[JPRT, 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



 
              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA


                                     


                                     


                            ANNUAL REPORT


                                     


                                  2002

=======================================================================

                      ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                            OCTOBER 2, 2002

                               __________

 Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China


         Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov






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              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                    LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

Senate

                                     House

MAX BAUCUS, Montana, Chairman        DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Co-
CARL LEVIN, Michigan                 Chairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California         JIM LEACH, Iowa
BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota           DAVID DREIER, California
EVAN BAYH, Indiana                   FRANK WOLF, Virginia
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska                JOE PITTS, Pennsylvania
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire             SANDER LEVIN, Michigan
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas                MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas             SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
                                     JIM DAVIS, Florida

                     EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

                 PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State
                 GRANT ALDONAS, Department of Commerce
                D. CAMERON FINDLAY, Department of Labor
                   LORNE CRANER, Department of State
                    JAMES KELLY, Department of State

                        Ira Wolf, Staff Director

                   John Foarde, Deputy Staff Director

                                  (ii)





                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Executive Summary and Priority Recommendations...................     1

1. Role and Purpose of the Commission............................     8
     Legislative Mandate.................................     8
     The Role of the Commission..........................     8

2. Human Rights in the Context of the Rule of Law................     9

3. Trends in the Development of Human Rights and Rule of Law.....    11

4. Commission Activities in 2002: Issues and Recommendations.....    16
     Religious Freedom...................................    16
     Labor Rights and Working Conditions.................    20
     Criminal Justice....................................    26
     Free Flow of Information............................    32
     Village Elections...................................    35
     Tibet...............................................    37
     Xinjiang--Uighurs...................................    42
     Impact of the WTO on Development of the Rule of Law.    46
     Rule of Law Programs................................    50
     General Recommendations.............................    52

5. Commission Activities for the Next Year (Illustrative List)...    53
     Human Rights and the Beijing 2008 Olympics..........    53
     Corporate Social Responsibility.....................    54
     Women's Rights......................................    54
     HIV/AIDS............................................    55
     Reform Through Labor (Laogai).......................    55
     Rights of Farmers and Rural Migrants................    56
     Indigenous Chinese ``NGOs''.........................    56
     Hong Kong...........................................    57
     Development of Prisoner Database and Registry.......    58

6. Additional Views of Commission Members........................    58

7. Appendix......................................................    64
     Website Summary.....................................    64
     Commission Activities in 2002.......................    65
     China's International Human Rights Commitments......    67

Endnotes.........................................................    70
          CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                     ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2002

                           Executive Summary

    An evaluation of human rights and the rule of law in China 
reveals a complex picture of contradictory trends and isolated 
improvements, overshadowed by the Chinese government's 
persistent violations of fundamental, internationally 
recognized human rights. China's leaders have worked to develop 
a market-oriented economy while maintaining firm Communist 
Party control. Over the past two decades, China has made 
important strides toward building the structure of a modern 
legal system. Chinese citizens today enjoy greater individual 
autonomy and more personal freedom than they could have 
imagined during the days of Chairman Mao Zedong. Nevertheless, 
China's leaders still do not respect fundamental international 
standards on many human rights for the Chinese people.
    A wide gap remains between the law on paper and the law in 
practice. The Chinese Constitution guarantees freedom of 
worship, assembly, speech, and other fundamental liberties, but 
provisions elsewhere in the Constitution undermine such 
freedoms. Furthermore, the political considerations of central 
and local leaders often trump constitutional and other legal 
protections. Chinese authorities often ignore legal protections 
for suspects and defendants in criminal cases. Although China 
has passed numerous laws and regulations on working conditions, 
these protections are frequently ignored by factory managers or 
go unenforced by local officials. This gap between law and 
practice is rooted, in part, in the Communist Party's desire to 
maintain unquestioned authority and power, the Chinese 
government's deliberate manipulation of the legal system, and a 
lack of public awareness of the law. The gap is also the result 
of official corruption, decentralization, and the sheer size of 
China.
    Some believe that long-lasting change in China depends on 
the expansion of specific legal mechanisms that empower the 
Chinese people to assert their rights and interests. China's 
20-year program of legal construction is accelerating as China 
implements its World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments 
requiring greater transparency in the lawmaking process, more 
effective procedures for challenging administrative action, and 
greater judicial independence. Although these commitments are 
aimed primarily at improving the legal framework for commercial 
transactions, they complement other government efforts designed 
to provide Chinese citizens with limited remedies for official 
misconduct. No one can be certain that these legal reforms will 
spur political liberalization and greater respect for human 
rights in China. However, they contribute to an essential legal 
framework in which human rights may be protected.
The Congressional-Executive Commission on China
    Congress created the Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China to monitor China's compliance with international human 
rights standards, encourage the development of the rule of law, 
establish and maintain a list of victims of human rights 
abuses, and promote bilateral cooperation. With Commissioners 
drawn from both the Congress and the Administration, the 
Commission has a special role and a unique vantage point in 
developing recommendations for policy and action. It seeks to 
mobilize members of Congress and encourage the Administration 
to act on human rights and rule of law issues, providing a 
forum where both branches can work together. The Commission's 
website (www.cecc.gov) informs Americans and others about these 
issues. The Commission also serves as a scholarly resource on 
China for the Congress and the Administration. In its annual 
report and at other times during the year, the Commission 
recommends legislation and policy and reports on progress in 
China. The Commission holds hearings, conducts visits to China, 
and meets with key decision-makers both in China and the United 
States.
    This inaugural report presents the Commission's findings 
for its abbreviated first year of operation. It is the product 
of a variety of activities undertaken since February 2002, 
including three public hearings and twelve staff-led 
roundtables involving 63 witnesses, staff research and visits 
to China, and ongoing cooperation and exchange with government 
agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Through 
these activities, the Commission has focused on many of the 
core issues outlined in its statutory mandate, including 
religious freedom, labor rights, free flow of information, 
criminal justice, the rights of ethnic minorities, and the rule 
of law. The Commission will examine these issues and others in 
greater depth over the coming year.
    This report also includes the Commission's initial set of 
recommendations for legislative and executive branch action. 
The Commission believes that the United States should continue 
to take a dual approach to promote both human rights and rule 
of law in China. Dialogue and high-level advocacy on human 
rights and cases of specific political prisoners should be 
coupled with enhanced financial and technical support for 
efforts to build a system based on the rule of law that will 
help protect the human rights of China's citizens. The 
Commission has highlighted its thirteen priority 
recommendations at the conclusion of this Executive Summary. 
These and other recommendations (41 in total) are discussed in 
greater detail in the body of the report.
    The Commission's Executive Branch members have participated 
in and supported the work of the Commission, including the 
preparation of this report. However, the views and 
recommendations expressed in the report do not necessarily 
reflect the views of individual Executive Branch members or the 
Administration.
Findings of the Commission
    China has worked vigorously over the last two decades to 
modernize its economy and improve living standards. To provide 
a foundation for market reforms and to attract foreign 
investment, China has undertaken an unprecedented program of 
legal construction. In its effort to rebuild a legal system 
left in shambles after the turbulent Cultural Revolution (1966-
1976), China has promulgated hundreds of laws, revamped its 
court system, engaged in a nationwide effort to professionalize 
and expand its corps of lawyers and judges, and undertaken a 
host of other reforms.
    These reforms have had a profound effect on Chinese society 
and government. Economic and political power has been gradually 
shifting from Beijing to provincial and local governments, 
making it more difficult for the central government to 
implement many legal reforms from the top down. One result is 
significant regional variation both in the pace of legal change 
and in the protection of human rights. The transition from a 
planned to a market economy has triggered the collapse of 
inefficient state-owned enterprises, contributing to rising 
unemployment and a breakdown in social services. Crime and 
corruption have grown at alarming rates. At the same time, 
state control over many aspects of daily life has weakened, and 
citizens have begun to use the law to protect their own 
interests. Nevertheless, farmers, workers, and religious 
practitioners are also increasingly taking their 
dissatisfaction to the streets, demanding their rights through 
protests and demonstrations. The Chinese government has 
consistently suppressed these efforts and, at times, arrested 
the protest leaders.
    Despite deepening economic reforms, China's authoritarian 
government has resisted calls for political liberalization and 
has made little progress on improving civil and political 
rights. Although the Chinese government is seeking to ease 
widespread anger over rampant official corruption by requiring 
the direct election of village leaders and encouraging official 
accountability, the Party has overshadowed such promising steps 
by continuing to suppress any threat to its unchallenged grip 
on power. The violent suppression of peaceful pro-democracy 
protesters in Tiananmen Square in 1989 set in motion a renewed 
period of intolerance of political dissent. The current Chinese 
leadership appears determined to modernize the economy while 
keeping a tight lid on political dissent, continuing firm Party 
rule, and maintaining its vision of social stability.
    China's leaders are keenly aware of the role that labor 
unions played in undermining Communist Party rule in Eastern 
Europe and are determined to prevent similar challenges in 
China. The Chinese government forbids independent trade unions, 
and labor leaders who have tried to organize independent unions 
have been detained or imprisoned. All unions are subject to the 
supervision of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU), which is tightly controlled by the Communist Party and 
serves the interests of the state and the Party. There is no 
right to strike. Regulations on workplace health and safety, as 
well as on work hours and overtime pay, are often ignored. The 
massive migration from rural to urban areas and the increased 
unemployment from shrinking and closing state-owned enterprises 
have seriously exacerbated worker unrest.
    The Chinese government and the Communist Party also attempt 
to maintain strict control over religious groups. All temples, 
mosques, churches, and monasteries in China are required to 
register with the state and submit to the supervision of 
government-controlled religious umbrella organizations. These 
organizations approve the selection of religious leaders, vet 
religious texts, and oversee religious education. In many 
regions, Chinese authorities have engaged in a systematic 
campaign to root out underground and unsanctioned religious 
groups and branded some as dangerous ``cults.'' Numerous 
religious leaders have been detained and imprisoned in this 
effort. In other regions, authorities have interfered less in 
unsanctioned religious activity.
    In enforcing their vision of ``national unity,'' China's 
leaders have made ethnic minorities a target of tight control 
as well. Although the Chinese Constitution grants nominal 
autonomy to many ethnic minorities, they are not able to 
exercise this autonomy in practice. A small number of Uighur 
separatists has committed acts of terrorism, and one Uighur 
group, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, has recently been 
added to a U.S. list of foreign organizations that support 
terrorism. However, many Tibetans and Uighurs who have 
protested peacefully for greater autonomy or, in some cases, 
independence, have been imprisoned and tortured. The Chinese 
government has not distinguished clearly between separatism and 
legitimate political, cultural, and religious expression. Thus, 
its efforts to control ethnic minorities have led to 
restrictions on the religious and cultural practices of Tibetan 
Buddhists and Uighur Muslims, including a recent ban on Uighur-
language instruction at Xinjiang University and a large public 
burning of Uighur-language books. China continues to forbid 
open expressions of loyalty to Tibet's exiled spiritual leader, 
the Dalai Lama, whom the Chinese government regards as a 
separatist.
    The Chinese Constitution guarantees freedom of assembly, 
but demonstrations must be approved in advance by police and 
permission is rarely granted. Authorities often break up 
demonstrations, such as the worker protests in Daqing, 
Liaoyang, and Fushun earlier this year, using a combination of 
detention of demonstration leaders, minor concessions to 
demonstrators, and, if necessary, force. After a peaceful 
demonstration by more than 10,000 Falun Gong members in 1999 
outside the central leadership compound in Beijing, the Chinese 
government banned the spiritual movement and launched a 
nationwide campaign to eradicate ``heretical cults.'' This 
campaign has resulted in the detention of thousands of 
practitioners and the torture and death of many Falun Gong 
leaders and members. The crackdown has led to intensified 
persecution of other groups as well, including underground 
Protestant and Catholic ``house churches.''
    Information control in China remains strict. In recent 
years, authorities have allowed journalists to write about some 
cases of official malfeasance as part of a government attempt 
to crack down on corruption. Newspapers and magazines have been 
quick to capitalize on this opportunity, feeding a public 
desire for investigative reporting. However, the government 
still prohibits direct criticism of the Communist Party and 
limits reporting on topics it deems sensitive, including 
workers' protests, rural unrest, Falun Gong, corruption at high 
levels, and the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. At the same 
time, the limits of reporting are often arbitrary and unclear. 
Journalists who cross these undefined lines can face demotion, 
job loss, and, in some cases, imprisonment. Chinese authorities 
regularly block foreign government radio and television 
broadcasts into China.
    Chinese leaders have embraced the Internet for its 
technological and commercial benefits, and there has been 
exponential growth in the on-line community. But they have also 
gone to great lengths to control Internet content and access. 
Authorities regularly block international news websites and 
have imposed strict registration and content requirements on 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Security networks monitor 
Internet traffic. In the past year, the government has 
intensified efforts to control the Internet, recently blocking 
the AltaVista and Google websites. The government requires 
Internet businesses to police their customers, and more than 
100 Internet businesses, including Yahoo's China subsidiary, 
recently signed a government-sponsored pledge, agreeing to 
monitor users and remove ``harmful'' information. Under Chinese 
law, any person who posts content that the government has not 
approved is subject to potential fines and imprisonment. For 
example, it is illegal to post anything that harms social 
stability, a vague phrase that authorities use as a pretense to 
silence those who use the Internet to criticize the Communist 
Party or its policies.
    China's criminal justice system provides the machinery for 
enforcement of many of the social and political controls 
discussed above. Despite revisions to the Criminal Procedure 
Law and Criminal Law, the impact of such reforms on the 
protection of criminal suspects and defendants has been 
minimal. China's criminal justice system remains subject to 
manipulation by authorities. Torture is illegal but remains 
widespread, and confessions coerced by torture are still 
admissible as evidence in criminal cases. Chinese authorities 
frequently ignore legal provisions that guarantee criminal 
defendants access to lawyers. Criminal defense attorneys who 
represent their clients zealously may be subject to 
intimidation and, in some cases, detention and criminal 
prosecution, particularly in politically sensitive cases. 
Undergirding the government's manipulation of the criminal 
process is Party control of the judiciary. Inadequate legal 
training and the generally low level of education of judges in 
China are also problems.
    In many criminal cases, Chinese authorities ignore even the 
minimal protections that Chinese law provides. During China's 
periodic Strike Hard anti-crime campaigns, local criminal 
justice authorities, under pressure from the central government 
to produce convictions, often flout basic criminal procedures 
(for example, by denying defendants access to lawyers) in order 
to obtain quick convictions. Many Chinese are detained for long 
periods without trial. The police have the administrative power 
to send individuals to ``re-education through labor'' for up to 
three years, with a possible one-year extension, for a variety 
of offenses that include prostitution, drug possession, and 
``disturbing social order.'' Re-education through labor is 
frequently used in political cases to circumvent the formal 
criminal justice system, a practice of grave concern to the 
international community.
United States Action on Human Rights and the Rule of Law
    The Chinese people themselves will ultimately determine 
China's direction and the degree to which the Chinese 
government respects fundamental human rights. The Commission 
believes that the United States should work to provide China's 
government and citizens with an enhanced understanding of the 
law and with a range of legal tools to protect human rights. 
The United States can achieve this goal in part by supporting 
legal development programs in China. U.S. NGOs have been at the 
forefront of these efforts. However, the U.S. government lags 
far behind other nations in providing technical and financial 
assistance for rule of law programs in China. This gap 
represents a missed opportunity by the United States to assist 
China's reformers.
    Human rights advocacy gives hope to those in China who risk 
their personal liberty, and even their lives, by demanding 
internationally recognized rights and freedoms. While engaging 
China through trade, political dialogue, and legal development 
initiatives, the United States must continue to pressure the 
Chinese government on both broad human rights and rule of law 
issues and individual cases of political prisoners. While the 
United States extends the hand of friendship, it will continue 
to support those who suffer persecution for asserting their 
internationally recognized human rights.
Priority Recommendations
    Based on the findings presented in this report and the 
Commission's belief that the United States must continue to 
pursue a dual policy of high-level advocacy on human rights 
issues and support for legal reform efforts, the Congressional 
members of the Commission highlight the following 13 priority 
recommendations to the Congress and the President:

           The Commission recommends that the 
        President, senior Executive Branch officials, and 
        members of Congress continue to raise human rights 
        issues, as well as individual cases of victims of human 
        rights abuses, including those discussed in this 
        report, whenever they meet with Chinese government 
        officials. The Commission further recommends that the 
        Administration include Commission leaders in any future 
        Presidential visit to China.
           The Commission recommends that the Congress 
        and the Administration expand U.S. government efforts 
        to disseminate human rights, worker rights, and rule of 
        law-related information in China through radio, 
        television, and the Internet.
           The Commission recommends that the 
        Administration continue to work multilaterally to 
        encourage China to cooperate fully with the UN Special 
        Rapporteur on Torture.
           The Commission recommends that the Congress 
        appropriate funds to an American university, NGO, or 
        other organization to train individuals from U.S. 
        faith-based or other organizations with links to 
        religious groups in China to assist Chinese religious 
        leaders in asserting their existing right of freedom to 
        practice religion under the Chinese Constitution and 
        international human rights documents.
           The Commission recommends that the 
        Administration sponsor programs with key Chinese 
        officials and policymakers to examine the role of 
        religion in society and to promote the concept of 
        religious tolerance.
           The Commission recommends that the Congress 
        and the Administration provide assistance to legal 
        clinics to expand the availability of legal 
        representation in cases involving worker rights, and 
        that special assistance be provided to legal aid 
        centers in communities with large numbers of migrant 
        workers, and migrant women in particular, to build 
        expertise and capacity in resolving the issues of 
        concern to this vulnerable group.
           The Commission recommends that the 
        Administration facilitate meetings of U.S., Chinese, 
        and third-country companies doing business in a 
        specific locality and industry in China to identify 
        systemic worker rights abuses, develop recommendations 
        for appropriate Chinese government entities, and 
        discuss these recommendations with Chinese officials, 
        with the goal of developing a long-term collaborative 
        relationship between government and business to assist 
        in improving China's implementation of internationally 
        recognized labor standards.
           The Commission recommends that the Congress 
        appropriate funds for suitable U.S. institutions to 
        conduct programs for Chinese criminal defense lawyers 
        on the role of the criminal defense bar outside of 
        China and promote exchanges between Chinese and U.S. 
        criminal defense lawyers.
           The Commission recommends that the Congress 
        authorize the development of programming in popular 
        legal education for groups in China, such as farmers in 
        remote areas and migrant workers, who are unaware of 
        their rights under existing law.
           The Commission recommends that the Congress 
        appropriate funds and earmark them for the Commercial 
        Law Development Program (CLDP) to implement a 
        commercial rule of law training program in China, as 
        authorized by the U.S-China Relations Act of 2000.

With respect to specific ethnic problems considered by the 
Commission this year,

           The Commission recommends that the Congress 
        and the Administration continue to urge Chinese leaders 
        to engage in substantive dialogue with the Dalai Lama 
        or his representatives.
           The Commission recommends that the Congress 
        appropriate increased funding for NGOs to develop 
        programs that improve the health, education, and 
        economic conditions of ethnic Tibetans.
           The Commission recommends that the Congress 
        and the Administration continue to emphasize that the 
        war against terrorism is not an excuse for suppression 
        and violations of human rights of ethnic Uighurs in 
        Xinjiang, and recommends that the Congress and the 
        Administration provide funding for NGOs to develop 
        programs that focus on preserving the Uighur culture 
        and language.

    The Commission's Executive Branch members have participated 
in and supported the work of the Commission, including the 
preparation of this report. However, the views and 
recommendations expressed in the report do not necessarily 
reflect the views of individual Executive Branch members or the 
Administration.
    This report was approved by a vote of 18 to 5.\1\

                 1. Role and Purpose of the Commission

                          Legislative Mandate

    The United States-China Relations Act of 2000\2\ created 
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (``the 
Commission''), established its mandate, and set rules for its 
operation. (See the Commission's website at www.cecc.gov for 
the full text of Title III of the statute.) Section 302 
describes the functions of the Commission, which may be 
summarized as follows:

           Monitoring the acts of the government of 
        China to assess its compliance with or violation of 
        international human rights standards, in particular, 
        the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
        International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
           Monitoring the development of the rule of 
        law in China, with special focus on progress toward 
        development of democratic institutions; reforming legal 
        procedures and processes; improving the transparency of 
        the legal system; treating individuals equally before 
        the law without regard to their citizenship; 
        establishing an independent judiciary with appellate 
        review; and examining the extent to which Chinese laws 
        are drafted and administered in consonance with the 
        requirements of the International Covenant on Civil and 
        Political Rights and other international standards;
           Monitoring and encouraging bilateral 
        cooperation between the U.S. and Chinese governments 
        and private sector organizations in both countries. The 
        focus should be on programs that improve the ability of 
        Chinese citizens to exercise the human rights 
        guaranteed to them in the Chinese Constitution and 
        under international norms of human rights, as well as 
        programs that support the development of the rule of 
        law in China;
           Establishing and maintaining contacts with 
        relevant non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
        cooperating with the Special Coordinator for Tibetan 
        Issues at the Department of State;
           Reporting to the President and the Congress 
        each year on the issues in the legislative mandate, and 
        making recommendations for executive or legislative 
        action when necessary; and
           Compiling and maintaining lists of persons 
        who have suffered from Chinese government abuses as a 
        result of seeking to exercise rights guaranteed to them 
        by the Chinese Constitution and existing laws, as well 
        as internationally recognized human rights.

    For a complete list of the Commissioners and links to their 
home pages, please see the Commission's website (www.cecc.gov).

                       The Role of the Commission

    The Congressional-Executive Commission on China focuses on 
human rights and rule of law issues throughout the year. Unlike 
most other government entities, the Commission's members come 
from both the legislative and executive branches, providing it 
with a special role and a unique vantage point on China. The 
Commission seeks bipartisan Congressional action and encourages 
Administration activities whenever it can be effective on 
specific China human rights and rule of law issues.
    The Commission recommends legislative and policy action 
whenever appropriate. Its recommendations normally appear in 
the annual report to the Congress and the President, laying out 
an action plan for U.S. policy toward China on issues related 
to human rights and the rule of law. The Commission works 
throughout the subsequent year to promote the implementation of 
these recommendations.
    The Commission also serves as a permanent forum for debate, 
information, and education on key issues in U.S.-China 
relations. Through its public hearings, issue roundtables, 
interaction with senior Chinese officials, NGOs, business 
groups, and academics in both countries, multilateral contacts, 
and staff research papers, the Commission provides the 
Congress, the Administration, and the public with current, 
accurate, and detailed information on human rights and rule of 
law issues in China. Through its website, the Commission 
informs not only Americans but also Chinese about human rights 
and rule of law issues in China.
    A full-time staff monitoring and analyzing human rights and 
rule of law issues serves as a resource for both the Congress 
and the Administration. The staff includes experts in the areas 
of human rights, religious freedom, legal reform, worker 
rights, Tibet, minority affairs, the Internet, media freedom, 
and commercial law and the WTO. They are available for 
briefings for members of Congress, their staff, and 
Administration officials, and can field inquiries on issues 
related to human rights and legal reform in China.
    The Commission will design and maintain a registry of 
prisoners of conscience in China with a view toward assisting 
members of Congress, other government officials, and NGOs in 
the goal of obtaining the release of these prisoners.
    Commissioners plan to visit China regularly to exchange 
views with Chinese officials, legislators, academics, and 
business leaders and to make firsthand assessments of human 
rights and rule of law developments in China's rapidly changing 
political, social, and economic environment. Staff visits 
designed to build relationships, gather information, and 
understand the actual situation in China take place on a 
regular basis.
    Through all these activities, the Commission examines the 
complex forces at work in contemporary China that both favor 
and resist change, assesses the impact of specific U.S. 
policies and programs on the reform process in China, and 
recommends actions that assist in improving human rights and 
the rule of law in China.

           2. Human Rights in the Context of the Rule of Law

        It is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have 
        recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against 
        tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be 
        protected by the rule of law.

                --Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

    Human rights cannot be enjoyed without legal structures 
through which to protect such rights. In theory, the Chinese 
Constitution provides for a number of the fundamental human 
rights that are set forth in international human rights 
documents, such as the right to peaceful assembly.\3\ Other 
provisions of the Chinese Constitution undermine such rights, 
however, and in practice Chinese citizens do not enjoy many of 
these fundamental rights in their daily lives.\4\ Chinese 
citizens need legal institutions and mechanisms through which 
they can enforce their constitutionally prescribed rights and 
other rights and protections established under law.
    As indicated in Sections 302(a) and 302(c) of the 
Commission's statutory mandate, a rule of law system includes 
both substantive and structural elements. The substantive 
elements consist of fundamental human rights and freedoms, such 
as those listed in Section 302 of the Commission's mandate, 
including:

           freedom of the press;
           freedom of religion;
           freedom of assembly;
           the right to due process and assistance of 
        counsel in crimi-    nal trials;
           the right to participate in systems of 
        democratic govern-
            ance; and
           internationally recognized worker rights.

The principal structural elements include:

           meaningful limits on the arbitrary exercise 
        of power by
             state actors supported by processes and 
        institutions
             through which citizens can challenge state action;
           predictability (i.e., consistent and fair 
        application and en-    forcement of the law);
           transparency (i.e., laws and lawmaking 
        processes that are 
            clear, public, and accessible);
           equal application of the law to all 
        individuals; and
           an independent judiciary.

    The Commission views the development of structural rule of 
law elements as an essential foundation for the protection of 
fundamental human rights in China. No one can ensure that the 
development of the structural elements will lead to greater 
respect for human rights in China. Authoritarian governments 
have created legal systems that enforce contract and property 
rights but still allow flagrant violations of individual 
rights. However, the development of the structural rule of law 
elements has contributed to the expansion of substantive rights 
and freedoms in some political transitions, such as those 
experienced in South Korea and Taiwan. More important, human 
rights cannot be effectively protected if the structural 
elements are not in place.
    Given this interplay between protection of human rights and 
the rule of law, the United States must pursue a dual approach 
as it seeks to improve human rights conditions in China. As it 
pressures the Chinese government to protect fundamental human 
rights in practice, the United States must assist China in 
strengthening the independence of its judiciary, improving 
transparency in lawmaking, and enhancing processes for 
challenging state action so that China develops a legal 
framework in which human rights are recognized and protected.

            3. Trends in the Development of Human Rights and


                          Rule of Law in China

    The Chinese Communist Party's insistence on maintaining its 
monopoly on power has bled much of the meaning from post-Mao 
constitutional promises to govern according to law\5\ and to 
recognize certain fundamental human rights.\6\
    Since the Revolution of 1911, various Chinese governments 
have moved in the direction of adopting elements of a system 
based on the rule of law. The Republic of China introduced a 
rules-oriented legal system based on European civil codes in 
the 1920s, but civil war and the Japanese occupation prevented 
implementation of the codes in much of the country. In 1948, 
the Republic of China voted in the UN General Assembly to adopt 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which expresses a 
global consensus on the need for states to recognize minimum 
standards of human rights in the treatment of their citizens.
    After 1949, the People's Republic under Mao Zedong 
abolished existing law and established a Stalinist legal 
structure emphasizing communist ideology over human rights and 
the rule of law. During the turbulent years of the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976), respect for the idea of individual 
human rights, never strong in socialist states, reached a new 
low. Radical Marxist rhetoric during that decade articulated 
``bourgeois rights'' as a key target, attacking the very idea 
of law as a tool to restrain the righteous indignation of the 
masses. Big character posters and slogans urged the people to 
``smash the Public Security Bureau, the Prosecutors, and the 
Courts'' and proclaimed ``the more chaos, the better.'' \7\

Origins of Reform

    The staggering human and social costs of the Cultural 
Revolution ultimately resulted in a moderate faction of the 
Party, led by Deng Xiaoping, coming to power in 1978. Deng 
introduced an era of social liberalization, economic 
pragmatism, and legal reform. The atmosphere of change in that 
moment encouraged some in China, including Deng himself, to 
consider reform within the political sphere as well. In a 1980 
speech, Deng said democracy was needed to allow the people to 
``supervise political power at the basic level.'' \8\ The 
Central Committee of the Party stated, ``There has to be 
sufficient democracy before correct centralization can be 
conducted.'' \9\ The Party's understanding of the term 
``democracy,'' however, did not include the notion of political 
criticism or opposition, as demonstrated by the arrest of 
democracy advocate Wei Jingsheng for his critique of Deng's 
leadership\10\ and the subsequent harsh crackdown on the 
``Democracy Wall Movement'' in 1979. It became clear that those 
in control of the government and the Party did not intend to 
abandon the Party's monopoly on power.
    Within the constraints imposed by the authoritarian one-
party system, the process of bringing regularity and 
predictability to government operations in China has 
accelerated since 1978. In describing this legal reform 
process, Professor William Alford of Harvard Law School told 
the Commission at its first hearing, ``Over the past quarter 
century, the PRC has been engaged in the most concerted program 
of legal construction in world history.'' \11\
    The first steps in establishing the new ``socialist 
legality'' included the passage in 1979 of key ``organic 
laws,'' formalizing the institutions of the people's courts, 
the people's procuratorate (China's prosecutorial authority), 
local people's congresses, and local people's governments.\12\ 
The same year saw the resurrection of the Ministry of Justice, 
abolished in 1959, and legal studies departments and programs 
at the university level. Many outside observers may not realize 
that these institutions--the basic requirements of a system 
based on laws--are so recent. New national legislation also 
included two important economic laws to facilitate the 
transition to a ``socialist market economy,'' the Chinese-
Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law, designed to attract foreign 
investment without losing Chinese control over business 
decisions and profits, and the Economic Contract Law, aimed at 
eliminating some of the inefficiencies of central planning by 
allowing state-owned enterprises to assume responsibility over 
their mutual business relationships.\13\
    In the area of the rights of criminal defendants, this 
early reform legislation included China's first formal Criminal 
Law and Criminal Procedure Law. Although the Criminal Law 
defined and assigned punishment to a list of specific crimes, 
the Law failed to fulfill the basic notice requirement of a 
rule of law system in that it included the notorious Article 
79, a catch-all provision for punishing unspecified acts as 
``crimes'' by analogy to the most nearly applicable crime 
defined elsewhere in the Law. In addition, the first chapter of 
the 1979 Criminal Law focused on the vague political category 
of ``counter-revolutionary'' crimes, defined as ``all acts 
endangering the People's Republic of China committed with the 
goal of overthrowing the political power of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat and the socialist system.'' \14\ The 1979 
Criminal Procedure Law limited the role of the trial court to 
confirmation of the procuratorate's pre-trial determination of 
guilt, turning trials into propaganda displays centered on the 
drama of the defendant's confession and repentance rather than 
an arena for fact-finding and justice. Defense counsel's most 
important role under the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law was the 
presentation of mitigating factors relevant to the sentence.
    Despite these severe limitations, and considering the low 
starting point, the two laws moved in the direction of 
recognizing the rights of criminal defendants as listed in 
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and in Section 302 of the Commission's mandate. Another 
important development in the Constitution (Article 33) and the 
Criminal Law (Article 4) was the declaration that all citizens 
were to be equal before the law--a basic requirement of the 
rule of law expressed in Article 7 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. These changes were a relief to those who 
remembered how criminal liability under Mao depended less on 
whether a crime had been committed than on whether the 
defendant fell on the correct side of the shifting boundary 
defining ``class enemies.'' \15\

Treatment of Dissidents

    Trials of dissidents and others jailed or exiled by the 
Party in subsequent years continue to demonstrate that formal 
enunciation of civil and political rights in the Chinese 
Constitution and laws mean little when the government considers 
the defendant to be a political threat. Early examples include 
those who spoke out for democracy together with Wei Jingsheng, 
in the late 1970s. Xu Wenli was jailed for 12 years and then 
released, only to be tried and sentenced to 13 more years in 
1998 for his participation in founding the China Democracy 
Party. Others persecuted for speaking out against government 
abuses include the renowned investigative reporter Liu Binyan, 
a Communist Party loyalist who was purged from the Party three 
times: in 1957 for being a ``rightist''; during the Cultural 
Revolution for being a ``counter-revolutionary;'' and finally 
in 1987, for ``bourgeois liberalism.'' The famous scientist 
Fang Lizhi, vice president of the Anhui University of Science 
and Technology, was fired and expelled from the Party for 
publicly arguing that democracy was the prerequisite for the 
full development of science in China.
    The split in Party leadership between reform-oriented 
liberals like Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang and hard-line 
conservatives was resolved by the hard-liners' decision to 
unleash the People's Liberation Army on student pro-democracy 
demonstrations, which were centered in Tiananmen Square in 
1989. Many leaders and supporters of the student movement, like 
Wei, Liu, and Fang, now live in exile. Others, like Chen 
Ziming, who currently lives under house arrest in Beijing, were 
tried and jailed in China. Among those treated most harshly in 
the aftermath of the killings in and around Tiananmen Square 
were the ordinary citizens and workers who had dared to join 
the demonstrations in support of the students. Of these, Han 
Dongfang, who tried to set up an independent workers' 
federation in Tiananmen Square during the demonstrations, 
barely survived two years of imprisonment and was finally 
released because of severe tuberculosis, which was ultimately 
treated in the United States. When he attempted to return home, 
he was barred at the border from re-entering China. Now he 
publishes the China Labour Bulletin in Hong Kong and hosts a 
talk show on Radio Free Asia, receiving calls from people in 
China about the practical problems faced by workers in the 
emerging ``socialist market economy.''
    Along with Xu Wenli and Chen Ziming, individuals currently 
imprisoned for political expression include China Democracy 
Party founders Qin Yongmin and Wang Youcai, both sentenced with 
Xu to long prison terms in December 1998. The same month, labor 
activist Zhang Shanguang was sentenced to 10 years for 
describing farmers' protests to Radio Free Asia. Most recently, 
Li Dawei, called by some the ``cyber dissident,'' was sentenced 
on June 24, 2002, to 11 years in prison for ``subverting state 
power'' by downloading pro-democracy texts from the Internet 
and contacting ``reactionary'' organizations abroad. Finally, 
in an ominous development for the rule of law in China, the 
prominent criminal defense lawyer Zhang Jianzhong has been 
arrested for allegedly making a ``false statement'' in a 
commercial case. Detained since May 3, 2002, Zhang has been 
allowed only minimal contact with his family and has met only 
once with the lawyer he hired. The lawyer his family hired on 
his behalf has not been permitted to meet with Zhang.
    This tale of harsh injustice meted out to political 
defendants reflects two fundamental flaws in Chinese law--the 
absence of an independent judiciary willing and able to 
withstand pressure from the Party, and the lack of an 
independent bar to defend those targeted by the Party. Abuses 
by China's law enforcement and security apparatus present a 
particularly severe obstacle to the implementation of the 
internationally recognized human rights of criminal defendants. 
Police and security agencies, for example, routinely disregard 
legal limits on the detention and interrogation of criminal 
suspects and commonly resort to torture and other forms of 
physical and psychological abuse.

The Growth of Individual Autonomy: Long-term Perspectives

    In comparison with the political domain, a more positive 
picture emerges when one contrasts the economic and social 
opportunities enjoyed by ordinary individuals in the China of 
today with the bleak decades before Mao's death. A distinct 
shift toward greater individual autonomy is apparent. Social 
controls exercised through China's state work units or danwei, 
which once held enormous power over the lives of individual 
workers, have relaxed as economic reform stimulates growth in 
the private sector and the state shifts some of the 
responsibility for social services to local governments. With 
the decline of the work assignment system, citizens now 
exercise more choice in employment, although this freedom may 
seem less attractive now that guarantees once inherent in the 
socialist ``iron rice bowl'' are being swept away by massive 
lay-offs.
    The once-restrictive hukou system preventing citizens from 
moving away from their place of registration of permanent 
residence is weakening. Many city-dwellers now own their 
residences. In the countryside, farmers have greater say in 
land use and management, areas previously micromanaged by the 
communes. For the time being, the intrusive role of 
neighborhood committees and local party branches has 
diminished, and citizens are willing to speak more openly about 
some topics long avoided as too risky, such as local corruption 
and exorbitant taxes and fees. Unfortunately, the persistent 
absence of clear definition of the boundaries of politically 
and legally acceptable speech, particularly under the Law on 
Protecting State Secrets\16\ and the State Security Law,\17\ 
continues to chill the development of true free speech in 
China.
    Many in China and elsewhere believe that the best hope for 
long-lasting change lies in the expansion of specific legal 
mechanisms through which the Chinese people are empowered to 
assert their rights and interests. The state has encouraged 
this development to a limited extent, if only to rein in its 
unwieldy and often corrupt bureaucracy. China's 1989 
Administrative Litigation Law, which establishes a procedure 
for challenging certain administrative actions, and the 1994 
State Compensation Law, under which citizens may seek 
compensation for a range of illegal official acts, though 
flawed in some respects, provide basic legal mechanisms through 
which state action may be challenged.\18\ As rapid economic 
change exposes Chinese consumers to a wide array of new 
products, public anger at the proliferation of flawed or 
dangerous goods has led to the creation of the Chinese 
Consumers' Association and the enactment of frequently-used 
consumer protection laws.\19\
    Statistics on the numbers of different kinds of cases filed 
show that growing numbers of individuals are using the law to 
protect their personal and property interests. From 1986 to 
2000, the number of civil and economic suits handled annually 
in Chinese courts increased from around 1.3 million to nearly 5 
million.\20\ Such numbers suggest a trend toward legal 
empowerment in China, at least in areas not considered a threat 
to state or party power. While the legal aid system is still in 
its infancy, Article 42 of the 1996 Lawyers Law imposes an 
affirmative duty on lawyers to furnish legal aid to the 
indigent.\21\ The Ministry of Justice, many law schools and 
universities, and a number of foreign and domestic NGOs have 
set up networks of legal aid centers to meet some of these 
demands.

New Social Tensions and the State's Desire to Maintain Stability

    Economic reforms have given rise to new social tensions and 
have undermined the legitimacy of the Party. A fiscal system 
that permits provincial governments to fund their operations 
through ``off-budget'' revenues has tempted many local 
officials to divert unregulated monies into their own pockets. 
As local revenues grow, local governments attain a measure of 
fiscal independence, making it difficult for Beijing to 
implement fully legal reforms and compromising the national 
uniformity of legal development.
    Crime and corruption have grown at alarming rates, leading 
to local lawlessness and increasingly angry citizen demands for 
redress against malfeasance and extortionate levies by 
officials. The central leadership has responded to public 
perceptions of a crime wave with national campaigns that 
encourage the police to disregard protections provided by the 
criminal procedure laws under the slogan ``strike hard against 
crime.'' The shift to a market economy and the closure of many 
failing state-owned enterprises have created a mushrooming 
population of laid-off workers demanding pension and severance 
packages owed them by former employers. Massive demonstrations 
have erupted as outrage and anxiety rise. Such problems, 
together with the government's efforts to control the 
associated tensions, have widened the gap between legal rights 
as they exist on paper and the ability to exercise those rights 
in practice.
    Despite increasing willingness to use the rhetoric of 
``rule of law'' and ``human rights,'' the government and the 
Party's desire to maintain control undermines the promises of 
the Constitution in the vital areas of the rights to freedom of 
association, religion, and expression. New social organizations 
(roughly equivalent in function to NGOs) must find government 
sponsors, and religion can only be practiced in institutions 
registered by the state. Restrictions on free expression remain 
severe, and the government continues to suppress demonstrations 
and other challenges to state power, including efforts to 
organize independent trade unions. In these areas, new 
regulations and government policy and practice actually roll 
back freedoms enjoyed under the looser policies of the 1980s.
    In summary, two trends have emerged since Deng Xiaoping's 
reforms began in 1978. On the one hand, Chinese citizens today 
enjoy more individual autonomy and freedom to pursue economic 
opportunity and acquire certain property rights, and do so 
under a more developed legal system and with less interference 
from the state, than was imaginable in 1978. On the other hand, 
they are still far from enjoying many of the fundamental rights 
and freedoms set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and other international human rights instruments.

                   4. Commission Activities in 2002:


                       Issues and Recommendations

    During this abbreviated initial year of activities, the 
Commission's focus was to establish a framework within which to 
examine human rights and the rule of law in China, set a 
baseline on which to make judgments about progress in the 
future, and make an initial set of recommendations to the 
Congress and the Administration. This section describes those 
areas that the Commission was able to examine in-depth during 
this period. Section 5 provides an illustrative list, although 
not an exhaustive one, of additional issues on which the 
Commission will focus over the coming year.

                           Religious Freedom

    President George W. Bush told students at Beijing's Qinghua 
University in February 2002, ``Freedom of religion is not 
something to be feared. It's to be welcomed.'' \22\ In his 
meetings that month in Beijing with President Jiang Zemin, 
President Bush urged the Chinese leader to grant religious 
liberty, free jailed Catholic clergy, and pursue dialogue with 
the Vatican. Nevertheless, despite guarantees in the Chinese 
Constitution protecting ``normal religious activity,'' \23\ the 
Chinese government continues to view religious groups as a 
threat and places strict limitations on religious practice and 
organizations. However, Beijing's heavy hand has failed to 
quash what has been called an ``astonishing revival'' in 
religious practice and belief in China.\24\
    The Chinese government officially recognizes five 
religions: Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism, and 
Protestantism. National regulations require that religious 
organizations and individual places of worship register with 
the Religious Affairs Bureau, a ministry-level component of the 
Chinese government.\25\ All mosques, churches, temples, and 
monasteries are forced to submit to state-controlled umbrella 
organizations that approve the selection of religious leaders, 
vet religious texts, and oversee religious education. These 
include the Buddhist Association of China, the China Taoist 
Association, the Islamic Association of China, the Patriotic 
Association of the Catholic Church in China, and the Three-Self 
Patriotic Movement Committee of the Protestant Churches of 
China. (Islam and Tibetan Buddhism are addressed in the 
report's Xinjiang-Uighur and Tibet sections, respectively.) 
Local regulations often are more detailed and restrictive than 
their national-level counterparts. Foreign domination over 
religion in China is strictly forbidden.\26\
    Many religious practitioners in China reject the validity 
of worshipping in religious institutions that fall under the 
auspices of a government controlled by the officially atheist 
Communist Party. As a result, underground churches and other 
unsanctioned religious groups are experiencing dramatic growth, 
despite the risk of punishment of members. Approximately 13 
million Protestants are part of China's state-sanctioned 
church, but analysts estimate that 50 million or more 
Protestants worship in unregistered house churches.\27\ About 
four million Catholics attend the official church, but perhaps 
twice that many gather in unregistered churches.\28\ Other 
religious movements, with varying degrees of orthodoxy, are 
also growing dramatically.
    In addition to laws and regulations making it illegal to 
participate in unregistered churches, the Chinese government in 
recent years has begun labeling many unsanctioned religious 
groups as ``cults.'' Anti-cult measures enacted in 1999 
initially were directed at Falun Gong, a meditation and 
exercise movement that some critics in China and elsewhere say 
exhibits mystical overtones. Falun Gong startled China's 
leaders with a massive demonstration outside the Zhongnanhai 
leadership compound in Beijing in April of that year. The ban 
on cults now extends to other groups and movements.
    The anti-cult regulations allow local authorities to 
classify unsanctioned religious practices as threats to social 
stability. Those who engage in such religious activities can be 
arrested as criminals and charged with disrupting social 
order.\29\ Because local officials often have the discretion to 
determine which religious practices are ``cult-like,'' 
implementation of the laws is often arbitrary. Some localities 
adopt a more tolerant approach to private religious practice; 
others are repressive. David Aikman, a foreign affairs 
consultant, told a Commission roundtable that ``Hunan Province, 
for example, which has seen the largest Protestant growth of 
any part of China in the last 20 years, is particularly harsh 
upon the unregistered leadership groups in its midst.'' \30\
    One illustration is the case of Pastor Gong Shengliang, 
founder of the banned South China Church. The unregistered 
Christian group he founded has grown rapidly over the course of 
a decade and now has an estimated 50,000 members in eight 
provinces in eastern and central China.\31\ Gong was sentenced 
to death on December 5, 2001, on charges of ``establishing [a] 
cult organization.'' \32\ He also was accused by authorities in 
Hubei Province of ``raping women and violating social order,'' 
\33\ charges that Paul Marshall of Freedom House told the 
roundtable were ``apparently trumped-up.'' \34\ Gong's 
execution originally was scheduled for January 5, 2002, but has 
been delayed due to international pressure so that he could 
appeal. Gong's niece, Li Ying, also a church leader, was given 
a death sentence, which was suspended for two years.\35\
    Local police often deem as ``cult-like'' practices that are 
accepted in mainstream religions in other Asian and Western 
nations. Praying for the sick, printing religious material, and 
conducting ecumenical relations between churches have all been 
cited as illegal activities in China. ``The result of these new 
laws and the move against so-called cults has been a marked 
deterioration in religious freedom in China over the last 
year,'' Marshall told the roundtable.\36\
    The Committee for Investigation on Persecution of Religion 
in China earlier this year released secret documents smuggled 
out of China that allegedly detail government repression of 
unauthorized religious groups. The documents, issued between 
April 1999 and October 2001, indicate a systematic and 
determined effort by officials at the national, provincial, and 
local level to suppress religious practice carried on outside 
of government control. Measures to be taken against banned 
religious groups include surveillance, interrogation, arrest, 
and confiscation of property. One document warns that some 
religious groups had formed political front organizations in an 
attempt to evade the crackdown: ``Discover them quickly, strike 
them when they appear, and decisively punish them by law, so as 
to destroy them in the cradle.'' Falun Gong, the Unification 
Church, and underground Protestants and Catholics are among the 
religious groups cited.\37\
    The documents reveal a suspicion within the Chinese 
leadership that Western nations supported democratic and 
religious freedoms in China as part of an effort to foment 
unrest, especially as China prepared to enter the World Trade 
Organization. In addition, Chinese authorities accuse the 
Vatican of ``waiting for an opportunity'' to incite religious 
believers to rebel.\38\
    China remains reluctant to normalize relations with the 
Vatican, despite recent overtures from the Holy See. In October 
2001, Pope John Paul II issued a statement in which he 
apologized for past church ``errors'' and ``failings'' with 
respect to China. He also expressed the hope that ``concrete 
forms of communication and cooperation between the Holy See and 
the People's Republic of China may soon be established.'' \39\ 
China's Foreign Ministry responded by calling on the Vatican to 
``break relations with Taiwan'' and to stop using religion ``to 
interfere in China's internal affairs.'' \40\ But Thomas 
Quigley, of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, told a 
Commission roundtable that many leaders within China's official 
Catholic Church have already established links with the 
Vatican, possibly with Beijing's tacit approval. According to 
Mr. Quigley, ``The vast majority of all the registered bishops 
have been reconciled with Rome, which the government obviously 
knows.'' \41\
    Meanwhile, Chinese authorities continue to wield a heavy 
hand against leaders of the underground Catholic Church. In 
February, the Vatican's official news agency, ZENIT, issued a 
list of 33 Catholic bishops and priests who were arrested, 
detained, or placed under house arrest in recent years. The 
best known, Bishop James Su Zhimin of Baoding, Hebei Province, 
was reportedly arrested in October 1997. His whereabouts remain 
unknown.\42\
    Chinese authorities are carrying out a harsh crackdown on 
Uighur Muslims in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region in 
northwest China. The crackdown, carried out under the guise of 
anti-terrorism measures, extends to ``religious extremism'' and 
``illegal religious activities.'' \43\ The Chinese government 
has imposed strict limitations on Muslim worship. Religious 
education in schools and universities has been banned, and 
those under the age of 18 are not allowed to participate in 
religious activities.\44\ Authorities closely monitor the work 
of Xinjiang's imams, or Muslim clerics, and in 2001 required 
them to attend 20-day ``patriotic re-education'' sessions to 
study Communist Party ideology and China's ``anti-splittism'' 
law.\45\ (See the ``Xinjiang-Uighurs'' section of this report.) 
There are 35,000 mosques in China, and more than 45,000 imams, 
all of whom must be approved by the government.\46\
    Three years after Chinese authorities banned Falun Gong, 
government suppression of the spiritual movement continues. 
Human rights groups have reported that thousands of 
practitioners have been arrested or detained for their beliefs. 
Human Rights Watch noted ``substantial evidence that torture 
and other abuses are common'' for Falun Gong practitioners in 
prisons, re-education camps, and other facilities.\47\ 
Unconfirmed reports suggest that scores, and possibly hundreds, 
of Falun Gong practitioners have died in police custody since 
suppression of the group began in 1999. Erping Zhang, President 
of the Falun Gong International Committee for Human Rights, 
told a Commission open forum, ``We are . . . sad to report 
that, in the year 2002, the repression has only worsened.''

    (Illustrative legal provisions include: PRC Constitution, 
Article 36; PRC Criminal Law, Article 300--1979, amended 1996; 
Detailed Rules on Implementing the Provisions on Managing the 
Religious Activities of Aliens in the PRC--2000; Decision of 
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on 
Banning Heretical Cult Organizations, Preventing and Punishing 
Cult Activities--1999; Regulations on the Registration of 
Social Organizations--1998; Measures for the Annual Inspection 
of Places of Religious Activity--1996; Measures for the 
Registration of Places for Religious Activities--1994; 
Regulations on Managing Places for Religious Activities--1994; 
Provisions on Managing the Religious Activities of Aliens in 
the PRC--1994; Implementing Measures on Managing the 
Registration of Religious Social Organizations--1991)\48\

                  RECOMMENDATIONS ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

The Commission recommends that the Congress appropriate funds 
to an American university, NGO, or other organization to train 
individuals from U.S. faith-based or other organizations with 
links to religious groups in China to assist Chinese religious 
leaders in asserting their existing right of freedom to 
practice religion under the Chinese Constitution and 
international human rights documents.

        This program would provide U.S. groups with the tools and 
        skills needed to conduct legal clinics and training sessions in 
        China, using their own resources and networks of contacts. Such 
        a program would include preparation of a Chinese-language 
        handbook with relevant information, such as texts of laws, 
        regulations, the Chinese Constitution, and international human 
        rights documents, and suggested guidelines for action.

The Commission recommends that the Administration sponsor 
programs with key Chinese officials and policymakers to examine 
the role of religion in society and to promote the concept of 
religious tolerance.

        Elements would include a program to bring key Chinese 
        individuals to the United States for two to four week visits to 
        see firsthand the role of religion in American society, as well 
        as a series of conferences with Chinese officials, leaders of 
        Chinese religious organizations, and Chinese academics to 
        examine and discuss the role of religion in society. Themes for 
        individual conferences could include the role of religion in 
        civil society; the role of religious groups in the delivery of 
        social services in Western countries; interfaith dialogue; and 
        the differences between cults, terrorist organizations, and 
        religious organizations. Participants should be people who 
        support reforms in existing Chinese government religious 
        policies, including officials from the Religious Affairs 
        Bureau, prosecutors' offices, and scholars from think tanks and 
        academia. Participants should include individuals from the 
        provincial as well as central level.

The Commission recommends that the Administration offer its 
good offices to assist representatives of religious faiths and 
the appropriate Chinese authorities in discussing ways to 
improve relations between China and their religious 
organizations, including the Holy See, without compromising 
essential religious principles or the Holy See's existing 
relationship with Taiwan.

        Chinese law forbids outside interference in the religious 
        practices of Chinese citizens. However, many Chinese Catholics, 
        in particular, seek guidance and instruction from the Vatican. 
        Catholic bishops and priests in China are serving prison terms 
        for their recognition of the Pope's authority.

The Commission recommends that the Congress urge the Chinese 
government to allow the import of religious literature without 
restrictions.

        China publishes large quantities of Bibles, Korans, and other 
        religious texts. However, specific versions of religious 
        literature used by faith-based groups often are unavailable. In 
        addition, some religious practitioners oppose using religious 
        material produced under the auspices of the Communist Party-
        controlled government. Currently, the importation of religious 
        material is illegal.

The Commission recommends that the Administration urge that 
China approve a follow-up visit to China and Tibet by the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance and urge China to 
implement the Special Rapporteur's earlier recommendations.

        The UN Special Rapporteur seeks to highlight and eliminate all 
        forms of intolerance and discrimination based on religion or 
        belief. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China 
        should welcome regular visits from the Special Rapporteur, 
        particularly to areas such as Tibet and Xinjiang.

                  Labor Rights and Working Conditions

    In 1998, China, along with all other members of the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), adopted the ILO's 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which 
obligates members to heed the four core labor standards--
freedom of association and the effective recognition of the 
right to collective bargaining, freedom from forced labor, the 
effective abolition of child labor, and nondiscrimination in 
employment. Moreover, China has signed the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and ratified the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
Both of these covenants contain provisions that protect the 
rights of workers, although China has taken reservations on the 
latter's section dealing with the right to form free trade 
unions and the right to strike.\49\
    As China has shifted to a market-oriented economy, labor 
issues have become more prominent. While some workers have 
benefited from the attendant economic changes, little progress 
has been made in implementing core labor standards. Efforts to 
improve compliance with China's own national laws are ongoing, 
but weak.
    Labor unrest has increased in recent years. In the spring 
of 2002, tens of thousands of workers engaged in protests in 
the northeastern Chinese cities of Liaoyang, Daqing, and Fushun 
over issues that included nonpayment of back wages and 
pensions, loss of benefits, insufficient severance pay, corrupt 
company and government officials, and the inability of workers 
to obtain a meaningful hearing on their grievances.\50\ 
Throughout China, the ``iron rice bowl'' that once guaranteed 
workers lifetime employment and benefits is fast disappearing 
as financially troubled state-owned enterprises downsize, 
privatize, and shut down.
    The unemployed rural workers, farmers, and young women who 
are flooding into cities, primarily in southern and coastal 
China in search of jobs in the rapidly growing private sector, 
exacerbate the labor problem. They have few of the benefits of 
local residents, and many find jobs in unsafe private factories 
where wage and hour, and health and safety laws are seldom 
strictly enforced. Economic and social stresses will grow and 
become more difficult to manage if Chinese workers are not able 
to enjoy their internationally recognized labor rights.

Freedom of Association

    The ILO's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work, as well as International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, provide workers the freedom to 
associate.\51\ While the Chinese Constitution guarantees 
freedom of association,\52\ Chinese law requires that all 
worker associations be approved by, and subordinate to, the 
All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU).\53\
    No free trade unions exist in China today. Although the 
ACFTU Constitution states that ``the major social functions of 
the Chinese trade unions are to protect the legitimate 
interests and democratic rights of workers and staff members,'' 
\54\ the government has harassed, arrested, and imprisoned 
labor activists who attempt to form independent unions or 
organize strikes or worker protests.\55\ Examples include Hu 
Shigen and Liu Jingsheng, who are serving sentences of twenty 
and fifteen years, respectively, for attempting to organize the 
Free Labor Union of China.\56\
    The ACFTU serves more as an instrument of the state and 
Party than as a body to promote interests of workers, 
traditionally acting as a vehicle for propaganda and as a 
benefits managing body. Wei Jianxing, the current head of the 
ACFTU, is a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo 
of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.\57\ 
There are signs that some individuals within the ACFTU have 
tried to take a more proactive approach regarding worker 
rights.\58\ However, both the Trade Union Law and the ACFTU 
Constitution continue to require trade unions to abide by the 
leadership of the Communist Party, promote economic reforms, 
and safeguard state power.\59\

The Right to Assembly and Strike

    The Chinese Constitution, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights provide for freedom of speech and 
assembly.\60\ Although Chinese law does not explicitly deny the 
right to strike, neither does the law protect that right. 
Authorities generally act against strikes and break up many 
worker protests, although the response of local security 
authorities varies widely.\61\
    According to government figures, which likely understate 
the scope, there have been protests involving more than 10,000 
workers in 31 cities in the last few years.\62\ Most of these 
were illegal under Chinese laws governing public assembly. 
Human Rights Watch has detailed the elaborate means used by the 
government to crack down on worker demonstrations, including 
targeted arrests and detention and other harsh treatment of the 
leaders, along with minor concessions to the majority of 
demonstrators.\63\ For example, four key leaders of the 
Liaoyang city protest, Yao Fuxin, Pang Qingxiang, Xiao 
Yunliang, and Wang Zhaoming, were detained in March 2002, 
charged with ``illegal assembly, marches, and protests,'' and 
now face possible five-year prison terms.
    Despite these measures, in order to manage unrest and 
prevent the formation of independent labor organizations, the 
government has tolerated some strikes and demonstrations and 
has even helped workers achieve their demands in a limited 
number of cases where workers have sought to address narrow 
economic grievances.\64\

Collective Bargaining

    The ILO's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work guarantees the right of workers to bargain 
collectively. Official Chinese sources often refer to 
collective bargaining in reaching labor agreements and cite as 
evidence the approval of 270,000 collective contracts in 
2001.\65\ In some areas in China, local labor authorities 
develop a standard employment agreement and distribute it to 
all factories for use as a labor contract. Workers have had 
little meaningful input into this process.\66\ Without 
independent labor unions and the ability of workers to organize 
freely, collective bargaining cannot truly be said to exist in 
China.

Working Conditions

    The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights recognizes the right of workers to safe and healthy 
working conditions. China has adopted measures to improve 
conditions at work, including the Labor Law, which requires 
employers to implement standards for occupational health and 
safety and to educate workers on safety issues; the Law on the 
Prevention and Cure of Occupational Diseases; Regulations on 
Labor Protection in Workplaces Where Toxic Products Are Used; 
and the Law on Work Safety.\67\
    Workplace health and safety continue to be serious problems 
in China. The State Administration for Work Safety, established 
in 2001, reported that, ``from January to July 2002, 65,350 
people lost their lives in a total of 549,939 workplace 
accidents.'' \68\ Safety in mines has become a priority 
concern, with the Chinese government reporting that 12,000 
miners were killed in accidents last year.\69\
    Chinese law setting maximum hours for the work week and 
overtime complies with international standards. However, in 
practice, Chinese often work hours far in excess of these 
limits, and companies frequently require excessive overtime 
that is not paid properly.\70\
    Migrant workers living in dormitories connected with 
factories in southern China often face conditions of severe 
overcrowding, lack of proper sanitation facilities, and 
inadequate fire and safety protection. Many have been denied 
medical care, access to schools for their children, and other 
social benefits.
    As in many areas covered by this report, the wide 
discretion that local and provincial officials often have in 
interpreting and implementing national laws and regulations 
results in inconsistencies in application and opens the door to 
corruption. For example, China's Labor Law allows enterprises, 
with the approval of the local ``labor administrative 
department,'' to adopt their own rules for working hours\71\--
an obvious invitation to abuse.

Labor Arbitration and Litigation

    The Labor Law and the Regulations for the Handling of Labor 
Disputes create a three-tier system for handling labor disputes 
that includes mediation, arbitration, and litigation.\72\ With 
the help of legal aid and information centers, some Chinese 
workers have begun to understand their legal rights. In 2001, 
workers filed 155,000 labor disputes, a 14 percent increase 
over 2000, although statistics on the issues underlying these 
disputes are not available.\73\
    Nevertheless, general awareness of China's laws and 
regulations on the part of workers, management, and even some 
government officials remains low.\74\ The Hong Kong Christian 
Industrial Committee, a group that organizes and provides 
assistance to workers in Hong Kong and China, found that among 
the workers they interviewed, ``Less than half . . . said they 
knew about labor law. None of the workers knew about other 
regulations concerning labor rights. Workers had no idea how to 
use the laws to defend their rights.'' \75\ Programs for 
enforcement generally do not exist, and enterprise managers 
often ignore the regulations even when they are aware of 
them.\76\
    Worker advocates often find themselves in peril. Xu Jian, a 
labor lawyer in the northern China city of Baotou, who 
represented laid-off workers seeking redress from two large 
state-owned enterprises, published pamphlets for workers 
describing their rights under Chinese law. He was arrested and 
sentenced in 2000 to four years in prison for ``incitement to 
overthrow state power.'' \77\ Local authorities in Shenzhen 
reportedly have ordered Zhou Litai, a lawyer who successfully 
represented migrant workers injured in the workplace, to close 
his law practice in that city.\78\
    Ultimately, judgments about the success of labor 
arbitration and litigation can rest only on whether workers 
receive fair and impartial adjudication of disputes, whether 
these remedies are made available to laid off workers (not 
currently entitled to this right under the law),\79\ and to 
what extent labor advocates are allowed to assist workers to 
pursue grievances and assert their legal rights.

Child Labor

    China ratified ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of 
Child Labor in August 2002.\80\ China's Law on the Protection 
of Minors and related regulations prohibit employment of 
children under the age of sixteen, except in very limited 
circumstances. Children between sixteen and eighteen cannot 
work in hazardous or physically strenuous jobs and are subject 
to restrictions that include a prohibition on working overtime 
or at night. These protections are ignored in many 
workplaces.\81\ One well-publicized case in March 2001 involved 
an explosion at a fireworks factory in Jiangxi Province, where 
the factory was located inside a school and students 
manufactured the fireworks. Forty-two people died, mainly 
children.\82\ Estimates for the number of child laborers in 
China vary widely.\83\ In the past, the Chinese government 
denied that child labor was a problem. However, in October 
2001, it established an interagency commission to study the 
issue. The commission's activities have not been made public.

Forced Labor

    The ILO's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights prohibit forced labor. Yet China's system of re-
education through labor (laojiao--administrative detention 
managed outside of the judicial process) and reform through 
labor (laogai--a criminal punishment) encompass several million 
individuals subject to forced labor. (See the Criminal Justice 
section for details on re-education through labor.)
    Chinese regulations bar the export of goods made with 
prison labor, and China denies that prison-made goods are being 
shipped to the United States.\84\ The United States and China 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 1992 to prevent import 
into the United States of products made using Chinese prison 
labor. A subsequent agreement in 1994 permitted U.S. officials, 
with Chinese government permission, to visit prison facilities 
suspected of producing goods for export to the United 
States.\85\ U.S. officials have made thirteen requests for site 
visits. Since 1996, they have been permitted to conduct only 
three site visits in China and found no proof of prison exports 
to the United States.\86\ In June 2002, Chinese officials 
agreed to regular meetings to facilitate implementation of the 
agreements. China then agreed in September 2002 to allow one 
previously requested visit to take place.
    The United States-China Relations Act of 2000 created a 
Prison Labor Task Force to monitor and promote effective 
enforcement of U.S. law in this area.\87\ Its first annual 
report to Congress stated, ``We believe that prison officials 
frequently provide prison labor to private, quasi-government, 
or government-owned manufacturing facilities to perform 
manufacturing and assembly work, and that the remuneration 
prisons receive for prisoners' services give prison officials 
no incentive to cooperate in preventing the export to the 
United States of goods made with prison labor.'' \88\ Overall, 
Chinese cooperation in implementing these understandings has 
been minimal.

    (Illustrative legal provisions include: PRC Constitution, 
Articles 17, 35, 42, 43, 44; PRC Law on Work Safety--2002; PRC 
Law on the Prevention and Cure of Occupational Diseases--2001; 
PRC Law on Trade Unions--1992, amended 2001; PRC Labor Law--
1994; Regulations on Labor Protection in Workplaces Where Toxic 
Articles Are Used--2002; Regulations on Enterprise Minimum 
Wage--1994; PRC Regulations Governing the Settlement of Labor 
Disputes in Enterprises--1993; Constitution of the Trade Unions 
of the People's Republic of China--1998)

         RECOMMENDATIONS ON LABOR RIGHTS AND WORKING CONDITIONS

The Commission recommends that the Congress and the 
Administration provide assistance to legal clinics to expand 
the availability of legal representation in cases involving 
worker rights, and that special assistance be provided to legal 
aid centers in communities with large numbers of migrant 
workers, and migrant women in particular, to build expertise 
and capacity in resolving the issues of concern to this 
vulnerable group.

        The demand for labor lawyers' services has increased 
        dramatically. Migrant workers, including young rural women who 
        travel to work in urban factories, are especially subject to 
        abuse. They need help not only in learning about their rights 
        but also in asserting them.

The Commission recommends that the Administration facilitate 
meetings of U.S., Chinese, and third-country companies doing 
business in a specific locality and industry in China to 
identify systemic worker rights abuses, develop recommendations 
for appropriate Chinese government entities, and discuss these 
recommendations with Chinese officials, with the goal of 
developing a long-term collaborative relationship between 
government and business to assist in improving China's 
implementation of internationally recognized labor standards.

        U.S. and other foreign companies with significant sourcing in 
        China focus their workplace compliance efforts on specific 
        suppliers. This program will seek to broaden foreign companies' 
        focus to address the systemic issues that affect them and 
        require Chinese government policy responses.

The Commission recommends that the Secretary of Labor travel to 
China and engage relevant Chinese officials on labor issues.

        Such a visit would raise the profile of labor issues in our 
        bilateral dialogue, confirm to the Chinese that compliance with 
        core internationally recognized labor standards and safe and 
        equitable working conditions are important to the United 
        States, emphasize the importance to the United States of the 
        principles of freedom of association and collective bargaining, 
        and encourage advances made during the 2001 visit to China of 
        the ILO Director General.

The Commission recommends that the Congress appropriate funds 
for suitable U.S. institutions to conduct programs for Chinese 
lawyers and law students on labor law, employment law, and 
international labor standards, and promote exchanges between 
Chinese and U.S. labor lawyers and academics.

        The number of qualified lawyers in China has expanded in recent 
        years, but demand still exceeds supply, particularly with 
        respect to worker rights. The ability of workers to assert 
        their legal rights depends upon access to qualified legal 
        representation.

The Commission recommends that the Congress fund programs to 
promote improved working conditions and safety at the 
enterprise level, including the use of worker health and safety 
councils, whose members would be chosen by the workers.

        China's workplace safety record has degraded to the point that 
        Chinese authorities have reached out to the international 
        community for help. The United States should fund programs on 
        workplace safety that over time could be replicated in other 
        Chinese enterprises, starting in a small number of enterprises 
        in carefully selected locations. The initial focus should be on 
        the mining industry, in which accident rates are exceedingly 
        high, and the toy and footwear industries, in which toxic 
        chemicals are used to produce large volumes of products 
        destined for the U.S. market.

The Commission recommends that the Administration, in 
conjunction with the governments of other countries that import 
Chinese goods, organize a series of conferences in key 
exporting regions in China to emphasize to Chinese 
manufacturers and exporters the importance of legal and fair 
working conditions to consumers in overseas markets.

        Conferences about global market expectations and the benefits 
        of acceptable working conditions to Chinese factory managers 
        have been well received in China, although they have been aimed 
        mainly at contract suppliers. Chinese companies are beginning 
        to manufacture and export under their own brand names. Seminars 
        describing how to develop, implement, and maintain social 
        compliance programs that conform to international norms would 
        give these Chinese factory managers and owners a basis upon 
        which to implement reforms in their day-to-day operations.

The Commission recommends that the Congress commission a 
detailed study to analyze the social unrest caused by the 
decline of China's state-owned enterprises and to recommend how 
U.S. technical and other support could help alleviate these 
problems.

        Large-scale labor unrest, especially in northern China where 
        many state-owned enterprises are located, has increased as they 
        reduce in size or shut down, often leaving workers without 
        pensions, health care, or other services. There may be ways for 
        U.S. assistance to help these workers, and a thorough study 
        would illuminate the options.

                            Criminal Justice

    The Chinese government revised the Criminal Procedure Law 
in 1996 and the Criminal Law in 1997.\89\ The revisions 
promised increased protection for criminal suspects and 
defendants and a fairer trial process.\90\ The amendments to 
the Criminal Procedure Law included an expansion of the right 
to counsel, a more meaningful role for defense attorneys during 
the pre-trial and trial stages, and other measures to address 
the problem of ``decision first, trial later'' (xian ding hou 
shen).\91\ The amended Criminal Law abolished the provision on 
``analogy'' contained in the 1979 Criminal Law. Under this 
provision, a person could be punished for an act that was not 
explicitly prohibited by law at the time the act was committed 
by providing for punishment according to the closest analogous 
provision of the Criminal Law.\92\ The revised Criminal Law 
also replaced ``counterrevolutionary'' crimes with ``crimes of 
endangering national security'' as part of an effort to 
depoliticize criminal law, at least on paper.\93\
    But as this report notes repeatedly, a wide discrepancy 
often exists in China between the law on paper and the law in 
practice. Criminal suspects and defendants frequently do not 
enjoy in practice the enhanced protections found in the revised 
laws. Although the revisions to the Criminal Procedure Law and 
the Criminal Law reflect progress toward internationally 
recognized criminal justice standards as set forth in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other international 
human rights documents, the Chinese criminal justice system 
still falls far short of international standards.

Absence of an Independent Judiciary

    Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights mandate 
that every individual is entitled to a fair and public hearing 
by an independent and impartial tribunal.\94\ However, the lack 
of an independent judiciary is a fundamental problem that China 
must address before it can meet international human rights 
standards. The Communist Party exerts significant control over 
the court system. Party political-legal committees often select 
judges--decisions that are then simply rubber-stamped by the 
relevant provincial or local people's congresses, which have 
the formal power to appoint judges.\95\ Most senior judges and 
members of the courts' adjudication committees are Party 
members.\96\ The adjudication committees supervise the work of 
the court and have the ultimate power to decide any case before 
the court.\97\ Moreover, judges often confer with the relevant 
political-legal committee in politically sensitive or difficult 
cases.\98\ As long as the Party controls the courts, a fair and 
impartial judicial process and protection of the fundamental 
rights of criminal defendants will remain elusive, particularly 
in cases of political dissidents or others deemed to be threats 
to ``national security.''

Right to Counsel and Right to Present a Defense

    Under the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law, a defendant had no 
right to legal counsel prior to seven days before the start of 
the trial. Under the revised Criminal Procedure Law, defendants 
may retain counsel much earlier in the criminal process--after 
the first interrogation or from the day he or she is first 
subjected to ``coercive measures'' (e.g.,  pre-arrest detention 
(juliu) and arrest (daibu)).\99\ Although a significant 
improvement over the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law, the revised 
law fails to conform to international standards. For example, 
it still leaves a suspect without counsel during a ``first 
interrogation.'' Given the widespread problem of torture, 
coupled with the fact that the law requires suspects to answer 
investigators' questions ``truthfully,'' the absence of counsel 
at the first interrogation is a serious deficiency in China's 
criminal process.\100\
    Although defense lawyers are entitled under the Criminal 
Procedure Law to meet with their clients during the 
investigation of an alleged crime, in practice lawyers are 
frequently denied access to their clients.\101\ In cases 
involving ``state secrets,'' a term that public security 
authorities construe expansively, a lawyer must first obtain 
approval from the relevant investigating authority before 
meeting with his or her client.\102\ The authorities frequently 
invoke ``state secrets'' to deny suspects access to a lawyer 
during the investigation phase.\103\ When actually allowed to 
meet with their clients, defense lawyers generally get only one 
brief meeting, which is usually monitored and sometimes 
recorded by investigators.\104\ Article 96 of the Criminal 
Procedure Law permits such monitoring, ``depending on the 
circumstances and necessities of the case.''
    The revised law provides defense counsel greater access to 
evidence in the possession of the authorities, at least in 
theory. In practice, the Supreme People's Procuratorate 
(China's chief prosecutorial authority) has interpreted the 
relevant provisions of the new law to require access only to 
formal documents in the file, such as copies of the detention 
and arrest notices.\105\ There is no requirement that 
prosecutors provide defense counsel access to physical 
evidence, documentary evidence, crime-scene records, or 
statements by witnesses or the victim that are in their 
possession. Moreover, the revised law severely restricts the 
ability of defense lawyers to collect their own evidence.\106\ 
Another long-standing problem unresolved by the revised 
Criminal Procedure Law is the absence of witnesses at criminal 
trials.\107\ Although the law requires the testimony of 
witnesses to be cross-examined at trial, witnesses in criminal 
cases frequently do not appear in court.\108\ Thus, in most 
trials defense lawyers are faced with the difficult task of 
trying to contradict written testimony.
    Professor Jerome Cohen of New York University Law School 
told a Commission roundtable that there are disturbing 
disincentives for lawyers to engage in the practice of criminal 
defense law. Criminal defense lawyers have encountered 
intimidation and harassment from the police and prosecutors as 
they attempt to assist their clients under the revised Criminal 
Procedure Law.\109\ Some defense lawyers have even faced 
criminal prosecution for zealous representation of their 
clients. For example, Zhang Jianzhong, a well-known lawyer who 
has represented some high-profile defendants in major 
corruption cases, has been detained since May 2002 under 
circumstances that remain murky. While Mr. Zhang has 
purportedly been charged with providing a false statement in a 
commercial case, members of the local criminal defense bar and 
other observers believe that the authorities are punishing Mr. 
Zhang for his vigorous criminal defense work.\110\ Criminal 
defense lawyers have also been targeted for prosecution under 
Article 306 of the Criminal Law, which prohibits a lawyer from 
forcing or inducing a witness to change his or her testimony or 
falsify evidence. Any lawyer who counsels a client to repudiate 
a forced confession, for example, risks prosecution under this 
provision.\111\

Torture

    The use of torture to obtain confessions during the 
investigation stage of the criminal process is still widespread 
in China. Article 43 of the revised Criminal Procedure Law 
prohibits the use of torture to coerce confessions, but in 
contravention of the UN Convention Against Torture, the 
Criminal Procedure Law does not prohibit the use of confessions 
obtained by torture from being admitted as evidence in 
court.\112\ To curb the high incidence of torture during the 
investigation stage, many scholars and Chinese reformers 
advocate the adoption of a rule making illegally obtained 
evidence inadmissible at trial, as well as rules guaranteeing 
the right to remain silent and the right against self-
incrimination. Professor Murray Scot Tanner of Western Michigan 
University told a Commission roundtable he believed that 
although significant progress on the torture problem may be 
possible within China's current authoritarian political system, 
more fundamental improvements must ``await a liberalization and 
democratization of that system.'' \113\ Professor Tanner 
explained that over the past several years, a growing number of 
officials and scholars within China's law enforcement system 
(including public security authorities and prosecutors) have 
begun to criticize China's serious torture problem and to call 
for reform. For example, Professor Cui Min of the Chinese 
People's Public Security University has written that as long as 
confessions coerced by torture are admissible for convictions, 
the Criminal Procedure Law's prohibition against using torture 
to coerce confessions exists in name only.\114\

 Administrative Sanctions

    One of the most highly touted reforms under the revised 
Criminal Procedure Law was the abolition of the form of 
arbitrary detention known as ``custody and investigation'' 
(shourong shencha), under which the police could detain 
suspects virtually indefinitely, without trial or judicial 
review.\115\ Chinese public security authorities, however, 
still use other forms of administrative sanctions. Under ``re-
education through labor'' (laojiao), for example, an individual 
can be ``sentenced'' by public security authorities to three 
years in a labor camp, with a possible one-year extension, for 
allegedly committing a variety of relatively minor offenses, 
such as drug use, prostitution, or offenses deemed to ``disturb 
public order.'' \116\ Suspects assigned to re-education through 
labor are not entitled to a trial, and therefore do not enjoy 
even the minimal procedural safeguards provided by the Criminal 
Procedure Law.\117\
    The public security authorities frequently use re-education 
through labor in political cases as a convenient tool for 
circumventing the formal criminal process. For example, 
authorities gave Li Guotao, one of the organizers of the China 
Democracy Party, a three-year re-education through labor term 
for ``disturbing social order'' after he protested the 
government's crackdown on other dissidents.\118\ Scholars and 
activists have documented the use of re-education through labor 
to detain pro-democracy protesters after the Tiananmen 
crackdown in 1989.\119\ As of early 2001, approximately 260,000 
people were being held in nearly 300 re-education through labor 
camps.\120\ Although detainees may challenge a re-education 
through labor term under the 1989 Administrative Litigation 
Law, Veron Mei-ying Hung of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace told a Commission roundtable that such 
efforts are fraught with obstacles.\121\ Some legal scholars 
and others in China have called for the abolition of re-
education through labor. Others advocate at least bringing it 
within the criminal justice system.\122\
    ``Custody and repatriation'' (shourong qiansong), another 
widespread form of administrative detention designed to 
``protect urban social order,'' targets the urban homeless, 
undocumented migrant workers, and beggars. Detainees are placed 
in custody, without trial, until they can pay for their release 
or are sent home.\123\ Experts estimate that this form of 
administrative detention affects nearly two million people 
every year.\124\ In theory, Chinese authorities consider 
custody and repatriation to be a form of welfare, but in 
practice public security authorities detain members of these 
marginalized groups and warehouse them in facilities, the 
conditions of which are essentially no different from detention 
centers or labor camps.\125\ Because both re-education through 
labor and custody and repatriation are criminal penalties 
masquerading as administrative sanctions, imposed without 
judicial procedures, they conflict with basic international 
criminal justice standards.

Strike Hard Anti-Crime Campaigns

    In response to an increase in crime and corruption over the 
past twenty years, the Chinese government has periodically 
instituted crackdowns against crime, referred to as Strike Hard 
anti-crime campaigns. Launched for the first time in 1983, 
Strike Hard campaigns are now, according to the Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights, a ``permanent feature of Chinese 
life.'' \126\ Abuses of the criminal justice process, increased 
use of the death penalty, and summary executions intensify 
during these campaigns.\127\ During the period from April to 
July 2001 of the most recent Strike Hard campaign, law 
enforcement authorities sentenced at least 2,960 people to 
death and executed 1,781 for crimes ranging from tax evasion to 
murder.\128\ The use of torture in order to quickly ``solve'' 
cases increases during Strike Hard campaigns, as does the use 
of re-education through labor.\129\
    The discussion above illustrates just a few of the problems 
with China's criminal justice system. Many other aspects of the 
system, such as pre-trial detention and appellate review of 
trial court decisions, fail to conform to international human 
rights standards. For example, detainees are denied the 
internationally recognized right to contest the lawfulness of 
their detention.\130\ Moreover, criminal suspects enjoy neither 
the presumption of innocence nor the right to remain 
silent.\131\ In addition, the right to a public trial is 
frequently not honored in China, particularly in cases 
involving political dissidents.\132\ The Commission will be 
examining these and other issues relating to the criminal 
justice system in the coming year.

    (Illustrative legal provisions include: PRC Constitution, 
Articles 33, 35, 37, 53, 123, 125, 126, 128, 129, 131, 133, 
135; PRC Criminal Law--1979, amended 1997; PRC Criminal 
Procedure Law--1979, amended 1996; PRC State Security Law--
1993; Ministry of Public Security Rules on the Process of 
Handling Criminal Cases by Public Security Departments--1998; 
Supreme People's Court Interpretation on Several Issues 
Regarding Implementation of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law--
1998; Supreme People's Procuratorate Rules on the Criminal 
Process for People's Procuratorates--1998; PRC Lawyers Law--
1996; PRC Administrative Punishment Law--1996; PRC 
Administrative Litigation Law--1989; PRC Law on Protecting 
State Secrets--1988; PRC Organic Law of the People's Courts--
1979, amended 1983; Security Administration Punishment 
Regulations--1957, amended 1986, 1994; Detailed Rules on 
Implementing the Law in the Administration of Re-education 
Through Labor--1992; Decision of the State Council Regarding 
the Question of Re-education Through Labor--1957; Supplementary 
Decision of the State Council on Re-education Through Labor--
1979; Notice of the State Council on Re-Issuing the Ministry of 
Public Security's Trial Methods for Implementation of Re-
education Through Labor--1982.)

                  RECOMMENDATIONS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE

The Commission recommends that the Congress appropriate funds 
for suitable U.S. institutions to conduct programs for Chinese 
criminal defense lawyers on the role of the criminal defense 
bar outside of China and promote exchanges between Chinese and 
U.S. criminal defense lawyers.

        Like judicial exchanges, such exchanges will enhance the 
        professional expertise, solidarity, and prestige of the 
        criminal defense bar. Programming should specifically include 
        case studies in legal ethics, which draw attention to the kinds 
        of challenges faced by lawyers in both countries. Programs 
        should include provisions for electronic follow-up (e.g., a 
        listserv) to build on the dialogue and contacts created in the 
        exchanges, with the goal of establishing long-term interaction 
        and support.

The Commission recommends that the Administration continue to 
work multilaterally to encourage China to cooperate fully with 
the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture.

        Although the Chinese government invited Theo van Boven, the 
        Special Rapporteur on Torture, to visit in 2003, it has not yet 
        indicated that it will cooperate fully with his investigation. 
        Indeed, during her recent visit to China, Mary Robinson, the UN 
        High Commissioner on Human Rights, stated that the visit was 
        not yet assured.

The Commission recommends that the Congress appropriate funds 
for a suitable U.S. institution to implement a program that 
would bring Chinese police and non-police experts on criminal 
procedure to the United States to learn firsthand the roles 
various institutions and societal actors (e.g., civilian review 
boards, courts, NGOs and the press) play in fighting torture 
and police abuse in the United States.

        A growing number of officials and scholars in China, including 
        those within China's law enforcement system, are openly 
        criticizing China's widespread torture problem and debating 
        proposals for reforms designed to combat torture. This program 
        would contribute to such reform efforts and would focus solely 
        on measures to curb torture; it would not include, for example, 
        training on police techniques for suppressing protests or 
        apprehending suspects.

The Commission recommends that the Congress appropriate funds 
for a suitable U.S. institution to implement a program that 
would include a series of conferences to which U.S., Chinese 
and legal experts from other countries would be invited to 
discuss questions of law relating to internationally recognized 
criminal justice standards such as the presumption of 
innocence, the right to remain silent, the right to contest 
detention, etc.

        As with the torture issue, legal officials and scholars in 
        China are openly debating these issues. This program could aid 
        such reform efforts.

The Commission recommends that the Administration and the 
Congress press the Chinese government to allow U.S. Embassy and 
Consulate officers to attend trials of political dissidents and 
individuals charged with ``endangering national security,'' or 
``revealing state secrets,'' particularly the trials of 
individuals who have committed non-violent acts.

        Although the U.S. Embassy and Consulates General in China 
        periodically request permission to observe the trials of 
        defendants charged with political offenses, Chinese authorities 
        almost never grant such permission.

The Commission recommends that the Administration encourage the 
Chinese government to review convictions and sentences of those 
imprisoned for ``counterrevolutionary'' crimes in light of 
revisions to the Criminal Law that eliminated this category of 
crime.

        On February 13, 2002, the Commission sent a letter to President 
        Bush recommending that he urge President Jiang Zemin to take 
        this action, which would address a continuing injustice and 
        likely permit the release of a significant number of prisoners.

                        Free Flow of Information

    Chinese authorities continue to censor the media despite 
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the 
press.\133\ China has signed, though not ratified, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which 
guarantees freedom of expression.
    China's newspapers and magazines have become more 
freewheeling in recent years as they struggle to turn a profit 
in an increasingly competitive market. But the central 
government still has the last word, and Beijing is aggressive 
in ensuring that media outlets know where it draws the line. 
Current sensitive subjects include labor strikes, rural unrest, 
Taiwan independence, the Falun Gong spiritual movement, the 
1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, criticism of the Communist 
Party, opposition to Chinese rule in Tibet and Xinjiang, and 
disclosures of corruption or nepotism within the government and 
military leadership.\134\ Chinese President Jiang Zemin has 
said that the news media in China ``are the loudspeakers of the 
Party and the people'' and have a duty ``to educate and 
propagate the spirit of the Central Party's committee.'' \135\ 
James Mann of the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies told a Commission roundtable, ``The Chinese Communist 
Party maintains its monopoly on power, and that includes the 
power over the principal newspapers and television stations.'' 
\136\
    A recent case in point is Southern Weekend (Nanfang 
Zhoumo), a newspaper published in Guangdong Province. Southern 
Weekend has long pushed the boundaries of media control in 
China by reporting frankly on sensitive social problems, 
including AIDS, crime, and trafficking in women. In the spring 
of 2002, the newspaper published a story about a criminal gang 
that killed 28 people in a spree of murder and theft. The 
article indicated that problems such as poverty and inequality 
in Chinese society led gang members to a life of crime.\137\
    As a result, Southern Weekend was accused of painting a 
negative picture of China's socialist struggle, and its deputy 
editor-in-chief, front-page editor, and a senior editor were 
demoted. The news section chief and the reporter who wrote the 
story also were fired and banned from ever working in 
journalism again.\138\ Now, the newspaper is significantly 
tamer. He Qinglian, former editor of China's Shenzhen Legal 
Daily, told a Commission roundtable, ``In a free country, the 
media is expected to criticize the government. In China, it's 
exactly the opposite; it is the government that criticizes the 
media.'' \139\
    Foreign media organizations operating in China are not 
immune from Beijing's control. In July 2002, Chinese 
authorities blocked BBC World news broadcasts into China after 
the British network aired a report about the banned Falun Gong 
spiritual movement.\140\ A month earlier, authorities detained 
and later expelled Canadian journalist Jiang Xueqin after he 
filmed labor unrest in northeastern China for the U.S. Public 
Broadcasting Service. Until recently, some major foreign news 
organizations, such as the New York Times and CNN, have had 
their websites blocked. The Chinese government continues to jam 
broadcasts of the Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia 
(RFA).\141\
    Calling China ``the world's leading jailer of 
journalists,'' \142\ the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) 
reported at the end of 2001 that at least 35 journalists were 
imprisoned in China.\143\ Kavita Menon of the CPJ told a 
Commission roundtable, ``China is too large and unwieldy for 
perfect control to be possible, but the Communist Party remains 
unwilling to cede the battle. Hardliners believe that to 
relinquish control over information would be to relinquish 
control of power altogether.'' \144\
    Many Chinese are finding ways around the government's 
information control. For example, a growth in purchasing power 
has allowed large numbers of Chinese citizens to purchase 
satellite-receiving equipment, even though regulations 
generally prohibit private use of such equipment. They often 
use the equipment to receive foreign television broadcasts and 
more politically open programming from Hong Kong.
    Internet use in China has grown rapidly, with an estimated 
46 million users at the end of June 2002\145\ and analysts 
predicting that China could have the world's largest on-line 
population in two years. Although most Internet users today 
live in larger cities, Internet cafes are becoming ubiquitous 
throughout China.
    The Chinese government continues to encourage expanded use 
of the Internet to improve economic efficiency, increase 
economic growth, and disseminate government information more 
effectively to the public. But Chinese authorities are also 
aware that the Internet creates new challenges to information 
control and are scrambling to meet what they perceive as a 
threat to that control. The Internet (e.g., e-mail, chat rooms, 
websites) has given Chinese citizens greater access to 
information about events inside China and overseas. Some 
organizational activities have developed over the Internet, 
perhaps the most well known being a large Falun Gong 
demonstration outside the government leadership compound at 
Zhongnanhai in 1999.
    The Chinese government policy towards the Internet 
generally parallels its approach to other media. To some 
extent, the Internet is harder to control than the print or 
broadcast media because of its decentralized and personal 
nature. The ``Seven No's'' on media activity issued in August 
2001 by the State Press and Publications Administration--
including prohibitions against disclosing state secrets, 
interfering in Communist Party affairs, and criticism of 
government policies--apply equally to the Internet.\146\ Over 
the past 18 months, the Chinese government has issued an 
extensive and still growing series of regulations restricting 
Internet content and placing monitoring requirements on the 
industry. For example, on August 1, 2002, the Ministry of 
Information Technology and the State Administration of Press 
and Publishing issued ``Interim Provisions on the 
Administration of Internet Publishing'' that clarify topics 
prohibited on Internet sites, including the oft-cited 
prohibitions against anything that will ``harm national unity, 
sovereignty, or territorial integrity'' or ``reveal state 
secrets'' and ``endanger national security.'' \147\
    James Mulvenon of the RAND Corporation pointed out at a 
Commission roundtable that the Chinese government has used two 
methods to control the impact of the Internet.\148\ High-tech 
software and hardware can block, monitor, filter, and hack 
websites and e-mail. This capability includes blocking offshore 
dissident sites, foreign news sites, general-purpose search 
engines such as Google and AltaVista, and VOA's weekly e-mail 
to China. Internet users in China attempting to access foreign 
websites have also found themselves redirected to Chinese 
government-approved websites.
    Meanwhile, low-tech methods include a combination of 
traditional control activities such as surveillance, 
informants, regulations, searches, and arrests to produce ``a 
regulatory and political climate of self-censorship and self-
deterrence'' on the part of Internet users and providers. A 
case in point is the arrest of Internet activists such as Huang 
Qi, who was arrested in June 2000 after establishing one of 
China's first human rights websites.
    A recent low-tech development is a ``Public Pledge on Self-
discipline for China's Internet Industry,'' a voluntary pledge 
sponsored by the Internet Society of China, an industry 
organization linked to the Ministry of Information 
Industry.\149\ Under this pledge, Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) and Internet Content Providers (ICPs) agree not to post 
or produce information ``that may jeopardize state security and 
disrupt social stability.'' \150\ Several foreign human rights 
NGOs have expressed concern that Yahoo's China subsidiary has 
signed this pledge. Another recent development is an August 
2002 action by the Chinese government to halt new approvals for 
Internet cafes and to stop screening applications for re-
registration as the government tries to exert firmer controls 
over this outlet for the Internet.\151\
    Under this dual high-tech/low-tech strategy, the Chinese 
government, with minimal resources, has succeeded in limiting 
use of the Internet for dissemination of what it considers to 
be undesirable political and social content, including 
pornography, Falun Gong information, human rights, and 
political commentary. At the same time, the government has been 
able to shift much of the responsibility for Internet control 
from the Ministry of Public Security to ISPs and ICPs.

    (Illustrative legal provisions include: PRC Constitution, 
Articles 35, 41; PRC Law on Protecting State Secrets--1998; PRC 
Criminal Law--1979, amended 1997, Article 111; Specific 
Measures for Taking Action on Cases Involving Internet Cafes 
and other Internet Access Service Business Establishments--
2002; Interim Provisions on the Administration of Internet 
Publishing--2002; Measures on the Administration of Internet 
Information Services--2001; Regulations on the Administration 
of Publishing--2001; Telecommunications Regulations--2000 
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress on the Protection of Internet Security--2000; Interim 
Provisions on the Administration of Internet Sites Engaging in 
News Publication Services--2000; Provisions Governing the 
Administration of Internet Electronic Bulletin Board Services--
2000; Supplementary Decision of the NPC Standing Committee 
Concerning Punishing Crimes of Leaking Important State 
Secrets--1988; Regulations on the Scope and Classification 
Level of State Secrets Concerning the Work of the Public 
Security Organs--1986)

              RECOMMENDATIONS ON FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION

The Commission recommends that the Congress and the 
Administration expand U.S. government efforts to disseminate 
human rights, worker rights, and rule of law-related 
information in China through radio, television, and the 
Internet.

        On topics such as worker rights and religious freedom, foreign 
        radio transmissions and the Internet provide a crucial external 
        link for both reformers and citizens attempting to learn about 
        basic rights and efforts within China to promote such rights. 
        In addition, China's WTO membership requires that it improve 
        dissemination and accessibility of laws and regulations. 
        Overall, the public's lack of awareness of legal rights impedes 
        legal reform, particularly in rural areas, including Tibet. The 
        Commission's website (www.cecc.gov) serves as an important 
        medium for disseminating human rights and rule of law related 
        information in China. (See Appendix 1--Website Summary.) VOA 
        and RFA management should increase programming to China that 
        emphasizes essential human rights-related topics such as 
        religious freedom, labor rights, freedom of expression, legal 
        rights and the legal system at the grassroots level, and other 
        human rights issues. VOA should create a Uighur language 
        service to provide news and information to Uighurs in Xinjiang.

The Commission recommends that the Administration urge China to 
end restrictions on foreign journalists based in China.

        Restrictions include limits on the number of journalists issued 
        correspondent visas, as well as regulations requiring 
        government approval for foreign journalists to conduct 
        interviews and to travel outside of their host cities to 
        investigate stories.

The Commission recommends that the Administration pursue 
political and technical ways to prevent China from blocking 
U.S. government Internet sites and e-mail and to make it easier 
for Chinese users to access them.

        The development of democracy in China depends upon people 
        having access to unfiltered information. People in China are 
        increasingly turning to the Internet and e-mail for news about 
        China and the world at large, but China's government continues 
        to try to ensure that its monopoly on such information extends 
        to these media. Although Chinese authorities employ 
        increasingly sophisticated means to censor the Internet, as the 
        technology for blocking access improves, so do the methods for 
        circumventing such blocks. The United States should complement 
        its diplomacy on this issue by using state-of-the-art methods 
        to ensure that Chinese users can access U.S. government sites 
        and receive e-mail from U.S. government agencies.

                           Village Elections

    China began experimenting with village elections in the 
early 1980s. Despite opposition from hard-line factions within 
the Communist Party, the National People's Congress passed a 
provisional law on rural self-governance in 1987.\152\ 
Following the Tiananmen Square democracy movement in 1989, the 
idea of expanding democracy in rural areas fell out of favor in 
Beijing. However, grassroots efforts to develop democratic 
activities continued in China throughout the 1990s, and in 1998 
the Organic Law on the Village Committees, revised to include 
widely recognized election procedures, was finally enacted.
    As a result, all of China's approximately 730,000 
administrative villages are required by law to conduct direct, 
competitive elections every three years. These elections 
involve hundreds of millions of rural voters.\153\ China's 
leaders hope competitive village elections will reduce 
corruption by making local officials more accountable to the 
people they serve and can help prevent social unrest in the 
Chinese countryside. In addition, Beijing often encourages 
officials elected by the villagers to join the Communist Party 
in an attempt to infuse the Party with a new credibility.
    U.S. and other international observers have monitored 
village elections in China for nearly a decade and generally 
believe that the balloting they have witnessed has been free 
and fair.\154\ However, outside observers have been able to 
monitor only a small fraction of the villages where elections 
occur, and Chinese government officials generally supervise the 
observation visits. As a result, it is difficult to determine 
whether the vast majority of village elections in China adhere 
to democratic principles. In addition, there has been little 
analytical work by international observers on the impact of the 
elections on actual governance at the village level. Professor 
Anne Thurston of The Johns Hopkins University's School of 
Advanced International Studies told a Commission roundtable, 
``One of the great frustrations of anyone trying to make sense 
of these village elections is that we simply do not know how 
widespread they are--how well and how universally they have 
actually been implemented.'' \155\
    Critics of the process say that the Communist Party often 
manipulates the outcome, and that reform at the village level 
has little impact on the spread of democracy at higher 
government levels. While there is talk that elections may be 
extended to the township level,\156\ Beijing still has no plans 
to let people vote for city mayors, provincial governors, the 
national president, or Party leaders. Chinese President Jiang 
Zemin has said that China's people are too uneducated to be 
given that responsibility any time soon.\157\
    Nevertheless, supporters say the elections are important 
because they familiarize China's villagers with some of the 
tools of democracy, including ballot boxes, voter registration, 
and candidate nomination. Liu Yawei of The Carter Center's 
China Village Elections Project told the roundtable that the 
election process ``has cultivated a new value system, a much-
needed sense of political ownership and rights awareness among 
the Chinese peasants who do not have any leverage in bargaining 
with the heavy-handed government.'' \158\
    In 1998, the remote rural township of Buyun, in Sichuan 
Province, conducted China's first direct election for a 
township leader. Local authorities allowed the unprecedented 
election in an effort to appease simmering peasant anger over 
rampant corruption and an onerous tax burden. The balloting, 
apparently carried out without formal approval from Beijing, 
was later declared unconstitutional. But last year Buyun tried 
again, this time finessing the constitutional issue by allowing 
voters to nominate one candidate to challenge the incumbent. 
(The incumbent won by a narrow margin.) Liu Yawei told the 
roundtable, ``There probably will be more cases in China in the 
near future to model their elections after Buyun. We are still 
holding our breath to see if this is going to spread.'' \159\
    In 1999, China began expanding the village election concept 
to some urban areas. Over the last few years, a dozen or so 
pilot cities have held elections for positions on urban 
neighborhood committees, the lowest level of organized 
government in Chinese cities.\160\ Regulations for the urban 
community elections have not yet been standardized, and local 
officials have a great deal of autonomy in carrying them out.

    (Illustrative legal provisions include: PRC Constitution, 
Articles 34, 111; Organic Law on the Village Committees--1998; 
Organic Law on the Village Committees (Provisional)--1987)

                  RECOMMENDATIONS ON VILLAGE ELECTIONS

The Commission recommends that members of Congress and the 
Administration who visit China request to observe village 
elections.

        Village elections in China remain in the developmental stages 
        and are fraught with problems. Nevertheless, they expose tens 
        of millions of Chinese peasants to an essential element of 
        democracy. To date, Chinese authorities have encouraged 
        foreigners to observe these elections, and the Administration 
        and the Congress should show support for these early and 
        tentative steps toward democracy by asking to visit election 
        sites.

The Commission recommends that the Congress require an analysis 
of the impact of village elections on village governance when 
making recommendations for future government funding to 
organizations promoting and monitoring village elections in 
China.

        Congress needs objective assessments of the impact of U.S. NGO 
        activity in China, especially when those activities receive 
        U.S. government funding. (See similar recommendation under 
        section on Rule of Law Programs.)

The Commission recommends that the Administration encourage the 
expansion of democratic reforms to higher levels of government 
in China. The Commission also recommends that the Congress 
support expanding technical assistance to elections at higher 
government levels in China.

        Chinese authorities have shown little inclination to introduce 
        democratic principles, such as direct representative elections, 
        at higher levels of government. Representative, democratically 
        elected government has proven to be the best safeguard against 
        corruption and abuse of power. The United States should do all 
        it can to encourage the spread of democracy in China.

                                 Tibet

    Defining geographical Tibet can be confusing, if not 
contentious. Although Tibetans make up barely a half percent of 
China's population, areas designated by the Chinese government 
as Tibetan account for 23 percent of China's total land 
mass.\161\ They include the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR, 
sometimes called ``Tibet''), which has the same rank as a 
province. In addition, there are ten Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefectures and two Tibetan Autonomous Counties located in 
Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan Provinces.
    China's claim to sovereignty over Tibetan areas derives 
from the Mongol ascendancy over much of Central and East Asia 
in the thirteenth century. After crushing Chinese imperial 
troops, the Mongol Khans established the Yuan Dynasty and ruled 
their empire from a newly built capital in Beijing. Tibetans 
avoided conflict with the Mongols, exchanging spiritual 
instruction by Tibetan lamas for protection by Mongols in a 
relationship that was later known as ``priest and patron.'' 
Today, China argues that Mongols were not conquerors, but 
unifiers, and that Beijing should exercise sovereignty over 
lands where Tibetans once deferred to Mongols. The Tibetan 
government-in-exile, based in Dharamsala, India, asserts that 
Tibet is an ``occupied country'' \162\ and that the exiled 
government ``is recognized by Tibetans, both in and outside 
Tibet, as their sole and legitimate government.'' \163\ The 
Dalai Lama seeks a resolution that would accept Chinese 
sovereignty over Tibetan lands in exchange for genuinely 
functional Tibetan autonomy.
    Beijing defends its modern administration of Tibetan areas 
with contentions that under the Chinese Constitution and the 
Regional National Autonomy Law, Tibetans are ``the masters of 
their state and society.'' \164\ Chinese leaders say that the 
human rights of Tibetans are fully protected and that economic 
and social development is proceeding rapidly with generous aid 
from the central government.
    The Chinese government asserts that Tibetans are but one of 
the 56 ``nationalities'' comprising the multi-ethnic state of 
China. Tibetan and other non-Han Chinese groups account for 
only eight percent of China's population, with the Han Chinese 
making up the rest.\165\ The Chinese Constitution and the 
Regional National Autonomy Law stipulate that local areas of 
``regional autonomy,'' administered by local ``organs of self-
government,'' should be established in areas where minority 
nationalities live in ``concentrated communities.'' \166\ 
Officials claim that autonomy functions successfully. In 
practice, the law provides local governments no alternative but 
to accept and implement directives from above: ``The organs of 
self-government of national autonomous areas shall place the 
interests of the state as a whole above anything else and make 
positive efforts to fulfill the tasks assigned by state organs 
at higher levels.'' \167\
    The call for independence is the most uncompromising 
expression of Tibetan interest, and even non-violent, pro-
independence activism has been largely crushed by the 
government. The Chinese Constitution provides the basis for 
calling ``separatists'' criminals and requires that citizens 
protect national and ethnic unity.\168\ Repercussions increase 
as the state broadens its perceptions of threat. Many Tibetans 
seek a path to modernity that would sidestep struggle with 
Beijing but allow retention of a functional Tibetan identity. 
They believe that operational, rather than nominal, autonomy 
could achieve this. Samdhong Rinpoche, elected last year by 
Tibetans in exile as their first prime minister,\169\ said 
during his July 2002 visit to the United States, ``Political 
separation from China is not important. What is important is to 
restore Tibetan civilization.'' \170\
    Conflict between Tibetan aspirations and Chinese policy is 
found within cultural, religious, and educational spheres. 
Party and government are hostile to any practice or expression 
that they perceive as nourishing a self-identity that suggests 
that being Tibetan is not the same as being Chinese. As the 
Chinese government seeks to diminish or eliminate aspects of 
Tibetan culture that it regards as threatening, the peaceful 
exercise of internationally recognized human rights is 
systematically suppressed.
    China's prime requirement is unity and stability for the 
nation and among ethnic groups. This is enforced by 
constraining Tibetan political, cultural, educational, and 
religious life. Human rights and rule of law in Tibet are 
configured to accommodate party and state interests. Dr. Dong 
Yunhu, a senior human rights official in the State Council 
Information Office, explained the Chinese position: ``The West 
stressed personal and individual rights; we stress the need for 
harmony between the individual and the collective.'' \171\
    Despite unrelenting effort by the Chinese government to 
discourage or prevent expressions of loyalty and devotion to 
the Dalai Lama, he remains the most respected and influential 
Tibetan anywhere. More than any other figure or institution, he 
is seen to embody not just Buddhism but vital elements of 
Tibetan identity. The Chinese government regards any expression 
of support for him as a form of opposition to official policy. 
Zhu Xiaoming, a senior Party official with oversight on Tibetan 
policy, told visiting Commission staff, ``The Dalai Lama uses 
religion as a pretext for harming the country. He carries 
people away [from the Motherland] under the signboard of 
religion.'' \172\ An ethnic Tibetan Communist Party official in 
Lhasa described the Dalai Lama as ``just a person who is 
engaged in politically subversive activities,'' adding that 
``he has never done anything for the Tibetan people in 40 
years.'' \173\
    Professor Elliot Sperling of Indiana University told a 
Commission roundtable that he believes Chinese leaders are 
awaiting the Dalai Lama's death and intend to choose a 
successor who will be molded to suit the interests of the 
state.\174\ The State Council's management of the enthronement 
of Gyaltsen Norbu as Panchen Lama in 1995 may provide a model. 
He was enthroned a few months after the Dalai Lama recognized 
then five-year-old Gedun Choekyi Nyima as the true 
reincarnation of the Panchen Lama--after the Dalai Lama, the 
most important figure in the dominant sect of Tibetan Buddhism. 
Infuriated, Beijing rejected the Dalai Lama's decision and 
installed Gyaltsen Norbu instead. Chinese officials continue to 
assert that Gedun Choekyi Nyima, held incommunicado along with 
his parents for the last seven years, is living a ``normal'' 
life. His current location is unknown and his status is 
unverified. If waiting for the Dalai Lama's death is the 
strategy of the Chinese government, it could exacerbate tension 
as Tibetans focus on what they may perceive as a destructive 
affront to their heritage and religion. In the belief that both 
sides will benefit, the Congress and the Administration have 
repeatedly urged Chinese leaders to engage in substantive 
dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives.
    Due to sustained repression and harsh punishment, fewer 
Tibetans risk any form of peaceful protest. The number of 
Tibetan political prisoners has declined since 1996 to less 
than 200 according to a recent report by the Tibet Information 
Network (TIN),\175\ a London-based independent news 
organization that monitors human rights inside Tibet. Three-
quarters are Buddhist monks and nuns. Approximately 100 Tibetan 
political prisoners are known to be currently serving sentences 
at TAR Prison No.1 in Lhasa, better known as Drapchi. They 
include high-profile cases such as monks Ngawang Phuljung, 
Jamphel Jangchub, and Ngawang Oezer, and nuns Ngawang Sangdrol 
and Phuntsog Nyidrol, all of whom have served at least ten 
years of sentences which range from 16 to more than 20 years 
for counterrevolutionary activities. According to the Tibet 
Information Network report, 22 of Drapchi's political prisoners 
have died as a result of severe abuse since 1989.
    As political detention decreases and China becomes more 
adept at blocking information flow, fewer new reports of 
mistreatment of political prisoners emerge. Abuses experienced 
by Tibetans attempting to cross the Tibet-Nepal frontier 
without proper documentation are common on both sides of the 
border. Several releases on medical parole of Tibetan political 
prisoners have occurred this year.\176\ Former prisoners 
remaining in Tibet are subject to close police control, and if 
they were released on medical parole they risk return to prison 
until their sentences have expired.
    Article 36 of the Chinese Constitution provides for the 
freedom of ``normal'' religious practice. Party official Zhu 
Xiaoming explained to Commission staff that this must be based 
on seamlessness between religion and patriotism. ``Loving the 
country is identical to loving religion,'' he said. The 
``Patriotic Education'' campaign, carried out from 1996 to 
2000, resulted in the expulsion or displacement of thousands of 
monks and nuns. Although the formally designated campaign is 
reportedly complete, routine forms of patriotic education 
continue at monasteries, nunneries, schools, and workplaces.
    The Chinese government exercises administrative authority 
over each Tibetan monastery and nunnery indirectly through a 
Democratic Management Committee (DMC) made up primarily of 
monks and nuns elected from among themselves. A DMC generally 
includes at least one representative of the local government, 
and local authorities must approve important decisions. Members 
of the DMC of Sera Monastery in Lhasa told Commission staff 
that boosting monastic enrollment depends primarily on whether 
income from monastery-run commercial enterprises is rising. The 
view held widely by officials and many Han Chinese citizens--
that religious institutions and practitioners are unproductive 
and hinder economic development--underlies this requirement.
    Official hostility toward religion also may play a role in 
a series of detentions of locally popular Buddhist figures 
implicated or charged with links to violence. They include 
Sonam Phuntsog and Tenzin Deleg of the Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture (Tibetan: Kardze) in Sichuan Province and Jigme 
Tenzin of Lhasa. Officials have shown a tendency to equate 
separatism and terrorism. Details about charges or legal 
proceedings are unavailable for these cases.
    Although there is conspicuous evidence that material living 
standards of Tibetans are rising, statistics showing sustained 
double-digit increases in local economic production\177\ and 
massive infusions of government funding\178\ are misleading. 
Article 9 of the Constitution appropriates natural resources as 
state property.\179\ Government policy compels farmers and 
herders to sell their meat and grain to the government at low, 
fixed prices. Thus, after the government has taken much of the 
value of both extracted natural resources and agricultural 
production, the local Tibetan economies have little left.
    Some academics and experts, including those who testified 
at a Commission roundtable, observe that Chinese authorities 
favor projects in natural resource extraction and large-scale 
infrastructure construction, and that beneficiaries of current 
development practices are concentrated among the urban, largely 
non-Tibetan population.\180\ For economic development to 
benefit the 80 percent majority of Tibetans who live in rural 
areas,\181\ small-scale models are needed that are 
environmentally and culturally friendly. Arthur Holcombe of the 
Tibet Poverty Alleviation Fund pointed out at the roundtable 
that Chinese statistics show urban per capita income rising 
much faster than rural incomes.\182\ Bhuchung Tsering of the 
International Campaign for Tibet told the roundtable that 
economic development must not further dilute Tibetan 
identity.\183\
    The Great Western Development campaign (Xibu Da Kaifa) has 
the most profound implications for western China of any 
official policy formulation to emerge in the post-Deng era. Ten 
provincial entities making up more than half of China's total 
area will be integrated into the national mainstream at a 
sharply accelerated pace through economic and social 
transformation. Of particular concern to indigenous populations 
is Western Development's effort to boost the influx of Han 
Chinese into the region under the rubric of promoting ``two-way 
population flow.'' Li Dezhu, Minister of the State Council 
Commission on Ethnic Affairs stated, ``There will be some 
changes in the proportions of the nationalities. There will 
also be some conflicts and clashes in their contacts. If this 
is not handled well, it will have a deleterious effect on 
national unity and social stability.'' \184\
    The project raising the greatest alarm is construction of a 
rail link between Golmud (in Qinghai Province) and Lhasa 
scheduled for completion in 2007. Arthur Holcombe told the 
roundtable, ``The new railway to Tibet will only intensify 
existing migratory trends, exacerbate ethnic income disparities 
and further marginalize Tibetans in traditional economic 
pursuits.'' \185\
    China has made progress at establishing public education 
infrastructure across a vast, lightly populated area. Credible 
reports, however, explain that poverty, as well as fees 
introduced during the 1990s, create significant barriers to 
school attendance.\186\ A senior Tibetan academic at the 
Chinese Center for Tibetan Studies in Beijing disputed this, 
telling Commission staff that Tibetan schools are ``free for 
all the people.'' Parents and students, however, contend that 
public schools in Tibetan areas impart low levels of literacy 
in both the Tibetan and Chinese languages, leaving students 
disadvantaged within their own culture and in China's economic 
mainstream. Educational models are needed that will prepare 
Tibetans for entry into a job market largely created and 
dominated by Han Chinese, yet facilitate retention of their 
self-identity, especially through competence in the Tibetan 
language. Witnesses before the Commission expressed their 
belief that international and U.S. government assistance is 
vital as Tibetans seek to acquire the educational tools to cope 
with a competitive, bicultural environment.

    (Illustrative legal provisions include: PRC Constitution, 
Articles 36, 51, 52, 53, 54, 112-122, and 134; PRC Law on 
Regional National Autonomy--1984, amended 2001, Article 7; PRC 
Criminal Law--1979, amended 1997, Articles 13 and 102-113. For 
an illustrative list of national laws and regulations affecting 
religious organizations, see the Religious Freedom section.)

                        RECOMMENDATIONS ON TIBET

The Commission recommends that the Congress appropriate 
increased funding for NGOs to develop programs that improve the 
health, education and economic conditions of ethnic Tibetans.

        Programs should continue to promote modernization and 
        prosperity while respecting Tibetan culture and language; 
        create direct benefits for Tibetans, especially in rural areas 
        where most Tibetans live; be environmentally sound and 
        sustainable; and do nothing to encourage or facilitate an 
        influx of non-indigenous persons. Economic development programs 
        should continue to include small-scale projects and 
        enterprises, including micro-financing opportunities for 
        Tibetans. Educational programs should continue to include 
        primary, secondary, and tertiary levels; and international 
        education exchange programs should continue to be for Tibetans 
        from Tibetan areas who will return to Tibetan areas. 
        Application for this funding should be open and competitive.

The Commission recommends that the Congress and the 
Administration continue to urge Chinese leaders to engage in 
substantive dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his 
representatives.

        There is mutual benefit to be achieved for Tibetans and 
        Chinese. An agreement could foster greater prosperity and 
        stability in Tibetan areas of China as well as a more secure, 
        robust future for Tibetan culture. The Dalai Lama recently 
        said, ``Genuine autonomy should cover all the Tibetan 
        territory, all the Tibetan ethnic group's areas.'' ``I'm not 
        seeking separation,'' he said. ``Our top most concern is 
        preservation of Tibetan culture, Tibetan spirituality, and 
        Tibetan involvement.''

The Commission recommends that members of Congress and 
Administration officials continue to urge that China end 
restrictions on Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the boy identified by the 
Dalai Lama as the 11th Panchen Lama, and his family members, 
and request that representatives of international observer 
organizations visit the boy and his family.

        The family should make its own decisions on matters of 
        residence and education, maintain normal correspondence with 
        others, and be free to visit others and receive visitors.

                           Xinjiang--Uighurs

    The Chinese government supports the U.S.-led global war on 
terrorism, but critics argue that Beijing is using terrorism as 
an excuse to crack down on human rights and religious freedoms 
of the Uighur Muslim population in Xinjiang.
    The Uighurs, a Muslim Turkic people, are the dominant 
ethnic group in China's westernmost region, the Xinjiang Uighur 
Autonomous Region. They have a different ethnic, cultural, 
historical, and linguistic background than Han Chinese and have 
resisted Beijing's authority since Qing Dynasty troops first 
took control of the Uighurs' homeland in 1759.\187\ Resistance 
to Chinese rule continued after the Qing officially gained 
control of the area in 1884 and renamed it Xinjiang.\188\ 
Uighurs managed to regain independence briefly in the 1930s and 
again in the 1940s.\189\ Many Uighurs today identify more 
strongly with their Central Asian neighbors than with China. 
However, while many Uighurs are unhappy with Beijing's 
controls, they manifest their discontent through different 
means, from deep personal immersion into Islamic traditions to 
advocating independence through violent methods.\190\ Yet 
``only a very few Uighurs have turned to militancy,'' as Dr. 
Justin Rudelson, former executive director of the University of 
Maryland's Institute for Global Chinese Affairs, told a 
Commission roundtable.\191\
    Uighur separatists have committed occasional acts of 
violence in recent years, and a few have been linked to 
terrorist groups. In August 2002, the U.S. government 
designated the East Turkestan Islamic Movement as a foreign 
organization that supports terrorism and placed this obscure 
Xinjiang separatist group under an executive order blocking its 
financial transactions and freezing its assets in the United 
States.\192\ China's state-controlled media have alleged that 
Osama bin Laden is an active sponsor of Xinjiang 
separatists.\193\ However, there is little evidence to 
substantiate the Chinese government's claims that thousands of 
Uighurs are associated with al-Qaeda and other terrorist 
organizations,\194\ or that ``the majority of [Xinjiang] 
separatists are engaged in terrorist activities,'' as asserted 
by Zhang Guobao, vice-chairman of China's State Development 
Planning Commission.\195\ President Bush has cautioned Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin that ``the war on terrorism must never be 
an excuse to persecute minorities.'' \196\
    According to China's official 2000 census, approximately 45 
percent of the 19 million people in Xinjiang are Uighurs. The 
Han Chinese population has swelled to around 40 percent now, up 
from approximately six percent in 1949. In the past, the 
increase in the Han Chinese population was largely due to 
government-initiated migration to Xinjiang. Now, however, many 
Han Chinese workers are moving to Xinjiang in search of new 
economic opportunities, as development there has become a 
priority for the central government under the Great Western 
Development campaign.\197\ This demographic shift is a source 
of the growing tension and resentment Uighurs feel towards Han 
Chinese and the Chinese government. A July 2002 Financial Times 
article stated, ``Settlers and migrant workers are pouring in 
from the east at such a rate . . . that Uighurs are beginning 
to feel like aliens in their own land.'' \198\
    Although Xinjiang has benefited from the central 
government's economic development policies, Uighurs contend 
that Han Chinese are the primary beneficiaries, often depriving 
Uighurs of jobs.\199\ Uighurs are also concerned about the 
economic and environmental impact of large extraction projects, 
such as a $5.6 billion, 2,500 mile pipeline to transport 
natural gas from the Tarim Basin in Xinjiang to Shanghai.\200\ 
They believe it will simply exploit the region's natural 
resources and provide little economic benefit to local Uighur 
people.\201\ Many observers also question the pipeline's 
viability.\202\
    Events in May 2002 amplified Uighur concerns. Article 4 of 
the Chinese Constitution guarantees cultural and linguistic 
protections for all nationalities. However, the practical 
effect of such protections is questionable. Western media 
reports describe a massive book-burning rally in the Xinjiang 
city of Kashgar in May.\203\ Officials claim that the books 
promoted separatism and threatened stability. Uighurs claim 
that the books related to their history and culture. Also in 
May, officials reportedly ordered Xinjiang University, the 
largest in the region, to cease all instruction in the Uighur 
language.\204\ Nearly half of the 32,000 students are from 
ethnic minority groups, mainly Uighur,\205\ making this ban a 
threat to Uighur linguistic preservation and Uighur identity.
    Uighur separatist activity, both non-violent and violent, 
occurred long before September 11, 2001, and Chinese government 
campaigns to suppress separatist actions and religious 
extremism have been in full effect for years. The government 
justifies its actions under Chinese law, such as Article 52 of 
the Chinese Constitution, which requires all Chinese citizens 
``to safeguard the unity of the country and the unity of its 
nationalities,'' Article 36, which protects only ``normal 
religious activities'' as determined by the state, and Article 
13 of the Criminal Law, which criminalizes separatist beliefs.
    In April 2001, the Chinese government renewed its Strike 
Hard anti-crime campaign. While on the national level the 
campaign targets crime (see the ``Criminal Justice'' section of 
this report), in Xinjiang the crackdown extends to separatists 
and ``illegal religious activities.'' \206\ Abulahat Abdurixit, 
chairman of the regional government, told the Xinjiang Legal 
Daily in April 2001 that the Strike Hard campaign in Xinjiang 
would specifically target ``national splittists,'' ``violent 
terrorists,'' and ``religious extremists.'' In January 2002, 
Abdurixit announced that artists, writers, performers, 
historians, and others who advocate separatism through art 
would also become Strike Hard targets.\207\ The campaign 
exacerbated the rate of sentencing and arrests in the region. 
Official accounts note that in May 2001, more than 3,000 cases 
were undergoing prosecution in Xinjiang and massive public 
sentencing rallies were held throughout the region, with 
attendance reaching over 300,000.\208\
    Strike Hard intensified in Xinjiang after September 11, 
2001. Within a month, authorities announced heightened measures 
against separatists, terrorists, ``illegal religious 
activities,'' and ``extremist religious forces.'' \209\ Senior 
Xinjiang Justice Department officials told visiting Commission 
staff in Urumqi that ``illegal religious activities include 
splitting the country and endangering national security and 
unity under the pretext of religion.'' \210\ Punishable 
activities targeted during the crackdown include looting, 
rioting, possessing and publishing materials containing 
separatist views, engaging in campaigns for religious wars, 
illegally setting up organizations, and anything perceived by 
authorities to be ``endangering state security or unity.'' 
\211\ Participation in such activities can lead to long prison 
sentences or execution. Senior Xinjiang Justice Department 
officials also told Commission staff that approximately 1,000 
people are currently in prison in Xinjiang for ``carrying out 
concrete activities toward splitting or endangering the 
country,'' mostly through violent means.\212\ The sweeping 
scope of such charges makes it difficult to discern which cases 
are legitimate and peaceful and which may be criminal and 
violent.
    The case of Rebiya Kadeer exemplifies the nebulous legal 
environment. Kadeer is a prominent Uighur businesswoman who was 
active in organizing grassroots campaigns to address Uighurs' 
social concerns.\213\ She is also a former member of the 
provincial-level Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference and was a Chinese government-appointed delegate to 
the 1995 United Nations World Conference on Women in Beijing. 
In August 1999, Chinese authorities arrested her while she was 
on her way to meet a visiting U.S. Congressional staff 
delegation. In March 2000, a Xinjiang court sentenced her to 
eight years in prison for ``passing state secrets'' to 
foreigners. According to an official Chinese news report, the 
alleged ``state secrets'' included local newspaper articles and 
names of people whose cases the courts had handled.\214\ Many 
observers believe Kadeer was targeted for her activism in the 
Uighur community and for her husband's support in the United 
States for Uighur causes and involvement with Radio Free Asia.
    Restrictions on religious activity in Xinjiang have a 
serious impact on Uighurs, whose culture and ethnic identity 
are closely tied to Islam. Regulations tightly control places 
of worship, activities of religious leaders, religious 
education, and participation in religious activities.\215\ 
Officials restrict the building of mosques in Xinjiang, and, 
according to unofficial reports, mosques have been torn down as 
part of a crackdown on religious activity.\216\ The Chinese 
government closely monitors and guides activities of Islamic 
religious leaders (imams), all of whom must be approved by 
local branches of the state-controlled Islamic Association of 
China. From March through December 2001, the government 
implemented an imam ``patriotic re-education'' campaign in 
Xinjiang. Imams were required to attend 20-day sessions to 
study patriotism, Communist Party ideology, and how to combat 
separatism.\217\ The China Islamic Affairs Steering Committee 
was set up in March 2001 under the administration of the 
Islamic Association of China to conform Islam to Chinese 
political ideology.\218\ The Committee is charged with 
translating religious texts in accordance with Chinese law and 
Islamic doctrine, and preparing sermons for distribution, 
according to the China Daily, ``to help the imams improve 
themselves.'' \219\
    According to unofficial sources, no one under the age of 18 
is allowed to enter mosques, and official sources verify that 
religious education is tightly restricted,\220\ under the 
Chinese government's assumption that religion interferes with 
education per Article 36 of the Chinese Constitution. Heavy 
restrictions on religious activities extend to teachers and 
university students. Dr. Tashpolat Tiyip, Vice President of 
Xinjiang University, told visiting Commission staff that at 
Xinjiang University, ``We do not allow for religious activities 
inside the school'' and that any student found participating in 
religious activities at the university would be dismissed. 
``They all obey the school rules and none participates in 
religious activities.'' \221\

    (Illustrative legal provisions include: PRC Constitution, 
Articles 36, 51, 52, 53, 54, 112-122, and 134; PRC Law on 
Regional National Autonomy--1984, amended 2001, Article 7; PRC 
Criminal Law--1979, amended 1997, Articles 13 and 102-113. For 
an illustrative list of national laws and regulations affecting 
religious organizations, see the Religious Freedom section.)

                  RECOMMENDATIONS ON XINJIANG--UIGHURS

The Commission recommends that the Congress and the 
Administration continue to emphasize that the war against 
terrorism is not an excuse for suppression and violations of 
human rights of ethnic Uighurs in Xinjiang, and recommends that 
the Congress and the Administration provide funding for NGOs to 
develop programs that focus on preserving the Uighur culture 
and language.

        While the U.S., Chinese, and other governments have linked some 
        Uighur separatists in Xinjiang to terrorist groups elsewhere, 
        the Chinese government's broader claims against the Uighur 
        minority in Xinjiang have not been proven. Combating terrorism 
        and separatism in Xinjiang has resulted in intensifying 
        repression against Uighurs, escalating violations of their 
        human rights (especially the right to religious freedom), and 
        undermining local efforts to preserve Uighur culture and 
        language. Programs to preserve Uighur culture should promote 
        Uighur language and literature.

The Commission recommends that the Congress and the 
Administration urge the Chinese government to lift restrictions 
on religious activity for Uighurs, allowing Uighurs of all ages 
to participate in religious activities and receive religious 
education.

        Restrictions on religious freedom in China particularly 
        resonate with Uighurs, as they consider Islam inseparable from 
        their culture and identity. Current Chinese restrictions on 
        religious activities are notably stringent for Uighurs in 
        Xinjiang, especially since an intensified government campaign 
        against terrorism and separatism has also extended to religious 
        extremism. Uighurs of all ages should be allowed to worship 
        freely, receive religious instruction, and obtain and study the 
        Koran and other religious texts.

The Commission recommends that the Congress and the 
Administration continue to press the Chinese government to 
allow U.S. Embassy and Consulate officers, as well as other 
international observers, to attend trials of individuals 
charged with ``endangering national unity or security'' in 
Xinjiang, particularly of individuals who have committed non-
violent acts.

        Xinjiang Justice Department officials told visiting Commission 
        staff that it is ``permissible and normal'' for foreign 
        diplomats to attend the trials of those accused of these 
        offenses. In practice, however, the procedures for doing so are 
        opaque and court authorities evidently do not consider it 
        normal for foreign observers to attend. Thus, few U.S. Embassy 
        officers have been permitted to attend these trials in the 
        past. Because charges of ``endangering national unity or 
        security'' against Uighur separatists are common, the 
        Commission believes it is particularly important to press the 
        Chinese government to permit U.S. and international observers 
        to attend these trials.

               Impact of the World Trade Organization on


                   the Development of the Rule of Law

    On December 11, 2001, China formally became a member of the 
WTO. In doing so, China agreed to abide by the rules governing 
trade relations among most of the nations of the world. U.S. 
trade analysts and business leaders expect China's accession to 
the WTO to provide greater opportunities and a more stable 
economic environment for American businesses operating there. 
More important, although some believe that increased trade may 
serve to strengthen the existing power structure in China, many 
others believe that the changes that the Chinese government 
must make to implement its WTO commitments will help foster the 
broader development of the rule of law.
    In joining the WTO, China has demonstrated an unprecedented 
willingness to make fundamental changes to its system of 
governance in response to the dictates of an international 
body. This decision itself is an important step in moving 
toward a system of government based on the rule of law. As U.S. 
Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade Grant 
Aldonas stated to the Commission, ``Observance of the law in 
any society has to become a habit.'' \222\ Reform-minded 
elements within the Chinese leadership have been eager to 
demonstrate China's commitment to compliance and the 
institutional changes that are expected to result from 
accession.\223\ Early in 2002, Long Yongtu, Vice Minister of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, announced that WTO 
accession will help China build ``a stable, transparent and 
predictable law system.'' \224\
    The WTO agreements and China's accession documents contain 
many core elements of the rule of law. The WTO imposes 
transparency on its members by requiring that all laws, 
regulations, judicial decisions, and administrative rulings 
relating to trade be published promptly.\225\ WTO agreements 
also require that all trade-related measures be administered in 
a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner,\226\ and that those 
measures not be enforced before they are officially 
published.\227\ Further, WTO members must maintain tribunals or 
procedures for the prompt, independent review of trade-related 
administrative actions.\228\ WTO members must incorporate these 
requirements into their own legal systems.
    The Chinese leadership has viewed the WTO as a vehicle for 
promoting economic reforms that were already regarded as 
desirable but politically difficult to achieve, including 
reforms that involve the same rule of law elements found in 
China's WTO commitments. Professor Donald Clarke of the 
University of Washington Law School told a Commission hearing 
that ``accession is part of a larger strategy of massive and 
fundamental economic reform.'' \229\ Recognizing the importance 
of the changes WTO membership would bring to its larger 
economic reform policies, China began amending and abolishing 
laws and regulations inconsistent with the WTO before it became 
a member. The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation (MOFTEC) reported that 2,300 laws and regulations 
had been ``cleaned up'' due to WTO non-compliance as of May 
2002, and of these 830 had been abolished.\230\ Efforts to 
undertake reform of China's administrative law regime and its 
judiciary also began long before China joined the WTO.

Reform of Lawmaking and Rulemaking Processes

    In joining the WTO, China has agreed to honor transparency 
commitments by publishing trade-related measures in an official 
journal and providing an opportunity for the public to comment 
on drafts before those measures are implemented.\231\ The 
Legislation Law passed in 2000 provides for the possibility of 
publishing drafts of ``important'' bills and of seeking 
opinions from various parties through public hearings, although 
it does not mandate releasing draft bills to the public at 
large.\232\ Similarly, the State Council's Procedural Rules for 
Formulating Administrative Regulations require that the State 
Council gather opinions from relevant government bodies, 
associations, and citizens, but does not require the release of 
draft regulations to the public at large.\233\
    Some administrative bodies have published regulations and 
other measures in draft form for public comment; administrative 
bodies that regularly issue rules and regulations involving 
trade and investment, such as the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, have done so more consistently.\234\ Other 
administrative bodies also have made public a limited number of 
proposed regulations, including some without obvious 
connections to trade.\235\ Some measures are shared in draft 
form with a limited Chinese audience, further promoting 
concerns among foreign investors and trading partners about 
discrimination and selective transparency. However, Chinese 
government authorities promulgate most measures in final form 
without distributing drafts and allowing public comment. This 
practice demonstrates that, on the whole, Chinese 
administrative bodies are far from achieving full compliance 
with China's transparency commitments.
    As expected, progress in implementing WTO rules on 
transparency varies widely at the provincial and local levels. 
A large number of laws and regulations at these levels need to 
be revised or rescinded. China's most commercially advanced 
provinces and cities lead the rest of the country in these 
reforms. For example, in 2000, the Shanghai people's government 
instituted an action plan that included a review of local 
measures for WTO compatibility. Shanghai also has begun holding 
open hearings on some draft legislation. In 2002, the Beijing 
people's government adopted measures that permit publishing 
draft rules and holding public hearings.\236\ Although a few 
other provinces and municipalities have set up WTO compliance 
centers and have taken significant steps toward revising laws 
and rules and improving transparency,\237\ many provincial and 
local governments continue to lack the will or knowledge 
necessary to embrace the changes that WTO membership requires.

Administrative Law Reform

    China lacks comprehensive procedures for making 
administrative rules and regulations, which leads to 
inconsistent rulemaking practices among administrative 
bodies.\238\ China also lacks adequate methods for challenging 
administrative actions, either internally or through the 
courts. Many administrative bodies have no procedures or 
personnel in place to hear and decide administrative 
appeals.\239\ The Administrative Litigation Law allows citizens 
to sue government officials in a court of law for violation of 
their ``legitimate rights and interests.'' \240\ However, the 
law limits the types of actions that can be challenged, and the 
courts have defined ``legitimate rights and interests'' 
narrowly.\241\ With the support of the Asia Foundation and U.S. 
legal scholars, the China Administrative Law Research Group, a 
group of Chinese legal scholars and government officials, is 
drafting a new law on administrative procedure that is to be 
completed by December 2003. Many Chinese and foreign observers 
hope that the new law, together with reform of all laws and 
regulations inconsistent with WTO requirements, will bring 
about a more uniform system of enforcing trade-related measures 
through administrative appeals and improved mechanisms for 
judicial review of administrative actions.

Judicial Reform

    Many argue that the weakness of China's judiciary poses one 
of the biggest obstacles to effective judicial review of 
administrative actions.\242\ The most significant development 
in judicial reform resulting from China's WTO membership has 
been the establishment of new procedures to handle 
transnational disputes, whereby foreign entities may have their 
cases heard before intermediate courts without first appearing 
before lower level courts.\243\ Similar procedures have been 
established for intellectual property cases. Judges assigned to 
these cases have begun training in business law, intellectual 
property, and legal English. For WTO-related cases, these new 
procedures may lessen the impact of corruption and lack of 
professional competence, problems that critics find throughout 
China's judicial ranks.\244\
    Some critics argue these new court procedures show that the 
Chinese government will attempt to limit the impact of WTO 
accession to the commercial sphere. Others argue that China's 
commitment to provide independent and impartial judicial review 
for WTO-related actions may be having a broader impact. For 
example, in the past year, the Chinese government established 
the first uniform national examination for new judges, lawyers, 
and prosecutors, and the Supreme People's Court issued a 
circular calling for standardized selection processes and 
improved professional competence at all levels of the 
judiciary.\245\ It is too early, however, to assess whether 
these calls for reform and efforts to improve the competence of 
China's judges will lead to beneficial changes in the judicial 
process, either within the realm of commercial law or more 
broadly.

U.S. Government Activities

    The United States Trade Representative (USTR) coordinates 
the Administration's monitoring efforts through chairmanship of 
the interagency Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) 
subcommittee on China WTO compliance, which consists of 
officials from those federal agencies most concerned with WTO 
commitments, including the Departments of Commerce, State, 
Agriculture, Labor, and Treasury and the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office. In China, the State Department, the 
International Trade Administration, the Foreign Agricultural 
Service, and U.S. Customs monitor compliance. The U.S.-China 
Relations Act of 2000 requires the USTR to submit an annual 
report on China's compliance with its WTO commitments, 
including the findings of the Department of Commerce's 
compliance monitoring program. The first report is due by 
December 11, 2002.\246\ Moreover, the Senate Finance and House 
Ways and Means Committees have tasked the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) with a four-year project to examine China-WTO 
implementation issues.
    In China, U.S. government agencies provide limited 
technical assistance for WTO implementation and compliance, but 
there is little coordination among them. U.S. diplomats have 
held training courses for Chinese government officials at 
various levels. The Department of Commerce has conducted a 
number of seminars throughout China, mostly on industry-
specific topics. U.S. agencies currently conducting programs 
have little experience in offering technical assistance. 
Moreover, agencies carry out existing programs without funds 
appropriated for this specific purpose, and the programs are 
not designed to address China's WTO commitments relating to 
rule of law development. The U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000 
authorizes the Department of Commerce to establish a commercial 
rule of law and technical assistance program related to 
commercial activities in China.\247\ If carried out, this 
program could help China meet its WTO rule of law commitments. 
However, the Congress has not appropriated funds for this 
specific purpose, and, consequently, the Department of Commerce 
has not established a comprehensive commercial rule of law 
program in China.

Foreign Government Assistance

    In contrast to the United States, other governments, 
including the European Union, individual European states, 
Australia, Canada, and Japan, have committed to provide 
significant technical assistance to China on WTO compliance and 
the development of the rule of law. The European Union has been 
the largest donor for training programs. Its WTO-related 
projects, reportedly estimated at about $100 million, are being 
phased in over a number of years as part of the EU's larger 
strategic plan for relations with China.\248\ Commission 
hearing witnesses have cautioned that the United States should 
not cede to other governments the opportunity to prioritize the 
content of technical assistance to China, as doing so may 
result in a Chinese legal system that favors other countries' 
interests to the detriment of the United States.\249\
    It is too soon to determine whether China will adhere to 
its commercial rule of law commitments, given the sweeping 
structural changes required. China's capacity to implement the 
changes necessary for WTO compliance continues to be debated 
vigorously in China, the United States, and elsewhere. Some 
doubt whether MOFTEC is capable of coaxing the other ministries 
into action.\250\ Analysts also question Beijing's ability to 
force provincial and local governments to change their policies 
and practices after having enjoyed significant autonomy for so 
long, despite the strong interest to comply among China's most 
senior leaders.\251\

    (Illustrative legal provisions include: Accession of the 
People's Republic of China to the World Trade Organization, 
Decision and Protocol--2001; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization--1994, Annex 1B (General Agreement 
on Trade in Services), Annex 1C (Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights); General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade--1947)

              RECOMMENDATIONS ON IMPACT OF THE WTO ON THE

                     DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW

The Commission recommends that the Administration develop a 
comprehensive plan for WTO-related technical assistance to 
China.

        Although China has undertaken its own training efforts, 
        officials there have stressed that a lack of expertise and 
        capacity to meet China's training needs has hampered progress 
        in WTO implementation. The need is particularly acute in 
        training for judges, administrators, and bureaucrats in WTO 
        rules and processes.\252\ A comprehensive U.S. government plan 
        should focus on WTO implementation areas that not only will 
        have an impact on commercial rule of law, but also will 
        accelerate the development of the rule of law more broadly. In 
        particular, technical assistance should be geared to 
        transparency in the legal system, administration of laws in a 
        transparent and reasonable manner, and the provision of fair, 
        impartial, and independent judicial procedures. Since existing 
        programs have focused principally on training national-level 
        officials, new training programs should target provincial and 
        municipal officials, in addition to addressing the training 
        needs of national-level officials more systematically.

The Commission recommends that the Congress appropriate funds 
and earmark them for the Commercial Law Development Program 
(CLDP) to implement a commercial rule of law training program 
in China, as authorized by the U.S-China Relations Act of 2000.

        The Department of Commerce's Commercial Law Development Program 
        (CLDP) focuses on all aspects of laws, regulations, and 
        administrative practices affecting trade. It has worked with 
        foreign governments, academics, and NGOs to conduct commercial 
        rule of law programs all over the world, including many 
        programs focusing on WTO accession and implementation issues. 
        The Congress should make funding for a CLDP China program 
        available either through a direct appropriation to the 
        Department of Commerce or through the U.S. Agency for 
        International Development (USAID). It appears that there are no 
        legislative obstacles to providing CLDP with the funding, 
        through USAID or otherwise, to carry out commercial rule of law 
        or technical assistance programs in China. A CLDP China program 
        should be part of the comprehensive plan in the previous 
        recommendation.

                          Rule of Law Programs

    From a small start in the late 1970s, provision by foreign 
entities of technical assistance to promote the development of 
the rule of law in China has accelerated. The spiraling number 
of programs and their increasing variety have made it difficult 
to sort out what kinds of efforts have been most effective and 
where governmental and non-governmental help in the future 
might be best deployed to achieve the desired goals. To 
untangle these issues, the Commission has begun to construct a 
database of rule of law programs that will be available on the 
Commission's website.
    The U. S. government lags behind other nations in 
supporting these kinds of programs.\253\ The bulk of 
government-funded assistance furnished so far has come from 
Europe, including a large program funded by the European Union 
itself, along with programs by individual European states. 
Other major assistance comes from the governments of Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea.
    Conversely, U.S. NGOs have been at the forefront of efforts 
to develop rule of law programs and have played key roles in 
developing creative ways to provide assistance. The Commission 
roundtable ``Promoting the Rule of Law in China'' introduced 
examples of ongoing U.S.-based rule of law programs. The Temple 
University School of Law was the major direct recipient of U.S. 
government funds for rule of law development in China, 
authorized for the first time in fiscal 2000. Its cooperative 
Masters of Law program with Qinghua University and other 
universities has already turned out more than 70 graduates, 
including judges, high-level officials, and private lawyers. 
U.S. faculty members are currently participating in drafting 
workshops with staff of the National People's Congress and the 
Supreme People's Court on new torts and property laws, as well 
as a code of judicial ethics.
    Robert Kapp, President of the U.S.-China Business Council, 
presented testimony at a Commission roundtable about the U.S.-
China Legal Cooperation Fund. The Fund sponsors small-scale 
cooperative projects in areas ranging from legal support for 
women in cases of domestic violence to the drafting of a code 
of legal ethics for the All-China Lawyers Association. At the 
same Commission roundtable, Nancy Yuan of the Asia Foundation 
presented some of the Foundation's grassroots rule of law 
projects. These and other grassroots initiatives, such as those 
of the Ford Foundation, address issues of concern to the 
average Chinese citizen and promote rights awareness in the 
areas of environmental protection, public health, HIV/AIDS, 
worker rights, property law, family law, trafficking in women 
and children, and consumer protection.
    NGOs from other nations work on rule of law programs in 
China. Multilateral organizations such as the UNDP, the Asian 
Development Bank, UNICEF, UNESCO, and the World Bank have also 
offered assistance in this area. Twice a year, foreign entities 
supporting legal reform and human rights work in China meet in 
Beijing to exchange ideas, avoid duplication of effort, and 
evaluate obstacles and opportunities.
    The Commission has concluded that popular legal education 
and legal aid programs are some of the most promising areas for 
future promotion of the rule of law in China. The staff members 
of existing legal assistance programs, including hotlines and 
drop-in clinics, say that demand for grassroots legal 
information and help far exceeds their ability to satisfy it. 
The large number of people seeking help to assert their rights 
in a legal context belies the assertions of some foreign 
scholars that China's lack of an ``indigenous rights 
tradition'' makes it unlikely that the concept of human rights 
can ever prosper in China. To the contrary, it appears that 
once they know the law, the Chinese people are no less willing 
than the people in other nations to seek legal means to protect 
their rights and interests.

                RECOMMENDATIONS ON RULE OF LAW PROGRAMS

The Commission recommends that the Congress authorize the 
development of programming in popular legal education for 
groups in China, such as farmers in remote areas and migrant 
workers, who are unaware of their rights under existing law.

        Programs of this type should involve cooperation with local 
        organizations and legal aid centers and focus on specific 
        rights under Chinese law. Programs in minority areas should be 
        offered in the relevant languages.

The Commission recommends that the Congress authorize and 
strengthen judicial training programs and exchanges between the 
United States and China.

        Judicial exchanges and training programs enhance the expertise 
        and professional prestige of judges in China, a vital component 
        of the culture of judicial independence. Such programming 
        should include discussion of case studies in judicial ethics 
        pointing out the challenges faced by judges in both countries. 
        Programs must include mechanisms for building lasting 
        communication and support networks (such as email lists and 
        electronic bulletin boards).

The Commission recommends that the Congress and the 
Administration provide special assistance to legal aid centers 
serving marginalized populations in China, such as the 
disabled, laid-off workers, victims of unsafe working 
conditions, and individuals harmed by environmental pollution.

        Many members of these marginalized groups should benefit from 
        existing Chinese laws that in principle extend legal 
        protections to them, but most members know little about 
        existing law and lack the resources to obtain useful legal 
        assistance.

The Commission recommends that the Congress instruct the GAO to 
review and analyze the effectiveness of all U.S. government-
funded programs promoting the rule of law, human rights, and 
democracy in China.

        Some existing programs have not been evaluated by external 
        auditors to assess their performance. Some programs have no 
        evaluation process at all. Diligent external evaluation can 
        lead to more effective future programming.

                        General Recommendations

The Commission recommends that the President, senior Executive 
Branch officials, and members of Congress continue to raise 
human rights issues, as well as individual cases of victims of 
human rights abuses, including those discussed in this report, 
whenever they meet with Chinese government officials. The 
Commission further recommends that the Administration include 
Commission leaders in any future Presidential visit to China.

        Our nation's political leadership, in both the Congress and the 
        Administration, should reinforce to Chinese counterparts at 
        every opportunity that the international community expects 
        China (and all nations) to abide by internationally recognized 
        human rights practices.

The Commission recommends that the Administration explore 
additional ways to build multilateral support to put pressure 
on China to improve human rights practices and legal protection 
of citizens.

        All 18 Congressional members of the Commission signed a letter 
        to President Bush on April 18, 2002, urging him to work with 
        members of the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) 
        to pass a resolution on China's human rights practices. In part 
        because the United States had no seat at the UNHRC in 2002, no 
        China resolution was introduced in the 2002 UNHRC session. In 
        addition to diplomacy at the UNHRC, the Commission believes 
        that the United States could usefully explore additional 
        multilateral approaches, including applicable United Nations 
        human rights mechanisms.

The Commission recommends that the Administration require that 
all Commerce Department officials assigned to China complete a 
course on human rights issues and their relationship to U.S. 
business activities in China.

        Many U.S. businesses bring American values to China with their 
        operations. Commerce Department officials can play a critically 
        important role in sensitizing business leaders to human rights 
        issues and to appropriate responses.

The Commission recommends that the Administration urge the 
Chinese government to ratify the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.

        China has signed but not sent this covenant to the National 
        People's Congress for ratification. On February 13, 2002, the 
        Commission sent a letter to President Bush recommending that he 
        urge President Jiang Zemin to direct his government to complete 
        the process of ratification.

The Commission recommends that Congress authorize funds for 
technical assistance to China to slow the spread of HIV/AIDS 
and to mobilize national and local policy responses to the HIV 
epidemic based on the epidemiology of HIV in China and on 
``best practices'' identified through international experience.

        An uncontrolled epidemic of HIV/AIDS in China will cripple the 
        capacity of the already battered public health system in China 
        to respond to normal public health demands. Technical 
        assistance on coping with HIV/AIDS could include cooperation on 
        drafting model codes on the national, provincial, county, 
        township, and municipal levels to address the epidemic without 
        infringing on basic human rights.

               5. Commission Activities for the Next Year

    This section provides a partial list of additional issues 
that the Commission will examine over the coming year. It is 
illustrative and is not intended to be comprehensive.

               Human Rights and the Beijing 2008 Olympics

    On July 13, 2001, Beijing was awarded the right to host the 
2008 Summer Games. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) 
selected Beijing despite vociferous criticism of China's human 
rights record. The IOC maintained that hosting the Games would 
spur improved civil liberties in China.\254\ The Secretary 
General of Beijing's bid committee, Wang Wei, encouraged that 
perception, vowing that the Beijing Games would ``improve all 
facets of life in China, including education, health, and human 
rights.'' \255\ But Kevin Wamsley, Director of the 
International Centre for Olympic Studies at the University of 
Western Ontario, said the impact of the Olympics on the host 
country is overblown: ``I'm sure in the years leading up to the 
Games political prisoners will be released, but it will be for 
the wrong reason,'' Wamsley said. ``It will be to save face, 
not to preserve humanity. Let's face it, a three-week festival 
can't change political, cultural, and historical traditions.'' 
\256\
    The Commission will look at what, if any, effect hosting 
the Olympics will have on China's human rights practices and 
how the U.S. government might encourage positive results.

                    Corporate Social Responsibility

    Many NGOs argue that foreign businesses operating in China 
focus on earning profits with little regard for the promotion 
of human rights. Businesses respond by saying that a U.S. 
corporate presence is the best way to promote democratic values 
in China. In recent years, companies around the world have 
instituted corporate social responsibility programs intended to 
strike a balance between financial success, relations with host 
governments, and the well-being of their surrounding 
communities. In China, as part of such programs, some U.S. 
companies and industrial associations have established 
guidelines governing their practices with respect to working 
conditions, environmental protection, community involvement, 
and other aspects of their corporate activities.
    There is debate regarding whether such social 
responsibility programs have a significant impact on business 
practices in China. NGOs have criticized multinational 
corporations for touting their programs while failing to 
establish mechanisms to implement them fully. The Commission 
will examine these corporate social responsibility programs and 
policies, focusing on the ``American values'' that U.S. 
businesses purport to bring to China and what those values 
embody. The Commission will also work to identify best 
practices and to determine whether foreign companies in China 
have lived up to the commitments they have made to adopt 
procedures and policies that will have a positive impact on 
China.

                             Women's Rights

    Article 48 of the Chinese Constitution states, ``Women in 
the People's Republic of China enjoy equal rights with men in 
all spheres of life.''
    Despite this guarantee of equality, the transition from a 
planned to a market economy in China has resulted in particular 
hardships for women. The one child policy, even in its somewhat 
milder current form, has had a severe and unequal impact on 
women, including in some instances forced sterilization and 
abortion. In addition, the continuing preference for sons has 
resulted in selective abortion and sometimes infanticide of 
baby girls, causing a skewed male-female ratio in the general 
population. The growing problem of HIV/AIDS (see below) will 
have a substantial impact on women who too often do not have 
the legal and political standing to demand protection from 
their sexual partners.
    Other issues the Commission will address include women's 
access to justice, women in the migrant workforce, trafficking 
in women, women's health issues, and family planning law and 
policy.

                                HIV/AIDS

    The United Nations Theme Group on HIV/AIDS in China's 2001 
update, ``HIV/AIDS: China's Titanic Peril,'' warns of ``a 
catastrophe that could result in unimaginable human suffering, 
economic loss, and social devastation.'' The United Nations 
estimates that up to 1.5 million people are infected with HIV 
in China, nearly double the official Chinese estimate of 
850,000 cases at the end of 2001. The New York Times quoted UN 
officials as saying that ``there could be as many as six 
million cases already in China, with 20 million expected by the 
end of the decade if nothing is done.'' \257\ Yet in some 
regions, low percentages of Chinese citizens are even aware of 
the disease and how it is spread. Unofficial news reports 
describe Chinese authorities as continuing to suppress 
information about HIV/AIDS in some parts of China.\258\
    The UN's Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
identifies HIV/AIDS as an undeniable human rights concern:

        There is clear evidence that where individuals and 
        communities are able to realize their rights--to 
        education, free association, information, and, most 
        importantly, non-discrimination--the personal and 
        societal impact of HIV and AIDS are reduced. The 
        protection and promotion of human rights are therefore 
        essential to preventing the spread of HIV and to 
        mitigating the social and economic impact of the 
        pandemic.\259\
    The Commission will examine the development of HIV/AIDS in 
China, the Chinese government's interest and effectiveness in 
addressing this issue, and the human rights implications of the 
disease.

                     Reform through Labor (Laogai)

    Before 1997, among the punishments that Chinese courts 
meted out at the end of China's criminal justice process was 
``reform through labor'' or laogai, which purported to reform 
unacceptable social and political behavior by inculcating 
``socialist values'' through rigorous labor. Due to 
international criticism of this aspect of China's penal system, 
the Chinese government officially purged the term laogai, and 
the corresponding formal institutions, from China's criminal 
law in 1997. Nevertheless, the forced labor sites that the 
former term laogai described continue to operate, modernize, 
and boost production of goods. Today's forced labor penal 
system produces manufactured goods, commodities, and 
agricultural produce in state-owned and operated farms, 
ranches, mines, and factories. Experts differ as to whether 
these sites operate at a profit or constitute a drain on the 
Chinese government budget. They also disagree on the scope of 
these sites and the number of inmates, and whether export of 
prison labor products to the United States is rising, falling, 
or remaining static. (U.S. law forbids prison labor imports 
into the United States.) China has numerous penal sites that 
were created as penal reform institutions that can also 
accommodate some productive labor. China also continues to 
operate hundreds of forced labor sites (camps and other 
facilities) created solely for commercial production using 
prisoners as the workforce. The Commission will examine these 
issues during the coming year.

                  Rights of Farmers and Rural Migrants

    Farmers and rural migrant workers, who comprise the vast 
majority of China's population, suffer additional injustices 
beyond those encountered by urban residents. Hou Wenzhuo, a 
Visiting Fellow at Harvard Law School, told a Commission open 
forum that the Chinese household registration system (hukou) 
has bifurcated China's population into the urban first world 
and the rural third world. Although reform of the household 
registration system has begun in some areas of China, rural 
migrant workers are still denied social services in the cities 
and are generally treated as second-class citizens because of 
their rural status. Rural migrant workers face unequal rights 
in employment, job security, and health and safety, and women 
migrant workers encounter additional discrimination in the form 
of sexual harassment, pregnancy discrimination, and unequal pay 
for equal work. Rural Chinese remaining in the countryside face 
significant problems such as arbitrary and excessive taxation 
and a lack of social services. While land-use rights have 
improved under China's 1998 Land Management Law, the law is 
often not adequately implemented. Corruption in village 
governments and local law enforcement agencies is widespread. 
Human trafficking is also a serious problem for rural women and 
children.
    In the coming year, the Commission will examine these and 
other human rights issues affecting farmers and rural migrants.

                      Indigenous Chinese ``NGOs''

    As China has moved from central planning toward a market 
economy, the state has retreated from many areas of social life 
where it once played a dominant role. A variety of social 
organizations has sprung up to help provide services once 
guaranteed by the state and to give a voice to new 
constituencies shaped by the changing economy. Education and 
health care are two examples of vital state functions now 
sometimes performed by non-state organizations. A 2001 report 
by the editors of China Development Brief lists 250 Chinese 
NGOs, ranging from the huge Party-led ``mass organizations,'' 
founded soon after 1949, to specialized local associations 
founded much more recently. They include the Shanghai Cancer 
Recovery Club and the Women's Legal Services Centre in Qianxi 
County.\260\
    Observers disagree on whether the term NGO, which implies a 
degree of autonomy from government control, should be applied 
to Chinese social organizations (called ``social associations'' 
under relevant Chinese legislation).\261\ Some point out that 
these organizations are ultimately under state control and, 
therefore, should not be considered as truly ``non-
governmental'' organizations. They contend that strict state 
supervision and suppression have led these groups to adopt an 
attitude of cautious deference to the government, rather than 
one of criticism and public advocacy. Others disagree, seeing 
them as nascent NGOs, at least in substance, if not in form. 
Some Chinese associations even argue that their connection with 
state sponsors can translate into more effective influence on 
government policy.
    The Commission will examine this issue and determine if and 
how such entities can help promote the rule of law and human 
rights in China and whether the U.S. government might play a 
role in assisting their development.

                               Hong Kong

    Five years after Hong Kong's reversion to China on July 1, 
1997, many in Hong Kong and elsewhere continue to voice 
concerns about the direction of the territory's development as 
a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China. The PRC-UK 
Joint Declaration of 1984, together with the Basic Law adopted 
by China's National People's Congress (NPC) in 1990, declared 
that Hong Kong would enjoy ``a high degree of autonomy'' after 
reversion under the rubric ``One Country, Two Systems.'' Some 
remain uneasy about developments since reversion while 
admitting that the transition itself has been generally 
successful, permitting Hong Kong to maintain its autonomy and 
unique character. Most analysts agree that Hong Kong's long-
term success will depend on preserving the quality and 
integrity of Hong Kong's highly respected civil service, 
maintaining and strengthening the rule of law and an 
independent judiciary, and building the vigilance of an 
informed and public-spirited populace. The Chinese government's 
continued commitment to accepting the spirit and letter of the 
Joint Declaration and Basic Law will also be of critical 
importance.
    Critics of the current Hong Kong government accuse it of 
adopting policies and making decisions that it believes will be 
pleasing to the Chinese government in Beijing, most frequently 
without any informal or formal expression of views by the 
latter. Some are concerned about the SAR's 1999 decision to 
refer a decision of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in 
cases involving the right of abode in Hong Kong to the NPC 
Standing Committee. Some critics cite the seemingly abrupt 
retirement of longtime Chief Secretary Anson Chan in 2001 as 
evidence that the integrity of the Hong Kong civil service is 
at risk. Such fears were fueled in 2002 when Chief Executive 
Tung Chee-hwa announced an ``accountability system'' permitting 
him to create a cabinet of appointed ``principal officials'' to 
lead government departments. In addition, many were unsettled 
by the process that gave Mr. Tung a second five-year term in 
early 2002, worrying that the method used to determine his 
candidacy called into question whether the government intends 
to meet the Basic Law's commitment to extend universal suffrage 
and directly elect the Chief Executive and all members of the 
Legislative Council by 2008. Recent statements by senior 
Chinese leaders fuel these concerns about Hong Kong's autonomy.
    The Hong Kong government is studying whether to adopt 
legislation under Article 23 of the Basic Law that deals with 
subversion and sedition. Some fear that the new law could 
become a legal device to limit public discussion or activities 
that the government may deem sensitive to the authorities in 
Beijing. Many have called on the Hong Kong government to ensure 
that any such legislation adheres to international human rights 
standards and that the government promote broad public debate 
and consultation in its drafting.

             Development of Prisoner Database and Registry

    During the coming year, the Commission intends to make 
substantial progress to meet the requirements of the 
legislative mandate to establish and maintain lists of victims 
of human rights abuses in China. This will entail the creation 
of a database of information on political and religious 
prisoners. A custom software application will be developed 
because no off-the-shelf product can provide the features, 
security, or interface needed. An Internet interface will 
provide access to information via a page on the Commission 
website. Development is expected to take at least 12 months. 
Until the database is operating, the Commission will monitor 
the key systemic issues underlying political imprisonment, 
identify individual prisoners who represent these systemic 
abuses, and take measures on their behalf.
    The design of the database will allow collection and 
analysis of a wide variety of information types for prisoners. 
Categories will include biographical and personal information, 
details about detention and imprisonment, the role and behavior 
of police, prosecutors and courts, as well as health, 
maltreatment and torture.
    The database will provide a powerful tool for the Congress, 
the Executive Branch, state and local government, NGOs, 
scholars, and the public to access information about 
individuals currently detained as a consequence of exercising 
internationally recognized human rights. The structure of the 
database will allow diverse queries, including about broad 
groups of victims based on any of many parameters, as well as 
searches based on very specific criteria. Whether a focus is 
defined by the reason for arrest, legal process, a geographic 
area, a period of time, a prison, or a religion, the Commission 
database will provide an invaluable tool for seeking 
information on current political imprisonment in China.

               6. Additional Views of Commission Members


               Dissenting Views of Senator Sam Brownback

    While I strongly support the efforts of the Commission to 
monitor the People's Republic of China's compliance with 
international human rights norms, it is my view that the report 
has some significant hurdles to overcome before I can be 
satisfied that it is fulfilling its mandate.
    The report identifies United States assistance and PRC 
cooperation on rule of law reform as the solution to changing 
the human rights situation in China. By directing the report's 
criticism away from the deliberate policies of the PRC 
Government that undermine international human rights norms, the 
Commission does a disservice. It is well known that the 
Government routinely uses the absence of rule of law to explain 
away human rights abuses, while also denying that they exist.
    As well, I have deep concerns with China's well-known 
reliance on forced sterilizations and abortions as part of its 
aggressive enforcement of its' population targeting programs.
    Earlier this year, in commenting on China's enforcement of 
its population programs, Secretary of State Colin Powell said 
in a letter dated July 21, 2002, ``Regrettably, the PRC has in 
place a regime of severe penalties on women who have unapproved 
births. This regime plainly operates to coerce pregnant women 
to have abortions . . .''
    The problem of coercive abortions and forced sterilizations 
in China is more than a serious problem, it is an international 
outrage. I would hope that the Commission would conduct a very 
thorough and intensive review of this issue and deal more 
substantially with these concerns in its report next year.
    For these reasons, I am unable to support this report. I 
would hope that next year's report will address these concerns 
more fully.

             Dissenting Views of Representative Frank Wolf

    While this first report by the Congressional Executive 
Commission on China (CECC) contains some worthwhile 
recommendations and observations on the continued human rights 
abuses in the People's Republic of China, I do not believe it 
sufficiently describes and addresses the degree to which these 
human rights abuses can be laid at the feet of the Government 
of China.
    In a recent letter to all CECC commissioners, human rights 
advocate Harry Wu outlined several human rights issues in China 
that should have been included or discussed with more vigor and 
analysis in this report. I share in Mr. Wu's analysis.
    For example, the section of the report on village elections 
gives the impression that the practice of village elections may 
be a positive development in a transition to democracy in 
China, without seriously analyzing whether or not the Communist 
Part may use village elections as a method of establishing 
control in the rural regions. The report says that ``critics of 
the process say that the Communist Party manipulates the 
outcome [s],'' but it does not adequately assert that China's 
rulers may use village elections as part of a strategy to 
maintain control.
    On another matter which Mr. Wu raises, it is perplexing 
that the report fails to reflect the debate this year in 
Congress and in the Bush Administration about China's planned 
birth policy, particularly regarding whether or not the 
Administration would withhold funding from the United Nations 
Population Control Fund. This important issue is not addressed 
in this, the first, report of the commission and is conspicuous 
by its absence. The commission recently held a hearing on this 
subject, and I believe the report should address in detail 
China's planned birth policy.
    Similarly, I agree with Mr. Wu that the report fails to 
discuss China's state-sponsored harvesting and trafficking of 
prisoners' organs, where a common thief can be executed in 
order for his organs to be sold for transplanting. Can you 
imagine being imprisoned for a minor offense and ending up 
being shot in the head and having your kidneys or corneas 
removed to be sold? Congress has held numerous hearings on this 
issue and the news media has written about this issue, but the 
report fails to discuss this horrible practice.
    I also believe the recommendations on religious freedom 
should be stronger. While these recommendations may be well-
intentioned, they lack the necessary depth of discussion in 
addressing the Chinese Government's continued persecution of 
believers of all faiths--Roman Catholics, Protestants, Falun 
Gong practitioners, Muslim Uighurs, and Tibetan Buddhists.
    Furthermore, I am concerned that this commission may not be 
willing to be a direct advocate on behalf of human rights and 
religious freedom, through letters or conversations with 
Chinese officials.
    As I stated at a commission hearing this year, this panel 
should follow the model of the Helsinki Commission and be vocal 
in its advocacy for individual cases and human rights in 
general. I agree with John Kamm, president of the Dui Hua 
religious freedom organization, who has done more than almost 
anyone I know for human rights in China, who said at a 
commission hearing, ``The model should be the Helsinki 
Commission . . . I foresee a day when this commission . . . is 
an arsenal of human rights.''
    The Helsinki Commission does not hesitate to write directly 
to leaders of member countries advocating human rights and 
religious freedom. The Helsinki Commission has done more than 
almost any other entity to bring freedom, hope and democracy to 
the former Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries. The 
CECC ought to follow this successful model. But, clearly, this 
has not yet occurred, and it is almost as if the CECC is afraid 
that it will offend the China Government.
     If I were a prisoner in China today, I wonder if I would 
have the same amount of trust and hope in the CECC to take up 
my case with Chinese officials as Soviet dissidents had in the 
Helsinki Commission, which was a tireless advocate with 
officials in the former Soviet Union.
    While there are those of us on the commission on differing 
sides of the China PNTR issue, I am concerned with the 
perception that many of the commission's staff are more skilled 
in the areas of business and trade than in the area of human 
rights. As the law that created the CECC states, monitoring 
China's compliance on respecting human rights is a primary task 
of the commission. I believe the commission's efforts would be 
enhanced if staff expertise were more balanced, especially to 
include more staff who have the passion for promoting human 
rights in China. While I know that the commission staff is 
composed of competent and skilled professionals, and they are 
people of integrity, I have been very disappointed with their 
shortcomings in human rights and religious freedom advocacy.
    For the reasons outlined above, I believe this report has 
some serious gaps in its coverage of human rights in China and 
I cannot sign the report.
    This commission was created with a mandate to promote human 
rights in China. Unfortunately, I do not see this happening. 
Human rights organizations have expressed similar concerns to 
me and some have even questioned whether the commission should 
continue to exist. I have similar questions regarding the 
continued viability of the commission.
    Lastly, an observation: the fundamental problem in China in 
regard to the government's human rights abuses and restriction 
on human liberty is not the ``law'' in China, but the 
``regime'' in China. The root problem in China is not just a 
faulty legal system, but a corrupt, totalitarian, oppressive, 
communist ruling regime that consistently violates human rights 
and religious freedom of its own citizens--Roman Catholics, 
Protestants, Falun Gong practitioners, Muslim Uighurs, Tibetan 
Buddhists or almost anyone who strives to worship and live with 
liberty.

            Additional Views of Representative Sander Levin

    The Congressional-Executive Commission on China was created 
to play an active role to both engage and pressure China to 
create a more open society with greater respect for human 
rights, worker rights and rule of law. The importance of this 
effort is underlined by the vital strategic role of the United 
States and the increasing significance of China. The United 
States and China are the largest and third largest economies in 
the world, respectively. The relationship between our countries 
is of crucial importance and is becoming increasingly more so.
    Although China is different from the former Soviet Union, 
and specific strategies and techniques will need to vary, the 
effective and activist role undertaken by the Helsinki 
Commission succeeded in focusing a spotlight on human rights 
and rule of law issues. In these ways, the Helsinki Commission 
served as an example in the establishment of this high-level 
Congressional-Executive Commission and should provide 
encouragement for it to meet its necessary and important 
challenge. The Commission has the potential to become a new 
meeting place for ideas on China and add an important new 
dimension to our bilateral relationship.
    In its inaugural year, the China Commission has held 
several important hearings, a number of staff roundtables and 
staff have visited China. The coming year provides the 
Commission an opportunity to accelerate, and enhance its 
efforts both at the Commissioner and staff levels. In this 
regard, the following are activities that would enhance the 
Commission's role:

           Regular visits by Commissioners and staff to 
        China to meet with key Chinese government and party 
        officials to engage the Chinese in difficult issues 
        regarding human rights and rule of law.
           Prominent participation by Commissioners in 
        senior level Chinese official visits to the United 
        States and in developing an on-going relationship with 
        the Chinese Ambassador to the United States and his 
        staff.
           Through its political prisoner project, not 
        only pursuing the important task of collecting names of 
        political prisoners but also developing strategies to 
        seek the release of specific prisoners and addressing 
        the larger systemic issues that these prisoners 
        symbolize.
           Exploring all multilateral avenues to 
        pressure China on violations of international 
        standards, such as working through the U.N. Commission 
        on Human Rights, the International Labor Organization, 
        as well as reaching out to other countries with ties to 
        China. Without other countries' support and 
        concurrence, our efforts to press China to improve its 
        compliance with international human rights and worker 
        rights standards will be less effective over the long 
        term.
           Continuously throughout the year, 
        anticipating, responding to and providing analysis of 
        significant human rights and rule of law events and 
        developments in China and proposing creative and 
        constructive policy and legislative responses.
           Becoming an important forum for its 
        Congressional Commissioners to air their broad spectrum 
        of views on China, to forge a bipartisan consensus and 
        thereby strengthen the Commission.
           Becoming an important forum for exchange of 
        views between Congress and the Executive Branch through 
        its Commissioners from each branch.
           Focusing concerted attention and analysis on 
        a few carefully selected broad, crosscutting human 
        rights and rule of law issues of particular current 
        relevance in China. In the coming year, such themes 
        might include workers rights and corporate social 
        responsibility.
           Energetically reaching out to the broad 
        spectrum of constituencies that work on human rights 
        and rule of law issues in China, such as the NGO 
        community and providing a forum for exchange of views 
        and as a key conduit for these groups to work with 
        Congress and where appropriate, finding means to 
        support Chinese human rights and workers rights 
        activists, either directly or through agencies working 
        on their behalf.

    In the coming year, I look forward to working with the 
Commissioners and Commission staff to bring to fruition key 
activities and to achieve the Commission's potential to play a 
vital role in shaping the U.S.-China relationship and improving 
human rights, worker rights, and the rule of law in China.

            Additional Views of Representative Sherrod Brown

    I joined this Commission in May 2002. As a member who stood 
in staunch opposition to extending most favored nation 
treatment to the People's Republic of China by granting 
permanent normal trade relations (PNTR), I harbored my own 
misgivings over the Commission's focus. But I was committed, 
and remain committed, to helping make trade work between the 
U.S. and China.
    The Commissioners and staff put forward great effort in 
creating this report. It is clear to me that several members 
made significant leaps in reaching compromises on various 
issues. But even after such endeavors, I must reluctantly 
oppose the final draft of the Commission's annual report. I do 
not oppose the observations made in this report. In fact, the 
signatures on this report represent a sea change among members 
of Congress and the Administration in recognizing the state of 
affairs in China. In the upcoming years, I am encouraged that 
this commission can work together and might develop itself into 
a force for change.
    My concern with the report, and my reason for not signing, 
is that the report does not do enough to promote change. These 
recommendations will do little to create tangible changes in 
China. To adequately address the concerns of the Chinese 
people, the Commission must aggressively push Congress, the 
Administration, the Chinese government, and the American 
business community.
    I commend the Commission for identifying corporate 
responsibility as a specific topic to be debated in the 
upcoming year, but I regret that the overall report falls short 
in recognizing the unmistakable role many American companies 
play in China's abuse of human rights. Why should another year 
pass before the Commission speaks out on this issue? This 
should have been a major topic for this year's agenda and 
should not have been omitted from the main body of this work. 
As we strive to encourage democracy in developing nations, 
something is obviously amiss in our China policy if American 
companies simply promote the status quo in China.
    During the PNTR debate, as CEOs of multi-national 
corporations lobbied to eliminate virtually any standards or 
rules governing trade with China, they talked about access to 
the 1.2 billion customers in China. What they did not say is 
that their real interest is 1.2 billion Chinese workers--
workers whom they pay cents to the dollar in comparison to 
American workers.
    Many executives claim that increasing trade with China will 
force China to improve its human rights record. But history 
shows that engagement alone will not necessarily bring 
democracy to China. As we engage with developing countries in 
trade and investment, democratic countries in the developing 
world have been losing ground to more authoritarian countries, 
where people enjoy far fewer freedoms and a working environment 
often hostile to discussion of labor rights and unions.
    In the Post-Cold War decade, the share of developing 
country exports to the U.S. for democratic nations fell from 
53.4 percent in 1989 to 34.9 percent in 1998, a decrease in 
18.5 percentage points.
    It goes without saying that western corporations are 
interested in investing in countries that have below-poverty 
wages, poor environmental standards, no worker benefits, and no 
opportunities to bargain collectively. As developing nations 
make progress toward democracy, as they increase worker rights 
and create regulations to protect the environment, the American 
business community too often plays a counter-productive role of 
punishing these countries by transferring their trade and 
investment elsewhere in search of more accommodating regimes 
that may ignore environmental degradation, inadequate health 
care, limits on human rights, widespread poverty, or worse.
    The People's Republic of China ignores the United Nations 
High Commission for Human Rights. They ignore the U.S. 
Commission on International Religious Freedom and the State 
Department's country reports. They ignore the agreements of the 
International Labor Organization. By only discussing these 
issues, our inaction would only encourage China's less than 
desirable behavior.
    This Commission should be making recommendations to 
American companies, such as advocating for worker empowerment 
and the right to assemble and bargain collectively. We should 
address the complicated issue of sub-contracting, where 
American companies can take advantage of oppressive working 
conditions without being held directly responsible. We should 
recommend that the US government encourage companies to adopt 
and follow a progressive code of conduct. The Secretary of 
Commerce, OPIC, and the Export Import Bank should be directed 
to give preference to companies that have a strong code of 
conduct and prove they have been following it in their business 
practices.
    We must also keep in mind that most reforms in Chinese law 
are meant to maintain stability in the country. They are not a 
result of philosophical changes in the government's agenda. To 
fully understand China's disdain for rules that impinge on 
their authority, simply look at the promises China has not kept 
as a new member of the World Trade Organization.
    Recently the United States, Japan, the EU, Australia, 
Taiwan, and Canada have confronted the Chinese at the WTO, 
demanding adequate responses to inquiries over market access 
and tariff-rate quota commitments in areas such as cars, 
fertilizers, machinery, newsprint, photographic material and 
beer. Instead, Chinese officials have brushed off these demands 
and characterized other WTO members as ``troublemakers.''
    This Commission needs to become an agent for change, 
similar to the Helsinki Commission and the role it played with 
the Soviet Union. We should encourage all American companies to 
apply to their operations in China the ideals our nation 
embraces. As we move forward, the Commission should measure any 
changes in China on an on-going basis and hold the People's 
Republic of China accountable for the promises it has made to 
the United States, the international community, and most 
importantly, its own citizens.

                              7. Appendix


                      Appendix 1.--Website Summary

    The Congressional-Executive Commission on China is 
committed to promoting the development of human rights and the 
rule of law in China. A crucial part of that task is providing 
information about these issues to the public in the United 
States, China, and around the world. To that end, the 
Commission maintains a website (www.cecc.gov) with 
comprehensive information about the Commission and its 
activities. This website is a useful resource, allowing a wide 
range of people to access information easily and to increase 
their understanding of issues related to human rights and the 
rule of law in China. The information on the website currently 
includes:

           The 2002 Annual Report issued by the 
        Commission;
           The Executive Summary of the 2002 Annual 
        Report in
            Chinese;
           Prepared testimony and complete transcripts 
        from the 
            Commission's hearings;
           Prepared testimony and complete transcripts 
        from the 
            Commission's staff-led roundtables;
           The Commission's upcoming activities;
           Background information on the Commission's 
        members
            and staff; and
           Links related to the U.S. government, the 
        Chinese govern
            ment, U.S.-China organizations, human rights, 
        religion, 
            labor, news media, Tibet, Uighurs, and the rule of 
        law.

    The database of rule of law and human rights programs of 
national governments, NGOs, and multilateral organizations in 
China will soon be available on the website. This database will 
be continuously updated as the Commission receives new 
information. Suggestions for corrections or additions are 
welcome, and should be emailed to Samantha Palans at: 
[email protected].
    In the future, the website also will permit users to 
request information from the prisoner database and registry.

               Appendix 2.--Commission Activities in 2002

Hearings

February 7      Human Rights in the Context of the Rule of Law

                                                William Alford, Harvard 
                                                Law School
                                                James V. Feinerman, 
                                                Georgetown University 
                                                Law Center
                                                Mike Jendrzejczyk, 
                                                Human Rights Watch
                                                Xiao Qiang, Human 
                                                Rights In China

April 11         Taming the Dragon: Can Legal Reform Foster
                                 Respect for Human Rights in 
                                China?

                                                John Kamm, The Dui Hua 
                                                Foundation
                                                Jonathan Hecht, Yale 
                                                Law School
                                                T. Kumar, Amnesty 
                                                International
                                                Michael Posner, Lawyers 
                                                Committee For Human 
                                                Rights

June 6           WTO: Will China Keep Its Promises? Can It?

                                                Susan S. Westin, 
                                                General Accounting 
                                                Office
                                                Christian Murck, 
                                                American Chamber of 
                                                Commerce in China
                                                Donald C. Clarke, 
                                                University of 
                                                Washington, Seattle
                                                Grant D. Aldonas, Under 
                                                Secretary of Commerce 
                                                for International Trade
                                                Jeffrey L. Fiedler, 
                                                Food and Allied Service 
                                                Trades Department, AFL-
                                                CIO
                                                Jon M. Huntsman, Deputy 
                                                U.S. Trade 
                                                Representative

Roundtables

March 4        Open Forum on Human Rights and the Rule of Law

                                                Wenzhuo Hou, Harvard 
                                                Law School
                                                Ignatius Y. Ding, 
                                                Silicon Valley for 
                                                Democracy in China
                                                G. Eugene Martin, 
                                                Foreign Affairs 
                                                Consultant
                                                Raj Purohit, Lawyers 
                                                Committee For Human 
                                                Rights
                                                Erping Zhang, Falun 
                                                Gong International 
                                                Committee for Human 
                                                Rights

March 18        Labor Rights in China

                                                Bama Athreya, 
                                                International Labor 
                                                Rights Fund
                                                Mark Hankin, American 
                                                Center for 
                                                International Labor 
                                                Solidarity, AFL-CIO
                                                Tony Freeman, 
                                                International Labor 
                                                Office

March 25        Religious Freedom

                                                Paul Marshall, Center 
                                                For Religious Freedom, 
                                                Freedom House
                                                Thomas E. Quigley, U.S. 
                                                Conference of Catholic 
                                                Bishops
                                                Joseph Kung, Cardinal 
                                                Kung Foundation
                                                David Aikman, Foreign 
                                                Affairs Consultant

April 15         Wired China: Whose Hand is on the Switch?

                                                Kathryn Hauser, 
                                                Technology Industry 
                                                Council
                                                Sharon K. Hom, Human 
                                                Rights in China
                                                Edward Kaufman, 
                                                Broadcasting Board of 
                                                Governors
                                                James C. Mulvenon, RAND 
                                                Center for Asia-Pacific 
                                                Policy

May 24          Promoting Rule of Law in China

                                                Nancy Yuan, Asia 
                                                Foundation
                                                Robert Reinstein, 
                                                Temple University 
                                                School of Law
                                                Robert Kapp, U.S.-China 
                                                Business Council
                                                William Sullivan, 
                                                Syracuse University

June 10        Ethnic Minorities in China: Tibetans and Uighurs

                                                Bhuchung Tsering, 
                                                International Campaign 
                                                for Tibet
                                                Elliot Sperling, 
                                                Indiana University
                                                Arthur Holcombe, Tibet 
                                                Poverty Alleviation 
                                                Fund
                                                Justin Rudelson, 
                                                University of Maryland
                                                Dolkun Kamberi, Radio 
                                                Free Asia

June 24         Restrictions on Media Freedom in China

                                                James Mann, Center for 
                                                Strategic and 
                                                International Studies
                                                Kavita Menon, Committee 
                                                to Protect Journalists
                                                He Qinglian, Princeton 
                                                University

July 8           Village Elections

                                                Liu Yawei, Carter 
                                                Center
                                                Anne Thurston, School 
                                                of Advanced 
                                                International Studies, 
                                                The Johns Hopkins 
                                                University
                                                Elizabeth Dugan, 
                                                International 
                                                Republican Institute

July 26          China's Criminal Justice System

                                                Jerome A. Cohen, New 
                                                York University School 
                                                of Law
                                                Murray Scot Tanner, 
                                                Western Michigan 
                                                University
                                                Veron Mei-Ying Hung, 
                                                Carnegie Endowment for 
                                                International Peace
                                                Jonathan Hecht, Yale 
                                                Law School

August 5        Open Forum on Human Rights and the Rule of Law

                                                Christine Shea, Amnesty 
                                                International
                                                Shiyu Zhou, University 
                                                of Pennsylvania
                                                Enhebatu Togochog, 
                                                Southern Mongolian 
                                                Human Rights 
                                                Information Center
                                                Sokrat Saydahmat, 
                                                Uyghur American 
                                                Association
                                                Derek Wong, University 
                                                of Pennsylvania
                                                Kathy Polias, Uyghur 
                                                Human Rights Coalition

September 9      HIV/AIDS in China: Can Disaster Be Averted?

                                                Bates Gill, Center for 
                                                Strategic and 
                                                International Studies
                                                Don des Jarlais, Beth 
                                                Israel Medical Center
                                                Joan Kaufman, Harvard 
                                                Law School

September 23     Women's Rights: China's New Population and
                                        Family Planning Law

                                                Edwin A. Winckler, 
                                                Columbia University
                                                Stirling Scruggs, 
                                                United Nations 
                                                Population Fund
                                                Bonnie Glick, Member, 
                                                2002 U.S. Assessment 
                                                Team to China
                                                Susan Greenhalgh, 
                                                University of 
                                                California, Irvine
                                                John Aird, Bureau of 
                                                the Census, Retired

Other

February 13    Chairman Max Baucus and Co-Chairman Doug
                                Bereuter write a letter to 
                                President Bush urging human 
                                rights dialogue with Beijing.

March 13       The Commission's 18 Congressional members send
                                 a letter to President Bush 
                                urging United States support 
                                for a China resolution at the 
                                United Nations Human Rights 
                                Commission (UNHRC) meeting in 
                                Geneva.

April 11        Co-Chairman Doug Bereuter delivers a speech to
                                the Washington International 
                                Trade Association.

May 6-18       Staff Director Ira Wolf, Senior Advisor Steve 
Mar-
                                shall, and Specialist on Ethnic 
                                Minorities Anne Tsai visit 
                                Beijing, Chengdu, Lhasa, and 
                                Urumqi.

July 2         Commissioners' staffers meet with Han Dongfang,
                                Editor of the China Labour 
                                Bulletin

      Appendix 3.--China's International Human Rights Commitments


    FOUNDATIONAL UNITED NATIONS INSTRUMENTS RELATED TO HUMAN RIGHTS

           United Nations Charter
           Universal Declaration of Human Rights

CORE UNITED NATIONS INSTRUMENTS RELATED TO HUMAN RIGHTS SIGNED, RATIFIED
                         OR ACCEDED TO BY CHINA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Convention or Protocol    Ratification Status         Reservations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Covenant    Ratified March 27,     The application of
 on Economic, Social and   2001                   Article 8.1 (a) of the
 Cultural Rights                                  Covenant to the
                                                  People's Republic of
                                                  China shall be
                                                  consistent with the
                                                  relevant provisions of
                                                  the Constitution of
                                                  the People's Republic
                                                  of China, Trade Union
                                                  Law of the People's
                                                  Republic of China and
                                                  Labor Law of the
                                                  People's Republic of
                                                  China.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Covenant    Signed October 5,
 on Civil and Political    1998
 Rights                   Not yet ratified
------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Convention  Acceded to December    The People's Republic
 on the Elimination of     29, 1981               of China has
 All Forms of Racial                              reservations on the
 Discrimination                                   provisions of article
                                                  22 of the Convention
                                                  and will not be bound
                                                  by it.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Convention  Acceded to April 18,
 on the Suppression and    1983
 Punishment of the Crime
 of Apartheid
------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Convention  Signed October 21,
 Against Apartheid in      1987
 Sports                   Not yet ratified
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Convention on the         Ratified November 18,  The People's Republic
 Elimination of All        1980                   of China does not
 Forms of Discrimination                          consider itself bound
 Against Women                                    by paragraph 1 of
                                                  article 29 of the
                                                  Convention.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Convention on the Rights  Ratified March 3,      The People's Republic
 of the Child              1992                   of China shall fulfill
                                                  its obligations
                                                  provided by article 6
                                                  of the Convention
                                                  under the prerequisite
                                                  that the Convention
                                                  accords with the
                                                  provisions of article
                                                  25 concerning family
                                                  planning of the
                                                  Constitution of the
                                                  People's Republic of
                                                  China and in
                                                  conformity with the
                                                  provisions of article
                                                  2 of the Law of Minor
                                                  Children of the
                                                  People's Republic of
                                                  China.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Optional Protocol to the  Signed March 15, 2001
 Convention on the        Not yet ratified
 Rights of the Child on
 the Involvement of
 Children in Armed
 Conflict
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Optional Protocol to the  Signed September 6,
 Convention on the         2000
 Rights of the Child on
 the Sale of Children,
 Child Prostitution and
 Child Pornography
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Convention Against        Ratified October 4,    1. The Chinese
 Torture and Other         1988                   Government does not
 Cruel, Inhuman or                                recognize the
 Degrading Treatment or                           competence of the
 Punishment                                       Committee against
                                                  Torture as provided
                                                  for in article 20 of
                                                  the Convention.
                                                 2. The Chinese
                                                  Government does not
                                                  consider itself bound
                                                  by paragraph 1 of
                                                  article 30 of the
                                                  Convention.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Convention relating to    Acceded to September   [Subject to]
 the Status of Refugees    24, 1982               reservations on the
                                                  following articles:
                                                 1. The latter half of
                                                  article 14, which
                                                  reads
                                                 ``In the territory of
                                                  any other Contracting
                                                  State, he shall be
                                                  accorded the same
                                                  protection as is
                                                  accorded in that
                                                  territory to nationals
                                                  of the country in
                                                  which he has his
                                                  habitual residence.''
                                                 2. Article 16 (3).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Protocol Relating to the  Acceded to September
 Status of Refugees        24, 1982
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Convention on the         Ratified April 18,
 Prevention and            1983
 Punishment of the Crime
 of Genocide
------------------------------------------------------------------------


  SELECTED INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION CONVENTIONS RATIFIED BY OR
                           ACCEDED TO BY CHINA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
    No.                   Convention               Date of Ratification
------------------------------------------------------------------------
C.11         Right of Association (Agriculture)   1984*
              Convention, 1921
------------------------------------------------------------------------
C.14         Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention,   1984*
              1921
------------------------------------------------------------------------
C.19         Equality of Treatment (Accident      1984*
              Compensation) Convention, 1925
------------------------------------------------------------------------
C.26         Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery        1984*
              Convention
------------------------------------------------------------------------
C.45         Underground Work Women Convention,   1984*
              1935
------------------------------------------------------------------------
C.80         Final Articles Revision Convention,  1984*
              1946
------------------------------------------------------------------------
C.100        Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951  Ratified November 11,
                                                   1990
------------------------------------------------------------------------
C.122        Employment Policy Convention, 1964   Ratified December 17,
                                                   1997
------------------------------------------------------------------------
C.138        Minimum Age Convention, 1973         Ratified April 4, 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
C.144        Tripartite Consultation              Ratified November 2,
              International Labor Standards        1990
              Convention, 1976
------------------------------------------------------------------------
C.150        Labor Administration Convention,     Ratified March 7, 2002
              1978
------------------------------------------------------------------------
C.159        Vocational Rehabilitation and        Ratified February 2,
              Employment (Disabled Persons)        1988
              Convention, 1983
------------------------------------------------------------------------
C.167        Safe and Health in Construction      Ratified March 7, 2002
              Convention, 1978
------------------------------------------------------------------------
C.170        Chemical Convention, 1990            Ratified January 11,
                                                   1995
------------------------------------------------------------------------
C.182        Worst Forms of Child Labour          Ratified June 29, 2002
              Convention, 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* In a letter dated July 11, 1984, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
  the People's Republic of China informed the ILO that China agreed to
  recognize this convention, which was ratified before October 1, 1949
  by the then Chinese government.

                                Endnotes

    \1\ This report was approved by a vote of 18 to 5.
    Voted to approve: Senators Baucus, Levin, Feinstein, Dorgan, Bayh, 
Hagel, and Hutchinson, Representatives Bereuter, Leach, Dreier, Pitts, 
Levin, and Davis, Undersecretaries Dobriansky and Aldonas, Deputy 
Secretary Findlay, Assistant Secretaries Craner and Kelly.
    Voted not to approve: Senators Smith and Brownback, Representatives 
Wolf, Kaptur, and Brown.
    \2\ United States-China Relations Act, Public Law No. 106-286, div. 
B, title III, sec. 301, 114 Stat. 895 (2000) [hereinafter ``2000 China 
Relations Act''].
    \3\ Constitution of the People's Republic of China, ch. II 
[hereinafter ``Chinese Constitution''].
    \4\ Chinese Constitution, arts. 36, 51-54.
    \5\ See, e.g., ibid., art. 4.
    \6\ Chinese Constitution, ch. II.
    \7\ Albert Hung-yee Chen, An Introduction to the Legal System of 
the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong: Butterworths, 1992), 32.
    \8\ Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-1982) 
(Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), 282.
    \9\ See, e.g., Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the 
Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Hong Kong: 
Joint Publishing Co., 1978).
    \10\ Wei Jingsheng, The Courage to Stand Alone: Letters from Prison 
and Other Writings (New York: Viking, 1997).
    \11\ Human Rights in the Context of the Rule of Law: Hearing Before 
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 7 February 2002 
[hereinafter ``Human Rights in the Context of the Rule of Law: 
Commission Hearing''], Written Statement Submitted by William Alford, 
Henry L. Stimson Professor of Law and Director of East Asian Legal 
Studies Program, Harvard Law School.
    \12\ Organic Law of the People's Courts of the People's Republic of 
China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renmin fayuan zuzhifa], adopted 1 July 
1979; Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates of the People's 
Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin jianchayuan zuzhifa], adopted 5 July 
1979; Organic Law of Local People's Congresses and Local People's 
Governments of the People's Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo difang geji renmin daibiao dahui he difang geji renmin 
zhengfu zuzhifa], adopted 4 July 1979.
    \13\ Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures Law of the People's 
Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhongwai hezi jingying 
qiyefa], adopted 1 July 1979; Economic Contract Law of the People's 
Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji hetongfa], adopted 
13 December 1981.
    \14\ As is noted below in the section on criminal justice, the 1997 
revisions to the Criminal Law eliminated the category of counter-
revolutionary crimes. However, many of the political acts once 
prosecuted as ``counter-revolutionary'' are now handled under the 
provisions on endangering state security or disrupting public order. 
Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo xingfa], adopted 1 July 1979, amended 14 March 1997, part II, 
chs. I, II, and VI).
    \15\ See Mao Zedong's 1957 speech ``On the Correct Handling of 
Contradictions Among the People,'' in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, 
Vol. 5 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), 384-421.
    \16\ Law of the People's Republic of China on Protecting State 
Secrets [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo baoshou guojia mimifa], adopted 5 
September 1988.
    \17\ State Security Law of the People's Republic of China [Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo guojia anquan fa], adopted 22 February 1993.
    \18\ Administrative Litigation Law of the People's Republic of 
China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng susongfa], adopted 4 April 
1989 [hereinafter ``Administrative Litigation Law'']; State 
Compensation Law of the People's Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo guojia peichangfa], adopted 12 May 1994.
    \19\ Consumer Rights Protection Law of the People's Republic of 
China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xiaofeizhe quanyi baohufa], adopted 31 
October 1993.
    \20\ 2001 Law Yearbook of China [2001 Zhongguo falu nianjian] 
(Beijing: Law Yearbook of China Press, 2001), 864; 1987 Law Yearbook of 
China [Zhongguo falu nianjian] (Beijing: Law Yearbook of China Press, 
1987), 883.
    \21\ Lawyers Law of the People's Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo lushifa], adopted 15 May 1996.
    \22\ President Bush at Tsinghua (Qinghua) University, White House 
News Release, 22 February 2002,  (12 September 2002).
    \23\ Chinese Constitution, art. 36.
    \24\ Religious Freedom in China: Staff Roundtable of the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China [hereinafter ``Religious 
Freedom in China: Commission Roundtable''], 25 March 2002, Testimony of 
Paul Marshall, Senior Fellow, Center for Religious Freedom, Freedom 
House.
    \25\ Regulations on Managing Places for Religious Activities 
[Zongjiao huodong changsuo guanli tiaoli], issued 31 January 1994.
    \26\ Chinese Constitution, art. 36.
    \27\ Religious Freedom in China: Commission Roundtable, Marshall 
Testimony.
    \28\ Religious Freedom in China: Commission Roundtable, Testimony 
of Thomas E. Quigley, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops.
    \29\ Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress on Banning Heretical Cult Organizations, Preventing and 
Punishing Cult Organizations [Guanyu chudi xiejiao zuzhi, fangfan he 
chengzhi xiejiao huodong de jueding], issued 30 October 1999.
    \30\ Religious Freedom in China: Commission Roundtable, Testimony 
of David Aikman, Foreign Affairs Consultant.
    \31\ Center For Religious Freedom, ``Freedom House Calls On 
President Bush To Protest China's Plan To Execute Christian Leader,'' 3 
January 2002,  (20 August 2002).
    \32\ Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United 
States, ``Chinese Embassy Spokesman: Gong Shengliang is Guilty of 
Establishing Cult Organization and Raping Women,'' 9 January 2002, 
 (2 August 2002).
    \33\ Ibid.
    \34\ Religious Freedom in China: Commission Roundtable, Marshall 
Testimony.
    \35\ Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United 
States, ``Gong Shengliang is Guilty of Establishing Cult Organization 
and Raping Women.''
    \36\ Religious Freedom in China: Commission Roundtable, Marshall 
Testimony.
    \37\ The Committee for Investigation on Persecution of Religion in 
China, ``Religion and National Security in China: Secret Documents from 
China's Security Sector,'' 11 February 2002,  (31 July 
2002).
    \38\ Ibid.
    \39\ Message of Pope John Paul II to China, 24 October 2001, 
 (3 September 2002).
    \40\ Religious Freedom in China: Commission Roundtable, Quigley 
Testimony.
    \41\ Ibid.
    \42\ Center for Religious Freedom, ``List of 33 Bishops and Priests 
Arrested or Restricted in China,'' 21 February 2002,  (31 July 2002).
    \43\ See, e.g., Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. 
Department of State, ``Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2001, 
China, including Hong Kong and Macau,'' 4 March 2002, 7,  (20 March 2002) 
[hereinafter ``State Department Human Rights Report, China'']; Human 
Rights Watch, Human Rights Concerns in Xinjiang, October 2001; Amnesty 
International, ``China's Anti-Terrorism Legislation and Repression in 
the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region,'' March 2002, 10-12,  (1 April 2002).
    \44\ Commission Staff Meeting with senior officials of the Legal 
System Committee of the People's Congress of Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous 
Region, and the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region Justice Department, 
16 May 2002 [hereinafter ``Staff Meeting with Xinjiang People's 
Congress and Justice Department''].
    \45\ See, e.g., Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, ``Mosque Leaders' Re-
education Campaign Stepped Up,'' South China Morning Post, 14 November 
2001,  (1 August 2002); 
Human Rights Watch, China Human Rights Update, February 2002, 11.
    \46\ BBC, ``Islam in China,''  (23 September 2002).
    \47\ Human Rights Watch, Dangerous Meditations: China's Campaign 
Against Falungong, January 2002, 4.
    \48\ The discussion of each issue in Section 4 of the report is 
followed by a list of key national laws, regulations, and decisions 
related to that issue area. The lists are not exhaustive, but rather 
illustrative, and are intended to provide the reader with a starting 
point for understanding relevant law. For example, local laws and 
regulations, which often are more detailed and more restrictive than 
their national-level counterparts, are not included.
    \49\ International Labour Organization Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work, adopted 19 June 1998 [hereinafter ``ILO 
Declaration''], art. 2; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, entered into force 23 March 1976 [hereinafter ``ICCPR'']; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, entered 
into force 3 January 1976 [hereinafter ``ICESCR'']. China ratified the 
ICESCR on March 27, 2001 with reservations (see Appendix 2).
    \50\ See, e.g., Human Rights Watch Report, Paying the Price: Worker 
Unrest in Northeast China, p. 2.
    \51\ ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 
adopted 19 June 1998, art. 2; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
adopted 10 December 1948, art. 20 [hereinafter Universal Declaration]; 
ICESCR, arts. 21, 49.
    \52\ Chinese Constitution, art. 35.
    \53\ Trade Union Law of the People's Republic of China [Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo gonghuifa], adopted 3 April 1992, amended 27 October 
2001, arts. 4, 9, 11.
    \54\ Constitution of the All China Federation of Trade Unions 
[Zhonghua quanguo zong gonghui zhangcheng], General Principles, para. 
4.
    \55\ Human Rights in the Context of Rule of Law: Commission 
Hearing, Written Statement Submitted by Mike Jendrzejczyk, Washington 
Director, Human Rights Watch Asia.
    \56\ Jiang Xueqin, ``Fighting to Organize,'' Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 6 September 2001, 72.
    \57\ People's Daily, ``Wei Jianxing,'' 24 September 2002  (20 August 
2002).
    \58\ Anita Chan, ``China and the International Labour Movement,'' 
China Review (Summer 2001); Commission Staff Meeting with John 
Chamberlin, First Secretary, Labor Affairs, Economic Section, Embassy 
of the United States in Beijing, 23 July 2002.
    \59\ Constitution of the All China Federation of Trade Unions, 
General Principles, para. 6.
    \60\ Chinese Constitution, art. 35; ICCPR, arts. 19, 21; ICESCR, 
art. 8(d).
    \61\ ``Deprived Groups May Be the Greatest Threat to Society,'' 
South China Morning Post, 6 February 2002.
    \62\ ``Labour Unrest Spreads to 16 Provinces and Municipalities,'' 
Hong Kong Cheng Min, 1 April 2002, translated in FBIS, Doc ID 
CPP20020404000066.
    \63\ Human Rights Watch, Paying the Price: Worker Unrest in 
Northeast China, August 2002, 15-38.
    \64\ Thomas Lum, Congressional Research Service, China: Labor 
Conditions and Unrest, Report for Congress, 15 October 2001, 13.
    \65\ PRC Ministry of Labor and Social Security, ``2001 Annual 
Statistical Report on the Development of Labor and Social Security 
Work,'' 3,  (20 August 
2002).
    \66\ Guangdong Province Labor and Social Security Office, Guangdong 
Province Workers' Labor Contract (Non-Local Personnel: Temporary 
Employment) (on file with the Commission).
    \67\ Labor Law of the People's Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo laodongfa], adopted 5 July 1994 [hereinafter ``PRC Labor 
Law''], arts. 52, 53-55, 56; Law of the People's Republic of China on 
the Prevention and Cure of Occupational Diseases, adopted 27 October 
2001; PRC Regulations on Labor Protection in Workplaces where Toxic 
Products Are Used, issued 12 May 2002; and the Work Safety Law of the 
People's Republic of China, adopted 29 June 2002. China has also 
promulgated regulations on administrative penalties for violations of 
the Labor Law and ascertaining responsibility for serious industrial 
accidents.  See Administrative Penalty Measures for Violating the Labor 
Law [Weifan zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodongfa xingzheng chufa banfa], 
adopted 26 December 1994; Regulations on Ascertaining Administrative 
Responsibility for Extremely Serious Accidents Due to Negligence of 
Production Safety [Guowuyuan guanyu teda anquan shigu xingzheng zeren 
zhuiqiu de guiding], issued 21 April 2001.
    \68\ ``Workplace Safety Poses Major National Challenge,'' China 
Daily, 8 August 2002.
    \69\ State Department Human Rights Report, China, 37.
    \70\ See, e.g., Philip Pan, ``Worked Till They Drop Few Protections 
for China's New Laborers'' The Washington Post, 13 May 2002, Section 
A1.
    \71\ PRC Labor Law, art. 39.
    \72\ PRC Labor Law, arts. 77-83; PRC Regulations on Settlement of 
Labor Disputes [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo qiye laodong zhengyi chuli 
tiaoli], issued 11 June 1993.
    \73\ PRC Ministry of Labor and Social Security, ``2001 Annual 
Statistical Report on the Development of Labor and Social Security 
Work,'' 3.
    \74\ Gerard Greenfield and Tim Pringle, ``The Challenge of Wage 
Arrears in China,'' ILO Labor Education (2002).
    \75\ Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee, Report on the Labor 
Rights and Occupational Safety and Health Conditions of Toy Workers in 
Foreign Investment Enterprises in Southern Mainland China, 67.
    \76\ Verite, Country Labor and ILO Compliance Assessment Series: 
People's Republic of China, draft report to be published in October 
2002, 13 (on file with the Commission) [hereinafter Verite,  Country 
Labor and ILO Compliance Assessment Series].
    \77\ China Labor Bulletin, ``Release Xu Jian--Background 
Information and Addresses,''  (20 September 2002).
    \78\ See, e.g., Craig S. Smith, ``China Tells Lawyer Who Aids 
Injured Workers to Close His Office,'' The New York Times, 3 January 
2002.
    \79\ Philip P. Pan, ``Chinese Workers' Rights Stop at Courtroom 
Door,'' Washington Post, 28 June 2002, A1.
    \80\ International Labor Organization, ``Ratification Map of 
Convention No. 182,''  (20 August 2002).
    \81\ Verite, Country Labor and ILO Compliance Assessment Series, 7.
    \82\ ABC News, ``A Classroom Into a Grave,'' 8 March 2001,  
(15 September 2002).
    \83\ Calum and Lijia MacLeod, ``Never Seen, Never Heard,'' South 
China Morning Post, 12 July 2000, 2, 3.
    \84\ Task Force on the Prohibition of Importation of Products of 
Forced or Prison Labor from the People's Republic of China, 2002 Annual 
Report, August 2002 [hereinafter, ``Prison Labor Task Force, Annual 
Report''].
    \85\ See 1992 Memorandum of Understanding on Prohibiting Trade in 
Prison Labor Products with China dated 7 August 1992; the Statement of 
Cooperation on the Memorandum of Understanding on Prohibiting Trade in 
Prison Labor Products with China, dated 14 March 1994.
    \86\ Ibid.
    \87\ 2000 China Relations Act, sec. 501 et seq.
    \88\ Prison Labor Task Force, Annual Report.
    \89\ Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China 
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susongfa], adopted 1 July 1979, 
amended 17 March 1996 [hereinafter ``Criminal Procedure Law'']; 
Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo xingfa], adopted 1 July 1979, amended 14 March 1997 
[hereinafter ``Criminal Law''].
    \90\ See generally Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Opening to 
Reform? An Analysis of China's Revised Criminal Procedure Law, October 
1996 [hereinafter, ``LCHR, Opening to Reform?'']; Lawyers Committee for 
Human Rights, Wrongs and Rights: A Human Rights Analysis of China's 
Revised Criminal Law, December 1998 [hereinafter ``LCHR, Wrongs and 
Rights''].
    \91\ See LCHR, Opening to Reform?, 53-60.
    \92\ See LCHR, Wrongs and Rights, 1, 33-41. In theory, the 
abolition of analogy brings the Criminal Law into conformance with the 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law making it 
so), which is expressed in Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: ``No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on 
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal 
offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was 
committed.''
    \93\ See LCHR, Wrongs and Rights.
    \94\ Universal Declaration, art. 10; ICCPR, art. 14.
    \95\ Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Lawyers in China: 
Obstacles to Independence and the Defense of Rights, March 1998, 2 
[hereinafter ``LCHR, Lawyers in China''].
    \96\ Ibid., 2-3.
    \97\ Ibid.
    \98\ For a discussion of the Party's influence on the courts, see 
generally Stanley Lubman, ``Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After 
Twenty Years,'' Northwest Journal of International Law and Business 20 
(2000): 395-398; LCHR, Lawyers in China, 1-10.
    \99\ Criminal Procedure Law, art. 96; LCHR, Opening to Reform?, 39.
    \100\ See LCHR, Opening to Reform?, 42; Criminal Procedure Law, 
art. 93.
    \101\ Human Rights in China, Empty Promises: Human Rights 
Protections and China's Criminal Procedure Law in Practice, March 2001, 
25-26 [hereinafter ``HRIC, Empty Promises'']; Challenges for Criminal 
Justice in China: Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 26 July 2002 [hereinafter ``Challenges for 
Criminal Justice in China: Commission Roundtable''], Written Statement 
Submitted by Jerome A. Cohen, Professor, New York University School of 
Law.
    \102\ Criminal Procedure Law, art. 96.
    \103\ LCHR, Opening to Reform?, 41. In cases involving ``state 
secrets,'' a suspect must first obtain approval from authorities before 
he or she may even retain counsel. Criminal Procedure Law, art. 96.
    \104\ Challenges for Criminal Justice in China: Commission 
Roundtable, Cohen Written Statement.
    \105\ HRIC, Empty Promises, 31-34. The people's procuratorates are 
the legal supervisory organs of the state. Chinese Constitution, art. 
129. The functions of the people's procuratorates include approving 
arrests made by public security authorities and supervising their 
investigatory activities, as well as prosecuting cases. See Margaret Y. 
K. Woo, ``Law and Discretion in the Contemporary Chinese Courts,'' 
Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 8 (1999): 606-07.
    \106\ See HRIC, Empty Promises, 30-34.
    \107\ Challenges for Criminal Justice in China: Commission 
Roundtable, Cohen Written Statement.
    \108\ Criminal Procedure Law, art. 47; Challenges for Criminal 
Justice in China: Commission Roundtable, Cohen Written Statement.
    \109\ Ibid.
    \110\ Ibid. Mary Robinson, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, raised Zhang Jianzhong's case with the Ministry of 
Justice, noting that he has not been accorded many of the legal 
protections required by the Criminal Procedure Law. Elisabeth 
Rosenthal, ``U.N. Official, in Beijing, Tells of Worry Over Rights,'' 
New York Times, 21 August 2002,  (28 August 2002).
    \111\ HRIC, Empty Promises, 36-39. Chinese criminal defense lawyers 
and observers believe that Article 306 may also possibly be implicated 
in Zhang Jianzhong's case, but the facts of his case remain unclear. 
See Challenges for Criminal Justice in China: Commission Roundtable, 
Cohen Written Statement.
    \112\ Article 15 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which entered into force 
on June 26, 1987, provides that ``any statement which is established to 
have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence 
in any proceeding.'' LCHR, Opening to Reform?, 68-69.
    \113\ Challenges for Criminal Justice in China: Commission, Written 
Statement Submitted by Murray Scot Tanner, Professor of Chinese and 
East Asian Politics, Western Michigan University.
    \114\ Ibid.
    \115\ HRIC, Empty Promises, 41-42.
    \116\ Human Rights in China, Reeducation Through Labor (RTL): A 
Summary of Regulatory Issues and Concerns, February 2001, 1 
[hereinafter ``HRIC, Reeducation Through Labor (RTL)''].
    \117\ ``Re-education through labor'' (laojiao) should be 
distinguished from ``reform through labor'' (laogai). Whereas re-
education through labor is an administrative (`` non-criminal'') 
sanction, reform through labor is a form of criminal punishment given 
after a defendant is found guilty after a trial.
    \118\ HRIC, Reeducation Through Labor (RTL), 8; Challenges for 
Criminal Justice in China: Commission Roundtable, Written Statement 
Submitted by Dr. Veron Mei-ying Hung, Associate, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace.
    \119\ Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Criminal Justice with 
Chinese Characteristics: China's Criminal Process and Violations of 
Human Rights, May 1993, 73-74; Hungdah Chiu, ``China's Criminal Justice 
System and the Trial of Pro-Democracy Dissidents,'' New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics 24 (1992): 1200.
    \120\ HRIC, Empty Promises, 51-52.
    \121\ Challenges for Criminal Justice in China: Commission 
Roundtable, Hung Written Statement.
    \122\ Ibid.
    \123\ See Human Rights in China, Not Welcome at the Party: Behind 
the ``Clean-Up'' of China's Cities--A Report on Administrative 
Detention Under ``Custody and Repatriation,'' September 1999.
    \124\ Ibid., 1.
    \125\ Ibid., 17-18.
    \126\ LCHR, Opening to Reform?, 5.
    \127\ ``Human Rights Watch World Report 2002: Asia: China and 
Tibet,'' 7,  (22 July 2002).
    \128\ Amnesty International Press Release, ``China: `Strike Hard' 
Anti-crime Campaign Intensifies,'' 23 July 2002.
    \129\ HRIC, Reeducation Through Labor (RTL), 1; Human Rights in 
China, Impunity for Torturers Continues Despite Changes in the Law: 
Report on Implementation of The Convention Against Torture in the 
People's Republic of China, April 2000, 6.
    \130\ See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
art. 9(4) (``Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or 
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in 
order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his 
detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.''); 
LCHR, Opening to Reform?, 33; Challenges for Criminal Justice in China: 
Commission Roundtable, Cohen Written Statement.
    \131\ LCHR, Opening to Reform?, 60, 63.
    \132\ Chiu, ``China's Criminal Justice System and the Trial of Pro-
Democracy Dissidents,'' 1197.
    \133\ Chinese Constitution, art. 35.
    \134\ Restrictions on Media Freedom in China, Staff Roundtable of 
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 24 June 2002 
[hereinafter ``Restrictions on Media Freedom in China: Commission 
Roundtable''], Testimony of James Mann, Senior Writer in Residence, 
Center for Strategic and International Studies.
    \135\ Statement by Chinese President Jiang Zemin, 11 January 2001, 
quoted in a written statement by Reporters Sans Frontieres 
International, submitted to the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council, 18 January 2002,  (22 August 2002).
    \136\ Restrictions on Media Freedom in China: Commission 
Roundtable, Mann Testimony.
    \137\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Asia 2001, China,'' 
 (31 July 2002) 
[hereinafter ``CPJ, 'Asia 2001, China''' ].
    \138\ Ibid.
    \139\ Restrictions on Media Freedom in China: Commission 
Roundtable, Testimony of He Qinglian, former editor, Shenzhen Legal 
Daily, author of China's Pitfalls.
    \140\ Ted Anthony, ``China Axes BBC After Falun Gong Item,'' 
Associated Press, 6 July 2002,  (16 September 2002).
    \141\ Wired China: Whose Hand is on the Switch?: Staff Roundtable 
of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China,'' 15 April 2002 
[hereinafter ``Wired China: Commission Roundtable''], Written Statement 
submitted by Edward E. Kaufman, Member of the Broadcasting Board of 
Governors.
    \142\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Ten Enemies of the Press 
for 2001,'' 3 May 2001,  
(31 July 2002).
    \143\ CPJ, ``Asia 2001, China.''
    \144\ Restrictions on Media Freedom in China: Commission 
Roundtable, Testimony of Kavita Menon, Asia Program Director, Committee 
to Protect Journalists.
    \145\ China Internet Network Information Center, 10th Statistical 
Survey Report on the Development of Internet in China, July 2002, 5.
    \146\ Compare ``Government Issues New List of Banned Media Topics'' 
 with ``Measures on 
the Administration of Internet Information Services'' [Hulianwang xinxi 
fuwu guanli banfa], issued 25 September 2000, art. 15 and ``Interim 
Provisions on the Administration of Internet Publishing'' [Hulianwang 
chuban guanli zanxing guiding], effective 1 August 2002, art. 17.
    \147\ Interim Provisions on the Administration of Internet 
Publishing'' [Hulianwang chuban guanli zanxing guiding], effective 1 
August 2002, art. 17.
    \148\ Wired China: Commission Roundtable, Written Statement 
submitted by James C. Mulvenon, Deputy Director, Center for Asia-
Pacific Policy, RAND.
    \149\ .
    \150\ ``Public Pledge on Self-Discipline for China Internet 
Industry'' [Zhongguo hulianwang zilu gongyue], issued 26 March 2002, 
art. 9.
    \151\ People's Daily, ``Three Departments Jointly Issue Notice: 
Approvals for New Internet Cafes Will Cease Prior to the End of 
August,'' 13 August 2002 .
    \152\ Village Elections in China: Staff Roundtable of the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 8 July 2002 [hereinafter 
``Village Elections in China: Commission Roundtable''], Testimony of 
Liu Yawei, Associate Director, The Carter Center's China Village 
Elections Project.
    \153\ Village Elections in China: Commission Roundtable, Liu 
Testimony.
    \154\ Village Elections in China: Commission Roundtable, Testimony 
of Anne Thurston, Associate Professor, The Johns Hopkins University's 
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.
    \155\ Ibid.
    \156\ The township government is one level above the village and is 
charged with administering several by villages.
    \157\ Rebecca MacKinnon, ``China's Experiments with Rural 
Democracy,'' CNN.com, 28 May 1999,  (31 July 2002).
    \158\ Village Elections in China: Commission Roundtable, Liu 
Testimony.
    \159\ Ibid.
    \160\ Village Elections in China: Commission Roundtable, Testimony 
of Elizabeth Dugan, Regional Program Director, Asia and the Middle 
East, International Republican Institute (IRI).
    \161\ Steven D. Marshall and Susette Ternent Cooke, Tibet Outside 
the TAR: Control, Exploitation and Assimilation: Development with 
Chinese Characteristics (Washington D.C.: Self-published CD-ROM, 1997), 
2564-66. Table 7 provides land area figures cited to seven Chinese 
sources including provincial statistical yearbooks. The thirteen areas 
designated as Tibetan and autonomous total 2.24 million square 
kilometers (865,000 square miles). Complete 2000 census data for ethnic 
populations in China is not yet available. The official 1990 census 
reported a total population of 1.13 billion, including 4.59 million 
Tibetans (0.4 percent of the total), of whom 2.09 million resided in 
the TAR. China's area is approximately 9.6 million square kilometers 
(3.7 million square miles).
    \162\ Tibetan Government-in-Exile, ``Facts--Occupied Tibet,'' 
 (7 August 2002). The area of 
``occupied Tibet'' is reported as 2.5 million square kilometers 
(965,000 square miles). Political status is given as ``occupied 
country.'' The Tibetan population is reported as six million, 2.09 
million of which is in the TAR.
    \163\ Tibetan Government-in-Exile, ``Background,''  (7 August 2002).
    \164\ Information Office of the State Council of the People's 
Republic of China, ``New Progress in Human Rights in the Tibet 
Autonomous Region,'' February 1998,  (20 August 2002).
    \165\ Population Census Office, National Bureau of Statistics of 
the People's Republic of China, Major Figures on 2000 Population Census 
of China, 1 June 2001, 30. Han population for the 2000 census is given 
as 1.159 billion of a total population of 1.266 billion for mainland 
China.
    \166\ Law of the People's Republic of China on Regional National 
Autonomy [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyufa], adopted 31 May 1984, 
amended 28 February 2001, art. 2 [hereinafter ``Regional National 
Autonomy Law'']. ``Regional autonomy shall be practiced in areas where 
minority nationalities live in concentrated communities. National 
autonomous areas shall be classified into autonomous regions, 
autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties. All national autonomous 
areas are integral parts of the People's Republic of China.''
    \167\ Regional National Autonomy Law, art. 7.
    \168\ Chinese Constitution, art. 52. ``It is the duty of citizens 
of the People's Republic of China to safeguard the unity of the country 
and the unity of all its nationalities.''
    \169\ Department of Information and International Relations, 
Tibetan Government-in-Exile, Dharamsala, India, ``It is Samdhong 
Rinpoche,'' 20 August 2001,  (20 August 2002) (Samdhong Rinpoche received about 29,000 
votes, 85 percent of those cast). According to ``Tibet in Exile at a 
Glance,''  (20 August 2002), the 
exiled government reports that 131,000 Tibetans are in exile and that 
125,000 of them are in India or Nepal.
    \170\ Barbara Crossette, ``Tibetan Monk Prepares Exiles for a 
Political Shift,'' The New York Times, 21 July 2002, Section A4.
    \171\ Erik Eckholm and Elisabeth Rosenthal, ``The Bright Young 
Stars of China's Future,'' The New York Times, 28 September 1999, 
Section A1.
    \172\ Commission Staff Meeting with Zhu Xiaoming, Deputy Secretary-
General, United Front Work Department, 9 May 2002.
    \173\ Commission Staff Meeting with Shoulang Rezhen (Tibetan: Sonam 
Rigzin), Vice-Director, United Front Work Department, TAR Communist 
Party Committee, 13 May 2002.
    \174\ Ethnic Minorities in China: Tibetans and Uighurs: Staff 
Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 June 
2002 [hereinafter ``Ethnic Minorities in China: Commission 
Roundtable''], Written Statement Submitted by Professor Elliot 
Sperling, Associate Professor of Tibetan Studies and Chair, Department 
of Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana University.
    \175\ Steven D. Marshall, In the Interests of the State: Hostile 
Elements III--Political Imprisonment in Tibet, 1987-2001 (London: Tibet 
Information Network, 2002), 3.
    \176\ Ngawang Choephel, an ethnomusicologist who had studied in 
Vermont, was released and allowed to return to the United States in 
January 2002. Nuns Gyaltsen Drolkar, Tenzin Thubten, Ngawang Choekyi 
and Ngawang Choezom were released during March-June 2002 and remain in 
Tibet. The elderly Tagna Jigme Zangpo was released in March and allowed 
to travel to the United States in July 2002.
    \177\ China Today, ``Tibet: Nearer and Nearer--an interview with 
Raidi, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the People's Congress of 
[the] Tibet Autonomous Region,'' May 2001,  (20 August 2002). 
According to Raidi [Tibetan: Ragdi], ``Over the past six years [1994-
2000] Tibet's [GDP] has increased at a rate of more than 10 percent 
annually, averaging 12.9 percent, ranking [it] at the national 
forefront.''
    \178\ ``Tibet Chairman Legqog on Ways Tibet Will Use Assistance 
from Other Parts of Nation,'' Ta Kung Pao, 10 August 2001, translated 
in FBIS, Doc. ID CPP20010810000064. Legqog [Tibetan: Legchog], Chairman 
of the TAR Government states that ``the central treasury's assistance 
and subsidies for Tibet during the Tenth Five-Year Plan period will 
reach 37.9 billion yuan,'' or doubling the amount provided under the 
Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996 to 2000). This is to say that each of the 
region's 2.62 million people will receive 26,700 yuan of assistance on 
the average.''
    \179\ Chinese Constitution, art. 9. ``Mineral resources, waters, 
forests, mountains, grassland, unreclaimed land, beaches and other 
natural resources are owned by the state, that is, by the whole people, 
with the exception of the forests, mountains, grassland, unreclaimed 
land and beaches that are owned by collectives in accordance with the 
law. . . . The appropriation or damage of natural resources by any 
organization or individual by whatever means is prohibited.''
    \180\ See generally, Ethnic Minorities in China: Commission 
Roundtable.
    \181\ China County and City Population Statistics 1992 (Beijing: 
China Statistical Publishing House, 1993). Statistics from the 1990 
census show 3.43 million Tibetans living in Tibetan autonomous areas 
classified as rural and 854,000 living in Tibetan autonomous areas 
classified as urban.
    \182\ Ethnic Minorities in China: Commission Roundtable, Written 
Statement Submitted by Arthur Holcombe, President, Tibet Poverty 
Alleviation Fund. Holcombe states that authorities ``estimated average 
per capita family income in urban areas of Tibet to be the equivalent 
of $606 in 1996, in comparison to only $117 in rural areas, and growing 
at about 5 times the rate in rural areas.''
    \183\ Ibid., Testimony of Bhuchung Tsering, Director, International 
Campaign for Tibet.
    \184\ Li Dezhu, ``Large-Scale Development of Western China and 
China's Nationality Problem,'' Beijing Qiushi, 1 June 2000, translated 
in FBIS, Doc. ID CPP20000615000057.
    \185\ Ethnic Minorities in China: Commission Roundtable, Holcombe 
Written Statement.
    \186\ Catriona Bass, Education in Tibet: Policy and Practice Since 
1950  (London: Tibet Information Network and Zed Books, 1998), 90-92, 
123.
    \187\ James Millward and Peter Perdue, ``Political History and 
Strategies of Control, 1884-1978,'' Address at the Conference of the 
JHU-SAIS Central Asia Caucasus Institute on Xinjiang: Muslim and Turkic 
Unrest in China's ``New Territory,'' 27 March 2002.
    \188\ Dewardric McNeal, Congressional Research Service, China's 
Relations with Central Asian States and Problems with Terrorism, Report 
for Congress, 17 December 2001, 1.
    \189\ James Millward and Peter Perdue, ``Political History and 
Strategies of Control, 1884-1978,'' Address at the Conference of the 
JHU-SAIS Central Asia Caucasus Institute on Xinjiang: Muslim and Turkic 
Unrest in China's ``New Territory,'' 27 March 2002.
    \190\ Ethnic Minorities in China: Commission Roundtable, Testimony 
of Justin Rudelson, Executive Director, Institute for Global Chinese 
Affairs, University of Maryland.
    \191\ Ibid.
    \192\ Press Briefing of Richard Boucher, Spokesman, U.S. Department 
of State, 26 August 2002.
    \193\ ``Fresh Claims of bin Laden link to Uyghur Separatists 
Emerge,'' South China Morning Post, 25 July 2002,  (26 July 2002).
    \194\ See, e.g., Dewardric McNeal, Congressional Research Service, 
China's Relations with Central Asian States and Problems with 
Terrorism, Report for Congress, 17 December 2001, 7-12; Chien-peng 
Chung, ``China's `War on Terror': September 11 and Uighur Separatism,'' 
Foreign Affairs (July/August 2002): 8-12; Dexter Roberts, ``Beijing 
Stokes the Fires of Ethnic Tensions,'' Business Week, 29 May 2002, 
 (31 May 2002); Human Rights Watch, China Human 
Rights Update, 10.
    \195\ Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, ``Top Cadre Issues Xinjiang Warning,'' 
South China Morning Post, 17 October 2001,  (1 August 2002).
    \196\ President George W. Bush, ``U.S., China Stand Against 
Terrorism,'' Remarks at the Press Conference of President Bush and 
President Jiang Zemin, 19 October 2002,  (3 September 2002).
    \197\ See, e.g., State Department Human Rights Report, China, 32; 
Matthew Forney, ``One Nation--Divided,'' TIME Asia, 25 March 2002, 
 (20 March 
2002).
    \198\ John Congreve, ``Enter the Dragon,'' Financial Times, 27 July 
2002,  (30 July 
2002).
    \199\ See, e.g., State Department Human Rights Report, China, 32; 
Congreve, ``Enter the Dragon.''
    \200\ Agence France-Presse, ``ExxonMobil to Take Stake in 4,000 km 
Chinese Gas Pipeline Project,'' 1 July 2002,  (3 July 2002). $5.6 
billion is the investment for just the gas pipeline's construction. 
Another estimated $3.1 billion will be spent on gas extraction, and up 
to $9.6 billion will be spent on construction of the distribution 
network.
    \201\ Ethnic Minorities in China: Commission Roundtable, 10 June 
2002, Testimony of Dolkun Kamberi, Director of the Uighur Service, 
Radio Free Asia.
    \202\ See, e.g., John Schauble, ``China's $A40b Gas Line is on the 
Way,'' The Age, 6 June 2002,  (6 June 2002); Agence France-Presse, 
``ExxonMobil to Take Stake in 4,000 km Chinese Gas Pipeline Project,'' 
1 July 2002,  (3 
July 2002).
    \203\ See, e.g., ``China Orders End to Instruction in Uyghur at Top 
Xinjiang University,'' Agence France-Presse, 28 May 2002, in FBIS, Doc. 
ID CPP20020528000103; Radio Free Asia News Release, ``Chinese 
Authorities Burn Thousands of Uyghur Books,'' 5 June 2002; Ethnic 
Minorities in China: Commission Roundtable, Kamberi Testimony.
    \204\ See, e.g., ``China Orders End to Instruction in Uyghur at Top 
Xinjiang University,'' Agence France-Presse, 28 May 2002, in FBIS, Doc. 
ID CPP20020528000103; ``Xinjiang University Drops Instruction in Uyghur 
Language,'' RFA Reports, June 2002, 3; Open Forum Staff Roundtable of 
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 5 August 2002, Written 
Statement Submitted by Sokrat Saydahmat, Member, Board of Directors, 
Uyghur American Association.
    \205\ Commission Staff Meeting with Dr. Tashpolat Tiyip, Vice 
President of Xinjiang University, 16 May 2002 [hereinafter ``Staff 
Meeting with Dr. Tashpolat Tiyip''].
    \206\ See, e.g., State Department Human Rights Report, China, 7; 
Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Concerns in Xinjiang; Amnesty 
International, ``China's Anti-Terrorism Legislation and Repression in 
the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region,'' March 2002, 10-12,  (1 April 2002).
    \207\ Human Rights Watch, China Human Rights Update, 11.
    \208\ State Department Human Rights Report, China, 31.
    \209\ Amnesty International, ``China's Anti-Terrorism Legislation 
and Repression in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.''
    \210\ Staff Meeting with Xinjiang People's Congress and Justice 
Department.
    \211\ Ibid.
    \212\ Ibid.
    \213\ See, e.g., State Department Human Rights Report, China, 31; 
Amnesty International, ``China: Uighur Businesswoman Rebiya Kadeer 
Sentenced to Eight Years After Secret Trial,'' 10 March 2000,  (20 March 2002).
    \214\ State Department Human Rights Report, China, 31.
    \215\ See, e.g., Regulations on Managing Places for Religious 
Activities [Zongjiao huodong changsuo guanli tiaoli], issued 31 January 
1994; Measures for the Registration of Places for Religious Activities 
[Zongjiao huodong changsuo dengji banfa], issued 13 April 1994; State 
Department Human Rights Report, China, 21.
    \216\ Human Rights Watch, China Human Rights Update,  11.
    \217\ See, e.g., Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, ``Mosque Leaders' Re-
education Campaign Stepped Up,'' South China Morning Post, 14 November 
2001,  (1 August 2002); 
Human Rights Watch, China Human Rights Update, 11.
    \218\ See, e.g.,``Committee to Spread True Koran,'' China Daily, 24 
April 2002; Human Rights Watch, China Human Rights Update, 11.
    \219\ ``Committee to Spread True Koran.''
    \220\ Staff Meeting with Xinjiang People's Congress and Justice 
Department.
    \221\ Staff Meeting with Dr. Tashpolat Tiyip.
    \222\ WTO: Will China Keep its Promises? Can it?: Hearing Before 
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 6 June 2002 
[hereinafter ``WTO: Will China Keep its Promises?: Commission 
Hearing''], Testimony of Grant Aldonas, Undersecretary of Commerce for 
International Trade.
    \223\ See, e.g., WTO: Will China Keep its Promises?: Commission 
Hearing, Testimony of Susan Westin, Managing Director of International 
Affairs and Trade, U.S. General Accounting Office.
    \224\ ``Long Yongtu on `Three Changes' from China's WTO Entry,'' 
People's Daily, 28 March 2002,  (2 August 2002).
    \225\ See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 30 
October 1947, as amended through 1966, art. X(1); General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS), 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Agreement, Annex 1B, art. III.
    \226\ See, e.g., GATT, art. X(3)(a), GATS, art. VI(1).
    \227\ GATT, art. X(2).
    \228\ GATT, art. X(3)(b).
    \229\ WTO: Will China Keep its Promises?: Commission Hearing, 
Testimony of Donald C. Clarke, Professor of Law, University of 
Washington Law School.
    \230\ ``Laws Revised to Meet WTO,'' China Daily, 25 May 2002, 
 (26 May 2002).
    \231\ Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China 
to the World Trade Organization, art. 2(c)(1).
    \232\ Legislation Law of the People's Republic of China [Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo lifafa], adopted 15 March 2000, arts. 34, 35.
    \233\ Procedural Rules for Formulating Administrative Regulations 
[Xingzheng fagui zhiding chengxu tiaoli], issued 11 November 2000, 
arts. 12, 19, 20, 22.
    \234\ See, e.g., The China Securities Regulatory Commission Seeks 
Public Opinions on Revising the ``Notice on Further Increasing the 
Standardization of New Stock Issuances by Listed Companies'' (draft for 
comment) [Zhongguo zhengquanhui gongkai zhengqiu ``Guanyu jinyibu 
guifan shangshi gongsi zengfa xingu de tongzhi'' (zhengqiu yijian gao) 
de xiugai yijian], issued 21 June 2002; China Securities Regulatory 
Commission Notice Soliciting Public Opinion Regarding ``Interim 
Provisions on Foreign Organizations Buying Stock and Participating in 
the Establishment of Fund Management Companies,''(draft for comment) 
[Jingwai jigou cantou canyu faqi sheli jijin guanli gongsi zanxing 
guiding (zhengqiu yijian gao)], issued 20 December 2001.
    \235\ See, e.g., Notice on Seeking Opinions Regarding ``Sanitation 
Standards on the Quality of Drinking Water in Drinking Water 
Pipelines'' (draft for comment) [Guanyu zhengqiu dui ``Shenghuo 
yinyongshui guanli fenzhi zhi yinshui weisheng guifan'' (zhengqiu 
yijian gao)], issued 27 June 2002; State Drug Administration Notice on 
Seeking Opinions to Revise ``Methods for Managing Anesthetic Drugs'' 
(revised draft for comment) and ``Methods for Managing 
Psychotherapeutic Drugs'' (revised draft for comment) [Guanyu zhengqiu 
dui ``Mazui yaopin guanli banfa'' (xiuding zhengqiu yijian gao) 
``jingshen yaopin guanli banfa'' (xiuding zhengqiu yijian gao) xiugai 
yijian de tongzhi], issued 24 April 2002.
    \236\ Beijing People's Government Measures for Formulating Rules 
[Beijing shi renmin zhengfu guizhang zhiding banfa], issued 21 May 
2002.
    \237\ See, e.g., Chongqing City Regulations on Unemployment 
Insurance (draft for comment) [Chongqing shi shiye baoxian tiaoli 
(zhengqiu yijian gao)], issued 28 January 2002; ``Shenyang Adapts to 
WTO Regulations by Establishing 'Work Office for Administrative 
Approvals''' [Shenyang zaoying WTO guize ``Xingzheng shenpi ban shi da 
ting''], 6 July 2002,  (15 
July 2002); ``Zhejiang Adapts to Entering WTO by Abolishing 76 `Red 
Head [Internal] Documents' '' [Zao ying ru xingshi Zhejiang feizhi 76 
ge hongtou wenjian], 19 April 2002,  (15 July 2002); ``MOFTEC Vice Minister Long Yongtu to 
Serve as Advisor on WTO Related Affairs,'' Beijing Zhongguo Xinwen She, 
9 April 2002, translated in FBIS, Doc. ID CPP20020409000221 (announcing 
the establishment of the Guangdong Provincial Consulting Council on 
Affairs Related to the WTO).
    \238\ This inconsistency is illustrated by the varying policies 
that ministries have with respect to transparency, as discussed above.
    \239\ Randall Peerenboom, ``Globalization, Path Dependency and the 
Limits of Law: Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the 
People's Republic of China,'' Berkeley Journal of International Law 19 
(2001): 232.
    \240\ Administrative Litigation Law, art. 2.
    \241\ Peerenboom, 235.
    \242\ See, e.g., ibid.
    \243\ WTO: Will China Keep its Promises?: Commission Hearing, 
Westin Testimony; see also ``Beijing Sets Up New Court System to Handle 
Foreign Cases, WTO Matters,'' China Daily, 5 February 2002, in FBIS, 
Doc. ID CPP20020205000018.
    \244\ See WTO: Will China Keep its Promises?: Commission Hearing, 
Clarke Written Statement; Human Rights in the Context of the Rule of 
Law: Commission Hearing, Written Statement Submitted by Stanley Lubman, 
Visiting Scholar, Center for Law and Society and Lecturer in Law, 
School of Law, University of California (Berkeley), 7 February 2002.
    \245\ ``PRC Supreme Court Circular Calls for Raising Judges' 
Professional Competence,'' Xinhua, 5 August 2002, translated in FBIS, 
Doc. Id. CPP20020728000031.
    \246\ 2000 China Relations Act, secs. 413(b)(2), 421.
    \247\ 2000 China Relations Act, sec. 511(a).
    \248\ WTO: Will China Keep its Promises?: Commission Hearing, 
Responses of Aldonas to Questions from Senator Max Baucus. The German 
Technical and Cooperation Corporation's training of MOFTEC lawyers and 
the Canadian International Development Agency's Canada-China World 
Trade Organization Capacity Building Project are examples of other 
large-scale programs that incorporate WTO compliance training into 
larger rule of law efforts. For a list of rule of law programs, 
including programs related to WTO technical assistance, see the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China website, www.cecc.gov.
    \249\ WTO: Will China Keep its Promises?: Commission Hearing, 
Aldonas Testimony.
    \250\ WTO: Will China Keep its Promises?: Commission Hearing, 
Testimony of Jon M. Huntsman, Jr., Deputy U.S. Trade Representative.
    \251\ Ibid.; Clarke Testimony; Written Statement Submitted by Chris 
Murck, Chairman, American Chamber of Commerce of China.
    \252\ WTO: Will China Keep its Promises?: Commission Hearing, 
Westin Testimony.
    \253\ Promoting the Rule of Law in China: Staff-Led Roundtable of 
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 24 May 2002, Testimony 
of Nancy Yuan, Director, Asia Foundation.
    \254\ Human Rights Watch, ``Olympics and Human Rights: Beijing in 
2008,'' 8 February 2002,  (5 August 2002).
    \255\ Matthew Forney, ``Beijing Bags It,'' TIME Asia, 23 July 2001, 
 (22 
August 2002).
    \256\ Jim Kernaghan, ``All Eyes on Beijing,'' London Free Press, 14 
July 2001,  20 
August 2002.
    \257\ Elisabeth Rosenthal, ``U.N. Publicly Chastises China for 
Inaction on H.I.V. Epidemic,'' New York Times, 27 June 2002,  (27 June 
2002).
    \258\ ``Not For General Release,'' Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 
August 2002, 31.
    \259\ United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, ``HIV/AIDS & Human Rights: What is a Human Rights Approach to 
HIV/AIDS?''  (28 June 
2002).
    \260\ China Development Brief, 250 Chinese NGOs: Civil Society in 
the Making, August 2001.
    \261\ Regulations for Managing the Registration of Social 
Organizations [Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli], adopted 25 
September 1998.

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