[Senate Prints 107-26]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



107th Congress                                                  S. Prt.
 1st Session                COMMITTEE PRINT                      107-26
_______________________________________________________________________


 
       U.S. DEFENSE POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN: IN NEED OF AN OVERHAUL

                               __________

                          A STAFF TRIP REPORT

                                 TO THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                      One Hundred Seventh Congress

                             First Session

                               April 2001

                                     




                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                 JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana            JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska                PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon              CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming                JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
BILL FRIST, Tennessee                RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island      PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia               BARBARA BOXER, California
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas                ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
                                     BILL NELSON, Florida
                   Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
                Edwin K. Hall, Democratic Staff Director

                                  (ii)




                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Letter of Transmittal............................................     v

  I. Executive Summary................................................1

 II. The PRC Threat to Taiwan.........................................2

     Taiwan's Defense Needs...........................................3
III.

 IV. Shortcomings in Current U.S. Policy..............................7

  V. Conclusions and Recommendations..................................9

                                 (iii)




                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                                                     March 8, 2001.
The Honorable Jesse Helms,
United States Senator,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.

    Dear Senator Helms:

    Attached you will find a trip report for my recent travel 
to Taiwan.
    From February 18-23, I toured several Taiwan military 
installations and met with numerous high-ranking military and 
civilian defense officials in and around Taipei, Kaoshiung and 
Hualien. The purpose of my visit was to become better 
acquainted with Taiwan's defense needs and to gauge the 
effectiveness (or lack thereof) of U.S. policy in response to 
those needs.
    Installations visited included army, navy, air force and 
marine corps bases, several defense command centers, the Chung 
Shan Institute of Science and Technology and Taiwan's Institute 
for National Strategic Studies. Individuals with whom I met 
included President Chen, several of his top civilian defense 
advisors, a variety of flag officers from each of Taiwan's 
services and representatives from Taiwan's Foreign Ministry. 
All of my interlocutors pleaded for full approval of Taiwan's 
defense requests and expressed a keen interest in the fate of 
the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, stating that the bill was 
in Taiwan's interest. At no time did I hear of any opposition 
to the TSEA. All of the information in this report was gathered 
from Taiwan Government briefings, meetings and conversations in 
Taiwan as well as unclassified U.S. Government reports and 
press accounts.
    In general, I found Taiwan's civilian and military 
officials charged with security to be concerned, thoughtful and 
prepared vigorously to defend Taiwan's democracy if the need 
arises. However, Taiwan's military possesses a number of 
shortcomings, particularly in light of Communist China's 
sustained military buildup and ever more threatening posture.
    While there are steps that Taiwan can and must take by 
itself to address some of these shortcomings, U.S. assistance 
is required for many others. Unfortunately, current U.S. policy 
is totally inadequate to the task. Without radical surgery, 
U.S. policy toward Taiwan threatens to leave that young 
democracy dangerously exposed to Communist Chinese attack.
            Sincerely,
                                    James P. Doran,
                          Senior Professional Staff Member,
                                         Asian and Pacific Affairs.

                                  (v)

       U.S. DEFENSE POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN: IN NEED OF AN OVERHAUL

                              ----------                              


                          I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    Taiwan's military is confronted with a host of needs to 
counter the People's Republic of China's military buildup and 
increasingly hostile posture. Specifically, Taiwan desperately 
needs more advanced, longer-range weaponry, early warning 
capabilities, and better C41 (command, control, communications, 
computers and intelligence) capabilities. It also needs several 
new hardware platforms, particularly submarines and advanced 
destroyers. Taiwan also needs a much better working 
relationship with the United States military.
    However, the U.S. Government imposes a host of petty and 
humiliating restrictions on our relationship with Taiwan. For 
instance, it requires Taiwan military personnel to wear 
civilian clothes or coveralls when they train in the United 
States. The U.S. Government routinely rejects Taiwan's defense 
sale requests for reasons that can only be described as a 
desire to placate China. Examples include not only major 
hardware items such as submarines, but also maintenance 
equipment for major weapons systems. Furthermore, the U.S. 
Government engages in the practice of degrading or ``dumbing 
down'' the capabilities of weapons that have been approved for 
Taiwan (such as the F-16).
    Though it may once have made strategic sense, current U.S. 
policy toward Taiwan is outdated, dangerous and, frankly, 
embarrassing. A radical change in mind set is needed to pave 
the way for a series of common sense changes in policy. Some of 
the changes recommended in this report are:

   Strict adherence to section 3(b) of the Taiwan 
        Relations Act when considering defense sales to Taiwan 
        and ending the practice of ``dumbing down'' Taiwan's 
        approved equipment;

   Lifting petty restrictions on visiting Taiwan 
        officials and military officers, and on U.S. military 
        officer travel to Taiwan;

   Establishing communications links between the Taiwan 
        and U.S. defense establishments;

   Establishing operational training programs with 
        Taiwan's military, including joint exercises;

   Devoting more intelligence community resources to 
        studying the PRC threat to Taiwan and establishing a 
        ``Team B'' of analysts to provide an alternative 
        assessment of the situation; and

   Making the defense of Taiwan an illustrative case in 
        the Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review.

                      II. THE PRC THREAT TO TAIWAN

    The basic parameters of China's increasing threat to Taiwan 
are well known, even if downplayed by the Clinton 
administration and China's many supporters in Washington. 
China's military budget has increased by double digit 
percentages for over a decade. Girded by its bulging trade 
surplus with the United States, cheap loans from the World Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank, and aid from Japan and other 
nations, China is procuring a raft of advanced and dangerous 
weaponry, particularly from Russia.
    A 1999 Pentagon report to Congress states that this 
buildup, combined with China's short-range missile deployments 
opposite Taiwan (which press reports indicate will number 600-
800 by 2005) will give the PRC, by 2005, the ability to attack 
and degrade Taiwan's key military facilities and damage its 
economic infrastructure. Furthermore, the report concludes that 
by 2005, the PRC will posses the ability to gain air 
superiority over Taiwan and will ``retain'' its ability to 
effect a naval blockade of Taiwan. These developments represent 
of shift in the balance of power away from Taiwan and toward 
Beijing in the coming years, should current trends continue.
    China's buildup is accompanied by ever more threatening 
rhetoric toward Taiwan, which reflects the growing importance 
the Chinese Communists place on ``re-unifying the motherland'' 
by absorbing Taiwan. This is evidenced by: China's February 
2000 White Paper, in which it asserted another, new yardstick 
for the possible employment of force against Taiwan (that being 
if Taiwan merely delays reunification talks for too long); 
Jiang Zemin's November 2000 statement that, ``It is imperative 
to step up preparations for a military struggle so as to 
promote the early solution of the Taiwan issue. To this end, it 
is necessary to vigorously develop some `trump card' weapons 
and equipment.''; and People's Liberations Army (PLA) Chief 
Zhang Wannian's November 2000 statement that war between China 
and Taiwan was inevitable by 2005.
    The staff of Taiwan's J-2 (intelligence) and various 
commanders are increasingly worried about China's developing 
satellite capabilities (including electro-optical and radar 
satellite capabilities), evolving information warfare 
capabilities (One general commented that the PRC's IW 
capabilities will pose a ``lethal'' threat to Taiwan by 2005 or 
so) and China's growing missile deployments and related 
testing. Also of concern to Taiwan is the recently-begun and 
pending deliveries of Russian Su-30 fighter/bombers armed with 
the advanced R-77 (AA-12) missile, recent and possible further 
delivery of Sovremenny destroyers armed with Sunburn missiles, 
the growing size and complexity of China's military exercises 
(including efforts to improve their logistical capabilities for 
Taiwan scenarios), numerous recent simulations of cross-Strait 
attacks and airborne assaults by the PLA and China's potential 
for landing huge numbers of troops on Taiwan through irregular 
means.
    Taiwan's military believes the PLA is moving toward a quick 
strike sort of ``solution'' to the Taiwan ``problem'' that can 
be effected before U.S. forces, should they be so ordered, have 
a chance to arrive on the scene.
    The Taiwan military is also concerned about the security 
ramifications of the so-called ``Three Links'' (direct trade, 
transport and postal links with China), toward which Taiwan 
seems inexorably to be moving.

                      III. TAIWAN'S DEFENSE NEEDS

    While Taiwan's military consists of many dedicated, capable 
leaders and personnel, and a good number of modern weapons 
platforms, it desperately needs more advanced, longer-range 
weaponry, early warning capabilities, and better C41 
capabilities. For Taiwan's detractors in the United States, 
this means that Taipei does not need new weapons platforms. 
This is not true. Taiwan does need new platforms, particularly 
submarines and advanced destroyers. Taiwan also needs a much 
better working relationship with the U.S. military in the 
fields of defense planning, intelligence, training, operational 
methods and tactics.
    While the Government of Taiwan would not provide its 
official defense request list, below are some items in which 
Taiwan has publicly expressed an interest.

             More Advanced, Longer-Range Weaponry/Platforms

    Many of Taiwan's high profile weapons platforms, such as 
the F-16 fighter and the Lafayette-class frigate, are mere 
shells of what they could be, possessing weapons that have very 
limited range and/or guidance systems. For instance, the 
Lafayettes carry only subsonic anti-ship missiles with an 
effective range of just 35 miles, surface to air missiles with 
only a two mile range and a Gatling gun that would 
automatically shut down if the Sunburn were coming toward it. 
Commanders and operators stressed the need to have better 
standoff capability to defend against the Chinese threat. This 
will require air, sea and ground-based weapons with longer 
ranges and better guidance systems than Taiwan currently 
possesses. It will also require several new platforms.


                               AIR FORCE


    Taiwan's pilots stressed the need to be able to take out 
China's numerous and increasingly long-range surface-to-air 
missiles (such as the long-range S-300), which pose a 
potentially lethal threat to Taiwan's air force, as well as the 
ability to counterattack numerically superior Chinese aircraft 
and naval vessels from a longer distance. The Taiwan Air 
Force's current standoff capability is severely limited. As the 
Pentagon noted in its 1999 report to Congress, China's 
increasingly capable air force is on the verge of attaining the 
ability to achieve air superiority over Taiwan, if it hasn't 
already.
    To ward off this dangerous development, Taiwan pilots 
specifically expressed interest in HARM missiles (High-speed 
anti-radiation missiles, employed to counter SAM sites), Joint 
Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) and longer range, infra-red 
guided missiles capable of attacking ground targets. They 
further requested that the recently approved AIM-120 air-to-air 
missiles be delivered to Taiwan rather than stored in Arizona 
(an arrangement imposed on Taiwan by the Clinton administration 
in 2000).
    Taiwan's air force (and navy) also has other significant 
shortcomings. For instance, it has no identification friend or 
foe capabilities. Thus, Taiwan aircraft returning home from a 
dogfight with Chinese fighters over the water could be in 
substantial danger of being shot down by friendly fire. 
Taiwan's F-16 pilots also lack night vision equipment and 
helmet-sighted air-to-air missiles (which the PRC has recently 
acquired from the Russians).
    Taiwan's Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDF) are plagued by 
the lack of ability to detect illumination by enemy radar and a 
shortage of guidance systems for their missiles. Attempts to 
procure technology to solve these problems from the United 
States have been unsuccessful.


                                  NAVY


    To counter the PLA's growing naval threat, Taiwan's naval 
commanders are interested in improving their sea-based air 
defenses, acquiring longer range and more accurate ship-to-ship 
and anti-air missiles, protecting their communications 
infrastructure, improving their ASW capabilities and developing 
a survivable force to counter a blockade. Taiwan will also need 
new naval platforms simply to replace its aging fleet, one-half 
of which will need to be retired in the coming years.
1. Submarines
    Taiwan commanders repeatedly stated that by far the most 
important item for Taiwan's navy, indeed for Taiwan's entire 
military, is the acquisition of submarines. China maintains an 
overwhelming 65-4 advantage in submarines over Taiwan. Two of 
Taiwan's submarines are WWII-era Guppy-class boats which are 
unsuitable for combat. Acquisition of new submarines must be a 
part of any prudent ASW strategy for Taiwan. More importantly, 
because of their survivability, submarines will be a crucial 
last line of sea-based defense against a Chinese blockade. 
Should, as the 1999 Pentagon report intimated, Taiwan's surface 
fleet be blitzed with air- and sea-launched missiles early in a 
confrontation, and should Taiwan's air bases be rendered 
inoperative by SRBM strikes, a fleet of surviving submarines 
could still possibly allow Taiwan to thwart a Chinese blockade 
by stealthily attacking the surface ships that would enforce 
that blockade.
    The standard State Department argument against selling 
submarines to Taiwan--that they are offensive--is an example of 
moral equivalence at work. It is absurd on its face not to 
consider that Taiwan is a democracy, has no designs on any of 
its neighbors, and faces a Communist China that has threatened 
to ``drown it in a sea of fire.''
    Others attempt to make ``military'' arguments against 
submarines for Taiwan, asserting, among other things, that 
submarines have a very limited sonar range and need to receive 
queuing information from elsewhere, rendering them less 
effective than aircraft at locating Chinese targets. This 
argument not only ignores the survivability of submarines 
(especially given China's weak ASW capabilities), but also 
neglects the fact that a Chinese blockade of Taiwan would have 
to take place near a few relatively narrow choke points, making 
it easier for Taiwan's submarines (especially if aided by an 
underwater surveillance system) to locate and destroy Chinese 
ships and submarines. In addition, these ``military'' arguments 
usually emanate from voices that are generally dovish on China. 
Thus, one can see that the principal objection against 
submarines for Taiwan remains the fact that it would displease 
the PRC.
2. Aegis destroyers
    Taiwan has requested four Aegis destroyers for the past 
three years, only to be turned down by the Clinton 
administration. It is a common misconception that Taiwan wants 
Aegis as a Theater Missile Defense system. In fact, Taiwan is 
currently ambivalent about purchasing TMD from the United 
States, based upon concern over technological developments and 
cost. Besides, the Pentagon has identified THAAD, not Aegis, as 
potentially a more suitable U.S. TMD system for Taiwan in the 
future.
    Taiwan wants, and Taiwan needs, Aegis destroyers to provide 
it with an adequate sea-based air defense and C41 system to 
deal with rapidly developing PRC air and naval threats. As of 
now, Taiwan's sea-based air defense and C41 capabilities are 
rudimentary at best. If Taiwan is to have any chance of 
overcoming China's 10-1 combat aircraft advantage, 2-1 surface 
fleet advantage, and its new and pending acquisitions of modern 
and deadly weapons such as Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, Sovremenny 
destroyers and Sunburn and AA-12 missiles, a modern integrated 
sea-based air defense system will be crucial. Aegis will 
provide exactly that.
    One problem with Aegis, however, is that it is now 
impossible for Taiwan to have Aegis ready by the crucial year 
of 2005, since it will take 8-10 years for the platform to 
become operational in Taiwan.
3. Kidd-class destroyers
    To deal with this problem in the interim, Taiwan is 
potentially interested in acquiring four existing Kidd 
destroyers that the U.S. Navy wishes to unload. The Kidds 
possess a radar system that is nowhere near as capable as 
Aegis, yet is at least one generation ahead of what Taiwan 
currently has. Costing a fraction of Aegis destroyers and able 
to be delivered and operational within a couple of years, the 
Kidds might provide a practical interim solution to Taiwan's 
sea based air defense needs before 2005. However, the Kidds are 
already 25 years old and will be nearing the end of their 
useful lives by the time Aegis, if approved this year, is 
operational. Thus, both Kidds and Aegis need to be approved by 
the Bush administration this year.
    Taiwan's Navy has also expressed an interest in P-3 
submarine hunting aircraft, as well as longer-range and more 
accurate missiles and torpedoes, all of which will be vital in 
countering blockade efforts.


                                  ARMY


    There has been a tendency by some in the United States to 
malign Taiwan's army as less than relevant, given that, at 
least in the early phases, this battle would be fought in the 
sea and in the air. Nonetheless, Taiwan's army commanders are 
dedicated, tough and thoughtful. They make a convincing case 
that, as long as Taiwan's political leadership holds out and as 
long as the United States will provide them with quality 
weapons and training, they have the wherewithal to repel a 
Chinese amphibious and/or airborne assault.
    Of course, there is great question as to whether China 
could even mount an all-out invasion of Taiwan and a serious 
case could be made that Taiwan's Army may be less relevant than 
the navy or air force. But deterrence involves raising the 
potential costs to the aggressor, and every little bit helps. 
The army is the last resort for Taiwan's defense, and a strong, 
viable ground force may be the critical factor that could give 
the Taiwan political leadership confidence and reduce its 
vulnerability to coercion in a crisis situation. Nor can we 
ignore China's massive irregular fleet of fishing and merchant 
vessels which could one day be used to land soldiers on Taiwan. 
Furthermore, China will almost certainly use Special Operations 
Forces in an attack against Taiwan. Thus, it would be a mistake 
to ignore Taiwan's army.
    Taiwan's army officers expressed interest in longer-range 
and more accurate artillery, advanced attack helicopters with 
advanced radars, and a limited number of advanced tanks, not to 
engage in a land battle, but to repel Chinese invaders while 
they are still in the water.

                             Early Warning

    Taiwan's commanders repeatedly mentioned the need for 
better early warning capabilities. Taiwan's ability to detect 
missile launches is virtually nil, and though Taiwan can better 
detect aircraft sorties, the short flying time across the 
Strait means Taiwan will have very limited warning time of an 
aerial attack or airborne assault. During that time, Taiwan 
will desperately need to scramble (or hide) its aircraft, 
disperse its naval vessels and deploy its rapid reaction ground 
forces. Extra minutes will be crucial. Thus, Taiwan is seeking 
from the United States longer range radars with missile 
detection capabilities. Taiwan commanders also made a desperate 
plea for U.S. satellite early warning data, which we presently 
share with several gulf states and Russia.

                            Software and C41

    Some in Washington make the specious and condescending 
argument that Taiwan's military commanders just want to buy and 
play around with their ``toys,'' with no regard for the 
software or C41 systems that make modern weapons work properly, 
efficiently and in an integrated fashion.
    This is not the case. The need for C41 was brought up 
repeatedly, and in quite urgent tones, by an array of different 
officers with whom I met. Taiwan's commanders are fully 
cognizant of the fact that, being outnumbered by the PRC, 
integration and coordination of their counterattack will be 
crucial. (To be sure, intensive work by some Pentagon officials 
over the past few years may be responsible for convincing some 
Taiwan officers of this necessity.) In fact, Taiwan has been 
seeking to buy a U.S.-made system that will provide them with 
integrated C41 capabilities--so far without success. Taiwan has 
also sought to buy other software items and a maintenance 
facility for one of its premier defense platforms, also 
unsuccessfully. These items will be detailed in section IV of 
this report.

              Working Relationship With the United States

    Taiwan's military has been isolated for 22 years. This has 
inevitably degraded Taiwan's readiness. The lack of interaction 
between the United States and Taiwan militaries will also 
result in great confusion, which could unnecessarily cost 
lives, should U.S. forces have to enter into battle with 
Taiwan.
    Taiwan's commanders expressed an interest in conducting 
joint exercises with the United States, joint planning, more 
robust and on-site training, direct, secure communications 
(both at the policy and operational levels), more technology 
cooperation, expanded intelligence sharing and joint special 
forces work (including with Taiwan's impressive Marine Corps).
    Finally, there is an unmistakable resentment that simmers 
in Taiwan toward what they view as shabby and impolite 
treatment by U.S. Government officials, particularly from the 
State Department and the American Institute in Taiwan. Taiwan's 
culture is exceedingly polite and it is unusual to hear direct 
criticism of anyone. Moreover, the Taiwan Government rightly 
fears retribution if it is too vocal on these matters. 
Nonetheless, a palpable sense of dismay and resignation is 
evident in Taiwan over the way some U.S. Government officials 
treat their Taiwan counterparts.

                IV. SHORTCOMINGS IN CURRENT U.S. POLICY

    The aforementioned attitudes on the part of both U.S. and 
Taiwan officials are undoubtedly an outgrowth of the petty and 
humiliating restrictions the U.S. Government imposes on its 
relationship with Taiwan. Examples include:

  --requiring Taiwan military personnel to wear civilian 
        clothes or coveralls when they train in the United 
        States (the French impose no such restrictions when 
        Taiwan personnel train in France). In fact, a Taiwan 
        Marine told me that, while training at Quantico on the 
        day after de-recognition in 1979, he was ordered 
        immediately to take off his uniform on orders that came 
        from Washington. (The directives addressing this and 
        other restrictions placed on Taiwan which must have 
        been issued by President Carter have never, to my 
        knowledge, been made public or provided to Congress.);

  --forbidding Taiwan pilots from wearing flight suit name 
        badges while training in the United States;

  --prohibiting the Taiwan defense minister from traveling to 
        the United States, while at the same time granting red 
        carpet treatment to Communist Chinese officers, 
        including many who were involved in the Tiananmen 
        Square Massacre;

  --denying Taiwan military personnel access to the Joint 
        Forces Command, while at the same time granting such 
        access to Communist Chinese officers;

  --denying Taiwan personnel access to U.S. submarines, while 
        at the same time granting such access to Communist 
        Chinese officers;

  --prohibiting direct training by Americans of Taiwan pilots 
        in Taiwan and limiting other types of training 
        (particularly operational training). In many cases, a 
        handful of Taiwan trainers must come to the United 
        States to learn training techniques and then return 
        home to train their personnel;

  --keeping the President of Taiwan under wraps while 
        transiting the United States and forbidding him to meet 
        with Members of Congress;

  --forbidding the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative 
        Office to fly Taiwan's flag over its building in 
        Washington;

  --forbidding U.S. Government personnel to set foot on the 
        grounds of Twin Oaks, the Taiwan Government's historic 
        estate in Washington; and

  --forbidding Taiwan diplomats in the United States from using 
        diplomatic license plates (no such restriction is 
        imposed on Taiwan diplomats in Canada).

    The U.S. Government also routinely rejects Taiwan's defense 
requests for reasons that can only be described as a desire to 
placate China. This is, of course, a flat violation of section 
3(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act, which states that sales to 
Taiwan shall be based solely on Taiwan's defense needs. Given 
China's military buildup and increasing verbal threats, there 
can be no legal justification for denying items such as Aegis, 
submarines and P-3s--all of which have been rejected in recent 
years--or Maverick G or AIM-120 missiles, which were rejected 
for several years before being approved in 2000. (The AIM-120s 
were only partially approved, as they will be stored in the 
United States until or unless China acquires the AA-12.)
    The U.S. has also rejected or delayed the following 
requests by Taiwan in recent years:

   HARM missiles, which Taiwan needs to counter the 
        PRC's growing SAM threat;

   Technology to allow Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) 
        pilots to know whether they have been illuminated by 
        enemy radar;

   Guidance systems for the IDF's missiles;

   Depot-level maintenance facilities for the Patriot 
        anti-missile systems, requiring Taiwan to send faulty 
        parts back to the United States for repair. This can 
        take as long as two years and has resulted in Taiwan's 
        Patriot system being inoperable for periods of up to 
        one week; and

   K-band traveling wave tubes, to assist in 
        researching and developing anti-missile systems.

                              ``Model T''s

    In addition to rejecting and delaying defense sales to 
Taiwan, the U.S. Government also engages in the practice of 
``dumbing down'' (often at late stages in the process) weapons 
that have been approved for Taiwan. Taiwan officers derisively 
refer to many of their U.S. weapons systems at ``Model T''s 
(for Taiwan). Thus, Taiwan did not buy F-16As and F-16Bs from 
the United States; it bought F-16Ts, which don't exist anywhere 
else in the world. The weapons systems, avionics and tactical 
training given to Taiwan along with the aircraft neither met 
Taiwan's expectations nor do they match that which has been 
given to other foreign recipients of the F-16. In particular, 
the United States for years did not provide ground attack 
munitions for the F-16s and has never provided the F-16's 
tactical training manual to Taiwan. Similar examples abound 
with other platforms, weapons and equipment sold to Taiwan.
    U.S. policy toward Taiwan has also been almost wholly 
passive. We have spent 22 years merely responding to Taiwan's 
defense sales requests. Only recently have efforts begun to 
study Taiwan's real needs, as with the recent Air Defense and 
Naval Modernization studies prepared by the Department of 
Defense. But it is frankly unclear whether those studies were 
ordered to fill a real need or to deflect attention from 
rejected defense sales.
    And it is far from clear that the lessons learned in those 
studies have been or will be applied. For instance, the Air 
Defense Review was rumored to have endorsed the sale of Aegis 
prior to the 2000 defense talks, but Aegis was not approved. 
Similarly, the more recent Naval Modernization Study is 
reported by the New York Times to endorse the transfer of 
submarines, Aegis and P-3s to Taiwan, but the contents of this 
study have been kept from the public and Congress.
    The United States has also not devoted enough attention to 
collecting and analyzing information regarding the cross-Strait 
military situation. As a December 2000 Pentagon report to 
Congress on the implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act 
stated, there are three main gaps in our knowledge of the 
situation.
    First, we need to know more about how the authorities in 
the PRC and Taiwan view their military and political situations 
in order to identify the most important conflict scenarios and 
to assess whether the balance of forces adequately deters 
Chinese attack and reassures Taiwan. Second, we need to know 
more about each side's training, logistics, doctrine, command 
and control, special operations and mine warfare capabilities. 
Third, we cannot confidently assess how each side's 
capabilities will develop and how each side will respond to 
these developments.

                   V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

    Though it may once have made strategic sense, current U.S. 
policy toward Taiwan is outdated, dangerous and, frankly, an 
embarrassment. It is difficult to look Taiwan's pilots, sailors 
and soldiers in the eye, knowing that one day they might die in 
combat due to the callousness and negligence of U.S. policy.
    An elaborate game that is tantamount to a policy of 
appeasement of Communist China, U.S.-Taiwan policy threatens to 
precipitate a war that neither the United States, nor Taiwan, 
is prepared to fight. A radical change in mind set is needed to 
pave the way for a series of common sense changes in policy, 
with the specific goal of deterring a conflict. Such changes 
should include:

    (1) Strict adherence to section 3(b) of the Taiwan 
Relations Act when considering defense sales to Taiwan. This 
would mandate that all of Taiwan's requests be approved, unless 
they are obviously militarily unnecessary (for instance, if 
Taiwan were to request long-range bombers or huge numbers of 
landing craft) or if the PRC threat were to diminish tangibly, 
and as long as the requests do not violate U.S. technology 
transfer policies.

    (2) End the practice of ``dumbing down'' Taiwan's approved 
equipment; no more ``Model T''s. Again, this is so long as 
deliveries to Taiwan are in line with U.S. global technology 
transfer policies.

    (3) Lift petty restrictions on visiting Taiwan officials 
and military officers. Taiwan's President should not be kept 
locked up in a hotel, and Taiwan's proud military men and women 
should be allowed to wear their uniforms in the United States. 
Taiwan's access to U.S. military facilities should far exceed, 
not trail behind, that afforded to Communist China.

    (4) Lift restrictions on U.S. military officer travel to 
Taiwan. The limit is currently set at the relatively junior 
rank of 0-6. American flag officers need to see Taiwan and 
Taiwan needs to benefit from the experience which U.S. flag 
officers have to share. In addition, when sending tough 
messages to urge Taiwan to improve its capabilities in certain 
areas, it is more effective, and respectful, if delivered by a 
general officer.

    (5) Allow more U.S. military personnel to train Taiwan 
personnel in Taiwan and allow U.S. pilots to fly backseat with 
the Taiwan Air Force (as French pilots do).

    (6) Establish direct, secure communications between the 
Taiwan and U.S. defense establishments. At a minimum, this 
should be done at the policy level, with either a hotline or a 
video-teleconferencing system linking the Pentagon, the U.S. 
Pacific Command and Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense. 
Ideally, an entire set of operational links should be 
established that allows U.S. and Taiwan aircraft, ships and 
shore units to communicate. Without this, chaos will certainly 
ensue should hostilities break out.

    (7) Establish operational training programs with Taiwan's 
military. Taiwan's military needs to work with ours. Ideally, 
the U.S. and Taiwan should conduct joint exercises. At a 
minimum, we should allow Taiwan to observe a U.S.-only exercise 
that is modeled on a Taiwan scenario. A permanent PACOM J-3 
presence should also be established at AIT in Taipei.

    (8) Enhance intelligence exchanges with Taiwan and 
establish intelligence contact between Taiwan and PACOM.

    (9) Provide Taiwan with satellite shared early warning 
data. This is simply a one-way flow of information that warns 
23 million democratically-governed people that missiles are 
coming.

    (10) Cooperate with Taiwan on information and electronic 
warfare.

    (11) Scrap the annual defense sale process. This is a hoary 
holdover from the Carter administration, designed to control 
Taiwan. There is no good reason why, if an item cannot be 
approved one year, that Taiwan must wait 12 months for another 
answer. We should accept and evaluate Taiwan's requests on a 
rolling basis, as we do with other countries.

    (12) Devote more intelligence community resources to 
studying the PRC threat to Taiwan (and to U.S. forces) and 
establish a ``Team B'' of analysts to provide an alternative 
assessment of the situation.

    (13) Make the defense of Taiwan an illustrative case in the 
QDR. A conflict in Taiwan is at least as likely as one on the 
Korean Peninsula, yet it seems little thought has gone into 
just what would be required for the United States to fight and 
win a war in the Taiwan theater.

    (14) Continue the focused studies on aspects of Taiwan's 
overall defense needs (we should initiate an Army study and a 
C41 study), but not as a means of unnecessarily delaying 
approval of Taiwan's legitimate defense requests. It is time to 
admit that, absent democratic political change in the PRC, 
continuing our current policy toward Taiwan will guarantee the 
destruction of that island democracy by China's rapidly 
expanding military forces. The fall of Taiwan will usher in an 
era of Communist Chinese hegemony in Asia, and the United 
States will be saddled with a new cold war, at the outset of 
which American credibility in the region will be in tatters.

    (15) Last, but not least, the U.S. Government needs to 
scrap the policy of strategic ambiguity. The U.S. needs to 
state unambiguously that we will defend Taiwan if it is 
attacked. In so doing, the U.S. must not fall into the trap of 
qualifying this assertion by stating that we will not defend 
Taiwan if it declares independence. In addition to being a 
betrayal of American values, such an overly clever policy 
construct would leave too much room for Beijing to try to 
exploit.
    While the corrective measures suggested above will 
certainly evoke howls of protest from the PRC, they are 
urgently needed both to deter conflict and, should deterrence 
fail, to save Taiwanese and American lives in combat.
    Naysayers will insist that these measures are inconsistent 
with our ``unofficial'' relationship with Taiwan, whatever that 
means. But these measures are entirely consistent with the 
law--the Taiwan Relations Act. Nothing in the TRA prohibits 
these activities; in fact, the TRA seems specifically to allow 
them. Section 4(a)(1) of the TRA states, ``Whenever the laws of 
the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, 
nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms 
shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to 
Taiwan.'' In other words, other than not recognizing Taipei as 
the Government of China, we are legally to treat Taiwan as a 
country.
    Pretending Taiwan does not exist is no longer an option. 
Nor is pretending that Communist China is not a threat. Nor is 
it an option to pretend that everything is fine between the 
United States and Taiwan, as some former U.S. officials have 
recently stated, Things are not just fine, and they need to be 
fixed. Soon.

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