 
guard, nothing stood between the U.S. VII Corps and Baghdad in 
March 1991; the Army even developed a plan for encircling and 
reducing the city in one move. Despite the weakness of the 
sanctions regime over the past decade, and Saddam's care and 
feeding of his army at the expense of the Iraqi people, the 
Republican Guard is probably less formidable now than it was 
    Moreover, as operations in Afghanistan show, the precision-
strike capabilities of U.S. forces have improved. While the 
Iraq campaign would be far larger and would demand the 
immediate and rapid commitment of substantial American ground 
troops--and though we should not underestimate the lengths to 
which Saddam will go once he understands that the goal is to 
remove him from power or kill him--the military outcome is 
nearly certain.
    The larger question with respect to Iraq, as with 
Afghanistan, is what happens after the combat is concluded. The 
Iraqi opposition lacks the military strength of the Afghan 
Northern Alliance; however, it claims a political legitimacy 
that might even be greater. And, as in Kabul but also as in the 
Kurdish and Shi'ite regions of Iraq in 1991, American and 
alliance forces will be welcomed in Baghdad as liberators. 
Indeed, reconstructing Iraq may prove to be a less difficult 
task than the challenge of building a viable state in 
    The political, strategic and moral rewards would also be 
even greater. A friendly, free, and oil-producing Iraq would 
leave Iran isolated and Syria cowed; the Palestinians more 
willing to negotiate seriously with Israel; and Saudi Arabia 
with less leverage over policymakers here and in Europe. 
Removing Saddam Hussein and his henchmen from power presents a 
genuine opportunity--one President Bush sees clearly--to 
transform the political landscape of the Middle East.
    Conversely, the failure to seize this opportunity, to rise 
to the larger mission in this war, would constitute a major 
defeat. The president understands ``we can't stop short.'' But 
imagine if we did: Saddam and the Iranian mullahs would be free 
to continue their struggle for dominance in the Persian Gulf 
and to acquire world-threatening weaponry. Our allies in the 
region who have truly stood with us--like Israel, Turkey and 
now Pakistan and Hamid Karzai's nascent government in 
Afghanistan--would feel a lonely chill. And our allies in 
Europe, who may enjoy a moment's smugness at the defeat of the 
U.S. ``hyperpower,'' would soon begin to worry about their own 
prospects in a world in which terrorists and terrorist states 
have acquired weapons of mass destruction. Very shortly, for 
lack of confidence in America's willingness to preserve and 
shape a global order, our friends would start appeasing our 
adversaries, and our adversaries' ambitions would grow even 
greater. Whether we want it or not, we are at a crossroads. We 
can either take up the task the president has laid out before 
us, or we can allow the development of a world that will soon 
grow far more unstable and dangerous.
    In short, even if we wished to, it is now impossible to 
recover the world of September 10, or to find a stable balance 
of power with the likes of Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Nor can 
we afford, as the president said, to ``wait on events, while 
dangers gather.'' And while there are risks involved in 
carrying out the president's strategic vision, the risks in not 
doing so are all the greater.